BATTALION AND S 1 ~ UNIT

STUDY NO 1
Published by History Section,
European Theater of Operations
This Document is
Published Solely
for the Guidance
of History Teams
And as an Exhibit
to COlmnanders who
Are Concerned with
Their Hork.
81 JAN 1945'
....
UNCLASSifiED
The followi ng are :r ea lized her e, but rather t han
delay manus cri pt for you they l'18r e not correct ed :
1. Certain nanes have no initials , ' others have . ' The
;t'ollowi ng a re wi t hou t initial s : J ohnson, J'ansen , Burd , Wood ,
Snodgrass , Howell and Seal . Ought to be unif orm, '
2 . On page 3 i t i s diff i cult to f ollow t he br i d&; e s as
to which is nUl'uber one , number t wo, number t hr ee 1 nur:1ber fom:- .
3. The poi nt Y on the map is difficult to f i nd on a c
c ount of its size.
4. The f low of the AlA River should be shown by s ome con.,..
vent i on .
5 Ther e s hould be a graphi c s ca l e on al;L the ma p's or
at lea st an a pprox i mat e onG.
6. So::ae naps lack the conven tional . s i gn for bridge .
7. The C.r . on page 6 i s not sho1'l!l on
the na p ncr is t tla t o ;."11 of on page 8.
8 . Firs t line , s econd par agr aph , page 9 "Cons i derably
to the wes t of Veche l:
t
i s all
9 . Top of page 10 yar ds out f rom r ailroad\I ,
il out f ron
a
i ndefin i t e .
10. Bottom of: page 10 w.!OO(i S a t Zwande:l.ber g
ll
not on map .
11. Bottom of page 10 aAt t l: i s point t hElr e occurre d t he
f i rst cont act wit h the enemy . It St atem.ent vIT i t h
top page 10 and fifth line bottom page 5.
12. Four t h l i ne page 11 should r ead : S'I'ACa and LT GEORGE
MtmN were a little forward of the I1vTG' s .
13. EottorJ. page 11 "more t han tha t c ould not be done . 11
There s hould a ppear no opinion by the author .
14. Red Barn should a ppea r on IE t o connect with previ ou.s
story.
15, Page 16 La ve dQnk not given on na p .
16. : rom bottom pago 17 should
be shovm
",
17. 10th line , page 19 , we should i ndi cate where G-2
i dent ificat ion mi ght be found .
18. Page
fZl, the plan should be shovm on a map .
19 . Page
21',
tenth line from bot tom ?fnade
ll
shoul d be "rooke'
20 . Page 21, fourth l ine from bottom, Bloorngard not shown
on map .
21 . Mi ddl e page 22 "( see lA)n should be placed aft er St .
Oedenorde.
22 . Sixth ,line f rom bott om page 2.3, " twin vvindmill VI
should be accounted for on map .
2.3. Same for uNunneryll page
24 . "Mutually eAclusiv8 If top page 27 probably not
understood .
25. Top paGe .3 0 . "Upper" , and ;tlowel'i\ part s of t own for
A and C Co:;:rrpanie s defil.:.i te !,
26 . The direct ion of the I'oads out of Scb.ijndel to Weerde
and st . Oedenrode do not jibe on IA and
27. Page 32 , Koevering not on map"
28. Third line , second paragraph page 36 , Erpgemert ought
to have indicated on the map at l east i t s approximat e direct'io:
29. Date of aotion given on map IF but not given in body
of particular account to Dat e of action not reache
until bottom of page .37, when we find September 25 two days
afterward
.30. IF appears to have muoh on it whioh is not explained
in the text
.31 . lG is tipped in ups i de down
.32 . Last line 1st paragraph , page .39 Bowser not on map.
.3.3 . Reference to IG a hit late . Should be on page .37 and
also mentioned on page 47 .
.34 . Seoond . .. gence
sb.ould be indioated r athe- : ' '. (:) '1 18 ly on
the authority of the vrrite
S . L. A. MARSIlf-LL, '
Lieutenant Colonel , GSC ,
Deputy Theater Histori an .
I
,.

\ The Bat t a l i on opera tion her eina fter
...
- -
of t he
1create
!
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:8
.

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t,

,
1
q
Hol land
airborne l\IARKET whereby
)CO[ COr2}S , 2nd Br i tish iu:my , c ould move a cross the I'Teder
Rhine and up i t s r:i ght bank into GerIi1any . Bn 1, 501s t Para- :1

chute I nfantry , 101s t Divi s ion , was dropped North of the q
VA..ART Cana l t o s e i ze ' a nd hold t ha t pa rt of the cor- j
.
l ",.,j
The opera t i on s 0 :[' all of t he Ameri can BattalioTl s were covered
in the same de t ail as 501-1 El nd the t a ct ica l s t ory is c om
pl et e . However , f or s us t a i ned a ct i on ::l nc. r esult s , the op
er a tion of 501-1 i s a n s tud. y a nd embr a c es s ome
unique tac t i ca l va lues . r
..
1 t he s u s t a i ned he l p of t he

..
The nar rat ive v'las deve loped wi th
l3n Comrilander and hi s Staf f , a ll
,,: c ompany offic ers , a nd f i nE' ly , the :tTl'3 n of t lle c ompanies .
, They were then in t he f'ront line ala", the southern bank of
t he nort hern arm of'

vTe e'K of 15 Oct 1944 .
v
,
. '"'.
<;
it
\
i


rel}Ort e d was par t
it \ vas inte nded to i
an airborne- prot ec ted corridor from t lle Belg ian-
j
border to Arnhem, t. hrough which the column of the
i
a
v;
the RHDJE . The work wa s done dur ing t he
orb d . . th
wer e no ( l SCrepanc l es 1n e
i. s t ol.'y . , All of t he l iving \I'.1ho are mentioned in the
. l
;
stor y and who were still on duty with the i r un i t s contr i but
t ry a t tacks descri bed i n ~ ~ i s nar rat i ve are cover ed in t he
separ ate r eport on the artillery.
\ .

;,
{

In t he beginning , 501 was given VECHEL as its objective,and
Rgt was supposed to mainta in the corridor def onse in that
.
..
,
general area En 1 was assigned to drop on the southern side
of the WILLEMS VAART CANAL. The En Commander , LIEUT COL
HARRY W. KINNARD, however, r equested of COL JOHNSON, the Rgtl
THE APPROACH AND Commander , that he be p8rmitted to
THE DROP
put the Bn down between the canal '

and the RIVER Aa, and this change was accordingly made. The


i : strip thus s el ected was about 1600 yds wide and upon confer


ence with COL WHITAKER, group commof 4.34th 'WC, it was agreed

'
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i,
Ii
that the change was operationally practicable . ThG En, with
J4
,(1
42 planes in its s orial, was the first to come in; of these

h

pl anes , 36 carried the En, .3 wera for an att ached plat of

:/t-,
nc ft, )26th Eng , and tho othors were RGT Rio/, planes. The origi-
L; v
?,.,
nal drop zono was SE of EERDE; the change in plan was design- "

od to got tho Bn over the water obstacles and land !
..
l\J 65- 285. approximate to VEcm L (or '11ho flight over
7

j
"'-''>; was excellent. The weather was fair and the day almost cloud- !o(

,
less. The serial hit all of the early check points including

the marking ship in tho Channe l. The fightor s wer e coming
1
:t along wolle While the serial was still ovor water, the Path- t

:i finder pIanos passod overhGad and f'l '3w on. l..s they came into ,
r
. . '
Holland, WHITAKER remarked to KINN.iillD that IllS mtips were not /

" 4i b;:. " ,
, ..
. ..n ... 4;-h .....\v.... I.: .. .. ,
. "" ' - '1: 1-:: ," ' '\ - . lrln, :.r
I
spaces. But he hit the last check point OK and KINNARD then
went back and hooked up---4 minutes from the enemy line. The
run-in from the IF was uneventful except for a light scatter
ing of flak. The men saw the British arty positions, then
the line of foxholes, and following that, the enemy foxholes '
and arty positions. The serial was then flying at 1500 feet;

it descended evenly to 450 ft over a 20 min period. A few
.f
,
f
minutes out, rug bullets ripped the wings of the lead plane
i
,
.'
t
't
'.
.l
and the fire shifted to which followed Yet only one
f
.-
r
,.
'j. man, LIEUT JANSEN,was hit fatally at this stage. He remain- j'
ed in the plane and became the only man of the Bn who did not #

;;

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.
,\ "
.1
jump.
f;.'
;
p

At the final check point just before the drop---the canal ne; 'r
I
: EINDHOVEN---- the course didn't seem just right to KINNARD. J'
.r.
i: As the plane went on to the WILLEMS VAART, he looked out Of ,!
, l
'i the right window VECHEL. It wasn't thero and he t
see any rail line. Then the green light flashed. The No 5\
\ man was just getting out the door when KINNARD saw another
\ stream go under the left wing and knew that his mon were dr1P

at the wrong point. He
tried to oriont himself as he \
but the time was too briof. Othorwi se , all that he
. s aw satisfied him that the Bn was coming down in good shape. \
i
The chutes were bunched tightly together. He had to "slip"
"

\
his chute to miss other men in mid-air .and when he hit the
I
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,
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- 2
4 ,,)
-)
,
,.
C.S. CS NO. 2541
SHEET NO. 5
HOLLAND
SCALE 1:100.000
J
MEREN
JilWSWIJK
DINTER
..,
- _ . 4 0
\1
,"
"
eN TN
LECEND
X =POINT 465-385
'( =KASTEEL
30
~ / ' ,P' / C:.J .)
30
U ......IAM ..... tl.,....'.;. U\o :\ 1f'.... .. ..... ....... .. ""J..'-...:.
'-
to scramble quickly to avoid be-ing crashed by ground he had

The bundle
lights had been so rigged up that they would drop right in
the middle of the stick. The Bn had been briefed that any
man who dropped where he could see a bridge should go straight
for it, whatever hj. s unit. However, the specific assignments
had been made that one plat of "A" was to go at once to the
lower RR bridge and one plat from "C" to the upper bridge
over the Aa RIVER. A plat from "B" was to move at once on
the road bridge in VECHEL.
KINNARD landed near a road and at once saw the large bldg that
is identified on the map as the "Y>ASTEEL" (See Sketch lA).
THE ADVANCE TOWARD But he still did not know where he
( VECHEL
was and he sent PVT BATTS of the
S2 Section OVer to the road in quest of information. BATTS
found a Hollander who told him that they were at KANlERAN--
6 kilometers from VECHEL---about 5 miles NW of where they were
due to drop. Upon getting this info
t
KINNARD decided to as
semble Bn on the OR near the KASTEEL and use the latter as a
Bn aid station to care for his drop casualties. KINNARD's
orderly was among the injured; KINNARD never saw him
"\. .... , .,-.'1".:-- ',, ;:.c' :-
after getting him to the KASTEEL. its orange '1"
r ,and the body of the "
K "
I I
\ men moved toward the CR. Viithin 15 mins, all company commander ;'
\ had rptd and the Bn was formed for the approach march with "E" I

"J"''''' _''"'''-..... '". '''.Jf:i r.1'VIt"1I j. \ ....

