PIaget Reason

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New Ideas in Psychology 24 (2006) 129 www.elsevier.com/locate/newideapsych
Reason
Jean Piaget{
(Translation and commentary by Leslie Smith1, Lake District, UK) Available online 4 August 2006 In Memoriam Terrance A. Brown. A delightful exchange in Chicago in 2004 led to this translation, and the tragedy in 2005 coincided with its completion. I dedicate this translation to Terry who set such a ne example as translator.
Abstract Reason Jean Piaget wrote three short papers shortly before his death in 1980: Paper I: Scientic Report on Work during 19781979. Paper II: Reason as Objective of the Understanding. Paper III: Reason: Introduction. Each is probably incomplete, Papers II and III denitely so. These papers were intended as a contribution to his 19791980 research project Reason, here translated into English for the rst time. Their central argument is distinctive. It amounts to Piagets nal statement of his empirical model of normative reason as a mechanism intrinsic to the construction of knowledge during childrens cognitive development. r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction Jean Piaget wrote three papers shortly before his death on 16 September 1980, aged 84 years. These papers have recently been published (Henriques, Dionnet, & Ducret, 2004). They were planned by Piaget as a contribution to the 19791980 research project Reason in the series of annual projects at his International Center for Genetic
E-mail address: l.smith@lancaster.ac.uk. URL: http://www.neasdencontrolcentre.com/ls/index.html. { Deceased. 1 All correspondence about this translation and commentary should be sent to Leslie Smith. 0732-118X/$ - see front matter r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2006.04.003
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2 J. Piaget / New Ideas in Psychology 24 (2006) 129 Table 1 Piagets constructivist research 19681980 CIEG Project 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 French publication La prise de conscience Reussir et comprendre Recherches sur la contradiction Recherches sur labstraction reechissante Recherches sur la generalisation Recherches sur les correspondances Morphismes et categories Le possible et le necessaire: Levolution des possibles Le possible et le necessaire: Levolution du necessaire Les formes elementaires de la dialectique Vers une logique des signications La raison 1974 1974 1974 1977 1978 1980 1990 1981 Morphisms and categories Possibility and necessity: the role of possibility in cognitive development Possibility and necessity: the role of necessity in cognitive development English publication The grasp of consciousness Success and understanding Experiments in contradiction Studies in reecting abstraction 1976 1978 1980 2001 n/a n/a 1992 1987
1976
1983
1987
10 11 12
1977 1978 1979
1980 1987 2004 Toward a logic of meanings Reason
n/a 1991 2006
Source: adapted from Ducret (2000).
Epistemology (Centre International de lEpistemologie GenetiqueCIEG). This Center was founded in Geneva in 1955 and some forty volumes were published (Archives Jean Piaget, 1989). Many are available in English translation (e.g. Piaget, 2001); others not so, including the rst volume in the series (Beth, Mays, & Piaget, 1957). During 19681980, a new turn was taken in 12 projects dealing with processes in the construction of knowledge (Ducret, 2000; Montangero & Maurice-Naville, 1997). Reason was the terminal project (see Table 1). Piagets nal papers merit publication on several counts: (i) Historical importance: These papers are some of Piagets last written works. They would have been published if their author had lived longer, and so should be published now in view of their recent availability. Piagets research program was initially formulated in his rst book Recherche (SearchPiaget, 1918, p. 148). The extent of the unity of this program merits scrutiny, whatever its nal evaluation in terms of these nal papers. (ii) Psychology and epistemology: An open question in the 21st century is how to combine epistemological insights with psychological evidence (Bickhard, 2003a, b; Campbell & Bickhard, 1986; Goldman, 2001). A paradigm case concerns the scope and limits of neuroscience (Changeux & Ricoeur, 2000; Damasio, 2003; Parker, Langer, & Milbrath, 2005). In Piagetian constructivism, a distinctive position amounting to a tertium quid, or third alternative, to biology and culture is taken on both the general question and the particular issue facing neuroscience (Smith, 2002b; ` Smith & Voneche, 2006). These nal papers are not irrelevant to this foundational question.
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J. Piaget / New Ideas in Psychology 24 (2006) 129 3
(iii) New principles: These papers contain new principles, and are a sharp reminder that Piagets own thinking continued to develop. (a) The empirical investigation of necessary knowledge is central to these nal papers, and this is a long-standing problem in Piagets work over a period of 50 years (Smith, 2002a, p. 110). An open question is how to address this problem. The position sketched by Piaget in his nal papers was related to that in his previous project, i.e. Project 11 in Table 1. In Project 11, a new approach was made using an intensional logic. An intensional logic, such as the entailment logic of necessity and possibility used in Project 11 (Piaget & Garcia, 1991), is importantly different from an extensional logic, such as class and propositional logic used by Piaget (1970a, b) in earlier studies (for discussion of the differences, see Haack, 1978). In her commentary on Project 11, Barbel Inhelder (1991) specically noted this difference, adding that far from ending debates, this book opens new perspectives. The nal papers are complementary to Project 11, and so are essential reading in the elaboration and evaluation of these new perspectives. (b) As well, Piaget continued to develop his position in the nal papers. Entailment logic is one particular logic, and there are others in the same class of intensional, modal logics. The adoption of that particular model raises two questions. One is whether some other model of modal logic could be used (for alternatives, see Cresswell & Hughes, 1996; Horty, 2001). Another is whether a formal model is required at all in that human reason is prior to rule-based reasoning (Brandom, 2000). It is worth noticing that the focus in Projects 89 in Table 1 was also on the modal concepts of necessity and possibility, yet no formal model of modal logic was used in those investigation, nor in a companion paper written in 1977 (Piaget, 1986). It is arguable that in the nal papers Piaget continued to explore alternatives to entailment logic. Two alternatives spring to mind. One is to revert to the position in Projects 89. Another is to stake out an alternative both to the position in Projects 89 and to the position in Project 11. In general, Piagets practice was to search for alternatives in line with his rst bookto elaborate, to extend, and to re-evaluate, even in his nal papers. Recall that the chief revisionist of the work of Piaget was explicitly stated to be its own author (Piaget, 1970a). (c) Piagets position in his nal paper is complex and condensed. Its novelty is attested, but so is its difculty. Piaget had sketched a new approachyes. Yet it was unclear whether any of us understood Piagets thinking (Pieraut-Le Bonniec, 1990). This is an astute and frank comment by one of Piagets colleagues in the project on reason with a research-based expertise in this area (Pieraut-Le Bonniec, 1980). It is a sure sign that Piagets nal papers require careful attention and critical scrutiny. It would be unfortunate for them to be written off in advance of their accessibility to the anglophone world. 1.1. Translation This translation is a complete English translation of Piagets three papers. It is primarily based on the recently published French text (Henriques et al., 2004). But it differs in two ways.
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4 J. Piaget / New Ideas in Psychology 24 (2006) 129
One is that textual differences are noted between the published French text and a photocopy of a non-published French text in my personal possession gained from one of Piagets 1980 colleagues. These texts are referred to as the H-text and A-text, respectively. The H-text was used as the default, but in a small number of cases the A-text was used instead. All these cases are documented. The other difference is the inclusion of an Abstract Endnotes. None of these is in the original, and so all are the translators, not Piagets. The Endnotes are provided since the French texts are subtle and yet concise, dense rather than explicit, and they also presuppose a high degree of familiarity with Piagets epistemology. The Endnotes are intended as secondary guidance in reading Piagets papers, and in no way as a substitute for their primary reading. The Endnotes are arranged in three types: a, b, cy Translation
These are typically short and conned to differences in the two French texts or to their English translation. i, ii, iiiy Information
These too are typically short in providing factual information and references. 1, 2, 3y Interpretation
These are typically longer and serve two aims. One concerns Piagets constructs by giving introductory guidance with examples and references to further reading. The other concerns the interpretation of Piagets position in these papers. Neither, of course, amounts to the last word. My recommendation is that, on their rst reading, Piagets papers should be read in their own right without recourse to the Endnotes. Further readings can then be made using the Endnotes, as appropriate. All references in this Introduction and the Endnotes are included in the terminal References. I want to thank Michel Ferrari and Richard Robinson for their feedback on an earlier draft of this translation leading to what is now an improved version. My special thanks go ` to Jacques Voneche at the Jean Piaget Archives in Geneva who shared many wise counsels as well as specic guidance on the French text and translation, and to both New Ideas in Psychology editorsMark Bickhard for suggesting the organization of the Endnotes, and Robert Campbell for his numerous, typically astute, and always searching remarks on the translation and commentary. If errors remain, they are of course mine. Leslie Smith Lake District, UK
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2. Reason I II III Jean Piaget Scientic Report on Work during the year 19781979. Reason as Objective of the Understanding. Reason: Introduction.
