fm3 01

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FM 3-01.87
PATRIOT
TACTICS, TECHNIQUES,
AND PROCEDURES
Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to
protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange
Program or by other means. This determination was made on 15 February 1992. Other requests for this
document will be referred to Commandant, USAADASCH, ATTN: ATSA-DT-WF, Fort Bliss, TX 79916-3802.
Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document.
FM 3-01.87
Field Manual Headquarters

Number 3-01.87 Department of the Army
Washington, DC, 26 September 2000
Patriot
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
Contents
Page
PREFACE ............................................................................................ vi
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION TO PATRIOT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES 1-1

Doctrinal Framework.......................................................................................... 1-1
Staff and Battle Crews ....................................................................................... 1-2
Software ............................................................................................................. 1-2
Chapter 2 INITIALIZATION ................................................................................................ 2-1
Battalion Initialization ......................................................................................... 2-1
Battalion Initialization Structure ......................................................................... 2-2
Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to
protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange
Program or by other means. This determination was made on 15 February 1992. Other requests for this
document will be referred to Commandant, USAADASCH, ATTN: ATSA-DT-WF, Fort Bliss, TX 79916-3802.
Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the
document.
i
Geographic Data Parameters ............................................................................ 2-3
Automatic Battalion Initialization ........................................................................ 2-5
Battalion FIDOC and Operational Parameters .................................................. 2-9
ABT/TBM Defended Assets ............................................................................... 2-16
Weapon Control Status...................................................................................... 2-19
Tab 76—Counter-ARM Threat Parameters ....................................................... 2-25
Deployment/Command Planning ....................................................................... 2-30
Battalion Communications Control Data Entry .................................................. 2-31
Communications Net Loading............................................................................ 2-37
Volumes Allocation ............................................................................................ 2-49
ICC/CRG Deployment........................................................................................ 2-51
Fire Unit Tactical Initialization ............................................................................ 2-60
Fire Unit Standard Emplacement....................................................................... 2-61
Battery Tactical Initialization .............................................................................. 2-66
Tactical Initialization........................................................................................... 2-67
Data Initialization Sequence .............................................................................. 2-68
Roll-Crossroll Alignment .................................................................................... 2-70
Radar Alignment Procedures............................................................................. 2-72
Manual Alignment Procedures........................................................................... 2-74
Location Data Confidence Level........................................................................ 2-76
Tab 14—Target Display Control ........................................................................ 2-76
Data Buffer Transfer .......................................................................................... 2-79
Radar Mapping .................................................................................................. 2-81
Alternate Search Sector Control ........................................................................ 2-84
Missile Depletion Rules...................................................................................... 2-88
GLIF Threshold .................................................................................................. 2-91
Chapter 3 PATRIOT AIR BATTLE OPERATIONS .......................................................... 3-1
Patriot Crew Responsibilities ............................................................................. 3-1
ICC Air Battle Operations................................................................................... 3-10
Track Management ............................................................................................ 3-12
Target Identification ........................................................................................... 3-19
Target Engagement ........................................................................................... 3-21
Threat Assessment ............................................................................................ 3-22
Methods of Control............................................................................................. 3-23
ii
Status Monitor.................................................................................................... 3-25
Fire Unit Surveillance......................................................................................... 3-26
ABT Search Sectors .......................................................................................... 3-26
TBM Search Sectors.......................................................................................... 3-27
A-Scope Operations........................................................................................... 3-29
Target Classification .......................................................................................... 3-31
Identification....................................................................................................... 3-34
Interaction of Fire Unit and ICC Identification Process...................................... 3-41
Engagement Eligibility........................................................................................ 3-43
Threat Assessment Process .............................................................................. 3-46
Tactical Ballistic Missile Considerations ............................................................ 3-48
ATM Capability................................................................................................... 3-49
Remote Launch.................................................................................................. 3-58
Launcher Dead Zones ....................................................................................... 3-67
Patriot Missiles................................................................................................... 3-73
FIDOC and Operational Parameters ................................................................. 3-76
Missile Selection ................................................................................................ 3-83
ATM Mission ...................................................................................................... 3-85
ECCM Operations.............................................................................................. 3-86
Ground Level Interference Filter ........................................................................ 3-100
Track While Scan............................................................................................... 3-102
Counter-Antiradiation Missile Operations .......................................................... 3-104
Chapter 4 COMMAND AND CONTROL ................................................................................... 4-1
Patriot Command and Control Structure............................................................ 4-1
Patriot Command and Control Processing ........................................................ 4-2
Master ICC Operations ...................................................................................... 4-3
Master ICC Communications ............................................................................. 4-5
MICC Display ..................................................................................................... 4-7
Fire Unit to Fire Unit Operations ........................................................................ 4-10
Data Links .......................................................................................................... 4-14
TROPO Linkage Using HSDIO Card ................................................................. 4-15
Data Languages................................................................................................. 4-15
Appendix A PATRIOT DATA SHEETS................................................................................. A-1
Manual Orientation and Alignment Data Sheets ............................................... A-1
iii
Technical Manuals ............................................................................................. A-1
Appendix B RADAR MAPPING ............................................................................................ B-1
Data Acquisition ................................................................................................. B-1
Preliminary Mapping Procedures....................................................................... B-2
Mapping Display and Control Selections ........................................................... B-4
Mapping Process ............................................................................................... B-8
Clutter Mapping.................................................................................................. B-15
Mapping Interference ......................................................................................... B-17
Appendix C AUTOMATIC EMPLACEMENT ........................................................................ C-1
Automatic Emplacement Overview.................................................................... C-1
Determining Satellite Coverage ......................................................................... C-3
Precision Lightweight GPS Receiver ................................................................. C-3
North Finding System ........................................................................................ C-10
Automatic Emplacement Status Monitor............................................................ C-12
Appendix D RSOP REQUIREMENTS................................................................................... D-1
Fire Control Configuration.................................................................................. D-1
Launcher Emplacement ..................................................................................... D-2
5-Point Initial Search Lower Bound Data........................................................... D-4
Fiber-Optic Cable Deployment (DLU Launcher)................................................ D-5
Remote Launcher Employment ......................................................................... D-7
Appendix E ALTERNATE ALIGNMENT PROCEDURES .................................................... E-1
Mixed Mode Emplacement ................................................................................ E-1
Manual Alignment Without PADS ...................................................................... E-3
Appendix F WORLDWIDE UTM CONVERSION PROCEDURES AND TABLES............... F-1
Maps, World Models, and Datum ...................................................................... F-1
Universal Transverse Mercator Overview.......................................................... F-3
Appendix G FIX-OR-FIGHT CRITERIA................................................................................. G-1
Fix-or-Fight Guidance ........................................................................................ G-1
Categories of Responses................................................................................... G-3
Fault Alert Filter Use .......................................................................................... G-7
Executing the Diagnostics ................................................................................. G-8
Appendix H BATI AND TACI FLOWCHARTS...................................................................... H-1
Appendix I TASK ORGANIZATION WITH HAWK.............................................................. I-1
Engagement Operations .................................................................................... I-1
iv
Alignment Methods ............................................................................................ I-3
Automatic Fire Distribution ............................................................................ I-6
Local Engagement Control Parameters............................................................. I-7
Friendly Protection ............................................................................................. I-8
Hawk Weapons Control ..................................................................................... I-11
Defense Design ................................................................................................. I-12
HIMAD Task Force Training .............................................................................. I-16
Glossary ................................................................................................................................ Glossary-1
Bibliography .................................................................................................................. Bibliography-1
Index ........................................................................................................................................... Index-1
v
Preface
This field manual (FM) is an in-depth guide to Patriot tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).
It is intended for use by Patriot and Hawk commanders at all levels and their staff, tactical
directors (TDs), tactical director assistants (TDAs), tactical control officers (TCOs), tactical
control assistants (TCAs), leaders, and trainers.
The manual includes chapters on initialization procedures, air battle operations, strategies, the
interfacing of Hawk and Patriot fire units (FUs), and command and control (C2),
communications. This FM also includes embedded training software programs for operators at
the battalion and firing battery. The appendices contain Patriot blank forms, Radar Mapping,
Determining Satellite Coverage, Reconnaissance, Selection and Occupation of Position (RSOP),
Alternate Alignment Procedures, Worldwide Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) Conversion
Procedures and Tables, Fix or Fight Criteria, and Battalion Tactical Initialization Flowcharts.
Also included are Patriot Advanced Capabilities-3 (PAC-3), and Configuration-1 and -2 software
and hardware update capabilities.
This publication implements the following international standardization agreements (STANAGs)

(NATO):
STANAG TITLE EDITION

3700 NATO Tactical Air Doctrine—ATP-33 (B) 5
3805 Doctrine for Airspace Control in Times of Crisis
and War—ATP-40 (B) 5
3880 Counter Air Operations—ATP-42 (B) 3
4162 Technical Characteristics of the NATO Identification System 1
The proponent for this manual is HQ, TRADOC. Send comments and recommendations on
DA Form 2028 directly to Commandant, USAADASCH, ATTN: ATSA-DT-WF, Fort Bliss,
Texas 79916-3802.
Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns or pronouns do not refer
exclusively to men.
vi
Chapter 1
Introduction to Patriot
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
This chapter is a guide to Patriot operations. Its focus is on how to use the
immense combat potential of the Patriot system and how to synchronize
Patriot operations with other air defense (AD) operations. The intent is to
provide battle crews and staff planners with a clear understanding of
system processing and software parameters to allow them to fight with
their weapon system intelligently.
DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK
1-1. FM 3-01.87 is a companion to FM 44-85. These manuals should be read
together. FM 44-85 describes the doctrinal framework with in which tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTP) described in FM 3-01.87 must function.
This manual discusses these subjects at length as they have a direct impact
on Patriot TTP. The classified material corresponding to the text in this
manual is in the Special Text (ST) (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U), which contains the
classified values referenced by the code numbers in bold and underlined
(example: P4-123).
SCOPE
1-2. This manual applies to Patriot units assigned to both corps and echelons
above corps (EAC) organizations. FM 44-85 discusses differences in missions
and applications.
AUDIENCE
1-3. In writing this manual, it was assumed that readers will be at least
acquainted with Patriot tactical and system operations. While hands-on
experience with the weapon system is not a prerequisite, it is helpful for a
better understanding of the system. Information from other sources was
incorporated in an attempt to make it easier to understand system
operations.
DISCREPANCIES
1-4. This manual does not replace any technical manuals (TMs). If any
discrepancies are found that exist between this field manual (FM) and any
TM, assume the TM is correct on technical issues, as it is more likely to be
up-to-date. Any discrepancies that are found in any classified information
code numbers must be referred to the USAADASCH War Fighter Division,
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FM 3-01.87
Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD). This FM is first and foremost

about tactics. It describes technical issues only as a means to understanding
tactical applications of the Patriot system.
STAFF AND BATTLE CREWS

1-2. Battalion S3s and their assistants may use the tactical information and
recommendations as a baseline for designing defenses, configuring software
data bases, and defining Patriot's interface into AD command, control, and
communications (C3) architectures. Use this manual as a reference for crew
training purposes. TDs and TCOs will find detailed information, not
otherwise easily available, on software, data processing, equipment, and
procedures.
PATRIOT
1-3. This manual was written for Patriot officers, noncommissioned officers
(NCOs), and enlisted soldiers. It is specifically directed toward the battalion
S3, the battalion electronics missile maintenance officer (EMMO), battalion
TDs, TDAs, and battery TCOs, and TCAs.
HAWK
1-4. Appendix I contains Patriot system processing for Hawk communications
and task force (TF) operations. It speaks directly to Hawk battle crews and to
Patriot operators. Hawk officers and trainers should read this appendix
closely. They include techniques and procedures for Hawk Phase III units
controlled by the Patriot information and coordination central (ICC).
COMMUNICATIONS AND LIAISON

1-5. Patriot communications officers and Patriot liaison officers assigned to
duties in the joint service arena will find the discussions and descriptions of
data links, interfaces, and communications useful. Air defense artillery
(ADA) brigade S3s and communications officers will find applications for C2,
task organization, and communications requirements.
SOFTWARE
1-6. This manual is mostly about software and its applications. When
necessary, for understanding, the manual discusses hardware. Patriot crews
and planners should keep in mind that many, if not most, TTPs employed by
Patriot units are either embedded in the system software or impact in some
manner on the software. Much of the air defense operations planning
performed by the battalion S3 finds its expression in the tab entries made by
battle crews before the battle begins, and in manipulation of the software
during the battle.
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FM 3-01.87
POST DEPLOYMENT BUILD-4

1-7. This manual describes the final fielded versions of PDB-4, software
Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3), Configurations 1 and 2. Also included
are the PDB-4.1, and 4.2 software upgrades for anti-radation missile (ARM)
ARM and cruise missile (CM) defense.
POST DEPLOYMENT BUILD-5

1-11. The Army is now testing the new Patriot PDB-5 software build (PAC-3,
Configuration 3). When the Configuration 3 software and hardware are
accepted, USAADASCH will update this manual with the doctrine and tactics
from ST 44-85-3 Doctrine and Tactics Impact Package (DTIP) (Update-2). It
will address the hardware and software changes, doctrinal and tactical
changes, and will incorporate future DTIP publications into this FM as a
change.
1-3
Chapter 2
Initialization
This chapter addresses the ICC and engagement control station (ECS)
initialization process. It stresses the importance, interaction, appropriate
values, and operator functions that must be conducted during
initialization. The Patriot system is a software-controlled automated
weapon system that requires specific parameters to ensure effective
operations. The battery and battalion with minimal human intervention
automatically implement firing doctrine (FIDOC) to include warning
procedures, alert statuses, rules of engagement (ROE), and supplemental
fire control measures. The system's ICC and ECS must be properly
initialized to ensure that system operations are maximized.
Initialization consists of the procedures necessary to configure Patriot
software for battle operations. The initialization sequence for an ICC is
contained in TM 9-1430-602-10-1 and for an ECS in TM 9-1430-600-10-1.
Initialization ensures operational readiness of the battalion and fire units
(FUs). It also results in a full current data base and establishes digital
data links with both intrabattalion and extrabattalion elements. The
classified material corresponding to the initialization process in this
chapter is in (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U), which contains the classified values
referenced by a code number in bold and underlined (example: P4-123).
BATTALION INITIALIZATION
2-1. This section on battalion tactical initialization (BATI) provides
information about the role initialization plays in battalion mission
accomplishment and how initialization fits into the overall operation of the
ICC as a command and control (C2) system. The kind of information required
for BATI is especially important for the battalion S3, because it attempts to
relate tactical situations to data contained in the ICC tactical data base. This
section includes—
• The sources of data parameters comprising BATI.
• Information or data required for BATI.
• Where initialization data comes from.
• Who should provide data required for BATI.
• How initialization data values are selected.
FUNCTION OF BATTALION INITIALIZATION

2-2. BATI provides the ICC weapons control computer (WCC) with data
parameters necessary for C2 of battalion engagement operations. The ICC
tactical data base contains data parameters that control tactical system
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FM 3-01.87
operations. BATI is a setup process that must be performed prior to tactical

operations. Engagement operations functions of the ICC use BATI data
parameter values. The ICC system functions vital to mission accomplishment
are—
• Command and coordination.
• Track management.
• Communications.
• Display and system control.
PURPOSE OF BATTALION INITIALIZATION

2-3. BATI works hand in hand with Patriot battery tactical initialization
(TACI). This cooperation is especially important because both the ICC and
ECS must maintain a common data base for proper command and control
from the battalion level. BATI defines FIDOC, identification, assets and
defended areas, volumes, and Patriot battery search sectors. In addition,
other operational data parameters in the tactical data base must be set at the
ICC and then transmitted to the Patriot batteries. BATI is required to set up
the system before battalion tactical operations can be performed. BATI is also
important because the tactical data base parameter values must be set
properly for optimum battalion command, control, and communications (C3).
Categories of initialization data and how they relate to system C3 functions
are discussed next.
BATTALION INITIALIZATION STRUCTURE

2-4. BATI establishes the ICC tactical data base and allows certain data
parameters to be input into the system before tactical operations are
initiated. BATI data parameters have been categorized in Figure 2-1 to help
understand how ICC processing uses initialization data. Figure 2-1 also
shows tabular displays used to input and display the software data
parameters in each category. Some data categories are used internally by the
WCC and are not related to battalion C3. Other categories provide data for
ICC displays. The TD and the TD's assistant control the BATI process. Other
tactical operations (TAC OPS) tabular displays that are related to
initialization tabs and which impact on BATI are included.
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FM 3-01.87
B A T I INIT IA L IZ A TIO N
STRUCTURE
CATEGORY T A B U L A R D ISP L A YS TAC OPS
G E O G R A P H IC D A T A T A B 58 T A B 59 T A B 12
P A R A M E TE R S T A B 72 T A B 62
F P F ID O C A N D TAB 1 T A B 78
T A B 76
ID P A R A M E TE R S T A B 10 T A B 79
C O M M U N IC A TIO N S
T A B 67 T A B 69
CONTROL AND TRACK
R E P O R TIN G T A B 68 TAB 2
P A R A M E TE R S
T A B 73
IF F P A R A M E TE R S TAB 6
T A B 74
F P S U R V E ILL A N C E
T A B 55
P A R A M E TE R S
A S S ET S/D E FE N D E D
T A B 70 TAB 5
AREAS
W EAPONS CONTRO L
T A B 61 T A B 71 TAB 5
A N D ID VO L U M E S
DEPLOYMENT
T A B 59 T A B 62
P L A N N IN G D A T A
IN ITIA L IZ A T IO N T A B 13 T A B 50
T A B 90
PRO CESS CO NTROL T A B 99 T A B 51
D IS PL A Y C O N T R O L T A B 16 TAB 0 T A B 14
A N D R E P O R TE D
IN F O R M A TIO N T A B 43 T A B 12
Figure 2-1. BATI Structure, Categories, and Tabs
GEOGRAPHIC DATA PARAMETERS

2-5. Parameters in the geographic data category are accessed using Tabs 58
(Figure 2-5) on page 2-8, 59 (Figures 2-30 and 2-33) on pages 2-49 and 2-52
respectively, and 62 (Figure 2-36) page 2-55. This data is required to—
• Convert track coordinates that are reported to the ICC.
• Report tracks on data links.
• Establish the battery positions for the ICC.
• Report the ICC site on data links.
• Include communications relay groups (CRGs) in the battalion data
communications network.
• Display communications unit positions at the operator console.
2-3
FM 3-01.87
FIRING DOCTRINE AND IDENTIFICATION PARAMETERS

2-6. FIDOC and identification parameters are inputted in Tabs 1
(Figure 2-7), 10 (Figure 2-9), 76 (Figure 2-18), 78 (Figure 2-19), and 79
(Figure 2-21). Parameters in the FP FIDOC and identification categories are
especially important to the process and conduct of battalion engagement
operations.
COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL AND TRACK REPORTING PARAMETERS

2-7. Communications control and track reporting parameters are located on
four different tabular displays. Communications control and track reporting
parameters are defined during initialization and command planning. This
process for setup and control of the distributed data network for the ICC and
control parameters are set in Tab 67 (Figure 2-24). FU communications
control and track reporting parameters are set in Tab 68 (Figure 2-25).
Extrabattalion unit (higher echelon units [HEUs], subordinate and lateral
battalions, and auxiliary units), communications control, and track reporting
parameters are set in Tab 69 (Figures 2-26 and 2-27). Tab 2 (Figure 2-39)
allows and prohibits the ICC to make changes in the communications control
and track reporting parameters for the defined units.
IDENTIFICATION, FRIEND OR FOE PARAMETERS

2-8. Three tabular displays are used for the identification, friend or foe (IFF)
and selective identification feature (SIF) parameter's initialization data
category. Tab 6 is used to control the IFF and SIF settings, while Tabs 73 and
74 provide SIF codes. These codes are normally obtained from the airspace
control order (ACO) provided by the airspace control authority.
PATRIOT FIRE PLATOON SURVEILLANCE PARAMETERS

2-9. The ICC manages Patriot battery alternate search sectors using Tab 55.
Tab 55 accommodates both Patriot battery ABT and tactical ballistic missile
(TBM) surveillance parameters, as shown in Figure 2-35. The Patriot TBM
threats include short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. These are surface
launched missiles with ballistic trajectories. The Patriot ABT threat includes
threat fixed-wing (FW) and rotary-wing (RW) aircraft, cruise missile (CM),
and tactical air-to-surface missiles (TASMs) mission.
ASSETS AND DEFENDED AREAS

2-10. There are two tabular displays, the tactical control Tab 5 and
initialization Tab 70 (Figure 2-11), that deal with assets and defended areas.
Tab 70 is the initialization data tab. Tab 5 is a TAC OPS tab that reflects
entries made in the initialization data tabs.
DEFINITION AND ASSIGNMENT OF WEAPONS CONTROL AND ID VOLUMES

2-11. There are three tabular displays that deal with weapons control and ID
volumes and points. Tabs 61 (Figure 2-34) and 71 (Figure 2-14) are
initialization and TAC OPS data tabs. Tab 5, a TAC OPS tab, reflects entries
2-4
FM 3-01.87
made in the initialization data tabs. Weapons control and ID volumes are
handled on these tabs in a similar manner that Tabs 70 and 5 handle assets.
DEPLOYMENT PLANNING DATA

2-12. BATI supports deployment planning using tabular displays in
conjunction with symbols on the tactical display. FP locations and
orientations planning are supported via Tab 59 (Figures 2-30 and 2-33) while
Tab 62 (Figure 2-36) displays ICC, CRG, and FP planned communication
links and antenna azimuths.
INITIALIZATION PROCESS CONTROL

2-13. Certain BATI tabs are used to control initialization and data transfer
processes in addition to data entry. The tabs placed in the initialization
process control category are Tabs 13 (Figure 2-2), 50 (Figure 2-3), 51 (Figure
2-22), 90 (Figure 2-4), and 98 (Figure 2-38).
DISPLAY CONTROL AND REPORTED INFORMATION

2-14. Tabs 0, 12, and 14 (Figure 2-10) are used for display control and other
reported information. Tab 0 is an index. Tab 12 is FP locations/boundaries.
Tab 14 is for target display.
AUTOMATIC BATTALION INITIALIZATION

2-15. The following sections describe the TTP to be used for the automatic
initialization process. Recovery sequence is described in Appendix H.
TAB 13—ICC MODE AND DATA BASE SELECTION

2-16. Tab 13, ICC MODE AND DATA BASE SELECTION, is the first tab
displayed by the tactical software. Figure 2-2 contains the Tab 13 format.
ICC MODE AND DATABASE SELECTION *13*

( )=SELECT ICC MODE: 0 = RECOVERY
1 = INITIALIZATION
( )=READ DATABASE
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
- - - -
( ) = PRIMARY TACTICAL DATABASE ( ) UPDATE DATABASE; 1=YES
Figure 2-2. Screen Display of Tab 13

2-17. Tab 13 is used during initialization to select the ICC mode and
read/write-up to 10 data bases. The initialization mode is used to enter data
into the ICC tactical data base or to review the previously entered
initialization data. Enter 1 for initialization and ensure that the READ
DATABASE field is blank normally.
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FM 3-01.87
TAB 50—INITIALIZATION CONTROL

2-18. Tab 50 is displayed after Tab 13. Tab 50 provides control of the
initialization processes by the selections shown in Figure 2-3.
INITIALIZATION CONTROL *50*

( ) = SELECT INITIALIZATION MODE CLEAR DATABASE BY CATEGORY
0 = MANUAL DATA INPUT CONTROL ( )( )( )( )( )
1 = AUTOMATIC DATA INPUT CONTROL 1=ASSETS+VOLUMES
2 = RETRIEVE/COMPARE FPS DATA 2=IFF CODES
3 = DEPLOYMENT/COMMAND PLANNING 3=COMMUNICATIONS
4 = DATA INPUT COMPLETE 4=ALTERNATE SECTORS
5=FP/CRG DEPLOYMENT DATA
2-19. The effects of the automatic SELECT INITIALIZATION MODE
selection are discussed. See TM 9-1430-602-10-1 for a detailed description of
other initialization control procedures.
2-20. A MANUAL DATA INPUT CONTROL selection (0) allows input and
review of initialization data through BATI tabs selected by the operator.
Initialization data may be either created (if the data base does not yet exist),
changed, or reviewed (if the data base has been read from ODS1 or it already
exists). The desired initialization tab is selected by hooking the tab number
from Tab 0, TABULAR DISPLAY INDEX, or by selecting the tab by number
by the keyboard SEL TAB key. After BATI, Tabs 1, 2, 6, 10, 13, 14, 40, 58, 70,
71, 73, 74, 78, and 79 are input and Tab 0 is entered. Tab 50 is redisplayed.
This allows an entry of 3 (DEPLOYMENT/COMMAND PLANNING) as the
INITIALIZATION MODE for completion of BATI tabs under control of Tab
51. See Appendix H.
2-21. With an entry of 1 in the INITIALIZATION MODE data entry field,
AUTOMATIC DATA INPUT CONTROL is selected. After Tab 50 is entered
with this selection, the BATI tabs will be automatically displayed in sequence
for data entry or review. The sequence of BATI tabs is 90, 58,
SYSTEM+WEAPON CONTROL, 1, 6, 10, 14, 40, 43, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76,
and 79. After Tab 79, the last tab in the automatic sequence, is entered, Tab
50 is redisplayed for completion of the DEPLOYMENT/COMMAND
PLANNING tabs.
TAB 90—DATA COLLECTION CONTROL-INTERNAL
2-22. Tabular Display 90 is a two-page tab used to control simultaneous data
collection to both internal and external data collection devices during BATI
and TAC OPS. Tab 90 is shown in Figure 2-4.
DATA COLLECTION CONTROL - INTERNAL PAGE 1 OF 2 *90*
2-6
FM 3-01.87
(1)=DATA COLLECTION DEVICE: 1= EDR, *TAPE*, 2=ODS2 *DISK*

(N)=RE-START WHEN DEVICE FULL: Y=YES, N=NO
(N)=REPLACE MEDIA: Y=YES, N=NO
YES=REMOVE AND LABEL DATA COLL MEDIUM AFTER ENTR TAB
COLLECTION DEVICE WILL BE FULL IN: nn : nn HOURS:MINUTES
(1)=EXTERNAL DATA COLLECTION 0= OFF, 1=ON

ENGINEERING TEST PARAMETERS:
(0) (1) = DRIVE SELECTION: 0, 1 = NTL
(cccccc) = MRT IDENTIFIER
2-23. Page 1 is used to allow data collection at the embedded data recorder
(EDR) or ODS2, internal to the ICC. Page 2 is used to allow data collection at
the battalion tactical operations center’s (BTOC’s) tactical command system
(TCS), the remote maintenance monitor (RMM), or at tape drive devices that
are external to the ICC shelter. The collected data can be used to assess
system performance and to identify system problems.
2-24. The DATA COLLECTION DEVICE data field allows the operator to
select the EDR, ODS2, or tactical storage device (TSD) for internal data
collection. The EDR allows up to 8 hours of continuous data collection on 8-
millimeter data collection tape. If ODS2 is selected, the operator must have
the data collection optical disk (OD) inserted into ODS2. The OD has the
capability to record a total of 90 minutes of data collection (45 minutes each
side of disk). Normally, the EDR is selected due to its greater capacity.
During tactical operations, the recording media should be changed when full
rather than recording over older data. Tab 90 is used in conjunction with the
RECORD MODE S/I.
GEOGRAPHIC CONTROL PARAMETERS

2-25. Tab 58 inputs battalion geographic control parameters. The ICC must
maintain a centralized air picture to manage and correlate reported tracks.
To do this, a coordinate conversion process must be performed. The battalion
system coordination center (BNSCC) entry in Tab 58 is important because it
provides a reference point for the ICC to convert tracks reported by other
coordinate systems to the ICC coordinate system. Tab 58 format is shown in
Figure 2-5.
BN GEOGRAPHIC CONTROL PARAMETERS *58*

( ) UTM=BNSCC LOCATION ( n )=UTM WORLD MODEL
2-7
FM 3-01.87
0 =INTERNATIONAL
(ddd:mm:ss,a)=DLRP LONGITUDE 1 =CLARKE 1880
(dd:mm:ss,a)=DLRP LATITUDE 2 =CLARKE 1866
3 =WGS-84
(n)=NORTH REFERENCE: 0=TRUE, 1=GRID 4 =EVEREST
5 =BESSEL
( n n )=UTM ZONE FOR GRID NORTH REFERENCE
2-26. Because the BNSCC is the center of the ICC display, it should be
central to the area of operations (AO), or wherever battalion elements are
deployed. The BNSCC should be chosen from the S3 operations map with
overlays depicting the battalion AO. A map coordinate, chosen in the center
of the area of operations, ensures that the ICC tactical display will provide
adequate coverage of the AO.
2-27. The data link reference point (DLRP), north reference, universal
transverse mercator (UTM) zone for grid north reference, and UTM world
model entries (WGS-84 is to be used) in Tab 58 are required to support track
reporting to non-Patriot elements. The DLRP allows all air defense artillery
(ADA) and joint track reports to be referenced to a common point. The DLRP
is customarily designated by the joint forces air component commander
(JFACC) or the airspace control authority (ACA) through operational data
(OPDAT). One DLRP is usually used for an entire theater of operations. The
DLRP is required for Hawk fire units (FUs) and some higher echelon units
(HEUs), when these elements are part of the TF. The BNSCC and the DLRP
must be within 17 degrees (latitude and longitude) of each other. The DLRP
must be the same for all elements exchanging data within the data link
network, to include joint and combined forces.
2-28. North reference, UTM zone for grid north reference, and UTM world
model entries are used when tracks are reported from an external battalion
source that uses a grid north reference system. Patriot ICC software
processing converts grid north-referenced coordinates to a true north
reference. Accordingly, the default and recommended setting for the north
reference on Tab 58 is 0=TRUE. The UTM zone for grid north reference entry
is required only if grid north was selected for the north reference (the grid
north reference system is sensitive to latitude). The ICC and Patriot batteries
must use World Geodetic System-84 (WGS-84) to ensure proper track
reporting and correlation. The proper model is found in the legend of military
maps and may vary, depending on the location and the theater of operations.
SYSTEM+WEAPON CONTROL TAB

2-29. The SYSTEM+WEAPON CONTROL tab (Figure 2-6) appears next. The
FU method of control for ABT engagements is normally centralized and
decentralized for TBM engagements. WPN CONTROL STATE and AREAS
ENABLE are based on a standing tactical order (STO) or ACO. During ICC
initialization only a 3 will be displayed in the automatic data reentry system
(ADRS) data field. During tactical operations this tab is available for
information and directing changes to the FUs.
2-8
FM 3-01.87
( ) ADRS: 1=ALL, 2=SUBS, 3=ICC, 4-SLCT SYSTEM=WEAPON S/I

( ) METHODS OF CONTROL: C=CENTRALIZED, D=DECENTRALIZED
( ) WPN CONTROL STATE: H=HOLD, T=TIGHT, F=FREE
( ) AREAS ENABLE: Y=YES, N=NO MOC: WCS: AE:
MOC: WCS: AE: MOC: WCS: LCL ICC: aaaa-aaaa-aaaaa
FP 1: aaaa-aaaa-aaaaa FP 7: aaaa-aaaa aaacc BNA: - -
FP 2: - - FP 8: - BNB: - -
FP 3: - - FP 9: - BNC: - -
FP 4: - - FP10: - BND: - -
FP 5: - - FP11: - BNE: - -
FP 6: - - FP12: - BNF: - -
Figure 2-6. Screen Display of SYSTEM + WEAPON CONTROL Tab
BATTALION FIDOC AND OPERATIONAL PARAMETERS

2-30. FIDOC and operational parameter changes are input into three pages of
Tab 1. This tab allows the operator to authorize the FIDOC and operational
parameters during initialization. During TAC OPS all three pages are used.
But during initialization only pages 2 and 3 are used (See Figure 2-7.).
( )ADRS: 1=ALL, 2=SUBS, 3=ICC, 4-SLCT FIDOC+OPNL PRMTRS PAGE 2 *1*
FP 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 BN A B C D E F
( )ID MODE; A=AUTO, M=MAN
( )ID WGHT SET; 1, 2 OR 3
AUTHNS: ( )ECM
Y=YES ( )POP-UP
N=NO ( )MIN SAFE VEL
( )SLOW TGT ENGA
( )SIF FRIEND
( )ADRS: 1=ALL SUBORD FP , 2=SLCT FIDOC+OPNL PRMTRS PAGE 3 *1*

FP 1 2 3 4 5 6
( ) = TBMA ENGAGEMENT MODE; A=AUTO , M=MANUAL
( ) = TBMB ENGAGEMENT MODE; A=AUTO , M=MANUAL
( ) = TBMA MOF CONTROL; R=RIPPLE, S=SLS
( ) = TBMB MOF CONTROL; R=RIPPLE, S=SLS
( ) = URBAN LOW ALT TRAJ CTRL; 1=ON, 0=OFF
( ) = TBMA DIVE CALCULATION; 1=ON, 0=OFF
( ) = TBMA DIVE ALTITUDE; TO
( )D = TBMA DIVE ANGLE; TO DEG
Figure 2-7. Tab 1, Pages 2 and 3
2-31. Page 2 of Tab 1 is used to enter the ID mode and ID weight set.
Authorizations for track ID criteria are entered in Tab 79 (Figure 2-21) for
each subordinate Patriot FP and battalion. Page 3 allows the operator to set
parameters for TBM engagement operations.
2-32. Tab 1, page 2, also controls authorizations transmitted by way of data
link to subordinate Patriot batteries. In the automatic ID mode, the
electronic countermeasures (ECM) authorization allows Patriot batteries
2-9
FM 3-01.87
subordinate to the ICC to automatically identify ECM emitters as hostile.

Authorizing ECM at the ICC allows the electronic countermeasure criteria to
be used for ID scoring. Authorization to use ECM as a hostile ID criterion is
normally not granted to Patriot batteries because of the presence of friendly
jammers (and the subsequent risk of identifying a friendly track as a hostile
target). In the manual ID mode, ID processing is conducted using ECM
criteria. However, the result of this processing is an ID recommendation for
the evaluated target.
ID MODE
2-33. The ID mode, either automatic or manual, can be set independently for
the ICC and the battery. In the manual ID mode, the TD or TDA enters the
ID for each track, except for TRUE FRIEND which requires receipt of a valid
Mode 4 IFF response. In the automatic ID mode, (auto IFF/SIF state Tab 6),
the FP assigns a track ID based on evaluation of the track using active and
passive ID criteria. The ICC, in the automatic ID mode, assigns track
identification based on FP track reports. The ICC and individual firing
platoons ID modes are set in Tab 1. The S3 or the commander implements
the selected ID mode. Their decision is based on guidance from tactical
directives, tactical standing operating procedures (TSOPs), and operation
orders (OPORDs), as well as the known data link architecture and the control
chain in which the battalion must operate. When Patriot has ID authority,
the system should be in automatic ID mode. Otherwise it should be in
manual.
ID WEIGHT SET
2-34. The ID weight set is a parameter used by the weapons control computer
(WCC) for ID processing. There are three ID weight sets numbered 1 through
3. As a track history is maintained by the system, an ID score is computed
continuously. The ID score depends on whether the track was reported within
(and correlated to) certain types of ID volumes. Whether the track exceeded
maximum safe velocity and whether any IFF responses were received, an ID
score is computed. Each ID weight is assigned specific values for different ID
volume correlation, maximum track speeds (passive ID criteria), and IFF
response (active ID criteria). Criteria having values in the ID weight set
are—
• Friendly origin volume correlation.
• Hostile origin volume correlation.
• Negative or positive IFF and SIF classification.
• Minimum safe velocity.
• Restricted and prohibited volume correlation.
• Safe passage corridor (SPC) volume correlation.
2-35. ID weight set 3 is for wartime operations. ID weight set 2 is used during
periods of transition from peace to war, while weight set 1 is used during
peacetime operations. Before using weight sets 1 or 2, however, units should
be thoroughly familiar with (S)FM 44-100A(U). It is important to note that
for automatic ID processing to work correctly, the ICC and ECS must use the
2-10
FM 3-01.87
same Patriot ID weight set. Accordingly, the TD or TDA at the ICC must be
aware of ID mode changes made at the FU. Hawk units subordinate to the
ICC must use a Hawk ID weight set having the same weights as the current
Patriot ID weight set.
2-36. Criteria for a pop-up target are normally not allowed. Minimum safe
velocity is allowed only when a slow and low joint criteria is in effect. Slow
target engagements are authorized only when the threat of enemy helicopters
is high and clutter returns are not significant. SIF friend is authorized when
SIF alone is joint criteria for a friendly ID.
2-37. Page 3 controls TBM firing doctrine. Normally TBM A and TBM B
engagement mode are selected as automatic. Also, the normal method of fire
for both TBM A and B is ripple. Ripple fire used for TBMs is slightly different
than that used for ABTs. The time delay between firings for TBM ripple is
P4-1 seconds while the time delay for ABTs is P4-2 seconds. For the
classified values, see (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U). Urban low-altitude trajectory
control is normally off except when low-altitude TBM intercepts could cause
damage in built-up areas. Consultation with civil authorities may be
necessary to get a proper assessment of whether the risk of damage caused
by low-altitude intercepts outweighs the risk of not engaging. When TBMs
are a threat to Patriot defended assets, the TBM A dive calculation should be
on and the dive altitudes and angles should be used. Default values for dive
angles and altitudes for Tab 67 and are found in (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U).
TAB 6—IFF/SIF CONTROL

2-38. IFF and SIF are controlled by way of Tab 6 and are part of the
initialization sequence and available in TAC OPS for on-line changes. Tab 6
provides the capability to select the types of codes used for correlation of
Mode 1 and 3A responses for the SIF. There are two available code sources,
KAA-63 tables in Tab 73, and compass rose tables in Tab 74. Tables 1 and 2
are compass rose and Tables 3 and 4 are KAA-63. The contents of this IFF
and SIF code tables will be discussed after Tab 6. KAA-63 code tables are
most commonly used for SIF; Tab 74 (compass rose tables) is seldom used.
The Tab 6 format is shown in Figure 2-8.
IFF/SIF CONTROL CMND VALUES: *6*
( )=SIF TABLE 1,2=CR;3,4=KAA-63 CODE ENTRY
( )=MODE 4 CODE A, B FORMS:
( )=MODE 4 THRESHOLD H=HIGH L=LOW KAA63 *73*
( )=MODE 4 LOW RANDOMNESS 1=YES, 0=NO CROSE *74*
( )=ENABLE MODE 4 1=ON, 0=OFF
( )=ENABLE SIF 1=ON, 0=OFF
( )=MODE 1 CORRELATION 1=USE, 0=DON’T USE
YEAR( ) DAY( ) TIME( )Z SOURCE=
2-39. IFF Mode 4 control entries are also available in Tab 6. The Mode 4 code
entry designates the code to be used in decoding Mode 4 responses. Code A or
Code B can be selected. Normally, joint procedures will specify the use of
Code A. The Mode 4 threshold entry can be set high or low. A high threshold
setting means that the system requires more specific criteria to be met than
2-11
FM 3-01.87
the low threshold. Certain criteria have to be met before the system
recognizes a Mode 4 response as valid. A low threshold setting has less
stringent requirements for Mode 4. Normally, the high threshold is selected
to gain a higher confidence that a positive Mode 4 response is valid since that
normally leads to true friend identification. The Mode 4 low randomness
entry is used for system control of Mode 4 interrogations. A Mode 4 low
randomness entry of YES allows the system to continue using Mode 4 if the
interrogator cannot maintain randomness of transmitted codes. Low
randomness is normally on.
2-40. ENABLE SIF entry of ON will make the FP ENABLE SIF switches
active at on-line Patriot batteries. With ENABLE SIF ON, fire units may
interrogate tracks with Modes 1, 2, or 3A. Mode 2 code returns are not
correlated against any other codes and are not used for track ID assignment
in the auto ID mode. Mode 2 code returns are displayed on the ECS track
AMP data tab and uptold to the ICC for display on the track AMP data tab.
The enable Mode 4 entry has a similar effect at the Patriot batteries. An
enable Mode 4 entry of ON will start on-line Patriot battery FP ENABLE
MODE 4 switches. Normally, both Mode 4 and SIF are on.
2-41. Mode 1 and Mode 3 correlation control entries allow the system to use
SIF correlation. It is not mandatory to authorize the use of Mode 1 or Mode 3
correlation. The Air Tasking Order (ATO) will define which modes will be
used. However, both may be enabled at the same time. If both are enabled,
the aircraft must respond correctly in both modes for positive correlation. The
default value for Mode 1 correlation and the Mode 3 correlation is 1=Use.
However, normally only one mode will be used for correlation based on the
ATO.
2-42. Precise time of day is automatically provided in Tab 6 to Patriot FPs
with the AEE PLGR and up-linked to the ICC, upon transition to TAC OPS
when a valid communications link is established. Tab 6 data field related to
the time of day (TOD) and identified as SOURCE = aaa, [(aaa = OPR
(operator) or global positioning system (GPS)]. Operator entry of TOD is
indicated by OPR and GPS indications (provided the precession lightweight
GPS receiver (PLGR) indicates TOD). An operator cannot override PLGR
provided TOD.
2-43. The precise time of day determination is an inherent function of the
GPS PLGR that will be used by the ECS and ICC. Precise time of day is
required to support told-in target correlation. Timely target cueing and target
hand-off also require PTOD. Both the ECS and ICC will now use PLGR
standard time to ensure that external synchronous communication links can
be correctly established, that ACOs are established at their proper time, and
the external source data correlation is correct. The PLGR standard time shall
be used to synchronize time of day (TOD) for Patriot. By using the PLGR
standard time, operator input will no longer be required for time
synchronization. This will allow Patriot to be in time synchronization with all
other PLGR time users. Current TOD control processing will be retained to
support units without PLGR capabilities. Operator entries will be disabled
for units that have PLGR and are receiving quality PLGR TOD data. Units
with PLGR data shall be able to provide TOD to HEUs and adjacent units if
they do not have PLGR based TOD.
2-12
FM 3-01.87
2-44. The ICC can establish its own TOD, but, the TOD may be overridden
when an FU with a PLGR TOD comes in line. If the local ICC is the BN TOD
master, then the Tab 6 TOD entry is required to establish the TOD for the
battalion network. If the local ICC is not the TOD master, then Tab 6 TOD
entries cannot be made on-line. When TOD entries are made in Tab 6 during
BATI, date and time are also used to display the last ICC data base update in
Tab 99 (Figure 2-58). FPs with precision lightweight GPS (PLGR) receiver-11
will have automatic emplacement enhancement capability and precise time of
day (PTOD). Tab 6 also allows the TOD to be entered or reset for the use of
the SIF codes, which are time-dependent. The time, day, and year
information are required for use at the ICC if the ICC does not have any
Patriot batteries on-line and if a battalion TOD master has not been
established in Tab 2.
2-45. When the ICC transitions to TAC OPS, the first Patriot on line will
send PTOD to OPS and establish active communications links with
subordinate Patriot FPs equipped with the ICC and be designated the TOD
master. As all other Patriot FPs come on-line, the lowest numbered FP will
then be designated the TOD master.
TAB 10—LOCAL ENGAGEMENT CONTROL PARAMETERS

2-46. Local engagement control parameters are input by way of Tab 10. These
parameters are used to help the TD establish asset defense for his AO. There
are three data entries pertaining to engagement control: Patriot engagement
range bias, Hawk engagement range bias, and operator override time. Range
bias affects ABT engagements Tab 10 (Figure 2-9) format is shown below.
LOCAL ENGAGEMENT CONTROL PARAMETERS *10*
( ) = FP1 ENGAGEMENT RANGE BIAS TO
( ) FP2
( ) FP3
( ) FP4
( ) FP5
( ) FP6
( ) HAWK FP ENGAGEMENT RANGE BIAS -15 TO +15
( ) SECONDS OPERATOR OVERRIDE TIME 00 TO 30 SECONDS
Patriot Engagement Range Bias
2-47. Patriot engagement range bias via Tab 10 changes the engagement
range limits expected by the system software. A positive range bias extends
the maximum anticipated engagement range and decreases the probability of
kill (Pk) while a negative range bias decreases the maximum anticipated
engagement range and increases the Pk. Range biasing has an impact on
intercept performance and affects the time to first launch (TTFL) calculation.
2-48. Patriot engagement range bias can be used when the battery missile
supply versus the expected threat level permits. To maximize Pk, negative
range bias may be used when a large raid size is anticipated against a
battery with a low missile inventory. Conversely, positive range bias, in effect
lowering the Pk, can be used when a battery with a full supply of missiles can
2-13
FM 3-01.87
risk engagement against a low-level threat. It is important to note that a

positive range bias has an impact on the multiple simultaneous engagement
capability of the system. Its use is not recommended. When Patriot
engagements are to be directed at long ranges with intercepts beyond
P4-3 kilometers, against small numbers of targets it is more effective to
instruct TDAs and TCAs to engage at those ranges, regardless of
time-to-launch release (TLR), instead of biasing the Patriot engagement
range. See (S)FM 44-100A(U). Tactical Note: It is better to engage ARM
carriers, ARMs, and jamming aircraft as soon as they come within range.
Hawk FU Engagement Range Bias
2-49. Hawk FU engagement ranges may be biased using Tab 10. The Hawk
FU engagement range bias is aggregate in nature; that is, one setting at the
ICC affects all subordinate Hawk FUs in the TF, regardless of location on the
battlefield. The Hawk engagement range bias has a range of + _ 15 kilometers
and may be used similarly as the Patriot battery engagement range bias. A
positive bias provides a means of decreasing time to first launch (TTFL) for
Hawk, which has the effect of increasing the range at which Hawk fire units
receive engagement commands from the ICC. A positive Hawk engagement
range bias facilitates engagement assignment at a range to achieve intercept
equal to the range bias setting plus the high-lethality range. The engagement
range bias facilitates the selection of Hawk FUs for engagement by the ICC,
but the bias has no effect upon the ability of the Hawk FU to make successful
engagements at longer ranges. Targets out of range for the Hawk system will
not produce the "in range" indication required to conduct the engagement
(the Hawk fire unit must wait until the target meets system engagement
capabilities regardless of the range of the target at the time the engagement
command was received). A negative engagement range bias should not be
used for Hawk fire units because this would increase the TTFL and have the
effect of reducing the range at which Hawk could engage. A positive range
bias should only be used if it is clearly apparent that Hawk FUs are not being
selected as the primary candidate for engagement.
2-50. Operator override time applies to Patriot batteries using the automatic
engagement mode only. This setting is the time given the TD or TDA to
review the track data on the to-be-engaged queue (TBEQ) before automatic
engagement. It begins after the target time to launch release (TLR) has gone
to zero seconds. The recommended value for this Tab 10 setting is five
seconds. The operator override time does not apply to TBM engagements in
the automatic engagement mode.
TAB 14—TARGET DISPLAY CONTROL

2-51. Tab 14, TARGET DISPLAY CONTROL (Figure 2-10), is automatically
displayed during the initialization sequence, and can also be called up by the
operator during TAC OPS. On page 1, the operator selects either English or
metric units of measure for the altitude, speed, and range fields in Tab 14,
Tab 78, (Track Amplifying Data), and also for target display data (Tab 79).
Normally, English should be selected.
2-52. On page 2, the operator enters upper and lower limits for all four
altitude bands, speed category limits for the target velocity vector display,
2-14
FM 3-01.87
and either tactical information link TADIL-B or NATO track numbers. Use
the default values for the altitude bands. The medium speed category should
be above MSV and below pop-up thresholds, if used. Otherwise, use default
values. Normally, TADIL-J track numbers should be used, depending on the
multi-TADIL environment.
TARGET DISPLAY CONTROL PAGE 1 *14*

( )= ALTITUDE UNITS: FOR TARGETS/MASK/VOLUMES
1=ENGLISH, 2=METRIC
( )= SPEED/RANGE UNITS: FOR TARGETS/CURSOR
1=ENGLISH, 2=METRIC

LO HI = BOUNDARIES OF ALTITUDE BANDS, TO
( )( ) = BAND A
( )( ) = BAND B
( )( ) = BAND C
( )( ) = SELECT ALT LIMITS
( )( ) = MEDIUM SPEED CATEGORY LIMITS, TO
( ) = TRACK NUMBERS: 1=NATO, 2=TADIL-A/B, 3=TADIL-J
TAB 40
2-53. Tab 40 controls special intelligence data. See (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U).
TAB 43
2-54. Tab 43 controls specified intelligence data. For more information see
(S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U).
TAB 70—TBM AND ABT DEFENDED ASSETS, (ICC)

2-55. Assets and defended areas are derived from the commander's intent
and operations order of higher echelon elements. Doctrinal considerations for
deployment planning for assets and defended areas can be found in FM 44-85
(for this discussion, the term "defended area" is considered to have the same
meaning as "asset," therefore, the term asset will be used for both).
2-56. The ICC considers assets when performing threat assessment and FP
candidate selection. This information will be discussed in three separate
areas: asset definition, asset assignment, and asset control.
INITIALIZATION PARAMETERS
2-57. Tab 70 (Figure 2-11) is used to enter initialization parameters that
define the ABT or TBM asset. Tab 70 is available during initialization and
during TAC OPS and CMND PLAN mode. Entering a zero in the ID data
field may erase entries in Tab 70. Asset ID, location, radius or polygon, TBM,
and asset threat category (ATC) are entered via Tab 70. Separate ABT and
TBM assets capability provides improved defense design in the following
areas:
• More accurate definitions of defended areas.
2-15
FM 3-01.87
• More flexibility to tailor the defense for current mission

requirements.
• Reduction in the probability of expending missiles against
non-threatening TBM targets.
TBM DEFENDED ASSETS *ABT ASSETS PGS 1-18* PG 1 OF 54 *70*
TB( ) =IDENTITY CENTER PT IN UTM

( ) =STATUS;A/I ( ) FP A/I COV ACTV 3 MAX
( ) =ATC; 1 TO 8 ( ) 1 ( )
( . )KM=RADIUS ( ) 2 ( ) SELECT
( ) 3 ( ) ( )=PG
( )=COORDINATE FORMAT ( ) 4 ( ) ( )=ID
0=UTM, 2=LAT/LON ( ) 5 ( )
1=MGRS, 3=GEOREF ( ) 6 ( )
ENTER TAB SETS FORMAT ( )
ABT DEFENDED ASSETS *ABT ASSETS PGS 19-54* PG 1 OF 54 *70*
AT( ) =IDENTITY CENTER PT IN UTM

( ) =STATUS;A/I FP A/I COV ACTV 3 MAX
( ) =ATC; 1 TO 8 1 ( )
( . )KM=RADIUS 2 ( ) SELECT
3 ( ) ( )=PG
( )=COORDINATE FORMAT 4 ( ) ( )=ID
0=UTM, 2=LAT/LON 5 ( )
1=MGRS, 3=GEOREF 6 ( )
ENTER TAB SETS FORMAT
ABT/TBM DEFENDED ASSETS

2-58. Tab 70 accommodates a total of 54 assets (18 TBM only and 36
ABT/TBM). Assets are now labeled with two alpha characters and two
numbers. ABT/TBM assets have the letters AT preceding the number that
can range from 19 to 54. TBM-only assets have the letters TB preceding the
number that can range from 01 to 18. Tab 70 accommodates a total of 54
assets. ABT assets (often referred to as ABT/TBM assets) are assessed for
both ABT and TBM threats. Two types of ABT assets are definable, a point
asset (without a radius) or a radial asset (with a radius). TBM assets are only
assessed for TBM threats. Three types of TBM assets are definablea point
asset, a radial asset, or a polygon asset. The polygon asset can be a minimum
of three coordinate points or a maximum of eight coordinate points.
2-59. The active/inactive (A/I) column is used to set the activity status of each
asset (A=active, I=inactive). Assets can be initially defined in the data base
with an inactive activity status, and then made active later. The ATC is an
important setting used to prioritize engagements based on the position and
heading of enemy aircraft in relation to the asset. The threat with the highest
ATC is placed on the TBEQ first. ATC can be set from 1 (highest priority) to 8
(lowest priority). Depending on the theater, assets may be rank ordered,
grouped, or no priority specified. The battalion S3 must work with brigade to
define asset threat categories (ATCs) for each asset to ensure that the
commander in chief’s (CINC’s) intent is met. Normally, the ICC and FUs will
2-16
FM 3-01.87
be designated ATC 1 also to ensure self-defense. THAAD batteries in an air

and missile defense task force (AMDTF) would receive equal priority. Tab 70
provides the operator the choice of four different coordinate systems for
defining assets and defended areas. The operator should enter the
coordinates in the same format used in the ATO, TAC OPDAT, or OPORD to
reduce the possibility of translation errors.
2-60. Assets entered as a circle are displayed as squares. The diameter of the
circle is the same as the width of the square. The center points are identical.
Figure 2-12 shows how circles define an asset and are displayed on the
system display.
ASSET AS ASSET AS
DEFINED DISPLAYED
UTM CENTER RADIUS Asset Numbers

(Asset Location) (Asset Size) AT 19 TO 54 (ABT)
TB 01 TO 18 (TBM)
Note: Assets with an inactive status (A/I = I)
are displayed with low brightness.
Figure 2-12. Asset Display
TAB 71—ALL VOLUMES AND POINTS DATA

2-61. Weapons control and ID volume initialization data is derived from
airspace control orders and published tactical operations data (TAC OPDAT)
information. ACO information involving airspace control volumes must be
manually translated to Tab 71 data parameters at the Patriot battalion. Joint
Chief of Staff (JCS) Publication 3-52 and FM 10-103 are references for
specific airspace control measures use. Some ACM types (and corresponding
references) which may be initialized are listed in Figure 2-13.
2-17
FM 3-01.87
STANDARD USE ARMY AVIATION FLIGHT ROUTE

MINIMUM RISK ROUTE/LOW LEVEL TRANSIT ROUTE
BASE DEFENSE ZONE
IFF ON/OFF PASSIVE ID LINES
MISSILE ENGAGEMENT ZONE
RESTRICTED OPERATION ZONE
COORDINATING ALTITUDE
Figure 2-13. Airspace Control Measures
GENERALIZED VOLUMES
2-62. Tab 71, weapons control and ID volume definition will be discussed.
BATI Tab 71 is used to enter initialization parameters that define the
weapons control and ID volumes.
2-63. There are several types of generalized volumes definable by Tab 71
entries. The polygon and cylinder volumes may be defined as a pure weapons
control volume (having only a weapons control attribute). A pure ID volume
(having only an ID attribute); or a composite volume (having both a weapons
control and an ID attribute) may be used to define a weapons control and ID
volumes. The polygon and cylinder volumes may be additionally defined as
(or given attributes for) a friendly origin, a hostile origin, a prohibited volume
(PV), or a restricted volume (RV). Friendly origins have a friendly ID
attribute, while hostile origins, RVs, and PVs all have a hostile ID attribute.
Corridor volumes must have a safe passage corridor (SPC) attribute, a
friendly ID attribute. SPCs are defined by a centerline, and width, and have
additional correlation criteria. The IFF passive ID (PID), IFFON, PIDON are
special volumes, defined as a line. They are used as an ID processing
boundary for automatic IFF interrogations in AUTO ID, MSV, SPC, PV, RV,
and pop-up target classifications and are only performed between the Patriot
battery and the IFFPID, and IFF on (IFFON) lines. Track speed and heading
information are used to correlate targets to specific volumes, except for
IFFPID and general points.
2-64. Tab 71 entries to define different weapons control and ID volumes will
now be discussed. Figure 2-14 shows the format of the tab.
( )=ID ( )=STAT;A/I/T =CURRENT STAT *VOLUMES* PG 1/150 *71*

DAY HRS MON YEAR ( . )KM=SPC WDTH ( )
( )( )( ) ( )=ON ( )=SPC DIRECTN; ( )
( )( )( ) ( )=OFF F=FWD, R=REV, B=BTH ( )
( . )KM=VOL RADIUS ( )=COORD FORMAT ( )
( . )TO(mm.m)aa=ALT 0=UTM 2=LAT/LON ( )
( )TO(nnn)DEF=HDG 1=MGRS 3=GEOREF ( )
( )TO(mmm)M/S=SPD ENTAB SETS FORMAT ( )
( )DEG=SPC TOLERANCE ( )
ATTRIBUTES;Y/N ( )=ORIG USED UNITS: /150 ( )
( )=SPC ( )=RVA ( )=PVA USED UNITS /800 SELECT: PG( ), ID( )
2-65. The activation time of each volume goes into the tab. If no time is
entered, active volumes will be used for correlation.
2-18
FM 3-01.87
2-66. Minimum risk routes, low-level transit routes, transit corridors, air
routes, standard use Army aviation flight routes, and other similar airspace
control measures are friendly ID volumes. Friendly origin volumes such as
joint or multinational air bases are friendly ID volumes also.
2-67. Airspace outside of airspace control measures and within a missile
engagement zone (MEZ) is usually entered as a hostile ID volume. Restricted
operations zones may be hostile volumes. Enemy airbases also may be hostile
ID volumes.
2-68. The IFF on-line is a line volume. The passive ID on-line is a line
volume. Usually, the two are combined into a composite IFF and passive ID
on line. For units supporting corps or close to the enemy, their lines normally
coincide with the fire support coordination line (FSCL). For rear area units,
an artificial line is used to ensure that the ID function supports the
engagement function. In this case the line is usually 100 km from the closest
battery.
WEAPON CONTROL STATUS

2-69. The weapons control residual status is the weapon control status
(WEAPONS HOLD, WEAPONS TIGHT, or WEAPONS FREE) used instead
of or outside established weapons control volumes. Volumes can have both ID
attributes and a weapon control attribute. Volumes that have either, but not
both, attributes are called pure volumes (ID or weapon control). These
volumes that have both attributes are called dual purpose or composite
volumes.
2-70. For pure volumes, either ID or weapon control, the weapon control
status reverts to the designated weapons control residual status when the
AREAS ENABLE S/I is off. The only exception to this is the IFFPID, which is
a line without a weapons control or ID attribute used to classify targets.
When the AREAS ENABLE S/I is enabled, the pure weapon control volumes'
weapons control status, as defined in Tab 71, is enabled once the volume is
activated. For example, the weapon control status and the activated volume
would be WEAPONS FREE with AREAS ENABLE S/I enabled. It would be
the residual weapons control with the AREAS ENABLE S/I off. Dual purpose
or composite volumes are unaffected by the AREAS ENABLE S/I.
2-71. The weapons control residual status is dependent upon the tactical
situation. The Patriot weapons control residual status is affected sometimes
by the weapons control state directed by headquarters.
2-72. Base defense zones, weapons free zones, restricted operations zones,
MEZ and other similar ACM normally have a weapon control status. This is
entered as the last part of the volume ID.
SAFE PASSAGE CORRIDORS

2-73. The SPC DIRECTION data entry field is a required entry if the SPC
attribute is indicated and CORR WIDTH data has been provided. Corridor
direction is used for track correlation with the SPC based on the direction the
track is flying in the corridor. There are three directions, with the direction
2-19
FM 3-01.87
referenced to the first point used to define the SPC centerline. The three
directions are—
• "F"—FORWARD: one way from first entered point to the last.
• "R"—REVERSE: one way from last entered point to the first.
• "B"—BOTH: two-way corridor.
2-74. SPC DIRECTION is another correlation criterion along with track
altitude, heading, speed, and corridor tolerance criteria. Most aerial routes
are both but this will be determined in the ACO.
2-75. The SPC WIDTH data entry defines the width of all corridor segments
defined in and centered about the volume boundary points. This entry only
applies if the SPC attribute entry is Y. The corresponding volume IDENTITY
must be defined as friendly. The SPC width is defined in the ACO. No buffers
are used.
2-76. When defining coordinates for volume/asset, the system incorporates
latitude-longitude (LAT-LONG), MGRS, and Geographic Reference
(GEOREF) as alternate input formats. This enhances the flexibility of the
system and eliminates hand conversion of other coordinates into UTM. The
system allows entry of UTM, GEOREF, MGRS, and LAT-LONG formats in
Tabs 70, 71, and 72. Use the coordinate system used in the ACO to enter data
into Tab 71.
Aerial Routes
2-77. All aerial routes and similar ACM receive safe passage corridor
attribute (SPCA). The ID volumes must be friendly.
2-78. The Tab 71 SPC TOLERANCE data entry field only applies if the SPC
attribute is also selected on the page. This value is used to correlate tracks
with the safe passage corridor based on the track heading. The SPC
TOLERANCE is the allowable deviation in degrees from the corridor
centerline (the corridor centerline is defined by a series of points, also entered
on the page). The normal tolerance is 30 degrees.
2-79. The software defines safe passage corridor width to the nearest tenth of
a kilometer. Width may range from 1.0 km to 20.0 km. Each time an aircraft
enters an SPC and correctly aligns with the corridor heading within the
period specified called the Safe Corridor Alignment Interval, it receives
positive credit. However, if an aircraft turned too early, it violated the
heading condition of the corridor segment it was entering. Pilots have some
heading flexibility while turning within the bounds of the SPC. There is an
area designated around the SPC bend that allows for correlation with either
corridor segment heading. A circle with a radius equal to 3/4 the width of the
corridor is defined in the FU evaluation, decision, and weapon assignment
(EDWA) logic processing. The center of this circle is the center line point at
the bend as currently defined for the SPC in the data base. If an aircraft is
found to be inside the SPC borders but does not align with the heading of the
corridor segment, then a check is run to determine if it lies within one of
those circles. If this is the case, the aircraft is inside a corridor bend and the
heading checks for both connecting corridor segments are to be performed.
This ensures that the aircraft will pass either heading condition as it
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FM 3-01.87
navigates through the turn so that SPC credit will be preserved, even if the
aircraft turns early or late.
Speed in Safe Passage Corridors

2-80. The speed entries provide another range of values used to correlate
tracks with the defined volume. Both minimum and maximum speed values
(the lower and upper target speed limit respectively) must be entered if speed
is to be used for volume correlation.
2-81. The track heading (HDG) entries are used to correlate tracks with the
particular volume defined on the page. The value provides a range of
headings allowed for volume correlation (the heading range is measured
clockwise from first entry to second).
2-82. The two altitude entries, shown as altitude (ALT), have units of
measure either in kilometers or kilo feet, based on the Tab 14 ENGLISH or
METRIC entry. This information provides a range of altitudes to be used for
correlation of the volume with reported tracks. Buffers are not added to
altitudes listed in the ACO unless specified.
Define Safe Passage Corridors

2-83. After the volumes and points are defined via data entries to Tab 71,
BATI processing allocates the volumes and points to the Patriot batteries.
Volumes and point allocation information is displayed in Tabs 61 and 5.
Units and points are based on the following:
• Cylinder Volume = 1 unit/1 point.
• Polygon Volume = 1 unit/1+ number of sides = points.
• Corridor Volume = n units = n segments/n points = 5n segments.
• General Point = 1 unit/0 points.
• PIDON/IFFPID = 1 unit/2-12 points.
2-84. The maximum number of volumes or points allocated to a single Patriot
battery is 55. The maximum number of points allocated to a Patriot battalion
is 250. The maximum number of points includes all volumes or points
allocated to the FP. If an excess exists, an alert informs the operator which
FP has excess geodata. The excess GEODATA alert is displayed during FU
deployment planning and in the command function. The operator must select
Tab 61 to see how many units and points are exceeded.
2-85. There are also limits to the number of active volumes or active points
allocated to FP. The maximum number of active volumes or active point units
allocated to a single Patriot battery is 27 units and 150 points. If an excess
exists, an alert is displayed which informs the operator which FP has excess
active geographical data. Tab 61 shows how many active volumes and active
points are excess for each FP.
MISSILE ENGAGEMENT ZONE

2-86. The portion of the missile engagement zone (MEZ) out to and just
beyond the launch range of Patriot batteries is a prohibited volume attribute
2-21
FM 3-01.87
(PVA). In rear areas the entire MEZ may be a PVA. Airspace control
measures (ACM) run through the PVA providing minimum risk to friendly
aircraft and missiles.
2-87. Friendly and enemy air bases within the low-altitude detection range of
Patriot may be designated either friendly or hostile origin volumes,
respectively. Friendly air bases are normally within a MEZ or a restricted
volume to protect friendly aircraft.
2-88. The entire MEZ is a restricted volume attribute (RVA). ACM run
through the RVA providing minimum risk to friendly aircraft and missiles.
TAB 72—GENERAL PURPOSE MAPS ENTRY

2-89. Tab 72 General Purpose Maps is a 20-page tab and is available during
ICC initialization and TAC OPS. Tab 72 is identical at the ICC and ECS.
Tab 72 provides the operator with the capability to create and display general
information lines, general purpose maps, general points, or other general
areas of interest. Tab 72 is shown in Figure 2-15.
GENERAL PURPOSE MAPS ENTRY PG nn OF 20 PGS *72*
(cccc) = IDENTITY BOUNDARY/LINE/CENTER PTS

(n) = MS1 DISPLAY; 1=ON, 0=OFF (nn)=
(n) = MS3 DISPLAY; 1=ON, 0=OFF SELECT PG
(nn.n) KM = RADIUS
(n) = LINE 1=YES, 0=NO
(n) = COORDINATE FORMAT ccccc)=
0=UTM, 2=LAT,LON SELECT ID
1=MGRS, 3=GEOREF
ENTER TAB SETS FORMAT
• General information lines can be used to display a forward support

coordination line (FSCL), forward edge battle area (FEBA), forward
line of own troops (FLOT), IFF off line, or a country/political
boundary, et cetera.
• Entering only one coordinate point creates a general point. An area
of interest is used for general information and can be created by
entering three or more coordinate points. All general purpose maps
are for display purposes only.
• Tab 72 input can be in any four coordinate formats: universal
transverse macerator (UTM), military grid reference system (MGRS),
latitude/longitude (LAT/LONG), or world GEOREF. Coordinated data
points can be entered either by data field entry or cursor hooking
point. General purpose maps can be downloaded to the tactical data
base via data base transfer.
2-90. Patriot did not have the capability to display general purpose maps
such as borders and joint operation boundaries. Previously, narrow SPCs
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FM 3-01.87
were used to mark boundaries that are not required for tactical operations.
This wastes points and computer processing time and is an improper use of
volume entries of Tab 71, All Volumes and Point Entry. General mapping
capability is considered necessary to add situational awareness for AD
operations and is used as such by all AD units. For example, based upon the
location and subsequent deployments, a Patriot battalion could have coverage
into an adjacent area operating with different identification and engagement
constraints. With boundaries available as display only information, the
operator could more accurately apply the published tactical directives.
General purpose mapping displays enhance the operator's familiarization
with an area and prove very useful in unfamiliar theaters of operation.
2-91. General purpose mapping gives the system the capability both at the
ICC and ECS to identify for display any line, point, or area to be used for
general operator information but not used in EO processing. The volumes and
points identified in Tab 71 are not affected by this capability. The display
definition contains entry of UTM, GEOREF, LAT-LONG, or MGRS
coordinates, and identity (free form) and entries by cursor placement. The
capability allows definition of twenty individual displays and is available
during initialization and tactical operations. Data buffer transfer from the
ICC to the ECS is provided. Displayed points and lines are in low brightness
so as to be distinct from other displays.
2-92. Tab 72, General Purpose Maps Entry, allows the operator to define,
control, and display general purpose maps. The tab is available in both
initialization and tactical operations. A free-form identity operator entry is
provided for the purpose of naming the map. Data entry of up to eight
coordinate points is provided by keyboard entry or cursor placement and
hooking via Tab 72. Special case items and general point (ICC, CRG, FSCL)
are entered in Tab 72. The MASK TERR/MAPS S/I at the ECS expands the
function for selecting general maps. The Gen Points S/I at the ICC must be
selected to display general points entered in Tab 72. If Tab 72 is selected
during tactical operations, the console at which it is displayed is removed
from EO due to the secondary use of the hook keys.
TAB 73—KAA 63 TABLE

2-93. One source of Mode 1 and Mode 3 SIF codes is the KAA-63 code tables.
Tab 73 is used to enter Mode 1 and Mode 3 KAA-63 codes, on four pages. Two
sets (tables 3 and 4) of Modes 1 and 3 data can be inputted for different
48 half-hour intervals.
2-94. Tab 73 has a capacity of 48 Mode 1 codes and 48 Mode 3 codes per
table/set. Both present and future sets may consist of either Table 3 or Table
4. Normally, odd day codes are entered in Table 3, while even day codes are
entered in Table 4. After code changeover time, the following day's codes are
entered in the superseded table. Entering zeros in the first data field can
clear the entire table. At least one set of codes is required, based on the SIF
table selection (Table 3 or 4), in Tab 6. It is advisable to have the future set of
codes available in the data base in case the present set is compromised. Tab
73 format is shown in Figure 2-16.
2-23
FM 3-01.87
KAA-63 TABLE-AM TABLE PAGE 1 * OF 2* *73*

TIME M1 M3 TIME M1 M3 TIME M1 M3 TIME M1 M3
0000 ( ) ( ) 0030 ( ) ( ) 0100 ( ) ( ) 0130 ( ) ( )
0200 ( ) ( ) 0230 ( ) ( ) 0300 ( ) ( ) 0330 ( ) ( )
0400 ( ) ( ) 0430 ( ) ( ) 0500 ( ) ( ) 0530 ( ) ( )
0600 ( ) ( ) 0630 ( ) ( ) 0700 ( ) ( ) 0730 ( ) ( )
0800 ( ) ( ) 0830 ( ) ( ) 0900 ( ) ( ) 0930 ( ) ( )
1000 ( ) ( ) 1030 ( ) ( ) 1100 ( ) ( ) 1130 ( ) ( )
KAA-63 TABLE-PM TABLE PAGE 2 * OF 2* *73*

TIME M1 M3 TIME M1 M3 TIME M1 M3 TIME M1 M3
1200 ( ) ( ) 1230 ( ) ( ) 1300 ( ) ( ) 1300 ( ) ( )
1400 ( ) ( ) 1430 ( ) ( ) 1500 ( ) ( ) 1530 ( ) ( )
1600 ( ) ( ) 1630 ( ) ( ) 1700 ( ) ( ) 1730 ( ) ( )
1800 ( ) ( ) 1830 ( ) ( ) 1900 ( ) ( ) 1930 ( ) ( )
2000 ( ) ( ) 2030 ( ) ( ) 2100 ( ) ( ) 2130 ( ) ( )
2200 ( ) ( ) 2230 ( ) ( ) 2300 ( ) ( ) 2330 ( ) ( )
Figure 2-16. Screen Display of Tab 73-KAA 63 Table, Pages 1 and 2
2-95. Mode 1 and 3 code entries are octal (base 8) numbers. The software
accepts all KAA-63 octal entries as legal entries. Codes must be carefully
checked after each entry in the tab.
2-96. Tab 73 is available for data entry during initialization and TAC OPS at
the ICC. A buffer transfer is required to transmit Tab 73 KAA-63 codes to the
Patriot batteries. KAA-63 SIF codes are handled as communication security
(COMSEC) information as specified in the unit's standing operating
procedures (SOPs).
TAB 74—COMPASS ROSE TABLES

2-97. Another source of Mode 1 and Mode 3 SIF codes are the compass rose
tables. Compass rose tables provide a means to correlate Modes 1 and 3 SIF
with aircraft headings. Tab 74 is used to enter Modes 1 and 3 compass rose
codes. Compass rose codes are changed in friendly aircraft based on the flight
path heading. Two tables numbered 1 and 2, of Modes 1 and 3 data can be
inputted for 9 heading categories. Tab 74, initialization data entries are
shown in Figure 2-17.
COMPASS ROSE TABLES MODE1 MODE3 MODE1 MODE3 *74*
HEADING: 0-45 TABLE 1:( ) ( ) TABLE 2:( ) ( )
45-90 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
90-135 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
135-180 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
180-225 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
225-270 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
270-315 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
315-360 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
ORBIT ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Figure 2-17. Screen Display of Tab 74, Compass Rose Tables
2-24
FM 3-01.87
2-98. Each table can be used as either the present or future code set. At least
one table per set of codes is required, based on the SIF table selection (Table
1 or Table 2), in Tab 6. It is advisable to have the future set of codes entered
in case the set currently in use is compromised. Tab 74 is available for data
entry during initialization and during TAC OPS at the ICC. Compass rose
IFF codes are handled as COMSEC information, as specified in the unit
standing operating procedure (SOP). Compass rose SIF correlation technique
and Tab 74 are seldom used.
TAB 76—COUNTER-ARM THREAT PARAMETERS

2-99. Tab 76 (Figure 2-18) supports the system capability to identify and
counter antiradiation missiles (ARMs). Tab 76 is the same at the ICC and
ECS. An ARM is an air-to-surface missile (ASM) which is launched from an
aircraft known as an ARM carrier (ARMC). System default values should be
used unless directed by the battalion S3 of higher echelon. Tab 76 is
automatically or manually sequenced during initialization and TAC OPS. See
Chapter 3 for tactics to counter ARMs. The following explains the ARM
threat parameters for classification and countermeasures using Tab 76:
• Page A of Tab 76 allows entry of ARM classification parameters to
identify an ARM. ARM classification parameter identifies flight
characteristics that the system will associate with an ARM missile.
When all of these parameters are met by a track, the system will
classify it as an ARM.
• Page B of Tab 76 allows for entry of ARM countermeasures. Any
counter antiradiation missile (CARM) measures that are authorized
on this page will be automatically activated when the operator at the
ECS enables the CARM S/I.
• Normally, low power is authorized when ARM attacks are imminent
or in progress and the ABT/TBM threat is minimal. However, the TD
needs to balance the benefit of low power reducing the “targetability”
of the Patriot radar set (RS) versus the greater range at which ARMs
can be detected in high power. Reduced search is normally not used.
Frequency diversity is normally authorized. ARM engagement mode
is normally automatic.
COUNTER ARM THREAT PARAMETER PAGE A *76*
MIN MAX ARM CLASSIFICATION PARAMETERS
(nnn) KM = RANGE 0 TO RMAX
(nn) KM = ALTITUDE 0 TO AMHMAX
(nnnn) (nnnn) M/S = SPEED 0 TO 9999
(nn) (nn) DEG = DIVE ANGLE 0 TO 90
(nn) DEG = APPROACH ANGLE 0 TO 90
(nn) SQ. M = TARGET CROSS SECTION 1 TO 99
2-25
FM 3-01.87
COUNTER ARM THREAT PARAMETER PAGE B *76*

ARM COUNTERMEASURES
(n) = LOW POWER 1 = ON 0 = OFF
(n) = REDUCE SEARCH 1 = ON 0 = OFF
(n) = FREQUENCY DIVERSITY 1 = ON 0 = OFF
(a) = ARM ENGAGEMENT MODE A = AUTO M = MANUAL
Figure 2-18. Screen Display of Tab 76, Counter-ARM Threat Parameters
TAB 78—LAUNCH DECISION PARAMETERS

2-100. Tab 78 receives the launch decision parameters. Engagement
threshold parameters provide data for information processing. The system
uses this information to determine which missile to launch for a particular
enemy target. The Tab 78 format is shown in Figure 2-19.
LAUNCH DECISION PARAMETERS *78*
( , )KF = THREAT MODIFIER ALTITUDE THRESHOLD _ . TO HMAX
( ) = MISSILE DEPLETION RULE; 1=BY LS, 0=EVENLY OVER ALL LS
( . )DEG = TARGET TO-MASK ANGLE THRESHOLD 0.0 TO 5.0
( )M/S = MIN SPEED THRESHOLD FOR TBEQ 000 TO 150
MISSILE CUT-OFF THRESHOLDS: THREAT CUT-OFF THRESHOLDS:
( ) = HIGH TBM 00 TO 15 MISSILES ( )=HIGH TBM 1 TO 9
( ) = LOW TBM 00 TO 15 MISSILES ( )=LOW TBM 1 TO 9
( ) = HIGH ABT 00 TO 15 MISSILES ( )=HIGH ABT 1 TO 9
( ) = LOW ABT 00 TO 15 MISSILES ( )=LOW ABT 1 TO 9
( ) = LOW HAWK 0 TO 9 MISSILES
2-101. The threat modifier altitude threshold is used for ICC threat
assessment processing. This setting establishes an altitude threshold used for
the assignment of the high-altitude asset threat category (ATC). With this
setting, tracks reported at an altitude above the threshold will be assigned an
ATC value of 10, which has the effect of placing the target at a lower position
on the to-be-engaged queue (TBEQ). Use of this setting is based on known
threat capabilities and the desire to defer high-altitude engagements based
on the tactical situation. If this is not the case, the track modifier altitude
threshold value should be the maximum Patriot search altitude. The
recommended setting is the maximum altitude of the highest aircraft in an
anticipated attack.
2-102. The missile depletion rule is also set by way of Tab 78. Missiles may be
depleted evenly across all launching stations (LSs) or just one LS at a time.
This parameter applies to Patriot batteries only. There is also a missile
depletion rule setting at the ECS. These settings must be kept consistent
between the ICC and the subordinate Patriot battery. The recommended
setting for this parameter is 1 (depletion by LS) to facilitate reloading.
2-103. The target-to-mask angle threshold parameter applies to Patriot only.
This setting is the angle by which the intercept point must exceed the
elevation angle to the masked region below the intercept point. The intent of
the target-to-mask angle threshold is to provide an early warning to the TD
or TDA that a target is about to enter a masked region. The warning will be
2-26
FM 3-01.87
provided when the target reaches the target-to-mask angle threshold above
the masked terrain elevation angle (see Figure 2-20).
THREAT FLIGHT PATH
TARGET-TO-MASK
ANGLE
1
LNIP 2
LNIP
1 The threat location at time 2 The threat location at time

of masking alert with a of masking alert without a
target-to-mask angle. target-to-mask angle.
Figure 2-20. Target-to-Mask Angle Threshold

2-104. The minimum speed threshold for the TBEQ setting applies to Patriot
batteries if the proper authorization is set through Tab 78. A target will not
be placed on the fire unit TBEQ unless the target speed exceeds the
minimum speed threshold. Value should be above clutter remains.
Recommended value is P4-4 mps. Targets flying slower than this value will
be classified as a slow target.
2-105. Tab 78 format allows missile cutoff and threat cutoff thresholds high
and low for both TBMs and ABTs. Hawk missile cut off threshold low is also
provided. Missile cutoff thresholds for Patriot and Hawk are used together
for ICC engagement processing. Missile cutoff threshold "high" TBM and
ABT indicates the number of ready missiles at which the ICC will begin to
prioritize missiles by only allowing FUs to automatically fire at high priority
threats. For example, if the high missile cutoff threshold for TBM and ABT
setting is 15, when the number of ready rounds is 15 or less, then
subordinate FUs will be commanded to engage threats having high ATC
values. This processing continues until the low missile cutoff threshold is
reached. At this point, ECSs are automatically commanded to engage threats
having ATC values above the low threshold threat cutoff value setting. The
recommended value for high missile cutoff is half the number of ready
missiles authorized at the Patriot batteries, 15 missiles. The low missile
cutoff recommended value is one-fourth the number of ready missiles, 8
missiles. Recommended value for Hawk is 6 for a platoon, 9 for a battery.
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FM 3-01.87
2-106. High threat cutoff threshold for TBM and ABT indicates the ATC of
targets that may be engaged when the high missile cutoff threshold has been
reached. For example, if the high threat cutoff threshold for TBM and ABT is
3, then subordinate fire units will be ordered to engage threats having ATC
values of 1 or 2. This processing continues until the low missile cutoff
threshold is reached. At this point, ECSs are ordered automatically, to
engage threats having ATC values above the low-threshold cutoff value
setting.
2-107. The recommended value for high threat cutoff for TBM and ABT is set
to protect all assets and defended areas equal to asset priority. ICC
engagement processing uses these parameters based on the engagement
mode. In the automatic engagement mode, the ICC will not send automatic
engage commands to ECSs unless these conditions are met. The TD or TDA
must initiate engagements if lower ATC threats are to be engaged. When
conducting an engagement in the semiautomatic engagement mode, the TD
or TDA is alerted (with a low missile alert) that the missile cutoff threshold
has been exceeded. Recommended high threshold is 8. Recommended low
threshold is 2.
TAB 79—IDENTIFICATION PARAMETERS

2-108. The safe corridor alignment interval setting is used to correlate tracks
within the safe passage corridor (SPC) for ID processing (see Figure 2-21). As
a track enters each segment of an SPC, the track receives a certain amount of
time to align to the corridor and be recognized (correlated). This period is
defined as the safe corridor alignment interval. If the heading of the track
comes within a certain tolerance of the corridor centerline azimuth and the
track is flying in the proper direction defined for the SPC, then the safe
corridor alignment interval applies. If the track meets the corridor's tolerance
within the specified alignment interval, then the track ID score is updated for
SPC correlation. The TD or TDA defines safe passage corridor tolerances and
directions in Tab 71. While the default value for the safe corridor alignment
interval is 20 seconds, the recommended value is 35 seconds. This value can
be adjusted and set based on the known capabilities and previous actions of
friendly aircraft in the operations area.
IDENTIFICATION PARAMETERS *79*
( )S =SAFE CORRIDOR ALIGN, INTERVAL 00 TO 99
( )KF =MIN SAFE VEL ALT THRESHOLD cn.n TO HMAX
( )KTS =MIN SAFE VELOCITY 000 TO nnn
( )KF =POP-UP ALTITUDE THRESHOLD cn.n TO nn.n
( )KF =POP-UP MAXIMUM RANGE EXTENT 000 TO nnn
( )KTS=MAX VEL BELOW POP ALT THRESH 0000 TO nnnn
( )KTS=POP-UP MAX VELOCITY THRESHOLD 0000 TO nnnn
2-109. Patriot battery software can recommend or assign a hostile identity to
a pop-up target. In the manual ID mode, the software provides ID
recommendations to the operator. A pop-up target is a low-altitude, relatively
fast or a very fast track at any altitude within a specified range. Altitude
range and speed thresholds used to classify tracks as pop-up targets are
2-28
FM 3-01.87
contained in Tab 79. Tab 79 sets firing platoon identification parameters and
shows target velocity thresholds.
2-110. Tracks located between the FU location and the PID/IFPID on-lines
are evaluated for pop-up criteria (if an IFPID is defined, assigned, and
activated through Tabs 71 and 5). Note that tracks located in a friendly origin
volume are exempt from the pop-up evaluation, and classification of a track
as a pop-up will have a permanent effect upon the ID score of the track. The
criteria for a Pop-up may be authorized in both forward and rear areas, but is
normally not authorized to Patriot batteries when friendly air forces have air
superiority because friendly tracks will receive the negative identifier. The
tactical director (TD) must use the aerial intelligence preparation of the
battlefield (IPB) and coordinate with the S2 during planning. The TD
recommends pop-up criteria to the S3/battalion commander based on mission,
enemy, terrain, troops, time, and civilian considerations (METT-TC) and
observation, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of
approach (OCOKA).
2-111. Minimum safe velocity (MSV) authorizes Patriot batteries to use the
MSV criteria in the ID weight set. MSV classification is applied to low- and
slow-flying tracks. Tab 79 contains altitude and speed thresholds used to
apply the MSV criteria. If a PIDON/IFPID has been established in the data
base, minimum safe velocity evaluation is used on targets between the
PIDON/IFPID and the Patriot battery location. If the PIDON/IFPID has not
been defined, then MSV evaluation is performed on all tracks. The MSV
classification temporarily affects the track ID score, and MSV ID scoring is
performed only when the track remains below the MSV threshold. In the
automatic ID mode, ID assignment is made using the MSV criteria (if
authorized), while an ID recommendation is provided in the manual ID mode
using MSV. The MSV authorization should normally be considered for use by
Patriot batteries in both the forward and rear operations areas. Usually, safe
velocities and altitudes are identified in the ACO or special instructions
(SPINS).
2-112. The slow target engagement authorization allows Patriot batteries to
engage tracks classified as slow targets. The minimum speed used for the
slow target classification is defined in Tab 78 as the minimum speed
threshold for TBEQ. Slow target engagements should not normally be
authorized, as this helps to keep the TBEQ clear at the ECS. Slow target
engagements should be authorized if helicopter attacks or enemy airmobile
operations are anticipated. Slow target engagements should specifically not
be authorized if friendly helicopter forces are operating in the Patriot
coverage area.
DEPLOYMENT/COMMAND PLANNING
2-113. The deployment planning Tab 50 (see Figure 2-3) will appear for the
second time during initialization. The TD/TDA should select
DEPLOYMENT/COMMAND PLANNING for the initialization mode.
TAB 51—DEPLOYMENT/COMMAND PLANNING CONTROL
2-29
FM 3-01.87
2-114. Tab 51, DEPLOYMENT/COMMAND PLANNING CONTROL, allows

selection of the current deployment data (active deployment) and provides
access to initialization tabs organized by different deployment functions.
DEPLOYMENT, PLANNING MODE, and DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION
selections in Tab 51 are shown in Figure 2-22. Select new plan reallocation
planning mode and COMM DATA BASE deployment function.
DEPLOYMENT/COMMAND PLANNING CONTROL *51*

