Legaspi vs.

CSC Facts: The respondent CSC had denied petitioner Valentin Legaspisrequest for information on the civil service eligibilities of JulianSibonghanoy and Mariano Agas who were employed as sanitarians inthe Health Department of Cebu City. Sibonghanoy and Agas had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians. Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent CSC to disclose said information. The respondent CSC takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring the suit. It is asserted that the petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspis actual interest in the civil service eligibilities of Sibonghanoy and Agas. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit

of a writ of preliminary injunction and TRO. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA. Furthermore, petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the public domains as blatant violation of Sec 3, Art XII of the Constitution prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. Petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the State that are of public dominion. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to bring the suit. Ratio Decidendi: The petitioner has standing to bring the taxpayers suit because the petition seeks to compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties. These duties are particularly in answer of the right of citizens to information on matters of public concern, and of a constitutional provision intended to insure the equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. Furthermore, the court considered that the petition raised matters of transcendental importance tot eh public. The mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right. Also, ordinary taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or orders of government agencies or instrumentalities if the issues raise are of paramount public interest and if they immediately affect the social, economic and moral well being of the people. The amended JVA does not make the issue moot and academic since this compels the court to insure the government itself does not violate a provision of the Constitution intended to safeguard the national patrimony. The content of the amended JVA seeks to transfer title and ownership of reclaimed lands to a single corporation. The court does not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues rose to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the public. The instant case raises constitutional issues of transcendental importance to the public. Court can resolve this case without determining any factual issue related to the case. The instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under the original jurisdiction of the Court. Furthermore, PEA was under a positive legal duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is purely legal or constitutional question. The right to information includes official information on on-going negotiations before a final agreement as required by the constitution. The Supreme Court granted the petition. PEA and Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation are permanently enjoined from implementing the amended JVA which is hereby declared null and void ab initio. Bel Air Village Association, Inc. vs Virgilio Dionisio G.R. L-383454 June 30, 1989 Facts: The Transfer Certificate of Title covering the subject parcel of land issued in the name of Virgilio Dionisio, the petitioner contains an annotation to the effect that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of Bel-Air Village Association, the respondent, and must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the Association in the interest of the sanitation, security and the general welfare of the community. The petitioner questioned the collection of the dues on the following grounds: the questioned assessment is a property tax outside the corporate power of the association; the association has no power to compel the petitioner to pay the assessment for lack of privity of contract; the questioned

Held: The petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held in the case of Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, that when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the person at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. It becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves theassertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general public which possesses the right. The petitioner, being a citizen who as such, is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right. Chavez v Public Estate Authority GR No. 133250, July 9, 2002 Facts: On November 20, 1973, the government through the Commissioner of Public Highways signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent of the total reclaimed land. On April 25, 1995 the PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI to develop the Freedom Islands. This JVA was entered into through negotiation without public bidding. The Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint investigation. Among the conclusion are: that the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands, the certificates of the title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and the JVA itself is illegal. On December 5, 1997, President Ramos created a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA. The Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions of the Senate Committees. On April 27, 1998, Petitioner as taxpayer filed the instant petition for mandamus with prayer for the issuance

assessment should not be enforced for being unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive, confiscatory and discriminatory; the respondent association is exercising governmental powers which should not be sanctioned. Issue: Whether or not the association can lawfully collect dues Ruling: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It held that the purchasers of a registered land are bound by the annotations found at the back of the certificate of title covering the subject parcel of land. The petitioners contention that he has no privity with the respondent association is not persuasive. When the petitioner voluntarily bought the subject parcel of land it was understood that he took the same free of all ecumbrances except annotations at the back of the certificate of title, among them, that he automatically becomes a member of the respondent association. One of the obligations of a member is to pay certain amounts for the operation and activities of the association. The mode of payment as well as the purposes for which the dues are intended clearly indicates that the dues are not in the concept of a property tax as claimed by the petitioner. They are shares in the common expenses for necessary services. A property tax is assessed according to the value of the property but the basis of the sharing in this case is the area of the lot. The dues are fees which a member of the respondent association is required in hiring security guards, cleaning and maintaining streets, street lights and other community projects for the benefit of all residents within the Bel-Air Village. These expenses are necessary, valid and reasonable for the particular community involved. The limitations upon the ownership of the petitioner do not contravene provisions of laws, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. The constitutional proscription than no person can be compelled to be a member of an association against his will applies only to governmental acts and not to private transactions like the one in question. The petitioner cannot legally maintain that he is compelled to be a member of the association against his will because the limitation is imposed upon his ownership of property. If he does not desire to comply with the annotation or lien in question, he can at any time exercise his inviolable freedom of disposing of the property and free himself from the burden of becoming a member of the association. Philips Industrial Development, Inc. vs NLRC Facts:- PIDI is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of electronic products. Since 1971, it had a total of 6 collective bargaining agreements with private respondent Philips Employees Organization-FFW (PEO-FFW), a registered labor union and the certified bargaining agent of all rank and file employees of PIDI.- In the first CBA, the supervisors (referred to in RA 875), confidential employees, security guards, temporary employees and sales representatives were excluded in the bargaining unit. In the second to the fifth, the sales force, confidential employees and heads of small units, together with the managerial employees, temporary employees and security personnel were excluded from the bargaining unit. The confidential employees are the division secretaries of light/telecom/data and consumer electronics, marketing managers, secretaries of the corporate planning and business manager, fiscal and financial system manager and audit and EDP manager, and the staff of both the General Management and the Personnel Department.- In the sixth CBA, it was agreed that the subject of inclusion or exclusion of service engineers, sales personnel and confidential employees in the coverage of the bargaining unit would be submitted for arbitration. The