,-.
'......... J"i": .1
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...,' "'.:...
M

...

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''::o \' i(...oj; ' .


J<'.i.'-"q
...... ..... _
"
...;tl. .. .... ... "..... n" .... .. ..'" .
- 3
as advance guard, "A" covering flanks, . "ctt as rear guard and
HQ coming down the road in center of the formation.
Hollanders were coming to the road from all sides until their
numbers became confusing. They crowded in trying to shake
hands with KINNARDts men, offering them fruit and other gifts
. '
-. and asking if they could be of help. KINNARDts officers took
their bicycles over for use of their own messengers and issu
ed memo receipts for them as the Bn continued to move along.
CAPT BURn of HQ CO was told to clear the countrymen away ex
cept for a detail which he was to use in collecting the Bn
bundles, and after the collection, he was to move via the main;
'f
1
'"
i'
road to VECHEL. During the hour or less when the Bn was get
:i
ting squared away for its advance, ftC n was covering the DZ. '
'i\ .
I
After it moved, BURD would be on his own with about 46 men,
i'}

including 8 cripples and the 38 nondescripts which he was us
!
"
i

ing in collecting the bundles and establishing the temporary

,.
:;
t
-t aid station; it was figured that this group would be able to
i
t

withdraw in rear of the Bn without undue difficulty.
,,'.
I
Because speed was the essence, the Bn moved right down the
',
ft'
. main road. It encountered stray German parties coming up the
, I

\
,
road in motor cars---but nothing else .. . . All were killed or
without loss to the Bn either in men or momentum.
,t
When the head of the column reached DINTER (or DINTHER) , it
rn: \ t LIEUT Bn 82, coming back down the road with a pick
., .. -'!.,i,..#',.t;;,". , . .,.._:.. ' . ""'1 ':"':' :"') .-. ... ,'.' ...... < ,.,>-\ '" : .:.. . . -<:. -..
r Up truck and a Hollander---identifie..Q. .f?,.9 ... 9f., the tlnder- . J
1 -rI "e)' :., .. : ....."t, ..<... <Io 1 .. .' " ....,;.,..... . . ..: '.. :'''. " . . . .. :\':'1. ; ).' ......... r"), ' . .
ground in DINTERi Into that truck and another truck taken
w.:t; 4_, ...
from a German party, sqds were loaded. A machine gun was
mounted on the first and the group rolled on, ahead
of the column. The main body continued marching and where the
highway comes athwart the RR bridge, KINNARD encountered 13 of
his own men. Some running, some cycling, they had raced right
on from the drop and had seized No 4 bridge while Bn was still
assembling. KINNARD sent his demo officer, LIEUT LEE J.
BOVVERS, one mile up the RR to blow a section of rail. At the
same time, he learned from the "C" men who had seized the upper
bridge that a group of "E" men under LIEUT SNODGRASS had al
ready come up and secured the No 3, lower, bridge. KINNARD
then got on a truck and headed for the road bridge over the
RIVER Aa. Hearing firing up ahead, he dismounted and advanced
on foot with his radio man. CAPT S.AIVIMTE N. HmW\J, En Exec,
r- who had jumped No 1 on the right wing plane with the mission of
going at once to No 3 bridge and securing it, met him just
after he had started and told him that LIEUT HOWARD of HQ CO,
with about 30 men, was already in VECHEL and engaging a small
detachment in .. . . .'
("the ,J
They had killed a few and captured a few and were
,..__.,r
still in good shape. By radio, word came from Rgt that an
enemy tank had broken through road bridge No 1 and was headed
- 5
i
. '
toward VECHEL..
. . .. ..... . ':'. .
( p--roa.. the town and then continued with the mop-up. A f

.' , little past the center of V'ECHEL, the lead scout of Bn I bump-
, < \
{
, \ ed into the lead scout of Bn 2. This meant that Rgt had secured f
all four bridges---the Rgtl mission: The hour was 1630. They {
I
> i had jumped at 1330. KINNARD then rptd his situation to Rgt and i
'( his company commanders joined him at the German CPo His Bn was '
still on the road and only just beginning to enter VECHEL. "B" a
...

was sent to cover VECHEL on the SE, "C" to cover the RR bridges
1
is
fight had developed at the KASTEEL and that BURD and his men
TROUBLE AROUND were being roughly handled. He had
THE KASTEEL
just left that area and had heard
the KINNARD discounted the story but as a precaution
sent LIEUT HOViTELL, Bn Sup Officer, and a few men west to the
KASTEEL to look things over. As they moved out, COL JOHNSON
called the Bn Commanders down to Bridge No 1 to give them ad
ditional instructions about organizing the VZClffiL defenses and
KINNARD then told him of BURD's situation. Bn l's dispositions
were not materially changed. Upon returning to his CF at
VECHEL, he heard by radio from HO"JELL that the men at KASTEEL
- 6
."'
J
were beleaguered and hotly fought by a force of perhaps 50
Germans and a number of mortars. The Americans, caught at
their work, had fallen back into the bldg. KINNA..RD asked
permission to send "C" to relieve the KASTEEL . Johnson replied
"Send one platoon. Your task is to defend VECHEL.tt
It was almost dark when LIEUT RAFFETY (later KIA) and 3rd Flat
started. Meanwhile a few men who had been around KASrI"EEL but
had gotten away before the Germans closed on it, straggled in
to the CP. They said the situation was "hot" and that the
defense did not appear to be organized. and his men
got as far as HEESVVIJK., r an into a small group of enemy in the
dark, were aggressively opposed, and proce.eded to dig in for
the night---BOO yds short of the objective. KINNARD alerted
the rest of "C" to move if needed. There was no contact with
enemy around VECHEL that night except that then,. and through
the next morning, German vehicles continued to blunder into
the roadblocks and were promptly captured or destroyed.
RAFFETY rptd soon after first light that the Germans were in
KASTEEL and that he was being opposed by two platoons which
were closing around both of his flanks. KINNARD said to JOHN
SON: "I'll have to pull him back or support him,1I and JOHNSON
replied: "Then pull him bacl{:." RAFFETY disengaged and fell
back on VECHEL. There was no other action on D Plus One. The
Dutch underground brought in word that there were 700 enemy
in Bn initiated vigorous patrolling in that direction,
- 7
I
and the 18-30 man patrols drew fire as they moved over the
ground between the roads and the river. BEUG was supposed to
mark the limit of Bn l's patrolling but KINNARD asked permis
sion to send a patrol all the way to KASTEEL to see what had
happened. "C" was given the mission and S/SGT DeHUFF took
charge of the patrol. He took .along a 300 SCR and from the
time he and his men quit the Bn area, every stage of his
progress was rptd,. At 1300 he told KINNARD: "I am now at
KASTEEL. The wounded are gone. There are no signs of our men
here but bloody bandages. The DZ is almost clear of bundles.
have found one 81 and one 60 mortar and have them with me.
The mission is complete. Our force has been lost. What are
your instructions?" He was told to return to VECHEL. Then
KINNARD asked permission to send "C" to HEES'vIJK and DINTER,
with one plat at the former place, so as to outpost the entire
force: He figured that the main threat toRgt was from that
flank. JOHNSON approved and "C" was sent on its way. So end
ed the third day. The move of tiC" initiated the whole series
of events which came to engage first the Bn and then the entirt
Rgt. It was obvious that the Germans had filtered in in con
siderable strength along the N side of the canal as any at
tempt at movement along the highway during the third day drew
fire. They made one attempt to get at No 3 bridge but were
driven back. They also hit hard at the planes flying re-suppl;:;
missions into the DZ.
- 8
,.'
,
ENEMY
DUC IN
POSITIONS
ELIMINATED BY
C-501
STRONC
ENEMY
DUG IN
POSITIONS
\ /"
, ~ O A D
1 ' BLOCK
PLATOO HEESWIJ K
RB
~
.. 0930
~ .
00
, ,
.. ,
,
II'
II
SITUATION AT 1000 HOURS

of the VECHEL area might in the long run be the costlier way
and that taking offensive measures against the enemy was more
PLANS FOR TAKING likely to preserve the corridor.
THE OFFENSIVE
Accordingly on the third night, he
proposed to JOHNSON that Bn 2 hold VECHEL and Bn 1 make a
sweep along the highway to KASTEEL, then return with its right
shoulder resting on the CANAL while Bn 3 made a corresponding
sweep to the South of the canal. JOHNSON disapproved, feel
ing that he should keep Hgt concentrated on the vital area.
However, KINNARD persisted and on the fourth day JOHNSON ap
proved the plan in part: Bn 1 would be permitted to assemble
at VECHEL and make the sweep to north of the Canal.
. I"; .
(NOW "e" was already formed on IIEESWIJJS:, considerably to the
l west of VECHEL. KINNARD therefore decided to have "C" deploy
f to the S of and to include the bridge over the Canal
Iwithin its ground: He would then use "G" as the dustpan, and
..
the other two companies as the broom sweeping toward it (See
-;
' .
r'
.
i Sketch lC). The distance of the sweep would be 5 miles and

II
it would cover the ground betwGGn highway and Canal, which
I
rsector was bisected almost evenly by the Aa RIVER. The attack
,
jumped-off at 0930 and "c" started its move from HEESVHJK to
the Canal at about the same time. "B" was on the left with
,
its left shoulder on the Canal. ttAl1 was on the right, . echelon7
f
ed to the right rear, and guiding on "B". When "B" got 1000 /
J"
-[
, .. .,
r- -: ,' ."..),. ',. .... , '. : 4' . "
.' .
- 9 - .
.'
.
Bn S3, LIEUT SEAL, with orders to have "A" push up and put a
1:
r it. flanking fire on the enemy, "B" meanwhile building up a base
l

of fire .