( ) =PLANNING MODE ( ) =DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION
1 =NEW PLAN/REALLOCATION 1 =ASSETS MODIFICATION
2 =CHANGE PLAN 2 =VOLUME MODIFICATION
3 =REVIEW PLAN 3 =COMM DATABASE
4 =FP DEPLOYMENT
5 =ASSETS ALLOCATION
6 =VOLUME ALLOCATION
7 =ALTERNATE SECTORS
8 =ICC/CRG DEPLOYMENT
0 =DEPLOYMENT INPUT COMPLETE
Figure 2-22. Screen Display of Tab 51, Deployment and Command Planning Control
2-115. Tabs 67 and 68 are only available in initialization. Tab 69 is available
in initialization or in TAC OPS through the COMMAND PLAN mode.
Selection of the active deployment data can be made when changes are
required or can be made to the active deployment data by way of BATI. The
number of pages for each tab is also indicated. Track reporting filter
information is provided for Hawk FUs and extra-battalion units. The
initialization data parameters required supporting the ICC, subordinate fire
units, and extra-battalion units are covered next. Net loading considerations,
direct links and direct link relay requirements, and communications
initialization data changes are addressed separately thereafter. Tab 2
appears next; however, no entries are required at this time. Figure 2-23
outlines the communication initialization requirements.
2-30
FM 3-01.87
Tab 67 — ICC Communications
• ICC / Bn Designator Letter

• RLRIU Address Set Number
• ATDL-1 1st/2nd Address
• TADIL A/B/J Bn Address, Upper and Lower Track Numbers
• RRT Ports 1-4 Configuration
• Direct Link Relay Number
• Direct Relay Type
Tab 68 — Fire Unit Communications
• FP Type (Patriot / Hawk) Deployment

• Hawk ATDL -1 Address Number
• Link Station Defaults
• Link Station Modem to “1”
• Hawk FP Altitude
• Track ID Reported to Hawk FP Track identification
• Hawk FP Maximum Range Limit / Sector Bounds reporting and output filter
• Altitude Track Reporting Limits controls designated tracks
Up to 12 pages for a maximum of 12 Fire Units reported from the ICC to the
defined units.
Tab 69 — Extra-Battalion Communications
Control and Track Filter
PAGE A PAGE B
• Communications • Track Filter Control
• Unit Type ID Code - Address • Special Information Reporting
• Unit Type • Track Heading Limits
• Link Address - Non-PADIL • Non-Patriot Tracks
• Link Station with Modem • Track Position Limits
• Link Station without Modem
• Direct Link Number
• Direct Link Relay Indicator
Up to 9 A/B Page combinations for a maximum of 9 Extra-BnCombinations
Figure 2-23. Communication Initialization Requirements
BATTALION COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL DATA ENTRY

2-116. ICC communications control data is entered through Tab 67 (Figure 2-
24) that sets up data communications for the ICC itself. The battalion letter
designation tells the software which routing logic radio interface unit
(RLRIU) address to use (subordinate Patriot batteries must know this letter
for entry on the FU version of Tab 68.). The RLRIU address designates the
ICC as part of the Patriot data communications network, and allows the ICC
to accept messages addressed for the battalion.
2-31
FM 3-01.87
BATTALION COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL DATA ENTRY *67*

( ) =BN ID/SOURCE S/I:A-F PLANNED DEPLOYMENT NET LOAD= PERCENT
( ) =RLRIU ADRS SET NO:1,2 =BN RLRIU ADRS ( )=BTOC: 0=NO,1=YES
( )/( )=1ST/2ND ATDL-1 ADRS UNIT ADRS UNIT ADRS UNIT ADRS
FP 1 FP 7 CRG 1
TDL-A TDL-B TDL-J FP 2 FP 8 CRG 2
BN ADRS = ( ) ( ) ( ) FP 3 FP 9 CRG 3
LOWER TRK= ( ) ( ) FP 4 FP 10 CRG-4
UPPER TRK= ( ) ( ) FP 5 FP 11 CRG-5
RRT PORTS:A/S:1( ) 2( ) 3( ) 4( ) FP 6 FP 12 CRG-6
( )=DIRECT LINK RELAY NO. 1-5 ( )=RELAY TYPE:0=UP/DOWN, 1=LATERAL
2-117. Each ICC must have a unique letter designation, A through F,
accommodating up to six Patriot ICCs that can be part of any ultrahigh
frequency (UHF) distributed data network. The lowest-lettered battalion (A)
is assigned to be the TOD master for the network.
2-118. Within the battalion net, the TOD master is the lowest-numbered
Patriot battery on line when the ICC initializes communications. The RLRIU
address set selection (1 or 2) is used for communications to other ICC
networks (master, subordinate, and lateral Patriot ICCs). This allows the
software to differentiate between ICCs when direct link relays are used
between ICCs. RLRIU addresses set requirements for direct links and direct
link relays discussed below.
2-119. Army Tactical Data Link-1 (ATDL-1) addresses allow the ICC to
communicate with units using the ATDL-1 protocol, especially Hawk units.
(Subordinate Hawk FUs must know the first ATDL-1 address for data
communications to the ICC.) It requires two addresses to accommodate the
maximum number of reported tracks. The Tactical Digital Information Link
A, B, and J for a battalion address allows the ICC to communicate to extra-
battalion units using the TADIL A, B, and J protocol, especially auxiliary
units. TADIL- A, B, and J requires lower and upper track number entries in
order for the software to establish a block of TADIL A, B, and J track
numbers for use by the ICC. There should be a minimum of 634 (decimal)
between upper and lower track numbers. The direct link relay number and
relay type are used to designate the ICC as a direct link relay, and to
automatically pass messages between two other Patriot battalions.
Requirements for direct links and relays are covered later in this chapter and
in Chapter 5. The RRT port configurations are designated either as
asynchronous for an internal clock, or as synchronous, to be used as an
external clock source.
2-120. Tab 67 entries must be coordinated with all units communicating with
the ICC. Both communications control data (data link addresses) and track
reporting parameters (geographic location and ID filter settings) must be
identified as part of the communications plan, and disseminated. Tab 67,
software data communications requirements, must be addressed in
conjunction with communications hardware requirements (patching,
communications routing list [CRL], antenna azimuths, frequencies, and so
forth) as parts of the overall communications plan.
TAB 68—FP COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL + HAWK FP TRACK FILTER
2-32
FM 3-01.87
2-121. Tab 68 enters FU communications control and track reporting

requirements. Each page of Tab 68 is used for entry of communications data
for an individual fire unit subordinate to the ICC. Figure 2-25 shows the
format for Tab 68.
FP COMM CONTROL + HAWK FP TRACK FILTER PAGE 1 *68*
=DEPLOYMENT NUMBER PLANNED DEPLOYMENT NET LOADING= PERCENT
( )=FP TYPE: 1=PATRIOT, 2=HAWK-2, 3=HAWK-3
=HAWK ATDL-1 ADDRESS
ALL ENTRIES BELOW APPLY TO HAWK FPS ONLY:
( )=LINK STATION: 1 THRU 6=CRG NUMBER, 7=ICC
( )=LINK STATION MODEM NUMBER: 1 THRU 5
( ) =HAWK FP ALTITUDE
( , , ) =TRACK ID REPORTED TO HAWK UNITS:U=UNKNOWN,H=HOSTILE,F=FRIEND
( )KM=HAWK FP MAXIMUM RANGE LIMIT FILTER/SECTOR BOUNDS
( , ) TO ( , ) =MIN/MAX ALTITUDE ABV MSL TRACK REPORTING LIMITS
2-122. Unit designation via Tab 68 sets up the system software for data
communications to these FUs. If an FU is defined for communications in
Tab 68, then enter the fire unit location in Tab 59. There is a maximum of
12 FUs, and up to six of these may be Patriot fire units. The page number
used to define the fire unit designates the FU number. Patriot batteries are
designated by only one entry, the unit type. The other entries in Tab 68 are
used to set up Hawk FU data communications. The Hawk ATDL-1 address is
displayed by the software based on the numbers of Hawk FUs and/or page of
the tab. The link station entry informs the software of the modem location
used for the Hawk FU. Modems working together with the Hawk ATDL-1 are
connected to an RLRIU that can be located at a CRG or within the ICC itself.
This entry allows the software to affiliate a modem with a Patriot specific
RLRIU address for communications on the network. The number of the
modems working together with Hawk ATDL-1 link must also be known by
the software to establish connection to the RLRIU within the link station.
2-123. Tab 68 provides a track reporting filter capability that applies to
Hawk FUs. These settings are used when it is desired to filter tracks
reported from the ICC to the Hawk fire unit. Track reports may be filtered or
limited based on—
• Track position and altitude. This geometric filter limits tracks
reported by track position and altitude.
• Area definition. Tab 68 allows definition of the size of the area in
which the tracks will be reported to the Hawk FU. Recommended size
is 60 km. The altitude of reported tracks may also be limited by the
minimum and maximum altitude entries. Tracks with reported
altitude outside the band defined by the minimum and maximum
altitude entries will not be reported to the Hawk FU. Altitudes above
mean sea level (MSL) are required. Minimum altitude should
correlate to lowest surface level. Maximum altitude is METT-TC
dependent but normally allows Hawk to focus on the threat it is
capable of defeating, the low- to medium-range. Recommended value
is 10 kf. If a high altitude threat exists, this value should be 45 kf.
Entry of the Hawk FU emplacement altitude in Tab 68 is also
required to support filtering by target altitude.
2-33
FM 3-01.87
• Track identification. IDs may be designated in Tab 68 for the Hawk

track reporting filter. Entry of specific track IDs (unknown, hostile, or
friend) designate the identification of tracks reported to the Hawk
FU. If an ID designation letter is not filled into Tab 68, that track ID
designation will not be reported to the ICC. All three IDs should be
passed to Hawk.
• Communications control data. The data must be part of the
communications plan and coordinated with subordinate fire units.
Track reporting filter information must also be coordinated with
subordinate Hawk FUs because these settings place limitations on
the remote tracks observed at the Hawk FUs. Remote track reporting
to Hawk from the ICC must be sufficient to provide Hawk early
warning and awareness of the overall tactical situation outside Hawk
radar range.
TAB 69—EXTRA-BN COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL + TRACK FILTER

2-124. Tab 69, page A, is used for extra-battalion unit communications
control and track reporting filter entries. Figure 2-26 shows an example.
EXTRA-BN COMM CNTRL DATA + TRACK FILTER PAGE nA *69*

PLANNED DEPLOYMENT NET LOADING= nnn PERCENT
(ac)=UNIT ID CODE/ADDRESS S/I (zzheeeennnnn)=UTM COMM LOCTN

(nn)=UNIT TYPE: 2=MICC 5=TSQ73 7=AUX/TDL-B 10=HEU/TDL-A UNIT ID
0-HEU/ATDL-1 3=LICC 6=GEHOC 8=HUX/TDL-A 11=HEU/TDL-J CODES:
1-HEU/TDL-B 4=SICC 9=AUX/TDL-J 12=AUX/PADIL HEU=HE
(ccc)=LINK ADDRESS: NON-PADIL LINKS ONLY BN A-F=
(n)=LINK STA W/MODEM:1-6=CRG NO.,7=ICC BA-BF
(n)=LINK STA MODEM NO.:1 THRU 5 1=HI,0=LO AUX1-3=
(n)=LINK STA W/O MODEM:1=ICC ONLY,2=OTHER A1-A3
(n)=DIRECT LINK NUMBER:1 THRU 5 ( )=DIRECT LINK RELAYED 1=YES, 0=NO
Figure 2-26. Screen Display of Tab 69, Page A
2-125. Track reporting to the extra-battalion unit defined in Page A can be
limited in the following areas:
• Special information reporting.
• Track heading, altitude, and position limits.
• Planned deployment net loading.
• Non-Patriot track information.
2-126. The unit ID code or address S/I entry is used in conjunction with the
unit type entry to define the extra-battalion element. The software will
recognize the extra-battalion element and then allow data communications.
Extra-battalions communications may be defined using ID codes and unit
type entries to identify the unit.
Extra-Battalion Communications Control
2-127. Tab 69 accommodates a maximum number of nine extra-battalion
units for ICC. The link address entry tells the software the link address
(ATDL or TADIL) of the defined unit (unless a Patriot MICC, SICC, or lateral
ICC [LICC] has been defined by the ID code and unit type entries). The
format of the address must be compatible with the protocol of the defined
unit type (the unit type entry is used to define the protocol used, while the ID
2-34
FM 3-01.87
code address S/I entry sets up the address switch on the console). Non-Patriot
units (not an MICC, SICC, or LICC) require a link station with modem data
entry because the RLRIU location interfacing the modem must be known.
The modem number also must be initialized. Requirements for non-Patriot
units with modems are essentially the same as Hawk FUs (as previously
discussed for Tab 68). Operators should note that Patriot units work together
directly with the routing logic radio interface units (RLRIUs) that comprises
the distributed data network. Patriot units use the Patriot air defense
information language (PADIL) protocol. Non-Patriot units, which use ATDL-
1 or TADIL-B protocols must be connected to a modem that is connected to
the link station RLRIU. The RLRIU converts the ATDL-1 or TADIL-B
protocol to PADIL for transmission to other Patriot RLRIUs on the network.
The use of modems for Hawk FUs and ATDL-1 or TADIL-B extra-battalion
units must be carefully planned because there are a finite number of modems
for network interfaces. There are five modems at a CRG and six at an ICC
(five usable). Additional four modems are installed in the ICC to support
SMU operations. The link station without the modem entry in Tab 69
indicates where the defined extra-battalion unit directs link entry to the
network. The direct link number identifies the RLRIU address used by the
RLRIU to support the direct link. The direct link relayed entry is required to
establish the direct link, as a direct link relay will be discussed later. Tab 69
entries for TADIL-A and TADIL-J links are only available with U.S. and
NATO Patriot systems upgraded with Configuration-2, PDB-4, and
communications Phase I modification.
2-128. A capability at the ICC allows for higher echelon (HE) to provide
target ID information through the Tactical Command System (TCS). The
current auxiliary (AUX) ports can be initialized as AUX-PADIL links to
receive HE data. The data is received at the TCS and is translated to Patriot
PADIL language and sent to the ICC through CP8.
Extra-Battalion Unit Track Filter
2-129. Page B, Tab 69 defines the extra-battalion unit track filter settings.
There is a corresponding page B of Tab 69 for each extra-battalion unit
defined in page A (Figure 2-26). Page B format is shown in Figure 2-27.
EXTRA-BN TRACK FILTER CONTROL PAGE B *69*
ac =UNIT ID CODE/SOURCE ADDRESS S/I
(n)=SPECIAL INFORMATION REPORTING ALLOWED: 1=YES, 0=NO UNIT ID
(nnn)D TO (nnn)D=TRACK HEADING REPORTING LIMITS CODES
(nn.n) TO (nn.n) =TRK ALTITUDE REPORTING LIMITS HEU=HE
NON-PATRIOT TRACK ***TRACK POSITION LIMITS**** BN A-F=
ID PRI AMPS REPORTING AOI INPUT BA-BF
(aa)(aa)(aa)(aa) UTM CTR =(zzheeeennnnn) (zzheeeennnn) AUX1-3=
(aa)(aa)(aa)(aa) E-W EXTENT=(nnn)KM (nnn)KM A1-A3
(aa)(aa) (aa) N-S EXTENT=(nnn)KM (nnn)KM
(aa)*SPACES DELETE* ALL LINKS TDL-A+J ONLY
Figure 2-27. Screen Display of Tab 69, Page B, Extra-BN Track Filter
2-130. Special information reporting should not be transmitted to the
extra-battalion unit unless the unit has a legitimate use or need for this
information. Since the Patriot system has a unique ID process, it may be
advisable to filter out certain primary identity amplification (PRI ID AMP) to
avoid confusion on some non-Patriot data links. Otherwise, track filtering
2-35
FM 3-01.87
should be implemented only when link saturation is anticipated due to heavy

track load. Under link saturation conditions, filtering by position and ID
should be considered first.
2-131. The track heading limits settings should only be used when the
tactical situation dictates based on unit location in relation to the anticipated
threat. Track heading limits is a filter criterion that directs the ICC software
to only report tracks with headings between the entered limits. If used,
headings away from the linked unit would be filtered.
2-132. The track altitude limits settings should not be set for Patriot units.
The Patriot ICC can display and order engagements of tracks at all altitudes.
If an altitude filter is to be applied to a subordinate Hawk or German Hawk
operations center (GEHOC), then the maximum altitude limit should be set
to the highest engagement altitude available at the defined extra-battalion
unit. Track altitude limits establish an altitude band for ICC track reporting
to the extra-battalion unit.
2-133. The track position limits should not be applied under normal operating
conditions. If filtering is required to prevent link saturation, then the
Northing and Easting extents should be consistent with overlapping and
adjacent coverage with the extra-battalion unit. This applies to
extra-battalion ICCs and GEHOCs. Filter settings must be coordinated with
extra-battalion units so that a thorough understanding of the air picture is
maintained. Units should note that certain information would not be reported
to them from the ICC. The UTM center, the Easting extent, and the Northing
extent establish the track position filter. These entries establish a
rectangular volume used for track reporting (the extents are the rectangle
height and width from the UTM center). The ICC will not report tracks
outside this volume to the extra-battalion unit. Tracks inside the volume will
be reported, if heading, altitude, or ID does not filter them out.
2-134. Non-Patriot track primary (PRI), identity (ID), and amplification
(AMP) data fields provide special information reporting to the extra-battalion
unit. Special ID information may be reported to the extra-battalion unit
using the entry provided in Tab 69. The ID PRI AMP filters apply to ATDL-1
or TADIL A, B, and J tracks by ID. Tracks with the ID PRI AMPs displayed
in Tab 69 will be reported to the extra-battalion unit. Blanking ID PRI AMPS
on Tab 69 stops the reporting of tracks with the ID to the extra-battalion
unit. Track filter settings do not apply to lateral ICC extra-battalion units
defined in Page A. Communications control parameters required by Tab 69
entry should be part of the communication plan and closely coordinated. The
number and types of extra-battalion units and use of direct links and direct
link relays in the battalion network affect net loading. The signal officer
(SIGO) must ensure that the planned net configuration is feasible. Filter
settings (Table 2-1) for defined extra-battalion units are based on the tactical
situation, type of extra-battalion unit, the extra-battalion unit's need to
know, mission, and known capabilities, and link saturation conditions.
2-36
FM 3-01.87
COMMUNICATIONS NET LOADING

2-135. The system automatically computes deployment net loading and the
results displayed in Tabs 67, 68, and 69. Net loading must be considered
when planning the battalion distributed data network. Net loading should be
kept below 100 percent to ensure reliable data communications are
maintained and to prevent loss of information caused by network
overloading. The command and control section in Chapter 4 covers net
loading. Table 2-1 provides an indication of how units, direct links, and direct
link relays contribute to multirouted net loading. Note: Net loading related to
battalion command and control is also discussed in Chapter 4.
Table 2-1. Net Loading Considerations
COMMUNICATIONS PERCENT
ENTITY LOADING REMARKS
LATERAL DIRECT 14.52 MAXIMUM OF FIVE DIRECT LINKS ALLOWED (WITHOUT ANY
LINKS TYPES OTHER DIRECT LINKS OR RELAYS). LOADING FOR
CRG AND ECS LINK STATION WITHOUT MODEMS ONLY.
DIRECT LINKS TIED TO ICC (NOT ROUTED THROUGH
CRG/ECS) DO NOT LOAD THE NET.
MASTER— 21.79 MAXIMUM OF ONE (THERE IS ONLY ONE MASTER)

>SUBORDINATE ALLOWED. LOADING FOR CRG AND ECS LINK STATION
BATTALION DIRECT WITHOUT MODEMS ONLY. DIRECT LINKS TIED TO ICC (NOT
LINKS ROUTED THROUGH CRG/ECS) DO NOT LOAD THE NET.
LATERAL DIRECT LINK 14.52 MAXIMUM OF ONE DIRECT LINK RELAY ALLOWED.
RELAYS LOADING FOR CRG AND ECS LINK STATION WITHOUT
MODEMS ONLY. DIRECT LINKS TIED TO ICC DO NOT LOAD
THE NET. THE DIRECT LINK RELAY ENTRY IN TAB 67
DETERMINES DIRECTION OF LINK.
MASTER— 21.79 SAME AS ABOVE.

>SUBORDINATE
BATTALION DIRECT
LINK RELAYS
Table 2-1. Net Loading Considerations (Continued)
COMMUNICATIONS PERCENT
ENTITY LOADING REMARKS
OVERHEAD FOR 2.47 COUNTS IF BN HAS ONE OR MORE PATRIOT BATTERIES IN
PATRIOT BATTERY THE NET.
NORMAL BATTALION 2.40 ALWAYS APPLIES.

OVERHEAD
PATRIOT BATTERY 10.17 UP TO SIX PATRIOT BATTERIES DEFINABLE (OUT OF A

MAXIMUM OF 12 FIRE UNITS).
HAWK FIRE UNIT 5.08 UP TO 12 HAWK FIRE UNITS DEFINABLE (OUT OF A TOTAL
OF 12 FIRE UNITS). LOADING FOR CRG LINK STATION
MODEMS ONLY. USE OF MODEMS IN THE ICC DOES NOT
LOAD THE NET.
2-37
FM 3-01.87
ATDL-1/PADIL MODEM 7.26 USE OF PADIL MODEMS REDUCES DATA RATES. LOADING
FOR CRG LINK STATION MODEMS ONLY. USE OF ICC
MODEMS DOES NOT LOAD THE NET.
TADIL-B MODEM 7.70 MAXIMUM OF FOUR TADIL-B UNITS DEFINABLE. LOADING

FOR CRG LINK STATION MODEMS ONLY. USE OF MODEMS
IN THE ICC DOES NOT LOAD THE NET.
INITIALIZATION REQUIREMENTS FOR DIRECT LINKS

2-136. Direct links are initialized in BATI via Tabs 67 and 69 data entries. A
direct link allows the ICC to communicate with another (extra-battalion) ICC
without using a modem. The advantage of using a direct link is the faster
data exchange rate between ICCs. A direct link allows data transfer at the
32 kilobits per second (kbps) data rate, while the data transfer rate with a
modem is 1,200 bits per second, (more information may be transmitted over
the link). There are more exit nodes available for interfacing other ICCs. This
provides the SIGO with more flexibility when configuring the network for
intra-battalion communications.
2-137. The disadvantage of using a direct link is the additional net loading
required by the direct link. Although there are five direct links (numbered
from 1 to 5), the 21.79 percent net loading realistically limits the number of
direct links in use. (Use of a direct link relay must be given a direct link
number. Therefore, direct link relay counts against the maximum number of
five direct links.
2-138. To explain direct link initialization requirements for Tabs 67 and 69
entries, it is necessary to use an example. Figure 2-28 depicts the use of two
different direct links.
DIRECT LINK 5 (Routed through CRG/ECS)

MICC CRG LICC
Bn or Bn
“A” ECS “B”
DIRECT LINK 3 (Direct routed between ICC’s)
SICC
This example network shows a master ICC (BN “with a direct link to a
Bn
“C” subordinate ICC (BN “C”) and another direct link to a lateral ICC
(BN “C”) which is routed through a CR or ECS.
Figure 2-28. Direct Link Initialization
2-38
FM 3-01.87
2-139. Tab 67 entries are required at the three ICCs for communications
control. Table 2-2 shows example data entries for the three ICCs. The
Remarks column of the table contains selections made in Tab 67.
Table 2-2. Tab 67, Entries for Deployment Example
AT AT AT
DATA ENTRY MICC SICC LICC REMARKS
BN ID LTR/SOURCE A C B EXAMPLES ONLY. EACH ICC WITHIN
EACH BN NET MUST HAVE A
DIFFERENT BN LETTER DESIGNATION.
RLRIU ADDRESS SET 1 2 2 ONE IS USED AS AN EXAMPLE ONLY.
NUMBER
DIRECT LINK RELAY NONE NONE NONE NOT REQUIRED—NO DIRECT LINK
NUMBER RELAY.
RELAY TYPE NONE NONE NONE NOT REQUIRED—NO DIRECT LINK
RELAY.
MASTER ICC
2-140. Table 2-3 shows how the MICC defines the SICC and LICC in Tab 69
using the two direct links. The required entries stipulate that the MICC must
know the battalion ID of the other ICCs (entered in Tab 67 at the other ICCs
as shown above). Since direct link 3 is directly connected to the ICC ("ICC
only" entered for link station without modem), this direct link does not
contribute to net loading. Direct link 5, from MICC to LICC, is routed though
a CRG or ECS ("Other" entered for link station without modem), and
therefore raises net loading 21.79 percent in the MICC battalion net.
2-141. Table 2-3 does not contain all Tab 67 required data entries (such as
ATDL-1 and TADIL-B addresses), but depicts only the entries pertaining to
the direct link requirements. Notice that all ICCs are using a different ID
code or battalion letter designation and different RLRIU address sets for each
direct link. The direct link relay and relay type entries are not used for direct
link initialization. (These entries have been shown in Table 2-2 to make this
point.) Required use of these entries for direct link relays is discussed in the
next section.
2-142. Tab 69 must be used to define the direct links during BATI. Each ICC
in the deployment example is required to define the other ICCs as extra-
battalion units in Tab 69. Since the SICC (Battalion C) does not communicate
directly to the LICC (Battalion B), but communicates through the MICC
(Battalion A), only the MICC needs to be defined as an extra-battalion unit
by the SICC. The same requirement applies to the LICC, where only the
MICC has to be defined in Tab 69 at the LICC.
Table 2-3. Tab 69 Entries for Example Deployment—MICC
2-39
FM 3-01.87
FOR FOR
DATA ENTRY SICC MICC OR REMARKS
LICC
UNIT ID BN C BN B THESE ENTRIES MUST AGREE WITH THE BN ID
CODE/ADDRESS S/I DESIGNATIONS ENTERED ON TAB 67 AT THE
OTHER ICC.
UNIT TYPE 4 3 BN C IS DEFINED AS AN SICC EXTRA-BN UNIT AT

(SUBORD (LATERAL THE MICC. BN B IS DEFINED AS AN ADJACENT
ICC) ICC) ICC (ACTUAL TAB FORMAT) OR LATERAL ICC
(LICC).
LINK STATION 1 2 THE SICC LINK STATION WITHOUT MODEM

WITHOUT MODEM (ICC (OTHER) ENTRY IS "ICC ONLY" BECAUSE IT IS DIRECTLY
ONLY) LINKED WITH THE MICC. THE "OTHER" ENTRY IS
USED FOR THE LICC BECAUSE THIS DIRECT LINK
IS ROUTED THROUGH A CRG OR ECS AS
DEPICTED IN THE EXAMPLE DEPLOYMENT.
DIRECT LINK 3 5 ENTRIES DEPICTED IN THE EXAMPLE

NUMBER DEPLOYMENT. THE SICC IS USING DIRECT LINK
NUMBER 3, AND THE LICC IS USING DIRECT LINK
NUMBER 5.
DIRECT LINK 0 0 A DIRECT LINK RELAY IS NOT USED IN THIS

RELAYED (NO) (NO) EXAMPLE. DIRECT LINK RELAYED ENTRIES = NO.
SUBORDINATE ICC
2-143. Table 2-4 shows how the SICC defines the MICC in Tab 69 using
direct link number 3. Table 2-4 also indicates that Tab 69 entries used to
define the MICC at the SICC must correspond to the data entries made at
the MICC itself. By defining the MICC, Battalion C defines itself as an SICC.
Table 2-4. Tab Entries for Example Deployment SICC
2-40
FM 3-01.87
DATA ENTRY FOR MICC REMARKS

UNIT ID CODE/ADDRESS S/I HE THE HE ENTRY IS USED BECAUSE BN A IS AN
MICC IN RESPECT TO BN B
UNIT TYPE 2 (MICC) BN A IS DEFINED AS AN MICC EXTRA-BN
UNIT AT THE RELAY ICC (BN B) WHICH IS AN
SICC
LINK STATION WITHOUT 1 THE LINK STATION WITHOUT MODEM ENTRY
MODEM (ICC ONLY) IS “ICC ONLY” BECAUSE BN B IS DIRECTLY
LINKED WITH THE MICC DEFINED ON TAB 69
(THE “OTHER” ENTRY ONLY IS USED WHEN
THE DEFINED DIRECT LINK IS ROUTED
THROUGH A CRG OR ECS).
DIRECT LINK NUMBER 3 THIS ENTRY AS DEPICTED IN FIGURE 2-28.
THE ICC IS USING DIRECT LINK NUMBER 3,
FOR THE DIRECT LINK TO THE MICC (BN A).
DIRECT LINK RELAYED 0 DIRECT LINK NUMBER 3 TO THE MICC IS NOT
(NO) BEING RELAYED, THEREFORE THE ENTRY IS
NO.
LATERAL ICC
2-144. Corresponding Tab 69 data entries at the LICC are shown in
Table 2-5. In the deployment example, the relationship between the LICC
and the MICC is lateral. Battalion B depicted as the LICC in relation to
Battalion A may be an MICC itself and have direct links to its own
subordinate ICC. The ID code, unit type, and link station must correspond
with the entries made on Tabs 67 and 69 at other units. It should be noted
that initialization entries for Tabs 67 and 69 must corresponded but must be
made from each ICC’s frame of reference.
2-41
FM 3-01.87
Table 2-5. Tab Entries for Example Deployment—LICC
DATA ENTRY FOR MICC REMARKS

UNIT ID BN A THE LICC MUST USE BN A AS A SOURCE
CODE/ADDRESS S/I ADDRESS FOR THE MICC. THE MICC HAS
DEFINED ITSELF AS BN A ON ITS OWN TAB 67.
UNIT TYPE 3 THE LICC DEFINES THE MICC AS ANOTHER LICC
(LATERAL (AS DEPICTED IN THE EXAMPLE DEPLOYMENT).
ICC) FROM THE BN B POINT OF REFERENCE, BN A IS
NOT AN MICC, BUT A LATERAL ICC.
LINK STATION 2 THE LICC (BN B) LINK STATION WITHOUT
WITHOUT A MODEM (OTHER) MODEM ENTRY FOR THE MICC (BN A) IS "OTHER"
BECAUSE DIRECT LINK 5 IS ROUTED THROUGH
A CRG OR ECS. MATCHES BN A TAB 69 ENTRY
SHOWN ABOVE.
DIRECT LINK NUMBER 5 THE LICC IS USING DIRECT LINK NUMBER 5 TO
BN A. THIS ENTRY MUST MATCH THE MICC
ENTRY IN TAB 69 PAGE USED TO DEFINE THE
LICC IN FIGURE 2-29.
DIRECT LINK 0 A DIRECT LINK RELAY IS NOT USED IN THIS
RELAYED (NO) EXAMPLE, DIRECT LINK RELAYED ENTRIES = NO.
2-145. Direct link relays are also initialized in BATI through Tabs 67 and 69
data entries. A direct link allows an ICC to relay data communications with
two other ICCs. The main advantage of using a direct link relay is flexibility
in configuring the UHF network. As with direct linking, direct link relays
contribute to net loading of all three battalions involved in initializing the
direct link relay. Direct link relay must be planned with caution and
considered only when net loading is not critical. There is only one direct link
relay allowed within a battalion UHF net. To explain direct link relay
initialization requirements for Tabs 67 and 69 entries, it is necessary to use
another deployment example. Figure 2-29 depicts the use of a direct link
relay among three ICCs. It shows an SICC acting as a relay unit for another
SICC, which allows communications from the relayed SICC to the MICC.
Notice this configuration requires three separate direct links numbers for the
direct link relay.
2-42
FM 3-01.87
DIRECT LINK 2
(Routed through
CRG / ECS)
DIRECT LINK
RELAY ICC
SICC CRG
Bn B or ECS
DIRECT LINK 1
(Directly routed
between ICCs )
SICC
Bn C
RELAYED ICC MICC

Bn A RELAYED ICC
This example network development shows an SICC (Bn B) acting as a direct llink
relay to relay data communications from another SICC (Bn C) to the MICC (Bn A).
Figure 2-29. Deployment Example Using a Direct Link Relay

2-146. Tab 67 entries are required at the three ICCs for communications
control. Table 2-6 shows data entry examples for the three ICCs. Selection
considerations in Tab 67 are in the Remarks column. It shows that only the
relay ICC has to define the direct link relay in Tab 67. The relay ICC must be
initialized with a different RLRIU address set from the relayed ICC because
the software has to transpose source codes to enable the direct link relay to
function. Source codes are used to address messages to units in conjunction
with the RLRIU address. The direct link relay requires a specific set of source
codes and therefore must use one of the five available direct link numbers. A
direct link relay number entered in Tab 67 establishes the direct link as a
relay in the software. This initialization data entry cannot conflict with the
other direct link numbers used to separately link the relaying ICC to each of
the relayed ICCs. As shown in Table 2-7, all direct link number assignments
must be different, for example—
• The direct link relay number is 3.
• The direct link number of the direct link between Battalion A (MICC)
and Battalion B (the relay SICC) is 1.
• The direct link number of the direct link between Battalion B (the
relay SICC) and Battalion C (the relayed SICC) is 2.
2-147. The only location where the direct link relay number and relay type
entries are made is in Tab 67 of the relay ICC. Tab 67 entry fields pertaining
to direct link relays are not used at the relayed ICCs.
2-43
FM 3-01.87
Table 2-6. Tab 67, Entries for Direct Link Relay
AT AT AT
DATA ENTRY MICC SICC SICC REMARKS
BN ID A B C EXAMPLES ONLY. ICCs WITHIN A
LTR/SOURCE BATTALION NET EACH REQUIRE
ADDRESS S/I DIFFERENT BN LETTER DESIGNATIONS.
RLRIU ADDRESS 1 2 1 THE RELAYING ICC (BN B) MUST USE A
SET NUMBER DIFFERENT RLRIU ADDRESS SET
NUMBER THAN THE RELAYED ICC. THIS
REQUIREMENT PERTAINS ONLY WHEN
DIRECT LINK RELAYS ARE INITIALIZED.
DIRECT LINK NONE 3 NONE ENTRY NOT REQUIRED FOR RELAYED
RELAY NUMBER ICC BUT REQUIRED FOR RELAYING ICC.
THE DIRECT LINK RELAY IS ASSIGNED A
NUMBER AT THE RELAYING UNIT. THIS
NUMBER MUST BE DIFFERENT THAN THE
DIRECT LINK NUMBERS USED BETWEEN
THE RELAY ICC AND EACH RELAYED ICC
ENTERED IN TAB 69.
RELAY TYPE NONE 0 NONE THIS ENTRY IS REQUIRED ONLY IF A
DIRECT LINK RELAY NUMBER IS
(UP/ ENTERED ON TAB 67. THE DIRECTION OF
DOWN) THE DIRECT LINK RELAY IS REQUIRED
FOR USE IN THE NET LOADING
COMPUTATION. SINCE THE DIRECT LINK
RELAY IS GOING FROM MICC TO SICC
THROUGH THE RELAY, THE DIRECTION
IS UP/DOWN. THIS ENTRY IS NOT
REQUIRED AT THE RELAYED ICCs.
2-148. The other direct link numbers are defined on Tab 69. Tab 69
initialization data requirements for the example network deployments are
discussed for each ICC. Tab 69 entries for Battalion B relay ICC, will be
discussed first and are depicted in Table 2-7.
Table 2-7. Tab 67 Entries for a Direct Link Relay—SICC (BN B)
Direct Link Relay entry of 3

Relay Type = 0 for UP/DOWN
2-149. This link is relayed from Battalion A to Battalion C and from

Battalion C to Battalion A through Battalion B. Since Battalion A is an
MICC and Battalion B and Battalion C are both subordinate ICCs (SICCs),
relay type is UP/DOWN.
2-150. Table 2-8 shows the required entries in Tab 69 at Battalion C (the
relayed ICC), via Battalion B with the direct link relay to the MICC
2-44
FM 3-01.87
(Battalion A). The unit ID entry of HE and the unit type entry of 2
establishes Battalion A as the MICC in relation to battalion C, an SICC. The
link station with modem entry of 2 (other) is used here because direct link 2
uses a CRG or ECS to connect the direct link from Battalion C to Battalion B
as shown in deployment example. Direct link 3 between Battalion C and
Battalion A is relayed, requiring a 1 (yes) entry in Tab 69, direct link relayed
field.
Table 2-8. Tab 69, Entries for Direct Link Relay—Relayed SICC
FOR MICC
DATA ENTRY REMARKS
UNIT ID CODE/ADDRESS HE THE HE ENTRY IS USED BECAUSE BN A IS AN
S/I MICC IN RESPECT TO BN C.
UNIT TYPE 2 BN A IS DEFINED AS AN MICC EXTRA-BN UNIT.
(MASTER
ICC)
LINK STATION WITHOUT 0 THE LINK STATION WITHOUT MODEM ENTRY IS
MODEM (OTHER) "OTHER" BECAUSE BN C IS LINKED WITH BN B
THROUGH A CRG OR ECS. SEE FIGURE 2-29.
DIRECT LINK NUMBER 3 THIS IS THE THIRD DIRECT LINK FOR THE UHF
NETWORK
DIRECT LINK RELAYED 1 DIRECT LINK NUMBER 3 TO THE MICC (BN A) IS
(YES) BEING RELAYED THROUGH THE RELAY ICC (BN
B). THEREFORE, THE DIRECT LINK RELAYED
ENTRY IS YES.
2-151. Table 2-9 contains Tab 69 entries for Battalion A. The MICC must
define both SICCs as extra-battalion units in Tab 69. At Battalion A, unit ID
code entries for Battalion B and Battalion C must correspond to the battalion
ID code address S/I entries in Tab 69 at Battalion B and Battalion C. Both
unit type entries are the same (subordinate ICC). For the link station without
modem entries, Battalion B requires an ICC only entry, while Battalion C
requires an "other" entry. (The direct link from Battalion C is routed through
a CRG or ECS as previously discussed.) Direct link number entries (1 and 2
for Battalion B and Battalion C, respectively) correspond to Tab 69 direct link
number entries for the MICC (Battalion A) at both SICCs. Direct link 1 for
Battalion B is designated as not relayed, while direct link 2 is designated as
relayed. Again, these entries correspond with the Tab 69 entries for Battalion
A made at both SICCs. To summarize, configuration of a direct link relay
contributes heavily to net loading. Establishment of the initialization data
parameters in Tabs 67 and 69 for all three ICCs involved with the relay must
be carefully planned and closely coordinated.
2-45
FM 3-01.87
Table 2-9. Tab 69, Entries for Direct Link Relay—Relayed MICC
FOR FOR
DATA ENTRY RELAY RELAYE REMARKS
SICC D
SICC
UNIT ID CODE/ BN B BN C THESE ENTRIES AT THE MICC MUST
ADDRESS S/I CORRESPOND WITH THE TAB 67 SICC
ENTRIES CONTAINED IN TABLE 2-7.
UNIT TYPE 4 4 BN A IS DEFINED AS AN MICC EXTRA-BN UNIT
(SUBORD (SUBORD AT THE RELAY (BN B) WHICH IS AN SICC.
ICC) ICC)
LINK STATION 1 0 THE LINK STATION WITHOUT MODEM ENTRY
WITHOUT (ICC (OTHER) IS "ICC ONLY" FOR BN B BECAUSE BN A IS
MODEM ONLY) LINKED INTO THE RELAY ICC (BN B). THE LINK
STATION WITHOUT MODEM ENTRY IS
"OTHER" FOR BN C BECAUSE BN C IS LINKED
THROUGH A CRG OR ECS INTO THE RELAY
ICC (BN B).
DIRECT LINK 1 3 THE RELAYED MICC IS USING DIRECT LINK
NUMBER NUMBER 3, FOR THE DIRECT LINK TO THE
SICC (BN C) THROUGH THE RELAY ICC, BN B.
THE MICC IS ALSO USING DIRECT LINK
NUMBER 1 TO COMMUNICATE TO BN B.
DIRECT LINK 0 1 DIRECT LINK NUMBER 3 TO THE MICC (BN A)
RELAYED (NO) (YES) IS BEING RELAYED THROUGH THE RELAY ICC
(BN B), THEREFORE THE DIRECT LINK
RELAYED ENTRY IS "YES". DIRECT LINK
NUMBER 1 LINKS THE MICC (BN A) DIRECTLY
TO THE RELAY ICC (BN B). THE DIRECT LINK
RELAYED ENTRY IS "NO" FOR THIS LINK ONLY
(TAB 69).
Battalion Communications Configuration

2-152. Battalion communications configuration control data is input via Tab
2. There are certain constraints on changing communications initialization
data in Tabs 67, 68, and 69. One constraint exists when the active
deployment data set is under consideration. Another constraint involves
active communications control.
TAB 2
2-153. Tab 2 will appear for the second time. Again, no entries are required at
this time.
TAB 51
2-154. Tab 51 (see Figure 2-22) will appear for the second time. Enter FP
DEPLOYMENT for the DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION.
2-46
FM 3-01.87
TAB 59—FP DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT + LOCATION SUMMARY

2-155. Battery locations and orientation data entered in Tab 59 are used by
BATI to allocate assets and volumes. The number of the deployment set
under consideration is displayed on the tab as 1=BN DEPLOYMENT
NUMBER. When Tab 59 is selected, fire unit locations and orientations are
shown on the tactical display as entered on the tab. The format of the first
page of Tab 59 is shown in Figure 2-30.
FP DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT + LOCATION SUMMARY PAGE A *59*
1=BN DEPLOYMENT NUMBER ( )=CURSOR TYPE: 0=PATRIOT 1=HAWK
( )D=TRIAL AZIMUTH =HOOKED TRIAL LOCATION
FP LOCATION –UTM -LATITUDE- -LONGITUDE- PTL STL1 STL2 STL3
1 ( )( : : . , ) ( : : . , )( )( )( )( )
2 ( )( : : . , ) ( : : . , )( )( )( )( )
3 ( )( : : . , ) ( : : . , )( )( )( )( )
4 ( )( : : . , ) ( : : . , )( )( )( )( )
5 ( )( : : . , ) ( : : . , )( )( )( )( )
6 ( )( : : . , ) ( : : . , )( )( )( )( )
Figure 2-30. Tab 59, Page A, FP Deployment Summary
2-156. The cursor type selection determines the type of fire unit (Patriot or
Hawk) and the corresponding symbology displayed. When CURSOR TYPE 0
is selected, the planner is able to move the Patriot FP symbology on the
display in conjunction with the cursor. Data entry of the tabs TRIAL
AZIMUTH and HOOKED TRIAL LOCATION places the symbol on the
display at the desired location and orientation (azimuth). Figures 2-31 and
2-32 depict the Patriot and Hawk fire unit symbology shown on the tactical
display in conjunction and under the control of Tab 59.
PATRIOT (CURSOR TYPE 0)
DISPLAYED SECTOR IS
ROTATABLE BY ENTRY OF
TRIAL AZIMUTH (ENTERED
PTL IS FINAL DISPLAY)
TRACK
SEARCH HAWK
BOUNDARY
BOUNDARY (CURSOR TYPE 1)
(DASHED LINE)
(SOLID LINE)
CURSOR PATRIOT
POSITION BATTERY
nn
DENOTES FP n DESIGNATION
LOCATION NUMBER
Notes:
1. Text and arrow annotations with symbols are
explanatory only and not displayed with the HAWK FIRE SIZE OF SYMBOL
cursor. UNIT = SECTOR
DESIGNATION BOUNDS AS
2.Unit designations (flags and numbers) do not NUMBER ENTERED IN
move with the cursor. TAB 68
3. Not to scale. (DEFAULT
VALUE = 90KM)
Figure 2-31. Hawk and Patriot Symbology via Tab 59
2-47
FM 3-01.87
THIS EXAMPLE COMBINES PATRIOT AND HAWK FP AS DEFINED

ON TAB 59, SHOWING RELATIVE FIRE UNIT AND BATTERY
POSITIONS AND OVERLAPPING COVERAGE
+
SYMBOLOGY (SLAVED TO
CURSOR AT A TRIAL LOCATION
WITH TAB 59 CURSOR TYPE 1
SELECTION {HAWK})
HAWK FP 11
11 SYMBOL RADIUS
8 (SECTOR BOUNDS)
DEFINED BY TAB
59 ENTRY (PAGE B)
“ FINAL” PLANNED HAWK FP8
LOCATION AS ENTERED ON 3 5
PAGE B TAB 59
“FINAL” PLANNED PATRIOT FP5
“FINAL” PLANNED PATRIOT FP3 LOCATION WITH 35-DEGREE PTL AS
LOCATION WITH 0 DEGREE PTL AS ENTERED ON PAGE A TAB 59
ENTERED ON PAGE B TAB 50
NOTES:
1. Text and arrow annotations with symbols are explanatory only and not
displayed with the cursor.
2. Unit designations (flags and numbers) do not move with the cursor.
3. Not to scale.
Figure 2-32. Tab 59 Deployment Example

2-157. Since the symbol is displayed in conjunction with other defined fire
units on the tactical display, relative locations and overlapping coverages are
depicted for selection of the best fire unit or battery TRIAL LOCATION and
TRIAL AZIMUTH. Final data may then be entered in the LOCATION-UTM
FIELD, PTL, and secondary target line (STL) 1 through 3 fields. Primary
target lines (PTLs) and secondary target lines (STLs) do not apply to Hawk
fire units (CURSOR TYPE 1); but as a minimum, PTLs are required entries
for Patriot batteries (CURSOR TYPE 0). Latitude and longitude positions are
displayed in conjunction with UTM position entries and vice versa. FP
locations may be entered in either UTM or latitude and longitude formats
when one is entered; the other will be displayed after the tab is entered.
2-158. Page B of Tab 59 is used only for Hawk fire units (FPs 7 through 12)
and cannot be used to define Patriot batteries. Note that the TRIAL
AZIMUTH field is missing because it is not applicable to Hawk fire units.
The CURSOR TYPE selection is no longer needed on page B. Figure 2-33
provides the format of page B, Tab 59.
2-48
FM 3-01.87
FP DEPLOYMENT SUPPORT + LOCATION SUMMARY PAGE B *59*

=BN DEPLOYMENT NUMBER
=HOOKED TRIAL LOCATION
FP LOCATION –UTM -LATITUDE- -LONGITUDE-
7( ) ( : : . , ) ( : : . , )
8( ) ( : : . , ) ( : : . , )
9( ) ( : : . , ) ( : : . , )
10( ) ( : : . , ) ( : : . , )
11( ) ( : : . , ) ( : : . , )
12( ) ( : : . , ) ( : : . , )
Figure 2-33. Tab 59, Page B, FP Deployment Summary (Hawk FUs)
TAB 51
2-159. Tab 51 (Figure 2-22) will appear for the third time. Enter ASSETS
ALLOCATION for the DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION.
TAB 70
2-160. Tab 70 (Figure 2-11) appears for the second time. Defended assets are
automatically to batteries by BATI. ABT assets must be within a P4-5 kms
area in front of the battery and for TBMs the assets must be within the
highest Pk foot print area. If more than six ABT assets or three TBM assets
are assigned to a battery, the TD/TDA must take action to deactivate excess
assets.
TAB 51
2-161. Tab 51 (see Figure 2-22) appears for the fourth time. Enter VOLUME
ALLOCATION for the DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION.
VOLUMES ALLOCATION
2-162. Volume allocations in Tab 61 (Figure 2-34) are used to activate or
deactivate volumes and points for individual Patriot batteries. (Data entered
for each Patriot FP in Tab 59 is initially used to allocate volumes and points.)
The activity status displayed in Tab 61 next to the volume or point ID reflects
the overall system activity status either A=Active, B=Behind, I=Inactive,
T=Time, *=Time Controlled Volume Revoked by the operator, or blank for the
volume or point. Tab 61 can be used to make the volume or point inactive for
individual FPs if the overall status is active. Volumes and points are
activated when the ID volume is added to the FP’s Tab 61. Spaces between
volumes in Tab 61 indicate the number of units used. For example, a three-
segment corridor will display the volume ID and two blank data fields before
the next volume title is displayed. Tab 61 is available in initialization and in
TAC OPS/CMND PLAN. It reflects activity status changes made in TAC OPS
by Tab 5.
2-49
FM 3-01.87
VOLUMES ALLOCATION PAGE OF 3 FOR FP 61*

OOOOO DELETES VOLUME TOTAL UNITS: DELETE
TOTAL POINTS: DELETE
( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ):
( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ):
( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ):
( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ):
( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ):
( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ):
( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ):
( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ): ( ):
Figure 2-34. Tab 61, Volumes Allocation
2-163. There are three pages of Tab 61 volumes and point's allocation data in
the tactical data base for each FP. There is only one set of volumes and points
in the data base as defined by Tab 71.
2-164. The TD/TDA ensures that the total number of units and points for
each firing battery are correct. Otherwise, excess data must be deleted. Each
battery may have 55 units or 250 points actively assigned before EXCESS
VOLUMES FPn alert appears.
2-165. If alternate search sectors controls are not required, go to paragraph
2-171. If alternate search sector controls are required, go to paragraph 2-167.
TAB 51
2-166. When Tab 51 (Figure 2-22) appears for the fifth time, enter
ALTERNATE SECTORS in the DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION data field.
ALTERNATE SEARCH SECTOR CONTROL Tab 55 will appear.
TAB 55—ALTERNATE SEARCH SECTOR CONTROL (ABT AND TBM)

2-167. The only difference between the ICC and the ECS version of Tab 55
(Figure 2-35) is that the ICC version can accommodate alternate sector
control ABT and TBM entries for up to six Patriot batteries. There are two
pages (ABT and TBM) of Tab 55 data maintained for each Patriot battery at
the ICC. The ICC maintains data for the Patriot batteries in the tactical data
base in up to 10 data sets per side of the EDR/ODS/TSD. This provides the
capability to change Tab 55 data for all Patriot FPs by changing the active
deployment during initialization or during TAC OPS and CMND PLAN (such
as, ON-LINE INITIALIZATION).
2-50
FM 3-01.87
ALTERNATE SEARCH SECTOR CONTROL – ABT FP -PAGE A *55*

SECT 1 SECT 2 =BN DEPLOYMENT NO.
( )D ( )D=DROP FROM LEFT SIDE IN 1 DEG INCREMENTS TO MAX-5DEG
( )D ( )D=DROP FROM RGHT SIDE IN 1 DEG INCREMENTS TO MAX-5DEG
( ) ( ) =DROP LOWER SHORT TO MEDIUM RANGE ROWS TO MAX-1 ROWS
( ) ( ) =DROP UPPER SHORT TO MEDIUM RANGE ROWS TO MAX-1 ROWS
( ) ( ) =DROP LOWER LONG RANGE ROWS TO MAX-3 ROWS
( ) ( ) =DROP UPPER LONG RANGE ROWS TO MAX-3 ROWS
( )( ) ( )( )=DROP SEGMENTS 1=HORIZON 3=LOWER MED 5=LONG RANGE
( )( ) ( )( ) USING 4 FIELDS:2=SHORT-POP 4=UPPER MED A=ALL SEGMENTS
(MAX)KM = DROP LONG RANGE SEARCH (MIN)KM = DROP SHORT RANGE SEARCH
ALTERNATE SEARCH SECTOR CONTROL – ABT FP -PAGE B *55*

=BN DEPLOYMENT NO.
SECT 1 SECT 2
( )D ( )D=DROP FROM LEFT SIDE IN 1DEG INCREMENTS TO MAX-15DEG
( )D ( )D=DROP FROM RGHT SIDE IN 1DEG INCREMENTS TO MAX-15DEG
( ) ( ) =DROP LOWER TBM ROWS 0 TO 8
( ) ( ) =DROP UPPER TBM ROWS 0 TO 14
( ) ( ) =DROP SEGMENTS USING ONE FIELD: 6=LTBM 8=XTBM B=BOTH
Figure 2-35. Tab 55, Alternate Search Sector Control, ABT and TBM
2-168. Tab 55 data is transmitted on the data link to and from Patriot
batteries by data buffer transfer. The TD/TDA may request Tab 55 data from
the Patriot batteries through the BATI receive and compare FP data (RCFD)
process. The TD/TDA may also transfer data to on-line Patriot batteries.
Data buffer transfers from the ICC must be handled with caution. If the ICC
has no ABT and TBM surveillance parameters in the tactical data base
(entered for the battery on TACI in Tab 55), then a data buffers transfer
made from the ICC will wipe out all data entered at the battery. Tab 55
information is derived from the defense design process and considers
emissions control (EMCON).
2-169. Normally, the TD/TDA do not use this tab to reduce the azimuth or
range limits of the ABT search sectors. Dropping long range search may be a
manual saturation alleviation technique. Likewise, the TD/TDA normally
does not reduce the size of the TBM search sectors.
TAB 51
2-169. Tab 51 (Figure 2-22) appears for the sixth time. Enter ICC/CRG
DEPLOYMENT in the DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION data field.
ICC/CRG DEPLOYMENT
2-170. Tab 62 (Figure 2-36) is the ICC and CRG deployment and
communications assignment tab. The ICC location is used to report the
location of the ICC data links. The ICC location in Tab 62 should not be
changed during TAC OPS. Entering HE as a communications link is
especially important since it allows data exchange with higher headquarters
over TADIL-B.
2-51
FM 3-01.87
ICC/CRG DEPLOYMENT + COMMUNICATIONS ASSIGNMENT PAGE A *62*

( ) =DEPLOYMENT NUMBER ( ) =HOOKED TRIAL LOCN UNIT ID CODES:
ICC=IC,BN A-F=BA-BF,CRG1-6=C1-C6,FP 1-12=01-12,HEU=HE,AUX 1-3=A1-A3
UTM LOCATION COMMUNICATIONS LINKS ANTENNA AZIMUTHS
ICC( )( , , , , , , )
CRG1( )( , , , , , , )
CRG2( )( , , , , , , )
CRG3( )( , , , , , , )
CRG4( )( , , , , , , )
CRG5( )( , , , , , , )
CRG6( )( , , , , , , )
ICC/CRG DEPLOYMENT-FP COMMUNICATIONS ASSIGNMENT PAGE B *62*

( ) =DEPLOYMENT NUMBER
COMM ANTENNA COMM ANTENNA UNIT
LINKS AZIMUTHS LINKS AZIMUTHS ID CODES:
FP 1( , , ) FP 7( , ) BN A=BA ICC=IC
FP 2( , , ) FP 8( , ) BN B=BB HEU=HE
FP 3( , , ) FP 9( , ) BN C=BC AUX 1=A1
FP 4( , , ) FP10( , ) BN D=BD AUX 2=A2
FP 5( , , ) FP11( , ) BN E=BE AUX 3=A3
FP 6( , , ) FP12( , ) BN F=BF
Figure 2-36. Tab 62, Pages A and B
2-171. Initialization Tab 62 has features designed to help communications
planning along with data entry for initialization. Tab 62 is available for use
in conjunction with the TACTICAL DISPLAY to help plan the battalion
communications network connectivity. Tab 62 function is similar to Tab 59 in
that data items entered into the tab are processed, and the computed
information is displayed both in the tab and as tactical display symbols. BATI
computes communication links and antenna azimuths from Tab 62 data
entries.
2-172. CRG UTM locations must be entered in Tab 62. Tab 62 entry of the
CRG location lets the ICC know that the CRG routing logic radio interface
unit (RLRIU) exists in the distributed data network. (With a CRG UTM
location entry in Tab 62, the ICC accepts information sent from the CRG
RLRIU address.) The CRG's UTM location is also used for deployment
planning purposes. The CRG's symbol is displayed for planning
communications links and antenna azimuths to the CRG under Tab 62
control. UTM locations and communications entries in Tab 69 are used to
display communications unit locations at the ICC only. This information is
used in conjunction with deployment planning through Tab 62. The display
enables the signal officer (SIGO) to plan links and antenna azimuths for the
communications unit supporting the extra battalion unit defined in Tab 69.
2-173. When a UTM LOCATION data entry is made and Tab 62 is entered,
the communications domain of the unit is shown on the tactical display.
Figure 2-37 shows the communications domain symbols used. FP
2-52
FM 3-01.87
communications domain symbols are also automatically displayed in Tab 59

LOCATION, and Tab 68 firing platoon TYPE entries. Extra-battalion unit
COMM LOCATION data entries made in Tab 69 is also used for
communications planning. Communications domain symbols are
automatically displayed for the extra-battalion units at the communications
exit unit location.
2-174. Planned communications links are established between units by entry

of the UNIT ID CODE within the COMM LINK field. For example, if a
planned communications link is desired between the ICC and CRG 3, C3
would be entered in one of the COMM LINK data entry fields for the ICC.
Entry of Tab 62 would then cause the link to be displayed between the units
on the tactical display. BATI processing would then automatically display the
“ICC” UNIT ID CODE in one of the COMM LINK fields for CRG 3. The
maximum number of communications links is shown in the following table.
Table 2-10. Maximum Communications Links Allowable
ALERT DISPLAYED
MAX # OF WHEN MAX UNIT
DEFINED UNIT TYPE ALLOWED NUMBER OF COMM LOCATION UNIT TYPE
AND DESIGNATION COMM LINKS LINKS EXCEEDED ENTRY ON ENTRY ON
LOCAL ICC (IC) 3 ENTRIES NOT TAB 62 NA

COMPATIBLE
CRG (1-6) 4 ENTRIES NOT TAB 62 NA
COMPATIBLE
PATRIOT BATTERIES 3 ENTRIES NOT TAB 59 NA
(FP 1-6) COMPATIBLE
HAWK FIRE UNITS 2 ENTRIES NOT TAB 59 TAB 68
(FP 7-12) COMPATIBLE—
HAWK
EXTRA-BN 1 ENTRIES NOT TAB 69 TAB 68
(BA-BF, HE, A1- A3) COMPATIBLE
(AS UTM
COMM LOC)
2-175. Use of Tab 62 entries and alerts ensures that each unit can support
the number of planned links. If a third communications link is entered for a
Hawk fire unit on Page A, and Tab 62 is entered, an ENTRIES NOT
COMPATIBLE-HAWK alert would be displayed because Hawk fire units are
allowed a maximum of two links. Communications links for a typical
deployment are shown in Figure 2-37. Communications links defined in Tab
62 consider the type of unit only. Note that location and unit type information
for display is provided from entries in Tabs 59, 68, and 69. Terrain elevation
data is not considered in link processing. This means that a line-of-sight
(LOS) analysis must be performed to ensure that the planned
communications link is viable.
2-53
FM 3-01.87
COMMUNICATIONS EXAMPLE COMMUNICATIONS

DOMAIN SYMBOLOGY DEPLOYMENT
THIS EXAMPLE COMBINES THE ICC, A CRG,
AND A BATTERY AS DEFINED ON TAB 62,
+
SHOWING COMM LINK DOMAINS, RELATIVE
UNIT POSITIONS, AND COMM LINK AZIMUTH
20 KM
SYMBOL MOVES
WITH/SLAVED TO CRG 3
CURSOR POSITION UNIT SYMBOL AND POSITION
DESIGNATION
NUMBER
DISPLAYED UPON
ENTRY OF TAB 62
5
LOCAL ICC
Notes: 1. Text and arrow annotations with symbols POSITION
BATTERY/FIRE
are explanatory only and not displayed UNIT POSITION
with the cursor.
2. Unit designations (flags and numbers) do
not move with the cursor.
3. Not to scale.
Figure 2-37. Communications Symbology and Example Deployment

2-176. Tab 62 also provides ANTENNA AZIMUTH information for each
COMM LINK entered. Azimuths are computed using the unit location data
from Tab 62 and Tab 59 entries. ANTENNA AZIMUTH data is computed
after the link is defined (by COMM LINK entries) and Tab 62 is entered (via
the ENTER TAB key). The example in Figure 2-37, in the CRG 3 to FP 5 link,
shows the ANTENNA AZIMUTH for CRG 3 is calculated based on unit
positions and displayed in Tab 62 as 107 degrees. The back azimuth of
287 degrees would be automatically displayed in the FP 5 ANTENNA
AZIMUTH field for this link to CRG 3 in Tab 62.
2-177. The data entered in Tab 62 is used for other purposes besides
communications planning. As previously discussed, the ICC LOCATION
entered in Tab 62 is a required entry used for coordinate conversion along
with communications network planning. The CRG LOCATION entries in Tab
62 are additionally used to define the CRGs in the communications network.
Failure to enter CRG locations will inhibit data transmission through the
CRG. There are three sets of Tab 62 ICC and CRG deployment data. The
number of the deployment set under consideration is displayed in the tab as
the DEPLOYMENT NUMBER.
TAB 51
2-178. Tab 51 (see Figure 2-22) appears for the seventh time. Enter
DEPLOYMENT INPUT COMPLETE in the DEPLOYMENT FUNCTION
data field.
2-54
FM 3-01.87
TAB 50
2-179. Tab 50 (see Figure 2-3) appears. Enter DATA INPUT COMPLETE in
the SELECT INITIALIZATION MODE field.
TAB 98—DATA BASE CONTROL

2-180. The Data Base Control, Tab 98, (Figure 2-38) allows the operator to
name data base and specify which data base will be the OB tactical data base
or TNG data base after BATI input is complete. Tab 98 is used to write the
tactical data base to the ICC disk. Up to 10 data bases can be stored on each
side of the ICC disk. The operator must designate the data number 0-9, a
12-character alphanumeric data base name, and a Data Base User (OB or
TNG).
DATA BASE CONTROL *98*

(n) / (cccccccccccc) / (ccc) DATA BASE NUMBER/NAME/USER
(n) TACTICAL DATA BASE NUMBER
CURRENT DATA BASES DATA BASE USERS
n-cccccccccccc-ccc n-cccccccccccc-ccc OB = Tactical / OB
n-cccccccccccc-ccc n-cccccccccccc-ccc TNG = Training
n-cccccccccccc-ccc n-cccccccccccc-ccc
Figure 2-38. Data Collection Control
TAB 2—BN COMMUNICATIONS CONFIGURATION CONTROL

2-181. Communications with fire units and extra-battalion units must be
disallowed before making any changes to the active deployment
communications initialization data in Tabs 68 and 69. Outgoing
communications are controlled via Tab 2. The format of Tab 2 is shown in
Figure 2-39. Tab 2 must be manually selected.
BN COMMUNICATIONS CONFIGURATION CONTROL *2*

REINITIALIZE (aacc) RLRIU: ICC, CRG1-6, FP1-6
TOD MASTER:
COMM STATE: A=ALLOW, D=DISALLOW, M=MONITOR FP
HEU =(a) FP1 = (a) FP 7 = (a) BNA = (a) BN
AUX1 =(a) FP2 = (a) FP 8 = (a) BNB = (a)
AUX2 =(a) FP3 = (a) FP 9 = (a) BNC = (a)
AUX3 =(a) FP4 = (a) FP10 = (a) BND = (a) CURRENT NET
FP5 = (a) FP11 = (a) BNE = (a) LOAD:
FP6 = (a) FP12 = (a) BNF = (a) nnn PERCENT
Figure 2-39. Tab 2, BN Communications Configuration Control
2-55
FM 3-01.87
2-182. When communications are in use, changes in the active deployment

communication data base are prevented by the system software. This
constraint exists to prevent disruption of active data communications with
fire units and extra-battalion units. If changes are desired to the active
deployment communications control data during TAC OPS or CMND PLAN,
then communications to the unit(s) affected by the changes must be
disallowed through Tab 2. CMND PLAN is a BATI process that is available
during ICC TAC OPS. The CMND PLAN mode lets the TD change certain
initialization data, while the TDA conducts normal TAC OPS activities (or
vice versa). Use of the CMND PLAN mode is discussed in the initialization
procedures in this chapter.
2-183. Tab 2 is available when deployment function 03=COMM DATABASE,
is selected by way of Tab 51 in the CMND PLAN mode during TAC OPS.
Tab 2 is automatically displayed first and last in the deployment function 03
sequence. Tab 2 is used to disallow communications to the desired units and
to re-allow communications after changes are made to data entries in Tabs 68
and 69. If any changes are attempted to unit communications data with
active communications (communications allowed through Tab 2), changes are
prevented and the COMM ALLOWED-TAB 2 alert is displayed as a
reminder. Tab 2 is displayed for review purposes only and is not active in
BATI before the transition to TAC OPS. Not all of the active deployment
communications initialization can be changed in TAC OPS CMND PLAN,
regardless of the active communications state of operation. Local ICC
communications initialization parameters in the active deployment data set
(in the tactical data base) cannot be changed during TAC OPS/CMND PLAN.
Changes to the active deployment are limited to protect the software
communications function. Transition to the initialization mode from TAC
OPS is required to make unlimited changes to the active deployment data
parameters. This allows the system to thoroughly check the integrity of the
communications data base processing which is not possible during TAC OPS.
Changes to active deployment ICC communications control data are limited
to the direct link relayed and relay type entries. The other Tab 67 parameters
cannot be changed. The changes to these parameters affect communications
to all defined fire units and extra-battalion units.
TAB 0—TABULAR DISPLAY INDEX

2-185. During ICC initialization, Tab 0 is available to the operator. This
information tab appears automatically during manual initialization. It can
also be called up by entering 0 at the keyboard, or by pressing the CONTR
DATA INDEX S/I. The tab consists of two pages which the operator can view
by pressing the ENTER TAB key. The cursor and HOOK key is used to select
tabs or verify tab data during manual initialization. See Tab 0 as shown in
Figure 2-40.
2-56
FM 3-01.87
TABULAR DISPLAY INDEX PAGE 1 OF 2 *0*

*0* TACTICAL TAB INDEX *14* TARGET DISPLAY CONTROL
*1* FIDOC / OPRNL PRAMS CHANGE *30* RETRIEVE XMTR BITE DATA
*2* COMMO CONTROL / STATUS DATA *54* RADAR FREQUENCY CONTROL
*3* LS TEST RESULTS *55* ALTERNATE SEARCH CONTROL
*5* ASSET + VOLUME STATUS *68* COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL
*6* IFF/SIF + TOD CONTROL *70* ASSET/DEFENDED AREAS
*7* LS CONTROL + WIND SPEED *71* VOLUMES DEFINITION
*8* FP CONTROL *72* GENERAL PURPOSE MAPS ENTRY
*9* REORIENTATION CONTROL *73* KAA-63 TABLES
*13* DATA BASE SELECTION
TABULAR DISPLAY INDEX PAGE 2 OF 2 *0*

*74* COMPASS ROSE TABLES
*76* ARM THREAT PARAMETERS & CMs
*78* LAUNCH DECISION PARAMETERS
*79* IDENTIFICATION PARAMETERS
*81* RS LOCATION/ALIGNMENT DATA
*85* LS LOCATION/ALIGNMENT DATA
*90* DATA COLLECTION CONTROL
*95* RADAR MAPPING CONTROL
*96* INITIAL SEARCH LOWER BOUND
Figure 2-40. Tab 0, Tactical Initialization Tab Index, Pages 1 and 2
TAB 5—ASSET STATUS/CONTROL

2-186. Tab 5 is a two-page tabular display available during TAC OPS. This
tab shows the allocation and status of the defined ABT/TBM volumes on
pages 1-3 (Figure 2-41) and assets on pages 1-3 (Figure 2-42).
ASSET STATUS/CONTROL *VOLUMES PG 1-3 PAGE nn OF 12 *5*

ID PRI FP 1 2 3 4 5 6 ID STAT FP 1 2 3 4 5 6
ccccc(a)c a a a a a a ccccc a a a a a a A=ACTIVE
ccccc(a)c a a a a a a ccccc a a a a a a B=BEHIND
ccccc(a)c a a a a a a ccccc a a a a a a I=INACTIVE
ccccc(a)c a a a a a a ccccc a a a a a a O=OUT OF
ccccc(a)c a a a a a a ccccc a a a a a a COVERAGE
ccccc(a)c a a a a a a ccccc a a a a a a
Figure 2-41. Tab 5, Pages 1-3, Volumes
2-57
FM 3-01.87
ASSET STATUS/CONTROL *ASSETS PG 1-3 PAGE OF 12 *5*

ID PRI FP1 2 3 4 5 6 ID PRI FP1 2 3 4 5 6
( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( ) A=ACTIVE
( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( ) B=BEHIND
( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( ) I-INACTIVE
( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( ) O=OUT OF
( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( ) COVERAGE
( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( )
( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( )
( )( )( )( )( )( ) ( )( )( )( )( )( )
Figure 2-42. Tab 5, Pages 1-3, Assets

2-187. Tab 5, pages 1-3, displays the FP allocation and status of each ABT
and TBM asset (page 1 is for TBM ASSETS TB01-18 and pages 2-3 are for
ABT assets AT19-54). The status displayed reflects the overall system
status, the activity status of the asset for the FP from Tab 70 and whether
the asset is behind or out of coverage based on the geometry. Both ABT and
TBM assets can be made either ACTIVE or INACTIVE using Tab 5 as
allocated to individual Patriot batteries. (Asset status, by FP, on Tab 5
differs from the overall system status set in Tab 70). If the asset is
designated as either BEHIND or OUT-OF-COVERAGE, then Tab 5 cannot be
used to change the asset activity status.
2-188. Tab 5 at the ICC allows the operator to display all of the assets and
volumes that have been initialized in the data base. Assets are displayed in
priority order, within each category, and by numerical order. Activation of a
volume being activated is also shown in Tab 61 and Tab 71. Deactivation of a
volume at the ECS will only be acknowledged at that ECS and not at the
ICC, until the ICC updates the volume status by an ENTR TAB action. Pages
4 through 12 of Tab 5 can be used to activate or deactivate allocated volumes,
time-controlled volumes, and points for each FP defined. Tab 5 format is
shown in Figure 2-43.
ASSET STATUS/CONTROL *VOLUMES PG 4-12 PAGE OF 12 *5*

ID PR1 FP1 2 3 4 5 6 ID PR1 FP1 2 3 4 5 6
( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) A=ACTIVE
( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) B=BEHIND
( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) I=INACTIVE
( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) O=OUT OF
( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) COVERAGE
( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )( )( )
Figure 2-43. ICC Tab 5, Pages 4-12, Volumes
2-189. Volume and point information displayed by Tab 5 in TAC OPS is

similar to assets information on page 1. Tab 5 groups volume ID by Patriot
2-58
FM 3-01.87
FP (one Patriot battery per page). The STAT data field displays if the volume
is active (A) or inactive (I). Entries to the STAT data field are accepted if the
activity status is not B or blank (no communications with the FP). Changes
made to volume status or to activity status via Tab 5 are reflected in BATI
Tabs 61 and 71.
2-190. Volumes are displayed in order by type and priority as hostile ID
volumes (including hostile combined weapon control volumes), friendly ID
volumes (including friendly combined weapon control volumes, weapons
control only volumes (without leading ID volume attribute), IFFON Line,
IFPID LINE.
2-191. For each volume identified in Tab 71, a time to activate and deactivate
can be entered. The operator, upon receipt of the ACO, can access Tab 71 and
enter the activation and deactivation time for each volume as per ACO
request. All times include day (dd), time (hhmm), month (mm), and year
(yyyy). If the fields are blank, the STAT field of Tab 71 or Tab 5 will control
the activation and deactivation of the volume. If a time is entered then Tab 5
will indicate a (T). The volume active/inactive status can be specified to
change in unison to comply with the ACO and thus avoid a mixture of
old/new ACOs. The ECS Tab 71 is the same as the ICC Tab 71 except that it
is set up for 55 units and 250 points.
Asset Allocation
2-192. Asset allocation is initially made using fire unit employment planning
information entered in Tab 59. As Patriot batteries come on line (or
communications become active), then BATI reallocates assets based on
reported locations, PTLs, and azimuths. After processing, asset status
information is then available for display via Tab 5 in TAC OPS. Tab 5 is
updated when—
• An asset overall activity status is changed using Tab 70.
• Inputs are made to Tab 70.
• The active deployment is completed.
• A Patriot battery status changes to limited or full operations.
• A Patriot battery location and azimuth is initially reported.
• A change of a Patriot battery azimuth (reorientation) is reported.
• The retrieve and compare FP (RCFP) data process is completed.
• A successful data base transfer to Patriot battery(ies) is completed.
2-193. Definition of assets (location size and priority), and allocations to
Patriot batteries are made based on the assigned mission and emplacement
of the subordinate fire units within system constraints. There are limits to
coverage provided by subordinate fire units; therefore, deployment planning
must ensure that adequate weapons coverage for assets is maintained. There
are also limits upon the active number of assets allocated to each Patriot
battery. Asset priorities must be designated judiciously, especially when the
available coverage is thin and the number of assets is high. Fire units
themselves are assets.
2-194. To summarize, initialization and control are accomplished using
different tabular displays. Tab 70 is used to define the asset and set the
2-59
FM 3-01.87
overall activity status. Tab 5 displays the status of the asset for each Patriot
battery and is used to make active or deactivate “in-coverage” assets
allocated to each Patriot battery during TAC OPS.
FIRE UNIT TACTICAL INITIALIZATION

2-195. The process of initializing the Patriot fire unit is called tactical
initialization (TACI). It consists of four basic procedures: standard
emplacement, standard emplacement with data base read, short-term
reinitialization, and long-term reinitialization. Each of these procedures are
used under specific conditions. This section does not address each procedure
in detail, since they are defined in the TMs. However, standard emplacement
(STD EMP), which is the most complete, will be addressed. The other
initialization procedures are a duplicate or subset of STD EMP.
2-196. The initialization procedures are used to establish and define the
system battle parameters and to create a data base that is used for
reinitialization and recovery operations. At the fire unit, one manstation
(MS) is designated as the initialization sequence controller. This is
accomplished when the ECCM ASSIST switch-indicator is selected. All
automatically sequenced initialization tabs are forced to that manstation.
Either manstation can be the sequence controller. Normally, MS 1 is the
sequence controller. At the appropriate time, MS 3 assists in the
initialization by entering launcher data or common data base items if a data
transfer is not anticipated. It should be noted that initialization is an
extremely important phase of Patriot operations. Care must be taken by the
crew to ensure that the procedures defined in the technical manual are
followed. Failure to strictly follow the defined procedure will result in
degraded system operations.
2-197. Standard emplacement is used the first time a data base has to be
created. This is normally performed after moving to a new location and if the
previous data base is not applicable, there is no previous data base or
configuration management changes the data base. A standard emplacement
will always be used when no data base is available. Recording of a
configuration management change because of system modification must be
performed on both side A and B of the FU disk. The standard emplacement
(STD EMP) with DATABASE READ is used when the site-peculiar data is
not applicable. Site-peculiar data is that data that is unique to a specific site,
such as radar location and alignment, launcher location and alignment,
mapping, and search sector control. This initialization procedure should be
used when moving into a new location and that the common data base items
and non-site-peculiar data are still valid. During this initialization procedure,
the crew only has to input the site-peculiar information, thereby reducing
initialization time.
2-198. Long-term reinitialization is a procedure used to reinitialize all data
tabs. Because it is a reinitialization procedure, it requires a valid data base.
This procedure is used when the system has been down for a prolonged period
(extended maintenance, for example) but has not moved from its location. It
is normally used when mapping functions must be performed, such as
mapping STLs that were not previously mapped, or to update the existing
2-60
FM 3-01.87
terrain map. This initialization sequence follows the STD EMP sequence but
does not allow the operator to enter data in the radar location, Tab 81. Short-
term reinitialization is a procedure used to reinitialize the system. It also
requires a valid data base. This procedure is generally used to access tabs
(except Tab 68, which is available but not changeable) that are not available
during on-line tactical operations so those minor updates to the data base
may be made.
FIRE UNIT STANDARD EMPLACEMENT

2-199. Standard emplacement consists of an automatic sequencing of tabular
displays and alerts that directs the operator through the initialization
process. The specific steps to perform a standard emplacement will not be
discussed here since they are defined in the technical manual. However, the
automatic initialization sequence will be followed and the four methods of
emplacement will be described. A detailed discussion of each tabular display
and its interactions on the system and the ICC will be provided.
2-200. The following are prerequisites for automatic emplacement (AE) of the
FU:
• Three satellites are within the field of view of the FU.
• Both the PLGR and the NFS are required for an automatic
emplacement. If one or the other is not available, then neither of the
units may be used.
• Both the RS and LSs must be in REMOTE for the AE function to be
successfully completed.
2-201. With the upgrade of the AE, there are now five methods of acquiring
the data needed for emplacement of the fire unit, RS and LS. They are shown
in Table 2-11 listed in order of preference.
Table 2-11. Emplacement Types
2-61
FM 3-01.87
SOURCE OF DATA FOR TAB 81 AND TAB 85

TYPES METHOD UTM ALT AZIMUTH ROLL CROSS ROLL
1
AUTO AE PLGR PLGR NFS NFS NFS
AUTOMATIC
2
DATA ADR PLGR PLGR NFS NFS NFS
REENTRY
3 3
MANUAL PADS PADS PADS M2 M1 M1
W/PADS
MANUAL
4
W/OUT PADS MAP MAP MAP M2 M1 M1
MIXED PLGR/ PADS PADS PADS M1 M1
4
MODE PADS
Notes:
1. Data automatically inputted via software and data link. See Appendix C for procedures.
2. Data previously derived from automatic emplacement (hard copy of Tabs 81 and 85 apply
only to TACI. K7 is updated). This is applicable only if the RS and LSs have not been moved.
3. M1 is the gunner's quadrant; M2 is the aiming circle.
4. See Appendix E for procedures.
2-202. An automatic emplacement at an FU results in the best location and

angular confidence levels being sent to the ICC. The FU alerts LOCATION
DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL of SURVEY = O and ALIGNED BY of
SURVEY = O are sent to the ICC when the final automatic emplacement is
achieved. Considering these inputs, the ICC establishes the initial correlation
cells. ICC site calibrations are accomplished on all FUs whether they were
emplaced manually or automatically. Because of the accuracy of the precision
lightweight global positioning system receiver (PLGR) and north finding
system (NFS), SITE ERROR alerts are not expected when site calibrations
are performed on FUs that were automatically emplaced.
2-203. If SITE ERROR alerts are repeatedly observed, the ICC operator
should perform the following:
• Determine which FU is continually defined in the alert.
• Determine if the FU was emplaced manually or automatically.
• If the FU was emplaced automatically, have the crew members check
that there is no radar set (RS), PLGR or NFS fault.
• Time permitting, have the FU crews perform a new automatic
emplacement.
• If the FU was manually emplaced, have crew members recheck the
alignment and ensure that the data was entered correctly.
• Confirm that the data in Tab 81 is correct.
2-204. If SITE ERROR persists, the FU should then perform the semiannual
preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) checks. If out of
tolerance, intermediate maintenance (IM) should be notified. Note: If the
alert reports a large difference (1,000 meters or more), then the TD or TDA
should check Tab 12 to ensure that the ECS crew did not make an obvious
error in entering data. The reported location received should be confirmed by
voice with the battery to ensure that the correct universal transverse
mercator (UTM) (Patriot) or latitude and longitude (Hawk) were entered. If
everything appears to have been entered correctly and the system reports no
2-62
FM 3-01.87
site error, an effort to correlate targets between batteries should be

attempted. If correlation occurs without problems, the battery should be
considered correctly positioned. If not, the battery must reboot its data.
TAB 12—FP LOCATIONS/BOUNDARIES-BN

2-205. The current azimuth of Patriot batteries displayed in Tab 12 should also be noted. Prior minor
azimuth changes indicate that site calibration has occurred and the FP azimuth was corrected.
Figure 2-44 shows the Tab 12 format. Note: FP1 through 6 is reserved for Patriot FPs and FP7
through 12 is reserved for Hawk and THAAD FPs.
FP LOCATIONS/BOUNDARIES – BN PAGE 1 *12*

FP UTM LOCATION PTL STL1 STL2 STL3 CURR AZ LF-BOUNDS-RT
1
2
3
4
5
6
BN

FP UTM LOCATION PTL
7
8
9
10
11
12
BN
Figure 2-44. Tab 12, FP Locations/Boundaries–BN
2-206. If a fire unit is entered in Tab 59, then entries for FU communications
will be required in Tab 68. If an FU is defined in Tab 68 in the normal
initialization sequence, then the software will expect a location and PTL
entry in Tab 59 to complete initialization. Fire unit communications data
requirements will be discussed later as part of the communications control
and track reporting parameters' category.
2-207. The entries for Tab 91, FP data acquisition mode (Figure 2-45),
Tab 81 RADAR LOCATION/ALIGNMENT DATA ENTRY (Figure 2-46), and
Tab 85, LAUNCHER LOCATION/ALIGNMENT (Figure 2-47), vary based on
the type of emplacement used. The required operator inputs for each method
are shown below.
2-208. Normally, the automatic emplacement (AE) capability will be used to
emplace and ready the unit for action. When performing an AE, the RS and
LS can be at any azimuth because the PLGR and the NFS rotate with the
shelter. However, it is always a good practice to align the system, RS and LS,
2-63
FM 3-01.87
at the mechanical stow azimuth. This will always provide a known reference
of where the alignment was accomplished. This alignment reference could
then be used when the RS or LS has to be returned to the alignment position
for manual data entry. When performing an automatic data reentry (ADR) or
a manual emplacement, the RS and LS must be emplaced using a secondary
method to determine position and azimuth data for the RS and LS(s). The AE
METHOD DATA ENTRY FIELDS for each tab must be filled in as follows:
• Tab 91.
§ Data Acquisition Mode.
§ STD Emplacement Type (1) Auto.
§ UTM = Approximately RS LOC (if necessary).
• Tab 81.
§ UTM World Model.
§ Wind Speed.
• Tab 85.
§ LS Number.
§ Depletion Priority.
FP DATA ACQUISITION MODE SELECT/CONTROL *91*

( ) = DATA ACQUISITION MODE: ( ) STD EMP TYPE: 1 = AUTO 0 = MANUAL
0 = STANDARD EMPLACEMENT ( ) UTM = APPROX RS LOC
1 = LONG TERM REINIT
2 = SHORT TERM REINIT (*) READ DATABASE
3 = STANDARD - - -
EMPLACEMENT WITH - - -
DATABASE READ - - -
- - -
- - -
Figure 2-45. Tab 91, FP Data Acquisition Mode Select/Control
RADAR LOCATION/ALIGNMENT DATA ENTRY PAGE 1 OF 2 *81*
LONGITUDE UTM
DEG MIN SEC E/W zzheeeeeennnnnnn (*)= UTM WORLD MODEL
( ) ( ) ( . ) ( ) ( ) 0 = INTERNATIONAL
MODEL
LATITUDE ALTITUDE 1 = 1880 CLARKE
DEG MIN SEC N/S METERS 2 = 1866 CLARKE
( ) ( ) ( . ) ( ) ( ) 3 = WGS-84
4 = EVEREST
5 = BESSEL
IS RS AT EXACT ALIGNMENT AZIMUTH?
( )=1=YES 0-NO. IF NO, REALIGN RS.