I. Scientic Report on Work during the year 19781979: Report for the Fonds National de la Recherche Scientique (Swiss National Science Foundation) In 19771978, our investigations were on the elementary forms of dialectic (Piaget, 1980).i They led us to the general conclusion that dialectic is the inferential aspect of equilibration.1 In wanting to demarcate equilibration as a constructive process from states of equilibrium characteristic of structures already constructed under a stable form, we observed what the subject is doing. That is, from these structures the subject is making extractions that consist in statements bound one to another under a discursive form (as Kant used to say).2 Even so, equilibration as a process consists in constructions whose inferential relationships go beyond the discursive and embody in consequence a raft of implications of a different nature. At issue was how to analyze them. Our guiding hypothesis is as follows. There are implications between actions or operations as such; these implications both lie beneath and precede implications between statements (propositions); and they constitute the essential driving force of cognitive, and in particular dialectical, constructions.3 Our concern in 19781979 was, rst and foremost, the study of this particular type of implication or relationship.ii But a precaution was imposed on us right at the outset and we took stock of this in every situation. The precaution consists in carefully distinguishing two aspects of action, one causal, the other inferential. The causal aspect concerns practical performance with all that it involves, but only the meaning of the action can give rise to inferential aspects.4 From this perspective, implication between actionsa notion that initially could have puzzled some of our mathematician collaboratorsis essentially an implication between the meanings of actions.5 As such, it depends on a systematic study of meanings at different levels of development. Such has been one of the two main goals followed this year. It has shown itself to be very fruitful in the form of the study of a logic of meanings. A useful remark to make at this point is this. For a number of years, we have called the logic that we have used in our investigations operatory logic (Piaget, 1949).a Such a logic is already for the most part a logic of meanings but only with reference to interpropositional structures; i.e. to extensional considerations drawn from classical truth tables in current use. Under a proposal from our collaborator, the physicist Rolando Garcia, it was above all important for us to remove from our logic these extensional aspects so as to reach at every level a logic of meanings by purging all contamination from extensional logics.6 Given the above, each of the projects in 19781979 was directed at the same time on two things strictly bound together.iii One was systems of meanings, the other was implications between actions or operations. It was of course convenient to start from sensorimotor levels prior to language.7 So two colleagues undertook investigations of instrumental activities using different possible instruments (rakes, etc.) intended for action on objects, either free-standing or placed in
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boxes open on one side or only from the top.iv Although subjects aged 12 years do not speak, it is easy to see the meanings that they attribute to different instruments and different situations.8 Right from these elementary levels, multiple implications between actions are open to observation, moreover under their three usual forms. Some bear on prior conditions, others on outcomes expected or obtained, and yet others resulting even in the more or less partial or complete understanding of the reason for failure or success. From this, three dimensions are already to be distinguished in implications such as these: conditioning, expansion, depth.b Other investigations were also directed on problems of practical intelligence but at more evolved levels. One was doing tiling without gaps between tiles of different possible shapestriangular, square, pentagonal, or hexagonal.v Yet another was weaving with woof-threads or warp-threads in an alternating sequence such that both understanding and re-constitution was at issue.vi Here again, implications between actions and the meanings attributed to actions are relatively easy to pick out. Moving on to implications between operations whilst avoiding verbal aspects that would mask any strictly active meanings, two colleagues revisited the classical problem of the reciprocal implications between ordinal and cardinal whole numbers. In their investigation, a nice technique enabled the actions themselves to be detached from their possible verbal context.vii Two containers are presented, placed at different heights, one high (H) and the other low (L) connected by a pipe angled at 451. Marbles can roll down the pipe, and the childs task is to do this, one by one in succession. Questions of the following type were then asked as follows: If you stop before the fth drops (or after the 3rd has dropped) how many marbles will be found in L, and how many remain in H? The total number of marbles is generally eleven as an aid to intuition without recourse to complicated counting.c A technique such as this shows how much we can nd out about the relations between ordinal and cardinal numbers by focusing on generative actions that constitute each as a function of the other.9 Other investigations in the same year were directed on the elementary and pragmatic forms of the 16 interpropositional operations with a binary truth table.viii These operations are late in formation (about 1112 years) when they bear on verbally stated hypotheses that are therefore at the level of hypothetico-deductive thought.10 On the other hand, if at issue is only the manipulation of objects, very early forms of relationships isomorphic to these future, interpropositional operations are observed, such as conjunction, incompatibility. But there is a distinction to notice here. The 16 cells of the classical truth table are nothing but cells resulting from a combinatorial system. But in adopting a perspective based on the relationships between meanings, more than 16 types of pre-operation are found. For example, the conjunction AB (equivalent to p.q in propositional language) is present under two quite distinct forms.ix Free conjunction is such that A and B can be found now together and now disjoint.11 Obligated conjunctiond is such that A and B are inseparable (pieces of the same object, or members of the same class). In the latter case we encounter the claim made by Anderson and Belnap in their logic, that the apparently obvious implication p.q*p (or in terms of objects A.BA) is excluded since neither p nor A can be present in an isolated form.e But just as in previous studies of the relations of necessity we found in young subjects relationships of pseudo-necessity (for example the conation of the general and the necessary), we encounter here in investigations of meaning pseudo-obligated conjunction, i.e. a conjunction is acknowledged by a subject to be obligated, when this is not the case.12
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From this perspective on meaning, it is also appropriate to distinguish carefully two sorts of negation.x Negations are called proximal when they take as a reference frame the nearest embedding (for example if B A A0 then the negation :A0 in :A0 BFA0 has meaning only in relation to the reference frame B).f Other negations are called distal in referring to the universe of discourse.13 This distinction is quite essential in the construction or analysis of implications between actions. In summary, we have gained as anticipated from the 19781979 investigations a data set about the logic of meanings and the nature of implications between actions. In the book publishing these ndings, we plan to complement the experimental part describing the observed facts with a theoretical part providing a formal analysis.xi The physicist Rolando Garcia, a trusted collaborator at our Center, has really wanted to take on the task of drafting this second part (he was formerly a student of the famous physicist Carnap in the USA).14 Actually, before tackling investigations of reciprocity as planned for next year (some of the material gained this year has already prepared us for that), what is open to us is the extension of the studies reviewed here. The key question for analysis is the examination of what subjects regard as proof or reason for what they regard as a truth.15 If the basis of any logic of action and meaning is always inferential, it is all the same appropriate to distinguish within these inferences those that involve only verication (in being true or false) and those that are aimed at picking out the why, therefore the reason for somethings being so.16 At the same time, what this amounts to is a necessary complement of what we have seen this year, and a framework in which come to be inscribed the questions about symmetry and reciprocity planned as the sequel to our investigations. Quite generally, an investigation in developmental epistemologyg (as moreover in all domains) shows itself to be fertile in two ways at the same time. These two ways correspond to what it gains and to new problems that it brings up. In this regard, the problem of reasons appears to us to be essential, linking problems studied this year with those to do with symmetry and reciprocity.xii II. Reason as objective of the understanding International Center for Genetic Epistemology, Geneva, January 1980. It is very difcult to dene reason on two counts. One is that reason enters into multiple relationships with meanings and their implications, whilst at the same time displaying specic characteristics belonging uniquely to it. The other is that reason has a dynamism on the basis of which reason R1 for a truth sooner or later raises the question of reason R2 for reason R1, and so on.17 Descartes, Spinoza, Schopenhauer, etc., have previously drawn attention to the difference between the ratio cognoscendi and the ratio essendi.18 Spinoza provides the following excellent example about circularity.xiii If a circle is dened as a gure where all straight lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal, this amounts not to the circles essence but only to one of its properties or meanings.h But in characterizing a circle as a gure described by any line whatsoeveri one of whose endpoints is xed and the other mobile, its reason is supplied as a formation process.19 In other words, reason is one of the meanings of the object or event under consideration, but a meaning that entails others through signifying implications.j Really in this particular case, the rotation of a line from one and the same xed point implies the equality of the radii as its consequence (proactive implications). But as well, it itself implies