But 'iA" was already having its own troubles. The Co, under
C.APT STANFIELD A, STACH, had moved out with 2nd Plat on the
left and 3rd Plat on the right, 1st Plat in support being
echeloned to right rear and following 3rd witD-in seeing distanc
1
---approximately 300 yds. One section of lJJGs from HQ was at
tached to the Co. There were two difficulties in keeping the
Co collected. The Aa RIVER intervened so as to form the
platoon boundary, and there was a gap of several hundred yds
to the left separating "A" from "B". The lefthand squad of
"A" was supposed to be on continuing patrol keeping contact
between the two companies, but this it proved unable to do,
and in its wanderings it got lost to the company so that it
became a cypher in the crisis of the action. The LMG section
followed along on the left bank of the river and STACH went
along with the guns, figuring that this was where he was most
likely to be needed. Visibility was good until "A" came next
to the woods at ZWANENBERG: At that point there occurred the
- 10
<
IS
CONTACT SOUAD
DRIFTED WAY
1 B
RED BARN
}"IJj
,'

501-A
o It...
if
IAJ
ACTION
M LR ALONe ..y I
THIS DITCH
I
x TURNER
KILLED 'tv6

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\ 'Q
XTURNER c.
SEEN HERE r'Y..L
.,

.,\ t.. 1 r" .,\ l,
"\ ,, , ..\ ,
.. M"
FROM ACTION
AN IZED.
,

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., \ ,
X
PULHASKI
BELOW
HEESWIJK
t
KILLED
/ \ BALANCE
OF 3 A l.,

;:,


I
I
" , ,",
HIGH CRASS
,1) , ..'.

!

.. . /
ADvANCE BY STACH
THIS SQUAD DISORG - ; .
I
3 UP WITH '. 'J
TURNER, OTHERS S ATTERED /'
IN WOODS, 1 KILLE]I /
SCALE
([I
II
j
,1fI. -.. MOVED FROM THIS. '\