( )=LOCATION DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL AIMING CIRCLE + GUNNERS
0 =SURVEY 1=MODIFIED SURVEY 2=MAP QUADRANT INPUT IN MILS
EL RDR TO MIR =( . )
( )=ALIGNED BY BRNG RDR TO NREF =( . )
0 =SURVEY 1=COMPASS EL RDR TO NREF TOP =( . )
EL RDR TO NREF BOT =( . )
()=WIND SPEED BRNG NREF TO RDR =( . )
0 =BELOW GALE 1=GALE + ABOVE ROLL =( . )
( ) MILS = RS EMPLACEMENT AZIMUTH CROSS ROLL =( . )
Figure 2-46. Tab 81, Emplacement TAB
2-64
FM 3-01.87
LAUNCHER LOCATION/ALIGNMENT *85*

()=LS NUMBER
(1)=LS EMPLACE TYPE 1=AUTO 0=MANUAL
INPUT BELOW IN MILS
( )UTM BRNG NREF TO LS = ( . )
( )METERS ALTITUDE BRNG LS TO NREF = ( . )
BRNG LS TO RDR = ( . )
( )=DEPLETION PRIORITY ELEV LS TO RDR = ( . )
01=HIGHEST LS ROLL = ( . )
( )MILS=LS EMPLACEMENT AZIMUTH LS CROSSROLL = ( . )
Figure 2-47. Tab 85, Emplacement Tab, Automatic Data Reentry
2-209. The automatic data reentry (ADR) method can be used for employing
the FU at the same location. If three satellites are not available or the PLGR
and NFS become inoperative after an automatic emplacement, then the ADR
method can be used for emplacing the FU at the same location as long as no
outrigger pads have been lifted on the RS or any LS. The ADR method uses
the data that was originally derived from either manual or automatic
emplacement using hard copies of Tabs 81 and 85. Tab 91, FP DATA
ACQUISITION MODE SELECT/CONTROL, is used to enter data from a
manual emplacement. Data is entered in the appropriate data field as
defined below—
• Tab 91.
– Data Acquisition Mode.
– STD EMP Type (0) Manual.
• Tab 81.
– UTM World Model.
– Altitude.
– RS at Exact Alignment Azimuth.
– Location Data Confidence Level.
– Aligned By.
– Wind Speed.
– Mils = RS Emplacement Azimuth.
– Roll/Cross Roll.
• Tab 85.
– LS Number.
– UTM.
– Meters Altitude.
– Depletion Priority.
– Mils = LS Emplacement Azimuth.
– LS Roll/Cross Roll.
2-210. An additional emplacement method is available to allow launchers to
be emplaced manually with automatically emplaced radar. This mixed mode
emplacement will allow the operator to manually emplace a launcher in
either TACI or K7. Launchers that are in a mixed mode emplacement do not
require GPS and NFS equipment. If emplaced in automatic mode, manual
data may no longer be entered. Launchers must then be deassigned then
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FM 3-01.87
reassigned. The procedure for mixed mode emplacement is defined in

Appendix E and requires strict compliance for missile acquisition to occur.
BATTERY TACTICAL INITIALIZATION

2-211. TACI provides the ECS with data parameters necessary for C2 of
engagement operations. The ECS tactical data base contains data parameters
that control tactical system operations. TACI is a set-up process that must be
performed prior to tactical operations. The ECS system functions vital to
mission accomplishment are—
• Track management.
• Communications.
• Display and system control.
2-212. TACI works hand-in-hand with the ICC BATI. This cooperation is
especially important because both the ECS and ICC must maintain a
common data base for proper command and control from the battalion level.
TACI defines FIDOC, identification (ID), assets and defended areas, volumes,
and the battery search sectors. TACI is required to set up the system before
battery tactical operations can be performed. TACI is also important because
the tactical data base parameter values must be set properly for optimum
tactical operations.
TAB 90—DATA COLLECTION CONTROL

2-213. Tab 90 at the ECS is similar to Tab 90 at the ICC. The ECS Tab 90 is
used in conjunction with the Data Coll S/I. Page one of the tab is for internal
data collection control and page two is for external control. The major
differences are—
• Page one has a data field for MAXIMIZE EDR COLLECTION.
During K-7 operations the only time that this data field can be
changed is just prior to the ACK. STARTS DATA COLL-MEDIA
OK? The default value is YES and the operator should not change
the value unless directed. If Y=YES is selected, the data collection
record size will be 4096 words written to the EDR. If N=NO is
selected, the data collection record size will be 2500 words written
to the EDR that each data record being sent to any external data
collection device will contain a maximum of 2500 words.
• Page two has an additional data field for AUTO MODE
SWITCHING. During K-7 operations, the only time this data field
can be changed is just prior to the alert ACK STARTS DATA
COLL-MEDIA OK? The default value is YES and the operator
should not change this value unless directed. If 0=OFF is
selected, data collection mode switching must be manually
performed by the operator. If 1=ON (DEFAULT) is selected, data
collection mode switching will occur automatically. The operator
should not change from default value of 1 unless directed.
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FM 3-01.87
( ) = DATA COLLECTION DEVICE: 1 = EDR -TAPE-, 2 = ODS2 -DISK-
( ) = RE-START WHEN DEVICE FULL: Y = YES, N = NO
( ) = REPLACE MEDIA: Y = YES, N = NO

“YES” = REMOVE AND LABEL DATA COLL MEDIUM, AFTER ENTR
( ) = MAXIMIZE EDR COLLECTION Y = YES, N = NO
COLLECTION DEVICE WILL BE FULL IN: : HOURS : MINUTES
Figure 2-48. Data Collection Control, Page 1

DATA COLLECTION CONTROL - EXTERNAL 2 OF 2 *90*
( )= EXTERNAL DATA COLLECTION: 0 = OFF, 1 = ON
ENGINEERING TEST PARAMETERS
( 0 ) ( ) = DRIVE ON = 0 1 = NTO, NT1

( ) = AUTO MODE SWITCHING 0 = OFF, 1 = ON
(c c c c c) = MRT IDENTIFIER
Figure 2-49. Data Collection Control, Page 2
TACTICAL INITIALIZATION
2-214. TACI establishes the ECS tactical data base and allows certain data
parameters to be input into the system before tactical operations are
initiated. TACI data parameters (Figure 2-50) have been categorized to help
understand how ECS processing uses initialization data. Tabular displays
are used to input and display the data parameters in each category. Some
data categories are used internally by the weapons control computer (WCC)
and are not related to battalion C3. Other categories provide data for ECS
displays. The tactical control officer (TCO) and the tactical control assistant
(TCA) control the TACI process. Other tactical operations (TAC OPS) tabular
displays that are related to initialization tabs and which impact on TACI are
included.
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FM 3-01.87
TACI INITIALIZATION
STRUCTURE
CATEGORY TABULAR DISPLAYS
DATA ACQUISITION
TAB 91
SEQUENCE
RS AND LS LOCATION
TAB 85 TAB 81
ALIGNMENT DATA
STATIC DATA FILE

ALTITUDE BANDS AND TAB 14
SPEED CATEGORIES
COMMUNICATIONS
CONTROL AND DATA TAB 68 TAB 99
TRANSFER
RADAR CONTROL
TAB 54
PARAMETERS
WEAPONS CONTROL AND TAB 95 TAB 97

RADAR MAPPING DATA TAB 96 TAB 92
ALTERNATE SEARCH
TAB 55
SECTORS SURVEILLANCE
TAB 73
DATA IFF/SIF TAB 6
PARAMETERS TAB 74
END OF MANUAL
TAB 98
INPUT DATA
Figure 2-50. TACI Data Parameters
DATA INITIALIZATION SEQUENCE

2-215. Tab 91 is the first to appear after system booting and is available only
in TACI. It provides the operator with initialization selections. Which
initialization procedure to select and under what conditions is described in
fire unit tactical initialization paragraphs.
Automatic Alignment Process

2-216. The automatic alignment process, using PLGR and NFS data, is
initiated through Tab 91. When Tab 91 appears, select either entry 0 or 3 for
the data acquisition mode. The automatic alignment process is applicable
only when selecting 0 = STANDARD EMPLACEMENT or 3 = STANDARD
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FM 3-01.87
EMPLACEMENT WITH DATABASE READ. Automatic emplacement is the

primary method, select 1=AUTO in the STD EMP TYPE data field.
2-217. AUTO emplacement method is selected with either STANDARD
EMPLACEMENT or STANDARD EMPLACEMENT with DATABASE
READ. A UTM coordinate is required in the UTM=APPROX RS LOC data
field. If MANUAL emplacement type is selected, then the UTM seed is not
required. If one is entered, the alert ENTRIES INCOMPATIBLE appears.
This UTM coordinate is the initial location seed UTM data for the PLGR and
NFS at the RS and LS. The UTM may be determined from a map spot, but
should be as close to the RS location as possible. For NFS alignment
accuracy, this UTM coordinate can be no more than 40 kms from the actual
radar location.
AUTO Emplacement Process

2-218. The AUTO emplacement process is initiated when entering AUTO in
Tab 91. The alert RS AUTO EMPLACING is displayed in the auxiliary alert
line of the controlling manstation. Tab 85 may also be entered at this time to
expedite LS automatic emplacement. The other manstation may continue
with the initialization process with those tabs that are permitted or planned.
2-219. If a valid initial location and/or azimuth cannot be obtained from the
PLGR or NFS because of a fault, or if the PLGR data is below an acceptable
level, Tab 91 will reappear with the alert RS/LS AUTO EMPLACEMENT
FAILED. The operator is required to monitor the alert line for any equipment
fault alerts. Select page 4 of the Fault Data tab to determine if any PLGR or
NFS faults are indicated. If none are indicated, attempt an automatic
emplacement again. If the automatic emplacement fails while the operator is
in the mapping sequence (Tabs 92, 95, 96, and 97), then Tab 91 will not
automatically appear. The operator should reboot the system and attempt
another automatic emplacement.
2-220. During the second auto emplacement attempt the fire unit should take
the following actions:
• Notify battalion. This allows the battalion to organize its resources to
support the fire unit.
• The S3 notifies position azimuth determining system (PADS) of an
impending mission.
• The S4 and logistics readiness center (LRC) consults with the
battalion EMMO on troubleshooting procedures.
• Notify the launcher crew that a manual emplacement may be
required. This allows the launcher crew to gather the required assets
and to stand by if the second AEE fails.
2-221. If a second auto emplacement attempt fails, then the MANUAL
EMPLACEMENT METHOD should be accomplished and notify battalion.
Notify the all personnel that a manual emplacement is required.
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FM 3-01.87
ROLL-CROSSROLL ALIGNMENT
2-222. The importance of Tab 81 cannot be overemphasized. The data from
this tab affects all major system areas in terms of surveillance, target
position and reporting, missile acquisition, and triangulation. This tab
establishes the exact location and pointing angle of the radar, which are
extremely important parameters. The operator must ensure that the
procedures defined in the TM are adhered to when entering data. A Patriot
basic rule that must be followed is: whenever entering data in Tab 81, the
radar must be at the position at which it was aligned.
2-223. Three factors affect the boresight of the radar: the pointing azimuth,
roll, and crossroll. When manufactured, the radar antenna is mechanically
boresighted perfectly level with the radar (zero roll and crossroll) to ensure
accurate alignment. Because this condition cannot be achieved in the field
environment, the boresight of the radar must be electronically adjusted. Roll
and crossroll are the electronic "Kentucky windage" used by the WCC to
boresight the radar.
2-224. Roll is the side-to-side level of the radar, while crossroll is the front to
rear level. When the roll and crossroll readings entered in Tab 81 reflect the
actual level of the radar set base, then the boresight of the radar is correctly
aligned. With errors in the roll and crossroll, the boresight is wrong, target
positions reported will be incorrect, and the acquisition beam for the missile
will be positioned incorrectly.
2-225. To understand the effects of crossroll, refer to Figure 2-51. The figure
shows the radar set boresight (top) with zero crossroll and shows the effects
of positive and negative crossroll errors in relationship to tracking a target
(bottom). Zero crossroll and boresight are necessary.
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FM 3-01.87
ZERO CROSSROLL
IVE
G AT LL
NE SSRO
O
CR
BORESIGHT
Figure 2-51. Zero Crossroll and Boresight

2-226. This can be visually demonstrated by placing a flashlight at the end of
a table and shining it on the wall. The point where the light strikes the wall
represents the boresight tracking position of the radar. To see the effect of
crossroll errors, raise only the rear of the flashlight off the table. The light
should strike the wall below its original position. This is negative crossroll.
By raising only the front of the flashlight, the effect of a positive crossroll
error can be seen.
2-227. The effects of roll on the boresight of the radar are similar to crossroll
and can be seen in Figure 2-52. Since roll is parallel to the radar beam, the
effect is minimal near the center of the search sector and greatest at the
edges. If errors occur in both roll and crossroll, the effects combine to cause a
greater error in the boresight of the radar.
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FM 3-01.87
BORESIGHT
ZERO CROSSROLL
Figure 2-52. Boresight and Crossroll Errors

2-228. Roll and crossroll errors at the launching station affect missile
acquisition in the same way. Considering the pointing azimuth, roll and
crossroll values inputted in Tab 85, the WCC predicts the location of the
missile in space for acquisition by the radar. Missile acquisition beams are
steered based on roll and crossroll values. The WCC compensates for
uncertainty characteristics in the missile's flight, such as missile speed, air
density, and wind velocity (these values are fixed average value constants in
the software used to calculate missile location at acquisition). Errors in radar
roll and crossroll add to errors in computing missile location errors. This can
lead to failure of the system to acquire missiles after launch. Tab 81 is only
available in TACI, in all four initialization procedures.
RADAR ALIGNMENT PROCEDURES

2-229. In the automatic emplacement mode, use Tab 81 for RADAR
LOCATION/ALIGNMENT DATA ENTRY when the PLGR has returned at
least one valid location. When the NFS has provided a valid response, the
initialization sequence is allowed to continue and Tab 81, page 1
(Figure 2-53), appears on the controlling manstation.
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FM 3-01.87

LONGITUDE UTM
DEG MIN SEC E/W ZZHEEEEEENNNNNNN ( )= UTM WORLD MODEL
( ) ( ) ( . ) ( ) ( ) 0 = INTERNATIONAL
DEG MIN SEC N/S METERS 2 = 1886 CLARKE
( ) ( ) ( . ) ( ) ( ) 3 = WGS-84
4 = EVEREST
5.= BESSEL
IS RS AT EXACT ALIGNMENT AZIMUTH?
( )=1=YES 0=NO. IF NO, REALIGN RS.
Figure 2-53. Tab 81, Radar Location and Alignment Data Entry
2-230. The World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS-84) was added to the UTM
WORLD MODEL data field. The RS location, altitude, and IS RS AT EXACT
ALIGNMENT AZIMUTH? data fields come up blank and are inaccessible
(cursor denied) because the final RS position has not been fully determined.
The operator is required to make an entry in the UTM WORLD MODEL data
field. The data entry for this field is taken from the topographic map of the
area of operations. In the auto emplacement mode, software subroutines
compensate for the differences between the PLGR world models and the
world models entered in this tab. All batteries in the battalion must use the
same world model (WGS-84). The WGS-84 world model is compatible with
the use of the PLGR and JTIDS communications.
2-231. In the manual mode, page 1 of Tab 81 provides for the entering of the
radar location in either UTM or latitude and longitude. When one data
parameter is entered, the other is automatically computed when the tab is
entered. Accurate radar location data is currently provided by the position
and azimuth determining system (PADS) organic to battalion. The location
entered in this tab is automatically sent to the ICC and displayed in Tab 12
at the ICC when data communication is initially established. The altitude
data for input in this tab is also provided by the PADS and is required to be
accurate within 10 meters. This data is provided to the ECS on the Radar
Location and Alignment form. See Appendix A.
2-232. UTM WORLD MODEL provides the specific grid system used in the
development of the maps used. A standard conversion is applied in several of
the Patriot algorithms, depending on the map model selected. Consequently,
the UTM WORLD MODEL selected must be the same throughout the
battalion. The UTM WORLD MODEL is normally defined in the legend of
military maps.
2-233. Is the RS at exact alignment azimuth? Data field is an entry used to
remind the operator to ensure that the radar is in fact at the align position.
There is no software check between this entry and the radar. The data field
will accept any entry made by the operator even if the radar is not at the
aligned position. It is in the tab strictly as a reminder to the operator. As
previously mentioned, when entering data in Tab 81, the radar must be at
the aligned position. This entry reaffirms this rule.
2-234. Page 2 of Tab 81 (Figure 2-54) is accessed by ENTER Tab which
accesses any multipage tab. As with page 1 data, the information on this page
is extremely critical. It will affect both fire unit and ICC operations. When
this tab appears in the automatic mode, the RS EMPLACEMENT AZIMUTH,
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FM 3-01.87
ROLL, and CROSSROLL data fields display NFS information. The

LOCATION DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL and ALIGNED BY data fields
remain blank. Changes to these data fields are not allowed (cursor denied).
The initial location confidence level reported in the azimuth error state (AES)
to the ICC is 2=MAP. This is based on the first data reading from the PLGR.
At the completion of a successful automatic emplacement, this is changed to
0=SURVEY for both location and alignment. The operator is required to
make a WIND SPEED entry.

( )=LOCATION DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL AIMING CIRCLE + GUNNERS
EL RDR TO MIR =( . )
( )=ALIGNED BY BRNG RDR TO NREF =( . )
0 =SURVEY 1=COMPASS EL RDR TO NREF TOP =( . )
EL RDR TO NREF BOT =( . )
( )=WIND SPEED BRNG NREF TO RDR =( . )
0 =BELOW GALE 1=GALE + ABOVE ROLL = ( . )
( ) MILS = RS EMPLACEMENT AZIMUTH CROSS ROLL = ( . )
Figure 2-54. Tab 81, Page 2, Radar Location and Alignment Data Entry
2-235. On page 2 of Tab 81 the normal TACI sequence continues. While the
operators are performing normal TACI sequence, automatic requests for
additional PLGR readings continue. When the number of samples achieve the
appropriate level, a final RS position is defined. This final position is then
used to update the initial radar location. An updated LOCATION DATA
CONFIDENCE LEVEL is sent to the ICC to recalculate all RS location and
altitude related information.
MANUAL ALIGNMENT PROCEDURES

2-236. In the manual mode, leveling of the M2 aiming circle, alignment to the
north reference stake, and the measurement of the required angles must be
accomplished with extreme care and accuracy to ensure that the best radar
alignment is achieved.
2-237. AIMING CIRCLE + GUNNER'S QUADRANT INPUT IN MILS data
determines the pointing azimuth of the radar. It is provided to the operator
via the radar alignment form, which is completed by a crew member during
emplacement.
2-238. Elevation radar data record to mirror (EL RDR TO MIR) is an angular
measurement in mils from the radar M2 to the radar mirror. The angle will
vary depending on the height of the individual making the measurement or
the height of the M2 above or below the radar mirror. This measurement,
when calculated with the other angles, will determine radar pitch. This
measurement is important and is required.
2-239. BRNG RDR TO NREF is a bearing measured clockwise in mils from
the radar M2 to the north reference M2. This entry is one of the data points
in determining the radar-pointing azimuth. Extreme care and accuracy must
be taken when measuring this angle.
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FM 3-01.87
2-240. EL RDR TO NREF TOP data is needed only if the launcher line-of-
sight emplacement procedure is going to be used to determine launcher
location. If PADS provides the launcher location, then no entries are required
in this data field. To perform this measurement, a survey rod is required with
the NREF M2 aiming circle. The combination of this data and the subsequent
data field, in conjunction with the angles measured in the LS line-of-sight
procedure and in Tab 85, provide LS location.
2-241. EL RDR TO NREF BOT data field is the same as the previous data
field and is a measurement from the radar M2 to the bottom of the NREF
survey rod. The combination of these two data fields provides the distance
from the radar to the NREF M2. No entry is required if PADS provides
launcher location data.
2-242. BRNG NREF TO RDR is a bearing measured in mils clockwise from
the NREF M2 to the RDR M2. This data in combination with BRNG RDR TO
NREF will provide the radar-pointing azimuth. Extreme care must be taken
when measuring this angle. Time permitting, a two-man approach should be
used; that is, two crew members take the measurements at both aiming
circles to confirm that they come up with the same answer.
2-243. ROLL is a measurement taken in mils with an M1 gunner's quadrant
on the radar to determine the actual roll of the radar. This measurement is
also used in determining the radar-pointing angle. Time permitting, the two-
man rule also applies here. Measurements must be taken at the aligned
position.
2-244. CROSSROLL is a measurement taken in mils with an M1 gunner's
quadrant on the radar to determine the radar's pitch angle. As with all
alignment measurements, extreme care should be taken in taking the roll
and crossroll measurements. A common error in taking these measurements
is to fail to annotate correctly the direction of the "arrow" by indicating a plus
or minus sign. Time permitting, the two-man rule also applies here.
Measurements must be taken at the aligned position. Supplementary roll and
crossroll measurements will be taken at the radar-pointing angle (PTL or
STL) after transitioning to tactical operations. This value will be used as a
reference for follow-on supplemental roll and crossroll measurements made
every 24 hours. If a difference of more than 2 mils is noted, then the radar
must be rotated to its aligned position, roll and crossroll measured, and the
system reinitialized with the new values. Refer to the radar TM for proper
radar set supplementary roll and crossroll procedures.
2-245. When manually emplacing the system, soldiers may use the NFS to
obtain roll and crossroll readings if they are operational. When the system is
manually emplaced, roll and crossroll is not automatically updated by the
system. Soldiers must verify roll and crossroll every 24 hours as outlined
above. Tolerances for manual alignment are ±2 mils for the RS and ±3 mils
for the LS.
LOCATION DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL

2-246. LOCATION DATA CONFIDENCE level data field is used to indicate
the level of confidence of the location accuracy of the radar. The level of
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FM 3-01.87
confidence selected in this data field has a direct application with the ICC
site calibration process. The entry made in this data field results in an
azimuth error state (AES) being applied to this fire unit and transmitted to
the ICC when communications are established. The AES received from the
fire unit will dictate the amount of azimuth correction applied during site
calibration, as well as the correlation box sizes used in target correlation at
the ICC. An accurate AES will ensure smaller correlation boxes and smaller
azimuth correction by the ICC. Again, as with the other alignment data, care
should be taken as to which entry is applied to this data field. The following
guide will be used in determining which confidence level to apply:
• 0 = SURVEY—applied if the radar is within 10 meters of the known
location.
• 1 = MODIFIED SURVEY—applied if the radar is between 10 and
40 meters of the known location.
• 2 = MAP—applied if the radar is between 40 and 120 meters of the
known location. The radar location must be resurveyed if its position
is more than 120 meters from a known location.
2-247. ALIGNED BY is the confidence level of the radar alignment
performed. This entry, in conjunction with the location confidence level,
provides the AES. An accurate pointing angle of the radar will result in a
smaller AES. The radar alignment performed must be within one degree. The
following will be used in determining which confidence level to apply:
• 0 = SURVEY—applied if the alignment was performed with survey
accuracy and the pointing angle of the radar is known to be within 7
mils. The north reference provided by PADS and the alignment
performed with the M2 aiming circle do not provide the survey
accuracy necessary for this selection.
• 1 = COMPASS—used for the majority of Patriot alignments using the
M2 aiming circle. This method ensures survey accuracy is achieved.
The known pointing angle must be within 1 degree. If the pointing
angle error is larger than 1 degree, the radar must be resurveyed.
The selection of compass results in a larger initial correction factor
being used in the ICC site calibration process.
2-248. WIND SPEED data field changes the ICC correlation and
triangulation box sizes as a function of the wind speed at the fire unit. An
entry in this data field affects the AES reported to the ICC. Considering the
AES reported, the ICC applies the appropriate correlation and triangulation
parameters. If the wind speed is above 35 nautical miles per hour (41 statute
miles), then 1 = GALE + ABOVE is selected. The wind speed data control is
located in Tab 81, page 2.
TAB 14—TARGET DISPLAY CONTROL

2-249. Tab 14 is available in TACI and on-line during TAC OPS. Page 1 of
this tab allows the operator to define English or metric units for display and
initialization of altitude and speed. The tab defaults to English altitude and
metric speed, so the operator must ensure that altitude and speed entries
support the data base entries. In initialization, the altitude and speed affects
Tabs 71, 78, 79, and 92. During TAC OPS, these entries affect track
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FM 3-01.87
amplifying data, tag data on the situation display, and range in Tab 14
(Figure 2-55). If initialization data is to be entered manually, the other MS
may assist in the initialization process at this point.
(1)= ALTITUDE UNITS FOR TARGETS/MASK/VOLUMES

1=ENGLISH, 2=METRIC
(2)= SPEED/RANGE UNITS: FOR TARGETS/CURSOR

1=ENGLISH, 2=METRIC
LO HI = BOUNDARIES OF ALTITUDE BANDS, -3 TO

(20) (79)aa = BAND A
(10) (20)aa = BAND B
(03) (10)aa = BAND C
(-3) (03)aa = BAND D
(090) (180)aaa = MEDIUM SPEED CATEGORY LIMITS, 000 TO 514 m/s
(120)KM = JAMMER STROBE LINE DISPLAY RANGE, RMIN-RMAX
Figure 2-55. Tab 14, Target Display Control, Pages 1 and 2

2-250. BOUNDARIES OF ALTITUDE BANDS, page 2 of Tab 14, provides the
operator with the ability to select the altitude bands to be displayed. The
altitude defined for each band is controlled via the altitude band switch-
indicators A through D, in the Situation Display Select - Track Data console
group. When directed, specific altitude bands may be entered. These bands
should be tactically meaningful as an aid to quick recognition by the operator.
The altitudes defined in this tab affect only the display.
2-251. MEDIUM SPEED CATEGORY LIMITS entry establishes the speed
range for the medium speed and heading target vector that protrudes from
each target. The defaulted speed range for the target vector is 90 to 180
meters/second.
2-252. JAMMER STROBE LINE DISPLAY RANGE entry is for display
purposes only and controls the range to where the jam strobe will extend. The
FU jam strobe extends from the middle of the screen to the range defined in
this tab. If, for example, RMAX is entered, the strobe will extend to the
system's maximum range. It is recommended that the default value be used.
It should be noted that when the strobe is hooked, the strobe extends from
the center of the display down to the fire unit location.
TAB 68—DATA COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL

2-253. Tab 68, DATA COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL (Figure 2-56) is the
means by which the software is made active to provide fire unit digital
communications with the ICC. It is through this tab that the fire unit's
number that the battalion it is reporting to, and the battalion's assigned
RLRIU addresses, are entered. Within a Patriot battalion, A Battery is FP 1,
B Battery is FP 2, and so on up to FP 6. The battalion letter, A through F is
the battalion's designation. There should not be two Patriot battalions with
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FM 3-01.87
the same letter designator in the same communications network.

Consequently, brigade normally assigns the letter designator.
DATA COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL *68*
( ) =LOCAL FP NUMBER: 1 THROUGH 6
( ) =ICC/BN DESIGNATION: A-F
( ) =RLRIU ADDRESS SET NUMBER: 1 OR 2
=RLRIU ADDRESS
2-254. RLRIU ADDRESS SET NUMBER defines which RLRIU set is
used within the battalion. Either set may be used, but all elements in the
battalion must have the same set. The battalion SIGO determines which
set is to be used. There are two sets of RLRIU addresses (1-2) in the
Patriot communications software. The RLRIU address that must be
entered into the various RLRIUs depends on which set is used and the
fire unit number. If the LOCAL FP NUMBER and the RLRIU ADDRESS
SET NUMBER do not match the setting on the RLRIU, the operator is
provided an alert informing him of the error. The operator must change
the FP NUMBER, RLRIU SET NUMBER, or the actual setting on the
RLRIU. RLRIU sets are listed in Table 2-12.
Table 2-12. RLRIU Address Assignments

BN A BN B
UNIT RLRIU ADDRESS SET 1 RLRIU ADDRESS SET 2
PFP 1 01 21
PFP 2 02 22
PFP 3 03 23
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FM 3-01.87
PFP 4 04 24
PFP 5 05 25
PFP 6 06 26
ICC N/A N/A
ICC (A) 41 41
ICC (B) 42 42
ICC (C) 43 43
ICC (D) 44 44
ICC (E) 45 45
ICC (F) 46 46
CRG 1 11 31
CRG 2 12 32
CRG 3 13 33
CRG 4 14 34
CRG 5 15 35
CRG 6 16 36
ALL 00 00
DATA BUFFER TRANSFER

2-255. A data buffer transfer is the transfer of common data base
initialization items, such as volumes, assets, IFF codes, and FIDOC
parameters from the ICC to subordinate fire units. This is the recommended
process for supporting the initialization of common data base items. It
minimizes initialization time, reduces the potential for error, and
standardizes the data base throughout the battalion. At the ECS, the crew is
alerted when the ICC transfers a data base to the fire unit. These alerts
inform the crew of the status of the transfer (transfer incoming, complete,
incomplete, delayed, or failed). The alert UPDATE DATABASE must be
acknowledged and update data base in Tab 8 to complete data base transfer.
The tabs transferred by the ICC are Tabs 1, 5, 6, 55, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 78
(page 1), 79, and PTL and STL data for Tab 95.
TAB 99—FP DATA TRANSFER CONTROL

2-256. Tab 99 (Figure 2-57) is available only in TACI and allows the operator
to select a data transfer from the ICC. If data communications with the ICC
are established and the ICC is in tactical operations (not initialization), then
a data transfer will be requested. Otherwise, do not request a data transfer at
this time in the initialization sequence. The common data base items can be
transferred by the ICC anytime during fire unit initialization or while in
tactical operations without a request being made in this tab. The tab entries
are self-explanatory.
FP DATA TRANSFER CONTROL *99*
( )=REQUESTS INITIALIZATION DATA FROM ICC

1 =REQUESTS DATA
0 =NO REQUEST
Figure 2-57. Tab 99, FP Data Transfer Control
2-79
FM 3-01.87
TAB 54—RADAR FREQUENCY CONTROL

2-257. Tab 54 is available in TACI and K7 (Figure 2-58). It allows the
operator to specify what frequency(ies) the radar will operate in. During
peacetime training operations, the data for this tab is defined by the major
command to which the Patriot battalion is assigned. During wartime
operations, the ADA brigade operation order specifies the frequencies for use
by the battalion, and procedures for the W-code assignment within the
battalion. Unit TSOP should be followed when selecting frequency sets and
establishing the fire unit's standard frequency. The appropriate frequency
separation should be used when assigning W-code sets and standard
frequency for each unit. During peacetime training operations, the area
frequency coordinator or post frequency management office should be
contacted to determine what sets and which frequencies are authorized.
RADAR FREQUENCY CONTROL *54*
( )=FREQUENCY DIVERSITY AUTHORIZED; 1=YES, 0=NO

( )=FREQUENCY CODE SET: WCODE
( )=STANDARD FREQUENCY
( )=1 FOR FULL FREQUENCY SET, OR SELECT FREQUENCIES BELOW;
0( ) 4( ) 8( ) 12( ) 16( ) 20( ) 24( ) 28( ) 1=INCLUDE FREQ.
1( ) 5( ) 9( ) 13( ) 17( ) 21( ) 25( ) 29( ) 0=EXCLUDE FREQ.
2( ) 6( )10( ) 14( ) 18( ) 22( ) 26( ) 30( )
3( ) 7( )11( ) 15( ) 19( ) 23( ) 27( ) 31( )
Figure 2-58. Tab 54, Radar Frequency Control
2-258. Patriot TSOPs and directives address when and how frequency
diversity is to be authorized. FREQUENCY DIVERSITY AUTHORIZED data
field allows the authorization for frequency diversity. It may be authorized
(1=YES) TACI and K-7. Even when authorized, frequency diversity cannot
occur until the ECCM ENABLE switch-indicator is selected during tactical
operations. When the ECCM ENABLE switch is selected, the frequencies
defined in Tab 54 are distributed within the search matrix by beam. If a
specified level of interference is detected in a particular beam, the frequency
associated with that beam is modified. When the COUNTER ARM mode S/I
is enabled, the frequency diversity occurs within the frequencies defined in
Tab 54.
2-259. FREQUENCY CODE SET W-CODE establishes the frequency range
that the system will use. There are several W-code sets selectable in the
system. During peacetime, operation W-code set 1 is the allowed set.
However, not all frequencies within this code set are authorized. The theater
frequency manager will determine the frequencies to use.
2-260. STANDARD FREQUENCY data field defines the standard frequency.
It is the single frequency that the radar operates in when frequency diversity
is not authorized. The appropriate frequency separation must be adhered to
so that mutual radar interference does not occur. The number entered in this
field equates to a specific frequency within the overall bandwidth for the
radar.
2-261. FOR FULL FREQUENCY SET, OR SELECT FREQUENCIES
BELOW is defined as follows. By selecting a 1 in this data field, all the 32
frequencies will be used when frequency diversity is authorized. If the
2-80
FM 3-01.87
operator wants the system to only diversify in specific frequencies, then an

entry of 1 = INCLUDE FREQ or 0 = EXCLUDE FREQ must be made in each
of the frequency data entry fields (0 to 31).
RADAR MAPPING
2-262. Radar mapping is an important function within the Patriot system as
it establishes the lowest angle that the radar will search. If pointed too high,
aircraft can fly undetected under the search beams. If pointed too low, the
radar will expend precious radar time resource canceling clutter from ground
returns to the lower search beam. Mapping performs two functions. The first
is the establishment of the operational search lower bound (OSLB) and the
second is the establishment of the system clutter map. Because of mapping's
importance, a detailed explanation of the process and the specific functions of
the operator in conjunction with each tab are provided in the TM. This
section will only highlight each tab and discuss its overall use.
TAB 95—RADAR MAPPING TRAIN CONTROL + SUMMARY

2-263. Tab 95 (Figure 2-59) determines the target line and the left and right
limits of the azimuth and is the initial tab of the mapping sequence. TAB 95
is available in TACI and for display only in K-7. Once the mapping sequence
is started, the manstation performing the mapping is locked in mapping until
completion. The operator defines the radar PTL and three STLs, and if
applicable, the antitactical missiles (ATM) search will skew. He then
performs radar reorientation and defines the sector width to be mapped.
RADAR MAPPING TRAIN CONTROL + SUMMARY *95*

( ) D=CURRENT RS AZIMUTH
( )D=PTL ( )D=STL1 ( )D=STL2 ( )D=STL3
( )D=TBM SEARCH SECTOR SKEW BEARING ANGLE: -15 TO +15
( )=RADAR TRAIN COMMAND: 0=RS TO PLT 1=RS TO STL1
2=RS TO STL2 3=RS TO STL3 4=RS TO AZ ( )
AZIMUTHS MAPPED: TO , TO , TO , TO
( )=PASSIVE EMPLACEMENT 1=YES 0=NO NO OSLB DATA AVAILABLE
( )D=LEFT MAPPING BOUND AZIMUTH
( )D=RIGHT MAPPING BOUND AZIMUTH
Figure 2-59. Tab 95, Radar Mapping Train Control + Summary
2-264. The NFS requires one minute for spin-down after obtaining the
azimuth, roll, and crossroll. During this time, commands entered in Tab 95
will not be processed. This generally is not a problem because there are
several tabs (Tabs 14, 68, 99, and 54) that require data input before reaching
Tab 95. However, if STANDARD EMPLACEMENT WITH DATABASE
READ was selected, there is a possibility of getting to Tab 95 before the
required NFS spin-down time has elapsed. If Tab 95 is entered before the
spin-down has completed, a FUNCTION REJECT alert will appear and the
train command will not be executed, and Tab 95 will not reappear. To correct
this condition, the operator must recall Tab 95. To do this, the following steps
must be followed:
• Set the WPS CTR S/I to OFF.
• Select Tab 95 via the Select Tab process.
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FM 3-01.87
• Set the WPS CTL S/I to ON (estimate that at least 1 minute has
passed since page 2 of Tab 81 was entered).
• Reenter the data and enter Tab 95.
TAB 96—INITIAL SEARCH LOWER BOUND DATA ENTRY

2-265. Tab 96 is available in TACI (Tab 96 can be viewed but not modified in
K7). It allows the operator to define the five-point initial search lower bound
(ISLB), the lower elevation of the long-range search sector, or skip all
mapping. The five-point ISLB is important because it allows the radar to be
emplaced silently and still have an accurate lower search capability. It also
provides the start point for the initial search during mapping. A number of
ISLB points (from 1 to 5) may be entered. The number of ISLB points is
driven by the terrain contour in the sector being mapped. The ISLB points
are normally determined and provided by the unit RSOP team. The long-
range segment minimum tactical elevation allows the operator the ability to
raise the lower elevation of the long-range search sector from 0 to 30 degrees.
For example, this would be done if there is a high mountain range in the
long-range search sector that the long-range search beams would detect, even
considering earth curvature. The SKIP ALL MAPPING function is used when
the system is to be emplaced "silently." If this function is selected, the system
will not radiate at all for mapping and the ISLB will become the operational
search lower bound (OSLB) when in tactical operations (see Figure 2-60).
INITIAL SEARCH LOWER BOUND DATA ENTRY *96*

POINT 1 POINT 2 POINT 3 POINT 4 POINT 5
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )=MILS BEARING
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )=MILS ELEVATION + -200
ENTER ELEVATION IN ONLY ONE FIELD ABOVE FOR LEVEL INITIAL BOUND
BEARINGS TAKEN WITH M2 AIMING CIRCLE ALIGNED WITH RS AZIMUTH
( )D=LONG RANGE SEGMENT MINIMUM TACTICAL ELEVATION: 00 TO 30

( )=0 TO SKIP ALL MAPPING: INITIALIZATION RADIATION PROHIBITED
Figure 2-60. Tab 96, Initial Search Lower Bound Data Entry
TAB 97—MAPPING DISPLAY/CONTROL SELECT ENTRY

2-266. Tab 97 is only available in TACI. It allows the operator to determine
which mapping process to select (Figure 2-61).
MAPPING DISPLAY/CONTROL SELECT ENTRY *97*
( ) = SELECT MAPPING DISPLAY OR CONTROL SEQUENCE

A = DISPLAY A – AZIMUTH/ELEVATION/RANGE – MODIFIED RHI
C = DISPLAY C – AZIMUTH/RANGE – CONSTANT ELEVATION PPI
0 = SKIP CLUTTER MAP OR RETURN TO RADAR TRAIN CONTROL
1 = PERFORM CLUTTER MAP – VALID ONLY AT PTL
( ) = 0 TO 7 = NUMBER OF AZIMUTHS TO SKIP WITH DISPLAY A.
Figure 2-61. Tab 97, Mapping Display and Control Select Entry
2-267. The SELECT MAPPING DISPLAY OR CONTROL SEQUENCE field
will accept either one digit or letter (A, C, 0, or 1):
2-82
FM 3-01.87
• A = DISPLAY A—should be selected when the terrain contour is

irregular. It produces an irregular OSLB. For example, the left side of
the sector is higher than the right side (terrain sloping), or the
terrain in the center of the sector is higher than the sides. "A
mapping" maps all 69 beams individually and provides each beam
return to the operator. This is the most difficult mapping display to
perform and visualize with what the returns are providing. With “A
mapping” the operator has the option to ship azimuths to reduce
mapping time and can command the system to compute (interpolate)
the skipped azimuths.
• C = DISPLAY C—should be performed when the terrain contour is
level. It produces a single OSLB. "C mapping" maps all 69 beams at
one time, like a fan. The radar returns are provided to the operator
after each time he moves the fan up or down to establish a low-
intensity contiguous grazing display. This display is easy to interpret.
• 0 = SKIP CLUTTER MAP OR RETURN TO RADAR TRAIN—allows
the operator to skip the clutter map process. This selection only
applies if the sector being mapped is the PTL. If an STL is being
mapped and this entry is selected, the mapping process will return to
Tab 95.
• 1= PERFORM CLUTTER MAP—the mapping process must always
end with the mapping of the PTL. If a clutter map is to be performed,
then this option is selected. A clutter map is only done at the PTL
when in TACI or at the current azimuth when in TAC OPS. The best
clutter map is the TACI clutter map because the radar performs
several "samples" per beam during this process. This is why the TACI
clutter map takes two to five minutes to be performed.
• 0 TO 7 = NUMBER OF AZIMUTHS TO SKIP WITH DISPLAY A—
entry only applies to A display mapping. It allows the operator to skip
some of the 69 beams. If no beams are to be skipped, the "0" is
entered and all 69 beams will be presented to the operator. If "5" is
selected, the first beam is presented, the next five beams are skipped,
and the seventh beam is presented with the next five being skipped,
and it continues.
TAB 92—MASKED AREAS DRAWING CONTROL

2-268. Tab 92 is available only in TACI and is the last tab in the mapping
sequence. Along with the tab, a circle divided in three equal search sectors is
displayed on the situation display. The individual sectors represent the PTL
and STL(s) mapped, to cover the full 360 degrees. The masked terrain map
(MTM) done during A mapping is displayed in the sectors mapped. These
points are represented in the legend in Tab 92 (Figure 2-62). They consist of
dots (....), dashes (- - -), pluses (+++), asterisks (****), and zeros (000). Each of
these indicators equates to a different altitude. The altitude for each is
displayed in Tab 92. The operator indicates the masked areas by connecting
the like indicators using the situation display cursor. These masked areas,
commonly called fences, are also set to the ICC and are only used for display
purposes. They are started during tactical operations through switch action.
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FM 3-01.87
To save time, the drawing of masked areas can be done while the clutter map
is in process.
MASKED AREAS DRAWING CONTROL *92*

( )M*100 = ALTITUDE LABEL FOR DESIGNATED MASK TERRAIN AREA
( ) = PROCESS CONTROL: BLANK = CONTINUE THIS SECTOR-1
1 = ADVANCE TO NEXT SECTOR-2
2 = END MASKED AREAS DRAWING
ALTITUDE SYMBOL CODING: .... = 000a TO 000a
-—- = 000a TO 000a
+++ = 000a TO 000a
*** = 000a TO 000a
000 = 000a TO 000a
Figure 2-62. Tab 92, Masked Areas Drawing Control
2-269. With the completion of Tab 92 and the radar clutter map, the mapping
sequence is completed. The manstations involved in mapping are
automatically released.
ALTERNATE SEARCH SECTOR CONTROL

2-270. Tab 55, Alternate Search Sector Control (Figures 2-63 and 2-64), is a
two-page tab. It is the last automatically sequenced initialization tab. It
allows the operator to tailor the ABT and TBM search sector, for elevation,
azimuth, and range. The complete ABT sector can also be dropped. Two
tailored search sectors (SECT 1 and SECT 2) may be defined, which are made
active during tactical operations by the ALTER SECTOR 1 or 2 switch-
indicators. The tab is formatted so the entries in SECT 1 on pages 1 and 2 are
controlled by ALTER SECT 1 S/I. Actual recommended values for this tab are
difficult to standardize or define because they are mission, enemy, terrain
troops and time available (METT-TC) dependent. Actual application will be
based on mission and system performance. To emphasize, only the search
sectors are affected by these entries. Tracking will continue in these areas. If
the ICC inputs this data and data buffer is transferred, the tab will be filled.
ALTERNATE SEARCH SECTOR CONTROL-ABT PAGE A *55*

SECT 1 SECT 2
( )D ( )D=DROP FROM LEFT SIDE IN 1 DEG INCREMENTS TO MAX-5DEG
( )D ( )D=DROP FROM RGHT SIDE IN 1 DEG INCREMENTS TO MAX-5DEG
( ) ( ) =DROP LOWER SHORT TO MEDIUM RANGE ROWS TO MAX-1 ROWS
( ) ( ) =DROP UPPER SHORT TO MEDIUM RANGE ROWS TO MAX-1 ROWS
( ) ( ) =DROP LOWER LONG RANGE ROWS TO MAX-3 ROWS
( ) ( ) =DROP UPPER LONG RANGE ROWS TO MAX-3 ROWS
( )( ) ( )( )=DROP SEGMENTS 1= HORIZON 3=LOWER MED 5=LONG RANGE
( )( ) ( )( ) USING 4 FIELDS:2=SHORT-POP 4=UPPER MED A=ALL SEGMENTS
( )KM = DROP LONG RANGE SEARCH ( )KM = DROP SHORT RANGE SEARCH
Figure 2-63. Tab 55, Page A, Alternate Search Sector Control ABT
2-84
FM 3-01.87
2-271. The DROP FROM LEFT SIDE and DROP FROM RIGHT SIDE entries
can reduce the azimuth from the left and right ABT search boundary. These
can be reduced in 1-degree increments, to no more than 5 degrees of the
search sector.
2-272. The DROP LOWER SHORT TO MEDIUM RANGE ROWS and DROP
UPPER SHORT TO MEDIUM RANGE ROWS entries allow the operator to
drop search beam rows in short- and medium-range search, thereby changing
the lower and upper elevation search angles.
2-273. The DROP LOWER LONG RANGE ROWS and DROP UPPER LONG
RANGE ROWS entries allow the operator to drop search beam rows in
long-range search, thereby changing the lower and upper elevation search
angles.
2-274. The DROP SEGMENTS field uses four data entries associated with
each sector control (SECT 1 and 2). Activation of these entries results in the
entire search sector being deactivated. The operator may drop all of the five
surveillance search sectors. Short pop and lower medium elevation search
sectors cannot be dropped independently; other sectors must be dropped with
them. As a basic rule, the system will not allow a hole in search coverage.
You may reduce it from the bottom or from the top, but you cannot take a
section from the middle.
2-275. The DROP LONG-RANGE SEARCH entry allows the operator to
reduce the maximum long-range search. Currently, the radar searches to
radar maximum (RMAX) range. This entry allows the operator to reduce the
range to where the radar will only search out to the range defined in this
data field.
2-276. The DROP SHORT-RANGE SEARCH entry allows the operator to
reduce the short-range search of the radar. Currently, the radar searches
from radar minimum (RMIN) to RMAX range. The previous entry allows the
operator to move RMAX in. This entry allows the operator to move RMI out
so that short-range search will begin farther away from the radar. This range
must be at least 4 kilometers less than the range applied in the drop long-
range data field.
ALTERNATE SEARCH SECTOR CONTROL – TBM PAGE B *55*

SECT 1 SECT 2
( )D ( )D=DROP FROM LEFT SIDE IN 1DEG INCREMENTS TO MAX-15DEG
( )D ( )D=DROP FROM RGHT SIDE IN 1DEG INCREMENTS TO MAX-15DEG
( ) ( ) =DROP LOWER TBM ROWS, 0 TO 8
( ) ( ) =DROP UPPER TBM ROWS, 0 TO 14
( ) ( ) =DROP SEGMENTS USING ONE FIELD: 6=LTBM 8=XTBM B=BOTH
Figure 2-64. Tab 55, Page B, Alternate Search Sector Control—TBM

2-277. The DROP FROM LEFT SIDE and DROP FROM RIGHT SIDE entries
provide the operator with the ability to reduce the TBM search sector. This
reduced TBM search is in 1-degree azimuth increments to a maximum of
15 degrees for each side.
2-85
FM 3-01.87
2-278. The DROP LOWER TBM ROWS and DROP UPPER TBM ROWS
entries allow the operator to reduce the elevation of the TBM search sector.
This reduction of elevation search sector is accomplished by eliminating beam
rows from the lower or upper portion of the search sector.
2-279. The DROP SEGMENTS USING ONE FIELD entry allows the
operator to drop two of the three TBM search sectors, either individually or
simultaneously, through this entry. The middle TBM sector may not be
dropped.
2-280. During engagement operations, Tab 55 is used to drop specific ABT
search sectors. The horizon, short-range, pop-up and lower medium-range
search sectors may be dropped at the TBM alert by way of ALTER SECT 1
switch-indicator. This assists in minimizing clutter returns. It is appropriate
for TBM-only missions. In the ABT mission, the dropping of ABT search
sectors other than long-range should not be performed. Dropping long-range
may be considered as a manually induced saturation alleviation process.
2-281. Upon entering Tab 55, the automatic initialization sequencing tabs are
completed. The operator must then input the launcher location data and a
Tab 6 entry if this was not done concurrently by manstation 3 during
initialization. The common data base items must also be entered at this time
if a data transfer was not accomplished. If a data base transfer was
performed, the operator should check and may make a hard copy of the
following tabs at the ECS for reference: Tabs 1, 6, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 78,
and 79.
TAB 85—LAUNCHER LOCATION/ALIGNMENT

2-282. Tab 85 is extremely important (Figure 2-65). Incorrect data will result
in failed missile acquisition and the loss of a missile. Care must be taken
when performing these functions, because the alignment data entered into
the computer will determine location and pointing angle of the launcher.
2-283. The PLGR and NFS of each LS require the input of "seed" data like
the RS. The seeding operation for the LS is automatically applied through the
ECS. This minimizes errors and is necessary for the differential data
acquisition function of LS emplacement. Valid readings are used to compute
the Northing, Easting, and elevation differences between the RS and LS
locations in Earth Centered Coordinates. These Earth Centered Coordinates
are converted by system software to FU local coordinates and then to UTM
coordinates for display in Tab 85.
2-284. Tab 85 is available in TACI and during tactical operations to facilitate
changes and late arriving launchers. LS emplacement can be performed
either manually or automatically. The automatic emplacement process
applies to both local and remotely deployed LSs. As it does with the RS,
Status Monitor also maintains the status of each LS’s PLGR, NFS, and
communications equipment. Status Monitor checks begin when Tab 85 is
entered and the LS is in sync. It consists of 16 pages to accommodate the two
banks of eight launchers each. The first 8 pages are for bank A, with the
second 8 pages for banks B to F.
2-86
FM 3-01.87
LAUNCHER LOCATION/ALIGNMENT *85*

( )=LS NUMBER
( )=LS EMPLACE TYPE 1=AUTO 0=MANUAL
INPUT BELOW IN MILS
( )UTM BRNG NREF TO LS = ( . )
( )METERS ALTITUDE BRNG LS TO NREF = ( . )
BRNG LS TO RDR = ( . )
( )=DEPLETION PRIORITY ELEV LS TO RDR = ( . )
01=HIGHEST LS ROLL = ( . )
( )MILS=LS EMPLACEMENT AZIMUTH LS CROSSROLL = ( . )
Figure 2-65. Tab 85, Launcher Location and Alignment
2-285. The LS NUMBER data field designates the launcher number or
address. It is already filled in with the appropriate number (1A to 8A) for the
first eight launchers. The operator must enter the LS number for the last
eight pages (1B-F to 8B-F). The number on this tab must coincide with the
address and bank switch on the launcher from which the data was provided.
The data is provided to the ECS crew by a launcher crew member, on the
Launcher Alignment form (see Appendix A).
2-286. The LS EMPLACE TYPE data field determines the emplacement
mode for the LS. Enter 1 for automatic emplacement or 0 for manual
emplacement. If MANUAL is selected, the data is entered as normal, and the
rules associated with manual data entry apply. If AUTO is selected, the
operator need only enter the LS number, if not already displayed. The LS
must be in the Remote Mode for automatic emplacement, otherwise the
operator is alerted LS na LOCAL—NFS DISALLOWED.
2-287. The DEPLETION PRIORITY entry defines the depletion order for
launchers. This entry is based on the MISSILE DEPLETION RULE entered
in Tab 78. If deplete BY LS was selected in Tab 78, then this entry will be
used to deplete the launcher according to the priority established in the tab.
It should be noted that this is not the determining factor in selecting a
launcher. If all the other factors in launcher selection are met, the priority
will apply.
2-288. When Tab 85 is entered, Status Monitor begins communicating with
the selected LS and initiates the automatic emplacement process. Once the
automatic emplacement is completed for selected LS, the operator is provided
with the following two alerts:
• LSna AUTO EMPLACEMENT COMPLETE informs the operator
that LSn has completed a successful emplacement.
• HARDCOPY LSna DATA TAB 85 informs the operator to make a
hard copy of that particular Tab 85 for the site data book. If Tab 85 is
selected, the LS number, UTM, azimuth, altitude, roll and crossroll
are displayed.
• If AUTO was selected, the cursor is denied in these fields, and the
only entry the operator can make is in the DEPLETION PRIORITY
data field.
2-289. If the operator receives the alert LSn EMPLACEMENT FAILED, the
operator must check page 4 of Fault Data tab to determine if there are any
faults with the LS, PLGR, NFS, or communications equipment. If the failure
2-87
FM 3-01.87
is caused by poor satellite data, the LS should be placed to "local" and a crew
member should determine the PLGR parameters.
2-290. The UTM location is a UTM coordinate provided by the PADS. There
are also line-of-sight and non-line-of-sight procedures in the launcher TM for
determining launcher location if PADS data is not available. The launcher
emplacement accuracy relative to the radar is ±10 meters.
2-291. The METERS ALTITUDE field is the altitude of the launcher above
sea level in meters. The data field will accept a 100 meters below sea level
entry. The altitude is normally provided by the PADS system.
MISSILE DEPLETION RULES

2-292. Launch decision parameters are input via Tab 78. Engagement
threshold parameters provide data for information processing. The system
uses this information to determine which missile to launch. The MILS=LS
EMPLACEMENT AZIMUTH data field displays the azimuth angle of the LS
as determined by the NFS (if applicable) or is entered from a hard copy by
the operator.
2-293. The INPUT BELOW IN MILS data entries in this area are a function
of survey data type provided. If the launcher UTM, altitude, and orienting
line are provided, the Patriot Launcher Location Alignment Data Form 2 is
used. If the launcher UTM location, altitude, and alignment data are not
available, then Form 1 is used. Copies of forms and launcher alignment
procedures at an unsurveyed site are available in TM 9-1440-600-10.
2-294. If the launcher UTM location is provided, the BRNG NREF TO LS
data entry is always entered as 3200 mils. If the launcher UTM is not
available, this angle is measured from the NREF M2 aiming circle to the
launcher M2.
2-295. If launcher UTM data are provided, the BRNG LS TO NREF entry is
the true azimuth of the launcher measured through the canister alignment
pins, subtracted from 6400 mils. This computation is done by the launcher
crew member using Patriot Launcher Location Alignment Data Form 2. The
ECS operator enters the resultant data. If the launcher UTM location data is
not available, then this angle is measured from the launcher M2 to the NREF
M2.
2-296. BRNG LS TO RDR is the angular measurement from the launcher M2
to the radar M2. This measurement is only needed if the PADS were not used
to determine location. If PADS was used, no entry is required. The launcher
line-of-sight procedure will define this measurement which, used with the
subsequent measurement, determines launcher location.
2-297. ELEV LS TO RDR is the angular measurement from the radar M2 to
the top of the survey rod collocated with the radar M2. This is similar to the
above angle and is not needed if PADS provided the launcher location. It is
part of the launcher line-of-sight procedure to determine launcher location.
2-298. LS ROLL is the measurement of the launcher's roll in mils using the
M1 gunner's quadrant at the aligned position. The measurement must be
2-88
FM 3-01.87
made as accurately as possible. Care should be taken to ensure that the

direction of the arrow on the M1 is annotated by affixing the correct plus or
minus sign to the angular measurement stakes. Toward the front or curbside
of the launcher, the sign will be positive.
2-299. LS CROSSROLL is the measurement of the launcher's pitch in mils
using the M1 gunner's quadrant at the aligned position. LS supplemental roll
and crossroll are needed if the launcher is not on a handstand. Once the
launcher has been trained to the firing azimuth, the PLGR will automatically
update the data base. The alignment azimuth of the launcher must be
marked on the LS azimuth bullring. The roll and crossroll will be measured
at the PTL. This provides a reference for the supplemental roll and crossroll
measurements that must be taken every 24 hours. If the difference between
the reference and the daily "reading" is more than 2 mils, the LS must be
reinitialized with updated roll and crossroll data. This will require that the
launcher be returned to the aligned stow position, the roll and crossroll
measured, and the LS reinitialized with the new values in Tab 85. See TM 9-
1440-600-10 for supplementary roll and crossroll measurement procedures.
When manually emplacing the system, soldiers may use the NFS to obtain
roll and crossroll readings if they are operational. When the system is
manually emplaced, roll and crossroll is not automatically updated by the
system. Soldiers must verify roll and crossroll every 24 hours as outlined
above.
TAB 6—IFF/SIF CODE CONTROL

2-300. Tab 6 (Figure 2-66) is automatically displayed during initialization
although this tab is part of the data transferred tabs. Most of the specific
data items of this tab will not be discussed in this section, but are covered in
detail in paragraphs 2-38 through 2-45 of this chapter.
IFF/SIF CODE CONTROL CMND VALUES: *6*

( )=IFF/SIF STATE A=AUTO, M=MANUAL CODE ENTRY
( )=SIF TABLE 1,2=CR;3,4=KAA-63 FORMS:
( )=CR AUTOMATIC CHANGE 1=YES, 0=NO KAA63 *73*
( )=MODE4 CODE A,B OR Z=ZEROIZE CROSE *74*
( )=MODE4 LOW RANDOMNESS 1=YES, 0=NO
( )=MODE4 CODE HOLD 1=YES, 0=NO
YEAR( ) DAY( )
UNUSED SIF CODES: CR TABLE ; CODE PAIRS IN 3, IN 4
Figure 2-66. Tab 6, IFF and SIF Code Control
TAB 98—DATA BASE CONTROL
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FM 3-01.87
2-301. Tab 98 is available only in TACI and must be selected by the operator.
This tab is selected when the operator has completed all data entries and
reviewed all the tabs in the initialization process. Upon entering this tab
(Figure 2-67), the initialization process is concluded. The operator is then
provided with two alerts that must be acknowledged for the data base to be
written. Upon completion of the data base write, the operator is directed to
enter tactical operations.
DATABASE CONTROL *98*

( ) IS MANUAL DATA INPUT COMPLETE? 1 = YES, 0 = NO
( )/( )/( ) DATABASE NUMBER/NAME/USER
( ) TACTICAL DATABASE NUMBER
CURRENT DATABASES DATABASE USERS
- - - - K7=TACTICAL S/W
- - - - LAT=LIVE AIR TRAINER
- - - - TNG=TRAINING
- - - -
- - - -
Figure 2-67. Tab 98, Database Control

2-302. The final update process is initiated at the end of initialization after
Tab 98 has been entered and a complete set of RS data has been averaged.
Tab 81 is automatically converted to hard copy with the final emplacement
data.
2-303. Units must use PLGR-based PTOD whenever possible. Units without
access to automated PLGR-based PTOD will manually enter PTOD.
Controlling units will provide the PTOD and if possible base it on PLGR
PTOD. If two adjacent units have no controlling unit, then the lowest
numbered unit will provide the PTOD. The operator can now use the
percentage value displayed on page 4 of the FAULT DATA Tab to make
emplacement time line decisions. If some or all LSs have not auto emplaced
when TACI is finished, the TCO or TCA must evaluate the emplacement
status to determine how close to completion each LS is. Mission requirements
and the emplacement status for the LS to auto emplace are key factors in
making this decision. A rule of thumb is: if emplacement status indicates
more than 70 percent, the unit should remain in TACI until the LS is auto
emplaced. If emplacement status indicates less than 30 percent, the unit
should go to the tactical operation software K7. Between 30 percent and 70
percent requires decisions based on the mission and on the number of LS
already auto emplaced.
2-304. The common data base items that are normally provided to the fire
unit as parts of a data base. The common data base items are in Tabs 1, 5, 6,
70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 78, and 79.
GLIF THRESHOLD
2-305. New software, PDB-4.2, updates Tab 1 with another page to include
the capability to select a GLIF and track-while-scan (TWS) velocity threshold
(36 km/hr to 144 km/hr). This will provide track and engagement capability
for slow speed track threats in clutter. The default value is set to 40 m/sec. If
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FM 3-01.87
that threat value is not saved to the TACI data base, then it will return to the
default value when the software is rebooted. (See Figure 2-68.)
FIDOC + OPERATIONAL PARAMETERS CHANGE PAGE 3 OF 3

*1*
(n) = TBMA DIVE CALCULATION 1 = ON, 0 = OFF
(nn) aa = TBMA DIVE ALTITUDE nn TO nn aa
(nn)D = TBMS DIVE ANGLE nn TO nn DEG
(n) = URBAN LOW ALT TRAJECTORY CONTROL 1 = ON, 0 = OFF
(a) = TBMA NOMINAL OVERRIDE Y = YES, N = NO
NOTE: YES ALSO TURNS OFF DIVE CALC
(nn) M/S = GLIF + T-W-S VELOCITY THRESHOLD; 10 TO 40, NOMINAL = 40
Figure 2-68. Tab 1, Page 3
• TBMA NOMINAL OVERRIDE default is N = No.
• GLIF + TWS VELOCITY THRESHOLD must be determined
according to the threat and METT-TC. The default value is 40m/sec.
• If the input to TBMA NOMINAL OVERRIDE = Y, then, on ENTR
TAB, TBMA DIVE CALCULATION will be reset to OFF (0) if
required. A subsequent entry of no requires the TBMA DIVE
CALCULATION to be set to ON by the operator.
2-91
BLANK
2-1
Chapter 3
Patriot Air Battle Operations

This chapter addresses Patriot air battle operations that consist of two
major missions, countering the tactical ballistic missile (TBM) threat and
countering the air breathing threat (ABT). The ABT threat includes fixed
and rotary winged aircraft, tactical air to surface missiles (TASMs) or
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Also addressed are crew
responsibilities and the division of labor in the ICC and ECS. It provides a
detailed explanation of software implementation, detection, identification,
engagement operations, kill assessment, TBM, ABT, and mixed defense
design functions. The software implementations of firing doctrine, tactical
operations, and recommended parameters are also discussed. The
classified material corresponding to Patriot air battle operations in this
chapter will be found in Chapter 3 of (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U), which
contains the classified values referenced by a code number in bold and
underlined (for example: P4-123).
PATRIOT CREW RESPONSIBILITIES

3-1. Patriot crew responsibilities and the division of labor within the ECS and
ICC are divided into two functional areas—weapons control and friendly
protection. Each functional area is assigned to one operator. This idea is
deemed effective because it evenly distributes operator tasks, exploits system
automation, and retains the appropriate officer-NCO division of
responsibility. Although this section does not outline the exact procedures to
be used during the air battle, it does specify areas of responsibility and
authority for each crew member and it explains recommended display console
configurations.
ENGAGEMENT CONTROL STATION CREW

3-2. The ECS is operated by a crew of three, one officer and two enlisted
personnel. The officer (usually a lieutenant) is called the tactical control
officer (TCO). He operates manstation (MS) 3 and performs the friendly
protect function. One enlisted soldier operates MS 1 and is called the tactical
control assistant (TCA). He performs the weapons control function. A
communications specialist is the second enlisted soldier and operates the
communications equipment at MS 2. Three separate crews man the ECS
during 24-hour operations.
TACTICAL CONTROL OFFICER

3-3. The TCO is the officer in charge (OIC) of the Patriot battery fire control
crew and is responsible for everything that happens or does not happen
during battery air battle operations (refer to Table 3-1). He is responsible for
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FM 3-01.87
identifying all targets. He should have the FRNDLY PROT and (as
appropriate to the tactical situation) the ECCM ASSIST S/Is enabled in the
Console Mode group. The FRNDLY PROT S/I enables alerts associated with
the identification processing (ID, conflicts, violations, et cetera). The A-scope
is displayed at this manstation. Other switches should be activated as
outlined in the tactical control officer's responsibilities in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1 TCO Functions and Responsibilities

FUNCTION RESPONSIBILITIES
Friendly protect Identify targets.
Ensure system is in assigned search, identification,
and engage mode.
CONSOLE Verify activation/deactivation SIF and Mode 4.
Manstation 3
Identify false targets based on track amplifying data
tab and situation display.
SWITCH ACTION Monitor situation display and alert messages.

CONSOLE MODE
Friendly protect
ECCM assist (as required)
MAP DATA
Identification areas Monitor party line for air battle.
WPN control areas
Defended areas
Mask terr/maps
TRACK DATA
Friends Apply or remove cease fire, hold fire, or engage hold.
Unknowns Monitors clutter conditions and activate clutter
Track numbers mapping.
Other switch-indicators as Perform A-scope evaluation.
required.
Make firing doctrine changes.
Direct radar emission control schedule.
Direct system reorientation.
Monitor status alerts and assess selected alerts.
3-4. The TCO ensures, through Tab 1, that the system is in the assigned
identification mode. He monitors the situation display, alert line, and tabular
display area. He uses the Track Amp Data tab display to identify targets
while in the manual identification mode and confirm identity while in the
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FM 3-01.87
automatic ID mode. The TCO also uses this tab and the situation displays to
assist him in determining clutter and false targets. False targets are
normally indicated as such with a "false" or "slow" indicator in the ENGST/M
data field of the Track Amp Data tab. These targets may also exhibit erratic
speed, direction, and altitude indications. If these tracks are false targets, the
TCO (if not busy) may consider dropping track.
3-5. The alert states and majority of the firing doctrine changes will be
accomplished at the ICC and data-transferred to each battery. The TCO will
monitor these transfers and ensure through tabular display (Tabs 1, 5, 6, 70,
71, 73, and 74) and the situation display that the changes have been
implemented. The TCO will implement changes that are provided to the
battery through voice communications. These changes will include activation
and deactivation of assets, volumes, IFF codes and tables, identification
weight sets, hostile authorizations in Tab 1 (Pop-up, ECM, MSV, and Slow
Target Engage) SIF authorization, and ID mode. This also ensures the unit is
in the correct ALTERNATE SEARCH SECTOR CONTROL radar search
mode.
3-6. To ensure that nonhostile aircraft are not engaged, the TCO is
responsible for applying the engagement overrides (HOLD FIRE, CEASE
FIRE, ENGAGE HOLD, or change target ID to friend) according to the
current rules of engagement. The TCO is also responsible for removing
engagement overrides. The CEASE FIRE override may be removed by the
TCA as dictated by the situation.
3-7. Manual IFF interrogation of targets is performed by the TCO. He
monitors the SIF and IFF response evaluation of targets via the Track Amp
Data tab. The enabling or disabling of Mode 4 Enable and SIF Enable S/I is
his responsibility in coordination with the TCA.
3-8. The TCO will perform ECM target evaluation when time permits. He
uses the A-scope presentation when required to assist him. The TCO also
monitors system operations and performs manual clutter map as necessary.
3-9. System reorientation orders are received and acknowledged by the TCO.
The actual reorientation is performed by the TCA.
3-10. The TCO monitors the TAC OPS net (party line 2) for target
identification information from the ICC. He maintains close coordination
with the TCA and keeps the battery command post (CP) advised. The TCO
provides guidance and leadership as appropriate. If only one console is
operational, the TCO operates it and performs TCA functions as well as the
friendly protect function.
TACTICAL CONTROL ASSISTANT

3-11. The TCA (refer to Table 3-2) monitors and initiates all engagements. In
the automatic engagement mode, the system engages targets more efficiently
than the operators. The TCA's primary task is to monitor and operate the
system in order to engage hostile targets. Therefore, he is responsible for
controlling all system functions that effect engagement. The TCA must have
the WPNS CNTR and EQUIP control switch-indicators (S/Is) enabled in the
Console Mode group. The alerts associated with weapons control,
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FM 3-01.87
engagements, radar status, and radar faults are displayed on MS 1 as a

result of enabling the WPNS CNTR switch-indicator. Other switches should
be made active as outlined in Table 3-2 below.
Table 3-2 TCA Functions and Responsibilities
Weapons Control Engage targets centralized (semiautomatic)
Engage targets as directed by battalion engage targets in self-
defense.
Decentralized (semiauto) engage targets as directed by the TCO.
Engage targets in the TBE QUEUE.
CONSOLE Engage targets in self-defense.

Manstation one Autonomous (semiauto) engage targets as directed by the TCO.
SWITCH ACTION Engage targets in the TBE queue.

CONSOLE MODE Engage targets in self-defense.
Weapon control
Decentralized (automatic) monitor engagements.
Equipment control
Autonomous (automatic) same as decentralized (semiauto).
MAP DATA
Reorient system.
Weapons control
volumes Place system in assigned mode of control.
Defended areas
Activate SIF enable when required.
TRACK DATA Activate MODE IV enable when required.
Unknowns
(Weapons Free) Activate ECCM enable when required.
Hostiles
Place system in correct engagement and search mode.
Track Numbers
LNIP Place appropriate launchers to operate.
PIP
Check that system is in assigned weapons control status.
Other
Activate/deactivate areas enable.
Other
switch/indicators Activate/deactivate radiation, control alternate search sectors.
as required Monitor situation display for alert messages.
Monitor party line 1 for air battle conditions and status panel.
Monitor system monitor alerts assess selected alerts.
Monitor system test indicators.
3-12. The TCA ensures that the system is in the correct engagement mode,
search mode, and mode of control. Furthermore, he is responsible for
configuring the system according to the current alert state. This may include
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FM 3-01.87
correct configuring system for the correct weapon control status, depressing
the areas enable switch, activating SIF enable, activating mode IV enable,
changing from threshold low to threshold high, or activating ECCM enable.
He also controls system radiation (off, active, or passive) based on direction
provided by the TCO, ICC, or battery CP. He places the radar in the
appropriate search mode (ABT or TBM) as directed. The TCA activates the
launching stations. The TCA also monitors the status panel for launching
station status and missile count. The display areas that are monitored by the
TCA include the situation display, tab area, alert line, and the status panel.
These are not listed in priority. Their importance depends upon the tactical
situation.
3-13. The TCA engages targets employing the rules of engagement and
supplemental fire control measures in effect. In the centralized mode of
control and semiautomatic engagement mode, all engagements are directed
by the battalion fire direction center (FDC). This is the normal method of
engagement operations. The TCA acknowledges the fire control order and
engages the target. If the target must be engaged immediately, the ICC
operator must augment the engage command with a voice command such as
"Engage your target 005 now!" The right to self-defense is never denied, but
the TCA must announce the intention to engage a self-defense threat to the
TCO and double-check self-defense criteria and procedures before
engagement. In some situations, such as when friendly air forces have air
superiority or when the possibility of fratricide exists, self-defense
engagements may be restricted (but not denied) by the airspace control
authority. Situation awareness is of prime importance under these
circumstances.
3-14. In the decentralized mode of control and in the semiautomatic
engagement mode, the TCA manually engages targets when directed by the
TCO in the order of the to be engaged (TBE) queue. In the automatic
engagement mode, he monitors the engagements. The TCA provides kill
assessments as appropriate. Depending on the ROE, normally in the
autonomous mode, the TCA places the system in weapons hold and does not
fire except in self-defense or in response to a formal order.
3-15. The TCA monitors cease fires applied to targets within his area of
responsibility. He may apply engagement hold on a target as appropriate.
The TCA monitors the air defense control (ADC) net (party line 1).
3-16. Strobe engagements are performed by the TCA when directed by the
TCO. Strobe engagement method is the preferred method of engagement
against ECM strobe targets.
COMMUNICATIONS OPERATOR
3-17. The communications operator monitors and operates the systems
communications equipment. As such, he monitors the tactical FM sets, makes
periodic checks of the data links, routing logic radio interface unit, and the
three UHF stacks. He is responsible for having the assigned address in the
RLRIU, ensuring all communications equipment is configured according to
the current communications plan, and passing and receiving tactical reports
to and from the battery CP (SAMSTAT, missile count, and engagement
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FM 3-01.87
reports). He assists the TCO in making assessments of communication faults.

He monitors the antenna mast group (AMG), and rotates and elevates the
UHF antennas when required. The communications operator implements all
communications ECCM in the ECS, including the use of UHF power
amplifiers. The communications operator is also responsible for
implementing the battery's part of the battalion communications plan,
properly patching all channels, and coordinating communications plan
changes with the ICC and battalion communications control. He is also
responsible for passing and receiving tactical reports to and from the battery
CP (SAMSTAT, missile count, and engagement reports).
ICC CREW
3-18. The ICC is operated by a crew of three—one officer and two enlisted
soldiers. The officer is normally a captain or a senior lieutenant and is called
the tactical director (TD). The TD performs the friendly protect function. One
enlisted soldier (operator/maintainer) operates manstation 1 (MS 1). He
performs the weapons controls function and is called the tactical director
assistant (TDA). The second enlisted soldier operates manstation 2 (MS 2)
and is called the communications operator. There are three separate crews
that man the ICC during 24-hour operations.
TACTICAL DIRECTOR
3-19. The TD is responsible for the battalion air battle operations.
Specifically, the TD's most important duty is identifying all targets. The TD
has the FRNDLY PROT switch-indicators activated. Alerts associated with
identification and engagement overrides are displayed on this manstation.
Other switches should be activated as outlined in Table 3-3.
3-20. The TD ensures that the ICC and ECSs are in the assigned state of
readiness, state of emission, and ID mode. The TD monitors the battalion
status panel and communications status with the FUs and higher echelons.
The TD selects appropriate tabs and monitors subordinate unit status and air
battle parameters. If entered data is incorrect, the TD applies the correct
condition via electronic data transfers or voice. The TD supervises the
battalion radiation schedule and unit search modes (TBM/ABT). In addition,
the TD maintains maintenance schedules, ensuring that the battalion is
prepared to perform its air defense mission.
3-21. The TD is responsible for resolving target identification. This ensures
that friendly aircraft are protected and not engaged. The TD directs IFF/SIF
interrogations as required by the situation. The TD is responsible for
applying all engagement overrides (HOLD FIRE, CEASE FIRE, or ENGAGE
HOLD).
3-22. The TD monitors the higher echelon net and alert messages, and
responds to all except engage commands. The TD normally coordinates
directly with the brigade or master battalion level TD. The TD monitors
party line 2.
3-23. The TD assesses the operability of MS 3 and the environmental control
unit, monitors' communications status, and directs the actions of the
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FM 3-01.87
communications operator when faults exist. When one console is out of action,
the TD operates the other console and performs both TD and TDA functions.
Table 3-3 TD Function and Responsibilities

Friendly protect Identify targets.
Resolve identification conflicts.
Ensure that FDC is in assigned state of readiness and
DEFCON.
CONSOLE Assign states of readiness and DEFCON to batteries.

Manstation 3
Ensure that batteries are in assigned identification
search and engage mode.
SWITCH ACTION Monitor battalion status panel and note FDC equipment
and higher echelon communications status.
Ensure that the battery IFF/SIF is correct.

CONSOLE MODE Call up FU status tab and note battery status.
Friendly protect
Monitor the situation display and alert messages.
MAP DATA
Identification areas Apply/release hold fire, cease fire, and engage hold as
WPNS CONTROL required.
volumes Apply/release IFF/SIF interrogation as required.
Defended areas
Monitor higher echelon alerts and respond to all engage
TRACK DATA commands.
Friends, unknowns
Track numbers
SOURCE/ADDRESS Monitors, status monitor alerts and assess selected
SELECT alerts.
Source – all, HEU
Other switch/indicators Monitor and operate party line 2.
as required.
TACTICAL DIRECTOR ASSISTANT

3-24. The TDA monitors and initiates all engagements. In the semiautomatic
engagement mode, the TDA assigns all engagements to subordinate batteries
(or battalions, when operating in the master battalion role). In the automatic
engagement mode, the TDA monitors and assigns engagements within the
battalion. The TDA should have the ENGAGE CNTR and EQUIP CNTR
switch-indicators enabled. The alerts associated with weapons control,
engagements, and equipment status appears on this manstation. The TDA
starts other switches as outlined in Table 3-4.
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FM 3-01.87
3-25. The TDA is responsible for performing all functions associated with
engaging targets under the supervision of the TD. The TDA monitors the
battalion status panel and ensures that the batteries are in the assigned
mode of control and weapon control status, including areas enabled. The TDA
monitors the batteries' equipment and communications status indicators, as
well as missile inventory of each battery and for the battalion.
3-26. The TDA calls up appropriate tabs and notes the batteries' operational
and missile statuses. The TDA ensures that the batteries and the FDC are in
the assigned engagement mode. The TDA directs the batteries to activate or
deactivate radar search mode and IFF based on the TD's orders and the
battalion emission control (EMCON) plan. The TDA keeps continuous track
of FU radar search mode, IFF, and operational status.
3-27. In the semiautomatic engagement mode, the TDA assigns all
engagements as directed by the TD within the battalion. The TDA assigns
engagements using the TBE queue that indicates which targets are most
threatening and the best battery for the engagement. The TDA responds to
all higher echelon engagement alerts and takes appropriate action. The
TDA's authority to order engagements is provided by voice command or alert
message from higher echelon when the battalion is operating centralized to
higher echelon. When the battalion is decentralized, the TDA's authority to
engage is based on the rules of engagement and supplemental fire control
measures in effect.
3-28. The TDA monitors cease fires and hold fires applied to targets within
his area of responsibility and may apply engage hold on a target as
appropriate. The TDA monitors status monitor alerts, assesses weapons
control computer, peripherals, and MS 1 faults, and monitors the system
built-in test equipment (BITE) panel. The TDA normally monitors the ADC
on party line 1.
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FM 3-01.87
Table 3-4 TDA Function and Responsibilities

Weapons control Assign engagements from TBE queue.
CONSOLE Check battalion status panel and ensure that all

Manstation 1 batteries are in the correct state of alert.
Assign engagement and search mode and weapon
control status to include AREAS ENABLE.
SWITCH ACTION Note batteries’ equipment status, communications
CONSOLE MODE status, and radar frequency code.
Engage control
equipment control Ensure FDC is in assigned engagement mode and
weapons control status.
MAP DATA
Weapons control volumes Direct radar activation/deactivation.
defended areas
Monitor situation display tab area and battalion status
TRACK DATA panel.
Unknowns (weapons free)
Monitor and operate party lines.
hostiles
track numbers Monitor status monitor alerts and assess selected
LNIP alerts.
PIP
Monitor system test indicators.
SOURCE/ADDRESS
Source/all Monitor higher echelon alerts and respond as
Other switch/indicators required.
as required.
COMMUNICATIONS OPERATOR
3-29. The communications operator (MOS 31F) is responsible for monitoring
and operating the battalion task force data and voice communications. The
communications operator monitors CRG status and the network link status
via the Communications Fault Data tab and make periodic checks of the data
links, RLRIUs, modems, and the three UHF stacks. The communications
operator initializes the joint tactical information distribution system (JTIDS)
terminal and switch multiplexer unit (SMU), and monitors them for proper
operation via Communications Fault Data tab. The communications operator
assists the TD in making assessments of communications faults. They
monitor the antenna mast group and are responsible for rotating and
elevating the UHF antennas when required. The communications operator
implements all communications ECCM in the ICC including the use of the
power amplifiers. The communications operator is also responsible for
implementing and monitoring the battalion communications plans, properly
patching all channels, monitoring the CRGs, and coordinating changes to the
plan with the ECS and CRG communications operators and battalion
communications control. They are also responsible for passing and receiving
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FM 3-01.87
tactical reports to and from the battalion tactical control station (TCS)
(SAMSTAT, missile count, and engagement reports).
ICC AIR BATTLE OPERATIONS

3-30. The ICC functions as a fire distribution center performing automated
threat assessment and fire distribution for local fire units (Patriot, THAAD,
or Hawk) as well as subordinate battalions while operating as a master
battalion. The ICC also performs extensive automated air battle management
and coordination functions. These include target correlation, identification
conflict resolution, engagement coordination, and kill assessment.
ICC AIR DEFENSE FUNCTIONS

3-31. The ICC provides the following air defense functions for efficient battle
management and command and control—
• Maintains air picture data.
– System triangulation.
– System calibration.
– Surveillance cueing against TBM tracks.
– Correlation of sensor data on air tracks.
– System oriented correlation.
– Smallest possible correlation cell sizes used.
• Manages and distributes track reports.
– Maintains battalion or master battalion in status data.
– Distributes target engagement status.
– Inputs into engagement decision.
– Monitors equipment status and readiness.
• Uses all available information to identify tracks and disseminate
track identity to subordinate FUs or battalions, adjacent battalions,
and higher echelon.
– Determines ID.
– Resolves ID conflicts.
– Resolves conflicts in data.
– Performs threat evaluation and threat ordering independently of
the FUs, on a master battalion or a battalion wide basis, using all
available data.
• Assigns or pairs targets to specific FUs or battalions for engagement
based on the commander's and/or computer's assessment of which FU
will be most effective in conducting the engagement.
FIRE DIRECTION CENTER OPERATIONS

3-32. Basic functions of the FDC in command of a battalion or master
battalion are—
• Controlling and coordinating the engagement and identification
actions of subordinate FUs and battalions.
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FM 3-01.87
• Coordinating with adjacent battalions.