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as prior conditions (retroactive implications) the conservation of length and of the form of that line, and too the conservation of the center of rotation ( from the xed endpoint).20 Thereby does reason R1 itself presuppose reasons R2, etc.21 This shows the complexity of the idea of reason. It is not reducible to simple implication. Instead, it comprises a coordination between implications, in other words mutual implications or higher power implications (implications between implications). The general form of these coordinations between implications can be any at all. The actual form depends on the questions asked by the subject in the course of trying to understand. But, as soon as the links become clear, and therefore everything is organized, it tends to take the form of a dialectical spiral.22 For example in the investigation of Rosita Zubel and Angela Wells conservations are simultaneously conditions and outcomes without thereby amounting to a vicious circle.23 Implicated in this is the ratio cognoscendi, manifest not merely as formation processes but also as checks on the truth or falsity of each assertion (stated or accepted in the cycle of inferences). In this regard, proofs can be distinguished from simple verications or justications.24 The latter may consist either in empirical verications or in reasoning by deductions verifying the chain of reasons (R1, then R1, R2, etc.). As for proofs it is necessary, it seems, to reserve this term for complex compounds that combine in one and the same whole the ratio essendi and ratio cognoscendi.k A case in point is that of simultaneously explicative and demonstrative theorems. Even in mathematics, this is not always the case, as Cournot used to emphasize.25 The role of reason is thus to introduce new necessities into systems where they were merely implicit or remained unacknowledged.26 The reason for a truth (empirical or deductive) is therefore a system of transformations that modify or enrich the original meaning implications and confer on them a necessary character. These transformations rely on structures or on partial compositions playing a role in structures under formation and progressively integrating these. In short, the peculiarity of reason is this. It consists in reconstitutions whose levels are connected by the interlinking of proactive and retroactive implications in a system that is at the same time the basis of implications between implications (cf. radii and rotations in the circle example).27 In this way are meanings recast and new implications formed in a new overarching system. Such is the explanation of the formative role of the search for reasons.l The main obstacle confronting young subjects in the search for reasons is the demand made by pseudo-necessities.28 These make young subjects believe in the necessary character of simple observables or more or less repeatable relations. Now, necessities are not observables.29 Rather, necessities intervening in reasons are formative with their links leading to that reconstitution of the object or event to be understood. Reason consists in this. III. Reason: Introduction International Center for Genetic Epistemology, Geneva, April 1980. Reason is to truth as causality is to facts, as Leibniz used to say.30 This implies that a judgment about either requires the construction of models to which reference may be made. However, in the case of causality, this model is made of operations that the subject attributes to exterior objects after having constructed them for him- or herself. But in the case of reasons, the model consists in reconstitutions under simultaneous forms of successive operations. These operations were the means by which the subject had
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constructed entitiesmsuch as classes, numbers, etc.about which problems of truth and falsity arise, in turn giving rise to reasons for acceptance or rejection.31 The instruments used by these models consist of course in meaning implications. We can distinguish three types. The rst, that we can call proactive, consists in anticipation. This starts from element E with its consequence(s) E0 necessarily owing from its presence and from actions. In this case and if the relation between E and E0 is necessary, we can say that E provides at least a part of the reason R1 for E0 . But the question immediately arises of establishing too the reason R2 for R1 (hence why the action E0 is necessary for the formation of E00 , etc.).n A second group of implications binds an element E not to its later consequences but to its antecedents or prior conditions that can be multiple but not for all that sufcient. Here we shall speak of retroactive implications, each proactive discovery capable of leading to retroactive recastings.32 We can then dene reasons as the more or less complete relationships whose union constitutes the foundation.33 A conception of reasons such as thisi.e. as the foundation of a truth Emakes this foundation of course essentially relative to the current state of knowledge.o This is both because each retroactive modication enriches the proactivity of new characteristics, and because each proactive enrichment adds new distinctions at the retroactive level (prior conditions). Now it is precisely this double relativity that appears to us to characterize reasons in contrast to any sort of inferential argument.34 Indeed,p the more this overarching system is enriched by new implications and implications between implications, the moreq is increased its overarching power.35 2.1. Information endnotes i. Project 10 in Table 1 (Piaget, 1980). ii. Project 11 in Table 1 (Piaget & Garcia, 1991). iii. Piaget is here forging a link between Project 11 on meaning and Project 12 on reasonsee Table 1. iv. D. de Caprona and A. Ritter (Piaget & Garcia, 1991, chapter 1). v. B. Vitale and M. Zinder (Piaget & Garcia, 1991, chapter 3). vi. G. Pieraut-Le Bonniec and E. Rappe du Cher (Piaget & Garcia, 1991, chapter 7). vii. I. Berthoud and H. Kilcher (Piaget & Garcia, 1991, chapter 4). viii. C. Monnier and C. Vachta (Piaget & Garcia, 1991, chapter 2). ix. R. Zubel and G. Merzagh (Piaget & Garcia, 1991, chapter 5). x. An implicit reference to L. Banks and A. Wells (Piaget & Garcia, 1991, chapter 6). xi. A reference to the text eventually published (Piaget & Garcia, 1991). xii. The intended reference seems to be to the two chapters not so far mentioned in Piagets reportone to A. Henriques, D. Maurice and V. Jacq, the other to S. Dionnet, J. Guyon and A. Sinclair (Piaget & Garcia, 1991, chapters 8 and 9, respectively). xiii. Spinoza (1661, Section 95, in Curley, 1994, p. 52). 2.2. Translation endnotes a. Piaget (1949). This reference is omitted from the H-text, but explicitly included in the A-text, included in References below. b. Conditioning, expansion, depth (conditionnement, amplication, approfondissement). Elsewhere (Piaget, 1987b, pp. 138139, my amended translation) this trinity was stated to
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termination pre alables, approfondissement, be prior determination, depth, expansion (de amplication). In Piagets model in contrast to behaviorism, conditioningi.e. prior determinationhas normative, and not merely causal, properties. At issue for Piaget is the Kantian problem about the conditions of objective understanding, in contrast to such subjective thinking as a blind play of representations, less even than a dream (Kant, 1787, A112). Kants answer was in terms of the schematism of the pure concepts of understanding that provide the true and sole conditions (1787, B185; cf. B580), an answer unavailable to Piaget with his commitment to a process view of mind and reason (see Endnote 1, revisited in Endnote 8). ) Endnotes 1, 3, 8, 19. nombrements complexes). In the A-text, there is an empty c. Complicated counting (de nombrements in which complexes had been manually inserted. Both the empty space after de space and insertion are omitted from the H-text. es). Obligated conjunction is translated d. Obligated conjunction (conjunctions oblige elsewhere as constrained conjunction (Piaget & Garcia, 1991, p. 60), presumably on the grounds that constrained and free are antonyms. The literal translation obligated preserves the link with modal-deontic logic. This issue is further discussed in Endnote 12. ) Endnote 12. e. Their logic. The logic is entailment logic (Anderson & Belnap, 1975). In the A-text, a minor typographical error in the spelling of the second authors surname has been corrected in the H-text. However, the notation given in the H-text A.BB is incorrect. It is meaningless in itself, and discrepant with the notation in the A-text, which gives A.B-A. ) Endnote 6. f. Negation. In the A-text, Piaget both uses the notation of set theory: B A+A0 A0 BA. In the H-text, the negation of A0 is given in terms of the symbolism of propositional logic: :A0 BA. piste mologie ge tique). Piaget always referred to his ne g. Developmental epistemology (e genetic epistemology or scientic theory of knowledge based on the analysis of the very development of that knowledge (Piaget, 1950a, p. 7). The term genesis has a traditional meaning in reference to origins and formation, as too the cognate term genetic meaning beginning or becoming. Due to advances in 20th century biology, this traditional meaning has now been overtaken, resulting in genetic as synonymous with innate. Piagets developmental epistemology diverges from a nativist epistemologyas also from a social epistemologyin two respects. Firstly, it requires the interaction of biology and culture and, secondly, it also requires the coordination of that interaction in frameworks used in action and thought (Smith, 2002b). ) Endnote 1. h. Meanings (ou signications). Meanings is included in the A-text, but omitted from the H-text. i. Whatsoever (quelconque). Whatsoever is included in the A-text, but omitted from the H-text.