parties failed to agree on a voluntary arbitrator and the Bureau of Labor Relations endorsed the petition to the Executive Labor Arbiter of the NCR for compulsory arbitration.- March 1998, Labor Arbiter: A referendum will be conducted to determine the will of the service engineers and sales representatives as to their inclusion or exclusion in the bargaining unit. It was also declared that the Division Secretaries and all staff of general management, personnel and industrial relations department, secretaries of audit, EDP, financial system are confidential employees are deemed excluded in the bargaining unit.- PEO-FFW appealed to the NLRC; NLRC declared PIDI's Service Engineers, Sales Force, division secretaries, all Staff of General Management, Personnel and Industrial Relations Department, Secretaries of Audit, EDP and Financial Systems are included within the rank and file bargaining unit, citing the Implementing Rules of E.O 111 and Article 245 of the Labor Code (all workers, except managerial employees and security personnel, are qualified to join or be a part of the bargaining unit)Issue:-Whether service engineers, sales representatives and confidential employees of petitioner are qualified to be part of the existing bargaining unit- Whether the "Globe Doctrine" should be applied Held: NLRC decision is set aside while the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter is reinstated. Confidential employees are excluded from the bargaining unit while a referendum will be conducted to determine the will of the service engineers and sales representatives as to their inclusion or exclusion from the bargaining unit, but those who are holding supervisory positions or functions are ineligible to join a labor organization of the rank and file employees but may join, assist or form a separate labor organization of their own.Ratio:The exclusion of confidential employees:The rationale behind the ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist or join a labor union equally applies to confidential employees. With the presence of managerial employees in a union,the union can become company-dominated as their loyalty cannot be assured. In Golden Farms vs Calleja,the Court states that confidential employees, who have access to confidential information, may becomethe source of undue advantage. UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION (UPSU), vs.HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA FACTS: Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It appears that on March 20, 1995 the union filed a petition for certification election on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by th e Secretary of Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for union membership under the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, which provides: Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor organization; right of supervisory employees. Managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate labor organizations of their own. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, pressing for resolution its contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code, so far as it declares managerial employees to be ineligible to form assist or join unions, contravene Art. III, 8 of the Constitution which provides: The right of the people, including those emplo yed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

ISSUES: 1) whether or not the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc. are managerial employeesand2) whether or not Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial employees from forming, joining or assisting labor unions, violates Art.III, 8 of the Constitution. RULING: 1) YES. The route managers cannot thus possibly be classified as mere supervisors because their work does not only involve, but goes far beyond, the simple direction or supervision of operating employees to accomplish objectives set by those above them. They are not mere functionaries with simple oversight functions but business administrators in their own right. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the employer, effectively recommend Such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment." Thus, their only power is to recommend. Certainly, the route managers in this case more than merely recommend effective management action. They perform operational, human resource, financial and marketing functions for the company, all of which involve the laying down of operating policies for themselves and their teams The term "manager" generally refers to "anyone who is responsible for subordinates and other organizational resources." Managers constitute three levels of a pyramid: FIRST-LINE MANAGERS : The lowest level in an organization at which individuals are responsible for the work of others is called first-line or first-level management . First-line managers direct operating employees only; they do not supervise other managers MIDDLE MANAGERS: Middle managers direct the activities of other managers and sometimes also those of operating employees. Middle managers' principal responsibilities are to direct the activities that implement their organizations' policies and to balance the demands of their superiors with the capacities of their subordinates TOP MANAGERS: Composed of a comparatively small group of executives, top management is responsible for the overall management of the organization. It establishes operating policies and guides the organization's interactions with its environment In the Case, entitled Worker's Alliance Trade Union (WATU) v . Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc .d e c i d e d o n N o v e m b e r 1 3 , 1 9 9 1 , t h e S e c r e t a r y o f L a b o r f o u n d : w e f i n d t h a t o n l y t h o s e e m p l o y e e s occupying the position of route manager and accounting manager are managerial employees.2)NO. The real intent of Art. III, 8 is evident in Lerums proposal. The Commission intended the absolute right to organize of government workers, supervisory employees, and security guards to be constitutionally guaranteed. By implication, no similar absolute constitutional right to organize for labor purposes should be deemed to have been granted to top-level and middle managers. Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, 8 infringed by a ban against managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, 8 is subject to the condition that its exercise should be for purposes "not