• Reporting to, accepting, and executing direction from higher air
defense headquarters.
FIRING DOCTRINE
3-33. Page one of Tab 1 is used to enter subordinate fire platoon and
battalions (BN). Alert states, DEFCON air defense warning (ADW), missile
attack warning, and chemical/biological/radiological environmental warning
states for each subordinate battalion. Page 1 also reports the local ICC alert
state commanded by higher echelon unit (HEU) and allows entry of the
achieved local ICC alert state.
3-34. Air defense systems provide command and control, and the following
functions must be performed: air picture generation (track management),
target identification, threat assessment, and fire distribution. In support of
these functions, the ICC becomes part of the total air defense architecture
with overall decision responsibility in the functional areas listed above. The
ICC relies on track data and status from its subordinate units and higher
headquarters and performs independent evaluations of the ICC's integrated
air picture.
3-35. Data flows into and out of the ICC over digital data links supplemented
by voice communications. The ICC has the capability for manual entry of
voice told data into its computer when voice communications are being used
as a backup for digital data links. This, and data received over the digital
data links, must be organized, assembled, and operated on to develop system
status, track information, and action recommendations. This data is provided
to the commander or operator by means of pictorial situation displays,
tabular data displays, alert messages, and hard copy printouts. The ICC
computer programs can perform tasks independently, accept operator input
through manual controls, and respond to these inputs by implementing
required actions.
3-36. The display and control (D&C) function provides operator interaction
with the ICC software system. D&C accepts and processes all keyboard
entries and switch actions. D&C also presents data to the operator in both
tabular and situation displays, as well as front panel and battalion status
panel indicators and readouts. Tabular data may be presented as a hard copy
printout as well as a cathode ray tube (CRT) display.
3-37. The D&C function uses data from all the other functions for display
generation. Track data is taken from track management. System
initialization and status monitor data include FU locations, volumes,
corridors, available equipment including communications, and operational
modes. Command and coordination software provides launch-now-intercept-
points (LNIPs), predicted intercept points (PIPs) and to-be-engaged queue
data (Figure 3-1). The various Patriot subsystems provide message alert
data. In turn, operator actions can include the manual input of voice told
messages as well as engagement, system control, and track evaluation switch
actions. Many of these actions will initiate other functions.
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FM 3-01.87
TRK TH ID ESTAT/S FP TLR TLL E/MI - TRK TH ID ESTAT/S FP TLR TLL

E/MI
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Figure 3-1. ICC To Be Engaged Queue
3-38. The display and control programs provide, on a real-time basis, control
of the display and communications equipment within the ICC besides
performing the following command and coordination functions:
• Management of target track data received from its own firing
batteries, adjacent Patriot units, and higher echelons. This includes
correlation of track data, ECM data, and engagement status data
received from multiple sources.
• Status monitoring detects improper operation or failure of hardware
elements within the ICC, data links with other air defense elements,
and the operational status of the units within its command.
• Evaluation of track identity data received from firing batteries,
adjacent battalion, and higher echelon to ensure proper resolution of
any conflicting identification data received from multiple sources.
Both passive and active identification parameters are considered in
this process.
• Threat assessment to determine which enemy targets are to be
engaged, the order of engagements, and which firing battery should
conduct the engagement.
3-39. Results from all these processes are displayed to the operators. The
system, depending on the designated method of control and mode of
operation, will either automatically issue the appropriate engagement
commands to the firing batteries or wait for an operator initiated engagement
command. Provisions are made for operator override of any automatically
initiated engagement action.
TRACK MANAGEMENT
3-40. The track management software are a key element of the ICC. It
ensures the continuity of track data within the battalion and brigade. Track
management performs track correlation, site calibration, triangulation, and
saturation alleviation, and exchanges this information with its local fire units
and subordinate or adjacent battalions.
3-41. No search or track functions are performed at the ICC. All track data is
provided to the ICC from its local fire units or external element, higher
echelon, or other battalions. Whenever the ICC receives a track, it opens a
battalion track data record (BNTDR). BNTDRs are designated as either local
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FM 3-01.87
or remote. Local BNTDRs are tracks that are being updated by a local fire
unit or subordinate battalion. Remote BNTDRs are tracks that are being
updated by a source other than a local unit, such as a higher echelon or an
adjacent battalion. Local tracks are displayed at the ICC with a high
brightness and remote tracks are displayed with a low brightness. Remote
tracks are not displayed at a Patriot fire unit.
3-42. The ICC will establish and maintain different track numbers for each
BNTDR. This is necessary for a common track due to each reporting source
having its track numbering assignment system. Up to 12 FU track numbers
on a common track can be maintained based on each FU reporting the track.
The ICC also stores up to 6 battalion track numbers to account for
subordinate or adjacent battalions. Additionally, 3 auxiliary, 1 ATDL-1,
1 TADIL-B, and 1 NATO track number can be maintained. The FU numbers
are used for correlation and communications purposes between the ICC and
FUs. To facilitate display and voice coordination, a common ATDL-1 number
is maintained on all battalion to battalion data links for each common track.
3-43. The ICC track management process also maintains an input file for
each track reported by the batteries. The Patriot fire unit input buffers and
the Hawk input buffers contain all the information for ID, IFF, ID history,
position, and engagement status reported by the unit on the track. The Hawk
input data buffers are used by the ICC software programs for ID
determination and conflict resolution, and track status maintenance and
reconstruction.
TARGET CORRELATION
3-44. Correlation is the function of comparing the individual track reports
from each reporting source and, if appropriate, combining these reports into a
single track file. The ICC performs automatic target correlation on all tracks
that pass an initial check. This check addresses the age of the track, when it
was last updated, if it is slow, false, has no velocity, or is not a virtual target.
If it passes these criteria, the ICC will attempt to correlate the track by using
track number, track position, velocity, and range rate. These correlations
have to meet variable correlation boxes that are defined as a function of the
type of track (local or remote), the type of radar, (Patriot or Hawk pulse
acquisition radar [PAR], continuous wave acquisition radar [CWAR], or high-
powered illuminator radar [HIPIR]) and the accuracy of the radar
emplacement. The Patriot correlation boxes are the most restrictive.
CORRELATION BOXES
3-45. Correlation boxes require two operator inputs to determine the initial
correlation box values for the FU location and azimuth uncertainty. The
inputs in the FU’s Tab 81 during initialization that affect correlation are
LOCATION CONFIDENCE and ALIGNED BY. The location uncertainty is
the maximum distance error between the "true" radar location as determined
by these methods: maps, modified survey, or survey. The azimuth
uncertainty is the maximum deviation of true azimuth of the radar to
measured azimuth as determined by the method of alignment—compass and
survey. Initial correlation boxes are then computed as a function of both
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FM 3-01.87
alignment values (location uncertainty and alignment uncertainty) and radar

tracking accuracy, respective range of the target, and some time delays
versus maximum target motion parameters. It is emphasized that these are
the initial correlation boxes. The variable correlation box sizes not only
consider the parameters just defined but also recalculate the alignment
uncertainty values (independent values for azimuth and elevation) based
upon site calibration results.
SITE CALIBRATION
3-46. The site calibration process is an automatic function performed at the
ICC that attempts to continually improve alignment data for the Patriot fire
units using only targets of opportunity. The process is divided into two
unique categories of azimuth calibration, pitch and roll (or roll and crossroll)
corrections.
3-47. Azimuth calibration selects correlated target with favorable trajectory
characteristics for possible use. Then the calibration process selects two fire
units that are both tracking the correlated target, then calculates the
computational uncertainty of the calibration process. This determines what
the new azimuth uncertainty would be if this target data were used to
calibrate these specific fire units and is a function of the target FUs
geometry. The location uncertainties translate into a large minimum
obtainable azimuth uncertainty. Conversely, if the radar location uncertainty
is the smallest possible, then the azimuth calibration process has the
potential to reduce the correlation box azimuth uncertainty to the smallest
possible radar location uncertainty.
3-48. When a good target and fire unit pairing is found (one that would
improve or reduce one or both of the fire units azimuth uncertainty), then five
data points (20 seconds) are gathered to enable integration over time and
minimize the effects of errors in the message transfers. The process then
computes the azimuth correction for the fire units. A comparison is made to
determine if the correction values are larger than the previous azimuth
uncertainty. If this is the case, then the process has detected an inconsistency
in the data or in other terms, a site error, and alerts the operator.
3-49. Site errors are caused by two phenomena. The first is when the radar
azimuth determined from initialization has an uncertainty greater than what
was defined in the Tab 81 ALIGNED BY data field. An example is that
0=SURVEY was entered and the error uncertainty was such that
1=COMPASS should have been entered. This is usually detected on the first
calibration attempt of a fire unit. The second case is when the initialized
radar location deviated from the true location by more than the distance
defined for the LOCATION DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL indicated on
Tab 81 (0=SURVEY, 1=MODIFIED SURVEY, and 2=MAP). This condition
does not usually cause a site error until several calibrations have been done,
and it usually results in bouncing the calculated azimuth around the true
azimuth. This eventually causes a correction larger than the previous
azimuth uncertainty. Both of these conditions will cause site error alerts.
When the ICC operator observes this, the unit that reported most often
should investigate it. As an example, the operator will see Site Error FP1,
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FM 3-01.87
FP2 and Site Error FP2, FP4. Fire unit 2 should be directed to recheck its
alignment data. Roll and crossroll calibration is a process that smooths the
elevation differences between fire units within the battalion to improve the
battalion's pitch and roll as a whole. This process does not generate a site
error alert.
3-50. An automatic emplacement at an FU results in the best location and
angular confidence levels being sent to the ICC. The FU alerts LOCATION
DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL of SURVEY = 0 and ALIGNED BY of
SURVEY = 0 are sent to the ICC when the final automatic emplacement is
achieved. Considering these inputs, the ICC establishes the initial correlation
cells. ICC site calibrations are accomplished on all FUs whether they were
emplaced manually or automatically. Because of the accuracy of the precision
lightweight global positioning system receiver (PLGR) and north finding
system (NFS), site error alerts are not expected when site calibrations are
performed on FUs that were automatically emplaced.
3-51. If site error alerts are repeatedly observed, the ICC operator should
perform the following:
• Determine which FU is continually defined in the alert.
• Determine if the FU was emplaced manually or automatically.
• If the FU was emplaced automatically, have the crew members check
that there is no radar (RS), PLGR, or NFS fault.
• Time permitting, have the FU crews perform a new automatic
emplacement.
• If the FU was manually emplaced, have crew members recheck the
alignment and ensure that the data was entered correctly.
• Confirm that the data in Tab 81 is correct.
3-52. If site error persists, the FU should then perform the semiannual
preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS). If out of tolerance,
intermediate maintenance (IM) should be notified. If the alert reports a large
difference (1,000 meters or more), then the TD or TDA should check Tab 12 to
ensure that the ECS crew did not make an obvious error in entering data.
The reported location received should be confirmed by voice with the battery
to ensure that the correct Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) (Patriot) or
latitude and longitude (Hawk) were entered. If everything appears to have
been entered correctly and the system reports no site error, an effort to
correlate targets between batteries should be attempted. If correlation occurs
without problems, the battery should be considered correctly positioned. If
not, the battery should first attempt to clear the fault by rebooting the
system. If site error still occurs, the unit must reinitialize the system.
3-53. Alerts are generated by the site calibration process along with the "site
error" alert. The ICC will receive the alert FPn AZIMUTH = nnn if the
azimuth at a particular fire unit is corrected more than 0.5 degrees. When
the ICC operator observes this alert, he should select Tab 12, FP
LOCATION/BOUNDARIES-BN, and note the azimuth range in the CURR
AZ data field. As a matter of practice, this tab should be selected and hard
copies made each time communications are initially established with a
subordinate unit.
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FM 3-01.87
3-54. The fire unit will also generate the alert UPDATE DATABASE TAB 8
when the following conditions occur:
• A corrected radar azimuth—a site calibration occurred and the
corrected azimuth was sent to the battery.
• An updated azimuth uncertainty—the azimuth error state (AES) has
changed due to a calibration.
• An updated elevation uncertainty—the AES has changed due to a roll
or crossroll correction.
• A data buffer transfer—the ICC has sent a data buffer transfer to
that unit.
3-55. The operator should perform a data base update upon receipt of the
alert UPDATE DATABASE—TAB 8 to ensure that the corrected information
is written on the data base. If necessary, verify the roll and crossroll, PLGR
and NFS information, and as a last resort, have the survey section survey the
equipment position again.
3-56. The current azimuth of Patriot batteries displayed in Tab 12 should
also be noted. Prior minor azimuth changes indicate that site calibration has
occurred and the FP azimuth was corrected. Figure 3-2 shows the Tab 12
format. Note: FP1 through 6 are reserved for Patriot FPs and FP7 through
12 are reserved for Hawk and THAAD FPs.
FP UTM LOCATION PTL STL1 STL2 STL3 CURR AZ LF-
BOUNDS-RT
1
2
3
4
5
6
BN

FP UTM LOCATION PTL
7
8
9
10
11
12
BN
Figure 3-2. Tab 12, Pages 1 and 2
TRIANGULATION
3-57. The triangulation process provides the Patriot system with the
capability to counter ECM. There may be occasions when the jamming source
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FM 3-01.87
is able to deny range data to the fire unit. When this occurs, that track is
reported to the ICC as a strobe with azimuth and elevation. This strobe will
also be detected by other fire units within the battalion and reported to the
ICC, provided there is overlapping coverage. The ICC then performs a strobe
correlation process, called triangulation, to determine the target's range and
provides this information to the reporting fire units. The triangulation
process is performed with data from adjacent Patriot battalions and
subordinate Patriot battalions (MICC to SICC).
3-58. As with target correlation, triangulation also has boxes associated with
its processing—Tab 81 and the radar azimuth corrections from site
calibration. The triangulation boxes are also based on the geometry of the
target to fire units and tracking accuracies of the jamming tracks. In
addition, with the missing track component of range, the triangulation
process is more sensitive to alignment errors, especially at longer ranges.
This leads to the caution that observing correlation at the ICC is not the only
indication of "good enough" survey data. If site error alerts are observed, they
should be investigated, or the triangulation performance will be
unacceptable. The triangulation process uses a variety of track reports in
deriving at the appropriate solution. These include: three strobes, a skin
track and strobe with range estimate, two strobes with range estimates, and
a strobe and strobes with range estimate. A range estimate track is one
where target range is estimated.
3-59. Triangulation provides an effective method of countering ECM
(Figure 3-3) as follows:
• Fire units automatically report strobe track data to the ICC.
• The ICC automatically provides fire units the triangulated solution
with range.
• ECM track evaluation, engagement, and missile guidance.
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FM 3-01.87
RS
ECS
ICC DETERMINES TRACK

POSITION AND SENDS THE
INFORMATION TO ALL FIRE UNITS
RS
ICC ECS
ACTUAL
JAMMER
POSITION
TRACK DATA
FROM FIRE UNITS
RS
ECS
Figure 3-3. Patriot Triangulation
SATURATION ALLEVIATION
3-60. Saturation alleviation is invoked when the number of tracks at the ICC
is greater than a prespecified system level to ensure that the most important
battalion track data record (BNTDR) is retained. The least important are
dropped. The two types of saturation alleviation are when the number of
tracks is too great and when the radar is saturated with too many actions.
The ICC has eight levels of saturation alleviation, which are displayed to the
left of the ICC alert line. The following is a description of each level:
• NULL—no tracks being dropped; display field is blank.
• HWK ST—displayed when the pulse acquisition radar (PAR),
continuous wave acquisition radar (CWAR), or subordinate battalion
strobes are being dropped.
• REMOTE—displayed when a local or subordinate battalion remote
track is received, does not correlate, and there are no BNTDRs
available. This level deletes "old remotes," then HEU remotes, and
then adjacent battalion remote friends, one by one, to accept all local
first track and subordinate battalion remote tracks.
• FRND-1—displayed when a local or subordinate battalion remote
track is received, does not correlate, no BNTDRs are available, and
all "old" and HEU remote BNTDRs have been deleted. This level
deletes long-range friendly tracks to accept all local, first track,
subordinate battalion remotes, and Patriot missile (PAM) tracks.
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FM 3-01.87
• FRND-2—displayed when a local track is received, does not correlate,

no BNTDRs are available, and all "old" HEU remotes and long-range
friends have been deleted. This level deletes medium-range friendly
tracks to accept all local, first track, or subordinate battalion remote
tracks.
• FRND-3—displayed when a local or subordinate battalion track is
received, does not correlate, no BNTDRs are available, all "old" and
HEU remotes, and all long- and medium-range friendly tracks have
been deleted. This level deletes friendly tracks that are between
medium- and short-range to accept all local first track and remote
tracks.
• FRND-4—displayed when a local or subordinate battalion track is
received, does not correlate, and no BNTDRs are available. All "old"
HEU, and long- to short-range friends have been deleted. FRND-4
deletes short-range friends to accept all local and subordinate
battalion track reports.
• THREAT—displayed when a local or subordinate battalion track is
received, does not correlate, and no BNTDRs are available. All "old"
and HEU remotes and all friends have been deleted. The THREAT
level deletes non-engaged hostiles and unknown BNTDRs and
unresolved strobes, one by one, in order of enemy threat status (low
threats first, medium threats next, and unresolved strobes and
triangulated strobes last).
3-61. Tracks that are never deleted are high threat, engaged, unevaluated,
Patriot missiles, virtual targets, alert and hooked tracks. Also tracks being
processed are never deleted from the TBEQ, process for engagement (PFE),
or the BNTDRs.
TARGET IDENTIFICATION
3-62. With an accurate air picture established, the next process is track
identity evaluation. When tracks correlate, the ICC compares IDs, sets the
appropriate hostile or friend description, and displays and resolves identity
conflicts.
3-63. The ICC accepts ID data from all sources listed in the track
management section (see Figure 3-4). The ICC automatically performs ID
conflict resolution (see Table 3-5) hierarchically that considers the unique
qualities of the various reporting units (for example, a reporting source-
specific hierarchy). These processes ensure a common, best ID result
throughout the battalion. Using embedded conflict resolution tables, the ICC
resolves most conflicts automatically. In cases that require operator input,
the manual resolution procedure, designed to aid in a rapid decision action by
the operator, is used. Patriot fire units report all identification data with
identity to the ICC such as—
• IFF results.
• Identification and weapons control volume correlation.
• Identification evaluation results.
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FM 3-01.87
• Additional ID data available on a track to the FU when it first reports

the track.
• ICC automatically determines the correct track ID and forwards it to
higher echelon and to reporting fire units.
• Higher echelon identities are automatically accepted.
REEVALUATION
FROM FIRE UNITS

VOLUME CORRELATIONS MERGE COMPOSITE AUTOMATIC
IFF TRACK ID ID
OTHER ID PARAMETERS ID DATA INFORMATION RESULT
TO FIRE UNITS AND

OTHER ICCs
TRACK ID
INFORMATION ECS
RS
ID INFORMATION
AND BATTALION ID
ICC
TRACK ID
INFORMATION
ECS
RS
Figure 3-4. Battalion ICC Identification
Table 3-5 Examples of ID Conflict Resolution
A BATTERY B BATTERY ICC ACTION

TRACK 1 UNKNOWN FRIEND Send A battery the friend ID
TRACK 2 FRIEND FRIEND No action required
TRACK 3 HOSTILE UNKNOWN Send B battery the hostile ID
TRACK 4 FRIEND HOSTILE Resolve the ID conflict at ICC
PASSIVE IDENTIFICATION DETERMINATION

3-64. The ICC receives ID history information on tracks from its Patriot
digital information link (PADIL) protocol units. The ID history information is
exchanged via PADIL with other ICCs (lateral, subordinate, or higher
echelon) enabling the most complete ID history file to be maintained on each
aircraft throughout the command. This ID history information exchange
includes—
• IFF response.
• Friendly or hostile origin volume correlation.
• Safe passage corridor correlation.
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FM 3-01.87
• Minimum safe velocity correlation.

• Restricted and prohibited volume correlation.
• Pop-up criteria violation.
• ECM emitter.
FRIENDLY PROTECTION
3-65. The ICC automatically inhibits the engagement of a track identified as
a friend, unknown, or assumed friend and prohibits the operator from
engagement of such tracks. The ICC automatically sends a HOLD FIRE
command to any FU or battalion initiating engagement of friends or assumed
friends.
TARGET ENGAGEMENT
3-66. The ICC automatically assesses the threat of all tracks reported to it.
The first step in the process is consideration of the track's eligibility for
engagement (see Figure 3-5). The ICC determines the track's eligibility
automatically by considering its identification with its weapon control
status—WEAPONS HOLD, WEAPONS TIGHT, or WEAPONS FREE. In a
WEAPONS HOLD volume, no targets are recommended for automatic
engagement. In a WEAPONS TIGHT volume, only hostile ID tracks are
recommended. In a WEAPONS FREE volume, both hostile and unknown
identified targets are recommended. Friends and unknown assumed friends
are never recommended.
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FM 3-01.87
Residual Area
W EAPONS TIGHT
V l
Patriot
W EAPONS HOLD
Fire Unit
VOLUME
W EAPONS FREE
Patriot V l
Fire Unit
Fire Units report to the ICC weapon control volum e correlation on each track
ICC assigns the track the m ost restrictive weapon control status, if there is a:
• fli
W EAPONS HOLD over W EAPONS TIGHT or W EAPONS FREE
• W EAPONS TIGHT over W EAPONS FREE
Engagement eligibility is based on weapon control status:

• W EAPONS HOLD— Hostiles (requires operator confirm ation to engage)
• W EAPONS TIGHT— Hostiles
• W EAPONS FREE— Hostiles and unknowns
Figure 3-5. Engagement Eligibility
THREAT ASSESSMENT
3-67. Threat assessment must perform two major subfunctions, target
evaluation and engagement control. Target evaluation includes both
classification and identification of tracks based on track position, track
history, IFF interrogation, and information provided from both extra- and
intra-battalion sources. Logic must be provided to protect friendly aircraft by
preventing or terminating engagement against them. Engageable tracks
must be examined for their potential enemy threat to battalion assets.
Engagement control must provide for FU selection and target assignment
considering operator and higher echelon’s input as well as FU capabilities
and prespecified selection criteria.
ENGAGEMENT STATUS
3-68. Engagement status data must be provided to the display and control
and communications control functions. Threat assessment processing must
receive FU status including missile inventories from status monitor, target
position data from track management, and engagement directives from both
display and control, and communications control functions.
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FM 3-01.87
THREAT EVALUATION
3-69. The ABT threat assessment process continually reevaluates each
eligible enemy target to determine its threat to a defended asset (up to 36
assets can be defined) or to the general area of the battalion. The threat
assessment process considers an enemy track location, speed, heading,
altitude, and its predicted intercept point relative to each asset location. The
targets are continually threat ordered automatically, and are based upon the
priority assigned to the asset they are threatening. The 18 most threatening
targets are presented on the TO-BE-ENGAGED DATA 1 tab for the
operator's use.
WEAPON SYSTEM SELECTION

3-70. The ICC automatically considers all potential candidates for target
engagement. Potential candidates that the ICC can consider are FUs either
directly subordinate to the ICC or in a subordinate battalion. The FUs'
unique system capabilities, operational status, engagement status, missile
availability, and launch now intercept points for the target are all considered
to determine if that unit should be selected for the engagement.
3-71. The selection process also considers which type of weapon to employ. A
preference in the selection process can favor one weapon type over another.
This, in turn, ensures balanced participation in the air battle by all types of
FUs. The candidate selection is continually updated to account for changes in
FU and target status to ensure that the current most appropriate FU is the
one selected for the engagement.
3-72. The ICC automatically selects a primary and secondary FU for each
eligible target to provide options to the operator in the semiautomatic
engagement mode. If the FU selected for the engagement is in a battalion
subordinate to the ICC, the engagement is addressed to that battalion.
METHODS OF CONTROL
3-73. The ICC can function in either a centralized or decentralized method of
control. Centralized is where the ICC directs the subordinate units’ (FUs
and/or battalions) engagements. In a decentralized method of control, the
ICC allows subordinate units to conduct their engagements while it performs
a management-by-exception role. In the battalion role, the ICC can direct all
the engagements of its subordinate FUs (centralized to the ICC), or allow the
subordinate units to be decentralized.
3-74. Decentralized allows subordinate units to conduct their own
engagements while performing a management by exception function, and
cueing the ICC operator when a decentralized battalion is not conducting a
high-priority engagement. The ICC can also function as a subordinate ICC in
either method of control, centralized to higher echelon (awaiting command on
engagements) or decentralized from higher echelon (actively directing its
engagements).
3-75. The ICC performs the engagement assignment process in either the
semiautomatic or automatic engagement mode. In either mode, the operator
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FM 3-01.87
can command an engagement (for example, engage shoot-look-shoot, salvo, or

ripple) on any eligible target by manual selection or in response to a higher
echelon command. The operator can manually select the FUs or battalions for
the engagement, or allow the system to automatically make the selection.
3-76. In the semiautomatic engagement mode, the operator can use the
TO-BE-ENGAGED DATA 1 tab, which provides the top 18 threats, to review
and sequentially select each track for engagement by performing a push-
button sequence (versus finding and manually hooking track symbols on the
situation display). The system then automatically selects the most
appropriate fire unit or battalion for the engagement and issues an engage
command. In the automatic engagement mode, the ICC conducts all
engagements at the optimum launch time, automatically selecting the most
appropriate fire unit or battalion for the engagement.
3-77. In the semiautomatic engagement mode, the PROCESS-FOR-
ENGAGEMENT switch provides a method by which the operator can review
a target before its optimum engagement time and select it for engagement
later. The resulting engagement command will be issued, later and
automatically, at the optimum launch time for the preselected target and the
current, best FU pairing (Figure 3-6).
3-78. The ICC continually monitors and coordinates engagements regardless
of the engagement mode or method of control selected. Engagement
monitoring occurs with every engagement to ensure proper reactions and
responses are continued until intercept. All engagements by subordinates are
displayed, along with the predicted intercept point (operator-selectable).
3-79. The ICC also coordinates kill assessment data from the FUs. The ICC
then transmits the data over ATDL-1, TADIL-B, and PADIL as engage status
to units that are tracking the target being engaged.
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FM 3-01.87
Hostile Assigned (A or B) Based on:

Process for Engagement for FU A Weapon Type, Weapon’s Availability,
Friends Nearby, and Weapon Lethality
Hostile Assigned to FU A
Hostile Assigned to FU B
Fire Unit A
Fire Unit B
Fire Unit Track Sectors
Figure 3-6. Fire Unit Selection Example

3-80. When the ICC receives an engagement announcement and firing
message from a subordinate, adjacent, or higher echelon unit, it
automatically sends a cease fire command on the subject target to
subordinate units (Patriot, Hawk, and AMDTF units). The cease fire
command will be canceled automatically if the engagement is unsuccessful,
thereby quickly allowing another fire unit to initiate a new engagement on
the surviving hostile.
STATUS MONITOR
3-81. The status monitor function provides fault detection at the ICC,
controls the ICC mode, and monitors battalion status. Battalion status
includes both communications and FU capabilities. The status monitor also
provides a time mark to synchronize battalion time and maintain the
battalion geometry and status data.
3-82. Inputs to status monitor include FU status messages and
communications line status through the communications controls function,
BITE data, and manual inputs from display and control. The status monitor
employs display and control to initiate status alerts to the ICC operators. It
also uses communications control to initiate status messages to higher
echelon.
3-83. The ICC continually monitors the status of all on-board hardware as
well as the operational status of all of its subordinate units. The equipment
status of the ICC, all Patriot, Hawk, and task force FUs is always provided
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FM 3-01.87
for the operator's review, and the operator is alerted to any change in that
status.
3-84. The operational and engagement status of all subordinate units is
provided by tabular displays. This status is also displayed on the battalion
status panel. This status is also used in the ICC's fire distribution process to
determine which fire unit or battalion is currently the most appropriate for
the engagement of each candidate target. Communications status to all
subordinate, adjacent, auxiliary, and higher echelon units, as well as relays,
is continually monitored and provided to the operators through tabular
display and status panel presentation.
3-85. This group of programs, very similar to those at the ECS, provides
automated assistance for rapid location of failed components within the ICC.
The fault isolation display-aided maintenance procedures called up by the
operator will display the step-by-step repair procedures to permit the
operator to isolate the problem.
FIRE UNIT SURVEILLANCE

3-86. Patriot is a sectored search, track, and engagement system. The search
sector can be controlled independently of the track sector. Surveillance
performs both search and track functions in the air-breathing threat (ABT)
and tactical ballistic missile (TBM) mode of operations. The Patriot
surveillance software has been enhanced as a result of radar hardware
improvements and new radar waveforms such as pulse Doppler. This has
resulted in the detection and track of smaller radar cross-section targets and
improved overall system surveillance performance.
3-87. Before any action can be taken on a target, it must first be detected.
The function of the search portion of the surveillance software is to search for
and detect targets. The system uses three basic search modes—ABT active
search, ABT passive search, and TBM search. ABT active and passive search
are used predominantly to detect aircraft, while TBM search is used to detect
TBMs, but can also detect aircraft.
ABT SEARCH SECTORS

3-88. The ABT search sectors are at +
_ 45 degrees of the radar pointing angle.
The ABT search range is from RMIN of P4-6 kilometers to RMAX of P4-7
kilometers, with an elevation up angle from P4-8 to P4-9 degrees. The ABT
search sector is composed of five search volumes—horizon (HORZ), short-
range pop-up (SRP), lower medium-range (LMR), upper medium-range
(UMR), and long-range (LR) (Figure 3-7).
3-89. The FU can search for ABT targets in either the active or passive
search mode. In the active search mode, the radar sends out RF energy, using
a variety of waveforms in all volumes within the entire search region in all
volumes. In the passive mode, the radar scans the sectors in receive mode
only. The receiver is open and will process external RF energy.
3-90. The external RF energy must be in the Patriot frequency band.
Typically, this energy is in the form of radar jamming. This jamming must be
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FM 3-01.87
sensed as continuous jamming to be processed in the passive mode. The

system will process this interference as a strobe, which will be used by the
ICC in the triangulation process. The ICC can downtell externally queued
tracks to the FUs when in passive search mode or in active search mode.
Tracks will be displayed within the assigned FU search sector. The passive
search mode is not applicable in TBM search, and the radar will not
transition to the TBM search mode when in passive search.
ALT
PTL
UMR
LMR
LR
SRP
HORZ
FU FU RANGE
TOP DOWN VIEW HORIZONTAL VIEW
Figure 3-7. Sample ABT Search Sectors

3-91. Along with the two ABT search modes defined, the fire unit surveillance
function also performs the wedge edge process. The radar measures the level
of jamming detected and compares it with a threshold for each search beam.
The results are then placed into a wedge edge file at the FU, which is mapped
to each search beam record. The wedge cell file is then consolidated by a
process that locates the ECM wedges in each row, combines rows, calculates
elevation, and transmits the appropriate wedges to the ICC that consolidates
the wedge cell file. The wedge data from several fire units is used to
determine the range of closely spaced standoff jammers (SOJs), escort
screening jammers (ESJs), or self-screening jammers (SSJs). This
information is then used in performing the Patriot SOJ countermission using
the virtual target. See (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U) for further details on the ABT
search sectors.
TBM SEARCH SECTORS

3-92. The TBM search mode consists of a combination of ABT and TBM
search sectors. The TBM search sector is ±45 degrees of the pointing angle for
the radar and up to P4-10 degrees in elevation. The search range is from
P4-11 kilometers RMIN to P4-12 kilometers RMAX. The TBM search sector
may be skewed from the ABT radar pointing angle by ±15 degrees; however,
skewing is not recommended. The TBM search sector itself consists of three
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FM 3-01.87
sectors: lower TBM (LTBM), upper TBM (UTBM), and extra high TBM
(XTBM) (Figure 3-8).
ALT
PTL
XTBM
UTBM
LTBM
UMR
LMR
SRP
HORZ
FU
FU RANGE
TOP DOWN VIEW

HORIZONTAL VIEW
Figure 3-8. Sample TBM Search Sectors
TRACK PROCESS
3-93. After the search process has detected a target, it is given to the track
process. The track function selects the optimal radar track rate and
waveform to continue track on that target until it leaves the fire unit track
coverage. The track rate and waveform are selected based on the range and
altitude of the track. The FU track coverage is ±60 degrees of the radar
pointing angle and P4-13 degrees to P4-14 degrees in elevation. The track
range is from P4-15 kilometers RMIN to P4-16 kilometers RMAX. After a
stable track has been obtained on a target by the fire unit, its position and
status are reported to the ICC. Tracks that are in preclassification status or
designated as clutter are not forwarded to the ICC. In the passive search
mode, targets within an FU track sector may be downtold from the ICC. The
ICC provides azimuth, range, and elevation to the FU. The FU will schedule
the radar to perform a single search action at the position provided by the
ICC. The FU will acquire and track only the told-in target until it is engaged,
dropped, or leaves the FU's sector. Once the target is under track, a track
data record (TDR) is opened on the target. When a TDR is established, the
identification of enemy aircraft and threat assessment processes are
initiated. See (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U) for further details on the TBM search
sectors.
3-94. The formation size is reported by the track function and is reflected in
the data fields of the Track Amp Data tabs in the ICC (ID/S) and FU
(ID/SZ/IDS). The size of the formation is dependent on the return received
due to several closely spaced aircraft or one large aircraft. There are specific
range and angle parameters that will result in the objects within the
formation being defined separately and placed in individual TDRs. The
formation size reported and displayed by Patriot is from 2 to 7. A blank in the
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FM 3-01.87
formation size indicates a single track is being reported. Because of the

reflections received from several closely spaced aircraft or one large aircraft,
the formation size is not entirely accurate. This means that if a 3 is
displayed, there may not in fact be three objects. It means that there is more
than one object in that TDR.
3-95. If the fire unit cannot determine the target's range (strobe track) due to
ECM, the target's azimuth and elevation are sent to the ICC. The ICC will
attempt to compute the target's range through triangulation. Triangulation is
the computation of target location based on track and strobe data of three or
more fire units. Once range has been determined, the ICC will send the
computed range to all fire units. Another function to assist in tracking during
a critical period, is fire unit support. This process is performed through the
ICC and supports tracking of engaged targets. The ICC continually sends
range data on a track, if available from another fire unit, to the fire unit
engaging the target. If the fire unit loses range on the target, it is available
through this process and the engagement is continued.
3-96. The operator can only influence the tracking process by dropping track
on a target or by turning off the radar (CEASE RADIATE). During tactical
operations, selecting the DROP TRACK switch-indicator can drop a hooked
track. All information on the target is discarded at the FU. If the radar is
searching and the target is still in the search sector, it will probably be
redetected and placed back under track. If other fire units had been tracking
the target during this time, the ICC will have retained the target status and
identification history and will send it to the FU. When CEASE RADIATE is
invoked, all search and track actions are terminated, resulting in the loss of
all targets and destroying any missiles in flight.
A-SCOPE OPERATIONS
3-97. The operator can also use the A-scope display to assist in determining
target track type. The A-scope display presents two digitized ranges versus
amplitude traces on the tabular display area. The A-scope display is
associated with the alert, nnn USE A-SCOPE, and the A-SCOPE switch-
indicator. For the alert to be displayed on a manstation, that manstation
must have the ECCM ASSIST switch-indicator selected. The nnn USE
A-SCOPE alert is generated when surveillance detects and tracks a target as
a repeater jammer. The alert is informing the operator that assistance is
required to further classify the jamming target. The alert will appear once a
minute if no action is taken. The operator should hook the target,
acknowledge the alert, and select the A-SCOPE switch-indicator. A dual trace
will appear in the tab display area with a target (TGT) definition data field.
The operator should review the dual trace and determine if the target is a
quiet track, repeater jammer, or unknown track type.
3-98. If the upper and lower traces are the same and the separation distance
is the same (Figure 3-9), the track is probably quiet and a 0 should be entered
in the data field. This will cause the system to attempt to track the target
with quiet track waveforms.
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FM 3-01.87
PROBABLY A QUIET TRACK
Figure 3-9. A-Scope Quiet Track

3-99. If the upper and lower traces are the same and the separation distance
is as depicted in Figure 3-10, the target is probably a repeater and a “1”
should be entered. The system will continue to track the target as a repeater.
The alert, nnn USE A-SCOPE, will be displayed every two minutes on that
track.
PROBABLY A REPEATER TRACK
Figure 3-10. A-Scope Repeater Track

3-100. If the operator cannot determine what the target is (quiet or repeater),
then a “2” should be entered in the data field. The system will continue as
before and the alert will be displayed every minute.
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FM 3-01.87
3-101. If a glob of many traces appear on both lines, it is probably clutter, and
the operator should enter a “2” in the data field and push the DROP TRACK
switch-indicator on that target.
3-102. A-scope cannot be selected on all targets. If the target is being
processed by a pulse doppler waveform, then the A-scope function is not
allowed on that track. The operator is alerted when this condition exists. If
only a single trace appears, the target is being tracked as either a quiet,
continuous, or noncontinuous jammer. If a dual trace appears, the target is
being tracked as a repeater jammer. The range displayed is an estimated
range of the target.
3-103. When A-scope is selected, it is mutually exclusive of the tab display
and static data displayed on the situation display. Volumes, assets, and other
data, if displayed, will be erased. When A-scope is cleared, the static data will
automatically be redisplayed.
3-104. The ECCM ASSIST switch-indicator should not be selected unless the
operator anticipates the use of A-scope (alerts from the system to use
A-Scope). Nonuse of the A-scope process will not degrade system capability.
A-scope should be used in performing the antihelicopter SOJ mission. This is
described later in this chapter.
TARGET CLASSIFICATION
3-105. When surveillance establishes a new track, EDWA begins pre-
classification and classification track processing. The classification process is
discussed in the next section.
PRECLASSIFICATION PROCESS
3-106. The preclassification filter (PCF) attempts to determine if a new track
is actually an aircraft, or if it is chaff or clutter. The principal characteristics
of chaff and clutter tracks are: never moving far from the original position,
erratic speed changes, very low speeds, and spurious high speeds. It is
important to realize that a track that begins as chaff or clutter may switch to
a valid ABT. The opposite is also possible, but unlikely.
3-107. Targets that are continuous (range denying) jammers, targets told-in
from the ICC, and targets classified as TBM tracks bypass the PCF. In each
of these cases, it is assumed that the track is real. All other tracks are
periodically reevaluated by the PCF until they are determined to be real (or
the track is dropped). No further EDWA processing is performed on a track
until this occurs. Tracks that have not passed the PCF are not uptold to the
ICC. They are displayed at the FU as general points with speed and heading
symbology. The operator may manually bypass the PCF by hooking the
general point and identifying it through ID switch action (not recommended).
3-108. The primary test in the PCF determines if a track has moved a
significant distance from its first recorded position. The required distance is a
small percentage of the track's original range. Tracks passing this test must
also pass additional tests for track characteristics that are consistently
outside the acceleration or velocity capabilities of enemy tactical aircraft. All
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FM 3-01.87
tests must be passed before the track can pass the PCF. These additional
tests can be divided into two categories, slow speed tests and false target
tests.
Slow Speed Tests

3-109. Slow speed tests consist of short-term and long-term tests. The short-
term test checks the current speed against a threshold entered by the
operator in Tab 78. The track fails this test if it is below that speed.
3-110. The long-term test compares an average track speed to a different
(fixed and inaccessible to the operator) threshold. This takes into account
that although clutter speed may be intermittently high, the average speed
will remain low. The track fails this test if it is below the fixed threshold.
False Target Tests

3-111. False target tests consist of maximum speed, change of speed, track
quality, track misses, and false target history. The maximum speed test
compares track speed and altitude to the Patriot ABT design threat
maximum speed and altitude. The track fails this test if its speed or altitude
profile exceeds this maximum.
3-112. The change of speed test determines if a track exhibits drastic changes
in speed at low altitudes. The test also determines changes greater than the
maximum "G" limit of the design enemy aircraft.
3-113. Track quality testing is determined as follows. Surveillance predicts a
track's position and where it will be the next time that the software schedules
another periodic tracking action. If the radar return from the track action
indicates that the target was not where it was expected to be, then the
differences are compared to (fixed and inaccessible) present or defaults
thresholds. If the differences exceed the thresholds, then the track fails this
test.
3-114. Testing for track misses is similar to the previous test. In this case, the
position differences are so large that no valid radar return for the track is
received. The total number of misses and the total number of consecutive
misses since the last PCF evaluation are compared to (fixed and inaccessible)
present or default thresholds. If either threshold is exceeded, the track fails
this test.
Clutter and Chaff Tracks

3-115. Clutter and chaff tracks are erratic by nature. Sometimes they appear
to be real ABTs for short periods of time. False target history tests try to
prevent tracks that currently look "real" from passing the PCF filter by
averaging the past performance of the track. If the track was false for 9 out of
the last 15 evaluations, then it is not allowed to pass the PCF on this
evaluation. There is an exception to this rule. If the track has not been false
for the last 4 evaluations and is not false on this evaluation, then it is allowed
to exit the PCF. (See ECCM OPERATIONS on page 3-86, procedures for
dealing with ECM operations.)
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FM 3-01.87
3-116. A chaff or clutter track may appear real for a period of time. The PCF
is not completely effective in preventing chaff and clutter tracks from being
considered for engagement. Some of these tracks pass through the filter. To
help prevent engagements in these cases, both the slow speed tests and the
false target tests are repeated every time EDWA reevaluates the target
(approximately every four seconds). Tracks that fail these tests will be
classified as slow or false, respectively. This will inhibit automatic
engagement and require reconfirmation for manual engagements.
CLASSIFICATION PROCESS
3-117. The target classification process evaluates track velocity, altitude, and
rate of climb or dive against a set of performance characteristics that
differentiate between confirmed classifications (ABT, TBM A, TBM-B, and
unengageable TBM) and presumed classifications (presumed ABT and
presumed TBM).
3-118. The following discussion is for information purposes only. The operator
has no input into the classification process. Classifications cannot be changed
by operator action. The operator cannot visually distinguish the presumed
classifications. The rules of engagement are identical for presumed ABT and
ABT, and for presumed TBM and TBM. Presumed ABTs and ABTs share the
same visual symbology. Presumed TBMs (PTBMs), TBM As, TBM Bs, and
unengageable TBMs are represented by the same symbol on the display.
TBM As and TBM Bs can be distinguished by the TBM A or TBM B indicator
presented below the ESTAT/S field in the FU Track Amplifying Data tab.
3-119. An unengageable TBM can be distinguished by hooking it and
observing that no LNIP is displayed (indicating that engagement is not
possible) and observing that the Track Amplifying Data tab shows no status
in the ESTAT/S field and no TBM A or TBM B indicator. Confirmed TBM
classifications do not change. A TBM B, for example, may be unengageable
due to its trajectory being outside the TBM engagement volume, but TBM B
will still be displayed in the Track Amplifying Data tab.
3-120. All tracks are initially classified as presumed ABTs. Targets that
achieve a confirmed classification exit the classification process. Targets with
presumed classification are periodically reevaluated to determine if they can
be assigned a confirmed classification.
3-121. A TBM cannot sustain flight within the ascent or descent limits that
define ABT performance for very long. If the performance of a presumed ABT
remains below that of a TBM A for a fixed time, it is classified as an ABT. An
ABT classification is also assigned if a presumed TBM exhibits
characteristics that are never associated with TBMs. These include emitting
ECM and beginning a climb after it has been observed to be definitely
descending. If the range of a presumed TBM is changing very slowly, then the
track is most likely clutter interference. In this case, classification is set to
presumed ABT to force the track through the PCF.
3-122. A track will probably be assigned a classification of TBM A if the track
exceeds the maximum performance of most ABTs but is less than the
minimum performance of any TBM B. One of the exceptions is for tracks
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FM 3-01.87
exhibiting a climb rate at higher altitudes than the capability of specific high-
performance aircraft. These tracks are classified as presumed TBM and
periodically reevaluated. They should eventually receive a confirmed
classification since an ABT cannot climb at this rate indefinitely.
3-123. If the track exceeds the maximum performance of a TBM A, it will be
classified as a TBM B. TBM B trajectories are so high and their velocities are
so great that their performance almost never overlaps that of TBM As or
ABTs.
3-124. Tracks that fall above the maximum performance of TBM Bs are
classified as unengageable TBMs. These tracks are moving too fast for
Patriot capability and cannot intercept tracks exceeding P4-17 mps.
IDENTIFICATION
3-125. Once a target is classified as an ABT (or possible ABT) the system
undergoes periodic identification reevaluation to determine identity (ID). The
FU can assign IDs of friend, assumed friend, unknown, or hostile
automatically (in automatic ID mode) and the operator can assign these IDs
manually (in either ID mode). The true friend ID is automatically assigned
only when a valid Mode 4 IFF response is received; it cannot be manually
assigned. The special friend ID, normally assigned only by ID switch action,
may also be automatically assigned when battery tracks correlate with
higher echelon tracks, in which case the FU accepts the ID. Targets that are
classified as PABTs lose any ID information they have acquired if they are
reclassified as a TBM. All TBMs are considered as hostile.
3-126. The FU acquires two types of ID information, passive and active.
Passive ID criteria are: the presence of continuous ECM that prevents the
radar from acquiring range, correlation with generalized ID volumes (friendly
origin, hostile origin, prohibited, and restricted volumes), safe passage
corridors (SPCs), minimum safe velocity (MSV), and pop-ups. The only active
ID criteria are SIF and Mode 4 IFF interrogation responses.
GENERALIZED VOLUMES
3-127. The generalized volume is designed to accommodate two specific
functions. The first is the multipurpose volume and the second is to
incorporate additional criteria into the volume correlation. A volume may be
created with multiple attributes assigned to the volume. For example, RV,
PV, WEAPONS HOLD, WEAPONS TIGHT, WEAPONS FREE, SPC, and
friendly or hostile origins may be assigned to one volume. Besides the
physical (spatial) correlation within this multipurpose volume, the target
may have additional criteria for correlating with a volume. These correlation
criteria are limits on a track's ground velocity (speed) and on a track's
heading. Additional criteria are optional and the conditions for correlation
can differ from volume to volume.
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FM 3-01.87
ATTRIBUTES
3-128. There are two primary types of attributes that can be assigned a
volume. They are identification attributes and weapons control attributes. A
volume may contain identification, weapons control, or both types of
attributes. The identification attributes are further defined in two categories,
friendly or hostile attributes. The friendly attributes are friendly origin and
safe passage corridor. The hostile attributes are hostile origin, restricted
volume, and prohibited volume. A volume may contain either friendly or
hostile attributes but not both friendly and hostile. There are three weapons
control attributes: WEAPONS HOLD, WEAPONS TIGHT, and WEAPONS
FREE. A volume may not have more than one weapon control attribute at a
time.
OVERLAPPING VOLUMES
3-129. To account for the possibility of overlapping volumes, an order of
precedence has been established for identification and weapons control
attributes. For identification, friendly attributes take precedence over hostile
attributes. If a volume with a friendly attribute(s) overlaps with a volume of a
hostile attribute(s) (shared airspace), a track that correlates with both
volumes would be given the attributes (identification flag [s]) of the friendly
ID volume. The most restrictive weapons control mode attribute from all
volumes with which a target correlates during a given evaluation is applied
to the target. WEAPONS HOLD will take precedence over WEAPONS
TIGHT or WEAPONS FREE. WEAPONS TIGHT will take precedence over a
WEAPONS FREE. It is important to note that this new order of precedence
does not affect the use of the residual weapons control mode. Correlation with
a weapons control volume takes precedence over the residual weapons control
mode regardless of how restrictive. For example, a track that correlates with
a WEAPONS FREE volume with a residual state of WEAPONS HOLD will
be given the WEAPONS FREE control mode.
VOLUME TYPES
3-130. A distinction must be made between dual-purpose volumes and pure
weapons control volumes. Dual-purpose volumes have both identification
control attributes and weapons control attributes. Pure weapons control
volumes consist solely of a weapon control attribute. The weapons control
volumes enabled condition (areas enabled) applies only to pure weapons
control volumes. A target is tested for correlation with a pure weapon control
volume only if the volumes enabled condition is in effect. A weapons control
attribute from either a dual-purpose volume or from a pure weapon control
volume is applied to a target only if the target correlates (meeting all
correlation criteria) with either type of volume.
ID PROCESSING
3-131. Some basic rules govern the evaluation, decision, and weapon
assignment (EDWA) passive ID processing logic for generalized volumes.
They include the following—
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FM 3-01.87
• The origin volume check is performed first and is done regardless of

where the target is, relative to the PIDON/IFFPID.
• Minimum safe velocity, safe passage corridor, prohibitive volume (PV)
and restrictive volume (RV) attribute checks, and pop-up checks are
performed only if the target is between the unit, and the active
PIDON/IFFPID or the PIDON/IFFPID does not exist or is not active.
• In maintaining the order of precedence of friendly over hostile, safe
passage corridors are checked for RVs and PVs. Targets correlating
with the SPC bypass the RV, PV, and pop-up checks.
• Volume correlation checks for the RV and PV attributes are done in
the same evaluation.
VOLUME CORRELATION
3-132. The passive identification process first checks the target's spatial
correlation with the volumes defined. If the target correlates spatially, then
the speed attribute is checked next. After the speed check, the heading check
is performed. These attributes (speed and heading) are checked based on the
entries made in Tab 71. If no entry was made for an attribute, the check is
bypassed. The target must correlate with all attributes to be given credit for
correlating with a volume. If the target fails to meet either the spatial
correlation or any of the additional attributes assigned to that volume, then
the target does not correlate.
3-133. The safe corridor alignment interval entered in Tab 79 (0 to 99 sec)
still works the same for friendly volumes entered with an SPC attribute,
corridor width, and direction in Tab 71. The safe corridor alignment interval
also applies to the heading criteria entered for a friendly volume (with an
SPC attribute but without corridor width). For targets which correlate with a
friendly volume that is not a corridor (SPC attribute without width or
heading entered in Tab 71), additional evaluations are allowed to correct an
incorrect speed or to get back into the volume (spatial correlation) before the
target loses SPC credit.
DEFINITION
3-134. Generalized volumes are defined in Tab 71 during initialization
according to the applicable ACO. The operator may alter the parameters of
these volumes during tactical operations through Tab 71 or deactivate them
through Tab 5.
PASSIVE ID LINE
3-135. Identification volumes such as prohibited volumes (PVs), restricted
volumes (RVs), and safe passage corridors (SPCs) are not considered for
correlation beyond the Passive ID Line (PIDON) or IFF Passive ID Line
(IFFPID). Therefore, if a PIDON/IFFPID is active, a target within any of
these volumes that is beyond the PIDON/IFFPID will not receive credit for
correlation. The IFF passive ID line/IFF on passive ID line replaces FSCL for
passive ID processing.
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FM 3-01.87
ECM EMMITTERS
3-136. The presence of continuous ECM (that prevents radar range
acquisition) tags a track with the ECM ID history indication. This ID
indicator is displayed on the Track Amplifying Data tab beside ECM EMIT.
This is a permanent hostile indicator. Only continuous ECM is allowed to set
ECM history, because quiet (non-ECM emitting) friendly tracks sometimes
receive credit for the two other Patriot ECM categories (noncontinuous and
repeater). This can occur when a friendly aircraft crosses in front of a
jamming source or due to the presence of chaff or clutter. Thus, the ECM
history indicator will usually be associated with a strobe. The target may
appear as a range-resolved jammer due to triangulation or radar burns.
Radar burn-through occurs on a strobe at a relatively short range when the
power of the Patriot radar allows it to defeat the ECM and obtain a skin
track. The operator may choose to have the system automatically ID all
tracks that carry ECM history as hostile through Tab 1. This will not affect
tracks that have been manually identified by the ICC or FU, identified by
HE, or identified as a true friend. The selection is normally not used. It is
likely that any friendly aircraft jammers operating in forward areas will be
identified as hostile if this selection is made.
FRIENDLY ORIGIN
3-137. Friendly origin (FORG) and hostile origin (HORG) volume correlation
are performed once (immediately after the preclassification filter has been
passed). It is not possible for a track to correlate with both a FORG and
HORG. Correlation with either of these volumes is displayed beside the
ORIGIN indication in the Track Amplifying Data Tab, FORG correlation is
displayed as F, and HORG correlation is displayed as H.
3-138. PROHIB VOL/RESTR VOL. PV and RV correlation are performed on
every reevaluation after the preclassification filter has been passed. When a
PV correlation occurs, PVs are not tested on subsequent reevaluations. The
same is true for RVs. Correlation with a PV is displayed in the Track
Amplification Data tab beside PROHIB VOL. RV is displayed beside RESTR
VOL.
3-139. SAFE CORR. SPC correlation is temporary and is performed on every
reevaluation after preclassification. However, if correlation is lost with an
SPC during one reevaluation, SPC history is not immediately lost. Only if a
previously correlated track fails to correlate in position or velocity with an
SPC on 4 consecutive reevaluations or has failed to correlate in heading
within initialized limits (Tab 71, CORR TOLERANCE) for more than a preset
time interval (Tab 79, SAFE CORRID or ALIGN. INTERVAL), correlation
will be lost. This is to account for targets in a turn within a corridor. SPC
history credit is displayed on the Track Amplifying Data tab beside SAFE
CORR.
3-140. SAFE ELV. The minimum safe velocity (MSV) test is performed on
every reevaluation after preclassification, only if it has been authorized in
Tab 1 and the track is within the PIDON/IFFPID. MSV is a temporary
friendly indicator. A track receives credit on each reevaluation that its
altitude and velocity are below the MSV thresholds defined in Tab 79. It loses
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FM 3-01.87
MSV credit if it exceeds either MSV thresholds upon reevaluation. MSV

history credit is displayed on the Track Amplifying Data tab beside SAFE
VEL. A discussion of a possible use for MSV (and pop-up) follows the section
on pop-up.
3-141. POP-UP. The pop-up test is performed only when authorized in Tab 1.
It is a permanent indicator. If pop-up is authorized and the ID mode is
automatic, then the ID of a track will become hostile when the track is within
the popup maximum range extent, and the low-altitude pop-up velocity is
exceeded or the pop-up maximum velocity is exceeded. These thresholds are
set via Tab 79. The tab entry threshold range limit can be from 0 km out to
100 km. The same restrictions apply as for ECM hostile authorization.
Tracks that are manually identified by the ICC or FU, identified by HE, or
identified as true friend will not be automatically identified as hostile. An
alert, nnn ID VIOLATION—POP-UP, will be displayed if the ID cannot be
automatically changed. Pop-up history is displayed on the Track Amplifying
Data tab beside POP-UP.
3-142. There are three important limitations on pop-ups. Only incoming
aircraft are evaluated for pop-up, pop-up evaluation is not done beyond the
value defined in Pop-up Maximum Range Extent (Tab 79), and pop-up
criteria are never applied within a FORG.
3-143. Use of pop-up and MSV could occur, for example, if the force
commander defines as a friendly criteria that all returning friendly aircraft
maintain speeds below a certain level at certain altitudes. To address this
friendly criteria, the operator could initialize the POP-UP ALTITUDE
THRESHOLD and MAX VEL BELOW POP ALT THRESHOLD above the
defined levels in Tab 79 (based on known Patriot velocity altitude errors).
The POP-UP MAX VEL THRESHOLD can be set to a much higher value to
avoid tagging returning friendly aircraft above the defined altitude level as
pop-up (threshold range limits are 0 to 100 km). The MIN SAFE VEL
ALTITUDE THRESHOLD and MIN SAFE VEL THRESHOLD could also be
set to the same error-adjusted values as the low-altitude, pop-up thresholds.
The result of this would be to identify all inbound aircraft above the defined
friendly limits as hostile and to weigh all aircraft (inbound or outbound)
below the limits towards the friend threshold.
3-144. Although pop-up and MSV can meet the previously defined friendly
criteria, generalized friendly and hostile volumes can also be defined that
meet it with more flexibility and less risk of misidentification. A one-way SPC
with the appropriate velocity and altitude thresholds can meet the friendly
criteria more closely. It will only apply to returning aircraft. MSV does not
have any heading criteria. A generalized RV or combined RV and PV, created
above the SPC volume with appropriate speed and heading criteria, would
weight correlating aircraft towards the hostile threshold without ignoring
other passive ID factors (such as FORG or SPC correlation). Also, these
volumes can be limited in area if desired. The IFFON/IFFPID and the
tracking boundaries limit pop-up and MSV.
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FM 3-01.87
ACTIVE IDENTIFICATION PROCESSING

3-145. The software control of the active ID process mode is now a separate
function from the IFF interrogation. Tab 1 selection of ID mode is separate
from the new Tab 6 function of IFF/SIF STATE AUTO or MANUAL. Tab 6
now controls the active ID process, and Tab 1 now controls the passive ID
process. The active process is based on track SIF and IFF responses. With the
IFF/SIF STATE in the AUTO mode, SIF Mode 1, 2, and 3 interrogation is
performed automatically one time for each range resolved track that passes
the preclassification filter and is within the IFFON/IFFPID line. In Tab 6,
the operator may choose to allow only the Mode 1 response, only the Mode 3
response, or both Mode 1 and 3 responses to be used for SIF history
determination (according to the SOP for the theater). There are three possible
SIF history statuses—positive SIF (PSIF), conflict SIF (CSIF), and negative
SIF (NSIF).
EVALUATION RESULTS
3-146. The evaluation results of IFF responses are displayed in the lower part
of the Track Amplifying Data tab for Modes 1 and 3 in the line RESPONSE
(RSPS). The Track Amplifying Data tab is in Figure 3-11.
TGT NO THRT TLR TLL ESTAT/M ID/SZ/IDS CONFLICT ID:

RECOMMEND ID:
ORIGIN:
TYPE: SAFE VEL:
GEOREF ALT SPEED HDNG RANGE ELEV ECM EMIT:
POP UP:
IFF CONDITION: SAFE CORR:
MODE: 4 1 2 3 PROHIB VOL:
CODE: RESTR VOL:
RESPONSE: IFF EVAL:
QUALITY:
Figure 3-11. Track Amplifying Data Tab
3-147. Patriot does not evaluate Mode 2 as part of the ID process. The Mode 2
RESPONSE will normally be blank but may display a reply if the
interrogated aircraft has a Mode 2 code set. Possible values for the other
modes are displayed and their meanings are described as follows:
• NOT INT—The track has not been interrogated. The IFF EVAL field
will be blank until interrogation has occurred.
• NO RESP—The track was interrogated, but did not respond to the
interrogation. This will occur when an aircraft without a working IFF
transponder is interrogated.
• INVALID—The track was interrogated, but failed to respond
correctly. One reason this occurs for Modes 1 and 3 is that the
KAA-63 codes the aircraft responds with do not match the KAA-63
code for this time entered in Tab 73.
• VALID—The code received from the aircraft matches the code
entered in Tab 73. Valid Mode 4 responses will create a True Friend
symbol on the display, and the software will not allow further
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FM 3-01.87
interrogations. True Friends must be observed to ensure it follows

EDWA and does not threaten friendly forces.
3-148. IFF CONDITION item contains explanations of IFF conditions and
codes displayed on the track amplification data tab and are defined as
follows:
• EMER—This is displayed when the aircraft IFF transponder has its
emergency switch turned on at the time of the interrogation. The
aircraft may set this switch for diverse reasons. Normally, a problem
exists that the pilot feels will prevent him from meeting friendly
aircraft control measures. The presence of EMER does not mean that
a VALID response will be received. Targets tagged with EMER can be
treated as a friend. The operator receives the alert, nnn
EMERGENCY IFF CODE, on a track that responds with EMER.
• IP—This is displayed when the aircraft IFF transponder has its
indicate position (IP) switch turned on at the time of the
interrogation. The aircraft presumably uses this switch when it is
voice commanded to do so by its controller. It is used to identify a
particular aircraft or the aircraft’s position. There is no defined use
for this item in Patriot.
• GARBLE—This item is displayed when an interrogation results in
two responses spaced so that one interferes with the other. This can
happen when two aircraft are very close together when interrogated,
or due to jamming in the IFF frequency. Closely observe tracks and
reinterrogate when tracks are no longer in proximity to each other,
within the same IFF wedge, or ECM strobe. A garbled IFF response
should never be used to ID a track.
• MULT REPLY—This item is displayed when interrogation results in
two or more responses spaced so close together that the IFF
interrogator cannot tell which is which. This is caused by the same
reasons as GARBLE. Closely observe tracks and reinterrogate when
tracks are no longer in proximity to each other, within the same IFF
wedge, or ECM strobe. A MULT REPLY IFF response should never
be used to ID a track.
• SPOOF—This item applies only to Mode 4 interrogations. It is set
when ECM is detected in the IFF frequency during an interrogation
response. Closely observe tracks and reinterrogate when tracks are
no longer in proximity to each other, within the same IFF wedge, or
ECM strobe. An IFF response that is being spoofed should never be
used to ID a track.
3-149. The CODE field refers to Mode 4 HIGH or LOW thresholds. Modes 1
through 3 are read in octal or are blank. The QUALITY field is used only
when compass rose codes are entered in Tab 74. These codes are not used in
most established theaters and are not planned in most contingency theaters.
Patriot crews should, however, be aware of the parameters of their use so
that they may easily be used if the situation demands.
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FM 3-01.87
AUTOMATIC IDENTIFICATION
3-150. If the SIF FRND entry in Tab 1 is set to YES and positive SIF is
detected on a track, the ID is set to friend regardless of other ID. The ID will
not be changed again automatically. This does not change the ID of tracks
that are already manually identified, identified by HE, or are true friends.
3-151. Conflict SIF is possible only if both Modes 1 and 3 are selected in
Tab 6 and the response is valid for one mode and invalid for the other. CSIF
does not have any ID weight in weight set 3, so it does not have any effect on
automatic ID. It is displayed beside IFF EVAL in the Track Amplifying Data
tab as confirmed (CONF).
3-152. Positive SIF is generated if the IFF response(s) for the selected
mode(s) is valid. PSIF provides a friendly weight. It is displayed beside IFF
EVAL as positive (POS).
3-153. Negative SIF is generated if the IFF response(s) for the selected
mode(s) is not valid. NSIF provides a hostile weight. It is displayed beside
IFF EVAL as NEG.
TARGET IDENTIFICATION EVALUATION

3-154. ID evaluation processing is performed on each reevaluation. The
weights assigned for each of the ID history indicators that are set for the
track are summed and compared to the fixed ID thresholds. In the automatic
ID mode, the ID is changed whenever the weight sum passes one of the ID
thresholds. In the manual ID mode, the ID is calculated, but the ID is not
changed. The RECOMMEND ID field in the Track Amplifying Data tab will
reflect the automatically calculated ID, and the operator will be alerted (nnn
RECOMMEND ID = aaaa, where aaaa = UNK, HOST, FRND, or AFND)
whenever it differs from the ID currently held by the track.
INTERACTION OF FIRE UNIT AND ICC IDENTIFICATION PROCESS

3-155. The preceding portion of the ID processing section dealt only with local
FU processing. This portion ties FU ID processing in with ICC ID processing.
3-156. The ICC acts as arbiter and distributor of FU ID and ID history. When
two or more FU tracks correlate into one track at the ICC, the ICC downtells
all ID and ID history information from any source to all tracking FUs.
ORIGIN VOLUME CHECKS
3-157. When an FU track passes the PCF, the origin volume checks are
performed. If a correlation occurs at the ICC, a check is made to determine
which FU has the oldest (earliest detection) track. If an older track exists, its
ID history for FORG or HORG is sent to the FU reporting the new track. This
FU erases its current origin history, accepts the downtold history, and uses it
for automatic ID and manual recommended ID determination.
SAFE PASSAGE CORRIDORS AND MINIMUM SAFE VELOCITY RULES
3-158. The SPC and MSV ID history parameters are processed by the ICC
using a simple rule—if any correlating FU currently has SPC (or MSV)
history, then all correlating FUs are downtold SPC (or MSV) history. Due to
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FM 3-01.87
differing FU aspect angles, velocity, heading, and siting errors, it is possible

for one FU to determine that an aircraft flying close to an SPC boundary
correlates while another FU does not. Differing velocity measurements can
cause the same problem with MSV. ICC processing of ID history parameters
ensures that if one FU detects them on a track, all FUs will use them for ID
determination.
HISTORY INDICATOR
3-159. The ECM history indicator is also downtold to all correlating FUs.
Directional ECM may cause a target to be tracked as a continuous jammer at
one FU, but not at another. The ICC also distributes PV and RV ID history
indicators.
SIF IDENTIFICATION INDICATOR

3-160. For the SIF ID history, the ICC maintains the most positive history
received and downtells it to correlating FUs. One FU may receive an invalid
response due to its aspect angle with the aircraft's transponder antenna,
while another FU receives a valid response. It is also possible that the
aircraft transponder is overloaded by interrogation requests from other units
(Hawk, Stinger, et cetera) at the time of one Patriot FU interrogation, but is
free at the time another FU interrogates.
PREVIOUS IDENTIFICATION HISTORY

3-161. Another major reason for sharing of ID history is illustrated in
Figure 3-12. The ID history for a track that flies across the coverage of
several FUs is maintained and disseminated so that an FU that acquires a
track can use all previous ID history for ID determination.
FLIGHT PATH
SPC
FRIENDLY
ORIGIN
Figure 3-12. Track ID History
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FM 3-01.87
MANUAL ID
3-162. Manual ID processing is relatively simple. When the fire unit operator
manually IDs a track using the HOST, FRND, UNK, or SPEC switches, the
ICC will be notified via the ID CONFLICT alert. The ID, chosen by the ICC
to resolve the conflict, is downtold and the FU automatically accepts it.
IDENTIFICATION HISTORY PRECEDENCE

3-163. IDs that are downtold from the ICC with an automatic ID source will
generally replace a locally derived automatic ID. ICC manual IDs or IDs with
an HE source are always accepted.
ENGAGEMENT ELIGIBILITY
3-164. Various factors must be examined for each target evaluation which
affect engagement eligibility. These include target ID, residual weapon
control state, target correlation with weapons control volumes, threat
eligibility, and target speed (slow and false target criteria). A friendly
identity (Special Friend, True Friend, Friend, or Assumed Friend) negates
the need for any threat assessment. In the case of an Unknown identity, it
must be determined which weapon control state the target is in. If no threat
assessment is performed, the target is not processed for engagement. A
hostile identity makes the target immediately eligible for manual
engagement, but the automatic engagement eligibility of the target is
prohibited if it has correlated with a WEAPONS HOLD volume or if residual
WEAPONS HOLD applies.
WEAPON CONTROL STATE

3-165. A local weapon control status (WCS) is determined for all ABTs. This
local WCS is directed to the ICC. The ICC downtells the most restrictive WCS
to all correlation FUs. The FUs apply this WCS to the tracks. Precedence
rules are established to assign one WCS to a target that may correlate with
overlapping coverage with a different WCS. The most restrictive state
applies. Correlation with a WEAPONS HOLD volume is more restrictive
than a WEAPONS TIGHT volume, and in turn with a WEAPONS FREE
volume. The residual state is taken only when there is no correlation with a
volume that has a weapon control state attribute.
THREAT ELIGIBILITY
3-166. Threat eligibility is based on target range, velocity, and heading. Only
when a track is close enough to have an acceptable Pk is it threat assessed.
Figure 3-13, provides a visual representation of this process. The eligible
target range threshold and the maximum acceptable intercept range can be
altered using the operator range bias in Tab 1. This bias should only be used
if directed by the force commander. If a track is close enough to be threat
assessed, it is checked for either inhibiting condition.
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FM 3-01.87
NO TARGET OUTSIDE THE

ELIGIBLE TARGET RANGE
THRESHOLD IS THREAT
ASSESSED
NOT ASSESSED
ANY TARGET THAT IS
PREDICTED TO PENETRATE
THE MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE
INTERCEPT RANGE IS
THREAT ASSESSED
ASSESSED
NO OUTBOUND TARGET
BEYOND THE MAXIMUM MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE
ACCEPTABLE INTERCEPT INTERCEPT RANGE (BASED
RANGE IS THREAT
ASSESSED ON Pk)
ALL TARGETS WITHIN THE

MAXIMUM ACCEPTABLE
INTERCEPT RANGE ARE
THREAT ASSESSED
BATTERY LOCATION
Figure 3-13. Threat Assessment
THREAT ASSESSMENT
3-167. After a target qualifies as an eligible enemy threat, the target will
undergo detailed threat assessment. Detailed threat assessment consists of
threat category assignment, TBEQ processing, and launch decision
processing.
ASSET THREAT CATEGORY

3-168. Threat category assignment associates 1 of 10 asset threat categories
(ATCs) with each ABT target based upon which asset or areas are threatened
(see Table 3-6). Eligible TBM targets are processed separately. ATCs 1
through 9 (ATC 10 is assigned to ABTs) can be assigned to TBMs as follows:
• Assign the ATC of the highest priority threatened asset to ABT
targets below the high-altitude threshold.
• Assign ATC 9 to ABT targets below the high-altitude threshold that
do not threaten any asset.
• Assign ATC 10 to ABT targets that are above the high-altitude
threshold.
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FM 3-01.87
Table 3-6 Asset Threat Categories

ASSET PRIORITY ASSET THREAT
CATEGORY
1 1
2 2
HIGHER 3 3
4 4
5 5
6 6
LOWER 7 7
8 8
GENERAL AREA THREAT 9
HIGH-ALTITUDE THREAT 10
TIME TO FIRST LAUNCH AND TIME TO LAST LAUNCH

3-169. The terms time to first launch (TTFL) and time to last launch (TTLL)
are defined here because they are used extensively. Asset threat categories
are discussed in this and following discussions.
3-170. TTFL is an estimated time it takes for the target approaching the
battery to be engaged with intercept occurring within an acceptable
probability of kill. The acceptable kill probability region is within the
azimuth limits of the track sector and within a range value based on the
target's altitude and ECM history. The boundary can be moved in and out by
entering an engagement range bias on Tab 10 at the ICC or Tab 1 at the ECS
(see the discussion of range bias in Chapter 2). This parameter is added to
the boundary value and moves the acceptable kill range in and out. Current
TTFL is displayed as time to launch release (TLR) in the Engagement Data
tab. A target that is detected at long range and flies toward the battery will
have a large TTFL.
3-171. As the target comes closer, the TTFL decreases and reaches 0 seconds
when the target's LNIP enters the high kill probability region. If the
estimated target flight path does not cross into the acceptable region
(crossing target), TTFL is not displayed or is displayed as +99 seconds. Also,
if the target is presently in the engagement boundary, but the intercept point
is outside of it, TTFL is not displayed (receding target). The launch decision
process computes the TLR value displayed on the engagement data display
for each TBEQ target. When the system is in the automatic engagement
mode, TLR indicates the time remaining before the target is automatically
engaged by the system. TTFL and delays in launch due to radar guidance
availability are taken into account, and the target is continuously displayed
on the TBEQ for operator review before automatic engagement. If the launch
is being delayed because of lack of guidance resources, the letter D appears in
front of the release time on the display. The operator review (override) time is
initialized and can be changed through Tab 1. In the automatic mode, when a
dash is shown in front of the release time, the operator review (override) time
is delaying the engagement. In the semiautomatic engagement mode, TLR is
equal to TTFL.
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FM 3-01.87
3-172. Time to last launch (TTLL) is the time remaining to the last
opportunity to initiate an engagement so intercept will occur before the
target penetrates the asset boundary. This is a very forgiving calculation. It
assumes that the target is heading directly towards the center of the asset at
its current speed. It also assumes that the Patriot missile has to fly to the
farthest point on the asset boundary to perform the intercept. Also, a delay
time, equal to the maximum time from engagement initiation to missile
launch, is considered. Thus, if the target is not heading directly towards the
asset, an engagement at TTLL=0 will be intercepted outside the asset
boundary.
THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS

3-173. The first step in the threat assessment process is to determine if the
target is above the enemy threat and altitude thresholds (Tab 78). If it is, it is
assigned an ATC of 10 (high-altitude threat), and the display of TTLL is
suppressed. High-altitude threats should only be engaged upon command.
They are not a direct threat to the FU or any of its assets.
3-174. The software then calculates a TTLL for the target to each asset that
the target is approaching. If none of these TTLLs is less than a fixed-asset
threat threshold, then the target is a general area threat. In this case, the
TTLL displayed is the smallest TTLL for any asset it is approaching. The
maximum value for TTLL is 99 seconds. If the target is receding from all
assets, the display of TTLL is inhibited.
3-175. If the TTLL is below the asset threat time threshold for an asset that
it is threatening, the highest priority defended asset is chosen. If more than
one asset with the same priority is threatened, then the one with the smallest
TTLL is chosen. The chosen asset ID is displayed with its ATC under threat
(THRT) in the Track Amplifying Data and Engagement Data tabs.
SELF-DEFENSE
3-176. The alert “nnn SELF DEFENSE THREAT” is generated by processing
in the threat assessment logic that determines when a track is an enemy
threat to the FU. This logic assumes an instantaneous turn towards the FU
at the current target speed. The TTLL for the target is calculated based on
the FU's minimum range engagement boundary. If the TTLL is less than
24 seconds and the track is eligible for engagement, the alert is displayed.
Sometimes this causes confusion (see Figure 3-14). A track may get the alert
just before its LNIP becomes invalid. If so, an engagement is not possible.
This should occur only when the target does not overfly the FU.
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FM 3-01.87
TTLL <24 SECONDS (ASSUMING

INSTANTANEOUS TURN)
MINIMUM RANGE
ENGAGEMENT BOUNDARY
Figure 3-14. Self-Defense Threat
ABT KILL ASSESSMENT

3-177. Whenever it is determined that an intercept on an ABT is complete,
kill assessment processing is begun. The kinetic energy of the target is
measured at the time of intercept. The kill assessment (KA) state of the
target is set to probable kill (Pk) at intercept. Intercept occurs when the
missile reaches the predicted intercept point and the fuze is made active by
detecting an object in its field of view. The KA status of a track is displayed to
the operator on the situation display. The # symbol modifier will blink on and
off on the track while the KA state is Pk. The Pk modifier does not indicate
that the track was killed. The current track kinetic energy is periodically
reevaluated for a period of time (P4-14 seconds). For a multiple engagement,
the kill assessment period will be restarted when the second intercept occurs.
Multiple firings on formations are not considered complete until the last
intercept. The KA of the track is set to confirmed kill (CK) if the track's
energy decreases significantly before the time expires. The track's energy is
calculated by looking at the heading, altitude, speed, and size before and
after the intercept. The # symbol will not blink for a track with a KA of CK.
KILL ASSESSMENT
3-178. The track KA is set to no kill (NK) for several reasons—the track
continuously emits (range denying) ECM, track energy increases; or the KA
evaluation time expires before track energy is observed to increase or
decrease significantly. The # symbol is removed when a KA state of NK is
assigned to the track.
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FM 3-01.87
TESTS
3-179. These are all commonsense tests. If a track continues to fly at the
same speed for a period of time after intercept, or it begins accelerating, then
it has not been killed. A killed track also does not continue to emit continuous
ECM. KA processing is not performed for TBMs. If the intercept goes to
completion, the KA state is set to Pk. If the intercept fails the KA state is set
to NK.
CHANGING THE KILL ASSESSMENT

3-180. The KILL and NO KILL switches at the FU will change the kill
assessment (KA) state of a track to confirmed kill (CK) or no kill (NK),
respectively. These switches should never be used. There is no information
available to the operator that will allow him to make this decision.
TACTICAL BALLISTIC MISSILE CONSIDERATIONS

3-181. PDB-4 improvements to the weapon system includes upgraded missile
and software that enhances asset defense against TBMs. Throughout this
document the various TBMs will be referred to as Type A and Type B. The
Type A TBMs are short-range missiles with a range of 300 kilometers or less.
The Type B TBMs are medium-range missiles with a range of 300 to
1,000 kilometers. All of these TBMs can now be countered by the Patriot
system. The following are recommendations for the tactical exploitation of
those capabilities.
3-182. Plan For The "worst case" TBM threat. Plan to fight against the most
difficult TBM that the IPB indicates the enemy possesses. In most cases,
these will be the longer range TBM Bs that fly at greater speeds and
altitudes. An altitude bias of –4 km should be used against TBMs type B. In
some cases, however, the TBM Type A, with shorter, slower, and flatter
trajectories, may be the most dangerous. Although this reduces the battle
space of the unit in altitude and time, it provides a better Pk at the required
altitude. The increased Pk offsets the reduced number of possible
simultaneous engagements. If only a threat of TBM A exists, the altitude bias
should not be used. The battalion commander and staff (S3 or S2) must
determine whether other altitude bias settings should be used. Usually,
doctrinal recommendations from USAADASCH and the Patriot Project Office
will be provided.
3-183. Fight in the automatic TBM engagement mode since the system is
designed to fight in the automatic TBM engagement mode. Once the system
has classified a target as a TBM, the engagement decisions are very limited.
Since the operator has little time to make decisions, he cannot distinguish
current advance low-radar cross section (ALRCS) ABTs from regular ABTs. If
guidance enhanced missiles (GEMs) are required to counter an ALRCS ABT
threat, the software must be tailored to select one.
3-184. Overlap TBM coverage for mutual protection between batteries, to
thicken the defense, and to share the limited number of protected assets that
may be entered into the system at the battery. All batteries have a TBM
engagement capability through active search or told-in tracks from the ICC.
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FM 3-01.87
TBM tracks also may be transmitted to adjacent battalions whose FUs are
threatened.
3-185. When the battalion's mission is to provide asset defense (such as
protecting an airfield or harbor area) against TBMs, two-fifths or more of the
batteries should be in the ABT and TBM surveillance mode, respectively.
Where the primary enemy is ABTs, one- to two-fifths of the batteries in the
TBM surveillance mode may be enough to provide necessary protection.
3-186. TBM polygon assets and the possibility of multiple launch sites make
it feasible to split the launch sites with the RS PTL and align launch stations
to the specific azimuth of the launch sites. This reduces missile fly out time.
If single launch sites are the only threat, then align both the RS and LSs
toward the launch sites.
ATM CAPABILITY
3-187. The PDB-4 upgrade has modified the ICC and FU software to
accommodate the changes in hardware and consequently has greatly
enhanced the system's ATM capability. With the hardware improvements,
the Patriot system can now counter a larger spectrum of TBMs. It also
provides for greater asset defense in addition to improving the self-defense
capability.
HARDWARE
3-188. The hardware changes in the system have primarily been in the
Patriot guidance enhanced missile. These consist of improvements to the
S-band fuze reaction time, improved sensitivity of the C-band track via
missile (TVM) seeker, and higher TVM data rate. The improvement in
sensitivity of the TVM seeker is accomplished through the addition of three
low-noise C-band amplifiers to the front end of the receiver. This low noise
amplifier change requires modifications to the seeker antenna monopulse
feed and to the intermediate frequency (IF) receiver. The S-band fuze
improvement requires changes to the fuze processor to provide greater
sensitivity and earlier detection of targets. The higher TVM data rate in the
missile hardware changes a programmable read-only memory in the timing
and control unit.
SOFTWARE
3-189. Overall, there have been two major functional improvements in the
software to counter TBMs. First, the system has an improved overall defense
capability against a wider range of TBMs. Furthermore, there is a capability
to provide limited TBM defense for critical assets within the high lethality
engagement zone. This is in addition to the normal FU self-defense
capability. All the software functional areas (surveillance, guidance, EDWA,
and status monitor) have been modified to provide this enhanced TBM
capability. The FU software accounts for the availability of the GEM and will
select the appropriate missile for the mission being conducted.
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FM 3-01.87
Target Classification
3-190. The target classification modifications include the addition of the new
Type B TBM and logic changes that account for updated intelligence data on
aircraft performance. The classification process also includes told-in
processing from other ICCs. The target characteristics and flight profiles of
various threat aircraft, TM, and TBM targets are compared to performance
boundaries defined within the software. From these flight profiles, the logic
will distinguish aircraft and TMs, from TBMs, arriving at a specific
classification for every track. The target classification process provides
several categories of classification within a presumed or confirmed category.
3-191. Presumed ABT (PABTs) target classifications are applied to targets
whose previously observed flight profiles do not demonstrate characteristics
that would allow a confirmed classification. All targets are initially classified
with the default of PABT.
3-192. Targets with the presumed classification continue to be processed by
the classification logic so that they may be positively classified. Before the
determination of a positive classification, the target maintains a presumed
status but is treated equivalent to a confirmed classification for engagement
purposes. A PABT will be treated as an ABT track, and a presumed tactical
ballistic missile will be treated as a TBM A.
3-193. Targets that have not yet received a confirmed classification are
processed by the classification logic each time it is evaluated by EDWA. Once
a target receives a confirmed classification, it is no longer processed by the
classification logic. Therefore, its classification will not change due to local
processing. A target may have a classification change due to a told-in
classification from the ICC. If a presumed TBM is determined to be emitting
ECM, its classification is changed to ABT.
3-194. The classification logic distinguishes TBM Bs. The TBM B threat is
easily discriminated from TBM As and ABTs by its greater flight dynamics
and higher altitude. The TBM B velocity profile almost never overlaps
profiles for TBM As or ABTs.
3-195. The classification logic compares target climb rate versus altitude
against the maximum altitude attributed to any aircraft. If the maximum
altitude rate or velocity profile is exceeded but is less than that for a TBM B,
the target is classified as a TBM A. If the climb rate is greater than most
aircraft, but within the capability of specific high-performance aircraft, a
PTBM classification is assigned. The logic accounts for the small probability
of an aircraft climbing rapidly at high altitudes and ensures that the target
will continue to be processed by the classification logic until a confirmed
classification is established. The classification logic sets a target dive
indicator if the descent rate of the target exceeds a specific threshold. If, after
this indicator is set, the target is observed to be climbing, the classification is
set to ABT. This logic assumes that TBMs will not change from a dive phase
to an ascent phase.
3-196. A level flight time test is performed for ambiguously classified targets
with an altitude less than 15 kilometers and an altitude rate within the
performance region of both ABTs and TBMs. If over a prescribed time frame,
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FM 3-01.87
the target remains in this region of altitude uncertainty, it is classified as an

ABT. This logic is based on the fact that any TBM, at apogee, will exceed the
altitude rate threshold within the prescribed time.
Threat Assessment
3-197. The threat assessment process has been enhanced to include critical
asset defense and accommodation of a ballistic trajectory used for a TBM B
ground impact point (GIP) calculation. ABT (seen as AT on the display)
assets will be threat assessed against a radius from the center point not the
actual size of the ABT asset, while pure TBM (seen as TB on the display)
assets will be assessed against the entire asset.
3-198. The threat assessment logic determines if a TBM is a threat by
predicting the TBM GIP. The GIP is determined by predicting the TBM
trajectory from its current position to the ground. Due to the trajectory
differences between TBM As and TBM Bs, different trajectory logic is
required. For a target to enter the threat assessment logic, it must have
reached its apogee and be on the downward descent of its ballistic trajectory
during periodic TBM threat evaluations. The trajectory predicted for TBM A
targets will initially be ballistic, with a dive angle toward the target during
the final phase of flight. TBM B targets are predicted to fly without a dive
maneuver.
3-199. A ground impact point area prediction uncertainty is defined around
the GIP. This area is called the GIP box. It is a representation of where the
system thinks the missile will impact plus additional area to account for
system error. The software uses the location of the highest priority asset in
the GIP area of uncertainty to determine if the trajectory prediction should
be modified for a dive maneuver or remain ballistic. If the asset is beyond the
predicted ballistic GIP, then no dive maneuver is calculated for Type A
TBMs. If the asset is between the ballistic GIP and the missile, dive
maneuvers are then calculated for Type A TBMs. The area of uncertainty
around the ballistic GIP has been defined large enough to contain the most
severe turn-down maneuver expected.
3-200. This GIP box has varying dimensions based on type of TBM. The
lengthwise direction of a GIP box is along the direction vector of the TBM
trajectory. This rectangular area of uncertainty is used to determine if the
battery or an asset is potentially threatened (site location within the
uncertainty box centered around the predicted GIP) or whether an active
asset is potentially threatened. This GIP box is never displayed, only the GIP.
For further details on the GIP box, see (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U).
3-201. The GIP is always computed but is displayed only when certain
parameters are met. If the TBM is threatening the FU or an activated asset,
the GIP is automatically displayed. If the TBM is non-threatening, the GIP is
displayed only when the target is hooked. The GIP box is never displayed, see
Figure 3-15.
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TBM
Trajectory
GIP Box
Ground
Impact Point
Figure 3-15. GIP Box

3-202. There are certain visual queues that an operator can observe which
will provide a quick indication if the TBM is engageable. If the TBM is
threatening the FU or an asset, the system will automatically display the
TBEQ symbology and the GIP. The ATC value displayed for this TBM target
will be that of the FU or the asset. If there are no active assets and the FU is
not threatened, then only the TBM symbol will be displayed. When this
particular target is hooked, the GIP will be displayed, and if the target is
engageable, an LNIP will also be displayed. The ENGST/M in the Track Amp
Data tab will indicate impact point out (IPOUT). The ATC value for this
track will indicate ATC 9, a general area threat. If no LNIP is displayed upon
hooking this track and there is no status in the ENGST/M data field, then the
TBM is not engageable. The key elements in observing TBM engageability
are the TBEQ symbol or an LNIP. If either is displayed, then a TLR and a
TLL should be displayed in the Engagement Data and Track Amp Data tabs.
3-203. As with any target under engagement, the various engage modifiers
(Cease Fire = CEASF, Hold Fire = HOLDF, and Engage Hold = EHOLD) also
apply to TBMs. However, there are several engage modifiers that are unique
to TBM targets.
• Engage Inbound (ENBND) indicates that the TBM is engageable and
threatening the FU or an asset. It also indicates that the TTFL,
which is also time to launch release (TTLR) is greater than zero.
• Impact Point Out (IPOUT) indicates that the TBM is engageable but
that the predicted ground impact point (GIP) is not threatening the
FU or an active asset. When the target is hooked, the system will
display a GIP and an LNIP if the TBM is engageable and
threatening.
• Pending Engagement (PENG) indicates that there is an engagement
pending on this target by another FU. This status is displayed when
an FU with a better score is going to conduct the engagement.
Battery scoring is discussed in the paragraph below.
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3-204. Once the GIP is initially calculated, based upon TBM flight path, the
FU and assets are then evaluated to determine which is most threatened.
The evaluation logic first evaluates the FU to determine if the TBM is a self-
defense threat. If the FU coordinates are within the GIP box, the TBM is
determined to be a self-defense threat. As such, the asset threat category
(ATC) is set to the highest priority value (ATC=1), regardless whether other
assets are also threatened.
3-205. If the FU is not within the GIP box, the other active assets are
evaluated. The system uses the following procedures to determine if an active
asset is threatened. If any of the multipoint TB asset coordinates are within
the GIP box, the TBM is determined to be an asset defense. For an AT asset,
software first draws (but does not display) a circle with a radius of
2 kilometers around the ABT asset. If the GIP box intersects this 2-kilometer
circle around the ABT asset, the system will consider the ABT asset
threatened and process that TBM for engagement. If the GIP box does not
intersect the circle, the ABT asset is not threatened, and the system will not
produce an automatic engagement (Figure 3-16).
Causes No
Engagement
Causes
Engagement
Asset
Figure 3-16. ABT Asset with GIP Boxes

