Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006

LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner, vs. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent. DECISION TINGA, J.: Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouses capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more. The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court. Antecedent Facts Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later. On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondents incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.8 As manifestations of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son, 10 and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boys parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.11 (2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.12 (3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13 (4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect14 but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.15 (5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels. 17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold. 18 (6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer. 19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.20 (7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991. 21 In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, they observed that respondents persistent and constant lying

to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.22 They further asserted that respondents extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.23 In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities.24 She presented her version, thus: (1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband.25 (2) She told petitioner about Davids attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from Davids act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot. 26 (3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.27 (4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28 (5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares. 29 (6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husbands whereabouts. 30 (7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.31 In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.32

In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant,33together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent. 34 In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondents psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test. 35 After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioners evidence and held that respondents propensity to lying about almost anythingher occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among othershad been duly established. According to the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void. Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.37 During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunals ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.39 Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTCs judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondents psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied. Taking exception to the appellate courts pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondents psychological incapacity. In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of

civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.43 Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the Courts 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molinawas decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. 47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36. This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance. Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36 Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage. The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage." 51 Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,52 in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A partys mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a spouses incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the

Japanese occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of "unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58 Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract.59 The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations. 60 Dr. Tolentino likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage."61 There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only."62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."65 The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume." 68 It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically

incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision ona case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law." 70 We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71 Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.72 The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law,73 and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil law. 74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal

of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.76 Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage. But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages illequipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition. Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full: 1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. 2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. 3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. 4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a

profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. 5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. 7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: "The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature." Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.77 Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition. 78 This requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 0211-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity. In any event, the fiscals participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.

As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines. We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina. First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondents claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered petitioners evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.80 As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs. Second. The root cause of respondents psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial courts decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among others.81 These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows: WITNESS:

Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness) Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage? A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You see, relationship is based on communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect. Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage? xxx ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness) Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioners officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness? A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy. Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the marriage?

A- Yes, Maam.83 The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself."84 These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondents testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by petitioners witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopezs common conclusion of respondents psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioners version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioners factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioners expert witnesses. Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise: To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.87 Third. Respondents psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural childs real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage. Fourth. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondents psychological

incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable. It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioners witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondents inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondents inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments. The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondents ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondents ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence. At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36. Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to

it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioners efforts to bring the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the part of respondent.90Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondents psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause93was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunals consent. In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced: The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows. The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94 Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioners allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondents version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.

Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondents condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.95 Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondents aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondents condition is incurable. From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondents condition is incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondents psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioners expert witnesses characterized respondents condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable. But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts taciturnity on this point. The petitioners expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code. On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioas opinion expressed during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is incurable," 99 and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.101 This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondents psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial courts decision that required a medical finding of

incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence. We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondents psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level. We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondents psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted. All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court. There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondents avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED. No costs. SO ORDERED. DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L. CORPUZDEDEL a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, respondents. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-respondent. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was working in the advertising business of his father. The acquaintance led to courtship and romantic relations, culminating in the exchange of marital vows before the City Court of Pasay on September 28, 1966.[1] The civil marriage was ratified in a church wedding on May 20, 1967.[2] The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on September 18, 1968;[3] Stephanie Janice born on September 9, 1969; [4] Kenneth David born on April 24, 1971;[5] and Ingrid born on October 20, 1976.[6] The conjugal partnership, nonetheless, acquired neither property nor debt. Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security Command and later a Jordanian national. Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she married and with whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate children as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions. Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1, 1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the

Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication in the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the country considering that Sharon did not reside and could not be found in the Philippines. [7] Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does. On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage.[8] After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church marriages between DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ celebrated on September 28, 1966 and May 20, 1967 are hereby declared null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the respondent to perform the essential obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties is dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of complete separation of property between the said spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family Code, without prejudice to rights previously acquired by creditors. Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code. SO ORDERED.[9] Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed alleging that I THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE. II THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND VOID. III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE. The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.[10] Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 8, 2002.[11] Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion and manifestly erred in its conclusion that the: (1) respondent was not suffering from psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations; (2) psychological incapacity of respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and permanence or incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted by the petitioner falls short to prove psychological incapacity suffered by respondent. The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent adverted to by petitioner fall within the term psychological incapacity? In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[12] it was ruled: x x x psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate. The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.

Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.[13] The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a very complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In this case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof.[14] It appears that respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children. Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity.[15] It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondentcompletely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity [16] or sexual promiscuity. At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation under Article 55[17] of the Family Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v. Marcos[18] that Article 36 isnot to be equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. In short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void. We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church. All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate court. We cannot deny the grief, frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present situation. Regrettably, there are circumstances, like in this case, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem. [19] While we sympathize with petitioners marital predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply the law no matter how harsh it may be.[20] WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 97-467 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006

MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner, vs. BRIX FERRARIS, respondent. RESOLUTION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida PerezFerraris of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error. On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision1 denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order2 dated April 20, 2001 where the trial court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed3 in toto the judgment of the trial court. It held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already present at the inception of the marriage.4 The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish the substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the essential marital obligations. 5 Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied6 for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. As already stated, the petition for review was denied for failure of petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal committed any reversible error. Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.7 The Court required respondent Brix Ferraris to file comment8 but failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived

the opportunity to file comment. Further, the Court directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on petitioner's motion for reconsideration which it complied on March 2, 2006. After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.9 Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination.10 It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court,11 save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts,12 which are unavailing in the instant case. The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.13 As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.14 It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained,15 which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals: Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital annulment cases is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish respondent's psychological condition. Here, appellant contends that there is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable. Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence showed that respondent's alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable

psychological malady. To be sure, the couple's relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the company of respondent. In fact, by petitioner's own reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began when petitioner started doubting respondent's fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from women that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Respondent could not understand petitioner's lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. x x x. xxxx At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type." In fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that one suffering from such mixed personality disorder is dependent on others for decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's information that respondent had extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" x x x. She stated that there was a history of respondent's parents having difficulties in their relationship. But this input on the supposed problematic history of respondent's parents also came from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening disabling factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to prove that respondent's supposed psychological or mental malady existed even before the marriage. All these omissions must be held up against petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved the onus of establishing nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.16 We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,17 where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends than his family on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his finances,

the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of were more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness. Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals18 that habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity. While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage.19 No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.20 Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35,21 37,22 38,23 and 4124 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 4525 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.26 Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. 27 Neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.28 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY. SO ORDERED. Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION

G.R. NO. 158896

October 27, 2004

JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner, vs. MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31 January 2001, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent herein Judge Manuel Siayngco ("respondent Manuel"). Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and respondent Manuel were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering that they could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy. On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around the house within the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional advancement as she did not even give him moral support and encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation from her own parents since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the emotional and physical capacity of the parties; and that he endured and suffered through his turbulent and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years. In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against her so that he could be free to marry his paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother; that it was respondent Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all his endeavors despite his philandering; that she

was raised in a real happy family and had a happy childhood contrary to what was stated in the complaint. In the pre-trial order,3 the parties only stipulated on the following: 1. That they were married on 27 June 1973; 2. That they have one son who is already 20 years old. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in his petition. He testified that his parents never approved of his marriage as they still harbored hope that he would return to the seminary.4 The early years of their marriage were difficult years as they had a hard time being accepted as husband and wife by his parents and it was at this period that his wife started exhibiting signs of being irritable and temperamental5 to him and his parents.6 She was also obsessive about cleanliness which became the common source of their quarrels.7 He, however, characterized their union as happy during that period of time in 1979 when they moved to Malolos as they were engrossed in furnishing their new house.8 In 1981, when he became busy with law school and with various community organizations, it was then that he felt that he and his wife started to drift apart.9 He then narrated incidents during their marriage that were greatly embarrassing and/or distressing to him, e.g., when his wife quarreled with an elderly neighbor;10 when she would visit him in his office and remark that the curtains were already dirty or when she kicked a trash can across the room or when she threw a ballpen from his table;11 when she caused his office drawer to be forcibly opened while he was away;12 when she confronted a female tenant of theirs and accused the tenant of having an affair with him;13 and other incidents reported to him which would show her jealous nature. Money matters continued to be a source of bitter quarrels.14 Respondent Manuel could not forget that he was not able to celebrate his appointment as judge in 1995 as his wife did not approve it, ostensibly for lack of money, but she was very generous when it came to celebrations of their parish priest.15 Respondent Manuel then denied that he was a womanizer16 or that he had a mistress.17 Lastly, respondent Manuel testified as to their conjugal properties and obligations.18 Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuels Clerk of Court, testified that petitioner Juanita seldom went to respondent Manuels office.19 But when she was there, she would call witness to complain about the curtains and the cleanliness of the office.20 One time, witness remembered petitioner Juanita rummaging through respondent Manuels drawer looking for his address book while the latter was in Subic attending a conference.21 When petitioner Juanita could not open a locked drawer she called witness, telling the latter that she was looking for the telephone number of respondents hotel room in Subic. A process server was requested by petitioner Juanita to call for a locksmith in the town proper. When the locksmith arrived, petitioner Juanita ordered him to open the locked drawer. On another occasion, particularly in August of 1998, witness testified that she heard petitioner Juanita remark to respondent Manuel "sino bang batang bibinyagan na yan? Baka anak mo yan sa labas?" 22

As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA GARCIA whose professional qualifications as a psychiatrist were admitted by petitioner Juanita.23 From her psychiatric evaluation,24 Dr. Garcia concluded: To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco contributed to the marital collapse. There is a partner relational problem which affected their capacity to sustain the marital bond with love, support and understanding. The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM IV) is secondary to the psychopathology of both spouses. Manuel and Juanita had engaged themselves in a defective communication pattern which is characteristically negative and deformed. This affected their competence to maintain the love and respect that they should give to each other. Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both partners who are expected to use healthy strategies to solve their disputes and differences. Whereas Juanita would be derogatory, critical, argumentative, depressive and obsessive-compulsive, Manuel makes use of avoidance and suppression. In his effort to satisfy the self and to boost his masculine ego to cover up for his felt or imagined inadequacies, he became callused to the detrimental effects of his unfaithfulness and his failure to prioritize the marriage. Both spouses, who display narcissistic psychological repertoire (along with their other maladaptive traits), failed to adequately empathize (or to be responsive and sensitive) to each others needs and feelings. The matrimonial plot is not conducive to a healthy and a progressive marriage. Manuel and Juanita have shown their psychologically [sic] incapacity to satisfactorily comply with the fundamental duties of marriage. The clashing of their patterns of maladaptive traits, which warrant the diagnosis of personality disorder not otherwise specified (PDNOS, with code 301.9 as per DSM IV criteria) will bring about more emotional mishaps and psychopathology. These rigid sets of traits which were in existence before the marriage will tend to be pervasive and impervious to recovery.25 In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuels allegations. She insisted that they were a normal couple who had their own share of fights; that they were happily married until respondent Manuel started having extra-marital affairs26 which he had admitted to her.27 Petitioner Juanita professed that she would wish to preserve her marriage and that she truly loved her husband.28 She stated further that she has continuously supported respondent Manuel, waiting up for him while he was in law school to serve him food and drinks. Even when he already filed the present case, she would still attend to his needs.29 She remembered that after the pre-trial, while they were in the hallway, respondent Manuel implored her to give him a chance to have a new family.30

DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel,31 testified that he conducted a psychiatric evaluation on petitioner Juanita, the results of which were embodied in his report. Said report stated in part: Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the psychological tests, respondent Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco, was found to be a mature, conservative, religious and highly intelligent woman who possess [sic] more than enough psychological potentials for a mutually satisfying long term heterosexual relationship. Superego is strong and she is respectful of traditional institutions of society like the institution of marriage. She was also found to be a loving, nurturing and self-sacrificing woman who is capable of enduring severe environmental stress in her social milieu. Finally, she is reality-oriented and therefore capable of rendering fair and sound decision. In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to be psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.32 CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco since 1992 described the Siayngcos as the ideal couple, sweet to each other.33 The couple would religiously attend prayer meetings in the community.34 Both were likewise leaders in their community.35 Witness then stated that she would often go to the house of the couple and, as late as March 2000, she still saw respondent Manuel there.36 On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent Manuels petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner Juanita holding in part that: The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not preponderantly supported in evidence. The couple [was] happily married and after four years of marital bliss [was] blest with a son. Their life together continued years thereafter in peace and prosperity. The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical, depressed and obsessive doubtless arose later in the parties relationship sometime in the early 90s when the defendant-wife started receiving letters that the plaintiff is playing footsy. xxx xxx xxx

The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-jerk responses to slight stabs of the Pavlovian hammer on marital relations. A wife, as in the instant case, may have succumbed, due to her jealousy, to the constant delivery of irritating curtain lectures to her husband. But, as our laws now stand, the dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in such cases. In contrast to some countries, our laws do not look at a marital partner as a mere refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he or she sometimes may sound like a firetruck.37

A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an order dated 04 May 2001.38 On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals.39 Thus: The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of plaintiff Manuel and defendant Juanita. It appears that there is empathy between plaintiff and defendant. That is a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a twoway process. An expressive interest in each others feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love "amore gignit amorem", sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise conscious of its value as a sublime social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 324). This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less, but reverse and set aside the decision of the lower court. Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity, not only of defendant but also of himself. 40 Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT SEPARATED ON MARCH 1997, THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING TOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION UP TO THE PRESENT III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V. MOLINA IV. IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE The Courts Ruling Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag41 is apropos. There, we held that whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage depends crucially on the facts of the case. Each case must be

closely scrutinized and judged according to its own facts as there can be no case that is on "all fours" with another. This, the Court of Appeals did not heed. The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a clear divergence in its factual milieu with the case at bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the couple involved therein, despite sharing the same bed from the time of their wedding night on 22 May 1988 until their separation on 15 March 1989, never had coitus. The perplexed wife filed the petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of her husband. We sustained the wife for the reason that an essential marital obligation under the Family Code is procreation such that "the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity." On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue herein. Rather, we have here a case of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by his wifes outbursts and overbearing ways, who finds his wifes obsession with cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by her lack of support and respect for his person and his position as a Judge. In our book, however, these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led respondent Manuel to file a case against her do not amount to psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations. It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals42 where we declared that "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.43 In Republic v. Court of Appeals44 we expounded: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an

extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.45 With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve the issue of whether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel.

A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.46 With this cardinal state policy in mind, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals47 that the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff (respondent Manuel herein). Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that respondent Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. The psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuels own evidence, contains candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in the best position to gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the essential marital obligations of marriage: She talked about her spouse, "My husband is kind, a good provider, cool, intelligent but a liar, masamang magalit at gastador. In spite of what he has done to me, I take care of him whenever he is sick. He is having extra marital affairs because he wants to have a child. I believe that our biggest problem is not having a child. It is his obsession to have a child with his girl now. He started his relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them together in the car. I think that it was the girl who encouraged him to file the petition." She feels that the problems in the relationship is [sic] "paulit-ulit," but, that she still is willing to pursue it. x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is not really psychologically incapacitated. He apparently told her, "You and Jeremy should give me a chance to have a new family." She answered and said, "Ikaw tinuruan mo akong to fight for my right. Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage natin." 48 What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity.49 Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.50 It must be shown that respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state 51 and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel has admitted that: "I had [extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child at that particular point."52 B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to

prove that his wifes lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.53 In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.54 The psychological report of respondent Manuels witness, Dr. Garcia, on the other hand, does not help his case any. Nothing in there supports the doctors conclusion that petitioner Juanita is psychologically incapacitated. On the contrary, the report clearly shows that the root cause of petitioner Juanitas behavior is traceable not from the inception of their marriage as required by law but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the priesthood,55 her husbands philandering, admitted no less by him,56 and her inability to conceive.57 Dr. Garcias report paints a story of a husband and wife who grew professionally during the marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to the hilt, becoming busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by respondent Manuel himself during his direct examination.58 Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed a window into the Siayngcoss life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.59 As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:60 Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent Manuel might be experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.61 WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 01 July 2003 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision

dated 31 January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102 is reinstated and given full force and effect. No costs. SO ORDERED. Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur. Footnotes

[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]

BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G. MARCOS, respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine qua non for such declaration.