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j. Signifying implications (implications signiantes). See Piaget (1986). Elsewhere its singular counterpart is translated as meaning implication (Piaget, 2001; Piaget & Garcia, 1991) and meaningful implication (Pieraut-Le Bonniec, 1990). ) Endnote 4. k. Whole (tout). Whole in the H-text, a correction of tour in the A-text. l. Search (Recherche). Search was the title of Piagets rst book, and Reason (raison) the name of this nal project. tres). Compare essendi in Endnote 18. A comparable claim is about the m. Entities (e tres) such as classes, numbers, morphisms etc. (Inhelder & creation of new objects (e Piaget, 1980, p. 21). n. E00 is given as E000 in the A-text, and corrected in the H-text. o. Knowledge (connaissances). Plural in French to which there is no natural equivalent in English, in which knowledge is a mass noun. p. Indeed (en effet). Indeed is given in the A-text in contrast to the misprint en effets in the H-text. q. The more (plus). The more is given in the H-text as a correction of ce qui (which) in the A-text. 2.3. Interpretation endnotes 1. Equilibration. The distinction between equilibrium as a state (level) and equilibration as a process was formulated in Piagets rst book: [all life is an] organization in unstable equilibrium the law of which is stable equilibrium onto which it is directed (Piaget, 1918, cis of Recherche, see Gruber and Voneche, 1995; for ` p. 158. For an English pre commentary, see Smith, 2002b, 2003). According to Piaget, any living being is an agent whose actions, including mental acts, form a sequence co-extensive with the agents life. At any point in the sequence, these actions have some level or degree of organization operative in its display. This organization is the organization of a framework (cadre Piaget, 2001, p. 320). Frameworks differ in their complexity, and include systems, structures, and schemes (e.g. Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). Crucially, this process is lawful and its laws are not reducible to causal laws in biology and culture. Reason gradually changes structure, not by chance, but following an evolutionary line drawn by its own functioning (Piaget, 1931, p. 153). Levels of equilibrium in human minds tend to be unstableany level is stable only to some degreeon two counts. One concerns constructivism. A question repeatedly stated in Recherche (Piaget, 1918, p. 46; cf. pp. 58, 96, pp. 165166) is about universality: is the universal knowable (luniversel est-il connaissable)? His answer was Yes, but it is constructed, and is not preformed. Organization is preformed neither in the intentionality of action nor in conscious thought. Rather, the proposal is that human cognition always involves parts and wholes, where the parts are individuals and the wholes universal (pp. 149159). The parts are individuals in two respects, namely individual acts or actions directed on individual objects such as looking at the river in ood, playing chess, applying the Pythagorean theorem. The wholes are universals also in two respects, namely any framework includes some whole, and its function is subsumption. For example, I am looking at one part of the river in one place at one time, where each of these concepts is something universal which serves as a rule (Kant, 1933, A106; for commentary, see Brandom, 1994). Further, any such property can in turn be embedded in universal laws or principles in higher order theories, for example the Pythagorean theorem linked to proofs
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of Fermats last theorem (Singh, 1997). The open question is which part is in fact linked to which whole. This link has some degree or level of organization, but it is an empirical matter what this actually is. So levels of equilibrium are unstable since organization is constructed by human agents. Secondly, instability arises from human fallibility. The link between any one part and whole can be wrong. The history of science is littered with commitments to false absolutes and psychology offers no exception due to each school having its own special method (Piaget, 1918, p. 62). Further, two links may apparently be correct individually, and yet they snuff each other out (p. 41). A paradigm case is whether science and religion are reconcilable or contradictory (pp. 21, 109). In general, Piagets proposal runs like this. Knowledge and values are fallible constructions of human minds in action. All the same, these constructions can be objective. What changes over time is their organization intrinsic to living minds. This organization changes in its use by reference to bidirectional relationships comprising prior conditions and anticipatable consequences. Equilibrium is a level of organization whose stability is constrained by the process of its formation. This process is equilibration whose activation is: (i) relative in that at any level, the degree of organization is better (development) or worse (regression) than that at a previous level; (ii) revisable in making any previous organization vulnerable to change arising from later actions in the sequence; (iii) recursive in that any action is the reference-frame for its successor; (iv) incomplete in that there is no nal state of fully comprehensive organization; (v) intrinsic with normative, and not merely causal, properties. Although Piagets stage model under (i) and (ii) has attracted attention in psychology, the same is not true of (iii) and (iv), whilst (v) has received almost none. The irony is that this trio of (iii), (iv), and (v) comprises the distinctive and original tenets of Piagets model. Piaget rened his distinction in later accounts, notably in his extended model (Piaget, 1985; for commentary, see Becker, 2004; Bickhard, 2003a; Campbell, 2001). As well, ` further changes were made later (e.g. Inhelder, Garcia, & Voneche, 1976; Piaget & Garcia, 1989). His papers on Reason are part of an ongoing revision. ) Endnotes 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 16, 20, 35, g. 2. Discursive form. A principal concern in Piagets model is the capacity of any agent both to cope with novelty and to produce novel actions. Indeed, one main outcome of Bergsonian creative evolution is a continual elaboration of the absolutely new (Piaget, 1914, p. 196). Human knowledge too is open to growth as more, better, and new knowledge, i.e. augmentation, amelioration, and novelty (Piaget, 1950c, p. 7, 1985, p. 3). Now, in alluding to the Kantian distinction between discursive and inferential uses of human understanding, discursive thinking is unproductive in all three aspects. Discursive thinking is thinking through concepts comprising predicates potentially applicable to objects, for example, thinking of a triangle as a gure enclosed by three straight lines and possessing three angles. But discursive thinking is inferentially sterile in that I should not be able to advance a single step beyond the mere denition (Kant, 1787, B747). Inferential thinking makes possible novel advances, for example, recognition that there is an equality between the internal angles of a triangle and two right angles. For Kant (1787, Bix), inferential thinking requires logic. Although this is not formal logic in the contemporary sense, commentators are divided as to its nature (Longuenesse, 1998). Piaget made the same commitment that inferences require a logic, but he regarded
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its identication and characterization as an empirical question in human development. It is for the investigator to nd out which structures are used and to analyze them (Piaget, 1973, p. 46, my amended translation). Since a structure is a framework with logical properties, the proposal is for an investigator to ascertain which properties in which logics are in use. ) Endnote 16, 26. 3. Action implications. According to Piaget (1918, pp. 4950), reason is a capacity born from action. Indeed, a major challenge is to articulate the deep relationships that unite action and reason (Piaget, 1925, p. 209). On this view, action is basic to human development in two ways, one temporal and the other epistemological. Practical intelligence: Practical intelligence in infancy is a temporal precursor of representational thought in childhood onwards. On this view, a major issue is how the advance from action to thought is made. Infant activity is conned to success or practical adaptation, whereas the function of verbal or conceptual thought is to know and state truths (Piaget, 1954, p. 360). Underlying this claim is a commitment to the standard view that knowledge entails the truth of what is known (Smith, 2002b): the property of knowledge is the attainment of truth (Piaget, 1971, p. 361). Other developmentalists have set out their proposals about why this advance has to be made, and how it is made (Bickhard, 2003a; Muller, Sokol, & Overton, 1998). Knowing and agency: Epistemology is the theory of knowledge. In Piagets epistemology, knowing is a relation between subject and object: S refers to the subject or knower; O to the object of knowledge, or what is known; and the relations between S and O have some degree or level of organization. Actually, in order to know objects, the subject must act upon them (Piaget, 1970a, p. 104). Anything can be an object of knowledgeI can know actual objects such the yew tree in my garden, other people such as my wife, and abstract objects such as the propositional calculus. The relations between any S and any O are multiple and complex in that knowing always embodies various possible circuits established between subject and object (Piaget, 1950c, p. 5, my amended translation). These circuits comprise a framework with normative, and not merely causal, properties. Some framework or other is used in all actions and in all mental acts. The use of a framework amounts to practical intelligence in that knowing-how is presupposed by knowing-that at any developmental level, and not merely in infancy. Piagets stance has independent support, including the priority of knowing-how over knowing-that (Ryle, 1949); the independence of practical reasoning from propositional reasoning (von Wright, 1983); and the normative inferentialism in discourse practices (Brandom, 1994). ) Endnotes 1, 7, 8, 16, 34. 4. Meaning of an action. Three kinds of meaningindicators, symbols and signswere identied in an early account (Piaget, 1953, p. 191). This position was later generalized: we shall say that there is a signifying implication between two schemes x and y that is x ' y, if the taking into consideration (or use) of x entails that of y, due to the fact that the meaning of y is a part of the meaning of x or has a feature in common with the meaning of x(Piaget, 1986, p. 306). In this later position, the meaning of an action is an implicatory relationship prior to logical relations such as class inclusion and propositional implication. ) Endnotes 1, j.