3-206. In the case of a TBM B threat, the closest asset to the GIP, if it is
within the GIP box, is chosen as the most threatened and the ATC is set
accordingly. In the case of a TBM A, when two assets of equal ATC are
between the GIP and the TBM, the asset closest to the GIP is chosen as the
most threatened. The reason for this rule is that generally a TBM A tends to
dive in the terminal phase.
3-207. All active assets that have been entered in Tab 70 will be evaluated for
TBM asset defense. It should be noted if an asset is to be provided TBM
protection, care must be taken to ensure that the asset's location is within the
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FM 3-01.87
high lethality defended area described in the next section. If no asset is

threatened, the TBM is categorized as a nonthreat.
Tactical Ballistic Missile Engagement Zones

3-208. Once the TBM is determined to be a threat to the FU or another active
asset, the TBM trajectory is evaluated for engagement consideration. The
predicted trajectory is correlated with a predefined engagement zone. This is
to determine if the trajectory is predicted to enter the airspace of high
lethality or engagement zone for engagement, as shown by the shaded areas
in Figure 3-17. Top view of a defended area is at Figure 3-18. For further
details see (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U).
TBM
M ax
Altitude
Min
Range Max
Figure 3-17. Defended Area Side View
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PTL
Figure 3-18. Defended Area Top View

3-209. Generally, the engagement zone is predefined. The maximum
engagement range and altitude are defined so that the LNIP prediction logic
will attain intercept in a high lethality region.
3-210. The upper altitude limits and outer ground range limits are different
for TBM A and TBM B threats and are a function of the type of missile, ATM
(PAC-2) or ATM 1 (GEM), used to engage the threat. The Pk values for
ranges and intercept altitudes for a mission kill using the ATM and ATM 1
missiles for TBM A and the various TBM Bs available in the world are
contained in Table 3-8.
3-211. The altitude and ground range engagement zones will render the TBM
as engageable if the LNIP is predicted within these zones or if the LNIP is
predicted to land within these zones (TTFL is greater than zero, see
Figure 3-19). These engagement zones are the maximum system capabilities
for Patriot, and the area on the ground can be defended with a limited degree
of protection. The most forward areas of the GIP may only cause a single
intercepter to be launched, which will dramatically decrease the Pk.
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FM 3-01.87
TBM B ( )
Does Not Dive
Dive Point
Altitude
TTFL = 0
Type A
TTLL = 0
Type B
Range
Intercept Boundary
for Last Launch
Figure 3-19. Intercept Boundary

3-212. With the post deployment build-4 (PDB-4) software and remote
launch, the Pk area has translated into a Pk region that extends much
further from the fire unit due to the remote launch capability and improved
trajectory shaping. This increased zone is due to the Pk footprint moving with
the remotely emplaced launcher(s).
3-213. The TBM A engagement zone for a local launcher is determined from
the fire unit. Based on the incoming trajectory of the TBM, the shaded area
illustrates the region where the system will be able to perform the normal
two-missile engagement of the TBM. The first intercept should occur at the
top of the volume, with the second intercept occurring within the volume.
3-214. For a remote launcher, this is a two-missile engagement area,
regardless of how far the remote launcher is from the fire unit. This is
because the engagement zones of the remote launchers reduce in size as the
launchers move forward, providing a maximum engagement zone of
P4-18 kms. Consequently, the two-shot region and the associated high Pk
area for a TBM B only extend out to P4-19 kms. See (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U).
3-215. There are some limitations on the size of the extended Pk region. For
TBM As, the Pk region will generally extend as a function of the remote
launcher range. This TBM A restriction is due to classification concerns
identified in (S)FM 44-100A(U). This large area is possible because of the
relatively low speed and altitude of a TBM A, allowing the Patriot missile
sufficient time to align and counter the incoming threat. For a TBM B, there
is a limitation on how far from the fire unit the high Pk zone will extend. This
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FM 3-01.87
restriction is due to the reduced engagement zones as the remote launcher is

moved forward in the various regions (remote LS engagement zones).
The TBM B will have a variable Pk region out to a variable range (see
[S/NF]ST 44-85-1A[U]). Any portion of the Pk curve that extends beyond the
two-shot region range will have a Pk of less than shown on the chart. The
shaded area in Figure 3-20 illustrates this condition.
Low Pk
Remote LS
Figure 3-20. TBM B Remote Launch Pk Restriction

3-216. The varying limitation on the high Pk only applies to TBM Bs. This is
due to the TBM engagement zones, which defines the area in which the
system will perform the two-missile engagement at the incoming threat.
3-217. The Patriot system has a limited capability against a medium-range
TBM. Patriot TBM threat set is defined as a TBM launched beyond P4-20
kms and within P4-21 kms. As long as the speed of this does not exceed the
system's unengageable TBM limit and conforms to the engageability
parameters, it will be engaged. If it does exceed the unengageable TBM limit,
the system will not allow a manual nor an automatic engagement. The
following Pk parameters are for local and remote launchers. The Pk footprint
moves with the remote launchers, and launcher emplacement restrictions in
terms of range from the FU still apply. The range is greater due to
surveillance improvements resulting from the low noise receiver modification.
3-218. As previously mentioned, Pk curves are associated with the launchers.
Consequently, remote launchers can be used to increase the Pk regions
against this threat. There are some additional restrictions associated with
the use of remote launchers against this long-range threat. Earlier detection
resulting from the surveillance improvements is necessary to account for the
extended downrange area. Based on the aforementioned, remote launchers
should not be emplaced beyond P4-22 kms from the FU. Consequently, if a
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FM 3-01.87
long-range TBM threat really exists, then (-4km/13kft) should be entered in

ECS Tab 1, page 2, and TBM ENGAGEMENT ALT BIAS data field. The
defended area footprints vary according to the type of missile used for the
engagement (ATM, ATM1, or Standard), and the type of TBM threat. See
(S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U).
3-219. The engagement zones determine the window of time (TTFL to TTLL)
in which an engagement is initiated. This is to ensure intercept will occur
within the high-lethality zone.
3-220. The Patriot batteries calculate a TBM engagement selection
parameter, which is used to score the FU's ability to successfully engage a
TBM under track that has been determined to be either a self-defense or
asset threat. This selection parameter score is exchanged between the FUs
and the ICC. The FU that computes the best score will be designated the
primary engagement candidate for the TBM under evaluation. Other FUs
will not automatically engage the TBM unless it becomes a self-defense
threat.
3-221. The essential factors used in determining the selection parameters are
as follows (listed in order of greatest to least influence on the total score):
• Self-defense threat to the local FU.
• Severity of engagement load at the local FU.
• ATM missiles availability at the local FU.
• Range of impact point from the local FU.
3-222. It is unlikely that two or more FUs will compute an identical score for
a given TBM, unless the FUs are collocated. In the automatic engagement
mode, the normal cease fire process, initiated when one FU engages the TBM,
precludes multiple FUs engaging a single TBM. In the manual engagement
mode, it is possible to shoot through a cease fire from another battery. Given
the lack of time to make engagement decisions against TBMs, manual
command and control procedures will preclude multiple engagements when
directed from higher and engaging in the manual mode.
3-223. The ICC primarily serves as a relay point between FUs for the
selection parameter exchange and does not evaluate the score on its own. The
ICC automatically determines which FU(s) is tracking the TBM and ensures
that each FU receives the other's score.
REMOTE LAUNCH
3-224. This section defines LS emplacement criteria, the engagement decision
and weapons assignment process at the FU and the defense design
considerations when implementing remote launch (Figure 3-21). TBM
defense design is based on launcher locations and the footprints related to the
defended area for the launcher, not the radar. Establish the TBM defense
design around the footprints for the expected threat. There are two separate
locations where launchers may be positioned to counter the threat: local
launchers and remote launchers phase-I. Orient the radar PTL pointing
towards the center of the threat launch locations. The launchers must be
pointed directly at a threat launch location to achieve the smallest crossing
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FM 3-01.87
angle and highest Pk. Whenever possible, orient launchers in pairs towards
the threat launch locations for redundancy.
VHF
Fiber-Optic Cable
P4- 23 kms
Local Remote
Figure 3-21. Local and Remote Launcher Emplacement
LAUNCHER EMPLACEMENT
3-225. LSs are categorized according to emplacement geometry, as shown in
Figure 3-22. Local LSs must be located within P4-24 kilometers of the radar
coordinates, and within the sector limits of 80 degrees from the radar PTL. A
remote LS is defined as any LS exceeding the P4-25 kilometer radius from
the radar. Remote LS emplacement is constrained by RS to LS
communications and by missile acquisition. The maximum radial distance
imposed by these constraints is not to exceed P4-26 kilometers. The remote
launch sector limits are defined as the track sector limits.
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FM 3-01.87
Maximum Range
From Radar
Rem ote Launcher Region
PTL
Track Track
Bounds Bounds
Lim ited Launcher

Local Launcher Placem ent Allow ed Behind
Region Track Sector
Figure 3-22. Launcher Emplacement Geometry

3-226. The remote LS train angle limits are discussed below. One set of limits
applies to the entire remote region and another to the local launchers.
• Remote launcher:
– Located beyond local LS range limit (from the RS). Not to exceed
P4-27 kilometers from the RS.
– Located within the track sector of the RS.
– Train angle limits are 45 degrees of the PTL.
• Local launcher:
– Located within P4-28 kilometers of the RS.
– Located with the track sector of the radar.
– Limited placement behind track sector.
• Train angle limit dependent on location:
– +35o (if the LS is within +10o of PTL).
– -35o to +5o (if the LS is within -80o to -10o of PTL).
– +35o to -5o (if the LS is within +80o to +10o of PTL).
– +45o (if the LS is in the remote launch region).
3-227. Communications line-of-sight (LOS) is required for both the local and
remote launchers. As a rule, if communications have been established with
the remote LS, it should be suitable for missile acquisition. LOS is required
for VHF communications and to ensure missile acquisition will not be
impeded by multipath signal reflections (Figures 3-23 and 3-24). While LOS
may be achieved, the surrounding area must be free of large reflective
surfaces (buildings, lakes, and large rocky hills). If terrain or artificial
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FM 3-01.87
features between the RS and LS exceed 2o (local LS) or 0.5o (remote LS) above
LOS, radar acquisition of the missile may not occur.
MISSILE ACQUISITION
LOS
LOS
Figure 3-23. Line-of-Sight Between ECS and RS and LS
MISSILE
ACQUISITION ??
??
LOS
LOS
Figure 3-24. No Line-of-Sight Between RS and Missile

3-228. The success of remote launch operations depends on ECS to LS
communication to engage a remote ABT track before actually tracking it
using an adjacent radar that is tracking the ABT track. The tracking radar
detecting the ABT track provides the target data to the nontracking radar.
When the nontracking radar engages the track on remote, the midcourse
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FM 3-01.87
guidance and TVM will provide missile uplink by the nontracking radar
before obtaining line of sight to the target. At extended range, the
communication link is susceptible to many factors as indicated below. The
associated considerations and operator actions will ensure a greater
likelihood of establishing and maintaining communication with remote
launchers:
• Atmospheric conditions—Weather and temperature changes affect
the signal-to-noise ratio.
• Terrain—Terrain changes also effect the signal-to-noise ratio. Each
location has its attributes. Generally, as elevation increases, so does
signal strength. At longer ranges, it is advantageous for the LS and
ECS to be at the highest elevations possible.
• Line of sight—This is necessary for data link upgrade (DLU)
communications with remote LSs.
• Surrounding noise—Background noise has an effect on the signal-to-
noise ratio.
REMOTE LAUNCHERS AUTOMATICALLY EMPLACED

3-229. There are some functional capabilities that are restricted from being
conducted from a remote LS. The strobe engagement mode (SEM) and the
SOJC engagement of a virtual target cannot be performed from a remote LS.
Only local launchers may be used for these two functions. Also, the remote
launch capability requires the DLU.
FIRE UNIT EDWA PROCESSING

3-230. Target processing has been modified to account for a defense design
using remote launchers. The engagement parameters are different for remote
and local launchers because of the decreased missile fly-out time from the
remote LS to the intercept point. The parameters affected include time-to-
first-launch (TTFL), time-to-last-launch (TTLL), missile time-of-flight
(TFLT), and the launch-now-intercept-point (LNIP). As Figure 3-25 indicates,
when choosing a remote LS over local LS, TTFL and TTLL decrease. The
missile TFLT normally is less for a remote LS, because the total flight
distance from the LS to intercept is less for the remote LS.
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FM 3-01.87
Altitude
Ground Impact
Range
Local LS Remote LS
Figure 3-25. Missile Fly-Out Time
3-231. For remote launch, threat assessment has incorporated LS selection
logic. With remote launch for TBMs, engagement decision parameters are
dependent upon the LS selected. Remote launchers are favored in LS
selection if remote launchers contain the correct type of missile available for
TBMs.
3-232. Remote LSs are favored for TBM asset defense—
• When it is too late to engage with local LS to defend a remote asset.
• When the total ATM missile inventory at the local LSs has decreased
to a specific low missile limit.
• When only ATM missiles are available at all launchers.
3-233. Under certain conditions a remote LS may not be advantageous, even
though one of the previously stated factors exists. When these conditions
exist, a local LS is chosen, if possible. These conditions are as follows:
• Only non-ATM missiles are available at the remote LS, and ATM
missiles are available at local LS for TBM engagement.
• The TBM trajectory is not anticipated to enter the engagement zone
of any of the remote LSs.
• There is unfavorable engagement geometry at all remote LSs, and the
local LS geometry is better. These conditions result from the ABT LS
dead zone test, the TBM LS engagement zone, and a TBM distance
and angle check.
3-234. Generally, local LSs are favored for ABT defense and for TBM
self-defense of the battery. The shorter distance from battery to impact point
results in more favorable engagement geometry. Remote launchers are more
effective for asset TBM defense.
THREAT ASSESSMENT AND LAUNCH STATION ASSIGNMENT

3-235. Before entering the TBEQ, all targets are assessed, assuming the LSs
are collocated with the RS, to determine asset threat category (ATC), LNIP,
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FM 3-01.87
TTFL, and TTLL. When the target enters the TBEQ, either from the
automatic process or from an operator engage switch action, the appropriate
LS is selected and a missile is reserved on that LS for an eventual
engagement. If the selected LS becomes unacceptable, EDWA will assign
another LS collocated with the radar, or reassess the target again when it
reenters the TBEQ.
LAUNCHER SCORING
3-236. An LS scoring system determines the best ready LS from all the
launchers evaluated. A score is computed for every LS evaluated. The LS
must be in remote and must contain at least one available missile. LSs that
are not scored will not be selected during the current weapons assignment
evaluation. There are several constraints that prevent LS scoring for a
particular LS. For example,—
• The LS is currently in use.
• The predicted intercept is in the LS dead zone.
• SEM and SOJC engagements are restricted to local launchers.
3-237. LS scoring is based on several elements. The specific parameters
selected are a function of whether it is an ABT or TBM engagement. The ABT
engagement is further defined for long range (>25 kilometers) and short
range (<25 kilometers). The operator has no control over the LS scoring
parameters other than the depletion rule set in Tab 78. The elements for
scoring are—
• LS intercept angle acceptability check (37o) for ABT only.
• TTLL criticality.
• Missile types for enemy threats (ATM for TBM engagement, SOJC for
SOJC).
• Patriot missiles initial turn angle (TBM only).
• Distance and angle from impact point to LS (only for TBM
engagements).
• LS assignment preference (TBM uses a remote LS, self-defense uses a
local LS).
• Missile frequency availability.
• Missile address conflicts.
• LS missile depletion.
• LS number.
LAUNCHER STATION ACCEPTABILITY CRITERIA

3-238. Once an LS is chosen, the threat evaluation process attempts to use
the same previously selected LS to determine ATC, LNIP, TTFL, and TTLL.
The selected LS may be used on subsequent evaluations. However, the
acceptability of the selected LS is reevaluated every second while the target
is on the TBEQ or hooked. The acceptability criteria are as follows:
• Has a new LS has come on-line?
• The LS must still be available.
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FM 3-01.87
• The missile must still be reserved and available for the pending
engagement. The missile must also be appropriate for the current
classification. The case in which the missile may no longer be
appropriate is after a classification change from a presumed state to a
confirmed state requiring a different missile type (for example, PABT
to TBM A or PTBM to ABT).
• For ABTs, the LNIP must be outside the LS dead zone, and the dead
zone is not predicted to interfere with asset defense.
• For TBMs, the LNIP must still be within the LS engagement volume.
If no LNIP is entered, the TBM will enter the LNIP in the future. A
remote LS is rejected if the LNIP is closer to the radar than to the LS.
This precludes tail chase engagements. LS is rejected if an intercept
is predicted behind the LS.
• A target becomes a strobe and a remote LS is assigned.
MISSILE RESERVATION AND PREEMPTION

3-239. Once an LS is selected, a particular missile on that LS is reserved
while the target is on the TBEQ until the engagement starts or the target is
deleted from the TBEQ. The reserved missile is not available for other
engagements during the time it is reserved. Specific conditions may exist
which will allow preemption of the reserved missile as described below:
• A higher priority target has entered the TBEQ and there are no LS or
missile resources available.
• An engagement initiated by the operator cannot be honored, because
there is no LS or missile resource.
• LS goes off-line with a missile assigned to a high priority target on
the TBEQ.
• An auto-engage target is ready for engagement, but has no missile
assigned.
REMOTE LAUNCH STATION ENGAGEMENT ZONES

3-240. The TBM engagement zone has changed with the implementation of
remote launch. The altitude and range of the TBM engagement zone are still
a function of the type of TBM and the type of Patriot missile used. The only
difference is that the TBM engagement zone moves with the LS. For local
LSs, the range is measured from the RS. For remote LSs, the range is
measured from the remote LS. The altitude is always measured from the RS.
For general planning purposes, the Pk curves for remote TBM engagements
are measured from the LS location.
3-241. The TBM engagement zone for remote launchers is similar to the zone
for local launchers, but with the zone transposed to the remote LS location.
This increases the maximum engagement boundary from the radar for each
respective remote LS. The engage boundary increase is not one-for-one in
terms of range.
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3-242. The range of the remote launcher TBM engagement zone is a function
of how far forward the remote launcher is emplaced. There are four regions
forward of the radar that effect the range of the TBM engagement zone. See
Figure 3-26.
2
REMOTE LS
REGIONS
LOCAL LS REGION
Figure 3-26. Launcher Emplacement Regions

3-243. The size of the TBM engagement zone for each of these regions is also
a function of the type of enemy TBM threat and the type of Patriot missile
used. The altitudes of the engagement zone remain unchanged. The
engagement zones for a TBM A threat, because of its speed and altitude,
remain constant. The engagement zones for the TBM B are affected by radar
detection range. For a TBM B with an ATM1 missile, if the launcher is P4-29
kilometers forward, the engagement zone does not move out to P4-30
kilometers from the radar. For TBM Bs, the engagement zone reduces in
range as the launcher moves forward of the radar.
3-244. The tables above illustrate how the TBM engagement zone changes in
range as a function of which region the remote launcher is in. For example,
the maximum engagement range for a Type A TBM with an ATM1 missile is
P4-31 kilometers; such as, a launcher emplaced P4-32 kilometers from the
radar.
3-245. For a Type B TBM with an ATM1 missile, the maximum engagement
range is P4-33 kilometers from the radar; such as a launcher emplaced at
P4-34 kilometers from the radar. Note that the engagement zone (EZ)
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FM 3-01.87
reduces in range the farther a launcher is emplaced from the radar. As a

general rule a two-shot engagement is used for any remote launcher. The
maximum engagement zone is P4-35 kilometers for a Type B TBM with an
ATM1 missile (Figure 3-27).
EZ 4
EZ 3
EZ 2
EZ 1
REGION 2 REGION 4
REGION 3
LOCAL REGION 1
Figure 3-27. LS Remote Regions

3-246. It is recommended that remote launchers be emplaced no further than
P4-36 kilometers from the radar. Limiting the distance between the LS and
the ECS helps to ensure reliable communications (DLU range) and provides
the best Pk over the greatest area.
3-247. The ABT engagement zone is also a function of range and altitude
from the radar. The ABT altitude and range curve is still used to calculate
TTFL for all launchers (local and remote) for all ABT engagements.
LAUNCHER DEAD ZONES

3-248. There is a region forward of each launcher referred to as the "dead
zone." This region applies to both local and remote launchers and its size is a
function of where the launcher is emplaced from the radar. The dead zone
results from the system’s ability to detect a low-flying target, acquire the
missile, and intercept the target. For local launchers, the dead zone is P4-37
kilometers. For remote launcher, the size of the dead zone is relative to how
far forward the LS is emplaced from the radar. The further forward the
launcher, the greater the dead zone.
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FM 3-01.87
3-249. The launcher emplacement regions (defined in Remote LS

Emplacement Zones) also apply to the dead zones. The dead zones are
irregular in shape and have a base value and wing component on the left and
right side of the region. Figure 3-28 is an illustration of the dead zones.
PTL
REGION 3
REGION 2
DEAD ZONE DEAD ZONE
LOCAL
Figure 3-28. Launcher Dead Zones

3-250. The dead zone range can be calculated using the following equation:
• Dead Zone = Base Value + Wing Component
• Base Value—A base value is defined for each central region with a
different value based on the range ring. The base values are as
follows:
– Local LS P4-38 kms
– Remote LS out to region 2 P4-39 kms
– Remote LS out to region 3 P4-40 kms
• Wing Component—To determine the wing component, reduce
P4-41 kilometers from the Base Value for every P4-42 degrees the
target LNIP is beyond the central region. For example, if the remote
launcher is emplaced at region 3, the base value of the central region
is P4-43 kilometers. If the LNIP is P4-44 degrees off the central
region, P4-45 kilometers would be added to the base value making
the wing components P4-46 kilometers for this launcher.
Note: The launcher dead zone only applies to the ABT engagements and not
TBM engagements.
FIRE UNIT DISPLAY PROCESSING

3-251. The launcher graph display (LGD) has been modified to accommodate
remote launch capability. The display now has two scales, one for local
launchers and one for remote launchers. The LGD is displayed for a manual
emplacement when Tab 85 is entered and for an automatic emplacement
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FM 3-01.87
upon completion of the automatic emplacement. If there are no remote

launchers, the normal LGD is displayed; otherwise, the extended LGD is
displayed. An on-screen scale CHANGE LEGEND is displayed anytime a
launcher is emplaced beyond P4-47 kilometers. This legend appears in the
lower right portion of the situation display and informs the operator of how to
change the LGD scale. The on-screen legend is—
• TO SELECT n KM RANGE SCALE—PRESS HOOK (Displayed when
the extended LGD is displayed).
• TO SELECT nn KM RANGE SCALE—PRESS HOOK (Displayed
when the normal LGD is displayed and a remote launcher is
emplaced).
ICC PROCESSING
3-252. The ICC battalion command and control (BCAC) software has been
modified to account for battery processing of remote launchers. For the ICC
to correctly assess enemy targets relative to a battery, it must know the
remote LS positions to appropriately calculate TFLT, LNIP, TTFL, and
TTLL. All Patriot battery LS positions are uptold if the FU has any remote
LS. The FU also reports the LS that it has selected for a particular target. If
the FU does not report an LS assignment for a particular target, the ICC will
use the FU position for performing threat assessment.
3-253. At the ICC, an asset defense file (ADF) is developed which lists the
closest batteries to active assets defined. This is a course check to determine
if a threatened asset can be defended. With the arrival of remote launch, the
ADF now considers the closest batteries of the closest remote launcher(s)
reported by the batteries. As previously discussed, the fire unit(s) now sends
the remote launcher locations to the ICC. The ICC ADF only considers the
remote launcher(s) reported from its local fire units. An MICC's ADF, for
example, does not include the remote launchers from a subordinate ICC. The
MICC's ADF considers the subordinate ICC's batteries and its own locations
as well as any remote launchers reported from its own batteries. The closest
battery, local battery, or local battery remote launchers are used for the
threat assessment calculations and fire unit selection.
TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS
3-254. The defense design process is essentially unchanged, although minor
modifications incorporate remote launch. It is recommended that remote
region 3 be the maximum region for the emplacement of remote launchers
(METT-TC dependent).
3-255. Remote launch is a battalion-level decision. Deploy remote launchers
as a last resort. Plan the defense to use only local launchers first. If the
defense needs to be improved and if it can be by using remote launch, do so.
However, realize that remote launch operations place a greater demand on
the battalion's resources (personnel, equipment, maintenance, and logistics).
3-256. Short-term missions such as initial lodgment protection force build-up
protection missions, and protection of staging and assembly areas may all be
operations suited for remote launch. Available airlift may require the
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commander to take minimal fire control equipment with maximum fire

power. For example, a single battery supplemented with eight additional LSs
can provide maximum defense until additional batteries can be airlifted to
their site.
3-257. Distribution of LS sections or platoons is critical and must be based on
mission. The distribution of LSs has a direct impact on the distribution of
firepower based on availability of ready missiles. Factors involved in this
decision include the following:
• Expected enemy threat—What does the intelligence community
define as the expected threat? What is the worst case scenario for a
dedicated attack? What are enemy targeting techniques for a given
target (for example, troop area, air base, fire unit)? If attack is
expected to come in waves, will it be a mixture of enemy vehicles such
as TBMs, HARMs, CMs, followed by ABTs, or will each wave be
dedicated to a specific threat vehicle? What is the expected time
interval between waves?
• Asset priorities—The area commander's defended asset list of
priorities for asset defense will determine during defense design.
• Self-defense—First priority for consideration will always be given to
the battery to provide self-defense protection.
• Launch station Pk curves—Each individual LS has its own associated
Pk curve. The Pk curves for local and remote LSs are the same. Local
LSs can support the defense of a remote asset against TBMs within
the Patriot system parameters. Remote LSs expand the high Pk
region to cover remote assets. They reduce missile fly-out times for
extended range TBM engagements. Remote LSs and their associated
Pk curves may be positioned too far forward of the battery to provide
protection of the parent battery. The firepower dedicated to the
support of a remote asset may be lost to the self-defense of the battery
and any asset behind the remote LS.
3-258. Remote launchers must always be deployed in launcher sections.
Single launchers will never be deployed to support a remote launch mission.
Deploying by sections maintains section integrity, reduces the logistical
burden on the battery, and simplifies security problems. What is more
important, section deployment allows remote launchers to maintain
firepower on simultaneously arriving TBMs. With only one LS available, the
engagement of multiple TBMs is constrained by the rate of fire from a single
LS. With two launchers present, multiple TBMs are served from separate
launchers at the maximum rate of fire for the system. The launch rate with a
single LS may cause single-shot engagements of TBMs rather than the
doctrine of two-shot engagements that result in a lower Pk. This defeats the
original purpose of deploying a remote LS. Factors involved in this decision
include the following:
• Plan to fight against the most difficult TBM that the IPB indicates
the enemy possesses.
• Do not use remote launch if the mission is against only ABTs. Using
remote LS does not increase the system Pk against ABTs. Remote
LSs limit the battery's effectiveness against low-altitude ABTs.
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• Distribute remote LSs by section and maintain at least half of the

battery's launchers as local. Self-defense capability must be
maintained to protect any assets. Remote launchers cannot provide
protection of the fire battery, while local LSs can provide protection of
all assets.
3-259. During the action analysis phase of tactical decision making,
participation by the S4 is critical. The logistics estimate should be used to
select feasible courses of action for further analysis (for example, is remote
launch supportable for this course of action). The S4 considers organization
strength data to accurately estimate many of the requirements for supplies
and services. He analyzes the following areas:
• The demands for and on missile resupply.
• The demand for additional maintenance assets.
• The need for any additional services (for example, transportation
demands).
3-260. Due to the above considerations and the current Patriot support
concept, remote launch may be more conducive in a non-mobile environment.
For example, a tactical situation where a Corps is in the defense or an EAC
Patriot unit is required to defend static assets (airport of debarkation [APOD]
or seaport of debarkation [SPOD]). It is recommended that battalions develop
standing operating procedures that account for all the logistic and security
implications concerning remote launch (site security, missile reload, crew
rotation, maintenance, refuel, and rations resupply). Suggested ideas for
support are as follows:
• Host unit support—This idea requires the fire unit to coordinate with
the defended asset to establish a support relationship. The defended
asset may provide common support such as security, fuel, billeting,
and rations. All other support will have to come from the fire unit
itself. The advantage of this concept is that it uses the defended
assets' resources, which reduces the assets required from the fire
unit, to accomplish the mission.
• Daily consolidated support—This idea requires the fire unit to
establish a site routine where all the support functions are done on a
daily basis to reduce the demands upon the fire unit assets. All
actions are done on a scheduled basis that is controlled by the fire
unit's command post. Emergencies can be handled on an exception
basis that is also coordinated through the fire unit's command post.
• As required support—This idea requires the fire unit to establish
good communications with the remote launch section to support
operational requirements (emplacement operations and maintenance
support). This idea requires the establishment of a small control
section at the remote launch site putting a greater demand upon the
resources of the fire unit.
3-261. The battalion may use any one or a combination of the support
concepts in their standing operating procedures. The remote launch
capability is more conducive for static situations. The tactical capability may
out-weigh the support considerations.
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3-262. Remote launch may be used to maintain or extend coverage during

asset movement. This may be accomplished by prepositioning launchers in
the defended area along a route of march.
3-263. Reconstitution is limited to like-equipped LSs because remote LS must
be DLU equipped. During the defense design process, the S3 must consider
on-line reconstitution to maintain protection over assets. This only applies if
two or more batteries are in proximity and have overlapping fields of fire.
Figure 3-29 shows a defense that lends itself to on-line reconstitution.
ASSET 4
ASSET 5
ASSET 3
LS7A LS8B LS6B
LS8A LS7B LS5B
LS5A
LS6A
LS2B LS3B
LS2A LS3A
LS1B LS4B
LS1A LS4A
B BTRY
A BTRY
Figure 3-29. Reconstitution Possibilities
3-264. Should A or B Battery (Figure 3-29) become nonoperational, all the
LSs protecting Asset 4 can be used by the operational battery. All
emplacement constraints for the LSs over Asset 4 must be met for both
batteries. The LS must be within angular limits, range limits, LOS limits,
and PTL support limits.
3-265. Launchers used for remote must be automatically emplaced. The
launchers have to be reemplaced by the gaining unit automatically. To
accomplish this
• The crew members at the remote LS must—
– Ensure the correct LS address is set.
– Change frequency, hopsets/transmitter set (if different).
– Set net start time.
• The crew members at the ECS must—
– Ensure that the other ECS has deassigned the remote launcher.
– Establish the remote LS Tab 85 data base.
– Ensure the remote LS is in SYNC.
– Reorient the LS as needed to support the PTL.
3-266. Each battery in the battalion will load all six hopsets and appropriate
lockout sets in each radio. Each battery will then operate on a unique hopset
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FM 3-01.87
and its assigned lockout set. When a group of remote launchers are to be
transferred to another battery, the launcher operator must ensure that the
launcher is at the alignment position (normally stow). If not, the operator
must rotate the LS to the alignment position, change the launcher address,
radio hopset, and set the time to coincide with the receiving unit. The PLGR
system provides a very accurate time source for the system.
3-267. The primary function of remote launchers is to intercept TBMs; the
missile load should be all GEMs. If this is not possible, the mix of GEM and
ATM missiles should be balanced between the local and remote locations. The
same missile selection rules still apply for TBM and ABT engagements
allowing all missiles to be used for these engagements (ATM1 and ATM
engagements from local launchers only). If radar frequency pairs are lost, the
remaining missiles with the same frequency pairs will not be selected for
firing. This will reduce the number of available missiles on that launcher. No
more than two missiles with the same frequency pair should be loaded on one
launcher. Missile dash numbers are stenciled on the rear of the missile
canisters.
3-268. The GEM Pk curves are a result of the enhancements to the Patriot
system hardware and software modifications. These include hardware
modifications that result in earlier detection and software improvements for
remote launch, enhanced missile trajectory shaping, and better fusing. The
synergism of these improvements results in a larger region of higher Pk. The
actual Pk values are defined in (S)FM 44-100A(U).
3-269. With this policy, the LS crewmen will only have to verify the remote
LS setup. The ECS operator will only have to enter the sharable remote LS
into the data base. This cannot be done in advance because of communication
protocol between the ECS and LSs. The LS only talks when spoken to. If two
ECSs have the same LS in their data base, both will try to establish
communications with the LS. This will result in the LS not synchronize to
either ECS.
PATRIOT MISSILES
3-270. The Patriot missile inventory includes four different missile types.
They are referred to as the Standard, SOJC, ATM, and ATM1 missiles. The
standard and SOJC missiles are also referred to as PAC-1 missiles, while the
ATM missile is the PAC-2, and the ATM1 missile is the GEM. There are no
visual differences between the missiles. Reading the noun nomenclature from
the data plate on the canister makes identification as to which type missile is
in the canister. Nomenclature and missile type is as follows:
• MIM-104A Standard
• MIM-104B SOJC
• MIM-104C ATM
• MIM-104D ATM1 (GEM)
3-271. Using the system software, the operator can identify the type of
missiles uploaded on the launchers by observing the Missile Inventory tab S/I
(see Figure 3-30). With the fielding of each new missile, all the capabilities of
the previous missile were retained. The LS ID, missile status, and missile
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FM 3-01.87
count will appear blank when the LS is inactive. U-UNKNOWN is reserved

for the PAC-3 missile.
MISSILE STATUS-LAUNCHER BANK A PAGE 1 S/I
LS1 LS2 LS3 LS4 LS5 LS6 LS7 LS8
HAZARD STATUS— SELECTABILITY MISSILE TYPE— MSL POSITION

1-NO HAZ-NO MISFIRE A-SELECTABLE 1-STD FROM BEHIND
2-NO HAZ-MISFIRE B-NOT SELECTABLE 2-ASOJ UL-UR
3-HAZ-NO MISFIRE C-NOT AT TEMP 3-ATM LL-LR
4-HAZ-MISFIRE D-S+A CHARGED 4-ATM1
E-READY U-UNKNOWN
MISSILE STATUS-LAUNCHER BANK B-F PAGE 2 S/I

LS1 LS2 LS3 LS4 LS5 LS6 LS7 LS8
HAZARD STATUS— SELECTABILITY MISSILE TYPE— MSL POSITION

1-NO HAZ-NO MISFIRE A-SELECTABLE 1-STD FROM BEHIND
2-NO HAZ-MISFIRE B-NOT SELECTABLE 2-ASOJ UL-UR
3-HAZ-NO MISFIRE C-NOT AT TEMP 3-ATM LL-LR
4-HAZ-MISFIRE D-S+A CHARGED 4-ATM1
E-READY U-UNKNOWN
MISSILE INVENTORY – BOTH BANKS PAGE 3 S/I
MISSILES— LAUNCHER AVAILABILITY—

TYPE HOT COLD 1A 2A 3A 4A 5A 6A 7A 8A 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
STD
ASOJ
ATM
ATM1
NO GUIDANCE FREQUENCIES— MISSILES
Figure 3-30. Missile Inventory S/I, Pages 1 to 3
STANDARD MISSILE
3-272. The MIM-104 Standard missile was the first missile type fielded with
Patriot and contained an analog fuze. This fuze was replaced by a digital
version of the fuze with the fielding of the MIM-104A. Both of these missiles
provide excellent performance against ABTs and adequate performance
against certain TBMs. The warhead fragment size limits performance against
TBMs to a Mission Kill.
SOJC MISSILE
3-273. To counter the long-range ECM threat, use the MIM-104B or SOJC
missile. The guidance and navigation hardware was modified to allow the
SOJC missile to fly a lofted trajectory to the jamming source and seek out the
strongest emitter during the terminal phase. To achieve the lofted trajectory
needed to maintain missile maneuverability at long range, missile acquisition
is delayed for the SOJC mission. The SOJC missile can fly five times longer
than the standard missile without the uplink/downlink between the RS and
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FM 3-01.87
missile. The SOJC missile retains the same performance against ABTs and
TBMs as the standard missile.
PATRIOT ANTITACTICAL MISSILE CAPABILITY 2 (ATM)

3-274. The ATM MIM-104C is used to counter the advanced TBM threat. A
new warhead and a dual-mode fuze were added to the missile. The new
warhead contains a more powerful explosive and larger fragments designed
to place sufficient kinetic energy on the warhead section of enemy TBMs to
achieve a warhead kill. The dual-mode fuze allows the ATM missile to retain
ABT performance and optimize TBM fuzing. The system software based on
the mission selected for the missile sets the fuze mode.
PATRIOT GUIDANCE ENHANCED MISSILE (ATM-1)

3-275. Patriot GEM missiles provide improved capability against TBMs and
advanced ABTs. The GEM improves system effectiveness and lethality
against high speed TBMs and incorporates a footprint with increased Pk. The
GEM also has increased lethality against advanced low radar cross section
ABTs. The modifications to the PAC-2 missile include an improved sensitivity
of the C-band track-via-missile (TVM) seeker, improved S-band fuze reaction
time, and higher TVM data rate. The improvement in sensitivity of the TVM
seeker is accomplished through the addition of three low-noise C-band
amplifiers to the front end of the receiver. This low noise amplifier change
required modifications to the seeker antenna monopulse feed and to the
intermediate frequency (IF) receiver. The S-band fuze improvement changed
the fuze processor to provide greater sensitivity and earlier detection of
targets. The higher TVM data rate is incorporated into the missile hardware
via a change to the programmable read-only memory in the timing and
control unit.
LAUNCHER CONFIGURATIONS
3-276. Missiles will be loaded on launching stations to facilitate reload
according to mission priorities. When the unit has a mix of missile types, the
different types will be evenly distributed across the launching stations. If the
unit has a TBM-only mission, the ATM missiles will be loaded in the upper
positions on the launching station, and the ATM1 missiles will be loaded in
the upper left/lower left or upper right/lower right positions. If the unit has
an ABT-only mission, a standard and an SOJC missile will be loaded in the
upper positions. If the mission is mixed, TBM and ABT, the ATM or SOJC
missiles will be loaded in the same manner as the ATM1 missiles (upper
left/lower left, upper right/lower right). These configurations in a mixed
missile type basic load will facilitate reload without removal of nonexpended
missiles.
3-277. Distribute the GEMs on the launchers so that the loss of a launcher
will not significantly reduce ATM capability. This will provide for redundancy
in case of launcher malfunction. GEMs should be loaded on the upper left and
lower left positions or upper right or lower right positions for easy access for
missile reload. Furthermore, even distribution will maximize launch rate of
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FM 3-01.87
these missiles. For example, if the battery has four GEM missiles, then put
the missiles on two separate launchers.
3-278. Each missile has a pair of assigned frequencies that are set at the
factory. These frequencies are used for communication with the missile.
Along with ensuring that the launcher is configured with the correct type of
missiles (STD, SOJC, ATM, and ATM1), the TCO and battery warrant officer
must ensure that a correct frequency mix is also distributed on the launcher.
The missile distribution should not exceed two missiles with the same
frequency pair per launcher. This will minimize the loss of a launcher due to
the radar exciter group not being able to support certain frequencies.
SYSTEM INFORMATION
3-279. Information about uploaded missiles is available to the operator in
page 1 of the Fault Data tab, the Missile Status, and the Missile Inventory
tab. The guidance frequencies information in the Fault Data tab indicates the
number of missiles that are supported in frequency by the radar. Those
missiles that have no frequency support are not usable for engagements. The
Missile Status and Missile Inventory tabs give the operator a "by missile"
indication of the missile status. Pages 1 and 2 show the status by launcher
for each bank. Missiles with no guidance frequencies supported by the radar
will show a B for NOT SELECTABLE. Page 3 is a missile summary by type
for all the available launchers.
FIDOC AND OPERATIONAL PARAMETERS

3-280. The commander now has the ability to provide some tailoring of the
Patriot system to counter the expected TBM threat within the theater of
operations. This tailoring is done by way of page 2 of ICC Tab 1 (Figure 3-31,
pages 1 through 3 of Tab 1).
FIDOC + OPERATIONAL PARAMETERS CHANGE PAGE 1 OF 3 *1*

( )ADRS: 1=ALL SUBORD FP, 2=SLCT FIDOC+OPNL PRMTRS
FP 1 2 3 4 5 6
( ) = TBMA ENGAGEMENT MODE; A=AUTO, M=MANUAL
( ) = TBMB ENGAGEMENT MODE; A=AUTO, M=MANUAL
( ) = TBMA MOF CONTROL; R=RIPPLE, S=SLS
( ) = TBMB MOF CONTROL; R=RIPPLE, S=SLS
( ) = URBAN LOW ALT TRAJ CTRL; 1=ON, 0=OFF
( ) = TBMA DIVE CALCULATION; 1=ON, 0=OFF
( ) = TBMA DIVE ALTITUDE; TO
( )D = TBMA DIVE ANGLE; TO DEG
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FM 3-01.87
( ) = FP SEARCH MODE A=ABT, T=TBM

( ) = GND LVL INTRF FLTR 0=OFF, 1=HRZN, 2=1+SRPOP, 3=1+2+LOMED
( ) = TRACK-WHILE-SCAN- INTRF FLTR 0=OFF, A=AUTO, M=MANUAL
( ) = TBMA ENGAGEMENT MODE A=AUTO, M=MANUAL
( ) = TBMB ENGAGEMENT MODE A=AUTO, M=MANUAL
( )aa = TBM ENGAGEMENT RANGE BIAS -n.n TO +n.n aa
( )aa = TBM ENGAGEMENT ALT BIAS -n.n TO +n.n aa
( ) = TBMA MOF CONTROL R=RIPPLE, S=SLS
( ) = TBMB MOF CONTROL R=RIPPLE, S=SLS
(n) = TMBA DIVE CALCULATION 1 = ON, 0 = OFF

(nn) aa = TBMA DIVE ALTITUDE nn TO nn aa
(nn)D = TBMs DIVE ANGLE nn TO nn DEG
(n) = URBAN LOW ALT TRAJECTORY CONTROL 1 = ON, 0 = OFF
(a) = TBMA NOMINAL OVERRIDE Y = YES, N = NO

(nn)M/S = GLIF + T-W-S VELOCITY THRESHOLD;10 TO 40, NOMINAL = 40
Figure 3-31. ICC Tab 1, FIDOC and Operational Parameters Change
3-281. The PDB-4.2 update has modified the K-7 operational software only.
Tab 1, page 3, has been updated to include the capability to modify the
velocity threshold that identifies tracks to be dropped from processing using
track while scan (TWS) and GLIF criteria. Tracks traveling faster than the
default velocity threshold found in page 3 of Tab 1 are not considered for
GLIF or TWS processing by the software. For operational conditions where
GLIF/TWS could not previously be activated due to lower velocity targets of
interest, this modification allows the capacity to retain track while still
allowing filtering of slow tracks and clutter below the threshold value. A
modified velocity threshold value is not saved to the TACI data base and will
revert to the default value when the software is rebooted. The default value
for this velocity threshold is unchanged from the PDB-4 version of software,
and the PDB-4 GLIF/TWS capability is retained if the threshold is left
unmodified.
3-282. The PDB-4.2 software allows a TBM A classification for targets that
exceed the PDB-4 altitude threshold limits but are not fast enough to be
classified as TBM B. The surveillance, EDWA, and guidance logic have been
modified to provide improved system performance versus a TBM A, other
than the nominal threat. TAB 1, Page 3, has been updated to enable or
disable the enhanced processing of this threat. It is recommended that the
tab control be enabled only if information is available which indicates that a
non-Nominal threat is active in the theater of operation. The purpose of
selecting non-Nominal threat altitude threshold is to ensure the software
selects the proper missile, GEM or PAC-2, for engagements. This selection is
not saved in TACI. When the software is rebooted, it will revert back to the
default value (disabled).
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3-283. When enabling the nominal override, the missile selection for TBM A
changes. The system will primarily select the GEM when the TBM GIP is
within P4-48 km radius from the selected launcher. Outside P4-49 km radius
the system will select a PAC II missile. The missile selection criteria is based
on the higher Pk achieved by the GEM against the nominal targets within
the P4-50 km radius.
FIRE PLATOON SEARCH MODE

3-284. FUs will be directed to the TBM search mode as determined by
battalion operations. The number of FUs in TBM search will be predicated on
the coverage required and EMCON.
TBM A ENGAGEMENT MODE

3-285. This engagement control field gives the operator the ability to select
an engagement mode for TBM As. This data field is defaulted to Manual, for
TBM A AUTO ENGAGE OFF. The entries in terms of TBM engagements will
be based on the enemy threat to be countered. If TBM As are not a threat to
the battalion or its assets (that is, the battery or asset is at least P4-51 km
from the TBM A launch point), then engagements of TBM As should be
manual. In this case, leave data field default. If both TBM As and TBM Bs
are threats to the battalion, then both TBM A ENGAGEMENT MODE and
TBM B ENGAGEMENT MODE will be automatic. The “nnn
SELF-DEFENSE THREAT” alert will not be displayed if a TBM A meets the
self-defense criteria, and the system TBM A ENGAGEMENT MODE is in the
automatic mode.
TBM B ENGAGEMENT MODE

3-286. This engagement control field gives the operator the ability to select
an engagement mode for TBM Bs. This data field is defaulted to A, for TBM
B AUTO ENGAGE ON. The entries in terms of TBM engagements will be
based on the enemy threat to be countered. If Type B TBMs are not a threat
to the battalion or its assets, in this case, leave data field default. If both
TBM As and TBM Bs are threats to the battalion, then both TBMA
ENGAGEMENT MODE and TBMB ENGAGEMENT MODE will be
automatic. In the automatic mode the “nnn SELF-DEFENSE THREAT” alert
will not be displayed if a TBM B meets the self-defense criteria.
TBM ENGAGEMENT RANGE BIAS AND ALTITUDE BIAS

3-287. The TBM RANGE and ALT BIAS will not be used unless directed by a
field bulletin. It has been determined, as a result of continued analysis
conducted on ATM and GEM (ATM1) performance, that the optimum altitude
for TBM B intercept is P4-52 kilometers. Consequently, for a TBM B mission,
a (-4km/-13 kft) must be entered in ECS Tab 1, page 2, TBM ENGAGEMENT
ALT BIAS. This entry is not saved on the data base and must be reentered
after each boot of the system.
TBM A AND B METHOD OF CONTROL
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3-288. The TBM A and B method of control should be left at the default value
of Ripple versus TBM A and B, when first arriving in the theater of
operations. This option should not be changed unless intelligence information
or engineering data is provided indicating that adequate system performance
is achievable against the existing enemy threat with a single missile.
TBM SEARCH SECTOR SKEW BEARING ANGLE

3-289. The TBM Search Sectors Skew is the angle that the TBM search sector
was rotated during initialization. TBM sectors skew cannot be done during
tactical operations and can be different from the ABT search sector. TBM
sectors skew should not be used.
3-290. Using Tab 95, Radar Mapping Train Control, the TBM search sector
can be skewed ±15 degrees. This sector should not be skewed unless IPB
information has provided data that the expected TBM trajectories are
different from the ABT PTL or secondary target line (STL) assigned.
Reorienting to an STL may be considered to counter the TBM threat, while
operations along the PTL will primarily counter the ABT threat. Once the
TBM search sector has been skewed in TACI, it cannot be changed while in
tactical operations. Care should be taken in assigning skewed TBM search
sectors. If the sector has to be changed, the operator must return to TACI.
ENABLE TBM A DIVE CALCULATION

3-291. Certain types of TBM As can perform a terminal dive maneuver after
missile apogee. To account for this dive maneuver capability, the TBM A
threat process has a dive computation used to determine and provide a dive
trajectory prediction. The LNIPs and GIPs are computed with the updated
diving trajectory prediction (the dive computation is only used for TBM As, in
Figure 3-32). There are several criteria necessary for the height of dive
computation to be applied. First, as with all TBM threats, the ballistic GIP is
determined. Second, the battery or asset must be threatened by the TBM A
(that is, located within the GIP box). Lastly, the battery or asset must be
between the incoming missile and the GIP (TBM A appears to overfly the
asset). Given that all these criteria are met, a straight line is projected at
default P4-53 degree angle from the ballistic trajectory to the asset. All
intercept calculations (LNIP, TTFL, TTLL, and so forth) are then made based
on the updated trajectory prediction that includes the dive point.
3-292. Not all TBM As can or will perform a dive maneuver. Tab 1, page 3,
enables or disables the dive calculation as appropriate. The enabling or
disabling of the dive calculation is based on the enemy TBM. If the IPB
indicates that there are no enemy Type TBM As in the theater of operations
that can perform the dive maneuver, then the dive calculation should be
disabled. If the threat includes TBM As that dive, then the dive calculation
should be enabled. When performing a point or specific asset defense to
counter the diving Type TBM A, the dive calculation should be enabled.
However, when performing an area defense in which synthetic or false assets
are input to provide a large area of coverage, the dive calculation should be
disabled. The default value for the dive calculation is 1 for enabled.
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FM 3-01.87
Direction of Flight
TBM
Ballistic Trajectory Prediction
Height of Dive
Dive Angle
Ground Impact
Point
Uncertainty/ GIP Box
Figure 3-32. TBM A Dive Calculation
URBAN LOW-ALTITUDE TRAJECTORY CONTROL

3-293. This function prohibits intercepts under the minimum intercept
altitude. This feature is selected when the defended asset engagement zones
overlays a populated area. The feature is not selectable by asset; it applies to
all TBM intercepts and can be selected during TACI or K7.
3-294. When enabled, the software logic will monitor the Patriot missile
altitude to prevent it from being commanded into the ground or from chasing
a TBM into the ground during TBM engagements. If the logic detects that the
missile is predicted to detonate below the minimum threshold of P4-54
kilometers above ground level and has a downward vertical velocity, the
intercept is aborted. The missile is commanded to climb until the rocket
motor has burned out and its altitude is at least 3 kilometers above the local
ground level. Then a destruct command is sent to the missile.
SELF-DEFENSE
3-295. Fire unit TBM self-defense has the highest priority, whether the FU is
entered as an asset or not. However, when entering the FU as an asset, it
must be assigned the highest ATC or equal to the highest asset ATC. Special
logic has been applied which ranks FU TBM self-defense threats highest on
the TBEQ. This logic also reserves guidance, launcher, and/or missile
resources to protect the FU if there is a conflict between an asset and the FU.
3-296. The FU operator will be provided the alert “nnn SELF-DEFENSE” if
the FU is in the manual TBM engage mode. The operator should
acknowledge the alert, which hooks the target and then engages it.
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FM 3-01.87
ASSET DEFENSE
3-297. The Patriot system can provide TBM asset defense, ABT asset defense,
or a combination of both. When an asset is defined in Tab 70, it will be
labeled as a TB for TBM asset or AT for an ABT asset. When activated, the
Patriot system will provide either ABT and/or TBM defense if as described
above. The intercept point is within the high-lethality region (engagement
zone) for TBMs. A 2-km radius is entered in Tab 70 for AT threats, and the
threat is assets against the TBM GIP box. For large assets to be defended,
multiple points (a minimum of three, up to a maximum of eight points) can be
defined such that a TBM impacting anywhere within this defended region is
certain to be assessed as a threat.
3-298. Tab 70 now allows the following four measures when initializing
assets for TBM defenses:
• Enter the TBM asset as a point defense (this method is not
recommended as it assesses the threat the same as PDB-3).
When defined as a point, the actual radius will be used for the threat
assessment when engaging the TBM. When entering a center point
with a radius, the software uses the entered radius for threat
assessment and not a 2-km radius as with ABT/TBM assets. In order
for the system to engage the TBM, the TBMs GIP box must intersect
the defended asset’s defended area.
• Enter a TBM asset as a point with a radius when there are vast
distances between TBM assets that exceed GIP box parameters. The
radius entered can be from 00.1 to 99.9 kms. However, the S3 must
ensure that the radius entered does not exceed the high lethality
region of the TBM warhead.
• Enter the TBM asset as a polygon asset. This is the
recommended method when having to defend a large TBM
asset or area. A minimum of three points can be entered, up to a
maximum of eight points. (This allows the S3 to tailor the defended
asset).
• Enter the ABT/TBM asset as a point with a radius. This will allow an
asset to be threat assessed against an ABT threat and will ensure a
GIP assessment against a TBM threat.
3-299. After emplacing the firing batteries to achieve optimal TBM defense of
assigned assets, a determination must be made as to the most appropriate
UTM point for asset definition through Tab 70. If both an asset and the
battery are threatened, then the TBM is assessed as a self-defense threat. If
multiple assets are threatened, then the TBM is assessed as a threat to the
highest priority asset.
3-300. A probable kill is the normal, if an FU initiates a kill assessment state
for TBMs indicating successful intercept. It is determined by the guidance
function when the missile achieves a negative closing velocity and does not
respond to a subsequent uplink query. For ABTs, a follow-on energy
calculation is performed, with a time-out, to indicate if target breakup and
consequent deceleration have occurred. Based upon remaining energy at the
conclusion of the time-out, a confirmed kill or no kill is determined. This
process is not attempted by the FU for TBMs because of the TBM speed,
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FM 3-01.87
intercept altitudes, and difficulty in measuring lack of deceleration in time to

consider any further reengagement (paragraph 3-177 discusses ABT kill
assessment in greater detail).
3-301. The ICC’s kill assessment logic for TBMs is the same as it is for ABTs.
There is an energy calculation performed at the ICC as a backup for the FU
ABT energy calculation, which is also active for TBMs. The reason for not
changing this test for TBMs was because of TBM speeds and intercept
altitudes. The TBM was assumed to have long since impacted the ground and
dropped track when the timer would have normally expired. The other
confirmed kill test at the ICC that applies to all target types is: if all tracking
FUs have dropped the target after a probable kill, then a confirmed kill is
declared.
3-302. The software will assist the operator in identifying TBM debris and
inhibit the automatic engagement of debris. The debris may result from TBM
breakup after intercept or during reentry into the atmosphere. A series of
TBM velocity and range rate tests have been added to the TBM threat
assessment process.
3-303. An Engage Hold condition is automatically applied to any TBM that
meets any of the criteria defined below. The Engage Hold condition will
inhibit the automatic engagement of that track. The process consists of the
following four checks: total velocities, ground velocity, smooth range rate, and
invalid LNIP.
3-304. If any of the above criteria are met, an Engage Hold is placed on the
TBM. It should be noted that the Engage Hold is a local condition and is not
transmitted to the ICC or other fire units. The Engage Hold will be displayed
in the ENGST/M data field of the Track Amp Data tab and the Engage Hold
symbol will be placed around the target.
3-305. The Engage Hold inhibits the automatic engagement of these targets;
however, the operator may manually engage these targets. The operator will
be unable to engage any target with an invalid LNIP. To engage the track,
the operator must hook the track and press the ENGAGE switch-indicator.
The engagement will occur when the release time goes to 0.
3-306. The determination of whether to engage debris is difficult. Current
software does not provide an indication on the size of the debris, only that it
meets the velocity criteria for debris. The operator has no indication of
whether the debris is a large object that can still do damage when it impacts
or a small object that will not cause any damage.
3-307. As a rule, the operator will not engage debris. Currently, there is no
way of making an informed decision on the size of the debris, and there is no
guarantee that the engagement will further destroy the falling object.
3-308. The battalion S3 may consider the following when deciding whether to
authorize the engagement of debris:
• Is missile conservation needed?
• How survivable, how recoverable, how critical, and how vulnerable is
the asset?
• Is the use of warhead decoys or chaff possible?
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FM 3-01.87
MISSILE SELECTION
3-309. There are now four types of missiles in the field. Table 3-7 is a
summary of the software missile selection logic that will accommodate the
specific engagement selected. If the mission is an ABT engagement, then the
standard missile is selected first. If there are no standard missiles, then an
SOJC missile will be selected, followed by an ATM, then ATM1 missile. The
EDWA logic first determines which launchers have the required missile for
the engagement, and then selects the best launcher. The operator can not
change the logic for missile selection. The only control the operator has in
this process is by selecting or deselecting (Operate or Standby) specific
launchers. This selection criterion incorporates the PDB-4.2 software
upgrade. Selection of the GEM for all TBM Bs is done in PDB-4.1 update
software. The TBM A nominal override capability found in Tab 1 is
accomplished in the PDB-4.2 update.
Table 3-7 Missile Priority Assignment
TYPE ABT SOJC TBM A TBM A TBM B ARM

MISSILE NON-QUIET
TARGETS (A) TAB *1* TAB *1*
RCS FILTER IN NOMINAL NOMINAL
MAINT. (A) OVERRIDE = YES OVERRIDE = YES
RCS = HI (A)
OR NO AND LS LS DISTANCE
RCS = MED (B)
RCS = LO (C) DISTANCE FROM FROM GIP IS
GIP IS GREATER LESS THAN
OR EQUAL TO P4-56 kms.
A B C P4-55 kms.
STD 1 4 4 3 4 4 4 4
SOJC 2 3 3 1 3 3 3 3
ATM 3 1 2 2 1 2 2 1
ATM1 4 2 1 4 2 1 1 2
NOTES: ATM IS A PAC-2 MISSILE.
ATM-1 IS A GEM.
IF RADAR CROSS SECTION (RCS) IS NOT MAINTAINED BY THE SYSTEM, THE RCS IS ASSUMED TO BE HI.
RCS TESTS APPLY ONLY TO QUIET TARGETS.
IF THREAT IS IN THEATER, ENTRY OF YES IS REQUIRED AND A COMBINATION OF PAC-2 AND GEMs MUST
BE LOADED ONTO THE LAUNCHERS.
MISSILE DISTRIBUTION
3-310. The anticipated enemy threat and the FU's mission must be
considered when distributing missile types. For example, a high-value asset
within range of enemy TBMs should be protected by an FU with
predominantly ATM missiles. Other considerations include the threat in the
days following the first attack.
FIRING PROCEDURES
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FM 3-01.87
3-311. The system will automatically schedule and prioritize ATM

engagements. It will fire two missiles to achieve the Pk defined. However,
according to Patriot ATM firing doctrine, the automatic shoot-look-shoot
(SLS) logic is to shoot one missile at all TBMs with the same ATC and
approximately the same TTLL, before firing the second shot. This ensures
that each TBM with the same ATC is engaged at least once before impact.
Both engagements of higher priority TBM targets will be scheduled before
the first engagement of a lower priority target.
AUTOMATIC HARD COPY OF TBM DATA

3-312. The system provides for the automatic hard copy of specific TBM data
at the FU. This automatic hard copy will be for TBM tracks only and will be
performed at three specific events—detection, engagement, and intercept.
The information will be automatically printed on the hard copy unit without
operator intervention, similar to a test action number (TAN). The data is
printed approximately 10 seconds after initial detection. Two lines will be
output for each TBM and event. Figure 3-33 describes the field in the hard
copy data. The TBM “y” position is equivalent to altitude. The units for speed
and altitude will always be printed in metric.
DETECT TBM X, Y, Z
TBM X Dot, Y Dot, Z Dot
ENGAGE POSITION IN
METERS VELOCITY IN METERS/SEC
INTCPT
TOD HEADING
IN
DEGREES
hh :mm: ss nnn T event sxxxxx yyyyy zzzzzsxxxx syyyy szzzz
hh :mm: ss nnn T event zzheeeeeennnnnnn zzheeeeeennnnnnn F vvvv ccc
TOTAL VELOCITY
TBM RAID IN METERS
TYPE TBM UTM GIP UTM SIZE PER SECOND
A or B POSITION POSITION
Figure 3-33. TBM Automatic Hard Copy Format
ATM MISSION
3-313. The ATM mission is conducted at the FU and coordinated through the
ICC. As previously mentioned, the FU operates in the automatic TBM
engagement mode, minimizing operator intervention, in the rapid reaction
required to counter the threatening TBMs. Manual engagements of
engageable nonthreatening TBMs should not be performed unless specifically
directed by higher echelon. The following are tactical implications of the TBM
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FM 3-01.87
software. These impacts are to be implemented to ensure that Patriot ATM

capability is optimized.
ROLE OF THE INFORMATION AND COORDINATION CENTRAL

3-314. The ICC has a limited role in the TBM defense arena, consisting of
engagement coordination and automatic downtells. In the area of
engagement coordination, the ICC relays the engage status with cease fire,
hold fire, and other engagement statuses as it does in the ABT mission. As
previously mentioned, the ICC also relays the FU TBM scores between
tracking FUs. The ICC will also display the FU with the best score in the
primary FU data field of the ICC Track Amp Data tab. The ICC operator
should not use this indicator as a means of determining which FU should
engage the TBM. TBM engagements are decentralized down to battery level
(which engages TBMs in the automatic mode).
3-315. The ICC still performs automatic downtells to subordinate Patriot
FUs. These downtells are based on the predicted path of the TBM and its
proximity to the assigned FUs and assets. If the path of the TBM is predicted
to pass within P4-57 meters of an FU and P4-58 meters of an asset, an
automatic downtells is sent to the FU.
3-316. The ICC should not attempt to engage TBM tracks. These tracks will
not appear on the ICC's To-Be-Engaged Data 1 tab, so the operator will not
know if they are truly threatening. The ICC should ensure that the FUs have
entered the proper search and engage mode parameters to counter the enemy
threat.
ECCM OPERATIONS
3-317. The Patriot system counters ECM in a variety of ways. The fire unit
performs the main effort to neutralize ECM. Using the repertoire of
waveforms within the radar, frequency diversity, or a combination of both,
the Patriot system is effective in the ECM or chaffs environment. If jamming
is so intense that the radar cannot determine target range, then the fire unit
reports the information as a strobe (azimuth and elevation) to the ICC, which
then performs triangulation and provides the needed range data to the fire
unit.
3-318. Triangulation requires track data from several fire units on the same
target source, so overlapping coverage is an important element in Patriot
defense design. The standoff jammer counter (SOJC) feature, using the
virtual target (VT) process provides the Patriot system with an excellent
capability against a range denied formation of SOJs. The strobe engagement
mode (SEM) also provides the fire unit with the capability to engage range-
denied targets. The Patriot system has been extensively tested in severe
ECM environments, to include the complete range of jamming, chaff, and
their combinations, and has performed outstandingly.
FIRE UNIT ECCM OPERATIONS—STROBE ENGAGEMENT MODE
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FM 3-01.87
3-319. The SEM provides the fire unit operator with the ability to engage
range-denied tracks. Jamming targets with sufficient power can be range
denied to the Patriot radar. When this condition occurs, the track data on
that target is processed as a strobe track, which only has azimuth and
elevation data. This strobe data is sent to the ICC and, provided there is
overlapping coverage, is processed by ICC triangulation, which will
determine the target's range. This range is then provided to the fire units. At
the fire unit, the strobe line will disappear and the target symbology will
appear at the designated range. The normal engagement process will then
apply to this target. In the fire-unit-to-fire-unit (FUFU) mode, each unit does
the triangulation. Triangulation is the normal means of countering
range-denied targets.
3-320. Target range—Target range is an absolute requirement for an
engagement. Missile initial turn, apogee, and TVM are some of the items
based on range. If range cannot be provided via triangulation, the ECS
operator can still conduct an engagement on a range-denied target via SEM.
3-321. Methods of deriving range—There are two methods of deriving
range in SEM operations. The first is a defaulted range of P4-59 kilometers
that is set in the software and cannot be changed by the operator. The other
is a range estimate that can be entered by the operator using the situation
display cursor and the RANGE EST switch-indicator. An FU operator will
perform the following procedures in conducting a SEM.
3-322. Using default value—The operator hooks the strobe of interest.
Strobes normally appear from the FU location to the range designated in
Tab 14. Once the strobe is hooked, it will extend down to the FU location. The
operator will then engage. The default value of P4-60 kilometers is used for
the programming of the missile's initial turn and apogee. Missile position,
radar position, and TVM are used in determining the actual range of the
target. The default method is the preferred option because it provides the
most effective capability against a close-in to long-range strobe target.
3-323. Using range estimate—The operator can also engage a strobe track
using the range estimate method. To conduct this engagement, the operator
first hooks the strobe track. Using the situation display cursor, the operator
places the cursor at the expected or provided range of the jammer then
pushes the RANGE EST switch-indicator in the Engagement Initiate group.
The hooked strobe will move along the strobe line to the range designated on
the CRT. The operator then engages the target. The missile's initial turn,
apogee, and TVM are programmed on this estimated range. The target's
actual range is then determined when the missile is airborne through the
missile's position, radar position, and TVM. This method is the least
preferred of the two options, due to the uncertainty of the range provided by
the operator.
3-324. Tactical considerations—The strobe engagement mode should not
be used unless the fire unit is operating in the autonomous method of control.
When operating as an integrated battalion, the ICC can provide accurate
range data by way of triangulation. The ICC will also use the wedge edge
process and provide a virtual target at the appropriate range of an SOJ
formation. When employing the strobe engage mode, the default range
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FM 3-01.87
method should be used. This will ensure that a close-in target is detected. It
is uncertain where the operator would get an accurate range to be used with
the range estimate method.
ICC ECCM OPERATIONS

3-325. The ICC supports the ECCM process through the track management
software that performs target correlation, triangulation, and SOJC
operations. This data is used to correlate the target position and transmit
this data to the FU.
3-326. Tab 15, Operator Correlation + Track Number Change (Figure 3-34),
is used during tactical operations when a jamming track cannot be range-
resolved by two FUs. The TD or TDA must correlate the jammer position by
entering two FU track numbers of the jammer. Both track numbers must be
from the same track numbers (two letters and three digits for ATDL-1 and
NATO tracks or four digits for TADIL-B tracks). The numbers are both strobe
track numbers and one strobe and one range-resolved track number.
3-327. Tab 15 is also used during tactical operations to change track
numbers. Changes may be necessary to resolve track number conflicts
(changes enter the track management and track correlation process). The
new track number must be the same as the original, whether TADIL-A/B,
ATDL-1, TADIL-J, or NATO. Illegal track number entries will be recognized
in the case of TADIL-A/B versus ATDL-1, TADIL-J, or NATO. Illegal track
numbers will cause an alert, a reject message to appear on the display. An
error entry between ATDL-1 and NATO will not be recognized.
OPERATOR CORRELATION + TRACK NUMBER CHANGE *15*
( ) COMMAND:
1 = CORRELATE JAMMER POSITION
2 = CORRELATE NRT-LOCAL TRACK
3 = CHANGE TRACK NUMBER
( ) ( )
Figure 3-34. Tab 15, Operator Correlation and Track Number Change
STANDOFF JAMMER COUNTER TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

3-328. Current software provides an improved capability to counter
formations of standoff jammers (SOJs) at long range, and formations of self-
screening jammers (SSJs). This capability referred to as standoff jammer
counter (SOJC) is an amplification of the existing wedge edge process that
allows the creation of a virtual target (VT). The following are
recommendations for the use of this capability.
3-329. Batteries should not create VTs of their own. The ICC should be the
only control center that creates VTs. The tactical director (TD) alone has the
tools to determine range and width of the enemy aircraft. Because wedges are
not displayed at the batteries, the batteries generally do not have the range
information of the jamming formation.
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FM 3-01.87
3-330. Use the width of the formation to determine the number of VTs that
need to be created. This is a judgment call on the part of the TD. He should
create VTs evenly spaced across the wedge to increase the probability of
providing a good range.
3-331. If more than one VT is to be created, each should be sent to the
separate batteries providing the wedges. This will evenly distribute firepower
and minimize the impact on each battery's multiple simultaneous
engagement capabilities.
3-332. A firing doctrine should be maintained. Fire one missile at each VT,
then evaluate, and fire again if necessary.
3-333. SOJC missions must be planned ahead of time. For the S3, this means
placing batteries where they will be most likely to successfully engage at
relatively long ranges, and it may also mean dedicating a battery or batteries
to this mission. The long fly-out times, the manual operator actions, and the
heavy use of TVM involved dictate that the battery has as few other
distractions as possible.
3-334. SOJC should be used sparingly and wisely. Jamming formations
should be considered as high-priority targets. In determining when to initiate
an SOJC engagement, the operator must consider the following:
• SOJC engagements are manual. They require several operator
actions, and therefore compete heavily for the operator's time.
• SOJC engagements are lengthy (due to missile flight time), therefore
reducing the total number of available missiles in flight and available
missiles in TVM.
• The engagement reduces missiles available for engagement,
preventing or delaying engagement of higher priority ingressing
ABTs or TBMs.
3-335. The VT provides a point in space for stable missile flight in a heavy
ECM environment. The SOJC missile has been fielded. The PAC-2 missile
incorporates all the specifications for SOJC. This will simplify the problem of
determining how to distribute missiles.
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION—SOJC MISSILE

3-336. The SOJC missile is basically the standard missile with improvements
to the guidance section. These enhancements were in the home-on-jam
processor, front-end automatic gain control (AGC), and improvements to the
on-board computer. These modifications provide for improvements against
specific types of ECM and overall improvement in an ECM environment.
ECM WEDGES
3-337. The wedge edge process provides information that allows the ICC
operator to determine the range and lateral extent of an SSJ formation. This
process is the keystone to the SOJC mission. As with triangulation, this
capability is optimized in a coordinated battalion defense that maximizes
overlapping coverage. The overlapping coverage ensures the generation of
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FM 3-01.87
wedges from multiple sources, resulting in intersecting wedges, which is

critical in determining range.
3-338. The surveillance function at each battery performs the wedge edge
processing. Surveillance measures the level of jamming and compares it with
a threshold for each search beam. If the threshold is exceeded, then that
beam is mapped to a wedge cell matrix. The wedge cell matrix is then
processed to determine the edges of the wedge by elevation and rows.
Sufficient continuous jamming must be detected in a minimum of six
contiguous horizontal beams to generate a wedge. However, jamming is not
required to exist in all six beams. It must exist in the first two beams and the
last two beams, and only single missed beams are allowed in between. These
wedges are then sent to the ICC for display. Each battery may send a
maximum of 12 wedges, with no more than 4 wedges per elevation band.
3-339. There are four elevation bands, with "A" being the highest and "D" the
lowest. When each band contains 4 wedges, a limiting process eliminates the
shortest wedges in the upper two elevation bands until the maximum number
of 12 wedges is reached. The elevation bands are only displayed at the ICC
and are controlled through altitude selection (ALT A, B, C, and SELECT ALT
S/Is). The total number of wedges being displayed, the total number of "hot"
SOJC missiles, and the total number of active VTs being sent by the battery
is now displayed on Tab 4. (It should be noted that wedge edges are not
displayed at the battery.) The ICC operator is alerted when the batteries are
providing ECM wedges. The wedges can then be displayed through the ECM
WEDGES S/I. The wedges are displayed with the point of origin at the
battery with the right bound being a solid line and the left a dashed line
(Figure 3-35).
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FM 3-01.87
FP1
FP2 FP3
TAB AREA
Figure 3-35. ECM Wedges Displayed at the ICC

3-340. The wedge edge process is not new and has been in the software for
some time. It now provides a key element of the SOJC process and is the
principal tool in determining where to place the VT.
3-341. Virtual Target—The VT is a system-generated artificial target, a point
in space that is used to provide a fixed point for early missile flight. The VT is
translated to a battalion and battery track data record (TDR) and provides a
stable point in the jamming formation for the initial stage of the missile's
trajectory. The VT is used during the initial phase of the missile's flight to
establish the optimum apogee and preserve missile velocity by minimizing in-
flight maneuvering. The in-flight maneuvering is caused by the missile
attempting to maintain track on a Centroiding Strobe. The Centroiding
Strobe is caused by the multiple SOJs' information with crossing flight paths.
3-342. The VT enhances the guidance function when engaging an SOJ
formation. It is used to program the initial turn and provides the best apogee
for the range. Missile fly-out is the same as for any engagement except for the
final stage of the flight. After approximately one-third of its flight toward the
VT, the real target is selected. The normal TVM passive correlation,
acquisition, and tracking are performed throughout its flight. During the
final P4-61 seconds of the flight, the missile is commanded to "on-board home
on jam" (OBHOJ) and continues toward the selected target. The more
powerful the jamming, the better the missile's homing capability.
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FM 3-01.87
3-343. To ensure real target acquisition by the missile, the VT must be placed
in the vicinity of multiple jammers or real targets. A VT may be created
within specific bounds on the scope. However, if a real track is not within
certain range and angle gates of the VT, the operator will receive the alert
NO REAL TGT/RE-ENG when he attempts to engage the VT. The operator
can acknowledge the alert and engage the track.
3-344. VTs may be created at the ICC or batteries. FUs should only create
VTs with the assistance/coordination with the ICC. To create a VT, the
operator must position the situation display cursor at the display location
where he wants the VT to appear. It must be noted that VTs can only be
created at ranges of 55 kms or more. The intensity of the jamming source
that produces the wedge edge will vary at times, thus allowing the system to
triangulate individual targets for short periods of time. The range of these
targets is a further indication of the range at which the VT should be created.
3-345. The operator then selects Tab 4 (Figure 3-36) through keyboard entry,
and enters a C in the TARGET CONTROL data field. At the ICC, the
operator also enters the FU number that the VT is being sent to in the FU
ADDRESS data field. Upon entering tab, the ICC display coordinates are
translated to system coordinates, and the VT's location is sent automatically
to the designated FU and forced on the display. The operator may create up
to three VTs per Patriot battery.
ASOJ VIRTUAL TARGET CONTROL *4*

( ) =TARGET CONTROL— C=CREATE, D=DROP TARGET
nnn RANGE FP TO CURSOR, aa

nn WEDGE COUNT
n VIRTUAL TARGET COUNT
nn HOT ASOJ MISSILE COUNT
ASOJ VIRTUAL TARGET CONTROL + ECM WEDGE STATUS *4*

( )=TARGET CONTROL— C=CREATE, D=DROP ( )=FP ADDRESS, 1 TO 6
FP1 FP2 FP3 FP4 FP5 FP6 ICC BNA BNB BNC BND BNE BNF
CURSOR-FP RNG —
VIRTUAL TARGETS—
HOT ASOJ MSLS —
WEDGES— BAND A
BAND B
BAND C
BAND D
Figure 3-36. ICC Tab 4, Virtual Target Control
3-346. In Figure 3-37 the ICC operator created three VTs and spread them
across the lateral expanse of the jamming formation. While all three can be
sent to one FU, it should not be normal procedure to assign more than one VT
to an FU at any one time. This is because when a VT is created, a TVM slot is
reserved for that VT. Creation of more than one VT per FU might result in
degradation of the FU's self-defense option due to lack of TVM slots. The VT
appears as a hostile target symbol with the "S" modifier. The VT is
automatically transmitted to the appropriate FUs and is forced on the
display.
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S
S
FP1
FP2 FP3
TAB
Figure 3-37. Virtual Targets Displayed at the ICC

3-347. The VT is not a real track, so the following conditions apply:
• If a VT is created at a subordinate Patriot battery, it can be displayed
at the ICC.
• The ICC does not use the VT in any correlation attempts.
• VTs are not forwarded to higher echelon, adjacent battalions.
• The following switch-indicators do not apply to a VT: TRAILS, ENG
HOLD, CEASE FIRE, SPEC, FRND, UNK, HOST, IFF, TRACK AMP
DATA, KILL, NO KILL, RIPPLE, SALVO, RANGE EST, and A
SCOPE. The use of any of these conditions will result in a NOT
ALLOWED FOR VIRTUAL TARGET alert.
3-348. The time to intercept, engage, and other modifiers such as hold hire
are displayed with the VT. The missile fly out and predicted intercept point
(PIP) are also displayed during mid-course phase. During that phase, the VT
is the PIP. The VT will remain fixed and TTFL, TTLL, and LNIPs are not
calculated. The PROBABLE KILL modifier will appear on the VT during the
kill assessment phase. The VT is dropped approximately four seconds after
intercept.
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FM 3-01.87
3-349. To drop a VT, the ICC operator hooks the VT, selects Tab 4, enters a D
in the TARGET CONTROL data field, and enters the tab. This sends a drop
track message to the appropriate battery.
3-350. The automatic engagement mode does not apply to VTs. VTs will not
be automatically engaged. The PFE, SELECT FP, 2ND FP, or direct
assignment to a battery is ignored, and the command is sent to the tracking
battery.
3-351. The battery should only conduct one VT engagement at a time. The
appropriate TVM slot is selected and reserved when the VT is assigned to or
created at the battery. Therefore, VTs should not be assigned or created
unless an engagement is to follow immediately.
SOJC TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

3-352. Jamming formations should be considered as high-priority targets and
engaged. This will force the jammers to retreat outside of Patriot range,
thereby becoming less effective. The VT process should be used whenever an
SOJ formation at long range or an ingressing SSJ formation is detected. The
ICC is the best node for determining that there is a jamming formation. The
wedge edge process at the ICC provides the operator with the tools to
determine range and lateral expanse of the formation. Virtual targets cannot
be created inside of P4-62 kilometers from a battery or beyond the
instrumented range of P4-63 kilometers. VTs cannot be created outside the
track angle limits of the battery. If the FU attempts to create a VT beyond
these limits, the alert ENTRY OUT OF RANGE is displayed. If the ICC
attempts to create a VT beyond these limits, the alert TARGET OUT OF
COVERAGE—FPnn is displayed. The optimum range for the VT is between
P4-64 kilometers to P4-65 kilometers.
Role of the Firing Battery (ECS)

3-353. As stated earlier, the battery can also perform the SOJC function in
terms of creating and engaging VTs using Tab 4. It is keyboard selectable and
used to create and drop VTs. The battery is able to engage VTs, either
commanded from the ICC or self-initiated. Engage commands sent from the
ICC will result in the alert “nnn ENGAGE.” The operator acknowledges the
alert, which hooks the target, and presses the ENGAGE S/I.
SOJC Firing Doctrine

3-354. The battery should not conduct self-initiated SOJC engagements.
Generally, the battery does not have the information on the jamming
formation's location (range). As previously mentioned, this information is
derived from the wedge edge process which is only displayed at the ICC. If
range information and the lateral expanse of the SOJ formation is made
available to the battery, via voice or send pointer on the suspected location,
then a VT may be created and engaged by the battery.
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ECCM Engagement Mode Selection

3-355. If the choice at the battery is between selecting the strobe engage
mode or creating a VT, then the SEM should be selected. Develop a VT to be
used against a jamming formation where range has been determined. The
battery does not have range on the strobes displayed unless it is provided
from an external source. Consequently, if the battery elects to engage a
strobe beyond the defaulted range of P4-66 kilometers, SEM is the preferred
method.
3-356. Range is an important element in determining where the VT should be
created. At the battery, this range must be provided from other than the
battery itself. While operating in the FUFU mode, an experienced operator
may determine the location of the formation by observing occasional
triangulated tracks within a certain area of the strobes. This can then be
used as the range point for creating a VT.
3-357. Some hostile aircraft have jammer equipment that may prevent
processing form establishing a reliable range. The jammer symbol will appear
at a greater or lesser range than the actual aircraft, but on an indicated
azimuth from the radar.
3-358. Since the range to the jammer is not available, it is not eligible for
automatic engagement. Range denying targets appear on the display with a
strobe line extending from the target symbol halfway to the radar location.
The strobe line appears when STRBS is selected or the range denying target
is hooked. Before beginning any jammer engagement, review the FAULT
DATA tab for the presence of a CP fault that may prevent a successful
engagement, as indicated by 10-TVMCP. The following engagement methods
will be used:
• Software estimate range (preferred):
– Verify the jammer symbol with strobe line halfway to radar
location.
– Hook the jammer symbol.
– Verify that strobe line now extends to radar location.
– Press ENG.
– The PIP and missile symbols appear when engagement is
accepted and target remains hooked.
– The strobe line is eliminated from display when the software
determines the range. The target symbology alternates between
jammer, unknown, or hostile.
• Operator estimate range (alternate):
– Verify the jammer symbol with strobe line halfway to radar
location.
– Hook the jammer symbol.
– Verify that strobe line now extends to radar location.
– Use the cursor stick to move the cursor to the known range of the
jammer. The cursor does not have to be on the target line,
because the software will only consider range.
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FM 3-01.87
– Press RANGE EST and verify that jammer symbol now moves
along the target line to the range selected. The range estimate
may have to be redesignated many times prior to pressing ENG.
– When a range estimate is entered, the software range estimating
cannot be performed.
– If an incorrect range estimate is entered and the operator wants
to return to the software method (preferred), the track must be
dropped. When the track is reacquired, the software method may
then be used.
– If the jammer symbol remains in the selected range for more than
4 seconds, press ENG and monitor the engagement.
– If the range data is less than 30 seconds old, the target symbol
jumps to the designated range, then returns to its original
location within 4 seconds. Move the cursor over the target symbol
and press RANGE EST. The target range is redesignated.
– Press ENG and monitor the engagement.
3-359. The following method must be performed in addition to the operator
responses to an engage fail alert as indicated in TM 9-1425-602-12-2:
• If the missile symbol does not appear.
• If the target symbol never moves:
– If the engagement was a software estimate range engagement,
re-engage by the software estimate range method.
– If the engagement was an operator estimate range engagement,
reengage by the operator estimate range method.
• If the target symbol moves rapidly and never stabilizes:
– If the engagement was a software estimate range engagement,
wait 10 seconds for the strobe line to reappear and reengage by
the software estimate range method.
– If the engagement was an operator estimate range engagement,
drop the track and reengage by the software estimate range
method when the track is reestablished.
• If the target symbol stabilizes in the range, verify the target now that
the range is known, and:
– If the target is to be reengaged, wait 10 seconds for the strobe line
to reappear by the software estimate range method.
– If the initial engagement was an operator estimate range method,
position cursor over the target symbol and press RANGE EST,
then ENG.
• If the target is not to be reengaged, perform the following:
– If the initial engagement was the software estimate range
method, no further action is required.
– If the initial engagement was the operator estimate range
method, drop the track.
3-360. The role of the ICC has a key role in the SOJC mission. It is the
control center that will determine (from information provided by the
batteries) if there is a jamming formation and where the formation is located.
It is from the battery display of wedges that the ICC operator will make the
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FM 3-01.87
determination on where and how many VTs to employ. The distance between
where the wedges cross will determine the number of VTs to be created. This
will be a judgmental call by each operator.
ANTIHELICOPTER STANDOFF JAMMER MISSION