The Case Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 55588, which disposed as follows: "WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the parties is hereby declared valid."[2] Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration. Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus: "WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the] parties' children. In

the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent. "Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate action consistent with this Decision. "SO ORDERED."
The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows: "It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F). "Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in 1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in Malacaang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in 1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service. "They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and eventually became sweethearts. "After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street, Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss Development Corporation when she was still single. "After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.

"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and chickens. While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in the morning before going to Malacaang. When she was discharged from the military service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation. "The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house. "On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh. G, Records, 153). "Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver. "At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong. "In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp. 85-100). "The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the other hand, did not. "The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x."[3]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise: "Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified, sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity must

be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such noncomplied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established by evidence and explained in the decision. "In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he offered testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was] incurable."[4] Hence, this Petition.[5]
Issues

In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues: "I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject himself to psychological evaluation. II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition."[7]
The Court's Ruling

We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such incapacity.

Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination

Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of information in order to determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had refused to submit himself to such tests. In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code[9] were laid down by this Court as follows: "1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected' by the state. xxxxxxxxx 2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. 3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. 4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same

sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. 5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. 7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. xxxxxxxxx (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."[10] The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[11] "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.

Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated. We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code. Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.[12] At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void. Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them. In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines outlined in Molina. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except that portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA MATIAS DAGDAG, respondent. QUISUMBING, J.: For review on certiorari is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 380-0-90 declaring the marriage of Erlinda Matias Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void under Article 36 of the Family Code. On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.2 The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children, namely: Avelyn M. Dagdag, born on January 16, 1978; and Eden M. Dagdag, born on April 21, 1982.3 Their birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, also on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino lived in a house in District 8, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, located at the back of the house of their in-laws.4 A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly reappear for a few months, then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries on her.5 On October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last they heard from him. Erlinda was constrained to look for a job in Olongapo City as a manicurist to support herself and her children. Finally, Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime,6 and that he escaped from jail on October 22, 1985.7 A certification therefor dated February 14, 1990, was issued by Jail Warden Orlando S. Limon. Avelino remains at-large to date.

On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.8 Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation, on September 3, 10, and 17, 1990.9 Subsequently, a hearing was conducted to establish jurisdictional facts. Thereafter, on December 17, 1990, the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law, Virginia Dagdag, as her only witness. Virginia testified that she is married to the brother of Avelino. She and her husband live in Olongapo City but they spend their vacations at the house of Avelino's parents in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. She testified that Erlinda and Avelino always quarrelled, and that Avelino never stayed for long at the couple's house. She knew that Avelino had been gone for a long time now, and that she pitied Erlinda and the children. 10 Thereafter, Erlinda rested her case. The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991, to manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. In compliance with the Order, the investigating prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties. However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence.11 On December 27, 1990, without waiting for the investigating prosecutor's manifestation dated December 5, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision12 declaring the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36 of the Family Code, disposing thus: "WHEREFORE, and viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the marriage celebrated at Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija between Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag on 7 September 1975 to be null and void. The Local Civil Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is hereby ordered to enter into his Book of Marriage this declaration after this decision shall have become final and executory . SO ORDERED." On January 29, 1991, the investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. After requiring Erlinda to comment, the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration in an Order dated August 21, 1991 as follows:13

"This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Honorable Court dated December 27, 1990 filed by the Solicitor-General. The observation of the movant is to the effect that 'Mere alcoholism and abusiveness are not enough to show psychological incapacity. Nor is abandonment. These are common in marriage. There must be showing that these traits, stemmed from psychological incapacity existing at the time of celebration of the marriage. In the case at bar, the abandonment is prolonged as the husband left his wife and children since 1983. The defendant, while in jail escaped and whose present whereabouts are unknown. He failed to support his family for the same period of time, actuations clearly indicative of the failure of the husband to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage defined and enumerated under Article 68 of the Family Code. These findings of facts are uncontroverted. 1wphi1.nt Defendant's character traits, by their nature, existed at the time of marriage and became manifest only after the marriage. In rerum natura, these traits are manifestations of lack of marital responsibility and appear now to be incurable. Nothing can be graver since the family members are now left to fend for themselves. Contrary to the opinion of the Solicitor-General, these are not common in marriage. Let it be said that the provisions of Article 36 of the New Family Code, to assuage the sensibilities of the more numerous church, is a substitute for divorce (See: Sempio Diy, New Family Code, p. 36) in order to dissolve marriages that exist only in name. WHEREFORE, and the foregoing considered, the motion for Reconsideration aforecited is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED" The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals, raising the sole assignment of error that: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING APPELLEE'S MARRIAGE TO A VELINO DAGDAG NULL AND VOID ON THE GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATTER, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY THE LAW NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN TO EXIST.14 On April 22, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision15 affirming the decision of the trial court, disposing thus: "Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.

Necessarily, the plaintiff is now endowed with the right to seek the judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Defendant's constant non-fulfillment of any of such obligations is continously (sic) destroying the integrity or wholeness of his marriage with the plaintiff. (Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1992 Ed., p. 46)." 16 Hence, the present petition for review ,17 filed by the Solicitor General. The Solicitor General contends that the alleged psychological incapacity of Avelino Dagdag is not of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. According to him, the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase "psychological incapacity" and an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case. Respondent, in her Comment, insists that the facts constituting psychological incapacity were proven by preponderance of evidence during trial. At issue is whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly declared the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice. Article 36 of the Family Code provides "A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.18 In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,19 the Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code: "(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less in will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code20as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code21 in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095."22 Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial court's decision was prematurely rendered. In the case of Hernandez v. Court of Appeals,23 we affirmed the dismissal of the trial court and Court of Appeals of the petition for annulment on the ground of dearth of the evidence presented. We further explained therein that "Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondent's psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. (Art. II, Sec. 12, Art. XV, Secs. 1-2) Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. (citing Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, supra. )"24 WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnote
1

Rollo, pp. 28-38. Id. at 29. Id. at 30-31. TSN, December 17, 1990, p. 6; Records, p. 47. Rollo, p. 29. The records did not specify what crime. Records, p. 32.

Originally, Article 39 of the Family Code provided: "Art. 39, The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. However, in the case of marriage celebrated before the effectivity of this Code and falling under Article 36, such action or defense shall prescribe in ten years after this Code shall have taken effect." However, Republic Act No, 8533 was eventually enacted and approved on February 23, 1998, which amended Article 39 to read as follows: "Art. 39, The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe."
9

RTC Records, p. 16. TSN, December 17,1990, pp. 22-23. RTC Records, p. 33. Id. at 38-40. Id. at 96. Rollo, p. 10. Id. at 28-38. Id. at 37-38 only.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

Id. at 6-26.

18

Republic v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 198, 214 (1997), Padilla, J., Separate Statement.
19

268 SCRA 198 (1997).

20

Article 68, Family Code. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. Art. 69, Family Code. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. x x x Art. 70, Family Code. The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from their separate properties. Art. 71, Family Code. The management of the household shall be the right and duty of both spouses. The expenses for such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70.
21

Article 220, Family Code. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties: (1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means; (2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding; (3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship; (4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all times; (5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;

(6) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests; (7) To demand from them respect and obedience; (8) To impose discipline on them as maybe required under the circumstances; and (9) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians. Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. Art. 225. The father and the mother shall, jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000.00, the parent concerned shall be required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians. A verified petition, for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated. The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved. The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply. 1wphi1.nt
22

Id. at 209-213. 320 SCRA 76 (1999). Id. at 88.

23

24

REPUBLIC VS. DAGDAG 351 SCRA 425 FACTS: On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries to her. In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at large to-date. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation. On the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only witness. The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The Investigating Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties.

However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without waiting for the investigating prosecutors manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated

not only because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal. ISSUE: Did the CA correctly declare the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity, as he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice? HELD: Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. In REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA (268 SCRA 198), the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the interpretation of Article 36 of the Family Code. Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with guideline number 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controverting evidence since the trial courts decision was prematurely rendered. THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 136921. April 17, 2001]

LORNA GUILLEN PESCA, petitioner, vs. ZOSIMO A. PESCA, respondent. DECISION

VITUG, J.: Submitted for review is the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 27 May 1998, in C.A. G.R. CV. No. 52374, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 130, which has declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent. Petitioner Lorna G. Pesca and respondent Zosimo A. Pesca first met sometime in 1975 while on board an inter-island vessel bound for Bacolod City. After a whirlwind courtship, they got married on 03 March 1975. Initially, the young couple did not live together as petitioner was still a student in college and respondent, a seaman, had to leave the country on board an ocean-going vessel barely a month after the marriage. Six months later, the young couple established their residence in Quezon City until they were able to build their own house in Caloocan City where they finally resided. It was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year that they could stay together when respondent was on vacation. The union begot four children, 19-year old Ruhem, 17-year old Rez, 11-year old Ryan, and 9-year old Richie. It started in 1988, petitioner said, when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs of psychological incapacity to perform his marital covenant. His "true color" of being an emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker, staying with friends daily from 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon until 1:00 o'clock in the morning. When cautioned to stop or, to at least, minimize his drinking, respondent would beat, slap and kick her. At one time, he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of the children. The children themselves were not spared from physical violence. Finally, on 19 November 1992, petitioner and her children left the conjugal abode to live in the house of her sister in Quezon City as they could no longer bear his violent ways. Two months later, petitioner decided to forgive respondent, and she returned home to give him a chance to change. But, to her dismay, things did not so turn out as expected. Indeed, matters became worse. On the morning of 22 March 1994, about eight oclock, respondent assaulted petitioner for about half an hour in the presence of the children. She was battered black and blue. She submitted herself to medical examination at the Quezon City General Hospital, which diagnosed her injuries as contusions and abrasions. Petitioner filed a complaint with the barangay authorities, and a case was filed against respondent for slight physical injuries. He was convicted by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleven days of imprisonment. This time, petitioner and her children left the conjugal home for good and stayed with her sister. Eventually, they decided to rent an apartment. Petitioner sued respondent before the Regional Trial Court for the declaration of nullity of their marriage invoking psychological incapacity. Petitioner likewise sought the custody of her minor children and prayed for support pendente lite.

Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served on respondent on 25 April 1994 by personal service by the sheriff. As respondent failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance within the reglementary period, the trial court ordered the city prosecutor to look into a possible collusion between the parties. Prosecutor Rosa C. Reyes, on 03 August 1994, submitted her report to the effect that she found no evidence to establish that there was collusion between the parties. On 11 January 1995, respondent belatedly filed, without leave of court, an answer, and the same, although filed late, was admitted by the court. In his answer, respondent admitted the fact of his marriage with petitioner and the birth of their children. He also confirmed the veracity of Annex "A" of the complaint which listed the conjugal property. Respondent vehemently denied, however, the allegation that he was psychologically incapacitated. On 15 November 1995, following hearings conducted by it, the trial court rendered its decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent to be null and void ab initio on the basis of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent and ordered the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Respondent appealed the above decision to the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court erred, particularly, in holding that there was legal basis to declare the marriage null and void and in denying his motion to reopen the case. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent valid and subsisting. The appellate court said: "Definitely the appellee has not established the following: That the appellant showed signs of mental incapacity as would cause him to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenant, as so provided for in Article 68 of the Family Code; that the incapacity is grave, has preceded the marriage and is incurable; that his incapacity to meet his marital responsibility is because of a psychological, not physical illness; that the root cause of the incapacity has been identified medically or clinically, and has been proven by an expert; and that the incapacity is permanent and incurable in nature. The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies in the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity."[1] Petitioner, in her plea to this Court, would have the decision of the Court of Appeals reversed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals,[2] promulgated on 14 January 1995, as well as the guidelines set out in Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina,[3] promulgated on 13 February 1997, should have no retroactive application and, on the assumption that the Molina ruling could be applied retroactively, the guidelines therein outlined should be taken to be merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. In any case, petitioner argues, the application of the Santos and Molina dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and not its dismissal.

Be that as it may, respondent submits, the appellate court did not err in its assailed decision for there is absolutely no evidence that has been shown to prove psychological incapacity on his part as the term has been so defined in Santos. Indeed, there is no merit in the petition. The term psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, has been explained by the Court in Santos and reiterated in Molina. The Court, inSantos, concluded: "It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase `psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Balumad's `Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law, quoting form the Diagnostic Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's `Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, `psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of `psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.[4] The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith[5] under the familiar rule of lex prospicit, non respicit. The phrase psychological incapacity, borrowed from Canon law, is an entirely novel provision in our statute books, and, until the relatively recent enactment of the Family Code, the concept has escaped jurisprudential attention. It is in Santos when, for the first time, the Court has given life to the term. Molina, that followed, has

additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in trying cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. Molina has strengthened, not overturned, Santos. At all events, petitioner has utterly failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent, let alone at the time of solemnization of the contract, so as to warrant a declaration of nullity of the marriage. Emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, invoked by her, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family[6] that the State cherishes and protects. While the Court commisserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent, totally terminating that relationship, however, may not necessarily be the fitting denouement to it. In these cases, the law has not quite given up, neither should we. WHEREFORE, the herein petition is DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Melo, JJ., concu (Chairman), Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez,

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003]

DIANA M. BARCELONA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TADEO R. BENGZON, respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.:

The Case The Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision[1] as well as the 7 August 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Order[2] dated 21 January 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in Civil Case No. Q-95-24471. The Regional Trial Court refused to dismiss private respondents Petition for Annulment of Marriage for failure to state a cause of action and for violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The assailed Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The Facts On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent Tadeo) filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (petitioner Diana). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23445 (first petition) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87. [3] On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo filed a Motion to Withdraw Petition which the trial court granted in its Order dated 7 June 1995. On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana. This time, the case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-9524471 (second petition) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106 (trial court). Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two grounds. First, the second petition fails to state a cause of action. Second, it violates Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 (Circular No. 04-94) on forum shopping. Respondent Tadeo opposed the Motion to which petitioner Diana filed Additional Arguments in Support of the Motion. The trial court, through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued on 18 September 1996 an Order (first order) deferring resolution of the Motion until the parties ventilate their arguments in a hearing. Petitioner Diana filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the trial court, through Pairing Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison, issued on 21 January 1997 an Order (second order) denying the motion. In denying the motion for reconsideration, Judge Pison explained that when the ground for dismissal is the complaints failure to state a cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the petition itself. Judge Pison held that contrary to petitioner Dianas claim, a perusal of the allegations in the petition shows that petitioner Diana has violated respondent Tadeos right, thus giving rise to a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected petitioner Dianas claim that respondent Tadeo is guilty of forum shopping in filing the second petition. Judge Pison explained that when respondent Tadeo filed the second petition, the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445) was no longer pending as it had been earlier dismissed without prejudice. Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts first order deferring action on the Motion and the second order denying the motion for reconsideration on 14 February 1997. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner Diana that the trial court in its first order erred in deferring action on the Motion until after a hearing on whether the complaint states a cause of action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the trial

courts second order corrected the situation since in denying the motion for reconsideration, the trial court in effect denied the Motion. The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the allegations in the second petition state a cause of action sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven to be true. The Court of Appeals also held that there was no violation of Circular No. 04-94. To determine the existence of forum shopping, the elements of litis pendentia must exist or a final judgment in one case must amount to res judicata in the other. In this case, there is no litis pendentia because respondent Tadeo had caused the dismissal without prejudice of the first petition before filing the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because there is no final decision on the merits.