contrary to law." In the case of Art.245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor organizations In Bulletin Publishing Co., Inc. v. Hon. Augusto Sanchez, this Court elaborated on this rationale, thus: T h e r a t i o n a l e f o r t h i s i n h i b i t i o n h a s b e e n s t a t e d t o b e , b e c a u s e i f t h e s e managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership. SAMUEL OCCENA VS. COMELECG.R. NO. L-34150 APRIL 2, 1981 FACTS: Petitioner Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gozales instituted a prohibiting proceedings against the validity of three batasang pambansa resolutions (Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment allowing a natural-born citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a foreign country to own a limited area of land for residential purposes was approved by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2 dealing with the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, and the National Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1 abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the Article on the Commission on Elections by a vote of 148 to 2 with 1 abstention.) The petitioner contends that such resolution is against the constitutions in proposing amendments: ISSUE: Whether the resolutions are unconstitutional? HELD: In dismissing the petition for lack of merit, the court ruled the following: 1. The power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa to propose its amendments and how it may be exercised was validly obtained. The 1973 Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments similar with the interim and regular national assembly. 15 When, therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue of such impotence. 2. Petitioners assailed that the resolutions where so extensive in character as to amount to a revision rather than amendments. To dispose this contention, the court held that whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely new Constitution based on an ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no moment, because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with a new one ... is no argument against the validity of the law because 'amendment' includes the 'revision' or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people." 3. That leaves only the questions of the vote necessary to propose amendments as well as the standard for proper submission. The language of the Constitution supplies the answer to the above

questions. The Interim Batasang Pambansa, sitting as a constituent body, can propose amendments. In that capacity, only a majority vote is needed. It would be an indefensible proposition to assert that the three-fourth votes required when it sits as a legislative body applies as well when it has been convened as the agency through which amendments could be proposed. That is not a requirement as far as a constitutional convention is concerned. Further, the period required by the constitution was complied as follows: "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such amendment or revision." 21 The three resolutions were approved by the Interim Batasang Pambansa sitting as a constituent assembly on February 5 and 27, 1981. In the Batasang Pambansa Blg. 22, the date of the plebiscite is set for April 7, 1981. It is thus within the 90-day period provided by the Constitution. Tanduay vs. NLRC FACTS: Private respondents were all employees of Tanduay Distillery, Inc., (TDI) and members of the Tanduay Distillery Labor Union (TDLU), a duly organized and registered labor organization and the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the petitioner company. A Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), was executed between TDI and TDLU. The CBA was duly ratified by a majority of the workers in TDI including herein private respondents and contained a union security clause which provides that all workers who are or may during the effectivity of the CBA, become members of the Union in accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws shall, as a condition of their continued employment, maintain membership in good standing in the Union for the duration of the agreement. While the CBA was in effect and within the contract bar period the private respondents joined another union, the Kaisahan Ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMPIL) and organized its local chapter in TDI. KAMPIL filed a petition for certification election to determine union representation in TDI, which development compelled TDI to file a grievance with TDLU. TDLU created a committee to investigate its erring members in accordance with its by-laws which are not disputed by the private respondents. Thereafter, TDLU, through the Investigating Committee and approved by TDLU's Board of Directors, expelled the private respondents from TDLU for disloyalty to the Union. By letter, TDLU notified TDI that private respondents had been expelled from TDLU and demanded that TDI terminate the employment of private, respondents because they had lost their membership with TDLU. The private respondents were later on terminated. In their petition, private respondents contend that their act of organizing a local chapter of KAMPIL and eventual filing of a petition for certification election was pursuant to their constitutional right to self-organization. ISSUES: a) whether or not TDI was justified in terminating private respondents' employment in the company on the basis of TDLU's demand for the enforcement of the Union Security Clause of the CBA between TDI and TDLU; and

b) whether or not TDI is guilty of unfair labor practice in complying with TDLU's demand for the dismissal of private respondents. HELD: The dismissal of an employee pursuant to a demand of the majority union in accordance with a union security agreement following the loss of seniority rights is valid and privileged and does not constitute an unfair labor practice. Article 249 (e) of the Labor Code as amended specifically recognizes the closed shop arrangement as a form of union security. The closed shop, the union shop, the maintenance of membership shop, the preferential shop, the maintenance of treasury shop, and check-off provisions are valid forms of union security and strength. They do not constitute unfair labor practice nor are they violations of the freedom of association clause of the Constitution. There is no showing in these petitions of any arbitrariness or a violation of the safeguards enunciated in the decisions of this Court interpreting union security arrangements brought to us for review.