In this essay I intend to argue that the Vietnam war should be best understood as an extension of the United States

containment strategy. This essay will focus on the early stages of the war, identifying the importance of the policy containment in the decisions of the first three administrations. I will confront Gareth Porter's argument that the cold war consensus should not be taken seriously as a means for understanding the war; but will make a different conclusion. I will conclude that Porter and the evidence presented shows a limited view of the effects of a monolithic view of communism and its effects on American policy in South East Asia. Before focusing on the Vietnam conflict one needs to examine how containment in south east Asia emerged. Prior to and during the Vietnam war there were a string of incidents that led to the belief in a communist uprising in South East Asia. Firstly, there was the fall of China in 1949. This was a massive failure for the united states who had attempted to support Chinese nationalist through military funding with the aim of containing communism. This defeat led to the United States taking an ideological blow causing pressure for containment action in Vietnam. Soon after in 1950 the Korea war began. It began with a surprise Northern offensive but eventually gained support from Chinese communists reenforcing the ideological threat of communism.1 Following these conflicts there were a string of communist guerrilla insurgencies in Burma, Indonesia Malaysia and the Philippines during the 1950's. These conflicts led Eisenhower and his administration to view communism in South East Asia as a threat to American security. When Vietnam announced its independence as a communist state in the aftermath of world war two, Eisenhower took action to stop communism spreading further in South East Asia.2 Gareth Porter argues that the cold war consensus and the policy of containment are not accurate explanations for America's intervention into Vietnam; he cites more important factors to be considered. Porter's first point is that throughout each of the three presidencies there was an awareness of a power imbalance between the communists and United States which favored the United States. He argues that this imbalance is what led to the continued commitment to Vietnam due to pressures from within each administration to take advantage of this imbalance.3 As such Porter argues that Eisenhower's adoption of a policy of containment used to gain public support in the Indochina conflict and make sure that the U.S. Military budget would not be tampered with.4 This trend of U.S. Military dominance continued into the Kennedy and Johnson era.5 Porter argues that this realization of a military imbalance led to what he cites as a possible future plan for withdrawal from Vietnam. Regardless, Porter argues that had Kennedy truly advocated a a cold war consensus he would not have assumed a policy of neutrally on containment in South Vietnam.6 Finally regards to Johnson, Porter argues that he was never swayed by any cold war doctrine. Porter cites evidence from back to the early 1950's when Johnson made a point opposing U.S. Military intervention Porter argues that this anti intervention stance remained when he sent a report to Kennedy in 1961. The report states that argues that U.S. Military intervention in Vietnam would be a massive mistake again pointing to the French failure to retake Indochina. Porter finally concludes that Johnson's decision for war was a result of pressures from within his
1 http://www2.sunysuffolk.edu/westn/coldwar.html#The Cold War in Asia 2 Robert McNamara, In Retrospect The Tragedy And Lessons Of Vietnam (Times Books, 1995 ), 31 3 Gareth Porter, Perils Of Dominance Imbalance Of Power And The Road To Vietnam (University Of California Press 2005), VII,VIII,IX,X 4 Porter, Perils Of Dominance, 230 5 Porter, Perils of Dominance, 14 6 Gareth Porter,Explaining the Vietnam War: Dominant and Contending Paradigms, Printed in Making Sense Of The Vietnam Wars Local National And Transnational Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2008), 72, 73