Issues In her Memorandum, petitioner Diana raises the following issues: I. WHETHER THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SECOND PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE SUFFICIENTLY STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION; WHETHER RESPONDENT TADEO VIOLATED SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 IN FAILING TO STATE THE FILING OF A PREVIOUS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE, ITS TERMINATION AND STATUS.[4] The Courts Ruling The petition has no merit.

II.

Sufficiency of Cause of Action Petitioner Dianas contention that the second petition fails to state a cause of action is untenable. A cause of action is an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right of the plaintiff.[5] A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff. [6] We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code.[7] The petition alleged that respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married at the Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship as shown by the marriage

contract attached to the petition. The couple established their residence in Quezon City. The union begot five children, Ana Maria, born on 8 November 1964; Isabel, born on 28 October 1968; Ernesto Tadeo, born on 31 March 1970; Regina Rachelle born on 7 March 1974; and Cristina Maria born in February 1978. The petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to comply with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time. The petition alleged the non-complied marital obligations in this manner: xxx 5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her sisters house or would play tennis the whole day. 6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak to her husband. 7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. She further insisted that she wanted to feel a little freedom from petitioners marital authority and influences. The petitioner argued that he could occupy another room in their conjugal dwelling to accommodate respondents desire, but no amount of plea and explanation could dissuade her from demanding that the petitioner leave their conjugal dwelling. 8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondents pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling and reside in a condominium located in Greenhills. 9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner waived his right to the conjugal dwelling in respondents favor through an extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains. The separation in fact between the petitioner and the respondent still subsists to the present time. 10. The parties likewise agreed on the custody and support of the children. The extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is hereto attached as Annex C and taken as an integral part hereof. 11. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligation of marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until the present time. Such incapacity was conclusively found in

the psychological examination conducted on the relationship between the petitioner and the respondent. 12. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is void ab initio and needs to be annulled. This petition is in accordance with Article 39 thereof. xxx.[8] The second petition states the ultimate facts on which respondent bases his claim in accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court.[9] Ultimate facts refer to the principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of which the cause of action rests. The term does not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of evidence which establish the material elements.[10] Petitioner Diana relies mainly[11] on the rulings in Santos v. Court of Appeals[12] as well as in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.[13] Santos gave life to the phrase psychological incapacity, a novel provision in the Family Code, by defining the term in this wise: xxx psychological incapacity should refer to no less than mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. xxx. Molina additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity.[14] Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the guidelines set forth in Santos and Molina. Specifically, she contends that the second petition is defective because it fails to allege the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. The second petition also fails to state that the alleged psychological incapacity existed from the celebration of the marriage and that it is permanent or incurable. Further, the second petition is devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the illness to bring about the disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, the second petition did not even state the marital obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly failed to comply due to psychological incapacity. Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (new Rules).[15]Specifically, Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules provides:

SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages x x x. (d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration. The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. (Emphasis supplied) Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.[16] The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that expert opinion need not be alleged in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological incapacity. Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work, respond to and control the human body. Scientists still do not understand everything there is to know about the root causes of psychological disorders. The root causes of many psychological disorders are still unknown to science even as their outward, physical manifestations are evident. Hence, what the new Rules require the petition to allege are the physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. Respondent Tadeos second petition complies with this requirement. The second petition states a cause of action since it states the legal right of respondent Tadeo, the correlative obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or omission of petitioner Diana in violation of the legal right. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,[17] the Court held: In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Devt Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been

defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). xxx. (Emphasis supplied) A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action hypothetically admits all the factual averments in the complaint. [18] Given the hypothetically admitted facts in the second petition, the trial court could render judgment over the case.

Forum Shopping Similarly untenable is petitioner Dianas contention that the second petitions certificate of non-forum shopping which does not mention the filing of the first petition and its dismissal without prejudice violates Circular No. 04-94.[19] Petitioner Diana refers to this portion of Circular No. 04-941. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint, petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith, to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not theretofore commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b) to the best of his knowledge, no action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such action or proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he must state the status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn certification contemplated herein have been filed.[20] Petitioner Diana points out that respondent Tadeo did not disclose in his certificate of non-forum shopping that he had previously commenced a similar action based on the same grounds with the same prayer for relief. The certificate of non-forum shopping should have stated the fact of termination of the first petition or its status. The Court has consistently held that a certificate of non-forum shopping not attached to the petition or one belatedly filed or one signed by counsel and not the party himself constitutes a violation of the requirement. Such violation can result in the dismissal of the complaint or petition. However, the Court has also previously held that the rule of substantial compliance applies to the contents of the certification.[21] In Roxas v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court squarely addressed the issue of whether the omission of a statement on the prior filing and dismissal of a case involving the same parties and issues merits dismissal of the petition. In Roxas, the Court ruled:

xxx an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would not constitute res judicata and litis pendentia as in the case at bar, is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings considering that the evils sought to be prevented by the said certificate are not present. It is in this light that we ruled in Maricalum Mining Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission that a liberal interpretation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on non-forum shopping would be more in keeping with the objectives of procedural rules which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. The dismissal of the first petition precluded the eventuality of litis pendentia. The first petitions dismissal did not also amount to res judicata. Thus, there is no need to state in the certificate of non-forum shopping in the second petition (Civil Case No. Q95-24471) about the prior filing and dismissal of the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-9523445). The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the instance of respondent Tadeo to keep the peace between him and his grown up children. The dismissal happened before service of answer or any responsive pleading. Clearly, there is no litis pendentia since respondent Tadeo had already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of the first petition when he subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res judicata because the dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal without prejudice. Circular No. 04-94,[23] now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, must be interpreted and applied to achieve its purpose. The Supreme Court promulgated the Circular to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice. The Circular should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.[24] A final word. We are ever mindful of the principle that marriage is an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family that the state cherishes and protects.[25] In rendering this Decision, this Court is not prejudging the main issue of whether the marriage is void based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court must resolve this issue after trial on the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. We are merely holding that, based on the allegations in the second petition, the petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action and does not violate the rule on forum shopping. Thus, the second petition is not subject to attack by a motion to dismiss on these grounds. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision dated 30 May 1997 as well as the Resolution dated 7 August 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. Azcuna, J., on leave.

JAIME F. VILLALON, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 167206 Present: Davide, Jr., C.J.

(Chairman), - versus -

Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.

MA. CORAZON N. VILLALON,

Respondent.

Promulgated:

November 18, 2005 x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition[1] for the annulment of his marriage to respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City where it was docketed as JDRC No. 3917 and raffled to Branch 69. As ground therefor, petitioner cited his psychological incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his marriage.

According to petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological incapacity were: (a) his chronic refusal to maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of interest in having a normal married life; (b) his immaturity and irresponsibility in refusing to accept the essential obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; (c) his desire for other women and a life unchained from any spousal obligation; and (d) his false assumption of the fundamental obligations of companionship and consortium towards respondent. Petitioner thus prayed that his marriage to respondent be declared null and void ab initio.

On September 25, 1996, respondent filed an answer[2] denying petitioners allegations. She asserted that her 18-year marriage to petitioner has been fruitful and characterized by joy, contentment and hopes for more growth in their relationship and that their marital squabbles were normal based on community standards. Petitioners success in his professional life aided him in performing his role as husband, father, and provider. Respondent claimed that petitioners commitment to his paternal and marital responsibilities was beyond reproach.

On October 7, 1996, the trial court directed the prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether there was collusion between the parties.[3] The report submitted to the trial court stated that there was no such collusion.[4]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) subsequently entered its appearance in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines[5] and submitted an opposition[6] to the petition on September 23, 1997. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

Petitioner testified that he met respondent sometime in the early seventies when he applied for a job at Metrobank, where respondent was employed as a foreign exchange trader. They began dating in 1975 and had a romantic relationship soon thereafter.[7] After going steady for about two years, petitioner and respondent were married at the San Pancracio Chapel in Paco, Manila on April 22, 1978. Petitioner claimed that he married respondent because he believed that it was the right time to raise a family and that she would be a good mother to his children.[8]

In the middle of 1993, petitioner decided to separate from respondent. According to him, their marriage reached a point where there was no longer any communication between them and their relationship became devoid of love, affection, support and respect due to his constant urge to see other women. [9] Moreover, their relationship tended to be one-sided since respondent was unresponsive and hardly ever showed her love, needs, wants and emotions.[10]

Petitioner admitted that on certain occasions before his marriage, he had two girlfriends at the same time. He also saw other women even when he became engaged to and, later on, married respondent.[11] Respondent learned of his affairs but reacted in a subdued manner.[12] Petitioner surmised that it was respondents nature to be silent and withdrawn.[13]

In January 1994, petitioner left the conjugal abode and moved into an apartment located five to ten minutes away. Before he left, he and his wife spoke to their three children who, at that time, were 14, 8, and 6 years old, respectively. [14] Petitioner consulted a child psychologist before talking to his children. [15] He considered himself as a good and loving father and described his relationship with the children as great.[16]

Despite the separation, petitioner would regularly visit his children who stayed with him on alternate weekends. He voluntarily gave monthly support to the children and paid for their tuition fees. He also shouldered the childrens medical expenses as well as the maintenance and miscellaneous fees for the conjugal abode. [17]

Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on his alleged psychological disorder of Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex. Dr. Dayan described the said disorder as a pervasive maladaptation in terms of interpersonal and occupational functioning with main symptoms of grand ideation about oneself, self-centeredness, thinking he is unique and wanting to always be the one followed, the I personality. A person afflicted with this disorder believes that he is entitled to gratify his emotional and sexual feelings and thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with Casanova Complex exhibits habitual adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to another. [18]

Dr. Dayan submitted a psychological report on both petitioner and respondent based on clinical interviews and psychological tests.[19]

Respondent testified that she first learned of her husbands infidelity in 1980. She discovered that he was having an affair with one of her friends who worked as a trader in her husbands company. The affair was cut short when the woman left for the United States to work. Eventually, she and petitioner were able to rebuild their relationship and overcome the crisis.[20]

When asked about the womanizing ways of her husband, respondent averred that she did not know whether her husbands acts could be deemed womanizing since there were only two instances of infidelity which occurred 13 years apart. [21] She also theorized that petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled so he could marry her old friend.[22] She stated that she has not closed her doors to petitioner but the latter would have to give up his extra-marital relationship.[23]

To controvert the findings of petitioners expert witness, respondent presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, who testified that Dr. Dayans findings were incomplete because a team approach was necessary in evaluating an individuals personality. An evaluation of ones psychological capacity requires the expertise of a psychiatrist and social worker. [24]

Upon order of the trial court, the parties submitted their respective memoranda.[25] The OSG likewise filed a certification[26] pursuant to Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals.[27] In due course, the trial court rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon celebrated on April 22, 1978, as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the petitioner pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

Accordingly, the conjugal assets and liabilities are hereby ordered to be liquidated and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains be effected in accordance with Article 129 of the Family Code.

As petitioner manifested that he wishes to maintain the custody arrangement now existing, the custody of the three (3) children Miguel Alberto, Fernando Alfonso, and Ma. Joanna Victoria shall remain with the respondent subject to visitation rights of petitioner as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties.

In order to cancel the registration of the Marriage Contract between herein parties appearing in the Book of Marriage of the city of Manila, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila as well as the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO), CRD Legal Department, EDSA, Quezon City.

SO ORDERED.[28]

Respondent and the OSG seasonably filed an appeal from the decision of the trial court, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74354. On March 23, 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 12, 2001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment entered DISMISSING the petitioners petition for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[29]

Contrary to the trial courts findings, the appellate court held that petitioner failed to prove the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of his alleged psychological incapacity. Although Dr. Dayan testified that petitioners psychological incapacity preceded the marriage, she failed to give sufficient basis for such a finding. Dr. Dayan

also stated that parental marital instability was the root cause of petitioners psychological incapacity but failed to elaborate thereon or link the two variables. Moreover, petitioners sexual infidelity was made to appear as symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder when, in reality, the same merely resulted from a general dissatisfaction with the marriage.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision which was denied in an order dated October 28, 2004. [30] Thus, petitioner took this recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, asserting that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that he failed to prove his psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The petition has no merit.

The totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On the contrary, what is evident is the fact that petitioner was a good husband to respondent for a substantial period of time prior to their separation, a loving father to their children and a good provider of the family. Although he engaged in marital infidelity in at least two occasions, the same does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal obligations. The same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in petitioners personal history.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[31] the court held that psychological incapacity, as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, must be characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability.[32] It should

... [R]efer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly

demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated....[33]

In the case at bar, although Dr. Dayan testified that petitioner suffered from Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex even before the marriage and thus had the tendency to cheat on his wife, such conclusion was not sufficiently backed by concrete evidence showing that petitioner indeed had several affairs and finds it difficult to be faithful. Except for petitioners general claim that on certain occasions he had two girlfriends at the same time, no details or explanations were given of such circumstances that would demonstrate petitioners inability to be faithful to respondent either before or at the time of the celebration of their marriage.

Similarly, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to establish the incurability and gravity of his alleged psychological disorder. While Dr. Dayan described the symptoms of one afflicted with Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder as selfcentered, characterized by grandiose ideation and lack of empathy in relating to others, and one with Casanova Complex as a serial adulterer, the evidence on record betrays the presence of any of these symptoms.

Moreover, we are not convinced that petitioner is a serial or habitual adulterer, as he wants the court to believe. As stated by respondent herself, it cannot be said that two instances of infidelity which occurred 13 years apart could be deemed womanizing, especially considering that these instances involved the same woman. In fact, at the time of respondents testimony, petitioners illicit relationship has been going on for six years. This is not consistent with the symptoms of a person suffering from Casanova Complex who, according to Dr. Dayan, is one who jumps from one relationship to another.

Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.[34] The evidence on record fails to convince us that petitioners marital indiscretions are symptomatic of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the evidence reveals that petitioner was a good husband most of the time when he was living with respondent, a loving father to his children as well as a good provider.

In Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,[35] we held that the cause of the alleged psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Further

The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.[36]

In the instant case, it appears that petitioner has simply lost his love for respondent and has consequently refused to stay married to her. As revealed by his own testimony, petitioner felt that he was no longer part of respondents life and that the latter did not need or want him.[37] Respondents uncommunicative and withdrawn nature apparently led to petitioners discontentment with the marital relationship.

However, as held in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,[38] refusal to comply with the essential obligations of marriage is not psychological incapacity within the meaning of the law. The policy of the State is to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage is the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of validity of the marriage.[39]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 23, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74354 and its October 28, 2004 Resolution, areAFFIRMED.