POINT 10 DITCH f5Z} ___) _ ._. _ __. __ I _
first contact with the Machine gun fire had opened
from the windmill on the right bank. (See Sketch lB). It
had done no initial damage. LIEUT BILLY TURNER of 2nd Plat,
STACH and LIEUT GEORGE MORN were frd in a little of the LMGs
FIGHTING ACROSS on the left bank at this time and
THE AA ,
were working their way across a
field when they saw four Germans in the weeds about 100 yds
away. No one fired and STACH called on the Germans to sur
render. Instead, they flopped into a drainage ditch and dis
appeared. STACH called back for two rugs, got them up to the
ground where he and the others had been standing: Then he
and his lieutenants crawled on through a high-weeded pasture.
They saw ahead of them a line of trees with flanking ditches
providing fairly good cover and they guessed this was the
enemy position. As they got to within 125 yards of it, rifle,
rug and mp fire enveloped them and the party became pinned.
TURNER and his plat sgt crawled on another 40 yds, dropped in
to a drainage ditch, and tho others lost sight of them. STACH
sent a runner back to the with word that the whole sec
, tion should get frd. It took them 10 minutes to get moving
but it "seemed like an hour" to STACH and he became so anxious
that he crawled ba ck to get them. One rifle sqd from the 2nd
Plat and 1 rug got frd by "fire and movement
a
to the ground
whero STACH had been. 'rhe other rugs were di s posed on the left
flank to fire over the ground separating the two companies
'and keep the enemy from enveloping tho line. More than that
- 11
could not be done. The contact squads had become lost and one
squad had been sent forward. The third squad of 2nd had lost
one man as the enemy fire opened, and the squad had thereon
scattered through the woods and was no longer a working unit.
If the company left was to advance itself, then strength would
have to be drawn from the right flank which was across the
river. The fire from the guns on the left, however, had caus
ed the enemy fire to falloff sharply, enabling the rifle
squad and the mg on the right to get all the way up to the
ditch where TURNER was pinned. He already had one prisoner--
a straggler who had been lying doggo in the ditch. He said
to TURNER: "Our men don't want to fight but the commander is
killing anyone who tries to sUl'render,"and he added that the
main line of resistance was about 100 yds to the left front
in a drainage ditch.
STACH re-grouped his mgs, 2 on the left, 1 next the river bank,
1 in the center. He then sent a runner to 1st Plat with word
that it was to cross the river via the bridge near the wind
mill. Pending its arrival, he ordered 1 rifle squad from 3rd
Plat to cross the Aa and get to him as quickly as possible,
then thought better of it, aL.l went in person across the river
to bring the squad back. The field intervening between STACH's
frd position and the enemy MLR was about 150 yds wide by 150
yds deep and was covered L:; wild plum trees and a rank growth
of weeds. TURNER had been told to have the guns ready so that
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when the force from acrOS$ river arrived, he CQuld cover
this field with a maximum fire to enable their approach. He
turned it loose as the squad from 3rd Plat came in on the
right flank. Under cover of the fire, the squad kept going
up the right flank, moving by bounds from ditch to ditch.
1st Plat arrived during this movement, got to the first
ditch and then took the same route as the squad. And as that
happened, LIEUT CECIL O. and six men on the left
charged directly into the open, going at a run for the road,
yelling and firing as they went. 1'his precipitate movement
stampeded the remaining el"lClmy from the forward line, though
the road was tree-covered and paralleled by As
the men closed in on the road and jumped into the ditch, the
enemy pulled Off through the ditches to the road on their
right---the main position---and to the red barn on down the
road. SGT BRUJt.1L& of HQ CO was killed as he made the charge
with FUQUAY but the others got to the road, took position
,
in the ditches and continued to fire toward the left front.
The squad on the right with STACH moved right along and
reached the road well to tho rightward of men, the
1 st Plat coming on behind them. From there, they saw TtJ"dNER
run out into the open field on "the left, stand there in the
open and yell for the enemy to come in and surrender. Some
of the Germans turned back and came toward our lines. LIEUT
SUMTER BLACKMAN, who had followed TURNER out, collected the
- 13
prisoners and headed them back. Then TURNER ran on to the
next field, stopped near the center of it and again called
loudly for a surrender. He got a bullet through his head
and died. But his machine guns had kept coming right on be
hind him. One of his gunners, PVT WEBB, was hit in the neck
by a bullet which severed his spinal cord. He fell near
TURNER. The enemy had completed his withdrawal to the di
agonal line and the red barn and automatic fire began to fall
amid the company like rain. The men sought the cover of the
ditches. "An,s prime need at the moment was contact with
"Bit and supporting fire from the Bn left flank. On the other
side of the RIVER Aa, Lli:UT HENRY J. 'PULHASKI had eliminated
the machine gun in the windmill. STACH sent him word to
press on to phase line 4 (See Overlay IE) with his remaining
squads. The Plat got out into an open field and began to
receive fire from the enemy in front of STACH. But on his
~ own side of the river,PULHASKI saw two Germans get up and
wave white handkerchiefs. He walked frd in the open. Then
someone fired a shot at close range. Instantly fire broke
out all along the line in front of P U L P ~ S K I and he fell,
riddled with bullets.
"Bit had come through somewhat similar misadventure. In the
first instance the company had come in check through trickery.
After advancing the first 1200 yds, the men saw a number of
white handkershiefs tied to the bushes ahead, and they pressed
- 14
,
on rapidly, thinking they had a surrender. In this way they
got sucked in to within about 300 yds of the German position.
Then fire---most of it high and ineffective---broke over them.
One man was hit in the shoulder and the rest of the men hit
the dirt.' LUUT IAN B. HAHILTON didn't fuss with his sit
uation. He sent word up and down the line: "In 10 minutes,
we will get up and go on." When the time had. elapsed, he
moved, and the men all got up and followed him. But the iriter
~ val had been well used. STACH had engaged the enemy SF at
close range on the right and had drawn a large part of the
bullet fire away from "Bi! . Too, the enemy had made the mis
take of not digging-in the positions of the three 20-mm guns
at the SF which were the chief harrassment of the advancing
infantry. From the ground where it went prone, "B" could see
these guns about 250 yds ahead and slightly off to the right.
A small group of riflemen crawled up to where they could drive
the Germans back from the guns; mortar fire completed their
destruction. This crippling of the enemy's principle arm had
almost decisive effect on the defensive action. Tho Germans
were also using two 81 and four 50-ram mortars but most of the
fire was falling well to tho rear of our men, and when the
20-mro guns were silenced, the mortar fire fell off. "B" then
moved on up, got to a ditch within olear view O f ~ and off to
the left of, the rod barn and conoentrated the fire of its
LMG seotion and 81 mortars on that objeot. So doing, it lift
ed the pressure from "A", oven though the companies were not
... 15
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SITUATION AT 1600 HOURS
,
L __
-- - - ~ ,
HEESWIJK ,
r
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I
in contact, and the enemy,. dealing with an aggressive infan
tryon one flank and receiving a withering fire from the
other; decided to quit. Fifty prisoners came out of the red
barn with their hands in air; that was the beginning of the
haul for the day and the end of the difficulties of the two
advancing companies. They made contact at the barn._ The
sector had narrowed (See Overlay IE) and the two companies
could now go frd shoulder to shoulder. They moved right along.
The back of the resistance had been b r o k e r i ~ Enemy fire had
fallen away to a whisper. The trap was fully set and patrols
moved along the highway to enfilade any enemy who tried to
break across it to the North. By 1500 "BIf was at LAVERDONK
with ",A" abreast and about 500 yds to go to DINTER. About
two reinforced companies of Germans had been distributed over
the positions southward of the windmill and all were now either
dead, prisoner, or fleeing in panic toward the rear where "C"
awaited their coming (See Sketch lD). 'rhe "dustpan" end of
the opening phase had been as spectacular as the results were
to be conclusive -. Under CAPT ROBERT H-.. PHILLIPS, the two
Plats of "C" which were at DIN'illR moved through HEESWIJK and
on to the canal about 1000 (See Sketch Ie). One Plat was
THE DUSTPAN left at lrEES'vIIJ"".K: as a RB force and
OPERATION
from that Plat one sqd was pulled
southward where they could cover the bridge across the Aa and
act as a block for the left flank. The rest pressed on.- Just
short of the bridge across the VHLLEMS VAART there is a small
- 16
"
collection of houses. As "C" got to within 150 yds of this
hamJet, it drew machIne gun fire from among them. The men
got down in the ditches alongside the road and volleyed into
the houses. The enemy vacated in a few minutes, getting out
the rear of the buildings, crossing the canal and raising
the drawbridge. "e" pressed on to the bank, and from behind
the covering dike, drove the Germans back from the opposite
shore with rifle fire. An attempt to cut the drawbridge chain
with rocket fire got no result, so under cover of fire from
the other men, LIEUT BRIERRE and one squad rowed across in a
small boat whi ch they fOUJJ!l tied to the bank, fanned out in a
covering position on the other side and then iowered the bridge
The Co was then disposed with one Plat north and qne south of
the bridge so as to serve as a buffer and establish the bridge
head at the same time. (It "vas this same bridge which was
used in the further advance of the Bn southward to SCHIJNDEL.)
At about 1200, "ClI began to draw small arms fire from Germans
moving westward against its line; the enemy moved to within
range, then took up ground in a more or less disorganized manne.
and fired uncertainly in "C"'s direction. Mortar fire from
within the position kept these scattered enemy at distance.
About 1500, the enemy made his all-out effort to break through
the noose. There was a wooded area on the right along the
canal and they moved that way in a rush. But PHILLIPS had al
ready put a machine gun on that bank and it caught them in the
- 17
/'
flank as they came in, mowed some of them down and drove the
others back. They then tried to work a trick, shouting,
tlKamerad" but coming frd with their arms. PHILLIPS sent word
by messenger that they'd have to put their arms down or he'd
fire. He already had their En Commander, having captured
him near the bridge early in the day, and when he suggested
to the German that he tell his men that further fighting was
useless, the German answered: "Never 1" The messenger return
ed. "They said to tell you they have plenty of time," he told
PHILLIPS. "They said it is too early in the day to surrender.'
PHILLIPS yelled at them: "I'm going to kill eVGry damned one
of you." His mortars had not opened on this large group at
all and the machine guns had gone quiet during the negoti
ations. He signalled them to let everything loose at once.
Within five minutes he witnessed this phenomenon--the Germans,
clinging to earth, were t hrowing their rifles and pistols
high in the air in token of surrender. So he told his men to
hold their fire. In the first group, 120 Germans came in,
dragging 40 wounded. Others came after them---250 all told
from the woods North of the canal and a handful from the south
shore. PHILLIPS had only 80 men at the position so he pulled
the other Plat down from HEES'4IJK.. In the morning he had
lost a sergeant shot through the hand while trying to coax
the Germans into a surrender along the canal bank, and that
was his only casualty of the day: The cover provided by the
- 18
4 '
OHEESWIJK
~ ,
,/5
/
A. CS,CS .... 27
.Sl MM /. SHEETSI8NE-18NW
/
1 PHASE LINES
/ /3 - IN THE __
~ ~ / ~ H-EE5WIJK ACTION
4 ,
SCALE I: 25000
'. . ~
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' , , - , ~ J" ' LD 0915
':
' ~ ~ \
i ': ;
.. : " ~
parallel ditches---the same ditches which had been used to
work south to the bridge---had made the German fire harmless. '
KINNARD in the meantime had circled around the north end of
his advancing line and had reached "Cil's position in time to
see the trap close. "B" and "A" came steadily on and at 1730,
"B"'s scouts moved into "CfI'S position. "N' had swung more
toward the highway to cut any final attempt at a break through.
