After rejecting the claim made by the opponent that the definitions of sadasadanadhi araNatva are faulty, MadhusUdana

next shows that the charge made regarding arthAntara is also not valid. MadhusUdana's reply (continued): yachcha - nirdharma asya brahmaNaH sattvarAhitye .api sadrUpavatprapaJNchasya sadrUpatvena-amithyAtvopapattyA arthAntaraM- u tam.h| tanna | And the (opponent) said: Just as the attributeless Brahman lac s existence (as an attribute) but (Its) very nature is existence, the very nature of the world too is existence. This establishes that the world is not mithyA (unreal). By this (it follows that you will have) established something other (than what you wanted to) arthAntara. (We say): It is not so. e enaiva sarvAnugatena sarvatra satpratItyupapattau brahmavat.h prapaJNchasya pratye aM satsvabhAvatA alpena mAnAbhAvAt.h, anugata-vyavahAra-abhAva-prasaN^gAchcha | The understanding of sat (existence) as encompassing everything and everywhere is established by One (principle). (But) each and every thing in the world cannot be proved to be comprehended as (pure) existence in the same way as Brahman. And a contingency would arise due to the lac of a comprehensive system (of understanding, explaining, and discussing a large number of things and topics.) (Therefore, the claim that we would be committing the fallacy of arthAntara is not correct.) MadhusUdana is ma ing a crucial point here regarding what is technically called anugata-dharma or consecutive property in nyAya. When a property occurs in a number of different things, the naiyAyi a would search for a common term or common concept to represent this common property and then refer to each of those things as possessing that common property. For example, if a pot is blue, a lotus is blue, and a cloth is blue, the naiyAyi a would ma e "blue-ness" a common property and say that the pot possesses "blue-ness", the lotus possesses "blue-ness", and so on. Such a system wherein a number of things are explained using fewer concepts is said to have the advantage of "lAghava" or light-ness as compared to a system where a greater number of concepts are required, in which case a defect of "gaurava" or heaviness is said to prevail. This is directly related to the principle of "Occam's razor" as used in the West. If I can explain a certain number of things using some hypotheses and you can explain the same things using fewer hypotheses than mine, then your explanation is better than mine. In eeping with the principle of "lAghava" or lightness rather than heaviness, the naiyAyi a-logician is always loo ing for anugata dharma's or common properties to explain things. In the case at hand, the opponent says that just as Brahman is by Its very nature existence, the duality in the world is also similarly by its very nature existence and hence real. MadhusUdana points out two problems with this claim: 1) There is no comprehension of the existence of individual things in the world as Brahman is. One does not get the idea "this pot that I see now is eternally existent and is never sublated."

2) If the reality of each and every thing in the world is admitted, then it would ta e a significant number of "real" entities to explain what is meant by "reality." This theory would be too heavy, suffer from the defect of "gaurava" because of the lac of a common property or anugata dharma. An explanation using a single non-dual Reality is superior even from this strictly logical viewpoint. Anand