G.R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999

LUCITA ESTRELLA HERNANDEZ v. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIO C. HERNANDEZ

DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated January 30, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, dated April 10, 1993, which dismissed the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner. Petitioner Lucita Estrella Hernandez and private respondent Mario C. Hernandez were married at the Silang Catholic Parish Church in Silang, Cavite on January 1, 1981 (Exh. A).[2] Three children were born to them, namely, Maie, who was born on May 3, 1982 (Exh. B),[3] Lyra, born on May 22, 1985 (Exh. C),[4] and Marian, born on June 15, 1989 (Exh. D).[5] On July 10, 1992, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City, a petition seeking the annulment of her marriage to private respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter. She alleged that from the time of their marriage up to the time of the filing of the suit, private respondent failed to perform his obligation to support the family and contribute to the management of the household, devoting most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends. She further claimed that private respondent, after they were married, cohabited with another woman with whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women, and that, because of his promiscuity, private respondent endangered her health by infecting her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). She averred that private respondent was irresponsible, immature and unprepared for the duties of a married life. Petitioner prayed that for having abandoned the family, private respondent be ordered to give support to their three children in the total amount ofP9,000.00 every month; that she be awarded the custody of their children; and that she be adjudged as the sole owner of a parcel of land located at Don Gregorio Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite, purchased during the marriage, as well as the jeep which private respondent took with him when he left the conjugal home on June 12, 1992.[6] On October 8, 1992, because of private respondents failure to file his answer, the trial court issued an order directing the assistant provincial prosecutor to conduct an investigation to determine if there was collusion between the parties.[7] Only petitioner appeared at the investigation on November 5, 1992. Nevertheless, the prosecutor found no evidence of collusion and recommended that the case be set for trial.[8] Based on the evidence presented by the petitioner, the facts are as follows: [9] Petitioner and private respondent met in 1977 at the Philippine Christian University in Dasmarias, Cavite. Petitioner, who is five years older than private respondent, was then in her first year of teaching zoology and botany. Private respondent, a college freshman, was her student for two consecutive semesters. They became sweethearts in February 1979 when she was no longer private respondents teacher. On January 1, 1981, they were married. Private respondent continued his studies for two more years. His parents paid for his tuition fees, while petitioner provided his allowances and other financial needs. The

family income came from petitioners salary as a faculty member of the Philippine Christian University. Petitioner augmented her earnings by selling Tupperware products, as well as engaging in the buy-and-sell of coffee, rice and polvoron. From 1983 up to 1986, as private respondent could not find a stable job, it was agreed that he would help petitioner in her businesses by delivering orders to customers. However, because her husband was a spendthrift and had other women, petitioners business suffered. Private respondent often had smoking and drinking sprees with his friends and betted on fighting cocks. In 1982, after the birth of their first child, petitioner discovered two love letters written by a certain Realita Villena to private respondent. She knew Villena as a married student whose husband was working in Saudi Arabia. When petitioner confronted private respondent, he admitted having an extra-marital affair with Villena. Petitioner then pleaded with Villena to end her relationship with private respondent. For his part, private respondent said he would end the affairs, but he did not keep his promise. Instead, he left the conjugal home and abandoned petitioner and their child. When private respondent came back, however, petitioner accepted him, despite private respondents infidelity in the hope of saving their marriage. Upon the recommendation of a family friend, private respondent was able to get a job at Reynolds Philippines, Inc. in San Agustin, Dasmarias, Cavite in 1986. However, private respondent was employed only until March 31, 1991, because he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by the company. He received P53,000.00 in retirement pay, but instead of spending the amount for the needs of the family, private respondent spent the money on himself and consumed the entire amount within four months of his retirement. While private respondent worked at Reynolds Philippines, Inc., his smoking, drinking, gambling and womanizing became worse. Petitioner discovered that private respondent carried on relationships with different women. He had relations with a certain Edna who worked at Yazaki; Angie, who was an operator of a billiard hall; Tess, a Japayuki; Myrna Macatangay, a secretary at the Road Master Drivers School in Bayan, Dasmarias, Cavite, with whom he cohabited for quite a while; and, Ruth Oliva, by whom he had a daughter named Margie P. Oliva, born on September 15, 1989 (Exh. E).[10] When petitioner confronted private respondent about his relationship with Tess, he beat her up, as a result of which she was confined at the De la Salle University Medical Center in Dasmarias, Cavite on July 4-5, 1990 because of cerebral concussion (Exh. F).[11] According to petitioner, private respondent engaged in extreme promiscuous conduct during the latter part of 1986. As a result, private respondent contracted gonorrhea and infected petitioner. They both received treatment at the Zapote Medical Specialists Center in Zapote, Bacoor, Cavite from October 22, 1986 until March 13, 1987 (Exhs. G & H).[12] Petitioner averred that on one occasion of a heated argument, private respondent hit their eldest child who was then barely a year old. Private respondent is not close to any of their children as he was never affectionate and hardly spent time with them.

On July 17, 1979, petitioner entered into a contract to sell (Exh. J) [13] with F & C Realty Corporation whereby she agreed to buy from the latter a parcel of land at the Don Gregorio Heights Subdivision I in Bo. Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite and placed a partial payment of P31,330.00. On May 26, 1987, after full payment of the amount of P51,067.10, inclusive of interests from monthly installments, a deed of absolute sale (Exh. K)[14] was executed in her favor and TCT No. T-221529 (Exh. M)[15] was duly issued. According to petitioner, on August 1, 1992, she sent a handwritten letter [16] to private respondent expressing her frustration over the fact that her efforts to save their marriage proved futile. In her letter, petitioner also stated that she was allowing him to sell their owner-type jeepney[17] and to divide the proceeds of the sale between the two of them. Petitioner also told private respondent of her intention to file a petition for the annulment of their marriage. It does not appear that private respondent ever replied to petitioners letter. By this time, he had already abandoned petitioner and their children. In October 1992, petitioner learned that private respondent left for the Middle East. Since then, private respondents whereabouts had been unknown. Ester Alfaro, petitioners childhood friend and co-teacher at the Philippine Christian University, testified during the hearing on the petition for annulment. She said that sometime in June 1979, petitioner introduced private respondent to her (Alfaro) as the formers sweetheart. Alfaro said she was not impressed with private respondent who was her student in accounting. She observed private respondent to be fun-loving, spending most of his time with campus friends. In November 1980, when petitioner asked Alfaro to be one of the secondary sponsors at her forthcoming wedding, Alfaro wanted to dissuade petitioner from going through with the wedding because she thought private respondent was not ready for married life as he was then unemployed. True enough, although the couple appeared happy during the early part of their marriage, it was not long thereafter that private respondent started drinking with his friends and going home late at night. Alfaro corroborated petitioners claim that private respondent was a habitual drunkard who carried on relationships with different women and continued hanging out with his friends. She also confirmed that petitioner was once hospitalized because she was beaten up by private respondent. After the first year of petitioners marriage, Alfaro tried to talk to private respondent, but the latter accused her of meddling with their marital life. Alfaro said that private respondent was not close to his children and that he had abandoned petitioner.[18] On April 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision[19] dismissing the petition for annulment of marriage filed by petitioner. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:[20] The Court can underscore the fact that the circumstances mentioned by the petitioner in support of her claim that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to marry her are among the grounds cited by the law as valid reasons for the grant of legal separation (Article 55 of the Family Code) - not as grounds for a declaration of nullity of marriages or annulment thereof. Thus, Article 55 of the same code reads as follows:

Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds: (1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner; .... (5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent; .... (8) Sexual infidelity or perversion; .... (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year. .... If indeed Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, which mentions psychological incapacity as a ground for the declaration of the nullity of a marriage, has intended to include the above-stated circumstances as constitutive of such incapacity, then the same would not have been enumerated as grounds for legal separation. In the same manner, this Court is not disposed to grant relief in favor of the petitioner under Article 46, paragraph (3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, as there is no dispute that the gonorrhea transmitted to the petitioner by respondent occurred sometime in 1986, or five (5) years after petitioners marriage with respondent was celebrated in 1981. The provisions of Article 46, paragraph (3) of the same law should be taken in conjunction with Article 45, paragraph (3) of the same code, and a careful reading of the two (2) provisions of the law would require the existence of this ground (fraud) at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the annulment of petitioners marriage with the respondent on this ground, as alleged and proved in the instant case, cannot be legally accepted by the Court. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on January 30, 1996, rendered its decision affirming the decision of the trial court. Citing the ruling in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[21] the Court of Appeals held:[22] It is clear in the above law and jurisprudence that the psychological incapacity of a spouse, as a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage, must exist at the time of the celebration of marriage. More so, chronic sexual infidelity, abandonment, gambling and use of prohibited drugs are not grounds per se, of psychological incapacity of a spouse.

We agree with the Solicitor General that petitioner-appellant failed to prove that her respondent-husband was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Certainly, petitioner-appellants declaration that at the time of their marriage her respondent-husbands character was on the borderline between a responsible person and the happy-go-lucky, could not constitute the psychological incapacity in contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, petitioner-appellant herself ascribed said attitude to her respondent-husbands youth and very good looks, who was admittedly several years younger than petitioner-appellant who, herself, happened to be the college professor of her respondent-husband. Petitioner-appellant even described her respondent-husband not as a problem student but a normal one (p. 24, tsn, Dec. 8, 1992). The acts and attitudes complained of by petitioner-appellant happened after the marriage and there is no proof that the same have already existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage to constitute the psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the respondent Court of Appeals erred I. IN FINDING THAT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS DID NOT EXIST FROM THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE. II. IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH HIS ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS. III. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE AWARD OF PERMANENT CUSTODY OF THE CHILDREN TO PETITIONER. IV. IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DENYING THE PRAYER FOR ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER REQUIRING PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE THREE CHILDREN IN THE AMOUNT OF P3,000.00 PER CHILD. V. IN NOT DECLARING THE REAL PROPERTY ACQUIRED BY PETITIONER AS HER EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY. The issue in this case is whether or not the marriage of petitioner and private respondent should be annulled on the ground of private respondents psychological incapacity. Petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to show that private respondents psychological incapacity existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. She argues that the fact that the acts of incapacity of private respondent became manifest only after the celebration of their marriage should not be a bar to the annulment of their marriage.

Art. 36 of the Family Code states: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.[23] In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[24] we held: Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate. The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable. In the instant case, other than her self-serving declarations, petitioner failed to establish the fact that at the time they were married, private respondent was suffering from a psychological defect which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. As the Court of Appeals pointed out, no evidence was presented to show that private respondent was not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. It was not sufficiently proved that private

respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature, and not merely physical. Petitioner says that at the outset of their marriage, private respondent showed lack of drive to work for his family. Private respondents parents and petitioner supported him through college. After his schooling, although he eventually found a job, he availed himself of the early retirement plan offered by his employer and spent the entire amount he received on himself. For a greater part of their marital life, private respondent was out of job and did not have the initiative to look for another. He indulged in vices and engaged in philandering, and later abandoned his family. Petitioner concludes that private respondents condition is incurable, causing the disintegration of their union and defeating the very objectives of marriage. However, private respondents alleged habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for finding that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due to private respondents youth and selfconscious feeling of being handsome, as the appellate court held. As pointed out in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals:[25] The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (citing Salita v. Magtolis, supra) nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. Moreover, expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private respondents psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests upon petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.[26] Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.[27] We, therefore, find no reason to reverse the ruling of respondent Court of Appeals whose conclusions, affirming the trial courts finding with regard to the non-existence of private respondents psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage, are entitled to

great weight and even finality.[28] Only where it is shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can these be overturned. The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary for us to pass upon petitioners contentions on the issue of permanent custody of children, the amount for their respective support, and the declaration of exclusive ownership of petitioner over the real property. These matters may more appropriately be litigated in a separate proceeding for legal separation, dissolution of property regime, and/or custody of children which petitioner may bring. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 112019. January 4, 1995.]

LEOUEL SANTOS, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS,Respondents .

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. no. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary "Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."

The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"), brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the decisions of the court a quo 1 and the Court of Appeal, 2 Leouel persists in beseeching its application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.cralaw It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.cralaw On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.cralaw Having to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in Negros Oriental.cralaw On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible and incompetent.cralaw A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).cralaw On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit evidence.cralaw On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 3

Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court. 4 The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 2891, which requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.cralaw Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary ". . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated." The Family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the sessions of the Family Code revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however, provide an insight on the import of the provision.cralaw "'Article 35. - The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 'xxx xxx xxx 'Article 36. - . . .cralaw '(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.' "On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes suggested that they say 'wanting in sufficient use,' but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa preferred to say 'wanting in the sufficient use.' On the other hand, Justice Reyes proposed that they say 'wanting in sufficient reason.' Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7) be modified to read:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary "'That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically

incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the celebration.' "Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase 'was wanting in sufficient use of reason of judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage' refers to defects in the mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligations.cralaw "Judge Diy raised the question: Since 'insanity' is also a psychological or mental incapacity, why is 'insanity' only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of marital obligations.cralaw "Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word 'mentally' be deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain the word 'mentally.' "Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence. Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is called selective impotency.cralaw "Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which describes a ground for voidable marriages. Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they should make a distinction.cralaw "Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.cralaw "Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is 'insanity' a ground for void ab initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.cralaw "On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase 'even if such lack or incapacity is made manifest' be modified to read 'even if such lack or incapacity becomes manifest.' "Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not apparent.cralaw "Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase 'psychological or mentally incapacitated' - in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one does

not know all the consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.cralaw "xxx xxx xxx

"Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground for voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.cralaw "xxx xxx xxx

"Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to marriage.cralaw "xxx xxx xxx

"On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately, consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not principally a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to marriage, which are completely different from each other, because they require a different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there is always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it should be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.cralaw "Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured.cralaw

"Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree. Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a defect in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of marriage, and therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.cralaw "Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity, there are also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage. 5 xxx xxx xxx

"Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the impotence that in some instances the impotence is only temporary and only with respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term 'incurable' has a different meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that 'psychological incapacity' can also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that 'psychological incapacity' is incurable.cralaw "Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with the essential marital obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages, it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.cralaw "Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured. Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow him to remarry. 6 xxx xxx xxx

"Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary "'Article 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization.'

Justice Caguioa suggested that 'even if' be substituted with 'although.' On the other hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause 'although such incapacity becomes manifest after its solemnization' be deleted since it may encourage one to create the manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.cralaw "Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity is not a species of vice or consent.cralaw "Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their February 9, 1984 meeting:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary "'On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase 'psychological or mental impotence' is an invention of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as 'psychological or mental incapacity to discharge . . .' "Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word 'mental' precisely to distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that 'psychological incapacity' refers to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.cralaw "Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not to go into the classification of 'psychological incapacity' because there was a lot of debate on it and that this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a special case.cralaw "At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.cralaw "Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of psychological incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied negatively.cralaw "Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or prospective in application.cralaw "Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactively because it is their answer to the problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law. On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the avalanche of cases.cralaw

"Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee approved.cralaw "The members voted as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary "(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.cralaw "(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio were for retroactivity.cralaw "(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.cralaw "Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The Committee approved the suggestion." 7 It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13 June 1994); thus: 8 "The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law." A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, 9 which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary "Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 1. who lack sufficient use of reason; 2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually; 3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage." (Emphasis supplied.) Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment, nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value

as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal provision.cralaw One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third paragraph of Canon 1095 has been framed, states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary "The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 'Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975, canon 297, a new canon, novus); then a broader one followed:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary '. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . . .' (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049); then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982, canon 1095, 3); finally, a new version was promulgated:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 'because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae)'.cralaw "So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary obligations of marriage." Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.cralaw In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary "This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in legal terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and education

of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by these duties." Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.cralaw It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate." The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a

party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity.cralaw Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.cralaw Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the Family Code, is that "Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code." (Emphasis supplied.) Our Constitution is no less emphatic:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary "Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.cralaw "Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).cralaw The ab ove provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and they are no doubt the tenets we still hold on to.cralaw The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.cralaw WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.cralaw

SO ORDERED.cralaw Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.cralaw Feliciano, J., is on leave.cralaw

[G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997] REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA,Respondents. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, psychological incapacity. Since the Codes effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled -- exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration -- Article 36 as the most liberal divorce procedure in the world. Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code. Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Facts This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends

on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couples best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start. In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridels strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridels refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridels failure to run the household and handle their finances. During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated: 1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila; 2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986; 3.That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years; 4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child; 5. That the respondent is not asking for damages; 6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife. Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits A to E1. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTCs decision. Hence, the present recourse. The Issue In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase psychological incapacity (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case, adding that the appealed Decision tended to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture. In denying the Solicitor Generals appeal, the respondent Court relied5 heavily on the trial courts findings that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities. Then, it added its own opinion that the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights x x x. It concluded that: As a ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates. In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made. Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals. The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that opposing and conflicting personalities is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties. The Courts Ruling The petition is meritorious. In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals,6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity x x x and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the

law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7 Justice Vitug wrote that the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of irreconciliable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness. The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8 COURT Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage? A Yes, Your Honor. Q There is no hope for the marriage? A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman. Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties? A Yes, Your Honor. Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions? A Yes, Your Honor. The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of thoughtfulness and gentleness on Reynaldos part and of being conservative, homely and intelligent on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is not indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows loves temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved. During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts in interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 VicarJudicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda. From their submissions and the Courts own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,11 recognizing it as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state. The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -- not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted asroot causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides: The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally -- subject to our law on evidence -- what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church -- while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other -- shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation. (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid. SO ORDERED. Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur Padilla, J., See Separate Statement. Romero, J., See Separate Statement. Vitug, J., Please see Concurring opinion.

JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, Petitioner, vs. MANUEL SIAYNGCO, Respondent. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 01 July 2003, reversing the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),

Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31 January 2001, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent herein Judge Manuel Siayngco ("respondent Manuel"). Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and respondent Manuel were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering that they could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy. On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together, respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement, tables, chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she would yell and scream at him and throw objects around the house within the hearing of their neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional advancement as she did not even give him moral support and encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated resentment and vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and appreciation from her own parents since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and incurable and, even if treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the emotional and physical capacity of the parties; and that he endured and suffered through his turbulent and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years. In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against her so that he could be free to marry his paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother; that it was respondent Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all his endeavors despite his philandering; that she was raised in a real happy family and had a happy childhood contrary to what was stated in the complaint. In the pre-trial order,3 the parties only stipulated on the following: 1. That they were married on 27 June 1973; 2. That they have one son who is already 20 years old. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in his petition. He testified that his parents never approved of his marriage as they still harbored hope that he would return to the seminary.4 The early years of their marriage were difficult years as they had a hard time

being accepted as husband and wife by his parents and it was at this period that his wife started exhibiting signs of being irritable and temperamental5to him and his parents.6 She was also obsessive about cleanliness which became the common source of their quarrels.7He, however, characterized their union as happy during that period of time in 1979 when they moved to Malolos as they were engrossed in furnishing their new house.8 In 1981, when he became busy with law school and with various community organizations, it was then that he felt that he and his wife started to drift apart.9 He then narrated incidents during their marriage that were greatly embarrassing and/or distressing to him, e.g., when his wife quarreled with an elderly neighbor; 10 when she would visit him in his office and remark that the curtains were already dirty or when she kicked a trash can across the room or when she threw a ballpen from his table;11 when she caused his office drawer to be forcibly opened while he was away;12 when she confronted a female tenant of theirs and accused the tenant of having an affair with him;13 and other incidents reported to him which would show her jealous nature. Money matters continued to be a source of bitter quarrels.14 Respondent Manuel could not forget that he was not able to celebrate his appointment as judge in 1995 as his wife did not approve it, ostensibly for lack of money, but she was very generous when it came to celebrations of their parish priest.15 Respondent Manuel then denied that he was a womanizer16 or that he had a mistress.17 Lastly, respondent Manuel testified as to their conjugal properties and obligations.18 Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuels Clerk of Court, testified that petitioner Juanita seldom went to respondent Manuels office.19 But when she was there, she would call witness to complain about the curtains and the cleanliness of the office. 20One time, witness remembered petitioner Juanita rummaging through respondent Manuels drawer looking for his address book while the latter was in Subic attending a conference.21 When petitioner Juanita could not open a locked drawer she called witness, telling the latter that she was looking for the telephone number of respondents hotel room in Subic. A process server was requested by petitioner Juanita to call for a locksmith in the town proper. When the locksmith arrived, petitioner Juanita ordered him to open the locked drawer. On another occasion, particularly in August of 1998, witness testified that she heard petitioner Juanita remark to respondent Manuel "sino bang batang bibinyagan na yan? Baka anak mo yan sa labas?"22 As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA GARCIA whose professional qualifications as a psychiatrist were admitted by petitioner Juanita. 23 From her psychiatric evaluation,24 Dr. Garcia concluded: To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco contributed to the marital collapse. There is a partner relational problem which affected their capacity to sustain the marital bond with love, support and understanding. The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM IV) is secondary to the psychopathology of both spouses. Manuel and Juanita had engaged themselves in a defective communication pattern which is characteristically negative and deformed. This

affected their competence to maintain the love and respect that they should give to each other. Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both partners who are expected to use healthy strategies to solve their disputes and differences. Whereas Juanita would be derogatory, critical, argumentative, depressive and obsessive-compulsive, Manuel makes use of avoidance and suppression. In his effort to satisfy the self and to boost his masculine ego to cover up for his felt or imagined inadequacies, he became callused to the detrimental effects of his unfaithfulness and his failure to prioritize the marriage. Both spouses, who display narcissistic psychological repertoire (along with their other maladaptive traits), failed to adequately empathize (or to be responsive and sensitive) to each others needs and feelings. The matrimonial plot is not conducive to a healthy and a progressive marriage. Manuel and Juanita have shown their psychologically [sic] incapacity to satisfactorily comply with the fundamental duties of marriage. The clashing of their patterns of maladaptive traits, which warrant the diagnosis of personality disorder not otherwise specified (PDNOS, with code 301.9 as per DSM IV criteria) will bring about more emotional mishaps and psychopathology. These rigid sets of traits which were in existence before the marriage will tend to be pervasive and impervious to recovery.25 In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuels allegations. She insisted that they were a normal couple who had their own share of fights; that they were happily married until respondent Manuel started having extra-marital affairs26which he had admitted to her.27 Petitioner Juanita professed that she would wish to preserve her marriage and that she truly loved her husband.28 She stated further that she has continuously supported respondent Manuel, waiting up for him while he was in law school to serve him food and drinks. Even when he already filed the present case, she would still attend to his needs.29 She remembered that after the pre-trial, while they were in the hallway, respondent Manuel implored her to give him a chance to have a new family.30 DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel,31 testified that he conducted a psychiatric evaluation on petitioner Juanita, the results of which were embodied in his report. Said report stated in part: Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the psychological tests, respondent Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco, was found to be a mature, conservative, religious and highly intelligent woman who possess [sic] more than enough psychological potentials for a mutually satisfying long term heterosexual relationship. Superego is strong and she is respectful of traditional institutions of society like the institution of marriage. She was also found to be a loving, nurturing and self-sacrificing woman who is capable of enduring severe environmental stress in her social milieu. Finally, she is reality-oriented and therefore capable of rendering fair and sound decision. In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to be psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.32

CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco since 1992 described the Siayngcos as the ideal couple, sweet to each other.33 The couple would religiously attend prayer meetings in the community.34 Both were likewise leaders in their community.35 Witness then stated that she would often go to the house of the couple and, as late as March 2000, she still saw respondent Manuel there.36 On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent Manuels petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to petitioner Juanita holding in part that: The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not preponderantly supported in evidence. The couple [was] happily married and after four years of marital bliss [was] blest with a son. Their life together continued years thereafter in peace and prosperity. The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical, depressed and obsessive doubtless arose later in the parties relationship sometime in the early 90s when the defendant-wife started receiving letters that the plaintiff is playing footsy. xxx-xxx-xxx The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-jerk responses to slight stabs of the Pavlovian hammer on marital relations. A wife, as in the instant case, may have succumbed, due to her jealousy, to the constant delivery of irritating curtain lectures to her husband. But, as our laws now stand, the dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in such cases. In contrast to some countries, our laws do not look at a marital partner as a mere refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he or she sometimes may sound like a firetruck.37 A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an order dated 04 May 2001. 38 On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on the case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals.39 Thus: The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of plaintiff Manuel and defendant Juanita. It appears that there is empathy between plaintiff and defendant. That is a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each others feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love "amore gignit amorem", sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise conscious of its value as a sublime social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 324). This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital

obligations, can do no less, but reverse and set aside the decision of the lower court. Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity, not only of defendant but also of himself. 40 Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT SEPARATED ON MARCH 1997, THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING TOGETHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION UP TO THE PRESENT III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V. MOLINA IV. IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT NULL AND VOID ON GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE The Courts Ruling Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag41 is apropos. There, we held that whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage depends crucially on the facts of the case. Each case must be closely scrutinized and judged according to its own facts as there can be no case that is on "all fours" with another. This, the Court of Appeals did not heed. The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a clear divergence in its factual milieu with the case at bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the couple involved therein, despite sharing the same bed from the time of their wedding night on 22 May 1988 until their separation on 15 March 1989, never had coitus. The perplexed wife filed the petition for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of her husband. We sustained the wife for the reason that an essential marital obligation under the Family Code is procreation such that "the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity." On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue herein. Rather, we have here a case of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by his wifes outbursts and overbearing ways, who finds his wifes obsession with cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is wounded by her lack of support and respect for his person and his position as a Judge. In our book, however, these inadequacies of

petitioner Juanita which led respondent Manuel to file a case against her do not amount to psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations. It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals42 where we declared that "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.43 In Republic v. Court of Appeals44 we expounded: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically

capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.45 With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve the issue of whether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel. A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.46 With this cardinal state policy in mind, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals47 that the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff (respondent Manuel herein). Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that respondent Manuel is psychologically incapacitated. The psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuels own evidence, contains candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in the best position to gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the essential marital obligations of marriage: She talked about her spouse, "My husband is kind, a good provider, cool, intelligent but a liar, masamang magalit at gastador. In spite of what he has done to me, I take care of him whenever he is sick. He is having extra marital affairs because he wants to have a child. I believe that our biggest problem is not having a child. It is his obsession to have

a child with his girl now. He started his relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them together in the car. I think that it was the girl who encouraged him to file the petition." She feels that the problems in the relationship is [sic] "paulit-ulit," but, that she still is willing to pursue it. x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is not really psychologically incapacitated. He apparently told her, "You and Jeremy should give me a chance to have a new family." She answered and said, "Ikaw tinuruan mo akong to fight for my right. Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage natin." 48 What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity.49 Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.50 It must be shown that respondent Manuels unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state 51 and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel has admitted that: "I had [extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child at that particular point."52 B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wifes lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.53 In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.54 The psychological report of respondent Manuels witness, Dr. Garcia, on the other hand, does not help his case any. Nothing in there supports the doctors conclusion that petitioner Juanita is psychologically incapacitated. On the contrary, the report clearly shows that the root cause of petitioner Juanitas behavior is traceable not from the inception of their marriage as required by law but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the priesthood,55 her husbands philandering, admitted no less by him,56 and her inability to conceive.57 Dr. Garcias report paints a story of a husband and wife who grew professionally during the marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to the hilt, becoming busier and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and togetherness as a

couple. This was confirmed by respondent Manuel himself during his direct examination.58 Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed a window into the Siayngcoss life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.59 As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos:60 Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent Manuel might be experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.61 WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 01 July 2003 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 31 January 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102 is reinstated and given full force and effect. No costs. SO ORDERED. Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Tenebro vs CA : 150758 : J. Vitug : En Banc : Separate Opinion

SEPARATE OPINION VITUG, J.: Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for contracting, while still being

married to Hilda Villareyes, a second marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas. Tenebro argues that since his second marriage with Ancajas has ultimately been declared void ab initio on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity, he should be acquitted for the crime of bigamy. The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.1 Bigamy presupposes a valid prior marriage and a subsequent marriage, contracted during the subsistence of the prior union, which would have been binding were it not for its being bigamous. Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage, prior to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense in a criminal action for bigamy? I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the psychological incapacity of a party or both parties to the marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter explained), the answer must be in the affirmative. Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity.2 As early as the case of People vs. Aragon3 this Court has underscored the fact that the Revised Penal Code itself does not, unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain, require the judicial declaration of nullity of a prior void marriage before it can be raised by way of a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law contemplated otherwise, said the Court, an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law, (but that in) its absence, (the courts) are bound by (the) rule of strict interpretation of penal statutes. In contrast to a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and, therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if the second marriage were contracted prior to the decree of annulment)4 the complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage, being void ab initio and legally inexistent, can outrightly be defense in an indictment of bigamy. It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a person may be convicted of bigamy although the first marriage is ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the second marriage is contracted, there has as yet no judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage.5 I maintain strong reservations to this ruling. Article 40 of the Family Code reads: Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. It is only for purpose of remarriage that the law has expressed that the absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. It may not be amiss to state that under the regime of the Civil Code of 1950, the Supreme Court, in Wiegel vs. Judge Sempio-Diy,6 has held that a subsequent marriage of one of the spouses of a prior

void marriage is itself (the subsequent marriage) void if it were contracted before a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage. Although this pronouncement has been abandoned in a later decision of the court in Yap vs. Court of Appeals,7 the Family Code, however has seen it fit to adopt the Wiegel rule but only for purpose of remarriage which is just to say that the subsequent marriage shall itself be considered void. There is no clear indication to conclude that the Family Code has amended or intended to amend the Revised penal Code or to abandon the settled and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter.8 A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by itself. The provision has been from Canon law primarily to reconcile the grounds for nullity of marriage under civil law with those of church laws.9 The psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations of the spouses is completely distinct from other grounds for nullity which are confined to the essential or formal requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal capacity or disqualification of the contracting parties, want of consent, absence of a marriage license, or the like. The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a party or the parties thereto may be said to have the earmarks of a voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be valid until it is judicially decreed to be a nullity. Thus, Article 54 of the Family Code considers children conceived or born of such a void marriage before its judicial declaration of nullity to be legitimate similar to the rule on a voidable marriage. It is expected, even as I believe it safe to assume, that the spouses rights and obligations, property regime and successional rights would continue unaffected, as if it were a voidable marriage, unless and until the marriage is judicially declared void for basically two reasons: First, psychological incapacity, a newly-added ground for the nullity of a marriage under the Family Code, breaches neither the essential nor the formal requisites of a valid marriages;10 and second, unlike the other grounds for nullity of marriage (i.e., relationship, minority of the parties, lack of license, mistake in the identity of the parties) which are capable of relatively easy demonstration, psychological incapacity, however, being a mental state, may not so readily be as evident.11It would have been logical for the Family Code to consider such a marriage explicitly voidable rather than void if it were not for apparent attempt to make it closely coincide with the Canon Law rules and nomenclature. Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity appears to merely differ from a voidable marriage in that, unlike the latter, it is not convalidated by either cohabitation or prescription. It might be recalled that prior to republic Act No. 8533, further amending the Family Code, an action or defense of absolute nullity of marriage falling under Article 36, celebrated before the effectivity of the Code, could prescribe in ten years following the effectivity of the Family Code. The initial provision of the ten-year period of prescription seems to betray a real consciousness by the framers that marriages falling under Article 36 are truly meant to be inexistent. Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact that a void marriage

due to psychological incapacity remains, for all intents and purposes, to be binding and efficacious until judicially declared otherwise. Without such marriage having first been declared a nullity (or otherwise dissolved), a subsequent marriage could constitute bigamy. Thus, a civil case questioning the validity of the first marriage would not be a prejudicial issue much in the same way that a civil case assailing a prior voidable marriage (being valid until annulled) would not be a prejudicial question to the prosecution of a criminal offense for bigamy. In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than the existence of the first marriage, this Court has declared in a line of cases that no crime of bigamy is committed.12 The Court has explained that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it must, even as it needs only, be shown that the subsequent marriage has all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsisting first union. Hence, where it is established that the second marriage has been contracted without the necessary license and thus void,13 or that the accused is merely forced to enter into the second (voidable) marriage,14 no criminal liability for the crime of bigamy can attach. In both and like instances, however, the lapses refers to the elements required for contracting a valid marriage. If, then, all the requisites for the perfection of the contract marriage, freely and voluntarily entered into, are shown to be extant, the criminal liability for bigamy can unassailably arise. Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not relate to an infirmity in the elements, either essential or formal, in contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent to the bigamous marriage due to that ground, without more, would be inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy. The judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage but it does not negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage. Its subsequent declaration of nullity dissolves the relationship of the spouses but, being alien to the requisite conditions for the perfection of the marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the part of the offender who had entered into it. Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.