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5. Puzzle. This puzzle is substantive, and so the scare quotes are misplaced. At issue is how there can be a logic of action, as required in Piagets model, when actions do not have truth values and when logic is the formal science of truth. Thoughts can have truth values, they can be true or false (Frege, 1906, p. 186). By contrast, actions as such do not have truth values (von Wright, 1983, p. 108). According to a dominant view, logic is the formal science of truth. Logic, like any science, has as its business the pursuit of truth. What are true are certain statements; and the pursuit of truth is the endeavor to sort out the true statements from the others, which are false (Quine, 1972, p. 1). On this view, logic is closely linked to language in that only statements have a truth value, i.e. can be true or false. In standard systems, logic is extensional since truth and falsity are the extensions or reference of statements. Formal analysis of these extensionsand nothing elseconstitutes a logical system in extensional logic. Thus in propositional logic, valid inferences are truth-preserving in that its rules ensure that falsity is never derivable from truth. Crucially, truth and falsity are the sole values in standard systems of extensional logic. Suppose, for example, it is true that p The door is closed. Then its negation in extensional logic $p The door is not closed is false. In an extensional logic, any proposition implies its own disjunction p- (p v q) that is, if p then either p or q and so is a tautology. This is so even if the other disjunct is false and irrelevant, for example q The Olympic Games in 2012 are in Paris. That is, a disjunctive implication that is apparently odd in common sense if the door is closed, then either the door is closed or the Olympic Games in 2012 are in Paris is a tautology in extensional logic. Extensional logic works well in its own terms of reference, but these terms are overly constrained, and too much is left out (cf. Haack, 1978). Non-extensional implications are not like this. Consider an obligation such as Op that stands for It is obligatory for the door to be closed. In extensional logic, its disjunctive implication Op - O(p v q) would mean that if it is obligatory for the door to be closed, then it is obligatory either for the door to be closed or for the Olympic Games in 2012 to be in Paris. And this seems to lead to paradox (see von Wright, 1983, p. 104). Why does an obligation about door closing extend to an obligation for the 2012 Olympic Games in Paris? Worse still, if the obligation is disregarded and the door remains open, then an extensional implication entails It is obligatory for the Olympic Games in 2012 to be in Paris. This paradox, whether apparent or real, can be removed in an intensional logic. (For different ways to do this, see Horty, 2001; Ross, 1968; von Wright, 1983).
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A logic of action is intensional in that its inference rules take into account things other than truth and falsity. Actions fall into two types, productive actions and preventative actions, i.e. forbearances. The key assumption is that laws of nature take their course, unless agents act either to produce or to prevent changes in the world (von Wright, 1963, pp. 36, 67). And agency has a logic. Further, its logic is different from extensional logic. For example, an action such as A Peter closed the door has an extensional negation in $A Peter did not close the door. But this negation is ambiguousit leaves out something important about actions as omissions. One aim behind an intensional logic is to provide a formal analysis for the clarication of the ambiguity, for example: $A1 Peter was asleephe was not doing anything. $A2 Peter tried but failed to close the doorthe door is self-locking. $A3 Peter specically refrained from closing the door. Notice that $A3 refers to an act of forbearance that is importantly different from not doing anything $A1 and from trying but failing to do something $A2. An extensional negation $A is global in merging these distinct cases. The modal properties of action are taken up below. ) Endnotes 11,12. 6. Contamination from extensional logics. Piaget is referring to the view attributed to him by Rolando Garcia that we must clean up my logic (Piaget & Garcia, 1991, p. 157). Here, Piaget seems to be making this claim himselfbut not quite. He accepts the switch to intensional logics, but stops short of accepting the adequacy of entailment logic; i.e., the particular model evidently proposed by Garcia. Notice that Piaget (1986, 1987) used no formal model of modal logic in other works. ) Endnote e. 7. Sensorimotor levels. This optimistic claim made by Piaget about the cognitive capacities of very young children reects his general stance in Endnote 3. The same claim is explicit elsewhere: from the beginning and even among our youngest subjects, a physical fact is recorded only within a logico-mathematical framework, however elementary it may be (Piaget, 2001, p. 320). This claim is incompatible with the negative interpretation of Piagets theory ubiquitous in commentary; i.e. the view that the theory dwells on the cognitive incompetence of infants and toddlers (e.g. Bremner, 2005; Case, 1999). ) Endnote 3. 8. Subjects (sujets). This term was the standard term used to refer to participants in psychological studies during the 20th century. Its use in Piagets model is epistemological in referring to SO relationships in the development of objective knowledge (cf. Endnote 3). In consequence, his model has to show how a knowing subject actually is in a position to develop objectively true knowledge; i.e. how objectivity emerges from actions on objects. The general problem is well known. Thus Kant (1787, B122) wanted to know how subjective conditions of thought can have objective validity. Subjective thinking and rationally successful knowing are not the same thing. Subjective thinking can appear in various guises as misperception, false belief, pseudo-reasoning, and misunderstanding. Since the causal contingencies in the display of such thinking can be investigated in psychology, then the investigation of the formation of true knowledge
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requires more than the investigation of causally formed falsehoods. The causes which merely give rise to acts of judgment do so in accordance with psychological laws; they are just as capable of leading to error as of leading to truth. [But objective knowledge requires] judgments whose justication rests on something else, if they stand in need of justication at all. And this is where epistemology comes in (Frege, 1897, p. 3). This general problem is important just because constructivist models generally are open to the challenge that objectivity is therein reduced to a subjective construction, either of the ego or of the social group (Phillips, 1997). Piagets proposal to resolve this problem has four parts. Firstly, he usually referred to this general problem as the accord problem (accord Piaget 1953, p.8; translated also as harmony, 1971, p. 342; correspondence, 1985, p. 19). Taking a cue from James Mark Baldwins (1911) distinction between thoughts and things, at issue in Piagets problem seems to be the fundamental relation peculiar to knowledge itself: the relation of thought to things (1953, p. 10my corrected translation). For Piaget, this relation is not a copy or replica relation. His argument was that thought is never a copy of things since this very notion is contradictory (Piaget, 1970a, p. 103, 1971, p. 345; Piaget & Inhelder, 1971, p. 386). quation Secondly, Piaget also referred to this as the adequacy problem (ade Piaget, 1967, p. 580, 1970b, p. 15, 2001, p. 229, note 13; see also p. 246, note 13). In the latter, Campbell has noted how Piagets terminology is reminiscent of the Scholastic denition of truth as adaequatio intellectus ad rem (adequation of the mind [to] the object). Thirdly, Piagets distinction between the psychological and epistemic subjects is implicated. The epistemic subject (as opposed to the psychological subject) is what all subjects have in common (Piaget, 1966, p. 285). Yet according to Piaget, what all subjects have in common always interacts with psychologically specic differences or what all subjects do not have in common. Central to this interaction are processes of equilibration (see Endnote 1). Piagets model required that the mind is always open to change in two respects. One is confronting new problems (contents, contexts). The other is creating (constructing, developing) new knowledge based on reasons. That is, mental capacities in their exercise impose serial organizations on the world whose adequacy is checkable through failures and successes, truth and falsity (Piaget, 1970a, p. 704, 1971, p. 206; Piaget & Inhelder, 1971, p. 387). Fourthly, the argument in the present papers is that any equilibratory advance towards objectivity has its basis in the epistemic subjects reasons. This argument is distinctive in three respects: (i) methodology: empirical accounts require knowledge to be based on the knowers reasons (Smith, 1993, Section 13); (ii) epistemology: reasons have multiple properties but knowledge requires reasons with normative properties (Smith, 2002a, chapter 5); (iii) metaphysics: the activation of reasons with normative properties is intrinsic to intellectual development (Smith, 2006b, chapter 5). ) Endnotes b, 1, 3, 9, 15, 18, 31, 34. 9. Constitute (constituent) is normative, not causal. Normativity is strictly required in Piagets epistemological model, and this was acknowledged by its author to be one of his central ideas: the normative factors of thought correspond biologically to a necessity of equilibrium by self-regulation (Piaget, 1972, p. 8). For example, many children learn early in life that two and two make four
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in their number learning. Yet make is initially liable to be interpreted as a causal relation, i.e. two becomes four in that by adding two to itself you make four. In its mathematical interpretation 2+2 4 the relation is normative; i.e. 4 is constituted by the addition of 2 to itself, and so this is a necessary truth. The separation of the two interpretations is crucial in cognitive development in that 2 is not the cause of 4, but its meaning implies that 2+2 4, which is not the same thing at all (Piaget, 1971, p. 49; for commentary, see Smith, 2002b). The implication is that causal understanding is only part of human understanding, and that its normative part is the senior part. It is the senior part in that causal relations conform to laws with two complementary featuresuniversality and necessity (Piaget, 1930, p. 273). For Piaget, norms are required for an adequate understanding of causality, where norms comprise logico-mathematical frameworks initially applied and later attributed to objects (Piaget, 1985, p. 43, footnote 4; cf. 1986, p. 309). Yet this has been missed in developmental psychology (Smith, 2006a), including research on number learning (cf. Cowan, 2003). ) Endnotes 1, 8, 12, 16, 21, 27. 10. Elementary and late forms. The claims in this sentence and its predecessor seem to be contradictory. In the Genevan account of formal operations, propositional reasoning is an accomplishment based on the use of a group structure, usually constructed in adolescence onwards (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). But here, early types of propositional reasoning are acknowledged. Arguably, however, these claims are consistent on two counts. Firstly, a truth table in propositional logic comprises rows and columns. These can be read bidirectionally by logicianseither from the main column to the rows, or from the rows to the main column. But this begs the question about how the rows and columns were grouped in one truth table as conditionality, and in another as disjunction. And as every logician knows, there are sixteen such possibilities (Wittgenstein, 1972, Section 5.101). Piagets proposal is that childrens understanding is initially directional in that the rows are identied individually and then interrelated over time to form one truth table, such as disjunction (Smith, 2002a, pp. 10607). Secondly, the distinction between process/outcome, i.e. equilibration/equilibrium, is relevant here, notably the relation of parts and whole (see Endnote 1). A particular truth table is a successful outcome (level of equilibrium); its formation process (an instance of equilibration) is another matter. Inhelder and Piaget focused on the former; by contrast, the present study deals with the formation process. ) Endnote 1. 11. Free conjunction. In propositional logic, a conjunction is true if and only if a pair of propositions is such that each is individually true (Quine, 1972). Further, the logic is extensionalsee Endnote 5. For example, suppose each of these propositions is true: Pizza is on sale at the bar. Cola is on sale at the bar. Then their extensional conjunction is also true in propositional logic. So an extensional conjunction is false in all of these three cases: Pizza but not cola is on sale at the bar. Cola but not pizza is on sale at the bar. Neither pizza nor cola is on sale at the bar.