The total bag netted 418 prisoners, 40 deadj 40 wounded,all
from the same unit---the ;i:'lALD or JUNGIVIRTH BN of a Parachute
Training Rgt. (See G2 identification notes; this operation.)
The Bn losses for the day were HQ Co, 1 DOW ~ "Aif, 2 off and 2
men KIA, 2 men LWA; "Bit, 1 man wounded; "Cit,. 1 wounded; IvIed, "
1 LWA.
, The annihilation of the German force in this \tsmall Cannae"
was accomplished by inferior numbers which had initially no
advantage whatever in potential fire p o w e r ~ The unhinging
blow was struok by the two companies maneuvering westward: ' It
is stated by prisoners of war t aken that afternoon that at the
time the line confronting "A" and nB" crumbled, the defenders
were without wire com.rnunication and did not know that "CII had
moved into the backstop position. Hence the first surrenders
were induced by the close-up fire fight and not by maneuver.'
\
The larger group which surrendered to "ClI, however, was al
ready beating back from the direction of the A-B assault when
first brought undor fire from "C". It appears probable that
- 19
this was their first intimation that there was an American
force on their rear. They did not know,. however, whether it
was a picket squad or an organized position and their early
quibbling with PHILLIPS is believed to have been a time-stall
ing and probing gesture. Yet it took only two well-placed
machine guns and four 60-mro mortars to convince them that they
were powerless. KINNARD, who romped through this whole op
eration as if it were an exercise, said this: "I had dreamed
of doing this thing many times---actually dreamed it, in my
sleep. Then the opportunity came. ' I do not believe any of
them got away. ff
As ' the companies came together, "0" pushed its bridgehead
about 200 yds farther S of the canal, "B" set up a perimeter
THE MOVE UPON defense around HEESHIJK and !fA"
SOHIJNDEL
around DINTER for the night. They
stayed there all the next day and were not engaged. On D
Plus 4, KINNARD was told that hG was to attack SOHIJNDEL on
D Plus 5. The success of the Bn had impressed JOHNSON with
the soundness of such undertakings on an even more extensive
scale and he was about to employ the Rgt south of the Oanal.
Already, however,. at HEES",H.P.t.: and DINTER, KINNARD was getting
a bitter taste from at leas t one consequence of his action.
The Dutch were breaking out their orange bunting, denouncing
the collaborationists in t llGir midst and putting up "Welcome"
signs. KINNARD knew that 110 would not be able to hold there,
- 20
and that shortly the Gernlans '!iould be back and would probably
take reprisals against all who had shovm their friendship for
the Allies. He was concerned for them on the one hand, and
on the other, he felt that he could not tell them that his
unit vvould be moving for 82curi ty reasons. He s aid: aI felt
li1<:e a damned heel every y.linute of the time.;;
At 1600 KINNAJW went to Rg t and got his orders for the next
day's at t ack. Tanks were to support him directly and he would
have an ample artillery. 501-1 VI/ould cross the canal and go
ri'::iht down the main roa d to SCHI JI\fn":::L: 501-3 under LIEUT
COL JULI.A.N E',121L would move on SCHIJl'IDEL along the RR from
EERDIG at the s aLle time. One squadron of 44th Hoyal Tank Rgt,
with 13 tanks, would participate in this pincer attack. From
Rgt, KLTUARD called his compa:l y comm.anders and told them to
get ready to meet him at the edge of the wood next the canal
upon his return so that tlley could ma.de a perimeter
reconnai s sance of the route of advance. He got back at
1715, and a lieutenant frora the tanks, riding in an armored
car, was alre ady at the company commander s , ready
to lead off in the r e connaissanc e . At that tline a patrol
-=- from ;lcn rptd that from a house to the west of the dike above
BOOMGAARD, they had drawn what they thought was .50 cal fire.
The recon just started to move . KINNARD was called to the
radio. It was the Rgt 83' on the line. He said: "You are
ordered to attack at once ." KI:Nl'JA... 'RD objected against the order
- 21
, .
figuring that an after-dark advance was too hazardous, but
JOHNSON was not at the C;P and KINNARD had no chance to argue
the question. So he briefed his commanders on an attack with
out reconnaissance. The lieut in the armored car then inform
ed him that he had just been called by his own command: All
13 tanks would support Bn 3, and Bn 1 would attack without
tank spt, this being presumably because they knew the route
from VECHEL would be open while the other route had not been
reconnoitered. As for the reasons why the plan was changed
and the night march suddenly ordered., KINNARD and say
they were given to understand by JOHNSON (la ter KIA) that the
situation of 502-1 to N of ST OED3NRODE was rptd to him by
higher authority as "oritical
if
and that his attack was
ed to relieve Whether that was the true reason, a study
of the situation of 502-1 will reveal that neither its com
mander nor the men had any feeling that their situation was
getting out of hand. 'rhey 'Nere engaged, but they were making
steady progress and expected to continue to do sounder their
own power.
The Bn started, marching in order, C; B, HQ" A, going frd in
colunm of companies right dovm the highvvay. There was no
special arrangement of weapons. KINN.ARD hud weighed the two
dangers of running into an ambush on the main road or getting
his command scattered in the dark and had chos en the
One Plat of "C" was l eft to ;'" ard tho BE and rear CF, along
..:.. 22
with the Bn demo section.' At 1900 the Bn advan6ed beyond its
OF line, and had progressed just 500 yds from there when it
drew 20-mm fire from the house where the ".50" mg had been
rptd. KINNARD heard the fire go well overhead and he saw the
entire first half of the column melt away as the men took to
the ditches. He wont running frd, yelling to the men: "Keep
moving: That fire's going way A private answered him
from the darkness: "Maybe it is, Colonel, but we already
./""' ..
have eight men hit in the legs." That many men from "C" had
been hit by a machine gun whicr had opened simultaneously with
the 20-mm gun. The cortlpany stayed there in the ditches on
both sides of the road putting fire on the houses with rifles
and rug, until at least they heard a motor vehicle pull away
from tho house and start toward SCHIJNDl!;L. rrhen the march
continued without further incident except that twice the truck
mounting the halted at a bend in the highway ahead of
them and gave them a few futile rounds. As the point got to
SCHIJNDEL, KI1j'NiiJ.-:m called his company commanders up to "c" by
radio. It was 2400. He ordered the seizure and occupation of
the town in this manner: "A" was to take over the SE end of
town around the Twin Hindmills; IIC" would dominat e the business
district and the NW and "B" would hold in the elongated, thinly,
populated area between the two other companies. The Bn was
to clear out all enomy that night, them set up strong, close
in defense, just out s ide of the housed areas. rtA" was to send
out a patrol to h'EIBOSCH Cd JRCH to meet Bn 3 and tell EWELL
- 23
of Bn Its situation. The Bn CP would set up in the center of
town. ItC" led off in pursuance to these orders, moved about
two blocks , received about a dozen rounds of small arms fire
from the darkness and kept right on moving. KINNARD came in
behind them and set up the CPo "C" then continued "'lith a very
casual examination of the houses, taking every third or fourth
house. "Bft followed, crossing the town to the south of it; itA"
"Vvas instructed to cross the town to the North, this precaution
being taken to avoid an ac cidental collision between the two
companies in the darkne ss. Each Co ran into a dozen or so of
Germans; they routed some of them out of bed and even those
they encountered in the street were wholly suprised and threw
up their hands. A few minutes after the CP was operating,
there was a heavy burst of automatic fire in the street out
side and LIEUT HARRY HOHARD of HQ CO ran out with four men and
directly toward the enemy gun, one-half block a w a y ~ As his
men ran frd in the dark, . close in to the bldgs, they fired.
The German gun quit, and threa minutes l ater Howard was back
with the gun and 8 prisonors.
By 0150 the town was completely in hand. A priest, head of
the Dutch underground, came to the CF and introduced himself,
THE MORNING asking what he could do to help. He
ENCOUNTER
said that the majority of his members
were hidden out in a factory noar the Twin Windmills, and would
do whatever the Americans wanted. KINNARD told him to get the
- 24
.:.
man who could speak the best English and then present him at
the CP. A little, bald-headed Dutchman rptd in about 10 minute
KINNARD told him: "Keep your people off the streets. Tell
them not to get out their bunting and to act as if we're un
welcome. Get that word to them tonight." The little man told
him that there were considerable forces of Germans at SCHIJNDEI
STATION and on the Heide (moor). KINNA1"1D asked him: : "Can you
send two small patrols or your men on bicycles to both of
these points and have them rpt t6 us what they find?" He
agreed, and the mission was duly carried out, the patrols rpt
ing back in about tvve hours '."lith some circumstantial informa
tion as to the enemy dispositions.
Bn 3' s s i tuati on was 0 bsu,L .' 8 .. So far a s KINNARD knew, EVlELL
was not meeting much opposition, and little firing could be
heard from the direction of EERDE. But the circumstances were
these: had open country to move over. He feared that
his men would become scatterud in the dark and so he had de
cided to move them along the railway embankment, and it was
not easy going. This accounted for his slower progress toward
the objective and for pa ssing the night without gett
ing definite word of ElHELL's forc e . At first light the two
Bns made patrol contact between and EERDE but shortly
thereafter Bn 3 drew a steadily increasing fire from south of
the RR tracks and began to veer north from the line and into
"An,s sector without having clearod the flank to the south.
- 25
EVJELL headed them straight into SCHIJNDEL and when he met
KINNARD he t old him IIthose buildintss looked damn good to me
and I thought I'd get my men where they could get their backs
up against something.!! They then talked the situation over
and agreed that they didn't know enough about the ?tbig picture"
or their reasons for being there to come to any decision about
what to do next, so they called for JOHNBON to come out.
I,leantime "C" out on the flank was having a field day against
enemy vehicles coming in from the west, and LIEUT HOWARD was
cautioning his men to "shoot high so you can knock off those
men without ruining a good motor car." At 0715, LIEU'r IAN B.
HAMILTON of "B" reported that two tanks and an infantry force
'I'flE LITTU FIGHT AT
TID:: NUNNERY
were pushing hard from S"'\'l,
astride the road. All other compa
coming
nies were alerted to send bazooka and grenade teams to these
sectors. KINNARD then tried to get observation from the church
steeple but found that a heavy ground mist effectively screen
ed the enemy. HMHLTON rptd next that the tanks were still
coming and that the Plat which had been outposting the road
'was pulling back past the factory and through the hedgerows.
He said to KINNARD: j'I'm leading the support Plat up to re
store the position." KI:NrlARD said: ltV/hat size is the enemy
force?" He replied: "'I'wo tanks and 200 men." KDfflARD said:
"Go ahead." HAMILTON had been at his radio and had received
t:ds me ssago : "Vie' ve been over-run and we're withdrawing."
- 26
this coming from 3rd Plat. Thinking that these were mutually
exclusive terms, he got his message off to KINNARD, then jump
ed for the door and ran to the next house. The 2nd Plat men
under LIEUT JOHN H. SALLIN were still sleeping in the doorways
along the KLOOSTER Road. SALLIN was at breakfast. HAl\ULTON
said to him: IlDrop your coffee. Third is falling back.
'We're counter-attacking." HAl-nLTOlf ran from door to door col
lecting men, yelling at them as he went: "Come onl we're
taking off." He found a plat scout, PVT RUEL O. HOSKINSON,
right by the HP, pointed toward the Nunnery bldg on the next
road over, and yelled: "We're heading that way. I think we
can get them from the flank." The advance body of the Germans
was already drawing into the edge of the town, a matter of
150-200 yds away. HAHILTON could not see them but he calcu
lated that if 3rd Plat had withdrawn, the Germans would come
straight in on the same line. 'rhis checked wi th his estimate
of where he thought he heard them firing. (In fact, 3rd Plat
had not been roughly handled: the appearance of the tanks
had simply startled it into a withdrawal. rrhe first tank had
fired three rds in their general. direction which did no damage,
and had then charged their machine gun and over-run it, though
meanwhile the gunner s had. fled.)
The German tanks, then coming to tho edge of the built-up area,
had backed away before receiving opposition, but the German
infantry had kept on coming, HAMILTON's idea was to make an
- 27