Endnotes: 1 Article 349, Revised Penal Code. 2 Odayat vs. Amante, 77 SCRA 338; see also People vs Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033. 3 100 Phil 1033. 4 See People vs. Mendoza, 50 O.G. 4767.

5 Mercado vs. Tan, 337 SCRA 122; Te vs. Court of Appeals, 346 SCRA 327. 6 143 SCRA 499. 7 145 SCRA 229. 8 I might add, parenthetically, that the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage even for purposes of remarriage should refer merely to cases when it can be said that the marriage, at least ostensibly, has taken place. For instance, no such judicial declaration of nullity would yet be required when either or both parties have not at all given consent thereto that verily results in a no marriage situation or when the prior marriage is between persons of the same sex. 9 Deliberations of the family Code Revision Committee, 9 August 1996. 10 Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential requisites are present: (1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female; and (2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer. (53a) Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are: (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a) Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2). A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. (n) 11 One might observe that insanity, which could be worse than psychological incapacity merely renders a marriage voidable, not void. 12 De la cruz vs. Hon. Ejercito, G.R. No. L-40895, 6 November 1975, 68 SCRA 1; Merced vs. Hon. Diez, et. Al., 109 Phil 155; Zapanta vs. hon. Montessa, et. al., 144

Phil. 1227; People vs. Mora Dumpo, 62 Phil 246; People vs. Lara, 51 O. G. 4079. 13 People vs. Lara, supra. 14 De la Cruz vs. Hon. Ejercito, supra; Merced vs. Hon. Diez, supra.

G.R. No. 162368 : July 17, 2006 MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, Petitioner, v. BRIX FERRARIS, Respondent. RESOLUTION YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida PerezFerraris of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error. On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a Decision1 denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order2 dated April 20, 2001 where the trial court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed3 in toto the judgment of the trial court. It held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already present at the inception of the marriage.4 The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish the substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she arrived at the conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to clearly demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the essential marital obligations. 5 cra Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied6 for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court. As already stated, the petition for review

was denied for failure of petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal committed any reversible error. Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.7 The Court required respondent Brix Ferraris to file comment8 but failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to file comment. Further, the Court directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on petitioner's motion for reconsideration which it complied on March 2, 2006. After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.9 Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination.10 It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court,11 save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts,12 which are unavailing in the instant case. The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.13 As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.14 It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained,15 which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals: Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital annulment cases is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish respondent's psychological condition. Here, appellant contends that there is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from psychological incapacity. There is absolutely no showing

that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable. Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence showed that respondent's alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of some deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the couple's relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy and contented with her life in the company of respondent. In fact, by petitioner's own reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began when petitioner started doubting respondent's fidelity. It was only when they started fighting about the calls from women that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Respondent could not understand petitioner's lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Respondent could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. x x x. xxx At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has a mixed personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant type." In fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that one suffering from such mixed personality disorder is dependent on others for decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's information that respondent had extramarital affairs was supplied by the petitioner herself. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" x x x. She stated that there was a history of respondent's parents having difficulties in their relationship. But this input on the supposed problematic history of respondent's parents also came from petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or supervening disabling factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to prove that respondent's supposed psychological or mental malady existed even before the marriage. All these omissions must be held up against petitioner, for the reason that upon her devolved the onus of establishing nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum.16 We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals,17 where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends than his family on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of were more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness. Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals18 that habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void based on psychological incapacity. While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage.19 No less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.20 cra Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35,21 37,22 38,23 and 4124 that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 4525 that would make the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.26 Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. 27 Neither it is to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.28 cra WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY. SO ORDERED. Panganiban, C.J., Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 152577 Present:

PUNO, Chairman, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., - versusTINGA, and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated:

September 21, 2005 CRASUS L. IYOY, R e s p o n d e n t. x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J .:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, [1] affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, [2] declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint [3] for declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997. According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a result of their union, they had five children ' Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert, and Carlos ' who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was 'hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987, Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named as 'Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Fely's acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing, constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.

Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim [4] with the RTC on 05 June 1997. She asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being previously married to respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely refuted the other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of the latter's drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could not have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus had no job and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of her children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently living with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent Crasus of misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing, Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.

After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs, [5] the RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner Republic participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. [6]

Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially reiterated the allegations in his Complaint; [7] (2) the Certification, dated 13 April 1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961; [8] and (3) the invitation to the wedding

of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used her American husband's surname, Micklus. [9]

Fely's counsel filed a Notice, [10] and, later on, a Motion, [11] to take the deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne, upon written interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines in New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the Orders [12] and Commissions [13] issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of New York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon written interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC. Taking into account that it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had presented his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998, [14]considering Fely to have waived her right to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed submitted for decision.

Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis of the following findings '

The ground bearing defendant's psychological incapacity deserves a reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiff's testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as striving for family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately established that the defendant practically abandoned him. She obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and married another man and has establish [sic] another family of her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another man in another country. Defendant's intolerable traits may not have been apparent or manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the case in this instance. Certainly defendant's posture being an irresponsible wife erringly reveals her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society throughout the civilized world. It

is quite evident that the defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her marital obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendant's own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendant's psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy, firmly. Going over plaintiff's testimony which is decidedly credible, the Court finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations. These are her excessive disposition to material things over and above the marital stability. That such incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in question is shown by defendant's own attitude towards her marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio. [15]

Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It even offered additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely null and void, to wit '

Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United States. Plaintiffappellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage Article 26 of the Family Code provides: Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW.

The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husband's citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien. It would be the height of unfairness if, under these circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as married to defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by affirming the trial court's declaration of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.[16]

After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002, [17] denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant Petition before this Court, based on the following arguments/grounds '

I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent's wife do not per se constitute psychological incapacity. II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence considering that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is inapplicable to the case at bar.[18]

In his Comment [19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Fely's psychological incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had already become an American citizen. He further questioned the personality of petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.

The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.

Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines, reads '

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals, [20] the term psychological incapacity was defined, thus '

'. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.

The psychological incapacity must be characterized by '

(a) Gravity ' It must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) Juridical Antecedence ' It must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) Incurability ' It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, [23] which, although quite lengthy, by its significance, deserves to be reproduced below '

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be 'protected by the state. The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ofejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild

characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts' cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts' (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095. [24]

A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, [25] further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.

Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence, this Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.

The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted only two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely, such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American husband's surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her Answer to respondent Crasus's Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.

It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. [26] Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article. [27]

As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 'is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. [28]

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the

personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue of this Court's ruling inMarcos v. Marcos, [29] respondent Crasus must still have complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina [30] that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.

In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. [31] No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. [32]

II Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not applicable to the case at bar.

According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in 1984 , after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since 1988 . At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen , and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.

III The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.

Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides '

ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government. [33] His Office is tasked to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. [34]

The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his intervention in such

proceedings could only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.

Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals. [35] While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.

In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta[36]

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)], this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State: (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at 213]

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285 (2001)] reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State [37]

Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, [38] which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are reproduced below '

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition. '

(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same period. Sec. 18. Memoranda. ' The court may require the parties and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with or without the memoranda.

Sec. 19. Decision. '

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general circulation.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.

Sec. 20. Appeal. '

(2) Notice of Appeal. ' An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.

Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely's abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem. [39]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid and subsisting.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice

G.R. No. 186400 : October 20, 2010 CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner, v. DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.cralaw DECISION MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a review of the December 10, 2008 Decision1cra1aw of the Court of Appeals (CA) in an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 entitled "Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos," docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16, 2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its decision pronouncing the nullity of marriage between petitioner and respondent final and executory. On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as JDRC No. 6211. After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition for annulment in a Decision, dated August 2, 2006, with the following disposition:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS celebrated on February 14, 1980 as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of both petitioner and respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal consequences provided by law. Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well as the National Statistics Office (NSO) copy of this decision. SO ORDERED.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice of Appeal on September 11, 2006. In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilos failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages. On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the denial of Danilos appeal was likewise denied. On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and executory and granting the Motion for Entry of Judgment filed by Cynthia. Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the September 19, 2006 Order which denied due course to Danilos appeal; 2) the November 23, 2006 Order which denied the motion to reconsider the September 19, 2006 Order; and 3) the January 16, 2007 Order which declared the August 2, 2006 decision as final and executory. Danilo also prayed that he be declared psychologically capacitated to render the essential marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home and their children. As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in this case as the marriage between Cynthia and Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before the Family Code took effect. It relied on the ruling of this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3cra1aw to the effect that the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10SC] extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988." Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing her Manifestation with Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Partial Reconsideration [of the Honorable Courts Decision dated December 10, 2008]. The CA, however, in its February 11, 2009 Resolution,4cra1aw denied the motion for extension of time considering that the 15-day reglementary period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA 208. The motion for partial reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following ISSUES

I THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING THAT:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING THAT THE FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN ARE NOT SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE. B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE COURT IS APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE, ITS RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS. MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC PERTAINS TO THE WORD "PETITIONS" RATHER THAN TO THE WORD "MARRIAGES." C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES" IS APPLICABLE TO MARRIAGES SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE FAMILY CODE. HENCE, A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL BY HEREIN RESPONDENT. D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN RESPONDENT REFUSED TO COMPLY WITH A PRECONDITION FOR APPEAL, A RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL IS NOT PROPER IN HIS CASE. II THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009 CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING AND THE FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. III THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE NOVELTY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE AND THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A LIBERAL VIEW OF THE RULES IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER. MOREOVER, THE INSTANT PETITION IS MERITORIOUS AND NOT INTENDED FOR DELAY.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the principal question to be resolved is whether or not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at bench.

Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also applicable to marriages solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia, the CA erroneously anchored its decision to an obiter dictum in the aforecited Enrico case, which did not even involve a marriage solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code. She added that, even assuming arguendo that the pronouncement in the said case constituted a decision on its merits, still the same cannot be applied because of the substantial disparity in the factual milieu of the Enrico case from this case. In the said case, both the marriages sought to be declared null were solemnized, and the action for declaration of nullity was filed, after the effectivity of both the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC in 2003. In this case, the marriage was solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the action was filed and decided after the effectivity of both. Danilo, in his Comment,6cra1aw counters that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980, years before its effectivity. He further stresses the meritorious nature of his appeal from the decision of the RTC declaring their marriage as null and void due to his purported psychological incapacity and citing the mere "failure" of the parties who were supposedly "remiss," but not "incapacitated," to render marital obligations as required under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Court finds the petition devoid of merit. Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Section 1. Scope This Rule shall govern petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily. The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.7cra1aw The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to petitioners interpretation that the phrase "under the Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word "petitions" rather than to the word "marriages."

A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application.9cra1aw As the statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a statute there should be no departure."10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary There is no basis for petitioners assertion either that the tenets of substantial justice, the novelty and importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her favor. Time and again the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial merit.11cra1aw As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The appellate court was correct in denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration considering that the reglementary period for filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. As pronounced inApex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The rule is and has been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is nonextendible. The Court has made this clear as early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the Court has consistently and strictly adhered thereto. Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the appellate courts denial of petitioners motion for reconsideration is justified, precisely because petitioners earlier motion for extension of time did not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA decision has already attained finality when petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration. It follows that the same decision was already beyond the review jurisdiction of this Court. In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the RTC decision which denied due course to respondents appeal and denying petitioners motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose is to bring up for review a final judgment of the lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to appeal.14cra1aw In the recent case ofAlmelor v. RTC of Las Pinas City, Br. 254,15cra1aw the Court reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to

appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities. In the case at bench, the respondent should be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his appeal considering that what is at stake is the sacrosanct institution of marriage. No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution. This constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code. Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence and inviolability, thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State finds no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. SO ORDERED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

G.R. No. 168335

Present:

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, BRION, BERSAMIN,

*

ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR. and

- versus -

SERENO, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 6, 2011

NESTOR GALANG, Respondent. x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), challenging the decision[2] dated November 25, 2004 and the resolution[3] dated May 9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 70004. The challenged decision affirmed the decision [4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 62, Angeles City, declaring the marriage of Nestor Galang (respondent) and Juvy Salazar null and void on the ground of the latters psychological incapacity. The assailed resolution denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Antecedent Facts

On March 9, 1994, the respondent and Juvy contracted marriage in Pampanga. They resided in the house of the respondents father in San Francisco, Mabalacat, Pampanga. The respondent worked as an artist-illustrator at the Clark Development Corporation, earning P8,500.00 monthly. Juvy, on the other hand, stayed at home as a housewife. They have one child, Christopher.

On August 4, 1999, the respondent filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Juvy, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 9494. He alleged that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage, as she was a kleptomaniac and a swindler. He claimed that Juvy stole his ATM card and his parents money, and often asked money from their friends and relatives on the pretext that Christopher was confined in a hospital. According to the respondent, Juvy suffers from mental deficiency, innate immaturity, distorted discernment and total lack of care, love and affection [towards him and their] child. He posited that Juvys incapacity was extremely serious and appears to be incurable.[5]

The RTC ordered the city prosecutor to investigate if collusion existed between the parties. Prosecutor Angelito I. Balderama formally manifested, on October 18, 1999, that he found no evidence of collusion between the parties. The RTC set the case for trial in its Order of October 20, 1999. The respondent presented testimonial and documentary evidence to substantiate his allegations.

In his testimony, the respondent alleged that he was the one who prepared their breakfast because Juvy did not want to wake up early; Juvy often left their child to their neighbors care; and Christopher almost got lost in the market when Juvy brought him there.[6]

The respondent further stated that Juvy squandered the P15,000.00 he entrusted to her. He added that Juvy stole his ATM card and falsified his signature to encash the check representing his (the respondents) fathers pension. He, likewise, stated that he caught Juvy playing mahjong and kuwaho three (3) times. Finally, he testified that Juvy borrowed money from their relatives on the pretense that their son was confined in a hospital.[7]

Aside from his testimony, the respondent also presented Anna Liza S. Guiang, a psychologist, who testified that she conducted a psychological test on the respondent. According to her, she wrote Juvy a letter requesting for an interview, but the latter did not respond.[8] In her Psychological Report, the psychologist made the following findings:

Psychological Test conducted on client Nestor Galang resembles an emotionally-matured individual. He is well-adjusted to the problem he meets, and enable to throw-off major irritations but manifest[s] a very low frustration tolerance which means he has a little ability to endure anxiety and the client manifests suppressed feelings and emotions which resulted to unbearable emotional pain, depression and lack of self-esteem and gained emotional tensions caused by his wifes behavior.

The incapacity of the defendant is manifested [in] such a manner that the defendant-wife: (1) being very irresponsible and very lazy and doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility; (2) her involvement in gambling activities such as mahjong and kuwaho; (3) being an estafador which exhibits her behavioral and personality disorders; (4) her neglect and show no care attitude towards her husband and child; (5) her immature and rigid behavior; (6) her lack of initiative to change and above all, the fact that she is unable to perform her marital obligations as a loving, responsible and caring wife to her family. There are just few

reasons to believe that the defendant is suffering from incapacitated mind and such incapacity appears to be incorrigible.

xxx

The following incidents are the reasons why the couple separated:

1.

After the marriage took place, the incapacity of the defendant was manifested on such occasions wherein the plaintiff was the one who prepared his breakfast, because the defendant doesnt want to wake up early; this became the daily routine of the plaintiff before reporting to work;

2.