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Piagets point is that conjunction in these childrens reasoning is not extensional. Instead, free conjunction is a hybrid in being true when one conjunct is true and the other is false. Taking the same three cases, a free conjunction is true in two of them: Pizza but not cola is on sale at the bar. Cola but not pizza is on sale at the bar. So a free conjunction cannot be an extensional conjunction. Piagets specic proposal is in terms of an intensional logicsee the next Endnote. ) Endnotes 5, 12. 12. Pseudo-obligated conjunction. Free conjunction in the previous Endnote amounts to permitted conjunction. And this is an astonishingly liberating claim about the logic in childrens frameworks, one likely to have been missed in previous English translations (Piaget & Garcia, 1991). Modal logics are intensional in taking criteria other than truth values into account. Two main types are alethic logic about what has to be, covering necessity, possibility, and impossibility (Cresswell & Hughes, 1996), and deontic logic about what has to be done, covering what is obligatory, permitted, or forbidden (Horty, 2001). Further commentary on these modal logics is given elsewhere (Smith, 2006a, 2006b). Alethic logic was used as a model of childrens reasoning by Garcia, notably in his discussion of co-tenability (Piaget & Garcia, 1991, p. 154). Yet there is another interpretation in deontic logic, evidently here invoked by Piaget. One modal logic of action is deontic, and it runs like this (von Wright, 1983, pp. 108, 119). Suppose you are the doorkeeper at the Prime Ministers residence in 10 Downing Street in London. Different norms are binding on you with different deontic properties. You are obliged to open the door on the arrival of any visitor, and to insure that the door is otherwise closed. Assume A stands for the action of opening the door and $A stands for the action of closing the door. Then on the arrival of a visitor with the door closed, the obligation binding on you is OA i.e. the obligation is for you to see to it that the door is open. In the same context, further norms can be derived, such as permission PA i.e. it is permitted for you to open the door. Again in the same context, so is prohibition F$A i.e. closing the door is forbidden. In short, even a single norm has logical relations, such as necessitation (entailment) and contrariety, with other norms in the same family. So there can be a logic of action and norms, even though neither actions nor norms have truth values (von Wright, 1983, pp. 108, 131). Piagets proposal about childrens logic diverges from standard models. Recall that in his model, any framework is open to change in that a framework operative in an earlier action can be re-used or revised in a successor action. Secondly, any advance requires the identication of distinct parts and then their re-organization in a whole in another framework. In particular, if children have some understanding of conjunction in one logic
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(extensional, propositional) and some understanding of obligation in another logic (intensional, deontic), a hybrid logic could be formed by their merger. An obligated conjunction is just such a merger. Thirdly, this pick-and-mix strategy can be generalized. If conjunctions can be obligated, can other conjunctions be forbidden? And what about inferencesare some permitted, others not so? Or classications, categorizations, contingencies, conditionals which of these are obligatory, permitted or forbidden? Fourthly, there is the potential for further generalization in that other principles from other logics are available for reorganization in comparable wayswhich of these are necessary, possible, or impossible? From an adults point of view, it may seem astonishing that childrens logics are hybrid From the position taken in Piagets Recherche (see Endnote 1), this prodigality of logics stands to reason. The term pseudo as in pseudo-necessity was initially invoked by Piaget (1922) in an early paper. An obligated conjunction is styled called pseudo because of a category mistake made by these children, viewed from the standpoint of an adults logic in which conjunction and obligation are operators directed on propositions and actions, respectively. In their standard logics, conjunctions and obligations do not operate on each other (see Quine, 1972, and von Wright, 1983, respectively). In these standard logics, actions and propositions can be conjoined; actions but not propositions can be obligatory. By contrast, in the logic of the childrens frameworks, conjunctions can be obligatory. This may be non-standard, but is not unintelligible. Far from it: novel advances require the reformation of existing knowledge systems. Children play games and in doing so often break the rules, sometimes forming new games (see Smith, 2006b). Childrens reasoning often breaks adults rules of logic, sometimes forming new logicssuch as those described here. Actually, adults do this too in making their novel advances. ) Endnotes 1, 5, 9, 11, 26, 28, 35, d. 13. Universe of discourse. In propositional logic, the scope of negation is universal under an interpretation of the symbolized proposition (Sainsbury, 1991). In an interpretation referring to Platos teacher in Ancient Greece, the proposition p Socrates is a man is true, and its negation $p Socrates is not a man is false under the same interpretation. Whereas in an interpretation referring to an Erasmus scholarship or the sculpture park in New York, the converse applies; i.e. in these interpretations p is false and $p is true. Piagets point is that in childrens frameworks, negation is subject to an accordion effect: its reference-frame may be pulled out or pushed in. 14. Carnap, Rudolf. See his autobiography along with critical commentary on his work (Schilpp, 1963). 15. Truth. Piaget is alluding to two fundamental capacities in the human mind, imagination or the capacity to form representations, and judgment or the capacity to afrm or deny that something is true or false. Their difference has been noticed for more than two millennia: imagination is different from assertion and denial; for truth and falsity involve a combination of thoughts [in judgment] (Aristotle, 325a, pp. 1014). Judgments could not be made without invoking normshow else could truth be distinguished from falsity? Imagination totally devoid of norms would be a blind play of
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representations, less even than a dream (Kant, 1787, A112). Yet the dominant schools in 20th century psychology have been marked by their commitment to norm-denial or to norm-reduction; i.e. in psychology, norms either do not exist or are reducible to causes (see Smith, 2006a). For Piaget (1972, p. 210), objectivity is gained with demonstrable truths, open to everyone. So interpreted, objectivity amounts to intersubjectivity in Freges (1897; cf. Smith, 1999a, 1999b) epistemology in that the same truth can encountered by different knowers for comprehension in the same way ) Endnotes 8, 16, 27, 31. 16. Verication. Piagets use of this notion is inclusive, covering both the verifying and falsifying functions of empirical testing in sciencehe is not siding with Carnap against Popper in this regard (cf. Piaget, 2001, p. 79, footnote 11; see also Schilpp, 1963). Knowledge acquired by observational means leaves open the manner or extent of its comprehension that fall short of good reason (cf. Pieraut-Le Bonniec, 1990). Two points lie behind Piagets claim. One is quite well known in that reasons can be socially transmitted, inferences can be learned, proofs can be taught. This point has been exploited in training studies in empirical research on Piagets account of conservation (Case, 1999). Yet transmitted knowledge can turn out to be false. The other point is less well known in that the capacity to give reasons for things is fundamental to how the human mind works in serving to conrm or to correct. In Piagets model, knowledge is never a copy of reality, but is instead a fallible construction. Although observable knowledge is a fact of lifea light pebble sinks in water, a heavy log oats in waterthe inferences to draw from such knowledge are another matter. Thus the weight of an object could be conated with its volume, or natural laws conated with deontic rulesneedles sink because they are too heavy for the water (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958, p. 33), whilst a boat does not sink because it doesnt do what it ought not to (Piaget, 1930, p. 136). This is where reason plays its part in the interrogation of the facts (Piaget, 1931, p. 147). And reason has a basis in logic: the study of true knowledge, envisaged in its most general form (Piaget, 1949, p. 4). Piagets position has counterparts elsewhere. One such rationale is that the human mind has the capacity to form spontaneous conjectures of instinctive reason (Peirce, 1908, p. 371). On this view, new ideas are vulnerable to two tendencies in the human mind, the formation of doubt on the one hand, and the xation of belief on the other. Reason can serve as an arbiter. But, Peirce realized that this function would be incompletely discharged by anyone reliant on logical rationality. This is because, claimed Peirce, logic had been narrowly restricted to deductive and inductive logic. His proposal was that a third form of logic was available, called abduction or retroduction (p. 368). Although neither Piagets account of equilibration nor his position here on reason is equivalent to Peirces abduction, there is common ground in their agreement that some rational system other than deduction and induction is at work in human minds. Another rationale is normative inferentialism and its principle that inferring is a kind of doing (Brandom, 1994, p. 91). In turn, doing is an action bound by norms such that norms that are explicit in the form of rules, principles or claims [depend on] a more fundamental form of norms that are implicit in practicein what is done rather than what is said (p. 62, his emphasis). According to Brandom, inferences can be rational without being based on the rules of logic. This is because the rules of a logic cannot be understood in the rst place without the prior use of an inferential capacity. Human agents have such a