administration. 7In light of these objections I will argue that Porter does not give enough credit to the effects that a monolithic communist view had on U.S. policy from 1950 to 1965. Following Truman's decision president, in 1950 Eisenhower decided to continue to commit America to helping the French retake Indochina through partially funding of the war. This is commonly accepted to be a move to build a strong ally in France which was weakened after world war two and vulnerable to communism. The move to fund the war in Indochina should also interpreted as the initiation of the policy of containment in South East Asia.8 George C Herring argues that Eisenhower's initiation of the containment policy was due an awareness of a communist plan for world domination. This communist world domination plan made American intervention in Indochina was inevitable.9 Although Porter argues that Eisenhower advocated a containment argument when it suited him but he cannot deny the pressures of what was perceived as a united enemy. In the 1950's. Khrushchev consistently made public statements about the overall communist aim for world domination.10 Despite evidence of a U.S. strategic advantage it is clear that Porter fails to judge U.S. Policy in terms of the demoralizing effects of Monolithic communism. Mark Lawrence argues that Eisenhower monolithic communist view greatly effected the conflict in Vietnam. Lawrence argues that Eisenhower only looked upon it as part of a global communist war .11 Despite the mention of individual strategic advantages it is difficult to quantify a strategic advantage when faced against an ideology. As such, the fear of monolithic communism led to Eisenhower and his administration to overlooking important facts about the Vietnam War and the cold war as a whole. Lawrence again supports this view pointing out that in committing to Indochina Eisenhower overlooked Vietnam's history of resistance to occupation, the nationalist element to the Vietminh and the country's few links to the Soviet union. As such it is clear that Eisenhowers containment policy arose from what he saw as a global threat. 12 Contrary to Porters analysis, I argue that Kennedy and his administration continued limited policy of containment in the vain of Eisenhower. When Kennedy was elected he continued sending aid into South Vietnam but also made a number of changes. He increased the number of U.S. Advisers in Vietnam to 16000, and significantly increased covert operations in the country. .13 McNamara makes it clear that Kennedy and his administration continued to advocate the view that Vietnam's loss would destabilize South East Asia, addressing the ignorance of important facts. McNamara cites McCarthyism as the reason for the ignorance. Prior to McCarthyism the U.S. Had access to a number of Soviet and Chinese experts, but in the wake of McCarthyism the amount of Asian experts in particular diminished. Due to the lack of access to Asian experts, anti communist policy in South east Asia was directed with a monolithic view of communism.14 Hedrick Smith supports this view arguing that the containment of communism was at the forefront of Kennedy's broad commitment of Vietnam. In regards to Kennedy's apparent neutrality on the cold war consensus I disagree. Like Smith, I would argue that not deploying U.S. ground troops in Vietnam does not point to neutrality in a cold war consensus. As mentioned previously, Kennedy significantly expanded America's political and covert military involvement in Vietnam15. Kennedy's advice from his administration as well as the joint chiefs of staff also suggests that any action they recommended was within the interest of preventing the fall of South East Asia In a
7 Porter, Perils Of Dominance 181,182,183 8 Mark Atwood Lawrence Explaining the Early Decisions: The United States and the French War 1945 1954, printed in Making Sense Of The Vietnam Wars (Oxford University Press, 2008), 28 9 George C Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950 1979 (New York: Wiley, 1979), x 10 McNamara, In Retrospect , 29 11 Lawrence, Explaining the Early Decisions, 38,39 12 Lawrence, Explaining the Early Decisions, 39 13 Hedrick Smith, The Pentagon papers (The New York Times, 1971), 86 14 Robert McNamara, In Retrospect The Tragedy And Lessons Of Vietnam (Times Books, 1995 ), 30,31.32,33 15 Hedrick Smith, The Pentagon papers, 86,87

programme of action presented by a Kennedy task force government representatives made a point of beginning a psychological campaign in the form of rehabilitating captured Vietcong rebels with the aim of showing them the errors of communism.16 Such an action shows the importance of the ideological conflict that that the United States was fighting during the Vietnam war. In regards to an initial plan for withdrawal, Robert McNamara argues that the reasoning for this was that the administration concluded that only the South Vietnamese could truly defend their nation. This point does not show a lack of support for a cold war consensus, it simply shows the limits of the American military. Regardless,this pivotal view led to Kennedy limiting America's role to only providing training and logistical support17 Lyndon Johnson's decision to commit