After reporting from work, the defendant was often out gambling, as usual, the plaintiff was the one cooking for supper while the defendant was very busy with her gambling activities and never attended to her husbands needs;

3.

There was an occasion wherein their son was lost in the public market because of the irresponsible attitude of the defendant; That the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders, there was an occasion wherein the defendant [would] steal money from the plaintiff and use them for gambling; Defendant, being an estafador had been manifested after their marriage took place, wherein the defendant would come with stories so that people [would] feel pity on her and give her money. Through false pretenses she [would] be able to deceive and take money from neighbors, relatives and other people.

4.

5.

6.

That the plaintiff convinced the defendant to stop her unhealthy lifestyle (gambling), but the defendant never listened to his advices; That the plaintiff was the one who [was] taking care of their son, when the plaintiff will leave for work, the defendant [would] entrust their son to their neighbor and go [to] some place. This act reflects the incapacity of the defendant by being an irresponsible mother; That the defendant took their son and left their conjugal home that resulted into the couples separation.

7.

8.

Psychological findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders. These disorders are manifested through her grave dependency on gambling and stealing money. She doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty and these disorders appear to be incorrigible.

The plaintiff tried to forget and forgive her about the incidents and start a new life again and hoping she would change. Tried to get attention back by showing her with special care, treating her to places for a weekend vacation, cook[ing] her favorite food, but the defendant didnt care to change, she did not prepare meals, wash clothes nor clean up. She neglected her duties and failed to perform the basic obligations as a wife.

So in the view of the above-mentioned psychological findings, it is my humble opinion that there is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties as a wife and mother to their only son.[9]

The RTC Ruling

The RTC nullified the parties marriage in its decision of January 22, 2001. The trial court saw merit in the testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and concluded that:

After a careful perusal of the evidence in the instant case and there being no controverting evidence, this Court is convinced that as held in Santos case, the psychological incapacity of respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations of his marriage with petitioner, which Dr. Gerardo Veloso said can be characterized by (a) gravity because the subject cannot carry out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family shouldered by any average couple existing under ordinary circumstances of life and work; (b) antecedence, because the root cause of the trouble can be traced to the history of the subject before marriage although its overt manifestations appear over after the wedding; and (c) incurability, if treatments required exceed the ordinary means or subject, or involve time and expense beyond the reach of the subject are all obtaining in this case.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is granted and the marriage between petitioner and defendant is hereby declar ed null and void pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.[10]

The CA Decision

The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA, in its decision dated November 25, 2004, affirmed the RTC decision in toto.

The CA held that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. It explained that Juvys indolence and lack of sense of responsibility,

coupled with her acts of gambling and swindling, undermined her capacity to comply with her marital obligations. In addition, the psychologist characterized Juvys condition to be permanent, incurable and existing at the time of the celebration of her marriage with the respondent.[11]

The petitioner moved to reconsider this Decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution dated May 9, 2005.[12]

The Petition and the Issues

The petitioner claims in the present petition that the totality of the evidence presented by the respondent was insufficient to establish Juvys psychological incapacity to perform her essential marital obligations. The petitioner additionally argues that the respondent failed to show the juridical antecedence, gravity, and incurability of Juvys condition.[13] The respondent took the exact opposite view.

The issue boils down to whether there is basis to nullify the respondents marriage to Juvy on the ground that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, Juvy suffered from psychological incapacity that prevented her from complying with her essential marital obligations.

The Courts Ruling

After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition, and that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under the terms of Article 36 of the Family Code.

hold

Article 36 of the Family Code and Related Jurisprudence

Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.[14]

In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[15] the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. The defect should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[16] We laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Roridel Olaviano Molina, whose salient points are footnoted below.[17] These guidelines incorporate the basic requirements we established in Santos.[18] In Brenda B. Marcos v. Wilson G. Marcos,[19] we further clarified that it is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. Thereafter, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages)[20] which provided that the complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.

Our 2009 ruling in Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez YuTe[21] placed some cloud in the continued applicability of the timetested Molina[22] guidelines. We stated in this case that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it. This is contrary to the intention of the law, since no psychological incapacity case can be considered as completely on "all fours" with another.

Benjamin G. Ting v. Carmen M. Velez-Ting[23] and Jocelyn M. Suazo v. Angelito Suazo,[24] however, laid to rest any question regarding the continued applicability ofMolina.[25] In these cases, we clarified that Ngo Te[26] did not abandon Molina.[27] Far

from abandoning Molina,[28] Ngo Te[29] simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. We also explained that Suazo[30] that Ngo Te[31] merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity.[32]

The Present Case

In the present case and using the above guidelines, we find the totality of the respondents evidence the testimonies of the respondent and the psychologist, and the latters psychological report and evaluation insufficient to prove Juvys psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

a.

The respondents testimony

The respondents testimony merely showed that Juvy: (a) refused to wake up early to prepare breakfast; (b) left their child to the care of their neighbors when she went out of the house; (c) squandered a huge amount of the P15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her; (d) stole the respondents ATM card and attempted to withdraw the money deposited in his account; (e) falsified the respondents signature in order to encash a check; (f) made up false stories in order to borrow money from their relatives; and (g) indulged in gambling.

These acts, to our mind, do not per se rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires. We stress that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. In Republic of the Philippines v. Norma Cuison-Melgar, et al.,[33] we ruled that it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing sobecause of some psychological, not physical, illness. In other words, proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage had to be shown.[34] A cause has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.

The respondents testimony failed to show that Juvys condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that rendered her unable to discharge her essential marital obligation. In this light, the acts attributed to Juvy only showed indications of immaturity and lack of sense of responsibility, resulting in nothing more than the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations. In Ricardo B. Toring v. Teresita M. Toring,[35] we emphasized that irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as these may only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses.

In like manner, Juvys acts of falsifying the respondents signature to encash a check, of stealing the respondents ATM, and of squandering a huge portion of theP15,000.00 that the respondent entrusted to her, while no doubt reprehensible, cannot automatically be equated with a psychological disorder, especially when the evidence shows that these were mere isolated incidents and not recurring acts. Neither can Juvys penchant for playing mahjong and kuwaho for money, nor her act of soliciting money from relatives on the pretext that her child was sick, warrant a conclusion that she suffered from a mental malady at the time of the celebration of marriage that rendered her incapable of fulfilling her marital duties and obligations. The respondent, in fact, admitted that Juvy engaged in these behaviors (gambling and what the respondent refers to as swindling) only two (2) years after their marriage, and after he let her handle his salary and manage their finances. The evidence also shows that Juvy even tried to augment the familys income during the early stages of their marriage by putting up a sari-sari store and by working as a manicurist.

b.

The Psychologists Report

The submitted psychological report hardly helps the respondents cause, as it glaringly failed to establish that Juvy was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital duties at the material time required by Article 36 of the Family Code.

To begin with, the psychologist admitted in her report that she derived her conclusions exclusively from the information given her by the respondent. Expectedly, the respondents description of Juvy would contain a considerable degree of bias; thus,

a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided description alone can hardly be considered as credible or sufficient. We are of course aware of our pronouncement in Marcos[36] that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated need not be examined by the psychologist as a condition precedent to arrive at a conclusion. If the incapacity can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a psychologists examination and report. In this case, however, no such independent evidence has ever been gathered and adduced. To be sure, evidence from independent sources who intimately knew Juvy before and after the celebration of her marriage would have made a lot of difference and could have added weight to the psychologists report.

Separately from the lack of the requisite factual basis, the psychologists report simply stressed Juvys negative traits which she considered manifestations of Juvys psychological incapacity (e.g., laziness, immaturity and irresponsibility; her involvement in swindling and gambling activities; and her lack of initiative to change), and declared that psychological findings tend to confirm that the defendant suffers from personality and behavioral disorders x x x she doesnt manifest any sense of responsibility and loyalty, and these disorders appear to be incorrigible.[37] In the end, the psychologist opined without stating the psychological basis for her conclusion that there is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant wife is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties as a wife and mother to their only son.[38]

We find this kind of conclusion and report grossly inadequate. First, we note that the psychologist did not even identify the types of psychological tests which she administered on the respondent and the root cause of Juvys psy chological condition. We also stress that the acts alleged to have been committed by Juvy all occurredduring the marriage; there was no showing that any mental disorder existed at the inception of the marriage. Second, the report failed to prove the gravity or severity of Juvys alleged condition, specifically, why and to what extent the disorder is serious, and how it incapacitated her to comply with her marital duties. Significantly, the report did not even categorically state the particular type of personality disorder found. Finally, the report failed to establish the incurability of Juvys condition. The reports pronouncements that Juvy lacks the initiative to change and that her mental incapacity appears incorrigible[39] are insufficient to prove that her mental condition could not be treated, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond her means to undertake.

c. The Psychologists Testimony

The psychologists court testimony fared no better in proving the juridical antecedence, gravity or incurability of Juvys alleged psychological defect as she merely reiterated what she wrote in her report i.e., that Juvy was lazy and irresponsible; played mahjong and kuhawo for money; stole money from the respondent; deceived people to borrow cash; and neglected her child without linking these to an underlying psychological cause. Again, these allegations, even if true, all occurred during the marriage. The testimony was totally devoid of any information or insight into Juvys early life and associations, how she acted before and at the time of the marriage, and how the symptoms of a disordered personality developed. Simply put, the psychologist failed to trace the history of Juvys psychological condition and to relate it to an existing incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

She, likewise, failed to successfully prove the elements of gravity and incurability. In these respects, she merely stated that despite the respondents efforts to show love and affection, Juvy was hesitant to change. From this premise, she jumped to the conclusion that Juvy appeared to be incurable or incorrigible, and would be very hard to cure. These unfounded conclusions cannot be equated with gravity or incurability that Article 36 of the Family Code requires. To be declared clinically or medically incurable is one thing; to refuse or be reluctant to change is another. To hark back to what we earlier discussed, psychological incapacity refers only to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. [40]

The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. [41] Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, we are compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.[42]

WHEREFORE, in view of these considerations, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Decision and the Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated November 25,

2004 and May 9, 2005, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 70004. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent Nestor Galangs petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Juvy Salazar under Article 36 of the Family Code. Costs against respondent Nestor Galang.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION Associate Justice

Designated additional member vice Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, per Special Order No. 997, dated June 6, 2011. * Sick Leave. [1] Under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. [2] Rollo, pp. 51-58; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, and concurred in by Associate Justice Godardo A. Jacinto and Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza (now a member of this Court). [3] Id. at 59. [4] CA rollo, pp. 47-58; penned by Judge Melencio Claros. [5] Records, pp. 2-3. [6] TSN, March 7, 2000, pp. 5-7. [7] Id. at 8-12. [8] TSN, June 13, 2000, pp. 5-6. [9] Record of Exhibits, Exhibit K, pp. 14-16. [10] Supra note 4, at 55-57. [11] Supra note 2. [12] Supra note 3. [13] Rollo, pp. 10-49. [14] So v. Valera, G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009, 588 SCRA 319, 331. [15] G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995, 240 SCRA 20, 34. [16] See Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, August 14, 2009, 596 SCRA 157, 175. [17] G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198, 209-213. (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity. (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. x x x x (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x x (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
[18] [19]

Supra note 15. G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755, 764. [20] Took effect on March 15, 2003. [21] G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193. [22] Supra note 17. [23] G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 694. [24] G.R. No. 164493, March 12, 2010, 615 SCRA 154. [25] Supra note 17. [26] Supra note 21. [27] Supra note 17. [28] Ibid. [29] Supra note 21. [30] Supra note 23. [31] Supra note 21. [32] Agraviador v. Amparo Agraviador, G.R. No. 170729, December 8, 2010. [33] G.R. No. 139676, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 177. [34] See Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 173294, February 27, 2008, 547 SCRA 123, 135. [35] G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 389, 408. [36] Supra note 19. [37] Supra note 9, Exhibit K-1, at 15. [38] Supra note 9, Exhibit K-2, at 16. [39] Supra note 37.

[40] [41] [42]

Supra note 15. See Paz v. Paz, G.R. No. 166579, February 18, 2010, 613 SCRA 195. Supra note 32.

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which steer a marraige in it's journey over troubled water. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the unseen hand of HIM who created all things. Who is to blame when a marriage fails? These poetic passage of the preceding paragraph were words of one the Supreme Court justices in the Philippines to whom a certain case of psychological incapacity was adjudicated and favored to the aggrieved party in a country where divorce is vehemently not allowed. For sometime divorce is an issue that became a subject for discussion in the media and among legislators. But until now there is no law that authorizes Filipino citizens to have a divorce. However more Filipino couple who wanted to break their marital bond legally, are filing cases in the court invoking psychological incapacity.

What is psychological incapacity? Article 36 of the 1987 Family Code of the Philippines provides that: A marriage contracted by any party who at the time of the celebration waspsychologically incapacitatedto comply with the essential requisites of marriage shall likewise be void even such incapacity becomes manifest only after solemnization. This is just one of the bases where marriage solemnized under Philippine Law is held to be void from the very beginning (void ab initio) . However this article is unique apart from the others since it is a very subjective and can be validly construed only by the wisdom of the supreme court justices. Marriage in the Philippines is considered to be a special contract between a husband and a wife, special contract in a sense that it has no expiration for as long as one of them are still alive. Basically in the Philippines before a person can marry they are required to present documents that they have the capacity to contract marriage such as proof of legal age, that they don't have existing marriage, that they have their consent freely given and any other essential requisites enumerated under the Family Code of the Philippines. Likewise they must also comply what the code required as regards to the witnesses, the solemnizing officer and other requirement enumerated in the code to make the celebration of the marriage valid. If all of the these were sufficiently complied with then the couple are now legally married and at the same time denied to nullify it wantonly for it needs the strict intervention of the state before the annulment can take place. Unlike

other countries who have divorce, separation in the Philippines is like a camel that enters the eye of the needle. Once a valid marriage takes place the contracting parties were estopped by their previous compliance of the said requisites. In case of litigation the state presumes the validity of the marriage and who among them (couple) who wanted to legally break their marital bond shoulders the burden of proof. Psychological incapacity under Philippine law Psychological incapacity if favored will result into breaking of marital bond legally since according to the law the marriage is held to be void from the beginning, good as if no marriage happened at all no matter how much money spent during the celebration. This is different from legal separation because in legal separation only properties are legally separated however each of them still cannot contract subsequent marriages for as long as one of them are still alive. Contrary to the latter, void marriages, couple are free to contract subsequent marriages once it is proven and granted by the court. In the Philippines there are a lot of cases filed petitioning their spouses as psychologically incapacitated to perform marital responsibilities. Here are some of the landmark cases in the repository related to psychological incapacity, to wit: Failure to communicate

G.R. No. 112019 Philippine Jurisprudence - LEOUEL SANTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

This is a case between Louie and Julia who have tied knot on September 20, 1986. On May 18, 1988 Julia left for the United States to work as nurse and did not return nor communicate with her husband for more than five years. Eventually her husband sought her in the US when he got a chance to visit in that place but no to avail. Now the deserted husband filed a case invoking psychological incapacity. The supreme court ruled that this is not a psychological incapacity because psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical, antecedence and incurability. This incapacity must be grave or serious and deep rooted in the history of the the other party way back to the very beginning of the celebration of marriage although the overt act of this incapacity manifests only thereafter. In addition it must not be less than mental and not just physical to the extent that the complained party is vehemently incognitive from the very beginning to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This was not proven in this case therefore the petition of the deserted husband was denied. Irreconcilable differences

G.R. No. 108763 Philippine Jurisprudence - REPUBLIC OF THE PHIL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLIVIANO MOLINA