3-361. Patriot may be used to counter the helicopter-borne communications
jamming aircraft. To perform this mission, the Patriot battalion operations
section must be informed through the IPB or other means of the general
location of the anticipated jamming aircraft. Once the general area is known,
the Patriot fire units covering that area can then perform the procedure
defined. If the intelligence information is provided before the anticipated
mission time, then a modified search sector may be considered. An alternate
search sector, ALT 1 or 2, can be developed tailoring the search sector toward
the known area. The following procedures should be performed by the
systems operators to ensure target detection and destruction.
3-362. The key element at the fire unit in conducting the antihelicopter
jamming mission is the ability of the operator to pick out the enemy
helicopter from surrounding clutter. Because of the slow speed of helicopters
resulting from nap of the earth flying or hovering, the track detected as a
helicopter will probably not meet the criteria of the preclassification filter. As
such, the track will appear on the display as a general point (preclassification
symbol). The operator now has to determine if the track is clutter, a
slow-flying aircraft, or the targeted helicopter. The following steps will assist
the operator in making that determination:
• The operators must be provided with the general area that the enemy
helicopter is anticipated to appear.
• If an alternate sector has been defined, then it should be activated.
• The operator should monitor that area of the scope and pay particular
attention to the general point symbols that appear in the area of
interest. He may consider offsetting and increasing the scale in the
area of interest to assist him in selecting the target.
• General points that appear to have movement should be hooked and
forced out of the preclassification filter by making them unknown.
This will also cause the track information to be sent to the ICC where
it may correlate with other fire unit track data, thereby providing
additional information.
• The operator should apply the TRAILS switch-indicator and select
the Track Amp Data tab display. The track velocity, heading, and
general flight profile should be monitored to assist in the target
determination. The flight path displayed by the trails should also be
monitored to see if the track is flying an SOJ orbit. Each manstation
can display up to four trails at one time (see Figure 3-38).
• A-scope should be selected on the track. The traces are depicted in
Figures 3-39, 3-40, and 3-41 show the types of returns that can be
expected from a helicopter SOJ, slow aircraft, or clutter.
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FM 3-01.87
• If the determination is that the track is not a threatening helicopter,

the operator should "drop track" on the target and perform this
procedure on the other general points.
• If it is determined that the track is a threatening helicopter, the
operator should inform the ICC who will make the target hostile and
direct an engagement on the target.
FP
TAB
AREA
Figure 3-38. Helicopter SOJ Trails Example
Figure 3-39. Example of a Helicopter A-Scope
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FM 3-01.87
Figure 3-40. Example of a Quiet Aircraft A-Scope
Figure 3-41. Typical A-Scope Clutter

3-363. The ICC's function in the antihelicopter operation is to provide
amplifying information to the batteries. This information will assist them in
making their determination on whether the track is a threatening helicopter.
3-364. The ICC will also define the general area where the mission aircraft is
expected. The information will be provided to the ICC from higher echelon or
from battalion tactical operations center (BTOC). Once the area is
determined, the ICC operator can provide this information to the fire units
via "pointer" or create a hostile volume via Tab 71, and data transfer this
volume to the affected units.
3-365. The ICC operator will perform basically the same evaluation of the
tracks in the suspected area to locate the enemy helicopter. He will note if
there is any correlation among the fire units that have overlapping coverage
of that area (real targets will correlate, but clutter tracks should not). If it is
determined that the track is the threatening enemy helicopter, the ICC
operator must downtell that to those fire units with overlapping coverage
that are not reporting the track. The track may still be in the
preclassification phase or a clutter blanked region of that fire unit. Tracking
the mission aircraft with multiple fire units will also ensure FU engagements
support the engaging fire unit drops track during the engagement.
3-366. When the helicopter has been detected and identified as hostile, the
ICC operator should send an engage command to one of the tracking fire
units. The ECS operator will engage the hostile helicopter when in range.
3-367. Tactical Considerations—Long-range engagements beyond
P4-67 kilometers will require P4-68 channels in a TVM slot and will affect
the system's multiple simultaneous engagement capability. Batteries may be
required to move closer to the forward line of troops (FLOT) or the forward
edge of the battle area (FEBA) to conduct this mission, because the earth's
curvature inhibits detection of the helicopter SOJ. Batteries given this
mission should remain EMCON silent until directed by the ICC to search for
the enemy helicopter.
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FM 3-01.87
GROUND LEVEL INTERFERENCE FILTER

3-368. The ground level interference filter (GLIF) was designed to improve
radar performance by blanking the detection location of low level, slow
moving clutter tracks, such as ground vehicles. This blanking results in fewer
surveillance validation actions, thereby providing more radar resource time.
GLIF was initially implemented in the horizon search sector only, out to a
range of P4-69 kilometers. Experience over the past several years has shown
that a significant number of vehicular tracks are being detected above the
horizon sector and beyond the range of the original filter. This is especially
true for emplacements with a depressed operational search lower bounds
(OSLB) that results in this type of clutter being detected in non-GLIF sectors.
To alleviate this problem, the original GLIF has been modified to add two
additional search volumes and increase the range.
3-369. GLIF processing is now performed in more than just the horizon
sector. The first element in GLIF processing is the creation of the GLIF map
(actual blanking by beams). This map is always constructed and based on
range, elevation, and speed parameters. Initial radar detections that are
placed under track are checked to see if they are within a range of
P4-70 kilometers, within the GLIF search sectors, and below a speed of
P4-71 meters per second. If the track meets this criterion, then the 600-meter
range cell, where the initial detection occurred, is blanked within the GLIF
map for that beam. A timer is also applied to that beam and is relative to the
frame time of the sector search. If no detections are made within that beam
for approximately P4-72 minutes, the blanked positions within that beam are
cleared. The timer is not determined and the GLIF map is not cleared when
the system is in Passive Search or Cease Radiate. The GLIF map and all
GLIF parameters are reset on a system reboot or reorientation. Although the
GLIF map is always created, it is only used to discard detection’s if the
volumes are defined as active in ECS Tab 1, page 2. It is also important to
note that the GLIF map is not cleared if 0 is selected in Tab 1, but those
detections are processed against the map.
3-370. GLIF is now implemented in three of the ABT search sectors. They are
the horizon (HRZN), short-range pop-up (SRPOP), and the bottom two rows
of the lower medium-range (LM) search sectors. The activation and
deactivation of GLIF within these sectors are selectable through ICC Tab 1,
page 2.
3-371. The tab entries are—
• 0 = GLIF OFF.
• 1 = GLIF in horizon search only.
• 2 = GLIF in horizon and short-range pop-up sectors.
• 3 = GLIF in horizon, short-range pop-up, and the bottom two rows of
the lower medium-range sectors.
3-372. The enhanced GLIF will apply processing of the map depending on
what is defined in Tab 1. For example, if only HRZN is selected in Tab 1, then
the processing will be applied, by beam, to the initial position in that sector
only. If all three sectors are selected in Tab 1, then the processing will be
applied, by beam, to the initial position from the horizon sector up to the
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FM 3-01.87
bottom two rows of the lower medium-range sector. Figure 3-42 is an example
of how this is accomplished.
LMR
LMR
SP
SP
HZ
GLIF DETECTION
LMR
LMR
SP
SP
HZ
GLIF BLANKING BY BEAM
Figure 3-42. GLIF Detection and Blanking

3-373. The upper section of Figure 3-42 illustrates a deployment where all
three sectors were authorized in Tab 1, and detections that met the GLIF
criteria were made as indicated. The lower illustration is a graphic depiction
of how the blanked area associated with each of those detected would be
applied to the GLIF map. As previously mentioned, the 600-meter range cell,
where the initial detection occurred, would be blanked. Subsequent
detections that correlate with the blanked area of that beam would be
discarded.
3-374. The GLIF range has also been increased. The GLIF range has been
increased from P4-73 kilometers to P4-74 kilometers. The selection of which
GLIF entry to apply is a function of the terrain and the establishment of the
OSLB.
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FM 3-01.87
3-375. When performing radar mapping, it has always been recommended

that the operator conduct a map reconnaissance. As part of this map
reconnaissance, the operator should now evaluate which search sectors, if
any may receive ground returns based on an anticipated lowering of the
OSLB. This terrain analysis will then assist the operator in determining
which GLIF setting to initially select. As part of this map reconnaissance, the
operator should be aware of road networks that traverse the radar search
sectors and can result in vehicular traffic being detected and tracked. The
default value for GLIF in Tab 1 has been changed to 0 = OFF. Any system’s
reboot, reorientation, or zero degree slew will set the GLIF indicator to the
default value of 0 or OFF.
3-376. Rules for GLIF selection are as follows:
• Enable GLIF volumes incrementally.
• The operator should be aware of display patterns of slow-moving
tracks that may appear as general points moving with a steady
direction that coincides with a road network. The operator should also
be aware of the symptoms of radar loading, such as dropping friendly
tracks and/or long-range hostile tracks.
• A GLIF entry of 2 may be considered if the OSLB is lowered more
than two degrees.
• A GLIF entry of 3 should never be used unless it has been determined
that the lower rows of the lower medium-range search sector are
subject to detecting ground returns. This condition can result if the
system is looking across a valley and the OSLB has been severely
lowered to detect tracks flying within the valley.
• Over time, the GLIF process can blank an area that coincides with a
road network. Helicopters, when flying the nap of the earth, do take
advantage of road networks. If an enemy helicopter threat is
anticipated, the GLIF processing should be set to OFF.
• The operator may deselect GLIF processing when concerned with
system detection within the GLIF areas.
TRACK WHILE SCAN

3-377. The Track While Scan (TWS) process can be used in conjunction with
the GLIF. The GLIF function is applied to the lower elevation medium-range
search beams. The GLIF is effective against repetitive ground vehicle traffic
and TWS is applied to all elevation angles and range (except the very long-
range region beyond the system maximum range). The GLIF is effective
against the following unwanted tracks or clutter:
• Ground vehicles—These objects are defined as automobiles, trucks,
trains, and et cetera.
• Surface vessels—These objects operate over water and include boats,
ships, buoys, and et cetera.
• Large stationary point sources—These objects are defined as towers,
buildings, or large man-made objects.
• Biological clutter—These objects are large birds, flocks, or large
swarms of insects.
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FM 3-01.87
3-378. To maintain track of unwanted tracks, a separate set of 300 Interface

Data Records (IDRs) has been established within a TWS file. The IDRs are
established for rejecting future detections and improve system resource time.
3-379. The unwanted tracks or clutter can be identified automatically by the
system or manually by the operator. In order to be identified by the TWS
process as unwanted, the track or clutter must meet the following
parameters: they must be “quiet” (non-jamming) and must have a speed of
90 MPH (40 M/S) or less.
3-380. When unwanted tracks or clutter are identified by the TWS process,
an IDR is established and the track is dropped (not displayed). When the
object is detected again, its position is compared to the TWS file. If it
correlates with an existing IDR, then the IDR position is updated.
3-381. The TWS is an FU process and is only available in K7. Page 2 of FU
Tab 1 controls the activation of TWS. For the process to function, either
Manual or Automatic must be selected.
3-382. Track While Scan states—
• OFF = The default setting.
• AUTO = An IDR will automatically be established for any object that
meets the parameters or any track that is manually dropped by the
operator that meets the parameters.
• MANUAL = An IDR is established for any track that is dropped by
the operator and meets the parameters.
3-383. Clearing the TWS file—
• Select OFF on Tab 1 page 2.
• A radar reorientation will clear the IDRs and reset the activation
state to OFF (a “zero degree slew” is a radar reorientation).
• A single IDR will be cleared if no correlation has been made within
the last 90 seconds.
3-384. Tactical considerations:
• Radiating over land—Place TWS in the MANUAL mode. This will
start the TWS process for clutter tracks dropped by the operator.
AUTOMATIC should be selected if the display becomes cluttered (in
excess of 20) with nor-real tracks. However, helicopters performing
nap-of-the-earth maneuvers can operate below 40 MPS. TWS should
be in the OFF mode if an enemy helicopter threat is defined for the
FU area.
• Radiating over water—Place TWS in the AUTOMATIC mode, GLIF
in the OFF mode.
• Combined—Address the worst of the two cases (if more unwanted
tracks or clutter appear over land, treat the emplacement as if over
land and vice versa). If the operator is not sure, place GLIF in the ON
mode and TWS in the MANUAL mode.
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FM 3-01.87
COUNTER-ANTIRADIATION MISSILE OPERATIONS

3-385. To survive the ARM threat, Patriot has several capabilities and
features which can be used to address each of the phases of the ARM battle.
These capabilities include the Configuration 2, counter ARM (CARM),
changes as well as elements of other programs such as the BTOC and
classification discrimination identification (CDI), which have spin-off benefits
for CARM. The Configuration 2 CARM modifications are discussed below.
3-386. Passive and active countermeasures may be implemented by the
operator at the ECS based on default or tailored settings in the CARM
tabular display. Passive measures include modification of the radar
emissions to reduce susceptibility to ARM lock-on and tracking. Active
countermeasures are related to engagement of the ARM carrier or ARM with
a Patriot missile. These features are automatically enabled upon operator
selection of the CARM Mode S/I.
3-387. Tab 76, COUNTER ARM THREAT PARAMETERS (Figure 3-43) is a
two-page tab that is available at the ICC and ECS. Page A is used to enter
parameters used in the ARM evaluation process. Parameters used for ARM
evaluation are target range, altitude, speed, dive angle, approach angle, and
target cross section. Page B of the tab is used to enable or disable ARM
countermeasures to be taken by individual FUs under ARM attack. Page B
also selects the engagement mode. Information pertaining to this tab can be
found in (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U).
COUNTER ARM THREAT PARAMETERS PAGE A *76*

MIN MAX ARM CLASSIFICATION PARAMETERS
( )KM = RANGE 0 TO RMAX
( )KM = ALTITUDE 0 TO AMHMAX
( )( )M/S = SPEED 0 TO 9999
( )( )DEG = DIVE ANGLE 0 TO 90
( )DEG = APPROACH ANGLE 0 TO 90
( )SQ.M = TARGET CROSS SECTION 1 TO 99
COUNTER ARM THREAT PARAMETERS PAGE B *76*

ARM COUNTERMEASURES
( ) = LOW POWER 1=ON 0=OFF
( ) = REDUCED SEARCH 1=ON 0=OFF
( ) = FREQUENCY DIVERSITY 1=ON 0=OFF
( ) = ARM ENGAGEMENT MODE A=AUTO M=MANUAL
Figure 3-43. Tab 76 Counter ARM Threat Parameters
3-388. As shown in Figure 3-44, the ARM battle begins with the targeting of
the system by hostile reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target
acquisition (RISTA) and concludes with the terminal dive of the ARM itself.
In each phase, relevant system features and capabilities are highlighted. The
CARM modifications are discussed below.
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FM 3-01.87
PHASE I PHASE II PHASE III PHASE IV

DETECTION AND
RISTA (TARGET
SEEKER LOCK-ON (BY LAUNCH ASCENT TURN DOWN TERMINAL
PATRIOT UNIT)
AIRCRAFT ENROUTE)
PASSIVE LOW POWER MODE ARM ID AND SELECTIVE MANUAL AUTO ARM ENGAGEMENT
EMPLACEMENT ENGAGEMENT
REDUCED SEARCH MANUAL ARM ENGAGEMENT
CONCEALMENT FREQUENCY DIVERSITY
FREQUENCY DIVERSITY
EMCOM REDUCED SEARCH
PROCEDURES PASSIVE SURVEILLANCE
PASSIVE ARM CARRIER ID AND

SURVEILLANCE ENGAGEMENT
CONCEALMENT
EMCOM PROCEDURES
U.S. AIR FORCE - U.S. ARMY

Joint Stars
Figure 3-44. Overall CARM Concept

3-389. CARM modifications are a set of software modifications, which
improve the capability of Patriot system to counter the tactical air-to-surface
ARM threat through enhanced situational awareness, and passive and active
ARM countermeasures. Enhanced situational awareness is achieved with the
capability of the system to identify real and potential antiradiation missile
(ARM) carriers in its battle space through the integration of CDI data at the
ICC and the capability for FUs to identify ARMs in flight using observed
kinematics and other track characteristics. This information is used to
generate operator alerts and warnings that, in turn, permit the appropriate
selection of countermeasure options. Classification criteria can be tailored to
the characteristics of the expected ARM threats in a given theater through
the use of tabular displays. Classification of ARMs will also enable the
system to automatically use unique rules for optimum selection of Patriot
missile, LS, guidance rules, and fuze delay settings for ARM engagements.
3-390. Passive and active countermeasures may be implemented by the
operator at the ECS based on default or tailored settings in the CARM
tabular display. Passive measures include modification of the radar
emissions to reduce susceptibility to ARM lock-on and tracking. Active
countermeasures are related to engagement of the ARM carrier or ARM with
a Patriot missile. These features are automatically enabled upon operator
selection of the CARM Mode S/I, which replaces the Weather Mode S/I.
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FM 3-01.87
However, the Weather Mode function is now an automated operation. The

activation of the CARM S/I will be verbally reported to the ICC when the FU
is in the CARM mode.
3-391. The key changes for CARM include new target classification or types,
a new system mode, new alerts and warnings, and a new initialization
tabular display. Figure 3-45 shows each of these changes are supported by
more detailed software modifications.
• SPECIAL TARGET NUMBERING

ARM CARRIER
• AUTOMATED USE OF EXTERNAL DATA
TARGET • TASM DISPLAY SYMBOL

TYPES • IMPACT POINT DISPLAY
• SPECIAL CLASSIFICATION LOGIC
• SPECIAL AUTOMATIC/MANUAL ENGAGEMENT
LOGIC
ARM
– LS SELECTION
– MISSILE SELECTION
– METHOD OF FIRE
– PRIORITY
– THREAT DETERMINATION LOGIC
• CUSTOMIZED SUITE OF COUNTERMEASURES

COUNTER ARM – LOW POWER
MODE – FREQUENCY DIVERSITY
–REDUCED SEARCH
• GENERAL ARM THREAT W ARNING

ALERTS AND
• ARM CARRIER ALERT
W ARNINGS • ARM ATTACK W ARNING
• PERMITS TAILORING OF CARM MODE

INITIALIZATION COUNTERMEASURES
TAB • PERMITS TAILORING OF ARM CLASSIFICATION
LOGIC
Figure 3-45. CARM Overview

3-392. Tracks can be classified as ARMs or ABT flagged as ARM carriers. An
ABT track will be flagged as an ARM carrier based on external positive ID
data that is provided by external sources to the ICC. This data is correlated
with local ICC tracks and downtold to the ECS. ARM carriers are designated
by target number "Ann." Any friendly identification will remove the ARM
carrier designation.
3-393 An ABT track will be flagged as an ARM carrier based on external
positive ID data that is provided by external sources to the ICC. This data is
correlated with local ICC tracks and downtold to the ECS. ARM carriers are
designated by target number "Ann." Any of the following events will remove
the ARM carrier designation:
• Valid Mode 4 IFF.
• Positive SIF and SIF is authorized.
• Composite ID is reset to friend or true friend.
• ICC downtell of ID changes.
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FM 3-01.87
3-394. ARMs are a classification of target, which will be displayed using the
tactical air-to-surface missile (TASM) symbol. The TASM symbol is a V with
a horizontal slash through it (V). The impact point is a V with a line below it
(V). Along with the target display, the predicted impact point may also be
shown.
3-395. In order to classify ARMs as a unique target type, distinct from TBM
and ABT, several software tests have been incorporated. The ARM
classification process occurs throughout the ARM flight, while a parallel TBM
or ABT process also takes place.
3-396. The first software test uses positive and negative ARM checks. If the
track receives a negative ARM classification at any time, then the parallel
TBM or ABT logic will immediately provide a classification and the track will
never again be considered for ARM ID. This enables the system to always
have a ready TBM or ABT classification or ID to eliminate delays in changing
from ARM to another track category. Any one of the following tests may
generate a negative ARM classification:
• True friend, friend, or positive SIF response to IFF/SIF interrogation.
• Target exceeds altitude, total velocity, and vertical velocity limits.
• Inconsistent flight phases (ascent, turndown, and descent).
3-397. In order for the system to satisfy positive ARM processing, two
preconditions must be met in addition to passing one of three sets of tests.
The two preconditions are—
• Target does not exceed ground range limit (this value can be set in
Tab 76).
• Target does not exceed RCS limit (this value can be set in Tab 76).
3-398. The three sets of tests are—
• SET 1: track originates from formation split of an ARM carrier or is a
new track that correlates with a known or presumed ARM carrier.
• SET 2: target altitude and acceleration during ascent phase are
within ARM limits for a minimum required period of time.
• SET 3: target dive angle and heading off of LOS flight profile during
descent phase is within ARM limits for a required period of time. The
system checks if the horizontal angle between the radar LOS to the
ARM and the ARM velocity vector is within the approach angle
specified in Tab 76. The system also checks if the vertical angle
between the radar LOS to the ARM and the ARM velocity vector is
within the dive angle specified in Tab 76.
3-399. The second ARM algorithm discrimination method uses velocity and
vertical velocity to distinguish higher speed arms. The third ARM algorithm
discrimination method uses the boost and descent phase of lower speed
ARMs.
2-400. Set 1 ARM test uses track split/correlation methods to aid in any ARM
classification type. Set 2 ARM test discriminates between High Speed-1/2 or
Low Speed ARM types using altitudes, velocities, and vertical velocity
measurements. If an ARM classification type is set by the set 3 test, the
classification type will be a Nominal ARM.
3-106
FM 3-01.87
3-401. The system allows tailoring of the ARM classification logic to the
tactical situation by specifying minimum and/or maximum values for
kinematics and physical characteristics. This capability reduces the chances
of misclassification when the tactical scenario presents an ARM with known
characteristics. Once a target has been classified as an ARM, the system
processes it differently for engagement to include threat determination, LS
selection, missile selection, method of fire, and engagement priority.
3-402. If the automatic engagement mode is selected, the system makes an
additional test to determine if the ARM is actually guiding to and
threatening the radar. This test is similar to Set 3 positive ARM indicators
shown above, but the heading limits are more restrictive.
3-403. In order to conserve missiles, the system attempts to use shoot-look-
shoot (SLS) whenever it predicts that there is an adequate amount of time. If
there is insufficient time for SLS, the system selects modified ripple method
of fire.
3-404. ARMs are ATC-1 targets. Self-defense ARM engagements will be
prioritized at the same level as self-defense TBM engagements.
3-405. Activation of the CARM S/I, the system will immediately implement
one or more countermeasures as specified in Tab 76 at initialization. The four
selectable countermeasures are—
• Frequency diversity—This countermeasure ensures that the system
is spreading the radar emissions over the full set of frequencies
enabled by the operator. This makes ARM guidance more difficult for
some ARMs and forces others to use a less sensitive, wideband mode
(such as, forces the ARM carrier to fly in closer toward the radar prior
to launching its ARM).
• Reduced search—This countermeasure extends the ABT search frame
times in the horizon and short-range pop-up sectors and drops the
long-range search sector. This reduces the number of pulses available
for the guidance accuracy of the ARM.
• ARM automatic engagement mode—This countermeasure will enable
the system to automatically engage ARMs threatening the FU.
3-406. The following provides the operators with better situational awareness
and facilitates their decision to select the CARM Mode S/I. The system will
provide the operators with three levels of warnings:
• General ARM threat warning—The system provides a general alert
"ARM Threat Warning" that indicates that an ARM attack has
occurred at another FU. It will be routed by the ICC digital data link
(DDL) to an FU that does not have the CARM mode S/I activated.
• ARM carrier alert—The system provides an alert "NNN ARM
Carrier" that indicates the target number is an ARM carrier (based
on external source data). Engagement may be required regardless if
the system assesses the track as a nonthreatening ABT. The alert
will be generated when a track is first identified as an ARM carrier.
• ARM attack alert—The system provides an alert "NNN ARM Attack"
to indicate that an ARM has been identified as attacking (self-
3-107
FM 3-01.87
defense) the local FU. This alarm is generated only if a Patriot FU is

tracking the ARM.
Note: The Weapon Control S/I must be selected at each console in order
for both TCA and TCO to receive ARM associated alerts.
3-407. The sequence of events and associated CARM actions are from the
perspective of Patriot operator actions. The ARM countermeasures and
advantages are relative to attack phase. Patriot operations from
emplacement through ARM engagements are illustrated in Table 3-8.
Table 3-8 Sequence of Events in the ARM Battle
CANDIDATE ARM
PATRIOT COUNTERMEASURES ATTACK
SYSTEM ACTIONS ADVANTAGES PHASE
SITE SELECTION SELECT RS SITES MINIMUM VISUAL/IR/SLAR DELAYS OR DEGRADES 1
AND PATTERN RECOGNITION RISTA DETECTION AND
PREPARATION TARGETING
EMPLACEMENT USE PASSIVE EMPLACEMENT CAPABILITY DELAYS OR DEGRADES 1

AND AVOID OTHER UNNECESSARY SIGNATURES RISTA DETECTION
INITIALIZATION (RF, IR, VISUAL). AND TARGETING.
INITIALIZE CARM MODE PARAMETERS
TAILORED FOR OPERATIONAL SCENARIO
VIA TAB 76 (BASED ON USAADASCH AND
PPO INPUT).
PRE-AIR BATTLE USE CDI/INTEL LINKS TO REMAIN QUIET DELAYS OR DEGRADES

1
OPERATIONS UNTIL THE AIR BATTLE STARTS (TIBS, RISTA DETECTION AND
HIGHER ECHELON). TARGETING.
DENIES OPPORTUNITY
FOR ARM ATTACK.
AIR-BATTLE FIGHT PER SOP PASSIVE OPERATIONS OR IF PASSIVE, DENIES -

ACTIVE OPERATIONS. OPPORTUNITY FOR ARM
ATTACK.
ARM THREAT INCREASE OPERATOR SITUATIONAL PROVIDES AWARENESS 2

WARNING AWARENESS. OF POTENTIAL ATTACK
DISPLAYED AND GIVES OPERATOR
(WHEN ARM A CUE TO ENABLE CARM
AND/OR ARM MODE IF APPROPRIATE
CARRIER
REPORTED)
ARM CARRIER ENABLE CARM MODE. PROVIDES CUE TO 2

WARNING WITH ENGAGE ARM CARRIER TARGETS ENABLE CARM MODE.
TARGET ACCORDING TO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. FOCUSES ATTENTION
NUMBER ON SPECIFIC THREAT.
DISPLAYED
CONFIRM CARM MODE ENABLED FOCUSES ATTENTION 4
ARM ATTACK ENGAGE ARM (AUTO OR MANUAL) ON SPECIFIC THREAT.
WARNING WITH
TARGET
NUMBER DESELECT CARM MODE WHEN ICC PERMITS OPERATOR TO -
OPERATOR GIVES VOICE COMMAND RESUME NORMAl
CONTINUE AIR OPERATIONS WITHOUT
BATTLE CARM MODE
RESTRAINTS.
3-108
FM 3-01.87
3-408. Tab 76 will be used to tailor the ARM classification logic to the tactical
threat and select the countermeasures. This will be used when the CARM
Mode S/I is activated.
ARM CLASSIFICATION PARAMETERS.

3-409.The values in Tab 76, page A, should be set according to the specific
enemy ARMs in the regional threat if this information is available and
provided by USAADASCH and the PPO for potential conflicts in various
regions. The smallest parameter bounds, which encompass all tactical air-to-
surface ARMs in the theater, are desired in order to reduce the potential for
misclassification. If the ARM threat is not known, the parameter values
should be set at greater bounds to keep from excluding a potential threat.
ARM COUNTERMEASURES
3-410. Restrictive ROE that prevent the system from engaging targets other
than TBMs will negate the benefits of this feature and will seriously
jeopardize the survivability of the radar in an ARM threat environment.
Therefore prior coordination of rules of engagement and aggressive pursuit of
management by exception engagements are necessary.
3-411. The use of countermeasures in the CARM mode may have benefits to
enhance radar survivability, but it introduces performance tradeoffs. Thus,
selection of countermeasures (Tab 76, page B) must be tailored to the mission
and tactical situation of the individual FU. Table 3-9 discusses benefits and
drawbacks of each countermeasure and recommends conditions for their
activation or deactivation.
3-109
FM 3-01.87
Table 3-9 Selection of Countermeasures

Recommended
Countermeasure Default Purpose Impacts Uses
Low power OFF Reduces the transmitted 1. Not permitted when OFFFUs in TBM/ABT
power of the radar in the radar is in TBM/ABT mission or in a cruise
order to force ARM surveillance mode. missile defense mission
carriers to penetrate 2. Will reduce detection or in tactical
closer to the radar range for targets with environments with small
before being able to lock small RCS. RCS.
the ARM seekers on
Patriot and launch. This
increases the exposure
of the carrier to Patriot
engagement or
engagement by other
friendly AD.
Frequency diversity ON Ensures that the system All frequencies may be ONFor all nominal
is spreading the radar detected. missions.
emissions over the full OFFIf frequency
set of frequencies diversity is strictly
enabled by the operator. prohibited in all cases.
This makes ARM
guidance more difficult
for some ARMs and
forces others to use a
less sensitive, wideband
mode.
Reduced search OFF This countermeasure Targets may ingress into ONFUs in nominal
extends the ABT search coverage more deeply ABT only missions
frame times in the before detection than without significant
horizon and short-range with nominal frame times. terrain masking.
pop-up sectors and OFFFUs in cruise
drops the long-range missile, small RCS
search sector. This target defense roles or
reduces the number of in terrain masking
pulses available to the environments or where
ARM. pop-up targets pose a
significant threat.
ARM automatic ON This countermeasure Same considerations for ONBy default,

engagement enables the system to other types of automatic needed for short
mode automatically engage engagement operations. reaction time
ARMs that are self- engagement
defense threats. operations.
3-110
FM 3-01.87
3-412. EDWA calculates a ballistic ground impact point for a track when it is
classified as an ARM, even before it is considered a threat to the fire unit
(ATC = 9). The ARM is considered to be a threat to the fire unit if either of
the following exists:
• If the ARM flight path is directly towards the fire unit and the ARM
GIP box touches the fire unit location, the GIP is re-computed and the
GIP symbol is displayed on the situation display at the fire unit
location. The ATC changes to 1.
• If the ARM flight path is not directly at the fire unit and the ARM
GIP box touches an imaginary horizontal line P4-75 km, left or right
and perpendicular to the PTL. The ARM GIP is re-computed and the
GIP symbol is displayed on the situation display at the fire unit
location. The ATC changes to 1.
3-413. In general, the CARM mode S/I should only be elected during a
threatening condition due to the performance tradeoffs that may be imposed
by the countermeasures. In order to obtain the full benefit from these
countermeasures, the S/I should be selected under the following conditions:
• The battalion is in the TBM mode.
• The battalion is in any other mode other than TBM and has received
any one of the three ARM alerts.
• Under the discretion of the commander.
3-414. When the ICC operator determines the ARM attack, ARM carrier, or
ARM warning condition no longer to be present, a voice command should be
issued to secure from CARM mode. Upon receipt of this command, the ECS
operators should deselect the S/I and verbally inform the ICC.
3-415. ARM carriers (designated by “Ann” target numbers) should be
considered for selective long-range engagement according to the preplanned
ROE. Such an engagement may remove the threat of an ARM attack and
save missiles (nominally two per ARM) which would have been expended if
the carrier were allowed to launch them. This engagement may also protect
another radar that may have been targeted by the carrier. Restrictive ROE
which prevent the system from engaging ABT targets will negate the benefits
of this feature.
3-416. Automatic ARM engagement is preferred due to the potentially short
timelines available for manual engagement in self-defense. An ARM may be
identified prior to its terminal dive and engaged manually. However, there
are potential disadvantages to manual engagement action—
• The ARM classification logic may not have completely settled (for
example, a negative ARM indicator may not yet have been violated).
• The ARM may not have been successfully guiding to the radar and
would not have been threatening, resulting in the waste of one or two
Patriot missiles.
• When manually attempting to engage the ARM, the system WILL
NOT LAUNCH the missile until missile release time equals 0.
3-111
Chapter 4
Command and Control

This chapter addresses Patriot command and control (C2) processes.
Command and control is the integrated process a commander uses to
synchronize personnel, communications, facilities, equipment, and
procedures to accomplish missions. The air defense C2 process must
perform four steps: acquire, assess, determine, and direct. This chapter
concentrates on the control portion of C2 of Patriot operations.
PATRIOT COMMAND AND CONTROL STRUCTURE

4-1. The Patriot control structure supports air battle management
(engagement operations) through coordinated positive control (real-time
operational data) and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for air
defense systems to supplement and back up real-time data. Patriot-peculiar
hardware and software, integrated by communications equipment,
intelligence, and IFF sources, form the technical interface, which Patriot
operators use to direct the firing of missiles in destroying enemy targets. This
technical contact, along with positive control, procedural control, and
operators, is the Patriot control structure, which is also referred to as
engagement operations.
4-2. There are four levels of C2 that affect Patriot engagement operations:
battery, battalion, ADA brigade, and joint. Patriot also must integrate into
joint controlling levels like the control and reporting center (CRC), normally
operated by the Air Force, or tactical air operations center (TAOC) operated
by the U.S. Marine Corps. Each Patriot level of engagement operations exists
as part of a hierarchy to supervise and execute defensive counterair missions
against TBMs and ABTs.
4-3. At the battery level, the purpose of engagement operations is to fire
missiles at hostile ABTs in the semiautomatic mode, normally while
centralized to the battalion ICC, CRC, or TAOC. TBM engagements will be
decentralized to the FU level and are conducted in the automatic mode of
operation.
4-4. At the battalion level, the purpose of engagement operations are aircraft
identification, friendly protection, and coordination of engagements control
between Patriot batteries. For ABT engagements, the battalion operates
either centralized or decentralized to ADA brigade control, CRC, or TAOC.
TBM engagements are decentralized to the FU level.
4-5. At the ADA brigade, the command and control of engagement operations
is to assist in aircraft identification for friendly protection. The ADA brigade
will interface with the joint controlling authority. Patriot ABT engagements
will normally be managed by exception. TBM engagements are decentralized
to the FU level.
4-1
FM 3-01.87
4-6. At the joint engagement operations level, operations include aircraft

identification, friendly protection, target assignment to ground or air
platforms, data flow between services, and management of data link
configurations and architectures.
PATRIOT COMMAND AND CONTROL PROCESSING

4-7. Data links are integral to the C2 process. Data links include PADIL,
TADIL-A, TADIL-B, TADIL-J, and ATDL-1. The Patriot battery can establish
three PADIL links using three UHF stacks available in the ECS. A battery
can only establish direct PADIL communications link to an ICC, CRG, or
another Patriot battery. The PADIL link to the ECS processes six target
identifications: assumed friend, friend, special friend, true friend, unknown,
and hostile. Both battalion and brigade can use any and all data links and
communications media. The communications media that data (in the form of
data links) passes over the airwaves includes HF, UHF, SATCOM, and
Troposcatter. Patriot PADIL is the primary communications media between
units. The other data link media are critical to external long-range data links
that are essential for ADA support of the battle.
4-8. The interrelationships of ID volumes, weapon control status areas,
residual volumes, and certain status indicator switches in system control and
situation display select groups on the console are important to understand.
There are five ID volumes, four of which are unique to Patriot and Hawk.
Friendly origins, hostile origins, prohibited volumes, and restricted volumes
are not used by any system outside Patriot and Hawk Phase III. The five ID
volumes are—
• Safe passage corridors (passed by airspace coordination order as
low-level transit routes [LLTRs]).
• Friendly origin volumes.
• Hostile origin volumes.
• Prohibited volumes.
• Restricted volumes.
4-9. Patriot weapons control volumes may be initialized with additional
attributes such as altitude, heading, speed, or labeled as WEAPONS FREE,
WEAPONS TIGHT, or WEAPONS HOLD to allow the operator to reserve
portions of the display for special engagement parameters. For example,
friendly suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) operations would be a good
candidate for a WEAPONS HOLD volume. The three weapons control
statuses are—
• WEAPONS HOLD—Do not fire except in self-defense or in response
to a formal order. This is the most restrictive weapon control status.
• WEAPONS TIGHT—Fire only at ABT targets positively identified as
hostile according to the prevailing hostile criteria. Positive
identification can be effected by a number of means to include visual
identification (aided or unaided) and meeting other designated hostile
criteria supported by track correlation. This does not apply to TBMs
since they are always considered hostile.
4-2
FM 3-01.87
• WEAPONS FREE—Weapons can fire at any air target not positively

identified as friendly. This is the least restrictive weapon control
status.
4-10. Residual volumes (that is, those areas not contained in a volume
defined by Tab 71) may be designated either during initialization or during
tactical operations by S/I as WEAPONS FREE, WEAPONS TIGHT, or
WEAPONS HOLD. The software requires a residual volume, and the default
is WEAPONS TIGHT.
4-11. On the ICC and ECS console, within the situation display select group,
two status indicator switches, WPN CONTR AREAS and ID AREAS, affect
the display of ID volumes and weapon control status areas. These switches
affect the display but do not affect how the software processes targets in the
activated volumes and areas.
4-12. The WPN CONTR AREAS switch, when lit, displays all weapon control
status areas associated with an ID volume in Tab 71 including display of
combined volumes. For example, a Tab 71 entry of FLOT associates a friendly
volume or origin with a WEAPONS TIGHT weapon control status. The ID
AREAS switch, when lit, displays all ID volumes and associated weapon
control status areas.
4-13 On the console, within the system control group, the WPNS HOLD,
WPNS TIGHT, and WPNS FREE switches change the residual volume and
how the software processes targets located in residual volumes for
engagement eligibility. The AREAS ENABLE switch forces the software to
process all weapon control status areas not associated with an ID volume.
MASTER ICC OPERATIONS

4-14. The ICC has the capability to function as a master ICC fire distribution
element. The MICC controls subordinate ICCs (SICC) and GEHOCs. Major
features of an MICC include—
• Increased external and internal interfaces.
• Brigade wide track management.
• Automatic fire distribution and battalion engagement assignment.
• ID and IFF coordination.
• Display enhancements.
MICC COMMUNICATIONS
4-15. The ICC can work together with nine external elements. These may be
five subordinate or lateral battalions (GEHOC, ICC if subordinate, and/or
MICC if lateral). External links to higher echelons control are the CRC,
tactical air operations center (TAOC), and airborne warning and control
system (AWACS). These three TADIL-B auxiliary links are not designed for
air battle operations, but designed for information inputs. The MICC has up
to 12 external links directly tied to FUs (of which 6 may be Patriot and 6 may
be Hawk FUs).
4-3
FM 3-01.87
MASTER BATTALION TRACK MANAGEMENT

4-16. The brigade track management function is one of the main benefits of
using the MICC. The MICC software maintains correlation of track data from
Patriot units, Hawk FUs, subordinate battalions, auxiliary inputs, and
higher echelon. The MICC and SICCs share this correlated air picture within
operator determined filter limits. The MICC software correlates and
triangulates tracks and downtells a track to SICCs not reporting that track.
The logic also supports improved acquisition by accelerating track data rates
to subordinate units in support of a cover and engage command when the
MICC has reporting responsibility and local Patriot data is available.
4-17. The ICC can filter tracks to external (higher echelon, lateral, or
subordinate) battalion elements. Page B of Tab 69 (refer to Chapter 2)
controls this feature. Even with communications allowed, the filter portion of
Tab 69 is accessible when using the COMMAND/PLAN function. The altitude
filter is for three-dimensional data only. This filter will not affect Hawk
CWAR or PAR tracks. The following are some C2 observations regarding
Tab 69—
• The special information reporting data field allows transmission of
special information to the battalion defined on page A.
• Track filter entries provide the capability to filter by heading
altitude, position, and identification. Do not apply filters except for
special cases such as link saturation. The only reason to filter by ID is
if a specific track ID is causing joint data link problems.
• The software requires the operator to reenter IDs in exactly the same
field they were deleted from.
• Normally, do not apply the leading filter.
• Normally, do not apply the altitude filter. If a tactical situation
develops and the S3 directs, consider setting the altitude filter to an
AMDPCS or GEHOC subordinate units only, and set the filter to the
highest acquisition radar altitude available to that battalion.
• Normally, do not apply the position filter. If the tactical situation
dictates, consider setting no less than 100 kilometers Northing by
100 kilometers Easting providing an area 200 kilometers by
200 kilometers for subordinate battalions.
4-18. The MICC designates a single ATDL-1 track number that is common to
subordinate battalions. When fire units directly subordinate to the MICC
detect a track first, the software will open a track data record for a local
battalion and assign a track number. If a subordinate battalion detects a
track first, the MICC accepts the already assigned track number and opens
its track record for correlation purposes.
4-19. If the MICC correlates a local track (directly tied FU) with an existing
battalion track record, the previous track number remains intact. If a
subordinate track correlates with an existing MICC track, the MICC requests
the subordinate to accept the MICC track number.
4-20. A subordinate accepts the MICC track unless the subordinate is a
Hawk assigned HPI ATDL-1 track number. The MICC will transmit the
Hawk HPI ATDL-1 track number to all local and external units.
4-4
FM 3-01.87
4-21. When a brigade ADTOC track number correlates to an HE track, the

MICC uses the ADTOC track number. If the HE track number does not
correlate to an ADTOC track, the MICC sends the HE track to all other units.
4-22. The enhanced MICC software performs triangulation solutions
composed of any combination of FUs, local Patriot FUs, lateral ICCs, or
subordinate ICCs. The MICC does not use Hawk strobes for triangulation.
Hawk strobes are not the same as Patriot strobes because they do not provide
elevation data and are therefore of questionable quality. A created
triangulation solution provides target position and velocity to each reporting
unit. The MICC follows the triangulation rules outlined below—
• Three strobes are necessary and must come from three separate
Patriot batteries.
• One strobe may be from a Patriot battery in a lateral ICC.
• Two strobes may be from Patriot batteries in a subordinate ICC.
• A directly tied fourth Patriot battery can provide a strobe input,
though not required.
MASTER BATTALION AUTOMATIC FIRE DISTRIBUTION

4-23. The MICC fire distribution follows the SICC logic (refer to SICC
discussion in Chapter 2). The MICC equally considers all local and
subordinate battalion FUs based on the reported operational status of each
FU. The MICC selects the battalion with the primary FU or selects the local
FU if it is primary. If a subordinate battalion is centralized to the MICC,
TBEQ ordering and automatic engagement release is equal to local FUs.
When a subordinate battalion is decentralized to the MICC, there is no
automatic engagement release and DECBN appears under the ESTAT data
field for the TBEQ and the AMP Tab.
MASTER BATTALION ID AND IFF COORDINATION

4-24. The MICC identification processes help ensure a common ID
throughout the data net. The improvements are—
• Automatic ID sharing between battalions.
• MICC normally governs ID.
• Hawk HPI unique track ID accepted.
• IDs implemented via joint level ID resolution tables.
• ICC operators resolve conflicting IDs.
MASTER ICC COMMUNICATIONS

4-25. The primary concern when deploying a Patriot battalion in the MICC
configuration is to determine whether the hardware and software can handle
the planned deployment. Master ICC communications must be able to
operate with external links to FUs and subordinate battalions.
4-26. The following chart (Figure 4-1) allows the SIGO to determine if the
planned deployment is viable, based on the number of local fire units and
number of external links needed. Use of this chart will preclude overloading
4-5
FM 3-01.87
the data link. The chart is relatively simple to use. The SIGO simply lines up
the number of directly subordinate Patriot batteries along the left side with
the number of directly subordinate Hawk FPs along the top, and reads the
number of allowable external links in the center of the chart (subject to the
limitations noted). For example, if the task force contained four Patriot
batteries and four Hawk FPs, the allowable number of externals is four.
NUMBER OF THAAD OR HAWK FIRE UNITS
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
NUMBER OF PATRIOT FIRE UNITS
0 10 10 10 10 10 9 8 8 7 6 6 5 4
1 10 10 10 9 8 8 7 6 6 5 4 3 -
2 10 9 8 8 7 6 6 5 4 4 3 - -
3 8 8 7 6 6 5 4 4 3 2 - - -
4 6 6 6 5 4 4 3 2 1 - - - -
5 5 5 4 4 3 2 1 1 - - - - -
6 4 4 3 2 1 1 - - - - - - -
NUMBER OF EXTERNAL LINKS ALLOWED
Figure 4-1. Link Planning
4-27. A second method of ensuring that the net load is below 100 percent is
shown in Figure 4-2. This chart allows the SIGO to determine the total net
load percentage before initialization. On the chart, local fire units are the
Patriot, THAAD, and/or Hawk units that are tied to the battalion. External
modem units are any battalion or higher level ATDL-1, PADIL, or TADIL-B
connected to the battalion (any external unit tied directly to an ICC modem
does not count). Refer to Chapter 2 for a description of direct links. Direct
relay links heavily load the net and limit operational application.
4-6
FM 3-01.87
MULTIROUTED NETWORK LOADING COMPUTATION FORM

TOTAL NUMBER OF
NUMBER PERCENT LINK PERCENT LINK MODEMS
OF UNITS LOADING LOADING USED
Patriot FU 3 X 10.17 30.51 NA
Hawk AFP** 4 X 5.08 20.32 3

ATDL-1/PADIL 2 X 7.26 14.52 2
Modems**
TADIL B 1 X 7.70 7.70 1
Modems**
Lateral Direct 1 X 14.52 14.52 NA
Links*
Master/Sub
Sub/Master X 21.79 NA
Direct Links*
Lateral Direct X 14.52 NA
Link Relays*
Master/Sub
Sub/Master X 21.79
Direct Link Relay NA
Overhead for Battalion with Patriot Batteries 1 or more: Enter 2.47.

No Patriot Batteries: Enter 0
2.47
Nominal Battalion Overhead 2.40
TOTAL LINK LOAD 92.44

* Direct links which are connected at CRGs and ECSs only. 6
Direct links tied directly to the ICC do not load the net.
** Modems which are connected at CRGs only. Total
Modems used directly from the ICC do not load the net. Modems
Used
Figure 4-2. Link Load Computational Form (example)
MICC DISPLAY
4-28. A system weapon control tab is available via S/I to provide functions of
displaced switches. The SYST/WPN CONTR S/I is on the console between the
HAWK ENG SUM and ICC STATUS tab. This tab is the data base for
method of control (MOC) weapons control state (WCS), and areas enable for
the ICC and subordinate battalions and FUs. Though the tab is the data base
for subordinate battalion ID mode, it only displays the ID mode for the local
ICC. ID mode control for the local ICC and FUs is via Tab 1.
4-7
FM 3-01.87
4-29. The System Control and Weapons Control tab provides for addressing
all subordinate elements. Only the local ICC and selected (SLCT) subordinate
elements use the source address function. ENTER TAB processes the
commands established in the fields. For example, selecting all with the WCS
data field command to TIGHT and hitting ENTER TAB enters WCS TIGHT
into the data bases of local FUs and subordinate battalions. The local ICC
must recall the tab and place itself in WCS TIGHT using the local function.
Only an MICC configuration displays lateral ICC parameters, and only an
MICC can enter a change for another Patriot battalion. For a discussion of
weapon control status and areas enable, see battery level operations.
4-30. The Site Amplifying Data tab provides the MICC operator with the
ability to monitor specific data for subordinate battalions. This data is a
replication of the data displayed on the battalion and FP status panels and
other Battalion Status tabs. The site amplifying data is provided in a tabular
display that is selected via a keyboard hooking process. To select a Site
Amplifying Data tab, the operator must ensure that the subordinate
battalion locations are displayed on the situation display. These locations, to
include the subordinate battalion FUs, are provided from the subordinate
battalion when communication is established with them. To display the
battalion and FP symbology flag, the operator must have SECTOR BOUNDS
and/or GENERAL POINTS S/Is selected. The operator then places the
situation display cursor over the flag of the battalion of interest and presses
SEL TAB, HOOK, SEL TAB. The Site Amplifying Data tab for that battalion
will automatically be displayed. The battalion flag does not have to be hooked
to get the tab. The operator may hook a subordinate unit flag of a battalion,
and the Site Amplifying Data tab for that battalion will appear.
4-31. The Site Amplifying Data tab consists of three different pages (see
Figure 4-3). Page 1 addresses the items displayed on the battalion status
panel. Page 2 is available only if the hooked battalion has one or more Patriot
batteries assigned. The data on page 2 replicates the information found in the
Battalion Status and Operational Assessment tabs. It also provides the
battalion authorization in terms of pop-up, ECM, MSV, SIF. Up to six
battalion displays will be provided. Page 3 provides the status of ABT and
TBM search, missile guidance, and launch commands.
4-8
FM 3-01.87
SITE AMPLIFYING DATA- BN : PG 1 *SEL SITE*

TYPE: ADW MSL ATK CBR DEFCON SOA MOC IDM IDWS WCS-AE EQPT COMM MSLS
EQPT/
FP SOA MOC WCS-AE FSA FSB COMM MSLS FP FSA FSB COMM MSLS
1 7
2 8
3 9
4 10
5 11
6 12
SITE AMPLIFYING DATA – BN PAGE 2 *SEL SITE*

PATRIOT UNITS:
OPR SRCH ID ID ABT TBMA TBMB TBMA TBMB MISSILES-HOT:
FP MODE MODE MODE WS ENGA ENGA ENGA MOF MOF STD ASOJ ATM
1
2
3
4
5
6
BN AUTHORIZATIONS: - - - -
SITE AMPLIFYING DATA – BN PAGE 3 *SEL SITE*

PATRIOT UNITS:
ABT TBM MSL LNCH
SRCH SRCH TRKG GUID CMD
FP STAT STAT STAT STAT STAT
1
2
3
4
5
6
Figure 4-3. Site Amplifying Data Tab

4-32. The ICC's Track Amp Data tab display facilitates the ICC's capacity to
control 12 FPs or to function as a master battalion. The information provided
has remained the same except that the tab has been reformatted placing the
TRKNG FP data fields to the bottom of the tab and adding data fields for FPs
7-12 (Hawk only). A BN data field has been added to indicate the subordinate
battalion (BN A, BN B, and so on) reporting the track. The ATDL-1 track
number appearing to the right of the FP number is the Hawk assigned track
number and may be referred to when operating with Hawk (for example,
"Your track AH204") (See Figure 4-4.)
4-9
FM 3-01.87
TRK THRT ID/S ESTAT/S UNIT TLR TLL E/MI CONFLICT ID:
RECOMMEND ID:
ORIGIN:
GEOREF ALT SPEED HDNG TYPE AGE IFF EVAL:
SAFE VEL:
IFF CONDITION: SAFE CORR:
MODE: 4 1 2 3 PROHIB VOL:
CODE: RESTR VOL:
RSPS: ECM EMIT:
TRKNG FP: 1/ 2/ 3/ 4/ 5/ 6/ POP UP:
7/AH204 8/ 9/ 10/ 11/ 12/ BN/
Figure 4-4. ICC Tactical Tab S/I Track Amp Data
FIRE UNIT TO FIRE UNIT OPERATIONS

4-33. The fire unit to fire unit (FUFU) capability within the Patriot system
allows fire units to conduct a coordinated air battle without an ICC. In the
FUFU mode of operations, fire units perform triangulation, track correlation,
engagement coordination, and support. The ICC track management software
has been implemented at the fire units, so that those functions are now
available at the fire unit. The ICC site calibration process is not performed at
the fire unit. The normal process for fire unit saturation alleviation still
applies. Track data with position, identification, engagement coordination
(HOLD FIRE, CEASE FIRE) and weapons control is exchanged between fire
units. Fire units perform track correlation only when communication with
the ICC has been lost. ID conflicts are provided, requiring manual resolution.
The weapons control state on each track is also shared with all fire units.
Each fire unit performs triangulation using shared data from at least two
other FUs. This provides range data on these tracks to the other units.
FIRE UNIT TO FIRE UNIT COMMUNICATIONS

4-34. FUFU communications messages are processed with the normal
acknowledgment scheme. The broadcast mode is used to transmit volatile
track and jammer update messages. Transition from ICC to FU control to
FUFU control is a simple process if multirouted communications were
previously established. In this case, units involved are activated by way of
Tab 2 (Figure 4-5). FUFU operations may not be a viable option if UHF
communications links must be reconfigured. The anticipated ICC downtime
will dictate the need to configure the communications network for FUFU
operations.
4-10
FM 3-01.87
BN COMMUNICATIONS CONFIGURATION CONTROL *2*

REINITIALIZE ( ) RLRIU— ICC,CRG1-6,FP1-6
TOD MASTER—
COMM STATE— A=ALLOW,D=DISALLOW,M=MONITOR FP
HEU =( ) FP1 = ( ) FP 7 = ( ) BNA = ( ) BN
AUX1 =( ) FP2 = ( ) FP 8 = ( ) BNB = ( )
AUX2 =( ) FP3 = ( ) FP 9 = ( ) BNC = ( )
AUX3 =( ) FP4 = ( ) FP10 = ( ) BND = ( ) CURRENT NET
FP5 = ( ) FP11 = ( ) BNE = ( ) LOAD:
FP6 = ( ) FP12 = ( ) BNF = ( ) PERCENT
COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL + TOD MASTER *2*

REINITIALIZE ( ) RLRIU: ICC, CRG1-6 OR ALL, FP1-6
A=ALLOWED D=DISALLOWED PRIME PATH CNTRL R=RADIO F=FIBER
COMMO STATE: ECS DLT MODES: 1A =( ) 1 =( )
ICC -( ) AUTO =( ) 2A =( ) 2 =( )
FP1 -( ) RADIO =( ) 3A =( ) 3 =( )
FP2 -( ) FIBER OPTICS =( ) 4A =( ) 4 =( )
FP3 -( ) REPORTED DLT MODES: 5A =( ) 5 =( )
FP4 -( ) AUTO/MANUAL 6A =( ) 6 =( ) TOD MASTER:
FP5 -( ) RADIO SILENCE 7A =( ) 7 =( ) Fpnaaa
FP6 -( ) FIBER OPTICS 8A =( ) 8 =( ) Bnaaaa
Figure 4-5. ICC and ECS Tab 2
FIRE UNIT TO FIRE UNIT OPERATIONS CONTROL

4-35. Fire unit to fire unit (FUFU) operations are used when the ICC voice or
digital communications have been lost because the ICC is relocating or is
nonoperational. This transition provides for the digital data and voice
communications exchange, but does not address the transfer of control.
Battalion procedures must be established to define the level of control, and
authority is transferred during FUFU operations. A master battery operation
may be considered where one battery is designated as the controlling unit,
but because the FU only displays tracks within its search/track sector and
not remote tracks, the air picture available at a master battery is not the
complete battalion air picture. This severely limits the effectiveness of the
master battery concept. If the battalion chooses to use this approach, the
battery most rearward in the defense should be used as the master battery
because it most likely has overlapping coverage with units forward of it. The
software does not support a master battery concept so control is by voice only.
Because each FU generates its own track numbers, the send pointer function
along with IM ENGINEERING is the only reliable means of ensuring that
the same track is being discussed at each FU. Fire unit to fire unit operations
only supports the capabilities previously defined.
FIRE UNIT TO FIRE PROCEDURES

4-36. If voice or digital communication is still available, the ICC directs fire
units to transition to FUFU operations. If both voice and digital
communications are lost with the ICC for more than five minutes, the fire
units should independently transition to FUFU operations. It should be noted
that a continuous effort must be made to reestablish communications with
the ICC through any means (UHF, FM, and AM). Fire units must operate in
this condition autonomously, even when FUFU operations are not achieved.
4-11
FM 3-01.87
This allows for a logical degradation to autonomous operations and a quick

recovery to FUFU, or battalion operations. If communications are established
with either a fire unit or the ICC, the air battle is again coordinated.
4-37. Once the ICC has directed FUFU operations, the ICC operator selects
Tab 2 and disallows communications with the fire units. When notified to
assume FUFU operations, the ECS operator selects the INDEP S/I in the
System Control group. Tab 2 is then selected, and communications disallowed
with the ICC and allowed with the fire units that are participating in the
FUFU operations.
4-38. When Tab 2 is entered, the operator will monitor the FU status panel
communications light. The light changes to red or yellow for approximately
15 seconds while Status Monitor checks the FUFU communications status.
Once the message acknowledgment threshold is passed, the communications
light will return to green. A yellow light indicates that one or more fire units
are experiencing bad communications. The light returns to green if the bad
communications links are eliminated or if they return to an acceptable
threshold.
4-39. With the establishment of communications between fire units, the
SECTOR BOUNDS switch-indicator is selected. The sector bounds of the fire
units with communications and within the geographic area of the fire unit
are displayed. A quick indication that communications have been lost with a
particular fire unit is the disappearance of its sector bounds.
4-40. In the FUFU mode, the fire unit operator can send tab, pointer, and free
form message to other FUs in the network. The TCA continues to conduct the
air battle using the TBEQ as the key indicator in performing engagements.
The ENGST/M data field of the Engagement Data and Track Amp Data tabs
must be monitored closely to ensure that targets with cease fire are not
engaged, thereby minimizing redundant engagements. The alert “nnn NO
ENG-CEASE FIRE” will be displayed on the alert line.
4-41. The TCO will perform his duties as friendly protector. He continues to
use the Track Amp Data tab as a key indicator of track identification. He can
also use the IM Engineering data tab to coordinate track numbers with other
fire units in the network (See Figure 4-6). The FU data field, which is the
bottom field in the tab, provides an indication of which fire units are
correlating and their target track number. There are six positions in the FB
data field across the bottom of the IM Engineering tab. Position 1 on the left
is FU 1; position 2, FU 2; and so on with position 6 on the extreme right being
FU 6. Position 1 will indicate FU 1's target number. From position 2 on, 100
is added to each position's target number. Figure 4-6 shows an example of the
IM Engineering tabs for a target with a track number of 23 at FU 1. The fire
unit that has hooked the target and displayed the IM Engineering tab will
have its position blank, as indicated by position 4. The target is number 69 at
FU 2, 85 at FU 3, and 37 at FU 5. FU 4's target would be displayed on the
situation display and on TRACK AMP when selected. This example assumes
that all six FUs are tracking the target. Ensure that FUs 1 through 5 are
identified as 0 through 4 followed by the track number.
4-12
FM 3-01.87
IM ENGINEERING DATA
TGTN/RT: TOBS : XL : TOTR :
AZIMUTH: TNNA : YL : TOBLCM :
ELEV : TR/JT : ZL : PRIMRY :
RANGE : DRANG : XLD : FSID :
VEL : DSINA : YLD : RTRID :
HEADING: DSINB : ZLD : RTRI :
ALT : FF : DX : RFST :
MMODE : TVMMOD : DY : CLASS :
RECMODE: LPDC : DZ : PRI :
FB: 023 169 285 437 NUMSRC : TOF :
FU1 FU2 FU3 FU4 FU5
Figure 4-6. IM Engineering Data Tab
TRANSITION BACK TO ICC CONTROL

4-42. The ICC operator must first establish voice communications with the
fire units and determine if there are any ongoing engagements. The ICC
waits until ongoing engagements are completed. Transition to ICC control
while engagements are ongoing may cause in-flight missile destruction. This
may happen if a fire unit is providing FU engagement support, or if target
range is due to triangulation. Engagement support is the process by which
target range data is being provided to the engaging fire unit because it does
not have its range on the target. This can be due to the unit dropping the
track during the engagement. By definition, triangulated tracks require data
from other FUs to perform the range solution. Concluding communications
while this data is being provided to the fire unit will result in missile
destruction. Therefore, transition to ICC control during the peak of an air
battle is not recommended.
4-43. If there are no engagements, then the ICC directs the fire units to
transition to ICC control. Upon direction to transition to ICC control, the fire
unit operator selects Tab 2 and disallows communication with the fire units
and allows communication with the ICC. The ICC operator selects Tab 2 and
allows communication with the fire units.
4-44. When Tab 2 has been entered at both the ICC and FU, the digital
communications process reverts to ICC control. The FP Status Panel at the
ICC indicates the correct communication status as the units return under
ICC control. The FU method of control should indicate INDEP at this time.
Once digital communications have achieved a yellow or green state, the ICC
commands the unit(s) to the centralized method of control through the
SOURCE/ADDRS and CNTR CONTR S/Is.
4-45. Normal operations are resumed when the units have transitioned to the
centralized method of control. FUFU is a degraded mode of operations for the
batteries only, with loss of C2 and identification capabilities from higher
echelon. All FU capabilities for track capacity, identification, and
engagements remain the same.
DATA LINKS
4-46. The designs of each data link is different and serves a different purpose.
Data link differences are important to understand because, for example,
4-13
FM 3-01.87
initializing TADIL-B to a CRC does not provide the same information as

initializing ATDL-1 to a CRC.
Who Is In Control?
4-47. Higher echelon units (HEU) above Patriot control the data link
configuration through joint link configuration control. If a controller from a
joint echelon orders a link shutdown or questions identification procedures,
the Patriot TD must comply.
Data Link to Use With HEU
4-48. Choosing which type of data link to use for the HEU link is critical. Use
the PADIL data link whenever the HEU is an ICC. PADIL provides
advantages including data type, amount, and rate. The following guidance
should be followed when establishing links to higher echelons other than an
ICC.
4-49. Always initialize ATDL-1 to a Hawk unit (whether HEU, lateral, or
subordinate). Initializing TADIL-B to an HEU ATDL-1 results in increased
miscorrelation of air tracks, increased dual designations, increased ID
conflicts. Patriot PTL data will be transmitted to the HEU.
4-50. Always initialize TADIL-B when establishing a joint level link to a
CRC, TACC, or TAOC. Initializing ATDL-1 on these links creates track
number problems, ID conflicts, and miscorrelation.
4-51. Always initialize TADIL-J when establishing a joint level link. This
joint link may be with an AWACS, Air Force Theater Air Control system
(TACS), or selected fighter aircraft(s).
4-52. Do not initialize to a higher echelon on any link type other than HEU.
Doing so creates numerous problems initializing to higher or any other
battalion or brigade element. Initializing HEU on an AUX link results in the
following commands not processing properly—
• Engage.
• Engage Ripple.
• Cease Engage.
• Assign.
• Cover.
• Cease Fire.
• Hold Fire.
• Charge data.
• Orders.
• ID difference.
• IFF/SIF negatively affected.
TROPO LINKAGE USING HSDIO CARD

4-53. Place the high-speed input/output (HSDIO) card into the LGM (Loop
Group Modem) in the TROPO van, remove a digital phase lock module
assembly (DPLMA) card (Patriot uses it to hook DNVT) and insert the
HSDIO card. Connect the four-wire WF-16 cable to the ports on the TROPO
4-14
FM 3-01.87
van and run the wire to the ECS entering through the hole in the floorboard.
Cut a patch cord and plug into the RLRIU port. If the distance between the
ECS and the TROPO van does not allow reliable communications to be
established, a remote multiplexer combiner (RMC) must be used. Place the
RMC on the tailgate of the ECS and connect it to the TROPO van using a
CX-11230 coax cable. Replace a DPLMA circuit card in the RMC with an
HSDIO circuit card and connect it to the ECS via the WF-16 wire as
described above. Since there is a built-in HSDIO card in the Configuration 2
Patriot ICC, the additional HSDIO card should be placed in the TRC-170
TROPO van that is located at the same end of the Patriot ECS (Figure 4-7).
CONFIGURATION 2 ICC
TROPO HAS BUILT-IN HSDIO CARD
HSDIO
CARD NL
N N
LA IO
E T
IR C
-W NNE
4 O
PATRIOT ICC
N
EC AN
C
TIO
NN E L
CO WIR
4-
PATRIOT ECS TROPO
Figure 4-7. TROPO Linkage
DATA LANGUAGES
4-54. Data links are integral to engagement operations. The data links
include PADIL, TADIL-A, TADIL-B, TADIL-J, and ATDL-1. Battery-level
engagement operations use only the PADIL data link. Both battalion and
brigade levels can use any data links and communications media. The
communications media, in the form of data links, include HF, UHF,
SATCOM, and Troposcatter. Though UHF is the primary Patriot
communications medium, the other media are critical to the reliable,
long-range data links that are so essential for ADA support of air and land
operations.
4-55. PADIL is a secure point-to-point full duplex link (transmits and
receives simultaneously) for exchanging information between Patriot
battalions and batteries at a rate of 32 kbps. PADIL provides two-way,
simultaneous exchange with multirouting to enhance survivability.
4-15
FM 3-01.87
4-56. PADIL data communications is capable of operation in either the high

frequency (HF) or ultrahigh frequency (UHF) bands. PADIL is used within
Patriot battalions for command and control, intelligence reporting, target ID,
historical information, track updates, and system maintenance monitoring.
Patriot batteries are PADIL capable only. The ICC, however, is TADIL A/B/J
and ATDL-1 capable. Thus, the ICC must serve as the interface for the
Patriot battery (Figure 4-8). Currently, the only mode of operation that
PADIL can perform is point-to-point.
AMG
ICC
AMG
ECS AMG ECS ECS AMG
PADIL NETWORK
Figure 4-8. PADIL Distribution Net (example)

4-57. PADIL may not be used with any communications system with a
nominal signal delay of 0.4 seconds or more. This is because the RLRIU
maintains PADIL message packets in short-term memory as a means to
compare and delete old messages in the multirouted system. For example,
tactical satellite (TACSAT) communications systems induce a delay caused
by signal transmission time to the communications satellite and return. This
delay is longer than the RLRIU memory, so that all PADIL messages passed
via TACSAT are in effect new messages because the RLRIU cannot compare
and throw out old messages. Direct TACSAT PADIL links are possible
between ICCs and between the ICC and ECS; however, such links introduce
anomalies in the system. The time of day clock becomes erratic, and
depending on the amount of traffic, the link itself will become degraded or
poor.
4-58. TADIL-A (Figure 4-9) is a half duplex (transmits and receives in
alternating time frames) secure netted link which exchanges digital
information for tracks and track management. It allows one way, sequential
data exchange, and normally operates in a roll call (polling) mode under
control of a net control station (NCS). The TADIL-A radio is located in the
TCS of the BTOC.
4-16
FM 3-01.87
USAF USMC
USN
USAF
USN
LINK-11/TADIL-A NETWORK
ALLIES
ALLIES
ALLIES
CUSTOMS
Figure 4-9. TADIL-A Distribution Net (example)

4-59. TADIL-A can operate in either the HF or UHF bands. When operating
in the HF band, TADIL-A provides omnidirectional coverage in excess of
300 nautical miles (NM) from the transmitting site. When operating in the
UHF band, the link provides omni-directional coverage to approximately
25 NM ship-to-ship, 150 NM ship-to-air or 100 NM air-to-ground. Greater
distances are possible with SATCOM shots. Testing has demonstrated ranges
in excess of 1600 NM. SATCOM relay to support an alternate network, such
as TADIL-A, would be based on the limited availability of SATCOM resources
and the high number of priorities during operations to support theater level
to national command authority communications needs.
4-60. The TADIL-A antennas should be remoted to the maximum tactically
feasible distance on the rear roadside of the BTOC. This minimizes
communications interference with the JTIDS, CTT, and MSE radios. Consult
the area frequency manager to deconflict frequencies. TADIL-A modes of
operation are explained below.
4-61. Broadcast (many to many) —This is a mode of operation in which a net
participant transmits successive reports without being interrogated by the
NCS. Broadcast is initiated manually and continues until manually stopped.
4-62. Roll Call (Polling)—This is the normal mode of operation in which each
net participant transmits, in turn, when his address is polled by the NCS.
The time it takes the NCS to poll each station once is called net cycle time.
More participants mean a longer net cycle time. The longer the net cycle
time, the older the target data becomes before it is transmitted to each
participant. This is significant for air defense users because the older the
data, the less likely it will be of immediate use to the system operator. A long
net cycle time reduces the likelihood that tracks will correlate. TADIL-A does
not carry TBM information.
4-17
FM 3-01.87
4-63. Short Broadcast (SBC)—A net participant can transmit a single block of
local data without being interrogated by the NCS. When operating in the
SBC mode, which is used only as required for certain tactical situations,
transmission of data is initiated manually.
4-64. Net Synchronization—This consists of a continuous series of preambles.
It is initiated manually by the operator and continues until manually stopped
by the operator. Operationally, it is often used as a first step in verifying
radio frequency connectivity between units.
4-65. Net Test—This consists of a 21-frame repeating test pattern. This test
pattern is a subset of the address codes. The transmission begins with
preamble frames and a phase reference frame and is then followed by a test
pattern.
4-66. Net Test Mode—This is a test of connectivity between units. It is also a
useful signal for setting the data terminal set (DTS) audio input and output
levels. The net test signal should be input to the DTS at 0 dB/m. The net test
also checks the DTS's Patriot unit address-receive circuits.
4-67. Radio silence is the absence of any transmission. A Patriot unit in radio
silence will receive data from other members of the net but will not respond if
it is polled. AWACS operators prefer this operating mode for Patriot (receive
only). The early warning information supplied by low fidelity sensors will not
correlate with Patriot data leading to uncertainty of combat ID.
4-68. UHF multipath occurs when the transmitted signal follows paths of
different lengths. The received signals are out of phase with each other
causing interference and phase error. As a result, units operating within a
ground wave coverage area and within the ionospheric refraction zone will be
subject to multipath interference. The fading in and out of the signal can be
monitored on the audio channel. In UHF, multipath transmissions may occur
when the signal is reflected from a large metal structure. Two actions that
can be taken are the relocation of operating units or changing of frequencies.
Higher frequencies are better than lower frequencies during the day.
4-69. UHF shadowing occurs when the signal is blocked by an obstruction.
Relay availability is an important consideration when planning UHF links
over extended areas. E2C and E3A aircraft operating on the same frequency
as the desired link will normally provide this function given the 24-hour
stationing that they normally provide in an operational environment.
4-70. TADIL-B (Figure 4-10) is a secure point-to-point full duplex link for the
transferring of data from land-based units. Links also exist between airborne
and land-based intelligence units. TADIL-B provides two-way simultaneous
data exchange between systems.
4-71. TADIL-B communication is capable of operation in either HF, UHF
satellite communications (SATCOM), or through landline. When operating in
the UHF band, TADIL-B provides a line of sight (LOS) that may provide
coverage of up to 80 kms over level terrain, but the planning range is 40 kms.
Currently, the only mode of operation that TADIL-B can perform is
point-to-point.
4-18
FM 3-01.87
CRC
PADIL PATRIOT
BATTALION ICC FIRE UNITS
TADIL-B
BRIGADE ADTOC TADIL-B/ATDL-1 TADIL-B/ATDL-1
HAWK ATDL-1 HAWK

BATTALION FIRE UNITS
Figure 4-10. TADIL-B Distribution Net (example)

4-72. TADIL J. TADIL-J (JTIDS) is a time-division-multiple-access netted or
point-to-point link for exchanging digital information or fixed data formats. It
is used by airborne, land-based, and shipboard tactical combat operations.
TADIL-J is a secure jam resistant, nodeless, high-capacity data link that uses
the class 2M terminal and the J series message formats for communications.
4-73. JTIDS offers various performance capabilities dependent on its mode of
operation. The network criteria include the number and types of participants,
line-of-sight (LOS) constraints, the use of relay, and the electromagnetic
compatibility requirements. Depending on the network and the number and
types of other tactical digital information links, the planner will specify
additional initialization parameters to tailor the network to the specific
implementation.
4-74. Once the planning parameters have been specified, network
initialization information is disseminated to network participants through
the operation task order LINK or equivalent message. The unit signal officer
must ensure the following gross throughput requirements are met by the
specific configuration as part of the planning process:
• THAAD Btry to Patriot BTOC/ICC 8486 kbps
• JTAGS to Patriot BTOC/ICC 4428 kbps (100 objects)
• Joint Surveillance Network (JSN) 7771 kbps (100 objects)
to Patriot BTOC/ICC 10350 kbps (200 objects)
12928 kbps (300 objects)
13148 kbps (400 objects)
• Patriot BTOC/ICC to JSN 6853 kbps
• Patriot BTOC/ICC to THAAD Btry 7909 kbps
4-75. The terminals have two effective range settings. The normal range
mode is 300 NM. The extended range mode is 500 NM. The actual range is
further constrained by the fact that JTIDS 2M terminal is a LOS radio and
broadcasts within the UHF frequency spectrum. Consequently, they are
4-19
FM 3-01.87
constrained to LOS. Maximum broadcast range from surface to an aerial

platform is 300 NM. Maximum range from a surface node to another surface
node is LOS, antenna, and terrain dependent. It is currently planned to have
an aerial relay to support JTIDS users operating over extended ranges.
Availability is not a surety and is a function of the theater net design. Dead
time setting must support range of the external JTIDS interface.
4-76. There are three modes of operation possible with the 2M message
structures—broadcast, point-to-point, and message format. Some message
structures provide the capability for higher data throughput, but at the
expense of antijam capability, and in some cases extended range. Choosing
the correct mode comes from an understanding of the emplacement
requirements and the tactical situation. For example, against a highly
mature threat, a high degree of antijam and security is required. Against a
less capable threat, a reduced antijam capability can be allowed. See
initialization of systems for further information. The following message
structures are available.
4-77. Standard double pulse is the standard and most rugged frequency
hopping procedure between 960 MHz and 1215 MHz. The transmissions have
the highest information security and jam protection. Communications are
effective in both normal and extended range modes. Packed 2 double pulse
provides twice the throughput as the standard double pulse, but each
message is only transmitted once, decreasing the antijam margin. Packed 2
double pulse provides the same throughput as packed 2 single pulse, with
each message being transmitted twice, but at the expense of extended range
capability. Packed 4 single pulse quadruples the throughput of standard
double pulse but at a loss of antijam margin and extended range.
4-78. There are three access modes. In the dedicated access mode, specific
time slots are assigned to a specific user, and only this user transmits in
those time slots. Dedicated access assigns slots based on user needs.
Reception is certain when the transmitter and receiver are in LOS. In the
contention access mode, a block of time slots is shared by a number of users.
Each user independently and randomly selects a time slot from the group and
transmits. When not transmitting, the users listen to all the time slots in a
group. Contention access is more flexible because another terminal can start
transmitting without having to receive specific transmit slots. However, the
probability of reception depends on how many platforms are transmitting. A
terminal receiving multiple transmissions will receive the transmission from
the closest unit first. In the time slot reallocation (TSR) access mode, no
controlling terminal is used. Reallocated time slots are available for use on
the next transmission for each terminal. Enhanced surveillance and timely
C2 are the principle advantages of TSR (now being developed). The net
control station (NCS) will establish the access mode.
4-79. The communications takes approximately three to four minutes to load
the JTIDS initialization program in the LCU from the hard drive. Only
Patriot peculiar entries will be discussed here.
4-80. Enter the battalion participant ID number which can be obtained from
the NCS or select the number of the preinitialized ID. Then the JTIDS Net
Entry menu must be completed with the unit peculiar data. The next
4-20
FM 3-01.87
required step is to enter unit position data, followed by host link

initialization.
4-81. WGS-84 is used as the JTIDS world model. Therefore, whenever
possible, WGS-84 should be used as the Patriot world model.
4-82. ATDL-1 is a secure point-to-point full duplex link for exchanging digital
information among Army systems and between Army/Marine C2 systems.
ATDL-1 data communications is capable of operation in HF, UHF, SATCOM,
or through land lines. ATDL-1 is used for C2, intelligence reporting, target
information, and track updates. Currently, the only mode of operation that
ATDL-1 can perform is point-to-point (Figure 4-11).
CRC
PADIL PATRIOT
BATTALION ICC FIRE UNITS
ATDL-1
BRIGADE ADTOC ATDL-1 ATDL-1
HAWK ATDL-1 HAWK

BATTALION FIRE UNITS
Figure 4-11. ATDL-1 Distribution Net (Example)
4-21
Appendix A
Patriot Data Sheets

This appendix contains data sheets used during manual emplacement of
both the Patriot radar and launching stations. For more information, read
the section on manual emplacement procedures found in Chapter 2.
MANUAL ORIENTATION AND ALIGNMENT DATA SHEETS

A-1. All data obtained during manual orientation and alignment are recorded
on special data sheets. These sheets are then hand-carried to the ECS crew
members for data input during initialization. Extreme care must be taken to
ensure that alignment data collected is precise and input accurately during
initialization. The manual emplacement data sheets are as follows:
• Patriot Radar Location/Alignment Data Sheet (Figure A-1).
• Patriot Radar Supplemental Roll and Crossroll Data Sheet
(Figure A-2).
• Patriot Launcher Location/Alignment Data Sheet (Form 1)
(Figure A-3).
• Patriot Launcher Location/Alignment Data Sheet (Form 2)
(Figure A-4).
• Patriot Launcher Supplemental Roll and Crossroll Data Sheet
(Figure A-5).
TECHNICAL MANUALS
A-2. The technical manuals provide step-by-step procedures for setting up the
M2 aiming circle and determining orientation and alignment. These
procedures are found in the operator level technical manuals (TMs). When
conducting manual orientation and alignment, use the radar operator
manual TM 9-1430-601-10-1 and for the launcher, use the launcher operator
manual TM 9-1440-600-10.
A-1
FM 3-01.87
PATRIOT
RADAR LOCATION AND ALIGNMENT DATA
LONGITUDE
LATITUDE
Z Z h e e e e e e n n n n n n n
UTM
AND
METERS ALTITUDE
EL RDR TO MIR
Elevation of Mirrors
.
from radar M2.
BRNG RDR TO NREF
Bearing of Radar M2
.
sighted on NREF M2.
EL RDR TO NREF TOP*
Elevation of Range Pole
.
Top from Radar M2.
EL RDR TO BOT*:
Elevation of Range Pole
.
Bottom from Radar M2.
BRNG NREF TO RDR
Bearing of Radar M2
.
from NREF M2.
ROLL .
CROSSROLL .
AZIMUTH RING READING
DATE 0 = International 3 = 1856 Clark
UTM WORLD MODEL 1 = 1880 Clark 4 = Everest
TIME 2 = 1866 Clark 5 = Bessel
PTL LOCATION DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL:

0 = Survey, 1 = Modified Survey, 2 = Map
STL#1
ALIGNED BY:
STL#2 0 = Survey 1 = Compass
ALIGNMENT WIND SPEED:

STOW 0 = Below Gale, 1 = Gale + Above
AZ MARK INITIAL SEARCH LOWER BOUND DATA ENTRY

CREW CHIEF ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) = MILS BEARING
CERTIFICATION ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) = MILS EL ±200
* = Elevation measurements required only for unsurveyed site.
Figure A-1. Radar Location/Alignment Data Sheet
A-2
FM 3-01.87
PATRIOT RADAR
SUPPLEMENTAL ROLL AND CROSSROLL
TIME ROLL CROSSROLL

REFERENCE
Taken as soon as possible
Z . .
after the RS is slewed to
the PTL.
SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)
Z . .
• DIFFERENCE . .
SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)
Z . .
• DIFFERENCE . .
SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)
Z . .
• DIFFERENCE . .
SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)
Z . .
• DIFFERENCE . .
• = If either the supplemental roll or crossroll differs by more than 2 mils

from the reference reading, return the RS to the align stow position
and realign per TM or crew drill procedures. Provide the new data
to the ECS for entry in Tab 81, and upon slewing the RS to the PTL,
start new supplemental roll and crossroll data sheet.
Figure A-2. Radar Supplemental Roll and Crossroll Data Sheet
A-3
FM 3-01.87
FORM 1
PATRIOT
LAUNCHER LOCATION AND ALIGNMENT DATA
USED WHEN ALIGNING ON UNSURVEYED SITE
LS NUMBER
BRNG NREF TO LS
Bearing of reference
.
M2 sighted on launcher M2.
BRNG LS TO NREF
Bearing of launcher
.
sighted on reference M2.
BRNG LS TO RS
Bearing of launcher M2
.
sighted on radar M2.
EL LS TO RS
Elevation of launcher M2
.
sighted on radar M2.
ROLL .
CROSSROLL .
UL UR
MISSILE UMBILICALS CONNECTED
LL LR
Note: For LOS emplacement, fill in all items.
Figure A-3. Launcher Location and Alignment Data Sheet (Form 1)
A-4
FM 3-01.87
FORM 2
PATRIOT
LAUNCHER LOCATION AND ALIGNMENT DATA
USED WHEN LS UTM, ALTITUDE, AND ORENTING LINE
ARE PROVIDED AT A SURVEYED SITE
LS NUMBER
Z Z h e e e e e e n n n n n n n
UTM
METERS ALTITUDE
ORIENTING AZIMUTH
LS M2 stake to position stake.
.
BRNG NREF TO LS
Bearing of reference.
.
TRUE AZIMUTH OF LS .
Azimuth from launcher M2
through canister alignment pins. .
BRNG LS TO NREF
Subtract from 6400 mils
.
and enter here.
ROLL .
CROSSROLL .
UL UR
MISSILE UMBILICALS CONNECTED
LL LR
ALIGNMENT AZIMUTH POSITION
Note: For UTM emplacement, fill in all items.
Figure A-4. Launcher Location and Alignment Data Sheet (Form 2)
A-5
FM 3-01.87
PATRIOT LAUNCHER
SUPPLEMENTAL ROLL AND CROSSROLL
TIME ROLL CROSSROLL

REFERENCE
Taken as soon as possible
Z . .
after the RS is slewed to
the PTL.
SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)
Z . .
• DIFFERENCE . .
SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)
Z . .
• DIFFERENCE . .
SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)
Z . .
• DIFFERENCE . .
SUPPLEMENTAL
(24 hours later)
Z . .
• DIFFERENCE . .
• = If either the supplemental roll or crossroll differs by more than 3 mils

from the reference reading, return the LS to the align stow position
and realign per TM or crew drill procedures. Then provide the new
data to the ECS for entry in Tab 85. After training the LS to the firing
azimuth, start a new supplemental roll and crossroll data sheet.
Figure A-5. Launcher Supplemental Roll and Crossroll Data Sheet
A-6
Appendix B
Radar Mapping
This appendix provides guidance and procedures for performing all types
of radar mapping operations (see radar mapping in Chapter 2). The
battery commander determines whether mapping is required; however,
the possibility of RF detection by the enemy during the mapping sequence
requires that the battalion commander or the S3 make the tactical
decision to map or not to map during passive defense operations. Mapping
may disclose the battery's location to the enemy before Patriot is ready to
fight. Not mapping affects system capability to engage low-flying aircraft.
DATA ACQUISITION
B-1. Before fire unit emplacement, site data must be determined and
collected for the initialization process by the RSOP team. The following are
considerations and procedures for establishing the ISLB:
• Single or multipoint ISLB data are entered in Tab 96 for each search
azimuth assigned (PTL and STLs).
• Tab entries (single or multiple) are based on terrain (RS UTM to
visible horizon, normally 10 kilometers). Note: Normally, the RS is
not to be positioned with prominent terrain features between the RS
UTM and RMIN. If there are prominent terrain features (positive or
negative elevations) between the RS UTM and RMIN, they must be
considered when calculating up to five points. For example, if there is
a sloping hill in front of the RS, determine the elevation at RMIN.
The same applies to a depression.
B-2. The RSOP OIC recommends ISLB, because—
• The RSOP team is physically on the ground to be occupied by the RS.
• The RSOP team has a topographical map.
• The RSOP team carries an M2 aiming circle that is used to determine
elevation angles.
B-3. The RSOP OIC validates the assigned PTL. The battalion S3 assigns the
PTL based on required area of coverage, threat, and anticipated hostile
avenue-of-approach. The RSOP OIC may recommend a change to the radar
location, based upon terrain or some physical obstruction not shown on the
map.
B-4. Once the radar site is selected and the PTL is validated, the RSOP OIC
makes a recommendation on the type of ISLB to use, that is, single or
multiunit. The RSOP OIC will transmit the proposed location to the battalion
commander for approval.
B-5. Using a topographic map, prominent terrain features are determined by
reading elevation contour lines. Changes in altitude, positive or negative, of
B-1
FM 3-01.87
greater than 20 meters between the radar UTM location to be approximately