LEGEND
HAMILTON' S MEN C--
CERMAN INFANTRY
COVERINC SQUAD -
.. HELD

, .
.. L K.. .
. t'3('L,' '
. -' <'-" .,") ,)
::." t.-- - ,


ATTACK
ON SCHIJNDEL
MORNrNC 22 SEPT. 44
0730 HOURS
....
(
"end run" around the buildings to his right---do it at once
---emerge on the line of the enemy advance between the main
body and the advance party, take the latter in rear and so
bring the whole movement in check. (See Sketch IF) . They
took off through the backyard of the Nunnery, HOSKINSON in the
lead, RAMILTON following, and 30 men behind them, all moving
at a dead run. They then crossed the road, circled around the
barns and houses to the right of the road and svvung back to the
road. They had guessed correctly: The enemy advance party
was now between them and the rest of the battalion. HAMILTON
spread one squad out behind the sheds and manure piles to the
right of the road to do the out-fighting and contain the
elements of the German main body which were coming up on his
right flank. HOSKINSON still leading, the remaining men then
turned left and back into the road. A gate blocked theln right
at the last moment; hardly pausing in his stride, HOSKINSON
shot the bolt off with his M-l and kept on going. The whole
thing had taken place so quickly that the enemy, advancing
cautiously along the line of houses on both sides of the road,
wa s taken totally by surprise. HOSKINSON shot and killed five
of them as he came at them from the rear; the supporting fire
from the other men bohind him killed five others, and that
broke up the threat. The r emaining 20 Germans betwoen this
flying wedge and the Bn threw up their hands in surrender.
But the enemy flank confronting the detachQd squad held its
ground and was not cloared out until later in tho morning
- 28
when with two tanks leading, HAMILTON took a platoon down the
road and attacked them on their own ground, . capturing 40 and
kiJ.ling 5. His own losses for the day were 1 KIA and 2 gVIA.
A few of the enemy, however, had already disappeared into the
houses of the town during the early advance, and while the Co
undertook a vigorous house-to-house rat-hunting campaign, there
was intermittent sniper fire through the town all morning.
About 15 more Germans were killed before this nuisance was
eliminated.
JOHNSON and the tanks arrived about 1000. He gave KINNARD six
tanks, but three of them and a plat from "A" were immediately
di s patched to clean out WEIBOSCH, which had been by-passed by
EVvELL and which was thought to contain about 40-50 enemy.
"B" and one tank undertook to clear the area .south of SCHIJNDEI
two tanks were kept in general support in the center of the
sector.
The attack then continued. Bn 3 was ordered to move S with
its right shoulder approximately on the highway toward ST
OEDENRODE, which meant that it would be advancing toward where
502 was then engaging. However, En 3 marked time on the line
of the RR and KINNARD was then told by JOHNSON that EWELL
would get off as soon as the ttbalance" of Bn 1 got up to that
line to attack S on the right side of the road. At the same
time, he was ordered to continue to hold SCHIJNDEL. So he
left a plat of "C" in the upper part of the town and one of
- 29
"An in the lower part, and went on with the remainder of his
foroe. STACH was left in command at SCHIJNDEL. The two tanks
which had gone to WEIBOSCH were to return to STACH as soon as
they had completed their mission; this meant that only t\'!O
tanks were available for mission toward ST OEDEN
RODE. As for arty support, the 377 li'A Bn, which was set up
in 502' s territory, had already been doing some firing on the
SCHIJNDEL STATION area.
tfB:7, the only full company left in Bn 1, vvas put in the as
sault by KIlmARD, with the two tanks following the assault
wave; this was th$ customary arrangement between British tanks
and American infantry throughout OPERATION l'1..i\.REET. The Bn was
given three phase lines for the attack, having used
this type of coordination in the HEESWIJK fight and found it
worked well. The line in each instance was ma:cked by an ir
igation ditch. Behind ;tBi? what remained of "C" was echeloned
to the right rear while HAil is one rem.aining plat came right
on down the main road. !fBIi in the assault got to the RRLD
almost without event, shooting three or four enemy stragglers
and also running into and destroying a few enelny vehicles en
route. olC;; rptd that it was getting 20-mrn fire and saw" a
German infantry force approaching about 1000 yds off its right
(west) flank. :Men from the Dutch underground patrols came in
with the same information, and a squad patrol from HAt! was
sent out to confirm it. At 1330, Bn 1. drew abreast of Bn 3
- 30
along the RR line and the attack jillilped off, but E'dELL had
chosen to advance over ground considerable to the east of the
highway and there was a gap of about 300 yards between the
two Bns. As the ground was perfectly flat &nd with almost no
cover, this Vias not a serious matter. The infailtry moved
along, and from behind the infantry line, the tanks engaged
the German works (foxholes and gunpits) at once from long
range: HAMILTON was riding along on the outside of one of
the tanks and telling the gunners where to fire. This frd
movement was interrupted when one of the tankers spotted a
German 88 gun---crewless---over to the left of the road, be
hind IIBn and in the ilgapll territory. The British tanks had
had a flank shot from this same sun earlier in the day and
the tank leader said he wouldn't go on until he had made a
run over into the other sector and destroyed the gun. So the
infantry marked time until he got back. During all of this
,
early action, the tankers had been having a field day shooting
into German trucks which from bivouac areas in the fields on
both flanks were trying to break onto the highv-my and get
away toward OEDENHODE. The joint action continued, ria combat
patrol act ion by a Bn, a to use EA1:ILl'ON's phrase, in which
the essenca of' the tactics was the softening up of th8 enemy
field works by tank fire, followed by a steady lllovement of
infantry groups up the ditches to points where they could bring
their small arms to bear. By th\3 time flBn reached Phase Line
- 31
1, it had killed 25 enemy and captured 45, at a cost to it
self of 2 KIA and 6 LWA,.. It was then 1430. The Bn held at
Phase Line 1, waiting for Bn 3 to get even. Then a call came
from Division: The corridor line above VECHEL was about to be
cut by a German armored force. The tanks supporting 501 would
have to return to nCBEL at once. KINliJARD heard JOHNSON get
the order. The tanks pulled out. JOHNSON told KL"lliJARD to
keep going. But then JOFJiJSON began to worry about the sit
uation at nCBEL, which was his primary responsibility. So
he ordered that when Bn 3 got up to the ditch which was the
Rgtl Phase Line, EdELL was to take his men to EERDE and be
ready to help the tanks. But En 3 had already passed Bn 1 and
gotten up to that line without the men on the right of the
road becoming aware of it. E'yJELL, getting the order, wasted
no motion in executing it. In the face of the enemy, he simply
walked his men off by the left flank, gang fashion, and re
assembled them around KOEVERllJG. He figured he was within
500 yds of 502nd by that time (In fact, he was not that close)
and that the enemy was in no state of mind to take advantage
of his open flank. And he was right about :Lt. However, the
withdrawal by Em!:LL according to order had left KnmARD in a
position whero, unsupported, and with an onemy force approach
ing on his right flank, his own withdrawal bocame not only
necessary but difficult. He was told to fall back on EERDE
via SCHIJND.EL. This meant turning his back on an enomy which
- 32
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, "
-I
:J:
~ 1 " 1
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Z-o
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.'
he had been engaging successfully but which would be in Bood
position to take advantage of the opening; fortunately the
150 prisoners which had already fallen to the Bn had been
shunted back to SCHIJNDEL where the DUTCH underground took
them in charge. That left him more mobile than he might have
been otherwise. So he planned to have "B" pivot around IIC"
which was echeloned to the right rear, "e" coming frd to cover
it with fire while it made the turn. After that, ;tC" would
turn outside of ItBI? while fiB" covered I'e
tt
9s line of withdrawal.
The plat of itA" unaer LIEUT BLACKMAN meanwhile was moving west
to where it would be outside both companies and would be able
to cover the flank against which the new enemy force was rptd
advancing. (See Sketch IH). KINNARD was worried about the
complexity of this maneuver because the enemy force in front
of him was still resisting stoutly. But he had no notion at
that time that 30 days later, the enemy would still be hold
,
ing the same ground and would have re-established h i ~ s e l f at
SCHIJNDEL.
"
But as they drew near to the line where "BI! was to begin the
pivot, "c" rptd an enemy tank to its immediate right front and
LIEUT BLACKMAiiJ" rptd that the German infantry force to the west
was materializing very rapidly. His patrol was already draw
ing 88 and 20-Iilm fire, as well as automatic fire from a heavy
mg, and he had just had his carbine shot out of his hands by a
20-rom shell. KINNARD figured then that he'd better get around
- 33
as quickly as he could. So he called for the arty down with
CASSIDY's force (See rpt of 502nd Rgt) to put fire along his
iInmediate front. "Bit being out in front, he had his right
cover the general front with fire until liB" had fallen back
to even with ItO", the men going ,back the same way they had
come up. Then both companies withdrew gradually over the
ground along which they had advanced. They got back to
SCHIJNDEL at 1730 and took up their former positions.
By now, the Bn had 250 prisoners and the aid station Was over
taxed with German wounded, there being about 170 all told.
WITHDRAWAL FROM The casualty situation was far be-
SCHIJNDEL
yond the resources of the Americans
present so the German 'medicos were put in charge of' their own
men. , The Bn OPL was pushed out well beyond the position of
the previous night. At 1800, Bn was ordered by Rgt to with
draw as soon as possible to WEIBOSCH. ' ,
Bn was now loaded down with a great number of enemy trucks,
cars and cycles of which it never had chance to make an inven
tory. KINNARD ordered them turned over to the Dutch under
ground with one exception-,..-a rolling kitchen complete with
peeled potatoes and two sides of beef. These went along with
the Bn. The German wounded, he decided to leave with the
German doctors and aid men though this meant that they would
get back to their own army. The Dutchmen who had been aiding
- 34
the En all day came to him and said: "If you're leaving,
we've got to get out with So he armed them vvith German
rifles and on the march out they helped cover the prisoners
---8 Dutchmen and 8 Americans being detailed -Co cover 250
KINNARD 'was concerned about y!hat might happen if the
prisoner collli"llIl became engaged in afire fight vv-hile on the
march after dark and he instructed them that in that case,
they were to look to their own safety and not try to bring the
prisoners through. The column closed on \{EIBOSCE at 19.30 and
the POWs were escorted on to VECHEL 'II.,hile at ',{EIBOSCH the Bn
set up an .all-around defense, using the dunes to the Sand W
of the town as an OF line.
These dunes, which run in a nore-or-less even N-S line, are
the dominant features of this part of the flat Holland ter
rain. They run from 25 feet to 40 feet in height and are well-
covered by grass and stunted firs, which latter provide service
able cover. KINNARD sm>' their tactical significance but at
this stage of operation, G2 was convinced that there was no
inportant enemy force to west'Nard. He felt that the enemy
was only to the east and was vdtlldrawing. The enemy had a
banc10ned tho throat to VECI-EL, it hlHS reckoned, and VTas
I
com- .
ing in at The throat of the day bofore hu.u. actually
materialized at this point and the GUARDS Aill.1ORED had become