This real life soap opera starred Reynaldo and Roridel who solemnized their marriage on April 14, 1985 and later bore a son out of utmost love and passion. However a year later the husband shows a sign of immaturity and irresponsibility as a father by preferring to be with his peers and friends instead of his family. In addition to his wife's calvary, Reynaldo depends only in his parents for the support of his family and was never honest to their finances that resulted into frequent quarrel. This problem results into litigation invoking psychological incapacity citing irreconcilable differences. The supreme court decided that the mere showing of irreconcilable differences is in no case psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their duties and responsibilities constitutes psychological incapacity. There is no showing of the gravity of the problem, neither it's juridical antecedence or incurability. In this case the supreme court held that their marriage will remain to be valid. Abandonment

G.R. No. 149498 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LOLITA HAMANO Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 149498 May 20, 2004

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LOLITA QUINTERO-HAMANO, respondent. DECISION CORONA, J.: Before us is a petition for review of the decision1 dated August 20, 2001 of the Court of Appeals2 affirming the decision3 dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the marriage contracted between herein respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano. On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter,

Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave birth to their child. On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see her and their child. The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer residing at his given address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The trial court granted the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of 60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November 7, 1996. On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no collusion existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondents motion to present her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony. On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which read: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID. The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered to make proper entries into the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this judgment of the Court. SO ORDERED.4 In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshios psychological incapacity, the trial court held that:

It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family. Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity and lack of respect for his wife and child which characterizes a very immature person. Certainly, such behavior could be traced to respondents mental incapacity and disability of entering into marital life.5 The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a decision dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which read: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.6 The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month after the celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support his family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for two months, he never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite the letters respondent sent. He even visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail. The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his family, and to "observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support" pursuant to Article 68 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically asked: But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the cohesion and creation of a family as a social inviolable institution? Why should petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is not around and worse, left them without even helping them cope up with family life and assist in the upbringing of their daughter as required under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code? 7 The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Molina8 and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.9 In those cases, the spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a "mixed marriage," the husband being a Japanese national. Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error: I

The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations, despite respondents failure to comply with the guidelines laid down in the Molina case.10 According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina. The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition. We rule in favor of petitioner. The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.11 Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.12 Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that: Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. xxx (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or

knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994), nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I dos." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. (5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such noncomplied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting

attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.13 (emphasis supplied) The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability."14 The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.15 We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshios psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities. Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support his family. He abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent sent him several letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not care at all to see his family. We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondents case had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent did not do. We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. 16 There was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological,not physical, illness.17 There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage. 18 According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply here because the present case involves a "mixed marriage," the husband being a

Japanese national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of nationality. In Pesca vs. Pesca,19 this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social institution that the State cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with respondent, terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED. Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., con

This case involves Lolita and her Japanese husband Toshio. Her husband went back to Japan to spent some holidays with his family and promised to go back to the Philippines. After sending money for two months the latter stopped giving financial support and abandoned his family. Now Lolita petitioned the court praying for the nullity of her marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity because of abandonment. The supreme court ruled that the act of abandonment on the part of the husband was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never proven to be due to some kind of psychological illness. There was no proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential to marriage. Wherefore the petitioned filed by Lolita was denied and set aside. Psychological incapacity granted As we can see the supreme court ruled that the failure to communicate (even intentional), irreconcilable differences and abandonment is in no case psychological incapacity. There are lot of cases that have been filed citing this article with the same issue and similarly the court ruled negating the petitions. Eventually while it is true that it is hard to established psychological incapacity there are also landmark cases wherein it is granted.

Psychiatric disorder

G.R. No. 155800 LEONILO ANTONIO VS. MARIE IVONNE F. REYES LEONILO ANTONIOG.R. No.155800 Petitioner, Present: - versus -QUISUMBING, Chairman, CARPIO CARPIO MORALES, and MARIE IVONNE F.REYES,TINGA, JJ. Respondent.

Promulgated:

March 10, 2006

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

cralawStatistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always disquieting. Deceit to the depth and

breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse's capability to fulfill the marital obligations even more.

cralawThe Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner) and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and affirm instead the trial court.

Antecedent Facts

Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was 36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the Gospel[4] at the ManilaCity Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding[5] at the Sta. Rosa de Lima Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.[6] Out of their union, a child was born on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.

cralaw On 8 March 1993,[7] petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted that respondent's incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to the present.[8]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As manifestations of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things, [9] to wit:

(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,[10] and instead introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth about the boy's parentage when petitioner

learned about it from marriage.[11]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

other

sources

after

their

cralaw(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when in fact, no such incident occurred.[12]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.[13]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect[14] but petitioner discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken place.[15]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the 'number one moneymaker in the commercial industry worth P2 million.[16] Petitioner later found out that respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in one of their quarrels.[17] He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.[18]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary cralaw(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer.[19] She spent lavishly on unnecessary items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.[20]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

cralaw(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he finally left her for good in November 1991.[21]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary cralaw

In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante HerreraAbcede(Dr. Abcede),apsychiatrist,andDr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other hand, theyobservedthat respondent's persistent and constant lying

to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.[22] They further asserted that respondent's extreme jealousy was also pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.[23]cralaw

In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities.[24] She presented her version, thus:

(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her husband.[25]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(2) She told petitioner about David's attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent from David's act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.[26]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at thePasigCatholicSchool for two (2) years.[27]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and she had done three (3)commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola, Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.[28]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.[29]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to monitor her husband's whereabouts.[30]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her monthly budget of P7,000.00.[31]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

cralawIn fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part.[32]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

cralawIn addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted by his assistant,[33] together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which are signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.[34]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

cralawIn rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as (i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondent's psychological evaluation, and (ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can fake the results of such test.[35]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

cralawAfter trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner's evidence and held that respondent's propensity to lying about almost anythingher occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her income, among othershad been duly established. According to the trial court, respondent's fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and

significance to her marriage.[36] The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void.

Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the part of the parties.[37] During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan Tribunal's ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal, which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion.[38] Subsequently, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the Vatican.[39]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

cralawPetitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the appellate court reversed the RTC's judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent's psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals[40] governing the application and interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.

cralawTaking exception to the appellate court's pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court. He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent's psychological incapacity. cralaw In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner.[41] It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof.[42] The Court is likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.[43]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as

presented by petitioner sufficiently meets the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. These standards were definitively laid down in the Court's 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals[44] (also known as the Molina case[45]), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited the Molinaguidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar.[46]Since Molina was decided in 1997, the Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.[47] In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,[48] wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.

This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.[49] Yet whatMolina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article 36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.

Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36

cralawArticle 36 of the Family Code states that '[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization."[50] The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the dissolution of a marriage.

cralawThe Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons 'who are not in the full enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage.[51] Marriages with such persons were ordained as void,[52] in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons already married, among others. A party's mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce Law of 1917,[53]but a marriage where 'either party was of unsound mind at the time of its celebration was cited as an 'annullable marriage under the Marriage Law of 1929.[54]Divorce on the ground of a spouse's incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese occupation.[55] Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of unsound mind was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.[56]The mental

capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a marriage void ab initio.[57]Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.[58]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract.[59] The initial common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.[60]Dr. Tolentinolikewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the marriage.[61]

There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family Code committee. Tolentino opinedthatpsychologicallyincapacitytocomplywouldnot be juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a cause for annulment of the marriage only.[62] At the same time, Tolentino noted '[it] would be different if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this would amount to lack of consent to the marriage.[63] These concerns though were answered, beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,[64] wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged that 'psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)incapacitythatcausesa party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.[65]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in the Molina[66]case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban observed that '[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereto.[67]Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity 'is a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and

responsibilities of the matrimonial assume.[68]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

bond

one

is

about

to

It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal wording of Article 36, with its centralphasereadingpsychologicallyincapacitatedtocomply with the essential marital obligations of marriage.[69] At the same time, it has been consistently recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the revision committee was for 'the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisionsofchurchtribunalswhich,although not binding on

the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law.[70]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:[71]

Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case, current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case shall rely primarily on that precedent.There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.

Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law,[73] and as one member admitted, enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still existent under civil

law.[74] It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.[75]Still, it must be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression. Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts, judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.[76]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that '[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t], and that '[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parametersof state protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposesthe limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity.

Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.

Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

cralawAs stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:

1)The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the foundation of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable, thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties.Both the family and marriage are to be protected by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

2)cralawThe root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by

experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychologicalnot physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof.Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained.Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

3)cralawThe incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration of the marriage.The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their 'I do's . The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

4)cralawSuch incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

5)cralawSuch illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriologicalpeculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts' cannot be accepted as root causes.The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that

effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

6)cralawThe essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

7)cralawInterpretationsgivenbythe NationalAppellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideallysubject to our law on evidencewhat is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.[77]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition.[78]This requirement however was dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.[79] Still, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or

fiscal assigned be on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case, considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity.In any event, the fiscal's participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records of this case.

As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity, consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.

We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.

First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife's behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel Pavillon which disputed respondent's claims pertinent to her alleged singing career.He also presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below considered petitioner's evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.[80]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.

Second. The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court's decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited unusual and abnormal behavior 'of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and inventing personalities and situations, of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among others.[81]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of at least two (2) major hospitals,[82]testified as follows:

WITNESS:

Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that thereare a couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards.There are a couple of things that seems (sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit.One of which is the persistent, constant and repeated lying of the 'respondent; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x

ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)

QWould you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage? AWell, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another.The lack of concern, the lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship.You see, relationship is based on communication between individuals and what we generally communicate are our thoughts and feelings.But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings, [you] are expected to tell the truth.And

therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that should be based on love, trust and respect.

Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?

xxx

ATTY. RAZ:(Back to the witness)

QMr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioner's officemates and ask him (sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner.And this is specifically stated on page six (6) ofthe transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about this, Mr. witness? A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to the extreme, then that is pathological.That is not abnormal.We all feel jealous, in the same way as we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or pathological.If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different women, then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.

Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic obligations of the marriage? A-cralawYes, Maam.[83]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent 'is [a] pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself.[84]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record, particularly the trial transcripts of respondent's testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held in Marcos v. Marcos[85] that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.[86] We deem the methodology utilized by petitioner's witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and Lopez's common conclusion of respondent's psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own acceptance of petitioner's version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself accepted the veracity of petitioner's factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner's expert witnesses.

Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:

To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to psychological incapacity.[87]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Third. Respondent's psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even before the celebration of marriage.She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about her natural child's real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after their marriage.

Fourth. The gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife. Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the belief that respondent's psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that any prolonged marital life was dubitable.

It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner's witnesses and the trial court were emphatic on respondent's inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of hermistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondent's inability to understand and perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or emotional commitments.

The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage hardly banishes nay extenuatesher lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations. Respondent's ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent's ability to adhere to the truth, her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.

At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and

Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that 'no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage. It would be improper to draw linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under Articles 45 (3) and46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.

Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.

Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate courtapparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner's efforts to bring the matter to its attention.[88] Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the marriage in question in a Conclusion[89] dated 30 March 1995, citing the 'lack of due discretion on the part of respondent.[90] Such decree ofnullitywasaffirmedbyboth the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,[91] and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.[92] In fact, respondent's psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive clause[93] was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal's consent.

In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:

The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.

The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.[94]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial court, of the veracity of petitioner's allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondent's version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.

Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of

the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear certain that respondent's condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify tosuch effect.[95]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her, desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent's aberrant behavior remained unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent's condition is incurable.

From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent's condition is incurable?It would seem, at least, that respondent's psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioner's expert witnesses characterized respondent's condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological incapacity was curable or incurable.

But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts' taciturnity on this point.

The petitioner's expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other provision of the Family Code.

On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee,[96] then the opinion of canonical scholars,[97]beforearrivingat itsformulationofthe doctrinal definition of psychological incapacity.[98]Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa's opinion expressed during the deliberations that 'psychological incapacity is incurable,[99] and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized 'by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.[100] However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.[101]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling that remained silent on whether respondent's psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial court's decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.

We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,[102] the Court anargumentthat Molina and Santosshould not apply retroactively

countered

with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted.[103] Yet we approach this present case from utterly practical considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses that respondent's psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly propounded to him.If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.

We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of respondent's psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.

All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court.

There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondent's avowed commitment to remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid sentimentality.Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of people in love to live together.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family Code, is REINSTATED.No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGAcralaw Associate Justice This is a petition filed by husband Leonilo to nullify his marriage with his wife Marie. The former found out that the latter frequently telling lies resulting to his dismay. His wife is likely to fabricate things and events about her educational attainment, career, income and any other matter. Moreover she is telling to have known somebody who are in reality not a real person. She is likely to be a congenital liar. In support to the husbands petition he presented a psychological tests that Marie's constant lying are pathological disorder. According to the trial court, respondents fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe. That her inability to distinguish from fantasy and reality, truth from fiction antedates from the very beginning of the marriage and affects the way she entered into marriage. This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The trial court thus declared the marriage between Leonilo and Marie null and void.

Refusal to engaged in sexual intercourse

G.R. No. 119190 CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997] CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAOTSOI, Respondents. DECISION TORRES, JR., J.: Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things. Who is to blame when a marriage fails? This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision on November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995. The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals1 in its decision are as follows: "From the evidence adduced, the following facts were preponderantly established: "Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, xxx Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A") "After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother. "There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life. "It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each

other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights. "In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers. "Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989. The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husbands examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never did. "The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man. "The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband. "On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife. "But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical technology or scienceK

"The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he stopped. "There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant, why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their marriage. "The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome their differences. "The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent. As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C") "The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr. Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman. "In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads: "ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. "SO ORDERED. " On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred: I in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties without making any findings of fact. II in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent. III in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. IV in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them. We find the petition to be bereft of merit. Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads: "Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. - Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved."

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it became incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them. To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19). The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz: "The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995)."4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which may not be necessarily due to psychological disorders" because there might have been other reasons, - i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, - why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial. Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from psychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above. We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim. "If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity."6 Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity. As aptly stated by the respondent court, "An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of sympathy for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his rights even though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330). Besides, if it were true that it is the wife who was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek

the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status. "We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not psychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is - a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution. This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:
1

Thirteenth Division: Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, J., ponente,Eduardo Montenegro and Antonio P. Solano, JJ., concurring.
2

Rollo, pp. 20-24. Ibid. Rollo, p. 34. Exhs. "2", "2-B" and "2-C.

Psychological Incapacity, G.T. Veloso, p. 20, cited in The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, Pineda, 1989 ed., p. 51.
7

Decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 30-31.

This is a real life drama of a distraught wife against her uncaring husband. Ten months have already passed however the husband did not initiate sexual contact to his wife although they have shared the same bedroom and sleeping together in the same bed. This is supported by a medical evidence that Gina is still virgin after 10 months of marriage while her husband is capable of having sexual intercourse because he was not an impotent. In this petition the court stated that love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say I could not have cared less. This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy that brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations. Furthermore one of the basis for marriage is to procreate children based on sexual cooperation. Wherefore the petition of Gina is gra nted and declared the marriage void.

The marital bond Marriage in the Philippines is regarded as an institution, a holy union between a man and a woman. It anchored in a biblical passages that what has been united by GOD let no man separate. As for the authors opinion, although not a religious authority, personally adhere to what it says. Religion being one of the builders of faith among individuals should constantly uphold the sanctity of marriage for marriage creates family which is the basic unit of the society. However for individual who wanted to enter into marriage (specially Filipino citizens) they must think a thousand times before making a decision. For chance is very slim to legally break a marital bond and claimingpsychological incapacity being your ground is like seeing a camel that enters into the eye of the needle notwithstanding the fact that the cost for litigation is maybe greater than the cost of the celebration.