10 kilometers from the RS. The left and right radar search sectors of the
assigned PTL, should be considered for possible entries using the multipoint
ISLB procedures. As described in the following M2 aiming circle procedures,
the location of the prominent terrain feature and its amount of sector
coverage must also be considered.
Note: Using left and right radar search sectors of the PTL allows for
terrain features in areas covered by most STLs as well as the area covered by
the PTL. However, if the search sector of an assigned Secondary target line
extends beyond the left and right boundary of the PTL, then another single or
multipoint entry would be required.
PRELIMINARY MAPPING PROCEDURES

B-6. Before the actual terrain mapping, the system goes through a logical
sequence of events. After RSOP and M2 data has been collected, and the
system is emplaced, the system initialization process is as follows—
1. The ICC downloads data to the ECS database. Tab 54 has been
entered.
2. SET WPN CONTROL alert—When the WPN CONTR switch/indicator
is enabled, the WCC is commanded to send mapping displays to one or
both manstations.
3. Assuming MS 1 is being used, MS 3 can enter mapping at any time by
also enabling WPN CONTR. If MS 3 enters the mapping process, it is
locked in until the end of the mapping sequence.
B-7. ENTER RS AZIMUTH COMMAND alert—When this alert is
acknowledged, Tab 95 will appear (Figure B-1). The current azimuth will be
shown in the data field RS AZ = which is the same azimuth as shown on the
HCU printout, which appeared after Tab 81, RS location, was entered.
RADAR MAPPING TRAIN CONTROL + SUMMARY *95*
D=CURRENT RS AZIMUTH
( )D=PTL ( )D=STL1 ( )D=STL2 ( )D=STL3
( )D=TBM SEARCH SECTOR SKEW BEARING ANGLE: -15 TO +15
( )=RADAR TRAIN COMMAND: 0=RS TO PTL 1=RS TO STL1
2=RS TO STL2 3=RS TO STL3 4=RS TO AZ ( )
AZIMUTHS MAPPED: TO , TO , TO , TO
( )=PASSIVE EMPLACEMENT 1=YES 0=NO NO OSLB DATA AVAILABLE
( )D=LEFT MAPPING BOUND AZIMUTH
( )D=RIGHT MAPPING BOUND AZIMUTH
Figure B-1. Tab 95, Radar Mapping Train Control + Summary

B-8. Enter radar PTL and STLs as appropriate. If STL(s) is to be mapped, the
RS must be commanded to the STLs first, then to the PTL. After the PTL is
mapped, the mapping sequence concludes.
B-2
FM 3-01.87
WARNING
To prevent injury, ensure that all personnel are
clear of the radar before entering the train
command. Visual inspection and audible alarm
procedures are required.
B-9. Enter radar azimuth train commands to PTL. Next, enter tab and
reorientation occurs. After reorientation, Tab 95 will reappear.
B-10. CHECK ACTUAL RS AZIMUTH alert appears. Acknowledge the alert
by pressing ALERT ACKNOWLEDGE.
B-11. Observe the D=CURRENT RS AZIMUTH data field in Tab 95. Visually
confirm RS heading. Should the RS AZ exceed + _ 2 degrees of commanded
azimuth, the alert RS AZIMUTH FAULT will appear. Manually return the
radar to the last alignment position, recall Tab 95, and perform the
procedures again.
B-12. The alert SOUND ALERT BEFORE RADIATING appears.
Acknowledge the alert. Crew members visually inspect the RS to ensure it is
positioned correctly.
B-13. ENTER TERRAIN MAP CONTROLS alert appears. Acknowledge the
alert.
B-14. Enter Tab 95 again. Then Tab 96 will appear. Enter single or
multipoint ISLB data provided by RSOP (Figure B-2).
INITIAL SEARCH LOWER BOUND DATA ENTRY *96*
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )=MILS BEARING
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )=MILS ELEVATION + -200
ENTER ELEVATION IN ONLY ONE FIELD ABOVE FOR LEVEL INITIAL BOUND
BEARINGS TAKEN WITH M2 AIMING CIRCLE ALIGNED WITH RS AZIMUTH
( )D=LONG RANGE SEGMENT MINIMUM TACTICAL ELEVATION: 00 TO 30

( )=0 TO SKIP ALL MAPPING: INITIALIZATION RADIATION PROHIBITED
Figure B-2. Tab 96, Initial Search Lower Bound Data Entry
B-15. In level terrain, if the elevation does not vary by more than 4 mils from
either level or from the starting point at the PTL, enter the average positive
or negative mils reading in the first data field (elevation). The azimuth would
be entered 0000. This is a single point ISLB.
B-16. In unlevel terrain, select the five most prominent terrain features and
enter the azimuth and either positive or negative elevation readings. Up to
five terrain features can be entered for each assigned search azimuth, two of
which can be beyond the search sector (one on each side).
Notes: 1. Two through five entries constitute a multipoint ISLB.
B-3
FM 3-01.87
2. While data entries in Tab 96 can receive an elevation of up to

+
_ 200 mils there can only be a 140-mil separation between the
most positive and the most negative elevation readings.
B-17. Long-range sector lower elevation angle entry will be 00.0 unless
otherwise directed. This elevation raises the lower elevation of the radar
long-range search sector. It can be used if a large mountain range exists in
the long-range sector that would be detected by long-range search actions.
B-18. SKIP MAPPING—dependent upon the state of emission (SOE) control
assigned the battery at time of emplacement, radiation may be prohibited. If
so, enter a 0 in the appropriate data field of Tab 96. No mapping, to include
clutter mapping, will occur. When this function is used, the RS is commanded
to the PTL only, the ISLB and the left/right mapping boundary bearings
(max) must be entered in Tab 96.
B-19. The applicable entries are made on Tab 96. When the tab is entered,
the TERRAIN MAP WAITS RADIATE ENBL alert will appear.
B-20. The operator starts the external alert for 10 seconds. This is followed by
pressing the RADIATE DISABL S/I (light OFF = radiation ON).
B-21. The MAPPING IN PROGRESS alert appears. This alert informs the
operator that automatic mapping of the sector is being performed. This
process can take up to 50 seconds.
MAPPING DISPLAY AND CONTROL SELECTIONS

B-22. If mapping was permitted, Tab 97 will appear when the auxiliary
MAPPING IN PROGRESS alert disappears (Figure B-3). The operator will
make selections depending on time constraints and the mission. If the skip
mapping function in Tab 96 was directed, then Tab 97 will not appear.
MAPPING DISPLAY/CONTROL SELECT ENTRY *97*
( ) = SELECT MAPPING DISPLAY OR CONTROL SEQUENCE

A = DISPLAY A – AZIMUTH/ELEVATION/RANGE – MODIFIED RHI
C = DISPLAY C – AZIMUTH/RANGE – CONSTANT ELEVATION PPI
0 = SKIP CLUTTER MAP OR RETURN TO RADAR TRAIN CONTROL
1 = PERFORM CLUTTER MAP – VALID ONLY AT PTL
( ) = 0 TO 7 = NUMBER OF AZIMUTHS TO SKIP WITH DISPLAY A.
Figure B-3. Tab 97—Mapping Display/Control Select Entry

B-23. DISPLAY A—Allows the operator to map up to 69 azimuth
positions, one at a time. AZIMUTH/ELEVATION/RANGE modified range
height indicator (RHI) consists of 21 horizontal traces on the lower portion of
the CRT (Figure B-4). Each trace represents one of the 21 radar elevation
beams. Radar returns are displayed along each beam. The complete
presentation provides a side view of both range and elevation of radar
returns along a single azimuth. The returns are displayed in high and low
intensities. The lower intensities represent grazing returns. High intensity
returns indicate masking terrain.
B-4
FM 3-01.87
Note: Display A enables the ECS operator to map up to 69 azimuth

positions, one at a time. It can also be used to map masked terrain, when
such data is to be obtained.
Figure B-4. Display A

B-24. DISPLAY C—If the terrain is fairly level, the operator can map an
entire sector at one time. It can also be used to determine ISLB. Display C -
AZIMUTH/RANGE - CONSTANT ELEVATION PPI (Figure B-5) depicts up
to 69 azimuths (can be less for STLs) at elevation beam 9 in plan position
indicator (PPI) format. It is recommended that C mapping always be
performed when C mapping may be the only mapping required, or it may be
used for rapid preliminary mapping to determine the ISLB. PPI consists of 15
traces on the upper portion of the CRT. The 15 traces are grouped in 3 sets of
fans. Each fan represents 5 adjacent azimuths at a specific elevation. Radar
returns are displayed along each azimuth. The center trace represents the
azimuth currently being mapped.
B-5
FM 3-01.87
Figure B-5. Display C

B-25. Display C shows the ECS operator what he can expect to map in
Display A. In case of fairly level terrain, he can map an entire sector at one
time. It can also be used to determine the ISLB.
B-26. Display D—A supplemental display used for mapping review. It may
also be used to elevate a designated OSLB after each pass through the sector
with Display A. Display D is a more finite presentation of Display C, but
should resemble key terrain points. See Figure B-6.
B-6
FM 3-01.87
69 Azimuth beam positions, High intensity returns indicating

each at the designated OSLB masked terrain at that azimuth.
elevation for that azimuth.
Tab 93 if azimuths have been skipped

or no Tab display if final review.
Low intensity grazing
returns indicating a
contiguous OSLB.
Note: Display D is a supplemental display used for review. It may also be used to
elevate or lower a designated OSLB after each pass through the sector with Display A.
Figure B-6. Display D
B-27. Display D and Tab 93, sector mapping review control (Figure B-7)
appears following completion of A mapping. Tab 93 allows the operator to
compute the missing OSLB for the remaining azimuths or to repeat the
mapping of those azimuths missed.
( )= SECTOR MAPPING REVIEW CONTROL *93*
0 = COMPUTE MISSION MAP DATA
1 = REPEAT DISPLAY OF SKIPPED AZIMUTHS
Figure B-7. Tab 93

B-28. The first option in Tab 97 is 0 = SKIP CLUTTER MAP OR RETURN
TO RADAR TRAIN CONTROL—this entry has two functions dependent on
the current azimuth of the RS. If the RS is at an STL, 0 is entered, and
Tab 95 will reappear allowing a new RS azimuth (for another STL or the
PTL) to be entered. If the RS is at the PTL and 0 is entered, initialization
clutter mapping will be skipped.
B-7
FM 3-01.87
B-29. The second option in Tab 97 is 1 = PERFORM CLUTTER MAP — Valid

only at PTL, this allows clutter mapping at the PTL upon completion of
operator controlled mapping. Considering terrain, this clutter mapping may
take up to five minutes. Clutter map A is only performed at the PTL.
B-30. Selecting 0 TO 7 = NUMBER OF AZIMUTHS TO SKIP WITH
DISPLAY A is used to reduce mapping time. Zero is the recommended entry
if the terrain is rough. After selections are made, press ENTER TAB.
MAPPING PROCESS
B-31. In Display C (Figure B-5, page B-6), the initial display presents returns
based on the ISLB (up to +_ 9 degrees) entered in Tab 96. The displayed ISLB
can be lowered 8-quarter beam widths or raised 12-quarter beam widths from
the entered ISLB using the cursor position keys up and down.
Note: There must be a five-second pause between cursor up or down
actions to allow for software to paint the sector display. Also, it is the
operator's responsibility to keep count of tab cursor actions. If based on these
actions, the ISLB in Tab 96 is to be changed.
B-32. The cursor position keys are used to display the elevation that contains
the fewest high-intensity returns. The lowest intensity or grazing returns is
displayed.
B-33. The ISLB becomes the OSLB (operational search lower boundary) by
pressing the HOOK key. If the HOOK key is pressed, the OSLB is for all 69
azimuths, including the azimuths in Display A, basically locking the ISLB
cursor at the OSLB position. In Display A it is possible to unlock the OSLB
cursor for a particular azimuth(s) by use of the CANCEL HOOK key.
B-34. If ENTER TAB is used without HOOK, the ISLB will default to the
Tab 96 entry. Tab 97 (refer to figure B-3, page B-4) reappears when ENTER
TAB or HOOK is accomplished in Display C. The following actions can now
be taken:
• Enter A—Select Display A for individual azimuth mapping.
• Enter 0—If at the PTL, clutter mapping will be skipped. If at an
STL, Tab 95 will reappear for entering a new RS azimuth to be
used for another STL or the PTL.
• Enter 1—To perform clutter mapping at the PTL B-36. In Display
A, RHI presentation (Figure B-8), two cursor symbols are provided to
assist mapping operations. A key controlled cursor (ISLB/OSLB) is
used for setting the OSLB. On the first azimuth displayed, the key
controlled cursor will appear at the ISLB entered in Tab 96. On
subsequent azimuths, the key controlled cursor will follow the ISLB
line. The operator cursor is used for setting masked terrain map
(MTM) points. On every azimuth displayed, there are three cursor
controlled hooked points for use in masked terrain mapping. The first
MTM point is set at the bottom of the OSLB beam at RMIN. The
operator sets the other two. Figure B-8 provides an example of a set
OSLB and two hooked MTM points.
B-8
FM 3-01.87
LOW INTENSITY RETURNS HIGH INTENSITY RETURNS
OSLB
OSLB
SET
SELECTED MTM POINTS

RADAR SITE SELECTED OSLB
TERRAIN PROFILE
kms
Figure B-8. Example of a Set OSLB and Two Hooked MTM Points
Note: This is only if an ISLB was not hooked in C map. If an OSLB was
set in C map (hooking the ISLB), the key controlled cursor will be positioned
at that OSLB for all 69 azimuths. CANCEL HOOK can be used to unlock the
cursor for a particular azimuth. Extreme care should be taken in selecting
the OSLB as, once set, the radar will not search below it.
B-35. In the PPI (Figure B-9), the fan description is as follows:
• Fan A—Equates to beam row 7, which is the lower elevation
(1/2 beam width) beneath the ISLB, or previously set OSLB.
• Fan B—Equates to beam row 9, which is the ISLB, or previously
selected OSLB.
• Fan C—Equates to beam row 11, which is the upper elevation
(1/2 beam width) above the ISLB, or previously set OSLB.
B-9
FM 3-01.87
CURRENT
AZIMUTH BEING MAPPED
AZIMUTH
RADAR RETURNS
Figure B-9. Display A, PPI presentation

B-36. The center trace represents the current azimuth displayed. The two
traces above center are the left two azimuths of current; the two traces below
center are right two azimuths of current (Figure B-10).
B-10
FM 3-01.87
RETURNS CORRELATED
IN ELEVATION AND
ADJACENT
AZIMUTH INDICATING
AZIMUTHS
CONTIGUOUS TERRAIN
CURSORS
ELEVATION BANDS FOR

CORRELATION OF RETURNS
AT ADJACENT AZIMUTHS
AT SELECTED ELEVATIONS
UNCORRELATED
RETURNS
Figure B-10. Azimuth being Mapped

B-37. In the RHI/PPI, the RHI alone is used primarily to set the OSLB. The
two displays together (RHI and PPI) are used to establish MTM points.
B-38. In setting the OSLB, refer to Figure B-8, on page B-9 and observe the
following procedures:
• At the first azimuth viewed, the ISLB key controlled cursor appears
at the Tab 96 entry. This cursor can be moved up or down only. The
cursor does have a wrap-around feature so that when stepped down
past SKIP, the cursor will reappear at the top of the RHI.
• The range and intensity of the returns in the RHI must be considered
when moving the OSLB cursor. The range of the RHI from left to
right is approximately 42 kilometers. If there are no high-intensity
returns close in to the unit (within 10 kilometers), the OSLB cursor
can remain in that position if the ground is level and 0 was selected
in Tab 96. It may be lowered if the terrain was sloping down from the
radar and 0 was selected in Tab 96. However, if the ground was
sloping and a negative value was entered in Tab 96, then the cursor,
for this beam, would not be lowered any further. The main concern is
to ensure that the search beam is not pointed in the ground. In
B-11
FM 3-01.87
establishing the OSLB, the cursor will be placed two beam positions
above the close-in, high-intensity returns.
• Once the key controlled ISLB cursor is set at the appropriate
elevation beam, the HOOK key is pressed, and the ISLB now becomes
the OSLB azimuth.
B-439. Azimuth skipping (Figure B-11)—If there are no returns on the RHI
presentation, take the key controlled cursor down to the word SKIP and press
HOOK, followed by ENTER TAB.
KEY
SKIP CONTROLLED CURSOR
CURSOR
Figure B-11. Mapping Cursors

B-40. Masked terrain mapping is accomplished by viewing both the PPI and
RHI presentations (Figure B-4, page B-5). The purpose of MTM is to point out
terrain features that could mask an aircraft. On each RHI presentation, up to
three points could be set: one when the OSLB is hooked, the other two by the
operator. Hook only returns above the OSLB, no returns—no hook.
B-41. Using the combination of PPI and RHI displays, the determination of
which points to hook can be made. The PPI provides a horizontal display at
the three elevation beams covering the center azimuth plus two azimuths on
either side. From the PPI, you can determine slope and/or density of terrain.
From the RHI, you can determine the elevation for that terrain. Looking at
Figure B-8, page B-9, a good rule of thumb is to hook high left and high right.
This is based not only on elevation, but also on the distance between the
terrain features.
Note: Hooked MTM points can be changed by positioning the cursor over
the original hooked point (cursor on top of cursor and pressing the CANCEL
HOOK key on the control keyboard.
B-42. Remember that, based on the displays, it is not always necessary to
hook MTM points, that is, if no returns exist above the OSLB. Note:
Interpolation of MTM points will be accomplished by the WCC for a skipped
azimuth if there are hooked MTM points on each adjacent azimuth. If more
than one consecutive azimuth is skipped, no interpolation will occur.
B-43. Tab 93 (Refer to figure B-7, page B-7) will only appear if any Display A
azimuths were skipped in Tab 97. Zero is the recommended entry. The
computer will then set the OSLB for those unmapped azimuths. This is based
on the operator selected OSLB azimuth before and after the skipped
azimuth(s)—interpolation. The skipped azimuths will be presented if a 1 is
entered in Tab 93.
B-12
FM 3-01.87
Note: Tab 93 will only appear when 1 to 7 azimuths were skipped during
Display A mapping as entered in Tab 97. Tab 93 will not appear for azimuths
on which the SKIP cursor function was used. Automatic computer
interpolation will be accomplished for those azimuths.
B-44. Display D (Refer to Figure B-6, page B-7) and the HORP display
(Figure B-12) will appear with the PRESS ENTER TAB TO CONTINUE
alert. This display is intended to review and evaluate the selected OSLB. The
HORP display (Figure B-12) is a horizontal plot of the ISLB and the OSLB.
The ISLB entered in Tab 96 is averaged and the results displayed as a
dashed line on the HORP. The OSLB created by the operator is displayed as
an asterisk line on the HORP. The operator should compare the OSLB to
what the terrain actually looks like (visual or from a topographical map) to
ensure that there is some comparison. If grossly in error, the operator should
perform the mapping procedure again. Upon acknowledging the alert and
entering the tab, Tab 97 and Display D will reappear.
LT AZ RS AZ RT AZ
ELEVATION +5 +5 ELEVATION
(DEGREES) (DEGREES)
+4 +4
+3 +3
+2 +2
ISLB
* *** *** * *** * * ISLB
+1 *
*** *** * ** *** ** * * ** +1
0 * * 0
-1 OSLB -1
AZIMUTH 0 = REFERENCE X = TRAINEE
Figure B-12. HORP Display

B-45. Tab 97 can now be used to return to Tab 95 if the RS is at an azimuth
other than the PTL or, if at the PTL, can direct or skip clutter mapping. Upon
entering the tab, the DRAW MASKED AREAS MAP alert will appear. When
acknowledged, Display E and Tab 92 will appear.
B-46. Display E (Figure B-13) is a PPI presentation of all the masked terrain
points, within a given sector (up to three), which have been mapped with
Display A. It is used in conjunction with Tab 92 (Figure B-14) which appears
simultaneously. Both appear as a result of entering Tab 97 with the RS at the
PTL.
B-13
FM 3-01.87
MTM FENCE WITH MTM CODED

ALTITUDE LABEL ALTITUDE SYMBOLS
20
***
*
***** 25
EQUATES TO OSLB
Figure B-13. Display E
MASKED AREAS DRAWING CONTROL *92*

( )M*100 = ALTITUDE LABEL FOR DESIGNATED MASKED TERRAIN AREA
( ) = PROCESS CONTROL: BLANK = CONTINUE THIS SECTOR-1
1 = ADVANCE TO NEXT SECTOR-2
2 = END MASKED AREAS DRAWING
ALTITUDE SYMBOL CODING: ... = 000a TO 000a
--- = 000a TO 000a
+++ = 000a TO 000a
*** = 000a TO 000a
000 = 000a TO 000a
Figure B-14. Tab 92, Masked Areas Drawing Control
B-47. Keyboard selected tabular displays must not be called up while Tab 92
is displayed. Tab 92 will clear and cannot be recalled. Display E and Tab 92
will appear whether skip mapping (Tab 96) or C map only was accomplished,
even though masked terrain cannot be drawn. Tab 92 is a mandatory
software entry for the sequence controller (normally on MS 1). If mapping
B-14
FM 3-01.87
was accomplished on both consoles, Display E and Tab 92 will appear on both
consoles. This is not normally the software Sequence Controller, that is,
console is not in ECCM ASSIST. However, MS 3 can clear the CRT by
entering a 2 in the second data field, followed by ENTER TAB. MS 1 will
continue with masked terrain drawing if Display A was used.
B-48. If STL(s) were mapped, the display and tab will not appear until PTL
mapping is completed. Display E appears at the PTL (Figure B-13).
Surrounding the center of the crow’s-foot is a ring of symbols equating to the
OSLB elevation. Within the sector will be clusters of coded altitude symbols.
These symbols are based on the MTM points hooked during Display A
mapping. These clusters equate to hills or mountains within the sector that
can be correlated to a topographical map.
B-49. Each sector is able to have a maximum of six masked terrain corrals
(three-sided dashed lines). The operator hooking both sides of the cluster
draws these corrals. The WCC will create the depth. Due to the six-corral
limitations, concentration on the most significant (highest) terrain features is
essential.
Note: A common pitfall is drawing masked areas without first planning
for the use of the six masked areas. The operator can run out of masked areas
by drawing too many around less significant terrain features. An advisable
procedure is to draw masked areas around the most significant terrain
features first, and then move on to the less significant features.
B-50. The most accurate method of assigning corral altitudes is to refer to a
topographical map for that particular hill or mountain. In place of that, use of
the average elevation (from Tab 92—appropriate symbology) is
recommended. This altitude assignment is for operator information only, and
the same number can be used for more than one masked terrain. The display
of meters or feet was selected in Tab 14. For example: if the masked area
(***) has altitudes from 350 meters to 410 meters, the average altitude is
380 meters. The altitude is rounded to the nearest 100 meters, so the first
entry in Tab 92 will be 04. The same entry is made for other corrals
surrounding "*" symbology.
B-51. Upon completing the PTL sector, a 1 is entered in the second data field
to advance to the next sector to be mapped (STL). When masked terrain
drawing is completed, a 2 is entered in the second data field of Tab 92,
resulting in the alert MASKED AREAS MAP COMPLETED. If a 1 is entered
and there are no more sectors to be mapped, Display E and Tab 92 will clear,
and the alert will appear.
CLUTTER MAPPING
B-52. Initialization clutter mapping is an automatic software process with the
operator acknowledging and complying with applicable alerts. During
initialization, this process will occur only with the radar at the PTL. Clutter
mapping is selected on Tab 97 (refer to Figure B-3).
B-15
FM 3-01.87
B-53. If operator authorized via a 1 entry in Tab 97, the clutter map process
will be accomplished at this time simultaneously with Display E and Tab 92
being displayed. The following alerts will appear:
• CLUTTER MAP WAITS RADIATE-ENBL—Operator sounds the
external alarm and presses the RADIATE-DISABL S/I (light OFF-
radiation ON).
• CLUTTER MAP IN PROGRESS—This alert will be displayed every
60 seconds until the clutter map is completed. This process may
take up to 5 minutes. Note: The clutter map update programs
(CMUP) S/I is not illuminated during TAC clutter mapping.
B-54. The system maps ground clutter within the beams of the OSLB and
within two elevation beams above the OSLB (horizon and short-range pop-
up). The results of this clutter map will be written on the data base tape upon
completion of initialization. This procedure is accomplished in standard
emplacement and long-term reinitialization. It should be noted that the
clutter mapping process is relative to the OSLB setting. Note: If clutter
mapping was not performed during initialization, an automatic clutter map
will be accomplished the first time the system is in RADIATE ENABLE. At
this point, the RS can be commanded to the PTL or an STL in PASSIVE
SEARCH. The radar being in a listen mode only, no reorientation or zero-
degree slew clutter mapping can be accomplished. The first time the radar is
commanded to ACTIVE SEARCH, an automatic clutter map will be
accomplished. This process can take up to 40 to 50 seconds.
B-55. In K-7 (tactical operations software), the clutter map is updated on a
continual basis during ACTIVE SEARCH; however, it has a low priority
relative to most radar actions. The operator can effectively raise the priority
of the clutter map update by the following two methods:
• By pressing the CLUTTER MAP UPDATE switch-indicator, the WCC
will initiate the clutter map process at a higher priority; however,
this method can take up to 15 minutes to complete (depending on
WCC activity). During the period that the clutter map is in progress,
the S/I will remain illuminated. Upon completion of the clutter map
process, the operator must update the recovery storage unit (RSU)
data base. Note: Before suspension of tactical operations (with
exception of march order), writing an EMP recovery tape is required
to record the latest clutter map update data.
Note: Prior to suspension of tactical operations (with exception of
march order), a data base update is required to record the latest
clutter map update data.
• The highest priority for clutter map update occurs when a
reorientation command is given to the radar. This clutter map process
is completed within 40 seconds and is automatically written to the
data base. Another method of achieving this clutter map is to perform
a 0-degree slew. This procedure is covered in TM 9-1430-600-10-1.
Note: The clutter map update procedures, less the reorientation
command to an STL or PTL, are usually performed in response to
increased clutter appearing on the CRT. It should be noted that if
performance of the preceding procedures does not clear the increased
B-16
FM 3-01.87
clutter, a long-term reinitialization with Display A mapping is

recommended.
B-56. CLUTTER MAP COMPLETE—This alert informs the operator that the
clutter mapping process is finished. If Display E and Tab 92 have been
completed when this alert appears, when acknowledged, the alert ENTER
ALTERN SEARCH CONTR DATA will appear and the operator can continue
with initialization. If Display “E” and Tab 92 have not been completed when
the clutter mapping process is finished, the alert is acknowledged and the
operator(s) continues with masked areas drawing. Note: The RADIATE-
DISABL S/I will remain off although radiation has ceased.
MAPPING INTERFERENCE
B-57. Both man-made and natural interference can prevent or hamper the
manual mapping process. Excessive interference is interference that appears
across most or all azimuths. It can be man-made, caused by ECM or chaff,
and/or it can be natural, caused by severe weather. Manual mapping should
not be performed in a severe weather, ECM, or chaff environment. Clutter
map updates should not be accomplished when the above interference is
present. This could result in large areas being blanked due to interference
such as a large thunderstorm. Be aware of what outside environmental
conditions are causing the clutter before performing any type of a clutter map
update.
B-58. Non-excessive interference is either man-made or natural that usually
appears on a limited number of azimuths (Figure B-15). The recommended
procedure is to skip the affected azimuth(s). The WCC will automatically
interpolate the OSLB for the affected azimuth(s), based on the previous and
next azimuth's OSLB settings. Use of the SKIP cursor function prevents the
interference from being entered in the map data file.
B-17
FM 3-01.87
ECM INTERFERENCE
Figure B-15. Example of ECM Interference
B-18
Appendix C
Automatic Emplacement
This appendix discusses detailed procedures for automatic emplacement
of the Patriot system. Patriot relies on the proper alignment of the radar
set and launching stations. It is important for the alignment to be
performed accurately and quickly. The precision lightweight GPS receiver
(PLGR) and the North Finding System (NFS) have been incorporated in
the Patriot FU to provide automatic emplacement (AE).
AUTOMATIC EMPLACEMENT OVERVIEW

C-1. Automatic Emplacement consists of the following three hardware
components:
• PLGR.
• NFS.
• GPS-North Reference System Input Output (GNIO) interface.
C-2. Together these units automatically perform the operator alignment
functions that generate location, azimuth angle, roll, and crossroll for the
system. Fire unit software programs are modified to account for this new
capability. The software portion of the AE is explained in Chapter 2. A block
diagram of the software flow for the automated location and alignment is
seen in Figure C-1. See TM 9-1425-600-12 for more information.
LS
LAM /LMM PLGR
PLGR
DLU GNIO
ECS NFS
DLU LCU
RS
RLRIU
PLGR
W CC CUG IOCT IOCT DACU GNIO
NFS
RAM/RMM
RW CIU RWCIU
Figure C-1. Automatic Emplacement System Block Diagram

C-3. When the AE option is selected, the PLGR will require fewer manual
input steps, thus simplifying and reducing operator tasks. The PLGR can
acquire positioning satellites quickly and at the same time provide reliable
C-1
FM 3-01.87
data. This allows the Patriot system to assume mission status with more
reliable RS and LS emplacement data. ECS initialization in the automatic
mode will receive radar and launcher data in Tabs 81 and 85 automatically.
C-4. LS emplacement guidelines, mixed mode emplacement procedures and
automatic data reentry as discussed in this manual have not changed. For
PLGR equipped units, the decision point for transitioning from TACI to K7
has changed. Due to the reduced emplacement timeline if more than
4 minutes have elapsed since entry of Tab 85, the unit should remain in TACI
until the LS is auto emplaced. If less than 2 minutes have elapsed, the
operator should go to K7. If between 2 and 4 minutes requires a decision by
the TCO based on the mission and on the number of LS auto emplaced. Given
the reduced timeline for PLGR, it is likely that all LS will be auto emplaced
before the completion of TACI providing that Tab 85 is entered immediately
after Tab 91 has been entered.
C-5. The AE may fail for either an equipment problem or poor satellite data.
Equipment problems will be reflected on page 4 of the Fault Data tab and the
operator should take the appropriate action to clear the faults. For an RS
fault the operator can reboot the radar or for LS faults the operator could
deassign/reassign the particular launcher. These actions send a reset to the
individual GNIO module. If this does not clear the fault, then AE diagnostics
must be run.
C-6. Poor satellite data failure occurs when the satellite coverage is
unsatisfactory, or even though there are sufficient satellites, their geometry
is not good. In some cases, even if the satellite coverage is predicted to be
good, one or more satellites may be off-line and the operator will be unaware.
If the automatic emplacement fails due to poor satellite data, the operator
should direct a crew member to go to the radar PLGR and, viewing the front
display, determine the status of the following parameters. If the parameters
are within the tolerance defined below, and then another AE should be
attempted by rebooting the system. If they are not within the specified
tolerance, then a manual emplacement should be conducted.
C-7. Operator can now use the percentage value displayed on page 4 of the
Fault Data tab (Figure C-2) to make emplacement time line decisions. If some
or all LSs have not auto emplaced when TACI is finished, the TCO or TCA
must evaluate the emplacement status to determine how close to completion
each LS is. Mission requirements and the emplacement status for the LS to
auto emplace are key factors in making this decision. The guideline is, if
emplacement status that indicates more than 70 percent, the unit should
remain in TACI until the LS are auto emplaced. If emplacement status
indicates less than 30 percent, the unit should go to K7. When the RS data is
between 30 percent and 70 percent this requires an operator decision based
on the mission and on the number of LS already auto emplaced.
C-2
FM 3-01.87
GPS + NFS STATUS PAGE 4 OF FAULT DATA S/I

EMPLACE EMPLACE
RS GPS = GO LS GPS NFS STATUS LS GPS NFS STATUS
RS NFS = GO 1A GO GO DONE 1A RS
EMPLACEMENT 2A DGRD DGRD 10 PCT 2A
STATUS = DONE 3A NOGO GO FAILED 3A
4A GO DGRD DONE 4A
5A GO GO 85 PCT 5A
6A GO GO 70 PCT 6A
7A GO GO FAILED 7A
8A GO NOGO DONE 8A
Figure C-2. Fault Data Tabular Display, Page 4
C-8. The alert, RS or LSna EMPLACEMENT FAILED, is displayed when the
system has failed to calculate a final position for the RS or LS(s). After two
automatic emplacement failures for either a hardware problem or poor
satellite coverage, a normal manual emplacement should be performed.
C-9. If the operator receives the alert, LSna EMPLACEMENT FAILED, the
operator must check page 4 of the Fault Data Tab to determine if there are
any faults with the LS, PLGR, NFS, or communications equipment. If the
failure is caused by poor satellite data, then the LS should be placed to "local"
and a crew member should determine the PLGR parameters. If they do not
meet the parameters defined above, then the following decision process must
be considered.
C-10. If the failure was due to a hardware problem, the hardware must be
fixed. Another automatic emplacement must be attempted at the next
appropriate satellite coverage time.
C-11. If the problem was due to poor satellite coverage, then the operator
may emplace the launcher(s) manually according to the mixed mode
emplacement procedure defined in Appendix E. If time is not a factor, the
operator may wait until the next appropriate satellite coverage period and
perform an automatic emplacement.
DETERMINING SATELLITE COVERAGE

C-12. The PLGR uses data from earth orbiting satellites to determine
location and elevation. Readings obtained in UTM coordinates, latitude,
longitude, and elevation, are provided to the ECS operator by way of tabular
display. A minimum of three satellites is required to allow the PLGR unit to
determine its position on the earth in three dimensions. Because the Patriot
system requires the three dimensions in terms of Northing, Easting, and
Altitude, three satellites are required to achieve its automatic emplacement
requirement.
PRECISION LIGHTWEIGHT GPS RECEIVER

C-13. PLGR is one component of the AE that operates passively, gathering
positioning data from a number of satellites, allowing an unlimited number of
users to simultaneously acquire precise position and navigation data under
all weather conditions any time of day or night. PLGR provides location and
C-3
FM 3-01.87
elevation data for each LS and RS. A minimum of three satellites is required
to ensure accurate location and altitude information.
C-14. The global positioning system is made up of three major segments:
space, control, and user. The GPS space segment consists of 24 satellites (21
navigational and 3 operational spares) orbiting the earth in six orbital
planes. The satellites continuously transmit RF (radio frequency) signals to
earth that contain the satellite's position and time of day. The satellites
operate in circular 20,200 kilometer orbits with precise spacing within the
orbits to ensure that a minimum of three satellites are in view of any user for
worldwide coverage (Figure C-3).
THE TIME IS…
MY POSITION IS...
Figure C-3. GPS Satellites

C-15. The Patriot time of day (PTOD) clock can be altered or changed by the
lowest numbered FU even though the ICC is on line. The PTOD entry is a
manual operation that is normally synchronized via voice with higher echelon
unit (HEU). Often, the time is incorrect due to operator error or delayed
input. If there is an operator error or delayed input for the PTOD, this will
affect the synchronization of HEUs and external communication links. HEUs
have no direct control. Once the battalion nets all the FUs together, the time
from the lowest numbered unit is used as the master for all units’ PTOD.
C-16. The PTOD is an inherent function of the GPS that will be used by the
ECS and ICC. PTOD is required to support told-in target correlation and
fusion. Timely target cueing and target hand-off also require PTOD.
C-17. The Patriot system will now use GPS standard time to ensure that
external synchronous communication links can be correctly established, that
airspace control orders are established at their proper time, and that external
C-4
FM 3-01.87
source data fusion/correlation is correct. GPS standard time shall be used to

synchronize TOD for Patriot. By using the GPS standard time, operator input
will no longer be required for time synchronization. At this point, Patriot will
be in time synchronization with all other GPS time users.
C-18. The control segment consists of a number of monitor stations and
ground antennas located throughout the world. The monitor stations
passively track all satellites for position and time data and pass this
information to the master control station. The master control station
determines the satellite orbits and provides updated position and time
messages for each satellite (Figure C-4).
SATELLITES
MASTER
MONITOR CONTROL GROUND
STATIONS STATION ANTENNAS
Figure C-4. GPS System

C-19. The user segment consists of the passive navigation sets. The passive
navigation set contains a receiver section and a computer section. The
receiver processes the RF signals from the satellites and sends the satellite
position and time to the computer section. By using the data transmitted
from the satellites, the computer section can derive the navigation set's
position coordinates and elevation. By monitoring any changes in the
navigation set position over time, the speed of the user set can be calculated
for mobile units (Figure C-5).
C-5
FM 3-01.87
THE TIME IS…

MY POSITION IS...
SATELLITE 1
SATELLITE 1
SATELLITE 1
MY POSITION IS…
MY ELEVATION IS…
THE TIME OF DAY IS…
USER MY SPEED IS...
EQUIPMENT
Figure C-5. GPS Navigation Information

C-20. PLGR provides accurate position, altitude, velocity, and time
information on a continuous, worldwide basis. This information is provided at
two accuracy levels through the standard positioning service (SPS) and the
precise positioning service (PPS). SPS is a civil position and navigation
service providing the lower accuracy available to any user. The PPS is a
military service providing higher accuracy. PPS is restricted to US and allied
military forces and, if in the national interest, to selected civil users. The
satellite transmits a coarse acquisition (CA) code and a precise code (P code).
The user is able to obtain a more accurate position and velocity solution, a
circular error probability (CEP), when using a P code (10 meters CEP) than
when using a CA code (100 meters CEP).
C-21. PPS is implemented with selective availability (SA) features. SA denies
the unauthorized real-time user of the full PPS accuracy. Cryptographic
measures are integral to SA requiring cryptographic keys to gain access to
full PPS accuracy.
C-22. PPS is also implemented with antispoofing (AS) features. These protect
PLGR users from transmitters that intentionally mimic PLGR navigation
signals (spoofing or meaconing). Cryptographic measures are also part of the
AS feature. The cryptographic keys are stored in the PLGR receiver using a
standard automated net control device or KYK-13. Two types of
cryptographic keys are used by the PLGR. They are group unique key (GUK)
and cryptographic key weekly (CKW). The GUK is normally good for a year,
while the CKW is good for 7 days. The Army is currently issued the GUK
codes yearly.
C-23. The Patriot PLGR requires cryptographic codes. There are two types of
codes: the SA and the AS codes. These codes are loaded with an automated
net control device. The SA code is a one-year code and is the only code that is
used with the Patriot PLGR.
C-6
FM 3-01.87
C-24. The PLGR is located in the curbside utility bay of the RS and on the
turntable pedestal on each launcher. On the RS, the PLGR antenna is
attached to the top of the main antenna array, while on the launcher the
PLGR antenna is attached to the DLU antenna mast support.
C-25. While the PLGR/NFS combination removes the operator from the
survey loop, it is not as simple as turning the ON/OFF switch to ON. There
are some critical time lines that must be understood by the TCO and TCA at
the battery and by the S3, TD, and TDA at the battalion. The time periods for
three requirements listed below must elapse before the WCC will have
location and altitude data for Tabs 81 and 85:
• RS PLGR position fix.
• LS PLGR position fix.
• RS to LS differential distance calculation.
C-26. For the RS PLGR to get a position fix, the PLGR must have power
applied, be in the field of view of three satellites, and receive an approximate
UTM location seed. When these conditions are met, the initial position fix
should be available within five minutes or less. The same conditions and time
apply to the LS PLGR. The radar and launchers must be in "remote" for the
data to be sent to the WCC. To obtain RS to LS differential distance, the LS
and RS PLGRs must have obtained a position fix based on 15 consecutive
position fixes at 18-second intervals. The time to compute this differential
distance is 4.5 minutes.
C-27. The differential distance computation is required because of missile
acquisition and spherical error probable (SEP). SEP applied to measurement
states that 50 percent of the time the measurement is within the error limits.
This also means that 50 percent of the time the measurement is outside the
error limits.
C-28. The launcher emplacement accuracy requirements for Patriot missile
acquisition are that LS locations be within 10 meters in each axis relative to
the RS. The SEP for the PLGR is 10 meters. The radar location is the base for
all relational measurements in the Patriot system. The location error for the
launcher is noted in relation to the radar, see figure C-6. As the PLGR has an
SEP of 10 meters, the UTM location fix received by the PLGR will fall outside
the relative error allowed for missile acquisition half of the time. To ensure
that the UTM location used for the LS is within acceptable error limits, the
WCC will sample the UTM location of each PLGR 15 times, compute the
differential distance, and average these readings to establish the UTM
location of the LS. This process also ensures that the RS and LS PLGRs are
using the same satellite constellation and removes any satellite bias errors.
Tests conducted at Raytheon facilities in Massachusetts and at White Sands
Missile Range (WSMR) using known survey locations established that 15
samples are adequate to ensure the LS location falls within the accuracy
error limits. Factors that effect PLGR location fixes are satellite positions,
masking, vegetation, and buildings. Determination of altitude for the LS,
relative to the RS, uses the same 15 samples consecutively with the location
samples.
C-29. PADS should not be used to confirm the accuracy of the PLGR. Its
accuracy is a function of how accurate the alignment stake is, and whether
C-7
FM 3-01.87
the initialization and operating procedures were followed. Most important is

the relative position between the radar and the launchers. The PLGR
accuracy and the subsequent processing of the PLGR data provide the
necessary relative position accuracy to ensure missile acquisition and conduct
the Patriot mission (Figure C-6).
10-METER LOCATION
ERROR ALLOWED
RADAR LAUNCHER
LOCATION
Figure C-6. Launcher Emplacement Accuracy

C-30. Given these fixed times, a time line that reflects automatic
emplacement can be established. This time line represents the longest time
needed to establish accurate data and should be used as a planning/decision
tool during TACI and K7. The time line assumes that each PLGR is turned
on and has warmed up, the ECS to LS DLT synchronization is established,
and the RS and LS are in remote (Shown in Figure C-7).
GPS SAMPLINGS
4.5
MINUTES
0 5 10 15 20
MINUTES
TAB(s) 85 AUTO
NFS EMPLACEMENT
Tab 91
SPINDOWN COMPLETE
ENTERED,
COMPLETED
Tab 85 (s)
RS TAB 81
ENTERED
PLGR AUTO EMPLACEMENT
INITIAL FIX COMPLETED
(AVERAGE TIME)
Figure C-7. Emplacement Time Line
C-8
FM 3-01.87
C-31. If the ECS transition from TACI to K7 before the relational data for the
LS location and altitude has been established, the sampling process starts
again. To establish a decision point on where to transition from TACI to K7,
the TCA or TCO who enters Tab 85 will record the time that Tab 85 was
entered for each LS. As the TACI process is finished, the TCA or TCO will
review the alerts and recall each Tab 85. If all the LSs have established
location and altitude as indicated by an alert, and Tab 85 has been filled in,
then transition to K7 can occur with all LSs green and ready to fire. If some
or all LSs have not auto-emplaced when TACI is finished, the TCO or TCA
must evaluate the time line to determine how close to completion the
emplacement of each LS is. Mission requirements and the time remaining for
the LS to auto-emplace are key factors in making this decision.
C-32. As a rule of thumb, if more than 8 minutes have elapsed since entry of
Tab 85, the unit should remain in TACI until the LS is auto-emplaced. If less
than 4 minutes has elapsed, the unit should go to K7. Between 4 and
8 minutes require a decision based on the mission and on the number of LSs
auto-emplaced. When Tab 81 and 85 data from PLGR and NFS is filled in,
these tabs must be hard copied and retained in the site data book for that
location. This data can be entered manually to reinitialize the LSs and RS if
the data base is lost. This can only be done if the LSs and RS have not been
moved in horizontal position and if the trainable platforms are returned to
the position where ADR data was derived (for example, mechanical stow).
C-33. To work in the automatic emplacement mode, the PLGR must be
initialized. Initialization is done manually at the PLGR using the front
display and keypad. Entries required are datum code (WGS-84), approximate
location, elevation, Zulu time, and date.
C-34. The following are the cold start procedures for the PLGR:
• Cold start procedure is performed once to initialize the PLGR and
must be redone whenever the PLGR batteries are removed or
replaced. Besides initializing the system, the cold start also includes
loading the appropriate codes.
• Power must be applied and the PLGR must be able to communicate
with the satellites. As it can take up to several hours to complete the
proper initialization, it would normally be performed in the motor
pool before the start of any anticipated use of the system.
• Code load procedure is a stand-alone procedure that will be used
when the system has been previously initialized, but for some reason
has lost its codes. The operator receives a 2 HOURS TO PLGR
CODES EXPIRES alert when the current code is about to expire.
• The SA code expires at 2400 hours Zulu time and the new code is
automatically transmitted by the satellite(s). This new code is
automatically accepted by the receiving PLGR if it is on during the
changeover time.
• If the PLGR is off during the code changeover time, it will attempt to
get the new code when it initially communicates with the satellites.
The operator can determine if the PLGR has the correct code by
noting the mission duration indicator on the PLGR control panel.
C-9
FM 3-01.87
C-35. Once the data is entered, it is retained in memory and is updated by

the data received from the satellites. The datum code is obtained from the
map datum table on the map covering the area of operations (refer to
Appendix F). The map datum is found in the legend of the map and is
normally directly below the scale bars and elevation contour interval
information. The term "horizontal datum" is the same as map datum.
Appendix F indicates that datum code 25 used if the area of operation is
within the continental U.S., the PLGR will always use 47 (WGS-84).
C-36. The AN/PSN-11 PLGR output location and altitude positions are based
on the WGS-84 world model and datum. For Patriot to integrate and pass
track data with other air defense elements and/or joint forces, the track
coordinates must be referenced to the common world model in use. This is
normally the world model of the maps used in the area of operation.
Currently, there are few maps made with WGS-84 world models. During the
initialization sequence, the entry in Tab 81 for world model is obtained from
the map legend for the area of operation. The software in the world model
selected in Tab 81 transforms map datum coordinates from the PLGR and all
coordinates for Tabs 81 and 85, are displayed in the selected world model
coordinates. All FUs will use the same world model. If no world model is
available on the map legend or from other sources, then WGS-84 is used.
C-37. The PLGR has on board BIT. The display unit displays a failure code
and test sequence number when a fault is detected by BIT. Using the failure
code and a fault isolation table in TM 11-5825-291-13, the line replaceable
unit (LRU) most likely to have caused the problem must be sent in for repair
and replaced with a new PLGR.
C-38. The emplacement procedures and crew drills have been modified to
account for crew member requirements to initialize, load, and verify the
readiness of the PLGR system to support an automatic emplacement. For
more information see the RS and ECS crew drills, ARTEP 44-635-13-DRILL
and the LS and missile reload crew drill, ARTEP 44-635-14-DRILL. The RS
and LS emplacement procedures have been modified to include a VERIFY
PLGR A9 OPERATIONAL STATUS paragraphs. These steps ensure that the
PLGR and NFS are ready to support automatic emplacement. The procedures
result in a self-test being performed on the PLGR and NFS and indicate to
the operator if the PLGR has the correct mission code. To retain satellite data
and time when vehicle power is removed, the PLGR has a battery to retain
the memory. The LS6 BA battery is changed semiannually.
NORTH FINDING SYSTEM

C-39. The NFS part of the AE provides the azimuth, roll, and crossroll
information for the RS and each LS. The NFS is also referred to as the
bearing-distance-heading indicator (BDHI).
C-40. The NFS is located adjacent to the PLGR on both the RS and LS. It is a
gyrocompass-based system, which senses the platform attitude with respect
to the earth's true north reference. NFS will determine the azimuth
orientation of the RS or LS over the range of 0 to 6399.9 mils with a ±2.0 mils
C-10
FM 3-01.87
accuracy. NFS provides roll and crossroll measurements within the range of
±100 mils (±5.6o) with an accuracy of ±2.0 mils.
C-41. The NFS provides this azimuth accuracy within the latitude range of
65o South to 65o North (This covers the entire world between the Arctic Circle
in the north and the Antarctic Circle in the south.). The NFS also provides
azimuth data when operating between 65o to 75o South and 65o to 75o North,
but the alignment error will exceed ±2.0 mils. However, this error will not be
greater than a factor of 0.063 per degree when operating in this latitude
range.
C-42. The NFS is required to provide the azimuth, roll, and crossroll data
within 2.5 minutes after an alignment command is received from the WCC.
The normal operating temperature range is between -32o F and +125o F. The
alignment time increases to 8 minutes if operating between -50o F and -32o F.
For proper alignment within the 2.5-minute time frame the NFS must be
seeded with the approximate UTM location of the NFS. This seed occurs
automatically via the WCC when the operator selects automatic
emplacement and enters Tab 91. If the UTM coordinate entered in Tab 91 is
not within approximately 40 kilometers of the actual location, the NFS will
require excessive time in determining accurate azimuth, roll, and crossroll.
C-43. The NFS has a local and remote mode similar to the radar and
launcher. When power is applied to the NFS, it performs a self-test. Upon
successful completion of this test, it reverts to the local mode. The GNIO will
report the NFS as no-go while it is in a local condition. The NFS is
commanded to the remote mode based on actions taken by the ECS or LS
operator. As such, the ECS and launcher operators must ensure that correct
procedures are followed. For example, the inadvertent interruption of power
while the launcher is in the remote mode may result in an erroneous NFS
no-go condition being reported by the status monitor once power is restored.
The following actions will command the NFS to the remote mode:
• During initialization—
– The initial system boot will command RS NFS to remote.
– Entering Tab 85 with AUTO EMPLACE selected will command
that LS NFS to remote.
• During tactical operations—
– Rebooting the system will initiate a remote command that
reinitialize the radar and the launchers NFSs defined in the data
base.
– An actual launcher reorientation will initiate a remote command
to the NFS. A "0" degree slew will not initiate the remote
command.
– Deassigning and then reassigning a launcher via Tab 07 and Tab
85 will initiate a remote command to that launcher's NFS.
– When the ECS detects a launcher mode change from local to
remote, initiate an NFS remote command to that launcher.
C-44. The following procedure can result in a launcher NFS no-go condition if
the NFS is in the local mode. If the launcher is placed into local via the LS
key rather than from the ECS, and then powering down, conditions will be
C-11
FM 3-01.87
established for a subsequent NFS fault. At this point, the ECS would see a
"LSna MODE FAULT" because the LSs are in local, and the ECS has it in
remote. The NFS no-go condition will occur when the LS is powered-up and
placed in remote. At this point, the LS NFS is in local (a no-go condition) and
the ECS will not sense a change from local to remote because it already has
that launcher in remote. Consequently, no NFS remote command will be sent
by the ECS, resulting in an erroneous NFS no-go condition.
C-45. The NFS does not require any adjustment or calibration at the
organizational level. The interface cable for the NFS is hardwired with
jumper wires to provide the correct azimuth, roll, and crossroll orientation
and rotation. This prevents the interchange of RS and LS interface cables for
the NFS.
C-46. The NFS has a built-in self-test that is accomplished within 20 seconds
of power application. BIT will detect 99 percent of the NFS mission-oriented
faults and isolate the malfunction to a battery replaceable unit (BRU). The
NFS BIT is accessible through the maintenance control system (MCS)
diagnostics.
C-47. Caution should be taken when removing the NFS. If an operator is not
familiar with the process, it is easy to mistake the mounting plate bolts for
the NFS mounting screws. The NFS mounting screws are Allen head screws
and require an extended Allen wrench and torque wrench. For further detail
information, refer to TM 9-1430-605-14&P.
AUTOMATIC EMPLACEMENT STATUS MONITOR

C-48. AE tests to the status monitor system are as follows:
• TAN 31 (PAS Control and Data Acquisition).
• TAN 32 (PAS Routine Equipment Monitor).
• TAN 34 (Precise Time of Day and associated status).
C-49. These tans use the RTYPE 111. The control portion of TAN 31 message
sends the PLGR and NFS UTM seed data and selects the mode of operation
for the PLGR and/or NFS. The data acquisition portion of the TAN 31
message retrieves the azimuth, roll and crossroll from the NFS, and the UTM
coordinates and altitude from the PLGR. TAN 32 provides the status of the
GNIO, PLGR, and NFS. The operator can see the results of TAN 32 actions in
the Fault Data Tab, page 4 (Figure C-8), and in the FP Status Tab, page 1
(Figure C-9).
C-12
FM 3-01.87
GPS + NFS STATUS PAGE 4 OF FAULT DATA-S/I
EMPLACE EMPLACE
RS GPS = LS GPS NFS STATUS LS GPS NFS STATUS
RS NFS = 1A 1a
RS EMPLACEMENT 2A 2a
STATUS = 3A 3a
4A 4a
5A 5a
6A 6a
7A 8a
9A 9a
Figure C-8. Fault Data Status Tab S/I, Page 4
FP STATUS PAGE 1 OF 2 S/I
OPERBLTY RS AZ DATA BASE IN USE:

PER GEOREF – –
WCC UTM
RS ALT
DDL MDM UTILIZATION:
IFF SEARCH CONTROL-ABT: – TBM: ODS1 ODS2 EDR
D+C ALTER1:
PAS ALTER2:
DROP LNG RNG: SKEW:
DROP SHT RNG:
Figure C-9. Fire Platoon Status Tab S/I
C-50. While TANs 31, 32, and 34 only apply to the RS, an identical set of
messages and responses apply to the LS via the LAMs/LRMs. This allows the
operator to see the status of each LS PLGR/NFS on page 4 of the Fault Data
Tab. TAN 34 (demand action 14) is used by the system to automatically
obtain the precise time of day and associated status. The TAN 34 is
scheduled at start-up and routinely every 26 major cycles. TAN 34 evaluation
consists of checking equipment status indicators reported in the RTYPE III
RRM.
C-51. The seven alerts that status monitor will place on the queue which
relate to AE are (aaaaaaaa = GO, NO GO, or DEGRADED and aana = RS or
LSna)—
• RS GPS/NFS aaaaaaaa
• HOURS TO GPS CODE EXPIRES
• RS GPS CODE INVALID
• LSna GPS/NFS aaaaaaaa
• LSna GPS CODE INVALID
• aana DO ZERO DEG SLEW-TAB 9
• aana ROLL/CROLL EXCEEDS TOL
C-52. These alerts are self-explanatory except for the last two. During normal
status monitor functions, the NFS is queried on an hourly basis for roll and
crossroll readings on the radar and each launcher. These readings are
compared to the emplacement readings to check for settling. If this hourly
reading exceeds the supplemental error limits of ±2 mils for the RS and
exceeds ±3 mils for the LS, the last two alerts appear. By performing a zero
degree slew, the operator forces the software to update the roll and crossroll
C-13
FM 3-01.87
data for that end item. This feature eliminates the need for crew members to
perform a supplemental roll and crossroll measurement every 24 hours.
Doing a zero degree slew is accomplished by sending the RS or LS from the
current position azimuth to the same azimuth.
C-14
Appendix D
RSOP Requirements
This appendix discusses the requirements to properly move and emplace
the Patriot battalion and battery equipment. The mission of the RSOP
team is to select proper terrain and equipment positions that enable the
Patriot battery to perform its assigned mission. The RSOP team performs
reconnaissance to prepare two primary areas required for any new
location—the fire control area and the launcher area. Additionally, the
RSOP team must designate locations for the battery support element. The
RSOP team directs the PADS survey party to establish the UTM
coordinates, altitude, and orientation azimuths for the RS and each LS.
FIRE CONTROL CONFIGURATION

D-1. The typical emplacement configuration for the fire control section is
shown in Figure D-1. Ensure that the ECS, EPP, AMG, and battery
equipment are situated to the rear of the radar, thereby keeping them out of
the primary and secondary search sectors of the radar set. Data and power
cable lengths limit the distance the RS, ECS, EPP, and AMG can be set
apart. Individual items of equipment should be positioned at maximum cable
length distance from each other, if possible. The radar set must have an
unobstructed field of view along the primary and secondary sectors of fire.
The ECS is positioned to the rear of the radar set and in a concealed area, if
possible, orienting the ECS door away from the radar set to minimize the RF
and noise hazard. Additionally, the ECS is connected by 26-pair cable or field
wire to the battery command post. The AMG is situated to provide
line-of-sight communications to the ICC and adjacent firing batteries. The
AMG, due to its stringent requirement for level terrain, is the most stringent
piece of Patriot equipment to emplace. The AMG must be level within
½ degree in roll altitude and 10 degrees in crossroll. The principal criteria for
position selection are—
• Level terrain of not more than a 10-degree slope.
• Accessibility.
• An area of 30 by 35 meters (100 by 115 feet).
• Radar field of view for PTL and STLs.
• AMG line of sight to the ICC, CRG, or adjacent FUs.
• Cable length restriction of 23 meters (75 feet) from EPP.
• AMG leveled within one-half degree (roll/crossroll).
D-1
FM 3-01.87
PTL
RS
10 METERS
EPP III
8 METERS
ECS
11 METERS
AMG
Figure D-1. Fire Control Emplacement
Table D-1 Patriot System Cable Length
TOTAL LENGTH USABLE LENGTH

CABLE METERS (FEET) METERS (FEET)
POWER (3 TO RS, 1 TO ECS) 23 (75) 19 (60)
RWCIU (ECS TO RS) 37 (120) 30 (100)
EPP CONTROL 23 (75) 19 (60)
AMG (POWER & RF SIGNAL) 23 (75) 19 (60)
LAUNCHER EMPLACEMENT
D-2. A typical launching platoon emplacement for an ABT mission is shown
in Figure D-2. All the launching stations are emplaced within the primary
sector and that at least four launching stations are available if the radar set
is retrained to cover either of the secondary sectors.
D-2
FM 3-01.87
PTL
STL 2 STL 1
TRACK BOUNDARY
SEARCH BOUNDARY
LS LS LS LS
LS LS
LS LS
Figure D-2. Typical Launcher Emplacement for an ABT Mission

D-3. A typical launching platoon deployment scheme with local and remote
launchers for a TBM mission is shown in Figure D-3. If missile reload is to be
conducted at the launching station site, an additional area next to the
launching station is required for the GMT to pull alongside. Remote
launchers must be emplaced close to the PTL and within the remote launch
capability.
PTL
TRACK BOUNDARY
LS LS LS LS
LS LS
LS LS
Figure D-3. Typical Launcher Emplacement for a TBM Mission

D-4. Minimum distance between the RS and local LSs is due to RF hazards.
An area 90 meters around the launching station should remain clear of all
personnel and other equipment because of missile backblast and explosive
safety distances. The terrain for the launching stations should be level with
D-3
FM 3-01.87
the radar or lower in elevation than the radar. Never select terrain that
places the launching stations (local or remote) at a higher elevation than the
radar. Figure D-4 shows the position criteria. The principal criteria for
position selection are—
• An area approximately 6- by 15-meters (20- by 50-feet).
• An additional 10- by 15-meter area to the side of a launcher if missile
reload is planned at the site.
• All LSs deployed within the PTL and at least four launchers in each
STL.
• A backblast area of approximately 90 meters behind the LS, clear of
personnel and equipment.
• An area between the RSs and the local LSs of 120 to 1,000 meters.
• An area between the LSs of at least 90 meters for explosive safety.
• LS locations within ±80 degrees of the PTL.
90 METERS
MISSILE
BACKBLAST
AREA
120 METERS
MINIMUM
FIBER-OPTIC
CABLE
RS
EPP III
ECS
AMG
Figure D-4. Position Criteria
5-POINT INITIAL SEARCH LOWER BOUND DATA

D-5. RSOP team members are responsible for determining the 5-point ISLB
for the RS. Prior to the fire unit emplacing, visibility permitting, use an M2
aiming circle as follows:
• Place the M2 aiming circle over the RS hub, with the recording
motion (azimuth) ring set to 0 mils.
• Using the nonrecording (orienting) motion knobs, point the M2
down the PTL. Note: A lensatic compass is sufficient for
D-4
FM 3-01.87
determining the PTL (remember to convert magnetic north to true

north per the map legend).
• Level the elevation micrometer scale and record the reading if other
than 0.
• Search from 5250 mils to 1150 mils, noting the azimuth and
elevation (positive and negative) of prominent terrain feature, from
the RS location to 10 kilometers in front of the radar. One point on
each side of the search sector can be out of sector, for example,
between the search sector boundary and the 90-degree line.
D-6. Prominent terrain features are defined as follows:
• Positive or negative elevation changes of 4 mils or more. Measured
from level to ground (negative) or from level to the top of terrain
features (positive).
• Terrain feature occupies 160 mils or more in azimuth of the RS
search sector.
• Position of the terrain feature in the sector is also considered.
Getting the ISLB on the top of positive terrain feature at the edges
of the search sector could permit an aircraft coming from the side to
approach the battery without being seen.
• A maximum of 5 points can be entered in Tab 96 (Figure D-5).
POINT 1
PTL
POINT 2 POINT 4 POINT 5
POINT 3
MASKING
M2 aiming circle at RS hub stake aligned to

with record set to zero Mils. Elevation Set to
zero Mils with M2 level.
Figure D-5. 5-Point ISLB
FIBER-OPTIC CABLE DEPLOYMENT (DLU LAUNCHER)

D-7. The RSOP team should deploy fiber optic-cables between the ECS and
the two primary LS positions (if fiber-optic cables are to be used). This allows
the LS emplacement to observe EMCON procedures. Care must be taken to
D-5
FM 3-01.87
route the fiber-optic cables so that vehicle traffic entering the new location
does not damage the cables. When positioning the fiber-optic cables at the LS
location, ensure that the cable remains clear of the backblast area (refer to
Figure D-4). Initially, daisy chaining the fiber-optic cables from the two
primary LSs is acceptable (Figure D-6). As soon as possible, cables should be
run directly to each LS.
PTL
FIBER-OPTIC CABLE
LAID BY LS CREW
LS LS LS
LS LS
LS
LS LS
FIBER-OPTIC CABLE
LAID BY RSOP TEAM
Figure D-6. Arc Layout

D-8. The maximum allowable attenuation of the original optical signal to any
receiving optical equipment is 30 decibels (systems specific). The losses
associated with Patriot optical equipment are as follows:
• FOC (300 meters)—.93 decibels (excludes connector losses).
• Fiber-optic connection—.58 decibels (cable to cable and cable to
bulkhead)
• Master bus unit (MBU) connection—2 decibels--ECS
• Slave bus unit (SBU) connection—2 decibels—two in GEN OFF in
first LS.
• FOC splice—.5 decibel.
Note: SBU connection for the second LS of daisy chain or single LS to
ECS is not included in the loss total.
D-9. Launchers may be employed in any way that will result in no loss of the
30-decibel signal from the ECS to the second launcher in the daisy chain.
Because of the obvious criticality to launcher data, the Patriot manufacturer
recommends that the rules for launcher deployment be based on worst case
signal degradation. The worst case scenario for Patriot launchers in a daisy
chain would be as follows (ECS to LS1 to LS2):
D-6
FM 3-01.87
• Terrain dictates all FOC cables are needed between ECS and LS.
Total cables in the chain are eight.
• All cables have one repair splice. Total cable splices in the chain is
eight.
• LS1 is powered down. SBU optical bypass has been activated (no
electrically repeated signal).
D-10. Using the information provided above, the total attenuation from ECS
to LS2 is 23.24 decibels. System margin is equal to loss budget—system loss.
System margin = 30 - 23.24 decibels = 6.76 decibels.
REMOTE LAUNCHER EMPLOYMENT

D-11. Remote launch phase-1 (RL-1) is a capability that allows LSs to be
formed into groups controlled by an ECS through the DLU and enhances, but
does not replace, capabilities provided by launchers emplaced with fiber-optic
cables. The RL-1 capacility was developed to enhance the TBM defense of an
asset. During defense design, the operator must ensure that the distance
from the controlling RS to the RL1 Launcher Station does not exceed 10 km.
This is a limitation of missile capture effected by 2/3 earth curvature. Figure
D-7 shows the relationship between the local launchers and the remote
launcher group.
GEM
MISSILE
ANTENNA
MAST
VHF
UP TO 10 km
REMOTE
VHF LAUNCHERS
FO
ENGAGEMENT
CONTROL STATION
REMOTE
LOCAL
LAUNCHER LAUNCHER GROUP
Figure D-7. Example of a Remote Launcher Group
D-7
FM 3-01.87
D-12. The RSOP team should deploy remote launchers using the same
emplacement criteria as any launching station. The terrain for the remote
launcher group should be level with the radar or lower in elevation than the
radar and close to the PTL. Select terrain that places the remote launching
stations within line-of-sight of the radar. The principal criteria for position
selection are—
• An additional area to the side of a launcher for missile reloads.
• Launchers deployed close to the PTL and at least two launchers in
each RL-1 group.
• An area between the RSs and the remote LSs of 120 to 10,000 meters.
• An area between the LSs of at least 90 meters for explosive safety.
• Remote LSs must have VHF line-of-sight with the ECS.
• An area that can be defended against ground attack.
D-8
Appendix E
Alternate Alignment Procedures

This appendix describes alternate alignment procedures for the Patriot
battery. It also provides an alternative procedure for aligning the Patriot
equipment without surveyed emplacement data.
MIXED MODE EMPLACEMENT

E-1. The mixed mode emplacement procedure provides a means of entering
launchers data into the fire unit data base. This is a contingency procedure
used when full auto-emplacement cannot be performed during TACI or K7
operations.
E-2. This procedure should not be used as the normal method of operations. It
is emphasized that manual data, which was derived by means other than the
procedure defined below, should not be used to emplace a launcher in an
automatically emplaced unit. The possible sources of error in manually
derived data, coupled with the bias error in the automatic data, make
acquisition of a missile fired from a manually emplaced launcher tenuous.
E-3. The only acceptable data is PADS data that can be mixed with
automatically emplaced radar. Map spot or resection is not acceptable. Strict
compliance with the mixed mode emplacement procedure is necessary to
ensure some confidence of missile acquisition. Normal emplacement
procedures for the launcher must be followed. Mechanical stow is normally
used. If launcher data is to be entered during TACI with an RS automatic
emplacement, then the operator must wait for the final radar location to be
displayed in Tab 81 before starting the mixed mode emplacement procedure.
EMPLACEMENT PROCEDURES
E-4. The following procedures will be used to perform a mixed mode
emplacement:
• At the appropriate time, during TACI or K7 operations, the PADS
vehicle will be backed up close to the curbside utility bay or to the
front of the RS. The reason for this maneuver is to position the PADS
as close as possible to the PLGR antenna mounted on the RS.
• Obtain the automatically derived data (Tab 81) from the site data
book and initialize the PADS using the UTM, altitude, and World
Model information.
• The PADS vehicle may be moved away from the RS once the
initialization data has been entered and when the PADS will allow.
The PADS initialization process may now be completed elsewhere.
This will allow the fire unit to radiate, if needed.
E-1
FM 3-01.87
E-5. Upon completion of the PADS initialization process, the PADS team will
establish a mixed mode reference stake in the battery area (recommend
vicinity of the fire control section). This stake will be used to reinitialize
PADS if mixed mode emplacement is required in the future. This reference
stake is good only for the fire unit that provided the Tab 81 data. Each fire
unit will have its reference stake. Refer to Figure E-1. The RSOP team then
moves to the launcher positions that are to be manually emplaced and
provides normal manual emplacement stakes.
PADS
RADAR
STAKE
REFERENCE
POINT
Figure E-1. PADS Mixed Mode Reference Points

E-6. Once the PADS has been initialized using the automatically derived
radar data, it will then be dispatched to determine the location, altitude, and
north reference for the launchers that are to be manually emplaced. PADS
must provide the location, altitude, and north reference data for the
launchers, which were initialized with the automatically derived radar data.
This will ensure that any PLGR induced bias error has been taken into
account. The data from a mixed mode reference stake can only be used for the
fire unit that provided the Tab 81 data.
E-7. The launcher operators will perform normal alignment procedures using
the M2 aiming circle and the M1 gunner's quadrant. The launcher must be as
level as possible to null the roll and crossroll effect on azimuth. Extreme
caution must be taken when making the M2 and M1 measurements, to
ensure the best accuracy possible. The alignment data generated through the
manual emplacement mode will be recorded on Launcher Location/Alignment
Data: Form-2. It is then provided to the ECS operators for input to the data
base during TACI or K7 operations.
E-2
FM 3-01.87
Note: Only data obtained from the M2 and M1 can be used in the mixed
mode emplacement. Data from the NFS cannot be used in place of M2 and
M1 data. This procedure must be followed when mixing manually and
automatically derived data. Not following this procedure may result in a
reduced probability of missile acquisition.
ROLL AND CROSSROLL TOLERANCES

E-8. When the final position for the RS is determined, the PLGR continues to
interrogate satellites in preparation to support an LS emplacement. The NFS
will not provide azimuth data once the emplacement azimuth has been
defined, but will continue to provide roll and crossroll data once an hour
during tactical operations or whenever a reorientation occurs. If the new
reading exceeds the tolerance (2 mils for the RS or 3 mils for an LS) the
operator receives two alerts. Alert "aana ROLL/CROLL EXCEEDS TOL"
indicates that the RS or LS roll or crossroll tolerances have been exceeded.
The alert "aana DO ZERO DEG SLEW-TAB 9" reminds the operator to
update the data base by means of a zero degree slew. For example, if the alert
LS3A DO ZERO DEG SLEW-TAB 9 appears, the operator will—
• Select Tab 9.
• Observe the current azimuth on LS3A in FROM field.
• Enter 6 in REMOTE CONTROL field for LS to LS azimuth.
• Enter the current azimuth of LS3A in TO field.
• Enter tab.
E-9. This results in a data update to the data base with the new data and an
automatic writes to the data base. If a zero degree slew was performed on an
LS, the operator will select Tab 85 for that LS and hard copy the tab for
inclusion into the site data base book. The NFS will not perform the hourly
roll and crossroll tolerance check for those launchers that were manually
entered, during a mixed mode emplacement, even if the launcher is equipped
with an operational NFS.
MANUAL ALIGNMENT WITHOUT PADS

E-10. These procedures are to be used only without all PADS data. Before
this alignment procedure is used, several critical facts must be considered.
Because of the potential inaccuracies of this alignment method, the Patriot
battery aligned in this manner should operate in the independent
engagement mode. No fire unit to fire unit target correlation through the ICC
will be possible. No triangulation of strobes will be possible. Data should not
be passed between a fire unit emplaced using this method and any other fire
unit or ADA unit. If manual emplacement is to be performed, enter a 0 in
STD EMP TYPE data field in Tab 91.
E-3
FM 3-01.87
FP DATA ACQUISITION MODE SELECT/CONTROL * 91*

(0) = DATA ACQUISITION MODE: (0) STD EMP TYPE: 1 = AUTO 0 = MANUAL
0 = STANDARD EMPLACEMENT ( ) UTM = APPROX RS LOC
1 = LONG TERM REINIT
2 = SHORT TERM REINIT ( ) READ DATA BASE
3 = STANDARD - - - -
EMPLACEMENT WITH - - - -
DATA BASE READ - - - -
- - - -
- - - -
Figure E-2. Tab 91, FP Data Selection Mode
RADAR SET ALIGNMENT

E-11. The radar is the base piece for the battery. It provides the location,
altitude, and azimuth to which all FU launching stations are aligned. To
ensure missile capture at launch, it is critical that the orientation and
alignment of the launching stations are made from the radar data. This
ensures that even if the location of the RS is not exact, its relationship to the
launchers is as exact as possible.
E-12. The UTM coordinates for the radar are obtained using map resection.
The altitude of the radar is determined from the contour lines on the map.
The azimuth of the radar will be obtained by "floating the needle" on the
NREF M2 aiming circle. Azimuth alignment of the NREF M2 aiming circle
must be to true north (Figure E-3). Extreme care must be taken when setting
up the M2 aiming circle at the radar and north reference stake locations to
ensure that the M2 is level.
00
BEARING OF RADAR
TO NORTH REFERENCE
NORTH REFERENCE
4800 0 STAKE
M2
RS
RS
00
M2
RADAR ALIGNMENT STAKE
WITH UTM AND ALTITUDE NREF
BEARING OF
NORTH REFERENCE
TO RADAR
Figure E-3. Radar Set Emplacement
E-4
FM 3-01.87
E-13. Use the most detailed map available. A scale of 1:25,000 is preferable to
1:50,000. When selecting the points on the map that are to be used for the
resection, the points must be visible from the radar location and must have
an angular displacement from each other of at least 45 degrees.
LAUNCHING STATION ALIGNMENT

E-14. Select the location of the launching stations to ensure that line of sight
exists between the launching station M2, the radar, and the NREF M2
(Figure E-4). Provide a means of communications between the radar crew and
the launching station crews to perform the alignment measurements for
input into Tab 85. Because the altitude of the launching station in
relationship to the radar is critical for missile capture, all launching station
altitudes will be measured from the radar altitude reference and taken from
map contour lines.
LS
NORTH REFERENCE
STAKE
BEARING OF LAUNCHER
TO NORTH REFERENCE
M2 BEARING OF
NORTH REFERENCE
TO LAUNCHER
LS
BEARING OF LAUNCHER
TO RADAR SET
M2 M2
RS NREF
RS
Figure E-4. Launching Station Emplacement
RADAR ENTRIES FOR TAB 81

E-15. Do not select Tab 81 before it appears automatically. If the operator
manually selects Tab 81 before it appears automatically, it will not reappear
again until the final display. It automatically appears when the NFS returns
a valid response and the GPS has returned at least one valid response. See
the following entries for Tab 81, Page 1:
E-5
FM 3-01.87
• UTM (obtained from map resection).

• UTM WORLD MODEL (obtained from map legend).
• ALTITUDE METERS (obtained from map contour).
E-16. Tab 81, Page 2, displays the NFS data. The operator during
initialization accepts this data—
• LOCATION DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL (2 for map).
• ALIGNED BY (1 for compass).
• WIND SPEED (as determined)
• EL RDR TO MIR (measured from RS M2).
• BRNG RDR TO NREF (measured from RS M2 EL).
• RDR TO NREF TOP (measured from RS M2 to stadia rod top).
• EL RDR TO NREF BOT (measured from RS M2 to stadia rod
bottom).
• BRNG NREF TO RDR (measured from NREF to M2).
• ROLL (measured from gunner's quadrant).
• CROSSROLL (measured from gunner's quadrant).
RADAR LOCATION/ALIGNMENT DATA Entry PAGE 1 OF 2 *81*
LONGITUDE UTM
DEG MIN SEC E/W ZZHEEEEEENNNNNNN ( )= UTM WORLD MODEL
( ) ( ) ( .) ( ) ( ) 0 = INTERNATIONAL
DEG MIN SEC E/W METERS 2 = 1866 CLARKE
( ) ( ) ( .) ( ) ( ) 3 = WGS-84
4 = EVEREST
IS RS AT EXACT ALIGNMENT AZIMUTH? 5 = BESSEL
( )=1=YES 0=NO, IF NO,REALIGN RS.

(2)=LOCATION DATA CONFIDENCE LEVEL AIMING CIRCLE + GUNNERS
EL RDR TO MIR =( .)
(1)=ALIGNED BY BRNG RDR TO NREF =( .)
0 =SURVEY 1=COMPASS EL RDR TO NREF TOP=( )
EL RDR TO NREF BOT=( )
( )=WIND SPEED BRNG NREF TO RDR=( .)
0 =BELOW GALE 1=GALE + ABOVE ROLL=( .)
( ) MILS = RS EMPLACEMENT AZIMUTH CROSS ROLL=( .)
Figure E-5. Tab 81
E-17. When using manual data entry mode, ensure that A55 and A74 WPN
CONTR AREAS is initially off before making the entries for TAB 85. The
operator will manually input—
• LS NUMBER (number of LS).
• UTM (leave blank).
• METERS ALTITUDE (leave blank).
• DEPLETION PRIORITY (from TSOP).
• BRNG NREF TO LS (measured from NREF M2).
• BRNG LS TO NREF (measured from LS M2).
• BRNG LS TO RDR (measured from LS M2).
E-6
FM 3-01.87
• EL LS TO RDR (measured from LS M2).