enGaged at UDEN to hold th8 corridor line, or rather, to re
it, since the anomy had actually slashed through. The
- .35
'
general apprehension felt in this quarter and the easy suc
cess of the day before both figured in KINNARD's estimate
of his situation, and he put only one platoon from itCH to
cover the line of the dunes. To round out the Rgtl situation,
Bn 2 was at ~ E C H E L and Bn 3 at EERDE.
At 0830 next morning all Bn commanders were called to Rgt CP
at V.iCmL. They were told that three German SS Bns were com
ing out of the ERPGEMERT area and proceeding toward VECHEL.
Bn 3 was ordered to move from EERDE to an assembly area be
tween E3RDE and VECHEL, about 800 yds N of the main VECHEL
highway., En I was ordered to EERDE. The information had
been correct. During that day, GENERAL IvlcAULIFFE, who was
combat team commander in VECHEL, used other forces---327th
Infantry and 501-2---and beat off the German attack. Bns
and 3 were not committed.
As it became obvious that the greater part of Rgt would not
be employed, KINNA..-qD on his ovm initiative began to push out
to the westward so as to strengthen his defensive position,
'mE FIGHT AROUND
TKiI! DUNES
and it was at this time that the
. OP detail along the dunes was in
creased to one platoon under LIEUT C}UUtLES BOWSER. This was
tho post farthest advanced to the west. By 1600, the Bn was
deploY8d with itCH to S 01' the RR, ;tB" just across the RR from
it and deployed along the RR embankment and flAil at the Send
- 36
I
of town, tying into the other companies with patrols. The
machine guns were attached to "Cil and "Bn. The mortars were
positioned around the church at EERDE and the main observation
post was in the steeple; from there one could get a good view
of the country and, in fact, see all the way to
iu"1other ob post was put in the windmill just west of town.
Nothing much happened that day except that the force along
the RR took a beating from sustained arty and mrtr fire be
tween 1700 and dark, the shells coming from the westward. The
Germans were back in SCHITIJDEL and some 88's had pushed up to
the Heide just S of the RR line at VVEIBOSCH. The Bn defenses
included also a roadblock about 100 yds N of the RR near
HEERTVELD---or about even with the plat under LIEUT BOWSER.
Through the night
t
listening posts were employed well out
along every covered avenue of possible
the hedges and ditches. By this time, lack of food was rob
bing the Bn of its vitality. Though the Dutch had tried to
help, a majority of the men had gone four days with little or
no food. KINNARD noticed that the patrols decreased in vigor
as the hours went on and the mon had troublo keeping awake.
They said it was bGcause they were hungry.
At 0600 next day, 25 Sopt, KIEIJA...1i.D and EVrELL wore called in by
JOHNSON and alertod for a move to UDEN. ii/hen KINNARD returned
to his CP at 0800, ho found that his Bn was already engaged.
CAPT SAllISIE N. HOMAN said to him as ho walked into tho CP:
- 37
. ,
If Tanks and infantry. I don't know how many, but it's plenty
rough out there. II EOViSER, ""ho had been covering the line of
the dunes, had looked out through the morning mist to see
Hfive tanks and 200 German infantry!! coming at him. About that
.
moment, fire from a defilade to the SE of the RR line broke
over the platoon which didn't wait to see what would happen.
It fell back limnediately to the company position and the dunes
became open to the enemy advance and his first scouts got up
to \vithin 700 yds of the tmiTl1. Mortar and arty shells were
:falling thick all around the town area when KINN.ARD reached
his OF: the church steeple was being rocked by 88 fire. It
took him about 20-30 :tilinutes to learn his exact
that the dunes defe:'1se line ViaS gone and the enemy was in
there---and he then called Rgt. At 0900, Bn 3 was ordered
to his assistance, and Rgt advised him also that 9 tanks from
the 44th Royal Arm.ored Tank Bn were on the way to help. About
this til:le an arty observer arrived from the tanks along with
a frd observer from the 907th. KINNARD had both of them order
that as much shell as possible be put along the face of the
dunes. The 81-mm mortars at t he church vvere already laying
it down in that area. Neither arty observer would ascend to
the steeple around vihich the 88 Y S were v.,rhistling; so LIEUT
EOHA.-qD volunteered for the job and YGlled down corrections
for both the arty and rnrtr fire. JOlE'JSON and cht3 tank COlli
mander arrived about 1000. KINNA..B.D called bacl{ guide officers
from IlBa and ;to" and told them he was attaching 3 tanks to
- 38
each company and would keep 3 in .general reserve. BOWSER
was told to take the plat which he had led out of the dunes
down to the S of town, and with three tanks following the
infantry, go up the front of the dunes. :H.A1vlILTON of
ilBa had
come back; he was told to take
3
tanks, move W on the N side
of , the
RR tracks and then turn S toward BOWSER.
Three or four rds hit into the church just below the steeple.
Along the RR embankment and within the housed area the volume
of enemymrtr fire increased steadily. Then the arty began to
find the windmill. A pvt from the S2 section who was on ob
duty there came running back to the Cp, If I was driven out,iI
he said, !lit was too hot.a KTh"NARD said: nThen get the hell
back,11 and he went. A load of ammo came in and stopped near
. the CP of acn. The Bn supply officer and his sgt, and all
of the co supply sgts carne up to it, just as an arty shell
~ landed dead on the truck, blew up the ammo load, and killed or
wounded every officer and NCO present. This occurred just as
the attack was getting undervvays: KINNARD had gathered his
tank men together with his plat leadors, briefed them on the
pincer counter-blow around the dunes, and started them off.'
" ,\ fe '11 put mrtr and arty on the dunes until you are ready to
move right into it,ll ho said. JOHNSON got hit by a mrtr
fragment whilo standing at ' the CP;' tho British liaison officer
was hit by tho same sholl. KINNARD, who was standing between
them, got away with an earache. ItI" of Bn 3 had como up by
- 39
..
....
this time and made contact with KINNARD's right, near the RR .
line; while the dunes attack was going on, the flank deployed
along the RR embankment had become engaged with another enemy
force pressing from the NW; it had also taken quite a few
casualties from the mortar EWELL's weight was there
fore put against this pressure.
The tanks assigned to Itc
a
seemed to be stalling and KINNARD
r-\' tried to j0ckey them along. One tank had come up just about
even with the windmill but had not yet turned left toward the
south of the dunes. A shell from over toward the RR hit direct
lyon it; the tank went up in flames and the crew were burned
to a cinder. Three minutes later the second Sherman was hit
by the same gun as it came in behind where the first tank was
blazing. The ammo inside exploded and the CJ:'f;vV were pulver
ized by shells which blew the hull apart. A third tank went
up like a torch when a shell hit it as it came into ItBi"S
lines. That ended the tank participation and changed the whole
scheme of the attack. Though KINNARD had folt t hat the tank
losses came because the tanks approached at an over-cautious
pace, the commandor said he would not permit any more tanks
frd until Bn had cleared tho lino of the dunes and the RR
track. called for arty fire on whero he thought the
A-T gun was firing from---near the RR station---and then he
alerted "Alf company for attack and told STACH to join him at
the Bn CPo By now tho church steople was crumbling and ItC"
- 40
was getting mg fire in heavy volume from the dunes.
STACH was told to swing all of nAn to the South and come up
through the dunes. He was given a section of L ~ G ' s and the
8l-mm observer: He was to keep Bn apprised of his movements
A COMPANY ADVANCES and IIC" would continue to support
ALOl\fG DUNES
him with small arms fire until he
masked the fire. The attack jumped off at 1215, with the
mortars and arty firing everything they could into the dunes
area.
The stretch into which the enemy had penetrated and which now
had to be cleared was approximately 1500 yds long in a N-S
line, with its mass averaging from 150 to 400 yards in width.
Out to the westward of it were rather dense patches of woods.
The face of these dunes was characteristically steep, yet
their surfaces were firmer because of the amount of vegetation.
"B", being on the right of the defensive position, could see
the enemy moving into the dunes and could evon put a little
fire on a fow of the more incautious of his number. But these
were Parthian shots at best. ItB!I had no t imG for coping with
tho situation farther South. Coming right down the ditches
of the railway embankmont, the Germ.ans had closed to within
short hand grenade rangG of P.AUILTOH's men, and they remained
thore, locked in a dog fight. At tho farthest point of enemy
advance on the; righthand ditch, 9 enomy dead lay stacked one
- 41
on another. Three of HAl\ULTON's men had been blown out of
their foxholes. The two forces thus lay there battling it
out within arm's throw of each other while IfA" deployed. By
1300, STACH was straightened avmy to the S of the dunes and
beginning to move North. He was using two plats as a base of
fire, employing the third as a maneuver element, and moving
them along, one dune at a time. The location of the attacking
plat hao. to be estimated "by guess and by God
ll
by KINNARD but
he tried to keep the fire moving 300-400 yds ahead of themo
Araid these sand masses the shell bursts became muffled and
reduc ed and KnrJ\Tk'1D estimated that he could have pulled his
arty back another 200 yds, could he have been sure where the
force 1,vas moving .
For STACH, in the attack northward, 2nd Plat under F U ~ U A Y
led off, followed by 1st Plat under i,.1OSIER, with the latter
being echeloned to the left and rear so as to cover the open
flank. On line wi th 1st Plat was the section of I1v1Gs from
HQ CO under LIEUT r.rURN, and in rear of the guns 'Here CO HQ
and 3rd Pla t under LIEUT VIlER. As i1A" moved out, MOSIER direct
ed 2nd LIE;UT JALIJES C. tTURPHY, hi s s econd in cOlild, to take one
sqd of 1st Plat and clear the woods to the we s t of the line
of dunes. The group bot thr ough the fir s t wood patch with
out incident, Gmer ged in a cl earing, and in one instant came
under such a volume of rifl e and machine gunfire that tho
lino went flat, with one exception. Without waiting for orders,
... 42
Pv'I' JOHN BLEFFER f ran wit h his machine gun to the left , of the
sqd line, flopped down, got the gun in action and put enough
fire into the enemy position (which he could not see) t ha t'
the German fire gradually depreciated and MOSIER wa s able to
get the balance of his plat up to the engagement, and deploy
his 3 mgs on line. They opened fire, and wi th ItOS1ER lead
ing t hem and yelling : "Let's go !1t the pla t char ged a cross 100
yds of open field to the we s t w,ard-reaching flange of dunes
al ong which the enemy on t his fl ank had taken up his position.
i
Mortar fire buffe t ed t hem and machine gun fir e cl i pped t he
gr asses through which they r an directly into the German fire
positions . As closed, a number of the enemy threw down
t heir arms and fled , though a mi nor ity att empt ed to stand and
defend the posit ion; all control vani shed at this point arid
4 in two and t hrees the attackers dr opped on the men in the
foxholes and mg pos itions, sometime s clubbing t hem or giving
t hem a bullet a t close range . a young off icer, was
almos t galvanized by the spe ctacle, such as t he feroc i ty of
his men. IT1 saw them in two and t hr ees j ump i nto machine gun
nest s . I saw some of our indi vidual s go a t a foxhol e contain-
i ng t VIO or t hree mon . 1.'fhat "'I e did in those moments we could
scarcely r emember aft orward because we had no time to t hink.
I t was courage SUGh as I had never imagined poss i ble , almost
foolish courag8 , and I doubt if any group of men could have
he l d their ground agai nst it. It t he duno agai n became
- ' 43
.
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,I
.,