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capacity whose central property is that of using norms, initially and implicitly in practice, and only later explicitly in thought. On this view, human agents are sapient, not merely sentient, where sapience is shown in the capacity to use concepts in accordance with some conception of the rules that regulate the application of concepts to their instances. These rules are normative and deontic. They necessitate some inferences, license others, and forbid others. A sentient parrot and a sapient person may exclaim Thats red. But differences then arise: the parrot does not treat Thats red as incompatible with Thats green, nor as following from Thats scarlet and entailing Thats colored (Brandom, p. 89, my emphasis). In this position, these inferences are based on norms whose use in action is in advance of their use in thought. Brandoms position is independent of Piagets position. Their view of the human mind in action is similar in two respects. One lies in the operation of norms and not merely causes. The other is the denial that all rational inferences are made on the basis of the rules of logic. ) Endnotes 1, 2, 3, 9, 15, 24, 26, 29. 17. Dynamism. A reference to the mechanism responsible for a living systems being in action rather than being inert. In Piagets early model, cognitive structures have an affective counterpart, where the latter are the categories of ideal and of value [that] express the same function, but in its dynamic aspect (Piaget, 1953, p. 9). The early proposal was that affect is intrinsic to the activation of action-structures whose cognitive use leads to knowledge. Here in this later account, the proposal is that reason makes its own contribution to activation. (For commentary, see Bickhard, 2003b; Brown & Weiss, 1987). 18. Ratio essendi, ratio cognoscendi why something is what it is how something is known to be what it is The distinction has its basis in Scholasticismsee also Endnote 8. Piagets references may have been as follows: Descartes: The distinction was used in reply to an objection to his famous Cogito argument I think, therefore I am. Descartes had asked, But what then am I? and his tentative answer was, A thing which thinks. This answer seemed to run into an objection: my essence could include things other than thinking. Descartes reply was that the Cogito argument never excluded this. The Cogito argument did not address the ratio essendi of the mind (what the mind really is), but was instead conned to its ratio cognoscendi (how I come to know the mindDescartes, 1642, pp. 138153). Spinoza: Regarding an essence as constitutive of reality, the real properties of things, his account of human knowledge true of reality added a twist in identifying three levels of knowledge. The rst was based on perception, language, memory and imagination, each directed on individual things in experience; the second on common notions and adequate ideas of the general properties of things; the third on formal essences that all things necessarily have. His example was an arithmetical problem: Given the numbers, 1, 2, and 3, what is the fourth proportional number? The correct answer 6 can be based on knowing at all three levels. But an understanding of the necessity of that answer requires knowledge beyond the rst level. For Spinoza, the essence invoked in this answer turns on a proportion that is necessarily 6 and could not be otherwise. A persons ratio cognoscendi at the rst level may be correct, and yet may not match the ratio essendi (Spinoza, 1677, Bk II: prop. 40).
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Schopenhauer: His foundational principle of sufcient reason was argued to have its roots in four other principles. These were: (i) the principium rationis sufcientis endi or principle of sufcient reason or ground of becoming; (ii) the principium rationis sufcientis cognoscendi or principle of sufcient reason or ground of knowing; (iii) the principium rationis sufcientis essendi or principle of sufcient reason or ground of being; (iv) the principium rationis sufcientis agendi or principle of sufcient reason or ground of acting. The second of these required knowledge to have sufcient grounds, and the third that the properties of things should be internally constitutive and reciprocally related. The last principle was manifest in human willing in action, complementing the rst principle about universal causality (Schopenhauer, 1847). ) Endnotes 8, 19, 25. 19. Formation process. One way to interpret Spinozas point is to regard his preferred denition as a directive or norm setting out instructions to be followed in the construction of a circle, rather than a proposition stating truth-conditions of circularity (cf. Brandom, 1994; Ross, 1968; von Wright, 1963). To follow the instructions, you should (have to) ensure that one end of a piece of string is xed and so immobile, and then you should (have to) move the other end, but always ensuring that the string preserves its full length, i.e. it remains fully stretched. Interpretation follows in the next Endnote. ) Endnotes 18, 20, b. 20. Rotation of a line. Instructive comments were made by one of Piagets colleagues, the logician Jean-Blaise Grize: let E be a circumference created by the rotation of a segment, E the equal radii of its circumference and E1 the length of an invariant segment in the rotation. E is a consequence of E and E1 one of its conditions. This leads to the following diagram
retroactive implication E1 < E proactive implication > E'
The proactive implication E E0 is what makes the consequence E0 necessary. The retroactive implication E1 E is what makes condition E1 necessary. What is, in sum, found there is the necessary reason for the contingent fact of the equality of the radii of a circumference: in the gloss due to Grize, the equality would be contingent, if it is detached from its foundation whose basis lies in its formation process (quoted in Henriques et al., 2004, p. 112; see also Pieraut-Le Bonniec, 1990). This interpretation could lead to contrary responses. One is a direct challenge that Piagets preferred denition of circularity is open to objection. What if the string is elastic? What if the string is reduced in length half way through its mobility? What if an ellipse is drawn rather than a circle? Is it ever possible to draw a perfect circle? These are all standard questions in philosophical skepticism (cf. Naess, 1968). The other challenge is more apparent than real. What if a child believes that the string either is elastic, or functions as a piece of elastic? What if the childs reasons are based on the nonconservation of area, length, number (Piaget, 1970a)? Yes, indeedand thats the point. In setting out his denition, Spinozas own reasoning was conserving, based on the
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assumption that all human minds operate at the same level. According to Piaget, this is falsesee Endnote 1. Further, its falsity has an epistemological basis evident in Piagets reference to the historico-critical philosophy of Leon Brunschvicg (e.g., 1927): what appeared necessary at one point in history does not always appear so in the sequel (Piaget, 1925, p. 196). Piagets point is not merely that liability to error is a fact of life, but also that some errors are errors only from the vantage point of a higher level of construction. In Euclidean geometry, an apparent necessity, that one and only one parallel line could be drawn through a point external to a straight line, is falsied in Riemanns geometry where there is no such parallel line. Piagets proposal is that any level of constructionsuch as the formation of conserving reasoning about circularitycan be xed by reference to bi-directional reasons as conditions and consequences. ) Endnotes 1,19, 28, 35. 21. Presuppose. One of several explicit references made by Piaget to normativity in his model of the mind, in this case to the normatively necessary relations between reasons. ) Endnotes 9, 27. 22. Spiral. In Recherche, Piaget (1918, p. 59) claimed that the development of knowledge occurs in a circle of sciences. He later changed this to a spiral on the grounds, rstly, that circles can grow in size and, secondly, this growth can be hierarchical (Piaget, 1950a, pp. 4142). Notice that the former rules out any account of the preformation of human knowledge, and the second rules out any conception of the advance of knowledge as rectilinear growth (cf. Smith, 2003). 23. Zubel and Wells. Rosita Zubel and Angela Wells worked on different studies in Project 11 (cf. Table 1; see Endnotes 9 and 10). A draft paper by the former is included as an Appendix (in Henriques et al., 2004). In planning a car rally, children, aged 4:6 to 11:8 years, were shown a three-dimensional landscape so as to work out the possible routes between different locations, avoiding various obstacles using different ways to travel. Their task was to ascertain the best route on any trip, i.e. the one that it was necessary to take. Interestingly, the main difference was not linguistic. Both Cristel, aged 4:9 years and Madeleine, aged 11:4 years, used modal words in reference to necessity (il faut, il faudrait). Rather, what differed was their use of necessity in their overall understanding, Cristel in relation to the avoidance of obstacles, Madeleine in relation to an objective check through measurement. 24. Proofs, verications. Piaget drew this distinction in different wayssee Endnote 16. Another way is between observables and coordinations, between what the subject believes he has observed [and] inferences, implicit or explicit (Piaget, 1985, pp. 3738). Yet another is by reference to the distinction between the generality in empirical contingencies and all-and-always universality (Kant, 1790, p. 98), restated thus by Piaget (1995, p. 178): it is well known that in logic universal and general do not mean the same thing. ) Endnote 16. 25. Cournot, Antoine Augustin. Piaget had this to say about Cournots (1875) position. The central idea behind rational thought is, according to Cournot, the notion of order that binds reasons and consequences one to another in terms of their own constructive connections with each other, and does so objectively and subjectively. There exists, indeed, an objective reason for things, and such reasons hang together one to another in terms of an order in reality, thus a subjective reason the notions in which order themselves as a function of that objectivity: the objective reason is found, so said Cournot of demonstrative proof, subjective reason is satised which means that notion-order has
