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bodily lifted and applied to Abundo. At the simplest, both Lonzanida and Ong were protestees who faced the same legal reality of losing the election, although Ong fully served the elected term; for Abundo, the legal reality is his recognized and declared election victory, In terms of factual reality, Lonzanida and Abundo may be the same since they only partially served their term, but this similarity is fully negated by their differing legal realities with respect to the element of election. Ong and Abundo, on the other hand, have differing legal and factual realities; aside from their differing election results, Ong served the full term, while Abundo only enjoyed abbreviated term. Based on this analysis, Justice Brion concluded his separate opinion by stressing that Abundo should not be considered to have been elected for the full term for purposes of the three-term limit rule, despite the legal reality that he won the election; as in Ong, the factual reality should prevail, and that reality is that he served for less than this full term. Thus, where less than a full term is served by a winning protestant, no continous and uninterrupted term should be recognized. This is the view that best serves the purpose of the three-term limit rule. Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro joined Justice Brions separate opinion. The Court also summarized the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of terms and involuntary interruption. Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections provides that when a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed the position through succession, his service for the unexpired portion of the term cannot be treated as one full term. Montebon v. Commission on Elections supplemented this by saying that if the official runs again for the same position he held rior to his assumption of the higher office, his succession to said position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption. On the issue of recall elections, Adormeo v. Commission on Elections and Socrates v. Commission on Elections held that an elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth trm, but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the officials servicefor he had become in the interim a private citizen. Latasa v. Commission on Elections ruled that the abolition of an elective office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent officials continuity of service. As mentioned above, Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections states that preventive suspension is not a term interrupting event as the elective officers continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions of the office during this period. Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections and Dizon v. Commission on Elections continued on to rule that when a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his term is interrupted when he losess in an election protest and is ousted from office. An interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary is sufficient to break the continuity of service. Lastly, Ong v. Alegre and Rivera III v. Commission on Elections declared when an official is defeated in an election protest and decision becomes final only after the official had served the full term for the office, then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full service should be counted in the application of term limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term. (GR No. 201716, Abundo v. Commission on Elections, January 8, 2013)
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