i!IN
II
" 'I
THE FIGHT
THE SAND DUNES
AT EERDE
"
"

(
quiet , 15 of the enemy were dead, 7--all but one having
vV' ounds---were prisoner, and an estimat ed 40-50 had fled back
t hrough t he dunes. The plat had overwhelmed five machine
gtms and one to accomplish thi s destruction of enemy
personnel .
The plat held steady t here for a brief period, reorgani z i ng ,
and t ool\: up a genGral posit i on so as to cover the left f l ank
of the Co and a t the same time an opt i mum f ield of
f ire against any of t he enemy trying to t urn west under the
pressure of 2nd and 3rd plats ' advance i nto the dunes. (See
Sketch lG) Ll TG; sect i on under :::tJRN be came the base of
t his action and i t s fire destr oyed a great number of the enemy
as they tri ed to cl ear out of t he hi gh ground . The guns and
the men around t hem. were given no qui et, hmvever , as the
Gerl11.an mor t ar s and arty t o the 'Ne stward continued t o rako
t he ir ground .
2nd Plat had cont inued to nove northward and at 1410, i t came
under mortar , grenade and arms fire from the enemy
poei t ions in the heart of tlle dunes . T110 men advanced around
t hG bases of the dunes using t he thick scrub as cover , going
on a f ow f eet , t s.king cover again , putt ing more f i re frd ,
wat ching f or any i n t he s crub ahead , concGntrating fire
t ovvar d it, moving on and in thi s Ii1anner gradually push
ing the enemy back from the southern dunGS , The 60-ITJn bat
ter i es were kept in constant operation , and in the raen ' s
- 44
view, were the most useful weapon; their own arty was falling
so far in front of them that they scarcely sensed it.
The plat came at last to a wide break in the dunes. The
highest dune of all rose ahead of them, but there intervened
for more than 100 yds a stretch of flat and barren 'ground.
They were considering what to do next when a German tank open
ed fire on them from about 1000 yds off to their left---not
far from 1st Plat's ground. The first bursts found their
targe t. LIEUT CECIL o. FUQ,UAY was killed and SGT BRONSLAVv'
a sqd leader, had his face blown away by the same
explosion, SGT KUSHNER , the plat sgt, was terribly wounded.
Pr ior casual ties durin8 the advance had 'eliminated all but
one squad leader. STACH sent over for 1atJRPIIY and told him to
take comd 'of the 2nd Plat. He got up there, ,re-organized
what was lef't of the plat, and after looking his s ituation
over and figuring that 2nd was no longer in shape to spear
head the attack, got ready to move it into the co support
posit ion. Then two things happened.
The enemy began to press frd against 2nd in a strong counter
attac,k, this move manifesting itself in a heavy resurgence of
firo from. the base of the big dune. There was no cheice for
2nd Plat but to told to their ground and slug it out with
fire. This the men had to do on their own initiative and
choico, for was no longer present to lead them. An
arty shell had critically wounded LIEUT liARRY MOSIER and
- 45
killed S/SGT H. and MURPHY had been ordered back
to take 1st Plat over. PVT BLEFFER, who had already figured
conspicuously' in t he day's work, took t he plat over when
MOSIER and ADAMS wer e hit, and when MURPHY got there, he had
things well in hand an.d was going around and encouraging hi s
men t.o increase their fire.
The men of CO HQ, on t he i r awn i nitiative , had become either
amrao bearer s or had joined t he assault platoons as riflemen
through this fight ing . Finally, l/SGT FRANK SEYlVIOUR and one
of the company runners , t ook over two of the machine guns .
By the test"i raony of the of ficers, the movement t hrough the
dunes of itself prodv.ced such dif fusi on t hat control became
almost i mposs i bl e ; i t became a It s oldier ' s battleI? and the
advance progressed be cause of the initiative of its i ndividuals
HI saw one man t hrowing r ocks int o the s crub to one $ide of
him," said LIEUT BLACKMAN. If The rocks hitting the scr ub
produced motion . The enemy fired' at it. He got a line .on the
Gnemy f ire pos ition and knocked it out. I sav! threG men con
suIt fu"nong themselvas , t hen got the ir heads down and char ge
straight i nto an onemy rug nGs t, 25 yards av'lay , and take i t
without loss . That was the way t ho thi ng went all day.n
As 2nd Plat continued to operate as a baso of firo against the
big dune , Jrd Plat under LillUT HARRY J. J.:1D;R was commi tted on
t ho right with the mission of driving tho enemy from the re
maining dunes and to thG westward so that they would break out
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..
-.
into the open fi elds 'Nhere the fire of 2nd Plat coul d get
at them. The a tta ched section of H5Gs had in the meantime
been passed up from 1st to 2nd Pla t.
MIER moved his m.en up through a copse to the east of the dunes
which were still t o be taken, the pl a t goinS nort h i n cl ose
squad col w!1J.'1 unt il i ts 1'rd f iles reached a point ev en ,vith the
'northern end of the dunes . (See Sketch I G). Then the plat
face d l eft and moved ai1ead---rapidly , the men clos i:i1g in at a
run. They completel y oVer -ran the enemy positions , and the
GerJTBn3 vi ho tried to get away dashed out in front of the mg s
along 2nd Pl a t ' s front , Gi ving t he gunners good shoot i ng .
3rd Pla t captured 17 , kill ed the sain.e number and flushed an
70 into 2nd v s line of fire . It is believed that al
most none of these es caped . 2nd Plat , in its advance to where
it established the f i re l ine , had taken 9 prisoners , killed 15
enemy-and driven an estimat ed 50---frol1l the German 6th Para
Rgt ---back deeper into the dunes For these achievements , "All
paid on that day:
7 men ; 1 officer KIA
13 men , 1 officer S';lA
8 men UTA
This a1710unted to 33 percont of tho company strength and it
incl udc:d many key personnel. But a s STACI-I regar de d thom when
the fight was onding , ho sm: thor.1J. Ii still vlith ch ins up and
rea(ly to do what I asked of them. II
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..
. -
KINNARD, at the Bn CP, had watched the hand played out and
could tell from the swelling of the American fire and the
diminishing of the German fire that his awn men were going
ahead.. ltI" had now moved up on -the right and had relieved the
most of the pressure on "Bn which had lost 1 officer and 8 men,
KIA, 3 men missing, 10 men S'viA and 1 officer and 2 men LWA in
its static, close-quarter grapple with the enemy. KINNARD
therefore ordered itB" to attack southward along the western
slope of the dunes. Before "BIf could get underway, however,
"A"'s leading patrols came into its lines, thus concluding
the action at about 1530. Rgt ordered KINNARD to set up a
defense to the RR line where he would tie in with
EVlELL. fiB" side-slipped down, taking over the ground of "A" 's
latest advance, "A" returning to its old reserve position.
"C", whose losses for the day had been 2 men 1 officer
and 5 men SWA, 2 men LWA and 2 men lIA, occupied the lower part
of the dunes, its left flank being refused to the CR below
ZANDVLIET. "F" covered the left and rear of this Bn position
with one plat prolonged south to cover the extension of the
dunes. The defense was complete by dark and the general po
sition was still under heavy arty fire.
In this manner, the unique, campaign of 501-1 drew to its
close. In little less than a week of battle, the Bn had
executed a 360 degree turn against the enemy, moving always
into enemy country, and moving the greater part of the time
- 48
with both of its flanks exposed to his fire. When it cldsed
back to VECHEL a day or two later, the circle was conplete.
During the fight at EERDE, it had engaged Bns 1 and 3 of 6th
German Para Rgt, 1 En of the Herman Goering Rgt and En 1 of
1st German Para Rgt. These vvere supported in the first in
stance, apparently, by flve tanks, (EOVlSER was certain he
sai:" five) though only one Tiger Tank entered into the battle.
Its opposition throughout the ea.rlier days was comprised of
the rear detachments of a -scratch, . and whittled-dovm German
,
triangular division---the 59th---in which the 1035, 1036 and
) 1034 Inf Rgts 'llere identified, as well as the 159 A-T Co,
and a division pioneer Bn. The name of the whole combat group
was "HUBERT.!! It is believed that the German commander at
HERTOGENBOSCH was collecting units coming in from the west
and feeding them down against this flank of the corridor as
rapidly as they could become organized. The troops which
KIlnfARD first opposed appeared to be ill-trained: Those which
he met in the last phase were first-class, but he had already
had a partial measure of the 6th . Rgt becauso he had . engaged
them in NORMANDY.
EVVELL said that when ordered to talw the road to SCHIJNDEt
that night "I was ready to turn in my soldier suit,u such was
the imaginable hazard of the plan. \\Thon JOHNSON was killed
by an arty shell, EWELL became Rgtl commander, and was such
- .49
v
"
whon this narrativG was put toge ther. It was his feeling
that thG accomplishments of the Rgt in these days revolved
to a great degree around the onterprise and cool judgement
.....
of
r
KDJNARD coupled with tho courage of his Bn. In this, he agreed
with the men who commandod under KINNARD.
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