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met up with reality-order. Now, this rational order differs from logical order, which is linear just like discourse order, whence the ineffectiveness of the syllogism in the advance of scientic knowledge and the role of construction of a priori synthesis in the discovery of truth. Indeed, the existence of rational order is recognized in this, that several possible equally logical demonstrations of one and the same proof do not have the same explanatory value, for only that one that ties together the order effective in construction really accounts for that truth. In the same way, the reason for things is not to be conated with their cause: e.g. if a lucky combination provides some singularity, that very singularity has a cause, but it does not have a reason, and that is why it strikes us (Piaget, 1950b, p. 216, emphasis in original. See also Henriques et al., 2004, pp. 86ff). ) Endnote 18. 26. Introduce new necessities. Necessities (sic)note the plural. It could be objected that this claim has not substantially advanced the position that Piaget stated sixty years previously about the reasoning of young children [whose] thought is devoid of logical necessityy there is here, if one likes, a logic of action but as yet no logic of thought (Piaget, 1928, pp. 146, 212). Au contraire, it is the main problem that is epistemologically intractable, namely the distinction between necessary truths of reason and contingent truths of fact (Leibniz, 1996). Childrens knowledge is initially knowledge of people and physical objects, a reality that provides regularities which are more or less general but devoid of necessity (Piaget, 1986, p. 308). How, then, could any necessity be constructed? One proposal is to regard the construction of necessities as a regulative function of reason: the necessity of establishing necessities, without which deductive activity becomes impossible [is a central principle of the mind, always providing that] this normative principle of the necessity of necessities is merely regulative and in no way species what is necessary (Piaget, 1986, p. 312). But this proposal simply knocks the problem one step back. Besides reason interpreted regulatively can lead to the formation of pseudonecessitiessee especially Endnotes 12 and 28. ) Endnotes 2, 12, 16, 28, 29. 27. Reconstitutions. Another reminder of normativity, in this case with regard to developmental progression. The implication is that an adequate developmental mechanism could not be wholly causal. In turn, this places a major restriction of the explanatory adequacy of causal psychology (roughly, most 20th century psychologySmith, 2006a). ) Endnote 9, 15, 21. 28. Pseudo-necessities. Taking a cue from Piaget (1922), a pseudo-necessity is a (i) necessity (ii) that is false (iii) in a context of co-possibilities discounted without good reason. For example, PHI was shown a box whose ve visible sides were white and was then asked the color on the back, replying whitey because the box is all white, so the back cant be another color (Piaget, 1987, p. 31). Thus PHI (i) has given his version of the Aristotelian denition of necessity as that which cannot be otherwise (Smith, 2002a, p. 115) and also (iii) knows there are colors other than white, and so (ii) the alleged necessity is false, not a necessity at allthe back could be another color. ) Endnotes 12, 20, 26. 29. Necessities are not observables. The construction of necessary knowledge was repeatedly stated by Piaget to be a major problem in his epistemology (for references spanning Piagets uvre over fty years, see Smith, 2002a, p. 110). This problem is fundamental, well known to Plato, and well dened by Kant (1787, B1B3): though all
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our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience [since] experience teaches us that a thing is so and so, but not that it cannot be otherwise. ) Endnote 16, 26. 30. Leibniz. Piaget (cf. ipse intellectus, 1953, p. 2 and 1966, p. 285; nil est sine ratione, 1986, p. 314) may have had in mind the following passages: Reason is so-called, if it is the cause not only of our judgments, but also of truth itself [in that] the cause of things is tied to the reason for truths. This is why cause itself is often called reason (Leibniz, 1765, Bk IV, chapter 17, Section 1). All truthseven the most contingenthave an a priori proof, or some reasons why they are truths rather than not. And this is just what is meant when it is commonly said that nothing happens without a cause, or that there is nothing without a reason (Leibniz quoted in Ishiguro, 1972, p. 113). (Contrary to empiricism) nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu, excipe: nisi ipse intellectus (there is nothing in the intellect that was not rst in the sensesyes: except the intellect itself; Leibniz, 1765, Bk II, chapter 1, Section 2). 31. Truth and falsity/acceptance or rejection. An elegant restatement of this view was provided by the founder of modern logic: to think is to grasp a thought. Once we have grasped a thought, we can recognize it as true (make a judgment) and give expression to our recognition of its truth (make an assertion) (Frege, 1906, p. 185; for commentary, see Smith 1999a,b). It is one thing to have ideas in a representational mind; it is something else to make true or false judgments. Reason is intrinsic to human judgment. If I am now thinking of snow falling on the summit of Mount Everest, I may have no reason for this. But if I judge this to be so and I have no reason why, you can reasonably question my judgment. ) Endnotes 8, 15. 32. Three types. Piaget announced three types of instruments, but specied only two of them in this paragraph. Both of the types that he speciedproactive and retroactive reasonsdeal with implicational necessities. In turn, these necessities are generative of further reasons linking them severally or jointly in systems. Arguably, the third type of instrument is their reciprocal relationship in higher-order systems (cf. Piaget, 1985, p. 73). ) Endnote 35. 33. Foundation. The view that knowledge is only as good as its foundations has many sponsors. If one builds a house in a sandy place, one must continue digging until one meets solid rock or rm foundations (Leibniz, 1686, p. 93). Piagets stance was more modest, comparable to the view that good foundations are not in fact available to human minds. Although we had contemplated building a tower which should reach to the heavens, the supply of materials sufces only for a dwelling-house, just sufciently commodious for our business on the level of experience and just sufciently high to allow of our overlooking it. The bold undertaking that we had designed is thus bound to fail through lack of materialnot to mention the Babel of tongues, which inevitably gives rise to disputes among the workers with regard to the plan to be followed, and which must end by scattering them over all the world, leaving each to erect a separate building for himself, according to his own design (Kant, 1787, B735).
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34. Relativity. Relativity in the sense of relationalism, not relativism. Relativism rules out objectivity that is specically required by Piagets (1954, p. 3; 2001, p. 318) model. One version of relationalism was invoked by Piaget (1950c) in his epistemological model. Another was invoked in his social statement in which both atomism (as in Auguste Comte) and holism (as in Emile Durkheim) were rejected in favor of exchange comprising the relationships among individuals (Piaget, 1995, p. 136; for commentary, see Mays & Smith, 2001). ) Endnotes 3, 8. 35. Overarching power (force densemble). This seems to have a family resemblance to overarching structure (structure densemblestructured whole, total structure; cf. Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). But the basic point is epistemological. A structure is one type of framework, matching formal structures in science. In childrens action and thought can be found hybrid framework that do not match structures in sciencesee Endnote 12. Since the great Newton was once a child, the issue in Piagets research program is to chart the (dis)continuities in these frameworks. All knowledge can be considered as being relative to a given previous state of lesser knowledge and also as being capable of constituting just such a previous state in relation to some more advanced knowledge (Piaget, 1950a, p. 13). This general claim ts the particular proposal in this paper about the contribution of retroactive conditions and proactive consequences. Any particular level or organization is nothing but a short-lived crystallization, always transcended in fact by the mind in its functioning (Piaget, 1931, p. 160). ) Endnotes 1, 12, 20, 32. References
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New Ideas in Psychology 24 (2006) 129 www.elsevier.com/locate/newideapsych

1977 1978 1979

1980 1987 2004 Toward a logic of meanings Reason

n/a 1991 2006

Source: adapted from Ducret (2000).

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