America to a conventional war against North Vietnam was again in the interest of containment. Fredrik LodgeVall makes it clear that Johnson and his administration believed that the current policy on Vietnam was failing. They could no longer limit its involvement to funding, advising and equipping South Vietnam. What is important is that Johnson and his administration concluded that if American forces did not intervene quickly it would only be a number of months until South Vietnam fell to the communist forces. In 1965 Johnson ordered a number of actions, notably the deployment of 50000 U.S. Troops and the operation rolling thunder bombing campaign. These July decisions are viewed as a turning point in the Vietnam war as they cement America's commitment to a conventional war.18 Arguably, this conventional war was commissioned with containment in mind. Evidence for Johnson advocating a view of containment comes from a meeting on 17 February 1964. Manama makes it clear that a number of people at the meeting notably Eisenhower argued that the ultimate objective of escalation should be to contain communism. Shortly after, Dean Rusk sent a memo to Johnson arguing that everything should be done to stop the Northern communist from overrunning South Vietnam. This advice clearly influenced Johnson has he decided two days later that regular bombing missions in North Vietnam would begin.19 Porter might argue that this was an example of pressure from his administration but I disagree. George Ball sent a number of memos advocating negotiation and withdrawal, all of which were rejected. What makes this memo important is that Ball failed to address the concerns raised by containment. Hence the rejection of any withdrawal and negotiation plans in 196520 McNamara explains this view further. He argues that Withdrawal was thought of to be impossible, again due to fears of communist expansion and reprisal. McNamara a number of recent soviet victories such as the revolution of Cuba but also the appeasement of Munich prior to World War two.21 Jonathan Schell shares this view arguing that the Vietnam war could not be abandoned. In regards to power Communism was a similar force to Nazism and in the aftermath of the Munich conference, the united states had learned that if aggression was not halted quickly it would spread like Hitler and Nazi Germany.22 Finally reinforcing the effects of monolithic communism one can see a clear example where it would not make sense for the United States to not take the initiative. George F Kenna provided evidence that in the months of 1965 China had become significantly weakened by a failed coup attempt in Indonesia. Had this view been given attention it would have arguably have changed Johnson's policy on the invasion of North Vietnam. However McNamara and others failed to listen due to their overwhelming global view of a united communist movement.23
16 Vietnam Program of Action by Kennedy's Task Force, in The Pentagon Papers, 127 17 Robert McNamara, In Retrospect , 29 18 Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam, Fredrik Logevall, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 1, Going to War ( Blackwell Publishing Mar., 2004), 100 19 McNamara, In Retrospect, 172, 173 20 McNamara, In Retrospect, 195 21 McNamara, In Retrospect, 192, 194, 195 22 The Real War The Classic Reporting on The Vietnam War (Patheon Books, New York 1987), 24 23 McNamara, In Retrospect, 215

Bibliography
http://www2.sunysuffolk.edu/westn/coldwar.html#The Cold War in Asia Gareth Porter, Perils Of Dominance Imbalance Of Power And The Road To Vietnam (University Of California Press 2005) Gareth Porter,Explaining the Vietnam War: Dominant and Contending Paradigms, Printed in Making Sense Of The Vietnam Wars Local National And Transnational Perspectives (Oxford University Press, 2008) Mark Atwood Lawrence Explaining the Early Decisions: The United States and the French War 1945 1954, printed in Making Sense Of The Vietnam Wars (Oxford University Press, 2008) George C Herring, America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam 1950 1979 (New York: Wiley, 1979) Hedrick Smith, The Pentagon papers (The New York Times, 1971) Robert McNamara, In Retrospect The Tragedy And Lessons Of Vietnam (Times Books, 1995 ) Memo from the Joint Chiefs on Commitment of U.S. Forces, in The Pentagon Papers Vietnam Program of Action by Kennedy's Task Force, in The Pentagon Papers Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam, Fredrik Logevall, Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 1, Going to War ( Blackwell Publishing Mar., 2004) The Real War The Classic Reporting on The Vietnam War (Patheon Books, New York 1987), 24