• LS ROLL (Measured from gunner's quadrant).
• LS CROSSROLL (measured from gunner's quadrant).
LAUNCHER LOCATION/ALIGNMEN *85*
( ) =LS NUMBER
(0)=LS EMPLACE TYPE 1=AUTO 0=MANUAL
INPUT BELOW IN MILS
( )UTM BRNG NREF TO LS = ( .)
( ) METERS ALTITUDE BRNG LS TO NREF = ( .)
BRNG RS TO RDR = ( .)
( )= DEPLETION PRIORITY ELEV LS TO RDR = ( .)
01=HIGHEST LS ROLL = ( .)
( )MILS=LS EMPLACEMENT AZIMUTH LS CROSSROLL = ( .)
Figure E-6. Map Spot Method
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION
E-18. Simple trigonometric rules explain the emplacement of the radar and
launching station when using this alignment method. The RS location
establishes one corner of a triangle, the NREF stake is another corner, and
the LS is the third corner. The top and bottom elevation readings of the
stadia rod determine the distance between the RS and the NREF stake
(Figure E-7). M2 measurements between the LS and RS, LS and NREF, and
RS and NREF determine the angles of the triangle. Given the known
distance of one side of the triangle and the angles, the WCC can calculate the
UTM coordinates and altitude of the LS in relationship to the RS.
E L E V A T IO N O F R A D A R T O
TO P O F N O R TH R E FE R E N CE
S T A D IA
ROD
M2
RS
NREF
STAKE
E L E V A T IO N O F R A D A R T O
BOTTOM OF NORTH REFERENCE
Figure E-7. Launching Station Emplacement
E-19. The following steps explain the procedure of setting up the M2 aiming
circle for NREF:
1—Set up and center NREF M2 over stake for the NREF M2.
2—Level NREF M2 taking extreme care to ensure M2 is absolutely level.
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FM 3-01.87
3—Determine the declination angle between magnetic north and grid

north from the map legend. If magnetic north is west of grid north,
subtract the declination angle from 6400 mils. If magnetic north is east of
grid north, add the declination angle to 0 mils. Record this reading as
NREF M2 GRID NORTH.
4—Set the azimuth scale and azimuth micrometer scale of the NREF M2
to the NREF M2 GRID NORTH reading determined in step 3.
5—Point the elbow telescope of the NREF M2 in the general direction of
north. Note: The aiming circle magnetic compass should not be used near
iron or steel masses.
6—Unlock the NREF M2 magnetic compass needle.
7—Open the covers over the NREF M2 orienting knobs.
8—While looking through the magnifier, adjusting the orienting knobs
until the magnetic compass needle are centered on the middle reticle.
9—Close the covers on the orienting knobs of the NREF M2.
10—The NREF M2 is now aligned to GRID NORTH.
E-20. Once the NREF M2 has been aligned, the radar M2 is used to
determine the radar azimuth. The crewman will follow the procedures found
in the ECS technical manual TM 9-1430-600-10-1.
TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
E-21. Since M2 aiming circle measurements must be taken from the LS to the
RS, to the NREF, and the NREF to LS, emplacement time for the fire unit
will increase considerably. To ensure LS to RS orientation and alignment is
as accurate as possible, take all M2 readings for each LS twice. If the two sets
of readings differ by more than .5 mils, retake the M2 readings for those LSs.
To ensure the best possible angular measurements, locate the launching
stations as close to the RS as possible while not violating RF hazard and
explosive safety restrictions. If PADS equipment becomes available after
performing these procedures, use the PADS to survey the RS and LS
locations and update Tabs 81 and 85 with survey data.
E-8
Appendix F
Worldwide UTM Conversion Procedures and Tables

This appendix discusses how the US Army uses the Universal Transverse
Mercator (UTM) system as its major reference system for locating field
units. Two methods exist to designate a given position within the UTM
system: UTM numeric grid and UTM letter grid designations. Currently,
all position inputs for the Patriot missile system use the numeric
designation system. Letter grid designations provide an alphanumeric
representation of a given position and is the common method used to
reference a given position from a military map. To ensure that military
maps can be used to input position data into the Patriot missile system,
operators must be able to convert UTM letter grid positions into UTM
numeric positions.
MAPS, WORLD MODELS, AND DATUM

F-1. If the world were flat, navigation would be simple. Every point in the
world could be referenced to the edges of the earth and hence to the edge of
the map. Unfortunately, the world is not a planar surface but is a spheroid-
like object. Things would be much easier if the earth was a perfect sphere. As
navigation and cartography evolved, various astronomers and surveyors
located around the world began to establish map standards. If phones and
satellites had existed, these various mapmakers could have talked and
compared notes, which would have resulted in one map standard. However,
that is not the way history was made. Each surveyor made his measurements
of the earth when developing his maps. Depending on his methods, he
determined the polar or equatorial radius of the earth. Considering these
measurement each surveyor mapped his portion of the world (Tables F-1 and
F-2). As a result, the dimensions of a UTM zone differ from world model to
world model.
F-2. If you lay a map on top of another map of the same area that uses a
different world model, you will notice that the grid lines do not match. The
terrain features do not seem to be in the same place. This is due to the
different starting points for drawing the map. The starting point is called a
datum. Two datum are used when drawing the map. The horizontal datum is
the reference point for the planar measurements and the vertical datum
determines altitudes. The effect of this different datum is significant.
F-1
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Table F-1. Map Datums/Spheroids/Codes

MAP DATUM MAP DATUM CODE MAP DATUM MAP DATUM
SPHEROID SPHEROID CODE
Adindan Clarke 1880 01 Old Hawaiian:
ARC 1950 Clarke 1880 02 Maui Clarke 1866 27
Australian Australian 03 Oahu Clarke 1866 28
Geodetic National Kaui Clarke 1866 29
1966 04 Ordnance Airy 30
Bukit Rirnpah Bessel 05 Survey of
Camp Area International 06 Great Britain International 31
Astro Bessel 07 1936 Unknown 32
Djakarta International 08 Quornog
European 1950 International Sierra Laone Unknown 33
Geodetic Datum 09 1960
1949 Unknown 10 South America: Unknown 34
Ghana Clarke 1866 11 Provisional Unknown 35
Guam 1963 Bessel 12 South Unknown 36
G. Segara Unknown 13 America 1956 Unknown 37
G. Serindung Unknown 14 Corrego Alegre International 38
Herat North International 15 Campo
Hjersey 1955 International 16 Inchauspe Everest 39
Hu-Tzu-Sham Everest 17 Chua Astro Bessel 40
Indian Unknown 18 Yacare Clarke 41
Ireland 1965 Modified Everest Tananarive
Kertau (Malayn Observa- Unknown 42
Revised 19 Tory 1956 Unknown 43
Triangu- Clarke 1880 20 Tirrbalai Unknown 44
lation) 21 Tokyo Unknown 45
Liberia 1964 Clarke 1866 22 Voirol World Geodetic 46
User entered Clarke 1866 23 Special Datum World Geodetic 47
Luzon Unknown 24 (SD):
Merchich Unknown SD, Indian
Montjong Lowe Special
Nigeria (Minna) 25 SD, Luzon
North America Clarke 1866 26 Special
1927 Clarke 1866 SD, Tokyo
CONUS Special
Alaska and SD, WGS-84
Canada Special
WGS-74
WGS-84
Table F-2. Map Legend Information

Spheroid Clarke 1866
Grid 1,000 meter, UTM Zone 13
Projection Transverse Mercator
Vertical Datum National Geodetic Vertical
Horizontal Datum 1927 North American Datum
Example: The equatorial width of an International World Model UTM

zone is 667,980 m and for Clarke 1866 world model the distance is 667,961 m.
This is only a difference of 19 meters. However, the polar length of an
International UTM zone from the equator to the northern most point is
9328380 m and for a Clarke 1866 the distance is 9,327,983 m. This is a
F-2
FM 3-01.87
difference of 397 m. An example illustrates the difference. Building 2 on Fort

Bliss, Texas is located at 31o 48’ 16.9” N latitude and 106o 26’ 8.3” W
longitude. Converting this coordinate into UTM using the Clarke 1866 world
model positions, Building 2 is at 13N3641003519498. Conversion using the
International world model positions it at 13N3640973519737. Comparing the
two points reveals an easting difference of 3 m and a northing difference of
239 m. By using the wrong world model, in this case International, Building 2
is effectively moved north to the middle of Smith-Bliss field. This difference
between UTM maps, when translated into azimuth measurements with
respect to true north also varies from the equator toward the respective poles.
The combined UTM error and azimuth error, if the wrong World Model is
selected, will prevent Patriot units from correlating targets or triangulating
jam strobes.
UNIVERSAL TRANSVERSE MERCATOR OVERVIEW

F-3. To aid in the use of the following UTM conversion tables, this brief
explanation of the UTM system is provided for your information. The UTM
system is based on the tangent to the meridian, rather than the equator, of
the standard mercator projection. It is used for areas of the world between
latitudes 80 degrees south and 84 degrees north. The polar regions, beyond
latitudes 80 degrees south and 84 degrees north, are covered by the universal
polar stereographic (UPS) system, based on the polar stereographic
projection.
F-4. The major UTM grid divides the earth into 60 longitudinal zones (each
zone is 6 degrees in width) and 20 latitudinal rows (each row covers 8 degrees
in latitude). The zones are numbered consecutively beginning with zone 1
(between 180 degrees and 174 degrees west longitude) and proceeding east to
zone 60. Each row within a zone is lettered consecutively, beginning with C
(between 80 degrees and 72 degrees south latitude) and extending to X
(between 72 degrees and 84 degrees north latitude). This particular zone-row
combination isolates a unique 6-degree by 8-degree quadrilateral called a
"grid zone." The grid zone designation consists of a one- or two-digit number
and a letter (See Figure F-1).
F-5. Each zone is divided by the central meridian, which runs North and
South through the center of the zone. A minor grid system of 100,000-m
squares is developed on either side of the central meridian and extends to the
limits of the zone. The eastern and western borders of each 6-degree zone
conform to the meridians, which cut the outermost 100,000-m squares into
partial squares. Each 100,000-m square designation consists of two letters.
Starting with 180 degrees and proceeding east along the equator, the
100,000-m north-south squares are lettered A through Z (Omitting the letters
I and O). The lettering for the east-west squares in the Southern Hemisphere
starts at 80 degrees south latitude and proceeds until the equator is reached.
The lettering for the east-west squares in the Northern Hemisphere starts at
the equator and proceeds northward to 84 degrees north latitude. The
squares, east-west, are lettered A through V (Omitting the letters I and O).
F-3
FM 3-01.87
Figure F-1. Grid Zone Designation

F-6. At this point, a position is isolated within any 100,000-m square on earth
by a zone number (1-60) and three letters. The 100,000-m squares are further
defined numerically in terms of easting and northing. This is the UTM letter
grid designation system (Figure F-2). Common military practice is to use a
shorthand representation, which drops the first three characters from the
complete UTM letter grid designation.
nnaaannnnnn
--- - - - ----- --
| | | | | |_ 100's of m-- northing
| | | | |_____ 100's of m-- easting
| | | |________ 100,000 m grid square designation-- northing
| | |__________ 100,000 m grid square designation-- easting
| |__________________ Zone grid latitude (C to X)
|_____________________ Zone designation (01 to 60)
Figure F-2. UTM Letter Grid Designation
F-4
FM 3-01.87
F-7. Because the 100,000-m square grid designations are defined numerically
in terms of easting and northing, any given position can also be defined with
only numeric designations. Grid designations in the Northern Hemisphere,
the origin of each zone (which is the intersection of the equator and the
central meridian of the zone) is defined as 0 meters northing and 500,000 m
easting. In the Southern Hemisphere, the origin of each zone is defined as
10,000,000 m northing and 500,000 m easting. Therefore, a position may be
defined in UTM numeric designation by specifying the zone, hemisphere,
easting and northing (Figure F-3).
nnheeeeeennnnnnn
--- - ----------- --------------
| | | |________ meters--northing
| | |_____________________ meters-- easting
| |____________________________ hemisphere (N or S)
|_______________________________ Zone designation (01 to 60)
Figure F-3. UTM Numeric Designation
UTM LETTER GRID TO NUMERIC GRID CONVERSION

F-8. Conversion of UTM letter grid coordinates to UTM numeric coordinates
requires converting the 100,000-m grid square easting and northing letter
designations to the equivalent numeric easting and northing. The
equivalency between the two coordinate designations are shown in
Figure F-4. The process to convert easting letter designators to numeric
easting is straightforward. The process to convert northing letter designators
to numeric northing is complicated by the existence of different surveys for
the various section of the earth's surface. These surveys use different
spheroidal approximations for the earth and letter the northing grid
differently. Patriot currently accepts UTM numeric coordinates from the
International, Clarke 1880, Clarke 1866, WGS-84, Everest, and Bessel
spheroids. When entering the following tables, the spheroid of the map used
to obtain the UTM letter grid coordinates must be known (See Figure F-4).
F-5
FM 3-01.87
__________________________ Zone designation (01 to 60)

| ________________________ Zone grid latitude (C to X)
| _______________________ 100,000 m grid square-- easting
| | | ______________________ 100,000 m grid square-- northing
| | | | ___________________ m-- easting
| | | | | ______________ m-- northing
| | | | | |
--- - - - --------- ---------
nnaaannnnnnnnnn UTM letter grid coordinate
---- ----- ----------- ---------
| || \ | |
| | | \___|__ |
| || | \ |
| || | \ |
--- - - --------- --- ---------
n n h e e e e e e n n n n n n n UTM numeric coordinate
--- - ----------- -------------
| | | |________________ m-- northing
| | |_______________________m-- easting
| |__________________________ hemisphere (N or S)
| ____________________________ Zone designation (01 to 60)
Figure F-4. UTM Letter Grid to UTM Numeric Equivalency
F-9. To convert a UTM letter grid coordinate into a UTM numeric coordinate,
follow the procedures indicated here:
• Step 1. Transcribe the zone designation of the UTM letter grid
designation to UTM numeric designation. This number does not
change.
• Step 2. If the coordinate is in the Northern Hemisphere, add N to the
UTM numeric designation; if not, add S (Refer to Figure F-3,
page F-5).
• Step 3. Find the UTM zone designation (left column) in Table 3
(Figure F-5).
• Step 4. Find the 100,000-m grid square--easting letter (center
column) adjacent to the UTM zone designation (Figure F-5).
• Step 5. Find the number in the right column corresponding with the
100,000-m grid letter. Add this number to the UTM numeric
designation (Figure F-5).
• Step 6. Transcribe meters easting (five digits) to the UTM numeric
designation.
• Step 7. (See Figure F-6) Find the grid zone latitude letter in the left-
hand column of Table 1 or 2 (Northern Hemisphere) or Table 4 or 5
(Southern Hemisphere) based on the spheroid for the map sheet being
used.
• Step 8. (See Figure F-6) Find the 100,000-m grid square—northing
letter in the second or fourth column adjacent to the zone grid
latitude letter.
F-6
FM 3-01.87
• Step 9. (See Figure F-6) Find the UTM number in the third column,
which corresponds to the 100,000-m grid letter and add it to the UTM
numeric designation.
• Step 10. Transcribe meters northing (five digits) to the UTM numeric
designation.
F-10. For the following example, refer to Figures F-5, F-6, and F-7. The
conversion of 38RPN7634529560 is taken from a map sheet that uses the
world geodetic system spheroid to UTM numeric. First (Step 1), transcribe
the UTM zone designation (38) of the UTM letter grid to UTM numeric. The
R in 38RPN7634529560 is in the Northern Hemisphere, so N is added to the
UTM numeric (Step 2) which now reads 38N. Looking at Table 3, zone 38 is
found in the second set in the UTM zone column (Step 3). The 100,000-m grid
P (Step 4) corresponds to 6 in the adjacent column, which is added to the
UTM numeric (Step 5) to make it read 38N6. Add the 5-digit easting of 76345
(Step 6) to make it read 38N676345. The grid zone latitude letter is R, so
looking at Table 1 (based on world geodetic system spheroid), we locate the
letter R in the left-hand column (Step 7). The 100,000-m grid square—
northing letter is N. Because the UTM zone (38) is even, the fourth column of
Table 1 is used to locate the letter N (Step 8). Adjacent to the N under the
UTM numeric column is the number 27, which is now added to the UTM zone
designation (Step 9) to make it read 38N67634527. Now the 5-digit northing
of 29560 is added (Step 10) to complete the conversion to UTM numeric which
now reads 38N6763452729560 (see Figure F-7).
F-11. The Worldwide UTM Conversion Tables (Figures F-8 through F-12) are
actual conversion tables used by Patriot. See Figure F-5 for an example of
easting conversions and Figure F-6 for northing conversions.
F-7
FM 3-01.87
Figure F-5. Table 3 Easting Conversions Example
F-8
FM 3-01.87
Figure F-6. Table 1 Northing Conversions Example
F-9
FM 3-01.87
___________________________ Zone designation (01 to 60)

| ________________________ Zone grid latitude (C to X)
| | ______________________ 100,000 m grid square--easting
| | | ____________________ 100,000 m grid square--northing
| | | | ________________ m--easting
| | | | | _________ m--northing
| | | | | |
--- - - - --------- ---------
3 8 R P N 7 6 3 4 5 2 9 5 6 0 UTM letter grid coordinate
--- - - - --------- ---------
| | | \ | |
| | | \___|__ |
| | | | \ |
| | | | \ |
--- - - --------- --- ---------
3 8 N 6 7 6 3 4 5 2 7 2 9 5 6 0 UTM numeric coordinate
--- - ----------- -------------
| | | |________ m--northing
| | |_____________________ m--easting
| |____________________________ hemisphere (N or S)
|_______________________________ Zone designation (01 to 60)
Figure F-7. UTM Conversions
F-10
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Figure F-8. Actual Conversion Table 1
F-11
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Figure F-8. Actual Conversion Table 1 (continued)
F-12
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F-13
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F-14
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F-15
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F-16
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F-17
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F-18
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F-19
Appendix G
Fix-or-Fight Criteria
This appendix contains fix-or-fight guidance for planners, S3 officers, and
ICC and ECS crews. This guidance is generic in nature and is not
intended to be the sole source of information used in the decision-making
process for fix-or-fight. Leaders must also consider the mission at hand.
In addition, test action numbers (TANs), which accompany status monitor
faults, require analysis by the system maintenance technician to
determine the true operability of the system.
FIX-OR-FIGHT GUIDANCE
G-1. The fix-or-fight guidelines and synopsis provide guidance to the tactical
control officer and the tactical director in deciding the appropriate response
to system failures during combat. The objective of fix-or-fight guidance is to
allow units to continue to fight as long as possible and logically, despite
system failures.
SCOPE
G-2. Fix-or-fight guidelines take effect when the unit is ordered to Battle
Stations. In the training environment, fix-or-fight guidelines are used when
the unit is ordered to assume Blazing Skies. Patriot's status monitor and
built-in test equipment conduct frequent checks on Patriot's many functions.
Whenever the results of a test action are outside established engineering
parameters, an appropriate indicator is given to the operator through the
display and control console and the fire unit status panel in the engagement
control station. The appropriate indicator and alert are presented as soon as
possible.
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

G-3. The fix-or-fight decision process consists of three elements. An initial
decision is made by the TCO when presented with fault indications. The TD
at the battalion FDC conducts a review. An analysis and review by the
battery and battalion system maintenance technician are also required.
Tactical Control Officer Actions

G-4. When presented with an equipment fault alert, the TCO will display and
make a hard copy of the operational assessment, fault data, and fire platoon
status tabs. The TCO notes the set of fault indicators and makes an initial
decision to continue air defense operations or to run diagnostics based upon
the guidance of the fix-or-fight guidance in Table G-1. The TCO immediately
notifies the TD of the fault indications present and of the initial fix-or-fight
decision. The TCO informs the battery system technician of the situation,
G-1
FM 3-01.87
requiring an immediate assessment of the fault indications and review of the

decision. The TCO furnishes all amplifying information on the residual
capabilities to the TD as it becomes available.
Table G-1. Fix-or-Fight Synopsis
STATUS MONITOR INDICATIONS RECOMMENDED COMMENTS
ACTION
HANG or CRASH MUST FIX Must fix if rebooting does not clear the
problem.
RS ISOLATED (Alert) MUST FIX Must fix if rebooting does not clear the
problem.
Reorientation – NO-GO MUST FIX Radar indicated azimuth is probably
wrong.
Radar search ABT–NO-GO Targets, which may appear on CRT, can
Radar search TBM–NO-GO be engaged if they are stable and if the
Radar track ABT–NO-GO DECISION fault data tab does not display TVMAP or
Radar track TBM–NO-GO RTG.
Missile guidance–NO-GO
If TVMAP or RTG (or both) are indicated,
Missile guidance–NO-GO DECISION the unit can be used to support ICC
Radar track ABT–NO-GO triangulation only.
Radar track TBM–NO-GO
Radar search TBM–NO-GO DECISION RTG unable to support the TBM mode.
Radar search ABT–DEGRADED System can be used for ABT mode.
Radar track ABT–DEGRADED
Missile guidance–DEGRADED
If TVMAP or RTG, no guidance available.
Missile guidance–NO-GO DECISION A unit without guidance may support BN
surveillance if radar search and tracking
equals DEGRADED or GO.
If FAULT DATA Tab indicates TVMAP,
Missile guidance–DEGRADED DECISION guidance capability is reduced. If the fault
data tab displays TVMCP, guidance
capability against jammers is reduced.
All other indicators FIGHT Notify the ICC and battery CP.
Tactical Director Actions

G-5. Upon notification of the fault indications on the status monitor the TD
checks the fix-or-fight criteria in Table G-1. The TD will review the
fix-or-fight decision from the battalion commander's perspective and will
consider the following:
• Apparent residual air defense capabilities of the battery.
• Overall equipment status of the battalion.
• Tactical situation and the battalion's need for the subject battery's
residual capability to support the tactical situation.
• Estimated time available to conduct diagnostics and corrective
maintenance before the air battle. The TD will consult with the
battalion system maintenance technician as required and
recommend the continuation or changing of the initial fix-or-fight
decision to the battalion commander or his/her representative.
G-2
FM 3-01.87
System Maintenance Technician

G-6. Upon notification of a fight-or-fix decision, the system maintenance
technician should report to the engagement control station as soon as
possible. The senior maintenance technician (SMT) will gather and analyze
all available fault indications. He will also assess the problem and the impact
of the problem on the air defense mission and the system's residual
capabilities. The SMT will then recommend a course of action as soon as
possible to the TCO.
CATEGORIES OF RESPONSES
G-7. Status monitor and built-in test equipment provide an extensive amount
of equipment status information to the operator. Much of the equipment
status information, however, is not tactically significant during wartime
conditions. Therefore, fix-or-fight guidance, considering that an operator
must make prompt decisions in response to fault indications during air
battle, is drawn from tactically significant fault indicators. Fix-or-fight
categorizes the tactically significant faults into response categories of must
fix, decision, and fight. There is a subset of the fight category, fight-while-fix,
in which the fault can be corrected without interrupting the air defense
artillery operations.
MUST FIX
G-8. During tactical operations, the operator must evaluate fault indications.
With some software failure indications the operator determines the “must fix”
conditions. For example, if there is no system residual capability and initial
immediate operator corrective actions do not clear the fault, the system must
be fixed.
System Hang or Crash During Normal Operations

G-9. A system hang or crash could result from a software failure or from an
electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Normally, the operator will immediately
attempt to reload the software. If unsuccessful, a decision to fix must result.
One condition that can result in the inability to recover from a hang or crash
is a fault in the weapons control computer or the tactical data base storage
and recovery device, which becomes a necessary fix situation. In addition, a
fault condition may occur where displayed data becomes so erratic that the
operator realizes the data is unreliable.
Reorientation No-Go
G-10. A reorientation no-go fault is a serious system fault that will not permit
correct system operation. This fault occurs when an attempted reorientation
has failed. The result is that the north reference is lost. Actual target
positions are probably in error although they appear to be normal on the
situation display. Missile acquisition may not be possible, and the system
cannot support battalion operations.
G-3
FM 3-01.87
Radar Set Isolated

G-11. When RADAR SET ISOLATE alert occurs, this means there are no
data communications between the weapons control computer and the radar.
The operator should attempt to reestablish that data link by depressing the
RADIATE-DISABLE switch-indicator. If the failure persists, he should reload
the software. If the failure still persists, the problem must be fixed.
DECISION
G-12. The fault indications in this category do not mean there is no residual
air defense capability retained. Neither do these faults mean that sufficient
residual capability exists relative to the air defense mission that a fight is
automatically made. Fault indications in this category require a quick
correlation between the operational assessment tab, target symbology, and
the fault data tab information.
Search No-Go
G-13. In most cases, a search no-go in the operational assessment tab
indicates that the status monitor has detected a condition that prevents
successful search and track operations. However, these fault indications can
be generated by conditions that do not effect the full envelope of the system's
capabilities to search and track. The operator should correlate his operational
assessment tab indication with the presence and stability of target symbology
on the scope. If all or some of the same target symbols are still displayed and
if they are stable, the operator should continue engagements. In case of
continued operations, the operators should be aware that some targets within
the battery's radar coverage might go undetected. In such cases, the TD
should use the adjacent batteries' overlapping coverage in the affected sector
to manually oversee the sector.
Track No-Go
G-14. A track no-go indication in the operational assessment tab normally is
accompanied by a search no-go. The same guidance and rationale for a
decision apply for a track no-go indication as they do for a search no-go.
Missile Guidance No-Go

G-15. There are two sets of conditions that can generate a missile guidance
no-go in the operational assessment tab. First, missile guidance is never
assessed at a level higher than the radar set search and track capabilities.
Therefore, every time a radar search or track no-go condition is displayed,
missile guidance no-go will be displayed whether or not any fault exists in the
guidance system. The absence of actual guidance problems is verifiable by
displaying the fault data tab. If TVM-AP is absent from the fault data tab
display then the system should be used to engage those eligible stable targets
that continue to be displayed. The other set of conditions that can generate a
missile guidance no-go are TVM-AP receiver faults. This condition is
indicated by TVM-AP being displayed on the fault data tab. In this case, no
G-4
FM 3-01.87
residual missile guidance capability exists and the only decision remaining is
whether or not to retain the battery for surveillance support to the battalion.
Missile Guidance Degraded

G-16. An operational assessment tab indication of missile guidance degrades
can be generated by varying degrees of equipment failures that might result
in increased miss distance. When TVM-CP is displayed in the fault data tab,
missile guidance performance against jamming targets will be significantly
reduced and the battery should not be used to engage jammers. The battery
can be used to engage triangulated jammers, but if the triangulation support
is lost during the engagement, the missile will most likely be ineffective.
Therefore, another battery should be selected, if possible, to engage jamming
aircraft. The affected battery can still engage quiet targets effectively, as long
as the targets remain as quiet targets. If TVM-AP is displayed in the fault
data tab together with missile guidance degrade in the operational
assessment tab, some guidance degradation may exist. The high lethality
envelope might be smaller. However, that the problem was not assessed as a
no-go signifies that the problem is not grave. Therefore, the affected battery's
firepower should be used, if needed.
FIGHT
G-17. All other status monitor indicators fall into this category. These faults
vary in impact upon the air defense mission from no adverse effect to
moderate impact. However, the faults in this category are such that the
battery should be used, if needed. In many cases, system contingency modes
or redundancies compensate for the lost capability. In other cases, some
capability is lost and there is no backup, but the fire unit can still make
significant contributions to the battalion's conduct of the air battle.
Search and Track Degrade

G-18. A degrade in either search or track can result in modification of the
normal search and track envelopes for the system. The system is expected to
retain all of its functional capabilities within the reduced envelope. Targets
under track are expected to be reliable. However, there may be targets within
the search coverage that are not displayed (these would be at longer ranges).
Target Evaluation Degrade or No-Go

G-19. A target evaluation degrade in either search or track can result in
modification of the normal search and track envelopes for the system. The
system is expected to retain all of its functional capabilities within the
reduced envelope. Targets under track are expected to be reliable. However,
there may be targets within the search coverage area that are not displayed.
Target Identification Degrade or No-Go

G-20. A target evaluation degrade or no-go is usually associated with a
display error. Distortions on the situation display may confuse the operator,
G-5
FM 3-01.87
and manual switch actions may require repetition. Such faults should be
apparent to the operator. If the condition seriously hampers the operator, his
tasks can be transferred to the other display console.
G-21. Target identification faults refer to the IFF system. Since other means
for target identification exist, these faults would result in a decision to
continue operations for as long as contingency identification exists.
Contingency modes include—
• Alternate IFF modes in instances where the identification fault
applies to only a single mode of the IFF system.
• Told-In target identification from higher echelons.
• Passive identification via the automated track history comparison to
the passive criteria initialized in the tactical data base.
Reorientation Degrade
G-22. This condition indicates that the radar set azimuth is different from
expected. It can occur following maintenance, in which the radar set was
rotated manually. It can also occur following a radar set retrain command in
which the radar set failed to achieve its expected azimuth within two degrees.
The system can normally be used if the current azimuth satisfactorily covers
the assigned search sector. Otherwise, reorient the radar set to the desired
azimuth.
Optical Disk CD-ROMs

G-23. The tactical storage media contains the software programs and the
local site dependent data base. The tactical storage media faults can result in
the system being unable to restart, reorientation, or perform system
diagnostics. The FU tactical storage media contains the diagnostic and
operational software. The TPT replacement (TPTR) tactical storage media
contains the TPT data base/scenario replacement sets. The TPT library
(TPTL) disk contains the data base/scenario library sets, and the final
tactical storage media contains the data collection. A fault in the FU tactical
storage media prevents both a rapid reloading and system reorientation.
FIGHT-WHILE-FIX
G-24. This category is a subset of the fight category. The only difference
between the two is that faults in this category can be corrected without
interrupting the battery from its conduct of the air defense mission.
C-E Faults
G-25. C-E faults are degrades and no-gos in the UHF communications system
as shown by the communications indicator on the fire unit status panel.
These faults can be due to breakdowns of individual links within the network
and can be repaired while the net is operational. If the fault is serious enough
to result in a no-go, the battery can continue to fully support search, track,
and guidance in an autonomous mode.
G-6
FM 3-01.87
Launching Station Low Fuel

G-26. The launching station low fuel warning indicates two hours or less of
fuel for the generator. Refueling of individual launching stations is
accomplished while the remainder of the system continues operations.
Hot Missile Count

G-27. The hot missile count can drop due to missile launcher failure or
missile failure. Reload or missile replacement is accomplished while the
remainder of the battery continues operations.
Launching Station No-Go

G-28. Launching station corrective maintenance and missile reload is
performed without interruptions to the remainder of the battery's operations.
If the indication is a digital data link red indication for all activated
launchers, the problem is most likely in the data link terminal at the
engagement control station. Otherwise, only those launching stations
displaying DDL RED require maintenance and the remainder can be used to
support engagements.
FAULT ALERT FILTER USE

G-29. To minimize the impact of intermittent fault alerts on the tactical
operations, a switchable filter is incorporated into the system. Only faults
that are intermittent can be filtered, that is, those faults detected through
routine, cyclic status monitor activity. The filter is enabled and disabled by
means of the EQUIP CONTR switch-indicator on the display console.
ENGAGEMENT CONTROL STATION

G-30. Only radar faults that are intermittent can be filtered. Those faults
that are detected through routine or cyclic status monitor activity. The filter
is enabled or disabled by means of the EQUIP CONTR S/I on the display
console. If both EQUIP CONTR switch-indicators are on, then the fault alert
filter is disabled and intermittent faults are not reported. If both S/Is are off
then the filter is enabled. The TCO will report all radar faults immediately
upon initial detection. If the EQUIP CONTR S/I is on at only one manstation,
that operator is responsible for reporting the faults immediately. When the
filter is enabled, radar faults that are stable for three minutes are reported.
Not all faults are filtered by activation of the EQUIP CONTR S/I. Failures to
items other than the radar set will continue to be detected, and status
displays will be updated to report these faults. Radar set failures that are
associated with specific events, such as an RU AZIMUTH FLT generated by a
reorientation attempt, will continue to be reported.
INFORMATION AND COORDINATION CENTRAL

G-31. At the ICC, use of the EQUIP CONTR switch-indicator (S/I) causes
fault alerts to be displayed at one, both, or neither console. Enabling and
disabling of the filter is performed in the same manner as the engagement
G-7
FM 3-01.87
control station (ECS). Before conducting the air battle, the filter should be
disabled (EQUIP CONTR S/I on) to direct alerts to manstation one, since the
TDA is a trained maintenance person and able to interpret and assess a
majority of the alerts. During the conduct of the air battle, the filter should
be enabled (EQUIP CONTR S/I off) at both manstations so that the number
of alerts is reduced.
EXECUTING THE DIAGNOSTICS

G-32. If the air defense mission permits, the diagnostic software should be
run every 24 hours, particularly for the radar. Status monitor and diagnostics
have complimentary strengths. Status monitors thoroughly monitor the
system over the region of the performance envelope used at any given site.
Those portions of the envelope not used at the site may have faults that will
go temporarily undetected by status monitor and remain dormant.
G-33. Dormant faults are faults that are not apparent and which may remain
undetected until either a specific function is required, a subsequent fault
occurs, or a maintenance procedure or functional check is carried out.
G-34. Daily execution of diagnostics will virtually guarantee that no dormant
faults exist. The diagnostics test the system for both mission-essential and
non-mission-essential faults. Periodically running the diagnostics will provide
the user with a record of any failing tests in non-mission-essential hardware
that may prove useful in troubleshooting status monitor detected faults in
mission essential hardware. The diagnostics also cover the performance
envelope independent of site specific conditions. These strengths, when
coupled with status monitor's ability to test the system dynamically, provide
essentially complete coverage for all fault conditions.
G-35. When warranted, field bulletins may be issued to identify specific
recommendations on areas where diagnostic results should be considered
part of the fix-or-fight criteria. Status monitor in the next fielded software
build will cover these areas.
G-8
Appendix H
BATI and TACI Flowcharts

This appendix contains BATI and TACI flowcharts that provide the
operator with a summary of PDB-4 system initialization and a listing of
tabs that are displayed as figures in the manual. These charts are
intended to provide a quick reference for ECS and ICC operators. The
charts consist of the following:
• BATI sequence (Figure H-1).
• ICC recovery sequence (Figure H-2).
• Retrieve and compare FP data (RCFD) sequence (Figure H-3).
• Patriot deployment and command planning sequence (Figure H-4).
• TACI sequence (Figure H-5).
• Tab reference table (Table H-1).
H-1
FM 3-01.87
AUTOMATIC
INITIALIZATION
TAB
TAB 13 MODE CNTL SEQUENCE
START (CHANGE ICC MODE) TAB 90 TAB 40
SELECTIONS TAB 58 TAB 43
TAB 01 TAB 54
0 = RECOVERY 1 = INITIALIZATION
TAB 06 TAB 70
TAB 10
SEE TAB 71
FIGURE
H-2 TAB 14 TAB 74
TAB 50 INITIALIZATION
CONTROL
(SELECT INITIALIZATION MODE) TAB 76
SELECTIONS
TAB 78
1 = AUTO DATA TAB 79

INPUT CONTROL
0 = MANUAL DATA
INPUT CONTROL 2 = RETRIEVE & COMPARE ENTER
FPS DATA (RCFD) TAB
3 = DEPLOYMENT SEE
ENTER
TAB 00 TAB INDEX PLANNING TAB FIGURE
(HOOK TAB NUMBER) F-3
4 = DATA INPUT
SEE
COMPLETE
FIGURE
INITIALIZATION F-4
TABS (LISTED AT ENTER TAB ALLOWS
RIGHT) ARE TRANSITION TO TAC
DISPLAYED AS OPS BY PRESSING
SELECTED BY ENGAGE CONTR
OPERATOR FOR SWITCH INDICATOR
DATA ENTRY DATA BASE CONT
REVIEW TABS ARE ENTER TAB. TAB 50
ALSO SELECTED IS DISPLAYED
VIA KEYBOARD TAB 98 W / INITIALIZATION
(SEL TAB ## SEL MODE = 3
TAB)
TAC OPS
TAB 2, BN
COMMUNICATIONS
TAB SELECTION CONFIG CNTL
VIA KEYBOARD (ALLOW EXTRA BN FINISH
COMMO)
Figure H-1. BATI Sequence
H-2
FM 3-01.87
TAB 13 MODE CONTROL Note: With RECOVERY selected in

START Tab 13 the system automatically
(CHANGE ICC MODE) reads the data base from the ODS
tape (or selected tape drive). If
SELECTIONS
DATA BASE READ is
unsuccessful, a BN DATA BASE
TAPE BAD alert is displayed.
0 = RECOVERY
ENTER TAB. “DATA

BASE COMPLETE”
1 = INITIALIZATION
ALERT IS DISPLAYED
TAB 06 IS DISPLAYED
TAB 6 IFF/SIF CONTROL
SEE
FIGURE
H-1 ENTER TAB
PRESS “ENGAGE CONTR”
SWITCH TO TRANSITION
TO TAC OPS
TAC OPS
OPERATOR SELECTS
TAB 02 VIA KEYBOARD
(SEL TAB 02 SEL TAB)
TAB 02 COMM CONTROL
RE-ESTABLISH EXTRA BN
COMMUNICATIONS AND FINISH
ENTER TAB
Figure H-2. ICC Recovery Sequence
H-3
FM 3-01.87
TAB 50
START Initialization CNTL
(Select initialization mode)
Data Conflicts Data Conflicts
TAB 74 TAB 78
2 = Retrieve and
compare FP data
Data Conflicts Data Conflicts
TAB 73 TAB 79
TAB 90 Data Collection
Required data: Data Conflicts

TAB 58 BN Geographic BNSCC, DLRP, TAB 71
Data parameters Repeat RCFD
and north
steps 2 and 3 repeated
reference.
Data Conflicts for all remaining
Enter TAB TAB 70 responding Patriot
Displays TAB 67 batteries
Required data: BN ID, Data Conflicts

TAB 67 RLRIU address, set #, TAB 6
BN Comm Control and 1st & 2nd
ATDL-1 address.
ALL DATA BASES COMPARED
alert displayed. Tab 12
Enter TAB
automatically displayed
Displays TAB 68
showing netted FPs
Required data:
FP type HAWK ATDL
TAB 68 TAB nn DATA CONFLICT:
address, link station
FP Comm Control FP j.k alert is displayed.
and modem # (for TAB 12 FP
HAWK only). All conflicts between data bases Locations/
printed out on HCU on a tab Boundaries - BN
by tab basis
Enter tab begins RCFD
SEL TAB, SEL TAB

RCFD STEP 2 displays TAB 50
initialization function
FP DATA BASE INCOMING RCFD STEP 3 set to 1 (automatic
RCFD STEP 1 and
Communications are data input control)
FP n INCOMING DATA BASE The data base
initialized with all XFER COMPLETE alerts are received from the
available Patriot batteries. displayed as each battery next responding
Data base requests are sent responds -or- incoming data Patriot battery is
from the ICC. The data base XFER failed alert then compared to
retrieved from the 1st displayed when FP defined the data base from TAB 50
responding battery is stored. in Tab 68 does not respond the 1st responding
Initialization CNTL
to ICC request for data Patriot battery
XFER (data buffer XFER from
next battery is then requested)
If communications cannot be established with any

FP, the alert NO FPs AVAILABLE is displayed FINISH
and Tab 50 is redisplayed.
Figure H-3. Retrieve and Compare FP Data (RCFD) Sequence
H-4
FM 3-01.87
REQUIRED DATA: Active

TAB 50 TAB 51 DEPLOYMENT deployment (if defined),
3 = DEPLOYMENT deployment for planning
START INITIALIZATION CONTR0L
CMD PLANNING
CMD PLANNING CNTL
(SELECT INITIALIZATION MODE) (SELECT DEPLOYMENT FUNCT) and planning mode (new
plan, change plan and
review plan).
All deployment functions are available
for selection in Tab 51 review plan mode
Function 01 is not selectable in

new plan. Performing function REQUIRED ENTRIES: Asset ID,
forces completion of function 05. status, center and radius.
ENTER TAB
TAB 70
01 = ASSET MODIFICATION REDISPLAYS
ASSETS DATA ENTRY
TAB 51 ENTER TAB
REDISPLAYS
Function 02 is not selctable in REQUIRED ENTRIES: Volume ID, TAB 51
new plan. Performing function status, boundary points or
forces completion of function 06. center/radius, and attributes.
SEL TAB-TWICE
TAB 71
02 = VOLUME MODIFICATION REDISPLAYS
VOLUMES DATA ENTRY
TAB 51
TAB 02
REQUIRED ENTRIES: In TAC OPS CMD REQUIRED ENTRIES: FP type, COMM CONTROL
Function 03 is required in new plan. plan, disallow commo with affected HAWK ATDL address link
Performing function may force units. Display only in initialization. REQUIRED ENTRIES: In TAC
station and modem number.
completion of functions 04 and 08. OPS or CMD PLAN, reallow
TAB 02 TAB 68 FP commo to units affected
03 = COMM DATA BASE units. In Initialization, tab for
COMM CONTROL COMM CNTL
display only.
ENTER TAB ENTER TAB

ENTER TAB ENTER TAB
displays redisplays
displays Tab 67 displays Tab 69
Tab 68 Tab 02
REQUIRED ENTRIES: BN ID TAB 69

TAB 67
LTR, RLRIU address set #, and EXTRA-BN
1st and 2nd ATDL-1 addresses. BN COMM CNTL
COMM CONTROL
Function 04 is required in new plan. REQUIRED ENTRIES: FP TYPE,

Performing function may force UTM LOCATION, ANC, PTL
completion of functions 05, 06 and 08. (Patriot batteries only)
04 = FP DEPLOYMENT TAB 59 FP DEPLOYMENT PLNG
Function 05 is required in new plan. REQUIRED ENTRIES: excess assets

Performing function may force and excess active assets must be
completion of functions 05, 06 and 08. deassigned from the FP.
05 = ASSET ALLOCATION TAB 70 ASSETS DATA ENTRY
REQUIRED ENTRIES: Excess volumes/points

Function 06 is required in new plan. must be deassigned from FP with alert
function selectable in change plan. EXCESS GEODATA.
ENTER TAB
06 = VOLUME ALLOCATION TAB 61 VOLUMES ALLOCATION REDISPLAYS TAB 51
FUNCTION 07 IS NOT REQUIRED IN

NEW PLAN, BUT IS SELECTABLE IF
NEEDED. FUNCTION SELECTABLE
IN CHANGE PLAN. REQUIRED ENTRIES: None.
07 = ALTERNATE SECTORS TAB 55 ALTERNATE SEARCH SECTORS
Function 08 is required in new plan. REQUIRED ENTRIES:

Function selectable in change plan. ICC location and CRG location.
08 = ICC/CRG DEPLOYMENT TAB 62 ICC/CRG DEVELOPMENT
00 SELECTION IS NOT ACCEPTED In initialization mode: TAB 50

UNLESS ALL DEPLOYMENT redisplays Tab 50 FINISH
FUNCTIONS ARE COMPLETE
INIT CONTROL
00 = DEPLOYMENT
INPUT COMPLETE In TAC OPS/CMD plan enables transition to TAC
OPS via ENGAGE CONTR 3/1. Data base tape TAC OPS
written upontransition to TAC OPS
Figure H-4. Patriot Deployment/Command Planning Sequence
H-5
FM 3-01.87
TABS
ALERTS
TAB 91
START DATA ACQUISITION
DATA ACQUISITION
STANDARD NO
Notes:
EMPLACEMENT
1. Auto emplacement of LS will
only start if LS is in remote.
2. Alert may appear earlier. YES
Entry of Tab 98 only allowed
if RS has completed auto
emplacement. MANUAL
EMPLACEMENT
3. Alerts may occur earlier. TYPE
AUTO
RS STARTS
NOTE 1
AUTO EMPLACING
TAB 81
FP LOCATION
ALIGNMENT DATA
RS AUTO EMPLACING
COMPLETE TAB 81
FP LOCATION
ALIGNMENT DATA
TAB 14
TARGET DISPLAY CONTROL
TAB 68
ENTER COMM CNTL DATA DATA COMMUNICATIONS
CONTROL
TAB 99
FP DATA TRANSFER
CONTROL
TAB 54
CONTINUED
ENTER RADAR CNTL DATA RADAR FREQUENCY
NEXT PAGE
CONTROL
Figure H-5. PDB-4 TACI Sequence, Page 1
H-6
FM 3-01.87
ALERTS TABS
CONTINUED FROM
PREVIOUS PAGE
START YES
SEQUENCE
SET WEAPON CNTL S/1
NO
ENTER RS AZ COMMAND
TAB 95
CHECK ACTUAL RS AZ RADAR MAPPING
CONTROL SUMMARY
SOUND ALARM
BEFORE RADIATING
TAB 96
ENTER TERRAIN INITIAL SEARCH LOWER
MAP CNTRLS BOUNDARY DATA ENTRY
TAB 97
SELECT ENTRY
MAPPING DISPLAY/CONTROL
TAB 92
DRAW MASKED AREAS MAP MASKED AREAS ALLOWS FOR TAB 55 CHANGES
DRAWING CONTROL
MASKED AREA MAP COMPL TAB 55

ALTERNATE SEARCH
ENTER ALT SEARCH CONTL SECTOR CONTROL
TAB 85
ENTER FIDOC DATA LAUNCHER LOCATION
ALIGNMENT
TABs 1, 6, 70, 71, 72, 73, TAB 06

74, 76, 78, 79, 80 IFF/SIF CODE CONTROL
END MANUAL INPUT TAB 98

WITH TAB 98 MANUAL INPUT COMPLETE?
YES
NO
NOTE 2: RS auto emplacement WRITE OR REVIEW
complete TACI DATA BASE
EMPLACEMENT
NOTE 3: LS na auto emplacement TYPE ACK ACR
complete AUTO WRITES DATA BASE
MANUAL
TAB 81
HARD COPY LS na DATA TAB 85
AUTO HARD COPY
Figure H-6. PDB-4 TACI Sequence, Page 2
H-7
FM 3-01.87
Table H-1. Tab Reference Table

TABS PAGES TABS PAGES
0 2-57 68 2-33, 2-78, I-5
1 2-9, 2-91, 3-77 69 2-34, 2-36
2 2-55, 4-11 70 2-16
4 3-92 71 2-19, I-15
5 2-57, 2-58 72 2-22
6 2-11, 2-90 73 2-24
10 2-13 74 2-25
12 2-63, 3-16 76 2-26, 3-104
13 2-5 78 2-26
14 2-15, 2-77 79 2-29
15 3-88 81 2-65, 2-73, 2-74, E-6
50 2-6 85 2-65, 2-87, E-7
51 2-30 90 2-7, 2-67
54 2-80 91 2-64, E-4
55 2-51, 2-85 92 2-84, B-14
58 2-8 93 B-7
59 2-49 95 2-81, B-2
61 2-50 96 2-82, B-3
62 2-52 97 2-83, B-4
67 2-32 98 2-55, 2-90
99 2-80
H-8
Appendix I
Task Organization With Hawk

This appendix provides the technical details necessary for a sound tactical
understanding of the interoperability between Patriot and Hawk units.
When Hawk is task-organized with a Patriot battalion, ICC operators
have an array of hardware and software configurations, communications
options, tab settings, and capabilities available for interoperability. The
ICC crew's ability to master system requirements in a task organization
with a Hawk environment is crucial to the combat success of the entire
task force. The classified material in this appendix pertaining to task
organization with Hawk will be found in (S/NF)ST 44-85-1A(U), which
contains the classified values referenced by a code number in bold and
underlined (example: P4-123).
ENGAGEMENT OPERATIONS
I-1 Patriot hardware and software ease the complexity of engagement
operations in a Patriot pure battalion. Incorporating Hawk into a Patriot
battalion provides tactical flexibility but requires battle crews to understand
the elements of the technical interface between Hawk and Patriot. Though
initializing and maintaining engagement operations in a Patriot/Hawk task
force is complex, Patriot software capabilities provide planners and crew the
capability to design and execute effective task force operations.
I-2. The design of the TF allows Patriot ICC operators to control Hawk Phase
III to reduce the possibility of simultaneous engagement. Control
configuration, coordination, and Hawk deployment can further reduce
simultaneous engagement. For TBM engagements, it may be necessary to use
range bias fires for the TF, use Patriot negative range bias (refer to
discussion in Chapter 2) but do not use range bias for Hawk.
CAUTION
The design of Patriot and Hawk software optimizes
intercept Pk with range bias set to the default values.
There is a high risk of negatively affecting system
effectiveness when adjusting range bias.
TASK FORCE CONFIGURATION

I-3. The ICC operator must understand that Hawk configurations at the
battery level will include two HIPIR radars for conducting engagements. At
the assault fire platoon there is only one HIPIR radar. This affects the
engagement operations, because a Hawk battery will be able to conduct more
engagements than an FU. In this appendix, an interoperability operation
applies to both a battery and assault fire platoons (AFPs) and may be
I-1
FM 3-01.87
referred to as a Hawk fire unit (FU). See Figure I-1 for an example of task
force organization.
BASELINE
HEU
ICC
PAT R IOT HA W K
BAT T ERY FIR E U NIT
Figure I-1. Example of Task Force Organization
TASK FORCE DEPLOYMENT

I-4. The Patriot software provides commanders with interoperability
functions for Patriot and Hawk TF capabilities. While METT-TC is the
driving force behind all ADA planning, especially forming a Patriot/Hawk TF
the type of theater and operation provide the framework for METT-TC
analysis. The following recommendations are subject to change based on
resources available, mission, threat, and the commander's intent.
AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE TASK FORCE

I-5. Patriot and Hawk systems are complementary. Patriot can engage both
TBMs and high and very low level, fast, long-range ABTs. Hawk, with its
360-degree coverage, can engage helicopters and low-level ABTs. Sharing a
common battalion command and control increases the combat potential of
both systems.
DEFENSE DESIGN
I-6. The task force will fight with a baseline of five Patriot batteries and four
Hawk fire units. This organization provides the battalion task force with the
capability of improved jammer triangulation and correlation, and facilitates
excellent area coverage.
FIGHT FORWARD OF PATRIOT

I-7. Air defense artillery doctrine, Patriot selection and fire distribution logic,
and Hawk capabilities against helicopter and low-level ABTs support
deploying Hawk 10 to 30 kilometers forward of Patriot. If the IPB identifies
TBM threats, consider entering Hawk into the Patriot data base as an asset
and deploying Hawk within 20 kilometers of Patriot to provide protection
against TBMs. Currently, Hawk has limited TBM engagement capability.
I-2
FM 3-01.87
CONTROL IN THE SAME MANNER AS PATRIOT BATTERIES

I-8. Hawk should be centralized to the ICC whenever data link capability
exists. Normally, Hawk FUs are not decentralized to battery control as long
as the data link exists.
SUBORDINATE ORIENTATION USING PATRIOT PADS SYSTEM

I-9. The accuracy of current methods used to align Hawk is not sufficient to
allow TF operations. Hawk HIPIR must be positioned using data provided by
PLGR systems or PADS, if available.
TASK ORGANIZATION
I-10. The software capability of both the Patriot battery and Hawk FU
enhances engagement effectiveness by automating the ICC software for
Hawk identification, threat assessment, and engagement tasks. The software
also accommodates the Hawk Phase III improvements of passive
identification, increased update rates on specific track assignments, and
improved radar search patterns. This provides Hawk with reduced reaction
times and increased probability of automatic and manual HIPIR locks.
I-11. The size of the TF is a function of METT-TC and overall system
capability. The ICC can control up to 12 subordinate FUs. The combination of
FUs controlled depends upon the types of FUs (Patriot or Hawk) assigned to
an ICC. Any combination of FUs may be subordinate to an ICC if there are no
more than six subordinate Patriot batteries. An operator can assign 12 Hawk
FUs, if all FUs are Hawk. Enter Patriot units in the data base through Tab
59 as units 1 to 6; the software will not accept Patriot in fields 7 to 12. Unit 1
can be a Patriot battery with FP2 a Hawk FU until assignment of unit 6,
after which the software will accept a Hawk FU. The ICC accommodates FUs
by way of the PCP or a battery configuration with communications through
the battery command post.
ALIGNMENT METHODS
I-12. Alignment for both weapon systems is critical. The following are
descriptions of the methods used for Patriot and Hawk alignment. For the
Patriot system, the PLGR is the main tool for determining location, altitude,
and a north reference angle required for emplacing Patriot, with PADS
system used as the backup. Patriot FUs emplace using true north as the
angular reference. This system enables track management to provide
excellent track correlation, and strobe triangulation provides the accuracy.
I-13. Alignment within the Hawk unit is also important. When operating
with Patriot, alignment procedures must be accurate enough to ensure track
correlation and rapid HIPIR radar lock. Consequently, when operating within
a TF, the survey section assigned to the Patriot battalion should be sent to
the assigned Hawk units to provide accurate location, altitude, and
alignment data. This will ensure correlation between Patriot and Hawk FUs
using the remote three-dimensional air picture.
I-3
FM 3-01.87
TARGET POSITION DATA

I-14. When operating with Patriot, Hawk must align to true north. Patriot
converts all Hawk target position data to the Patriot north-oriented
coordinate system as seen from the ICC system coordinate center (refer to
BNSCC and DLRP discussion in Chapter 2). Basing this conversion on the
ICC system coordinate center reduces the chance of reporting high-altitude,
short-range targets in one position to Patriot and another position to Hawk.
The track management correlation process, which uses square correlation
cells, is changed to reduce the number of miscorrelation opportunities and
number of calculations. The site-oriented correlation (SOC) process now uses
a correlation cell adjusted to account for radar dependent errors in range and
azimuth. To limit the number of calculations, a large correlation cell, velocity,
and height test screens out tracks that should not correlate with the input
track. The refined correlation cell test performs the final correlation check.
The SOC process is valid for first time Hawk correlation with the ICC (see
Figure I-2).
HAWK
S IT E O R IE N TE D
P A T R IO T
O R IG IN A L H A W K C O R R E L A T IO N
CELL, RADA R TYPE DEPENDANT
Figure I-2. Correlation Cells for Patriot to Hawk Correlation
TARGET ACQUISTION DATA

I-15. The ICC provides acquisition data to Hawk, if Hawk has no local data
on the track. The ICC sets specific parameters in the data message that
reports the availability of high-accuracy data to Hawk. Hawk then uses the
Phase III enhanced HIPIR three-dimensional search capability on the remote
target. For these specific tracks, the ICC increases the track data update rate
to Hawk for Weapons Assigned, Cover, or Engaged commands. If Hawk loses
lock or coasts a track, the ICC takes reporting responsibility and increases
I-4
FM 3-01.87
the track data update rate. This gives Hawk a higher probability of
reacquiring the target.
I-16. The air picture provided to Hawk is still controlled through a filtering
process provided in Tab 68 (Figure I-3). Besides filtering by altitude and
range, the operator can now also filter by identification.
FP COMM CONTROL + HAWK FP TRACK FILTER PAGE 1 *68*
( ) =DEPLOYMENT NUMBER PLANNED DEPLOYMENT NET LOADING=PERCENT

( )=FP TYPE: 1=PATRIOT, 2=HAWK-2, 3=HAWK-3
( )=HAWK ATDL-1 ADDRESS
ALL ENTRIES BELOW APPLY TO HAWK FPS ONLY:
( )=LINK STATION: 1 THRU 6=CRG NUMBER, 7=ICC
( )=LINK STATION MODEM NUMBER: 1 THRU 5
( ) =HAWK FP ALTITUDE
( , , ) =TRACK ID REPORTED TO HAWK UNITS: U=UNKNOWN,H=HOSTILE, F=FRIEND
( )KM=HAWK FP MAXIMUM RANGE LIMIT FILTER/SECTOR BOUNDS
( . ) TO ( . ) =MIN/MAX ALTITUDE ABV MSL TRACT REPORTING LIMITS
Figure I-3. Tab 68, FU Communication Control + Hawk FU Track Filter
I-17. Tab 68, is used to identify the type of battery or platoon assigned to the
battalion, how data communications will be established with this FU, and
defines the track update filters associated with each of the assigned Hawk
FUs. The tab is available during initialization and TACOPS. Tab 68 consists
of up to 12 pages, one for each FU defined in the battalion.
I-18. The FP TYPE data field is used to define the type of fire unit—Patriot or
Hawk. If it is a Patriot FU, then no further information is required or allowed
in this tab. The Hawk ATDL-1 address is automatically assigned as a
function of which page the FU is entered. FU 1 on page 1 is AH, FU 2 on
page 2 is BH, and so on until FU 12 on page 12 is LH. During defense
planning it is important that the Patriot battalion provide ATDL-1 addresses
for individual Hawk FUs, by voice or hard copy, when initializing their
systems.
I-19. The Link Station (CRG 1 to 6 or ICC) and Link Station Modem Number
must be defined by the Patriot battalion during the defense planning process
and transmitted by voice or hard copy. The remainder of the tab addresses
the filter definition for Hawk units only. The operator can now filter by
altitude (0 to nnnn feet), identity (U=unknown, F=friend, H=hostile), and
range (0 to nnn km) according to threat characteristics. The filter range
defined, Tab 68 controls the size of the Hawk sector bounds displayed at the
ICC.
I-20. The Planned Deployment Net Loading (PDNL) will automatically
update as FUs are entered by way of Tab 68. ICC operators should monitor
this percentage and ensure that the configuration does not exceed 90 percent
during peak air battle operations.
I-21. The Min/Max Altitude ABV MSL Track Reporting Limits allows the
operator to further filter the targets that will be passed on to Hawk FUs. The
operator can input a minimum and maximum altitude according to Patriot
TSOP that will be applied to the range entered above.
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FM 3-01.87
AUTOMATIC FIRE DISTRIBUTION

I-22. The threat assessment process integrates Hawk FUs into the TBEQ.
Consequently, the ICC computes launch now intercept points (LNIPs) for
these Hawk FUs and consider the FU in the asset defense logic. Hawk FUs
connected to an ICC are now eligible for the automatic engagement process
because that ICC computes FU release times.
I-23. The FU selection logic considers an increased number of FUs to support
TF operations. The logic initially considers Patriot first independently of
Hawk FUs. For ABT targets, the logic considers all FUs local to the ICC and
at subordinate battalions in the automatic mode. The Patriot ICC selection
logic removes Hawk FUs that meet the following criteria:
• There are no fire sections operationally ready at the FU.
• The target altitude is higher than the HIPIR engagement altitude set
at the FU.
• The target is receding from the Hawk FU.
• The LNIP is invalid.
I-24. The ICC software checks and computes the range and range offset
(Figure I-4) to properly assess the Hawk FU priority for target engagement.
The target must be heading towards the defended asset and is not receding
from the Hawk FU.
FLIGHT
PATH
RANGE
OFFSET
(RO)
HIGH
LETHALITY NORMAL
LETHALITY
RANGE
(RNG)
LEGEND:
RNG = DISTANCE FROM HAWK FU TO TARGET
RO = RANGE OFFSET FROM HAWK FU TO TANGENTAL
TARGET PATH
Figure I-4. Range and Range Offset

I-25. A Hawk launch now intercept point is computed for each track and a
validity check is made for altitude, range, HIPIR cutoff velocity, and missile
gimbals limits. If the LNIP is valid, then the Hawk unit is eligible for
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FM 3-01.87
engagement selection by the ICC. If the LNIP is invalid (altitude or range),

the FU is no longer considered as a candidate.
I-26. Once the two candidates’ (Patriot and Hawk) FU lists have been
determined, the recommended FUs (primary and secondary) will be selected.
As with the candidate logic, the first step is to prioritize the Patriot FU
candidates and then to independently prioritize the Hawk unit candidates.
Both the Patriot and Hawk units are tested against a set of disadvantages.
These disadvantages are used to order the candidates and used as part of the
final selection between Patriot and Hawk. The Hawk disadvantages are
• Hawk is at or below the low missile threshold.
• Hawk cannot intercept target before target reaches asset.
• There is no Patriot backup for the Hawk engagement.
• Target is friend protected for Hawk.
• The Hawk is busy.
• Engagement will result in a nominal lethality intercept.
I-27. The selection of the best (primary) and the second best (secondary) FUs
is then determined by merging the ordered list of Patriot and Hawk
candidates for the target under consideration per the following criteria:
• The best Patriot is selected over the best Hawk if that Hawk is busy
has missile count below threshold value, or if the target is friendly
protected for that Hawk.
• If both units, best Patriot versus best Hawk, have negative TTLL,
then the fewest negatives are selected. If only one is negative, then
the other is selected.
• When both have positive TTLL, preference is given to selecting
Hawk. Hawk is always selected if its LNIP is within the high-
lethality zone. It is always selected (with Patriot as a secondary)
provided the Patriot TTLL is predicted to be positive at the predicted
Hawk intercept time.
LOCAL ENGAGEMENT CONTROL PARAMETERS

I-28. Tab 10, Local Engagement Control Parameters, has the ability to bias
the engagement zone of Hawk assigned to the ICC. This Hawk bias is
aggregate in nature; that is, one setting at the ICC affects all Hawk units in
the TF, regardless of position on the battlefield. The Hawk bias is limited to
+
_ 15 kilometers. This can be used similarly to the Patriot range bias and
provides a means of decreasing the TTFL for Hawk, thus increasing the
range at which Hawk receives engagement commands from the ICC.
I-29. A positive Hawk range bias facilitates engagement assignment to Hawk
at a range to achieve intercept equal to the range bias plus the high-lethality
range. It facilitates the selection of Hawk for engagements, but it has no
effect upon the FU’s ability to engage at those longer ranges. Targets that are
out of range for the Hawk system will not produce the "in range" necessary
for an engagement. So regardless of the range at which the FU receives an
engagement command, it must still wait for the target to meet system
parameters.
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FM 3-01.87
I-30. Negative range bias should not be used for the Hawk units assigned
because this would increase the TTFL; in effect, reducing the range at which
Hawk could engage. Positive range bias should only be used if it is apparent
that Hawk FUs are not being selected as the primary FU over Patriot. As an
alternative, using Patriot negative range bias (this will increase Patriot
TTFL) should be considered. This would decrease the range at which Patriot
could engage, thereby enhancing the probability that Hawk would be chosen
for engagement. This alternative has advantages over the use of Hawk range
bias in that Patriot Pk would be increased, while Hawk processing of targets
for engagement would be unaffected. It must be reiterated at this point that
the preferred ways to ensure that Hawk gets first shot are through
positioning of Hawk FUs to support engagements. Patriot tactical directors
will need additional training.
FRIENDLY PROTECTION
I-31. Friendly protection for Hawk candidate FUs is a function added to the
FU selection process to determine if a local Hawk candidate FU is prohibited
from engaging a track because of friend protection criteria. A hostile or
unknown track is considered friend protected if there is an ICC ID friend or
IFF mode IV friend within a specific zone about the hostile or unknown track
(Figure I-5).
I-8
FM 3-01.87
ZONE FOR AFP B ZONE FOR AFP A
N N
AZIMUTH AZIMUTH
W E W E
S S
HAWK FU SITE A HAWK FU SITE B
Figure I-5. Hawk Friendly Protect

I-32. If a track is in a friend protect condition, the ICC will not automatically
assign to Hawk for engagement. The ICC operator will be alerted “ccnnn
FRND PROT FP nn/RE-ENG” if he attempts to assign the engagement to site
B. He can choose to override the friend protection condition. This friend
protection feature is equivalent logic used within Hawk to protect friends
near hostile targets due to uncertainty in missile assignments to tracks
within certain angular tolerances. Engagement override is not recommended.
I-33. The ICC interfaces with Phase III Hawk and accommodates the Hawk
low-altitude simultaneous Hawk engagements (LASHE) capability. With the
LASHE capability, Hawk can conduct close-in multiple simultaneous
engagements. The engagement monitor logic at the ICC accounts for Hawk
multiple engagements capability. When Hawk enters the LASHE mode, that
status is reported to the ICC and displayed by section in the Hawk
engagement summary tab (Figure I-6).
I-9
FM 3-01.87
HAWK ENGAGEMENT SUMMARY PAGE 1 S/I

() = HOOKED TRADK-ID+SIZE FP( ) CEASE ENGAGE COMMAND
CURRENT COMMANDS: FS A FS B
FP TTI RSPS CMND TRACK-ID MSL STAT TRACK-ID MSL STAT TRACK-
ID
1
2
3
4 30 WILL COVER PA102-U 3 SILNT PA108-H3
5
6
HAWK ENGAGEMENT SUMMARY PAGE 1 S/I

( ) = HOOKED TRADK-ID+SIZE FP( ) CEASE ENGAGE
COMMAND
CURRENT COMMANDS: FS A FS B
FP TTI RSPS CMND TRACK-ID MSL STAT TRACK-ID MSL STAT TRACK-
ID
7 25 RCVD ENGA PA115-H 7 HPISR PA115-H
8
9 35 CANT COVER PA121-H 4 LASHE PA130-H3
10
11
12
Figure I-6. Hawk Engagement Summary Tab (Example)
I-34. The threat assessment process provides the integration of Hawk tracks
on the TBEQ (Figure I-7). This allows the operator to fight from the TBEQ
and greatly minimizes the workload associated with Hawk engagements.
TRK TH ID ESTAT/S FP TLR TLL E/MI - TRK TH ID ESTAT/S FP TLR TLL E/MI
PA 02 H ENGI/8 8 02 25 1/06 -
101 -
PA S PENG/ 2 15 35 0/23 -
112 -
-
-
-
-
-
Figure I-7. ICC To-Be-Engaged Data Tab (Example)
IDENTIFICATION PROCESSING
I-35. The identification processing for both Patriot and Hawk has been
improved. Phase III Hawk has an automated passive identification scheme
that closely parallels the Patriot system. The Patriot passive identification
scheme is the baseline. The track processing through the passive algorithm
remains fundamentally unchanged. The weight sets and ID sums for Friend,
Unknown, and Hostile have not been modified and still apply. The software
supports the interoperability functions listed below:
• Use Patriot passive identity data when available.
I-10
FM 3-01.87
• Manage the identity data flow.

• Resolve conflicts whenever possible.
I-36. If the Patriot ICC is in the automatic ID mode, it normally accepts IDs
reported over ATDL-1 from Hawk, when Hawk radars are only tracking the
target. If the system is in the manual ID mode, the ICC operator is required
to accept or reject all identity changes. If a Patriot track correlates with the
Hawk track, the Hawk identity will be maintained unless or until the Patriot
passive identity has determined a more definite identity or a conflicting
identity. For example, if Hawk sends up an identity of Unknown, the target
ID will be Unknown. If the track correlates with a Patriot track that has an
identity of Unknown or the default assumed Friend condition, the target ID
will remain Unknown. If the Patriot ID then becomes Friend, the target ID is
automatically changed to Friend. If the system was in the auto ID mode, the
operator is alerted in the manual ID mode.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
I-37. Automated conflict resolution has been incorporated in the software
based on a series of ID conflict resolution tables developed for the various C2
nodes. However, ID conflicts still occur and they require operator
intervention. The ICC operator is required to resolve an identity conflict once
the alert has been displayed and before the operator can continue to review
other alerts. To resolve the conflict, the operator must select an identity for
the track and then acknowledge the alert. The sequence is —
• Step 1—Acknowledge the alert. This hooks the target and generates
the alert "ID S/I REQUIRED."
• Step 2—Note ID indicator lights on console to determine target
identification at the ICC.
• Step 3—Select ID. Determine whether to disagree with the conflict or
agree and press the appropriate ID S/I.
• Step 4—Acknowledge alert.
I-38. If the operator selects automatic ID at the ICC, then conflicting sources
will automatically be commanded to accept the ICC identity. The operator in
this case does not necessarily become the identity source even though the
identity push-button was used. The previously established identity source is
maintained. If the operator selects an identity to agree with the conflicting
source, then that identity and source will be used. This conflict processing is
consistent with the "source-specific" identity resolution tables. The intent is
to minimize conflict situations and maximize automatic identity
dissemination.
HAWK WEAPONS CONTROL

I-39. The weapons control volume, like all other volume correlation for
Patriot, is performed at the ECS and the results sent to the ICC. With Phase
III Hawk volume correlation, ICC performs weapon control status and
volume correlation for Hawk-only tracks.
DATA BASE COORDINATION
I-11
FM 3-01.87
I-40. The TF operations officer must ensure that the data base in use has
been provided to Hawk in the TF. This can be accomplished by making a
hard copy of the Patriot data base and providing this to subordinate Hawk
FUs. Of course, Hawk TCOs must be taught how to read Tab 71, but this has
the further advantage that system IDs for airspace control measures become
standardized throughout the TF. Phase III Hawk performs volume
correlation on the same data base as Patriot.
ALTITUDE CORRELATION
I-41. For Hawk tracks with altitude such as an HIPIR track, the ICC
correlation function uses the altitude provided and performs normal volume
correlation. For CWAR and PAR tracks that do not have an altitude,
successful correlation with a volume is achieved if the altitude limits for the
radar fall within the altitude limits of the volume. For example, if the
altitude limit of the radar is 5,000 feet and the volume is from ground level to
30,000 feet, the target would correlate. However, if the lower limit of the
volume is 10,000 feet, then the target would not correlate.
MULTIPLE VOLUME CORRELATION

I-42. For cases of successful correlation within multiple volumes, the most
restrictive weapon control status applies (WEAPONS HOLD over WEAPONS
TIGHT over WEAPONS FREE). If the track does not correlate with any
weapons control volume, then it is checked against the residual state. It
should be noted that heading and speed criteria are not assessments used in
this correlation unless the track is in a directional control volume. This
means that Hawk-only targets displayed at the ICC may carry the wrong
weapons control status. For example, if the Patriot data base has a
directional WEAPON HOLD volume, Hawk-only targets processed within
that volume carry the WEAPON HOLD regardless of the direction in which
they are moving.
DEFENSE DESIGN
I-43. Terrain and the mission are major factors in deciding whether to fight
as pure battalions or to task-organize. If there is no requirement for
overlapping coverage between Patriot and Hawk, then pure Patriot and
Hawk battalion operations may be favored. Yet, if there is a requirement to
have Hawk operate in Patriot coverage, then TF organizing should be
strongly considered. This places both weapon systems under the ICC’s
command and control which provides improved track correlation, target
identification, threat assessment, weapons assignment, automatic
engagements, and friendly protection. These enhanced functions result in
more positive target identification and increase system responsiveness and
survivability.
I-44. If a TF is to be organized, then it should consist of no less than three
Patriot FUs. This helps ensure that the TF retains good triangulation with
the Patriot batteries.
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FM 3-01.87
I-45. METT-TC assists in determining the exact size of the TF. A mix of three
Patriot batteries and four Hawk FUs is a good baseline to start with. This
facilitates excellent area coverage and is within the human factor workload of
the ICC operators. It also facilitates the assignment of the remaining Patriot
batteries and maintains Hawk administrative integrity.
HAWK INTEGRATION
I-46. The basic philosophy of conducting defense design for Patriot and Hawk
TF has not changed. Patriot is to be planned as the "base piece," then
augmented by Hawk. The first position consideration of Hawk should be
about 10 to 30 kilometers forward in the Patriot sector, in valleys and low
areas not covered by Patriot. This ensures that the Patriot air picture is
provided to Hawk and that Hawk will detect the low flyers coming up the
valleys and in areas not covered by Patriot (Figure I-8). Hawk should be
placed within 20 kilometers if TBMs are expected, and Hawk will be treated
as a defended asset for Patriot.
ABT DIRECTION
OF ATTACK
H
H H
P P P
P
Figure I-8. Task Force Deployment (Example)
I-47. Hawk engagement of ABT targets forces the threat up into Patriot
coverage. If the terrain is not suited for this type of deployment, then Hawk
should still be employed between 10 and 30 kilometers forward and within
Patriot coverage. This ensures that Hawk FUs are selected for engagement
before Patriot, thereby initially using the Hawk missiles to counter the air-
breathing target threat. Lastly, Hawk can be deployed on the flanks and rear
of the Patriot FUs. Special consideration must be given to the deployment of
Hawk Phase III systems to ensure there is minimum or no opportunity for
simultaneous engagement of an ABT by both Hawk and Patriot. This can be
accomplished only through proper placement of Hawk within Patriot's
coverage.
I-48. Identification filters should not be applied to the subordinate Hawk
units. The range filter should be set to P4-76 kilometers, thereby providing
early warning to the Hawk FUs. The altitude filter should be set to P4-77 kft.
I-13
FM 3-01.87
I-49. Hawk should initially operate centralized to the ICC. Both HIMAD
systems in the TF have the capability of performing volume correlation in
support of weapons control and passive identification. TF operations officer
(S3) must now ensure that the data bases generated for the mission considers
the Hawk elements assigned. Hawk has the ability to enter by tabular
display restricted volumes, prohibited volumes, safe passage corridors, safe
velocity, and weapon control status. The weights associated with each volume
are initialized by the Hawk operator through the remote control unit and
stored in memory.
HAWK BLOCK 4 SOFTWARE

I-50. To maintain commonality, the Hawk Block 4 software has the same
point totals necessary to achieve the identification of Friend P4-78, Hostile
P4-79, and Unknown P4-80 to P4-81 as those for Patriot (weight set 3). It
should be noted that the Hawk passive identification process does not have a
point total for an Unknown or Assumed Friend.
I-51. In generating the data base for TF operations, the Patriot senior tactical
director or operations officer must minimize confusion and workload by
creating a single data base that will support the operations of both systems.
Furthermore, he must ensure that the data base generated produces the
same identification on a track detected by both systems within the same
airspace. The weight sets defined for Patriot are fixed and cannot be changed,
whereas the weight sets for Hawk can be initialized and can be changed for
each mission. Hence, the following guidance is provided to assist in providing
a uniform data base that supports Patriot and Hawk TF operations.
I-52. A data base for a TF of three Patriot batteries and four Hawk FUs is
shown as an example in Figure I-9. The Hawk restricted volume (RV) is
entered in the Patriot system as a hostile volume (HV) with a restricted
attribute. Hawk enters it as a single restricted volume (RV). In the Patriot
system the prohibited or restricted volume is entered as a hostile volume
with prohibited and restricted attributes. In the Hawk system it is entered as
a single prohibited volume. The safe passage corridor (SPC) or low level
transit route (LLTR) is entered as a single SPC in both the Patriot and Hawk
systems.
I-14
FM 3-01.87
IIFFPID
H
H H
HOO1
P
SPC DEFENDED
ASSET
Figure I-9. Patriot and Hawk Defense Design (Example)
I-53. Patriot Tab 71 shows the comparable Hawk Volume Entry Tab for the
RV and PV (see Figure I-10). In the Patriot system, once the volumes have
been defined via tabular display, they are then allocated during the
deployment phase of initialization to each of the Patriot FUs assigned. They
are then transferred or downloaded via data link to each of the Patriot
batteries. This process does not apply to Hawk assigned to the TF.
Consequently, separate actions are necessary to assure that their data base is
provided to them.
( )=ID ( )=STAT;A/I/T =CURRENT STAT *VOLUMES* PG 1/150 *71*

DAY HRS MON YEAR ( . )KM-SPC WDTH ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )=ON ( )=SPC DIRECTN; ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )=OFF F=FWD,R=REV,B=BTH ( )
( . )KM=VOL RADIUS ( )=COORD FORMAT ( )
( . )TO(mm.m)aa=ALT 0=UTM 2=LAT/LON ( )
( )TO(nnn)DEG=HDG 1=MGRS 3=GEOREF ( )
( )TO(mmm)M/S=SPD ENTAB SETS FORMAT ( )
( )DEG=SPC TOLERANCE ( )
ATTRIBUTES;Y/N (N)=ORIG USED UNITS: /150
( )=SPC (Y)=RVA (Y)=PVA USED PNTS: /800 SELECT: PG( ),ID( )
Figure I-10. Tab 71 Hawk Volume Entry
I-15
FM 3-01.87
VOLUME DATA
ID XXX STATUS X O INACTIVE 1 ACTIVE

ALTITUDE LIMITS (MSL) UPPER XXX LOWER XXX KFT
TYPE (2) 1 WCV 2 PROH 3 REST
NUMBER OF POINTS X IN LAT/LONG
POINT 1 XXXXXX XXXXXX POINT 4 XXXXXX XXXXXX
WCV STATUS X 1 FREE 2 TIGHT 3 HOLD
FUNCTION X 0 RETURN 1 DISPLAY 3 CORR
VOLUME DATA
ID XXX STATUS X O INACTIVE 1 ACTIVE

ALTITUDE LIMITS (MSL) UPPER XXX LOWER XXX KFT
TYPE (3) 1 WCV 2 PROH 3 REST
NUMBER OF POINTS X IN LAT/LONG
WCV STATUS X 1 FREE 2 TIGHT 3 HOLD
FUNCTION X 0 RETURN 1 DISPLAY 3 CORR
Figure I-11. Hawk Volume Entry for Restricted and Prohibited Volumes (Type 2 and 3)
I-54. One of the most important items that the TF operations officer must
establish is the weight set that each system will use. Patriot normally uses
weight set 3 for its passive ID process, and should continue to do so. As
previously mentioned, Hawk can initialize on-line the weights for each type of
volume. The following weights should be initialized in the Hawk Block IV
system to ensure that the same identification is produced by both systems
Restricted Vol - P4-82 Same as Patriot

Prohibited Vol - P4-83 Weight Set 3 Values
SPC Vol +P4-84
Positive IFF +P4-85
Max Safe Vel - P4-86 This is a Hawk Hostile indicator. This is
similar to Patriot’s maximum velocity
pop-up criteria indicator.
using their individual passive process, see Figure I-12.
Figure I-12. Hawk Identification Weight Sets
I-55. These weights are the same as those of weight set type 3 within the
Patriot system. In weight set type 3, the thresholds for target identification
are identical for both systems. The use of the above numbers in the Hawk
system will result in the same target identification being generated for the
same volume violations.
I-56. The defense design found in Figure I-9 illustrates that the area where
Patriot expects the target to be made hostile (eligible for engagement), is
I-16
FM 3-01.87
entered as a hostile volume with restricted and prohibited volume attributes.

This results in a point total of P4-87 because the track violated both the PV
and the RV attributes.
I-57. As previously mentioned, there is no point sum for Unknown Assumed
Friend in the Hawk system. The ID resolution tables inherent in the ICC
should result in a like identification being provided to both systems when
there is a conflict between Unknown and Unknown Assumed Friend.
I-58. Patriot ICC software uses a series of parameters to determine if the
approaching TBM will cross the boundary of the Hawk FU. Phase III Hawk
has a limited self-defense capability against TBMs. The Hawk self-defense
boundary is set in the software and is made active with the inclusion of a
Hawk FU in the ICC data base. If Hawk is threatened, Patriot will downtell
the TBMs position to Hawk and increase the target's data update rate.
I-59. Hawk, by manual-operator action, attempting to lock on, searches the
designated area. Once lock-on is established, Hawk will then engage. The
engagement command is Fire 2.
I-60. Patriot will continue to monitor the TBM and will not engage unless
parameters are such that Patriot automatically takes over the engagement.
For example, TBM is a self-defense threat. An asset is threatened (this could
be Hawk FU defended by a Patriot battery) and no "Cease Fire" is received
from Hawk.
I-61. This capability, while available in Block IV, is still under analysis and
the complete doctrinal or tactical impact has not been fully assessed. There
are definite Hawk deployment restrictions (regarding Patriot) that need to be
clarified.
HIMAD TASK FORCE TRAINING

I-62. Both Patriot and Hawk operators must be trained to work together to
ensure that the high-to-medium altitude air defense (HIMAD) TF functions
properly. This section is directed mainly toward Hawk tactical officers and
radar operators, but Patriot TDs should read and be familiar with this
information. Training and familiarization should be conducted in the
following areas:
• ICC commands and Hawk responses.
• Terminology.
• Track management ID coordination.
• Accuracy of data.
ICC COMMANDS AND HAWK RESPONSES

I-63. The ICC may send commands initiated by the computer or by operator
action. At the Hawk FU, it may be difficult to tell whether a command was
operator or computer initiated. Patriot TDs and TDAs, used to directing the
fires of Patriot batteries over the data link with little or no voice direction,
will find that they must talk to Hawk on a more regular basis. The following
paragraphs are oriented toward Hawk operators, but they describe what
I-17
FM 3-01.87
happens for both Hawk and Patriot during some of the most common data
and voice commands and responses.
ICC SEMIAUTOMATIC ENGAGEMENT MODE

I-64. In the semiautomatic engagement mode, the Patriot ICC presents a list
of targets to the operator. This list, called the to-be-engaged-queue (TBEQ), is
presented in order of threat and with recommendations which Patriot or
Hawk FU should engage the track. The operator can then review the
recommendations, and with two switch actions, issue Engage commands to
subordinate batteries or platoons. This is called the "shoot-off-the-queue"
method of engagement and is the preferred way to engage. In the automatic
engagement mode, the computer issues engagement commands from the
same TBEQ, and the TCO can override the decisions of the computer. This
method is normally used only when the number of targets available for
engagement exceeds the ICC crew's capacity to handle the situation in the
semiautomatic mode.
I-65. By design, the ICC will not allow an Engage command to be sent to
Hawk unless the target is engageable by Hawk. For Patriot operators, this
means that the ICC has computed a valid launch now intercept point (LNIP).
For the Hawk operators, this means that the target will produce an IN
RANGE within a specified and short reaction time. This is because emission
control for the Hawk HIPIR is extremely important. Issuing an Engage
command to the FU before it can engage the target would require additional
or excessive time by the HIPIR before the command can be executed. The ICC
operator will get the alert "INVALID LNIP" should the operator manually
hook a long-range or receding target and manually send an Engage command
to Hawk.
I-66. The ICC will not issue an Engage command on a jam strobe that is not
range resolved. When the Hawk HIPIR locks on jam or when the radar
operator (RO) uses manual range, the FU will report a jam strobe to the ICC.
Since the ICC will not issue an Engage command through the data link when
this happens, then the situation must be dealt with verbally. Hawk must tell
the ICC what is going on with the track and request direction. In some cases,
it may be possible to standardize actions to be taken by the Hawk FU, so that
the ICC knows what is happening, thus reducing the need for talk. It is
important for Hawk operators to understand what actions will produce the
HIPIR jam strobe at the ICC, and that such a strobe inhibits the ICC's target
correlation, shared ID, and the issue of an engage command.
I-67. The ICC will not save engagement commands for a later Hawk
response. If a target requires engagement and a specific Hawk unit has been
selected and an engage command sent, the ICC will monitor the FU for a
timely response. If the FU takes some action (sends "WILCO" or assigns the
HIPIR) within a certain time, then a second time period is initiated. During
the second time period, the Hawk FU must fire if the command was to
engage. During these two time periods, no other FU will be given that target
for engagement. Patriot FUs will receive a temporary Cease Fire command. If
the designated Hawk FU does not fully respond when the second time period
expires, the Cease Fire is removed from the Patriot FUs and the target is
I-18
FM 3-01.87
then evaluated for engagement by other FUs. The TD receives the alert "FP
x: DA010 NO ENGAGE."
I-68. If the TDA attempts to issue an engagement command to Hawk and
there is no HIPIR radar available for assignment, the ICC will issue the alert
FU BUSY. High-powered illuminator radars (HIPAR) are considered
unavailable for assignment if they are currently firing on another target or if
they have previously been issued an Engage or Cover command and the
timers have not expired.
I-69. The ICC normally uses the Hawk high-lethality envelope for LNIP
calculations as the region for engagement recommendations. The Hawk
range bias discussed earlier in the section expands the area in which Hawk
FUs are considered for engagement recommendation. It does not, however,
alter the range at which the Hawk unit will get an IN RANGE and therefore
should not be used. This is different from Patriot range bias, in that Patriot
units may shoot at targets beyond the range at which the computer
determines to be the optimum range. Patriot can engage targets whose time
to launch release (TLR) exceeds 0, though this happens at the expense of a
lower probability of kill. The recommendation is to use Patriot negative range
bias, but only when the deployment of Hawk units, allow Patriot to shoot first
every time.
I-70. The Cover command can only be issued manually. The TD or TDA must
manually hook the target, designate the desired Hawk FU, and send the
command. Unlike the engage command, the cover command can be issued on
any target, approaching or receding. One exception is; the Cover command
will be rejected if the target is beyond the range initiated by the ICC in Tab
68. The alert will be "TARGET OUT OF COVERAGE."
I-71. The ICC may manually apply a Cease-Fire by hooking the target and
pushing the Cease Fire switch-indicator. If the HIPIR is assigned to that
target, a Cease Fire will be received at the Hawk FU. A Cease-Fire may also
be manually or automatically applied to a target by control echelons above
the Patriot ICC to which a data link exists.
I-72. Without any operator action, a Cease-Fire will be sent to Hawk
whenever it does not respond within the specified time period to an Engage or
Cover command. The response that will inhibit the issue of the automatic
Cease Fire is either will comply (WILCO) or the HIPIR assigned status
issued by the Hawk FU, and the HIPIR is assigned. If the Hawk FU does not
respond, the TD receives a NO RESPONSE alert and a Cease Fire is issued
automatically.
I-73. The TD or TDA can apply a Hold Fire to a target in the same manner as
a Cease Fire and it may be manually or automatically applied to a target by
control echelons above the Patriot ICC to which a data link exists. When the
HIPIR is assigned to a target that has a Hold Fire applied, every time the
HIPIR reports its status to the ICC, the ICC will send a Hold Fire command
to the Hawk unit. If the TCO or RO sends a CANTCO or REJECT, and the
HIPIR stays assigned to the target, it will appear momentarily that the Hold
Fire was removed. However, within seconds, another HIPIR report will be
sent to the ICC and the Hold Fire will be reissued.
I-19
FM 3-01.87
I-74. The ICC sends an automatic Hold Fire if the FU is assigned to a track
with an ID of unknown assumed friend. For Phase III FUs, the letters AF
will appear on the second page of the track data tab and the symbol U will
appear as dashed, not recommended. These tracks will continue to be
displayed on the Phase III Hawk high threat list, if appropriate.
I-75. Hold Fire will be issued automatically whenever the HIPIR is assigned
to an ID friend track or if the target ID is changed while the HIPIR is
tracking it. The Hold Fire in this last case will be issued immediately, usually
before the ID change is visible and the FRIEND ENGAGED lamp is
illuminated.
I-76. The ICC operator can issue a Cease Engage to a specific Hawk FU, but
since this is not a command that the Patriot system uses, there is no switch
action for it. The TD issues the Cease Engage command using the Hawk
engagement summary tab (Figure I-6). A Cease Engage will automatically be
issued in two circumstances.
I-77. First, if the HIPIR is assigned to a remote told-in track that is being
dropped for lack of radar track updates, the ICC will issue the Cease Engage
command to keep from having the FU continue to search for a track on which
it cannot provide legitimate location data. If the Hawk radar operator (RO)
has detected a track at this azimuth and location and if the radar was
originally assigned based on an Engage or Cover command, then it is possible
that the continued attempt to acquire lock might be desired. This must be
coordinated orally between the TCO and the TD.
I-78. Second, when the ICC has determined that the current HIPIR
assignment is not as critical as another, it will issue a Cease Engage. Instead
of waiting for the Hawk FU to become free, the ICC looks for a timely
response. It will automatically issue the Cease Engage command to free up
the radar for a new engagement. This Cease Engage for a higher priority
target is different from the one above in that the Hawk TCO will observe a
command symbol on a different target at the same time the Cease Engage is
displayed.
TERMINOLOGY
I-79. There are certain terms that cause confusion during task force
operations. The following list, contains a partial list of common terms:
• Engagement. Hawk operators often consider the process of assigning
the HIPIR through to the termination of an assignment to be an
engagement if there is a missile fired. Patriot's use of the term relates
only to firing a missile.
• Tracking. If the TD asks if the Hawk FU is tracking a target at some
location, the TCO usually responds, "No," if the HIPIR is not assigned
to that target. Patriot considers it tracking if a track data file has
been established. A CWAR or PAR track report sent to the ICC can be
the source of this track data file. This can lead to confusion.
• Patriot TDs and TDAs must understand the word tracking the way
the Hawk operators understand it; that is, that the HIPIR is locked
on the target in question and is tracking its progress. Hawk
I-20
FM 3-01.87
operators, for their part, may respond to such a question by

identifying the radar that is the tracking source. For example, the
TCO might respond, "Yes, we are tracking that target with the
CWAR."
• Reboot versus reset the computer. For Patriot operators, rebooting
the computer is a standard method of troubleshooting many
problems. Especially when trying to fix a problem with a data link,
this is a time-proven method. For the Hawk operators, however,
resetting the computer has little to do with system operation and is
not helpful in the same way as rebooting the Patriot computer.
TRACK MANAGEMENT AND ID COORDINATION

I-80. There are calculations made at the ICC to determine whether the tracks
sent uplink by Hawk should be correlated into established track files
generated with data from Patriot and other Hawk FUs or data from higher
echelon sources. If a track report was first downtold to Hawk before the radar
detected or acquired the target and took over reporting responsibility, then
the new Hawk track report is tested for a miscorrelation with the currently
held track. If it is determined that the Hawk track should not correlate with
the previously downtold report, miscorrelation "damage control" goes into
effect. Previous engagement status and ID, for example, no longer apply to
the track, as they were meant for the track originally downtold.
I-81. Following a miscorrelation or a later decorrelation, the ICC to readdress
the engagement status and ID of the new track. If the Hawk track is not
correlated at the initial report or later decorrelates, remote engagement
status is corrected and the original track is downtold to recreate the full air
picture. With Phase III Hawk, a coordinated ID response is designed into
both the ICC and Hawk.
I-82. If the track is not correlated, Hawk tracks may become correlated with
some other established track, and an ID change will occur. Several ID conflict
resolution tables exist at the ICC for use in resolving conflicts, automatically
whenever possible. Conflicts are resolved using rules in these tables. These
rules are based on the type of systems involved in the ID conflict. In some
cases, the TD must be involved in the resolution of the conflict. In most cases,
the Hawk TCO will not have to become involved.
I-83. If the new uncorrelated Hawk track does not match other established
tracks at the ICC, then there is no historical track record. The remaining
track will undergo an ID reevaluation.
I-84. The track data the ICC receives from a Patriot battery is extremely
accurate. For this reason, Phase III Hawk takes the most advantage of this
accuracy. The Phase III Hawk HIPIR will be assigned to a Patriot track and
will be immediately directed to a point in space versus performing a standard
search.
I-21
Glossary
ABT air-breathing threat

A/I Active/Inactive
ACA airspace control authority
ACM airspace control measures
ACO airspace control order
ACP airspace control plan
AD air defense
ADA air defense artillery
ADC air defense control
ADE air defense emergency
ADF asset defense file
ADL automatic data link
ADR automatic data reentry
ADTOC air defense tactical operations center
ADRS automatic data reentry system
ADW air defense warning
AE automatic emplacement
AES azimuth error site
AFND assumed friend
AFP assault fire platoon
AGC automatic gain control
ALRCS advanced low-radar cross section
Alt altitude
ALT altitude
AM amplitude modulation
AMG antenna mast group
AMDPCS air/missile defense planning and control station
AMP amplifying
ANCD automated net control device
Glossary-1
FM 3-01.87
AO area of operations
APOD aerial port of debarkation
ARM antiradiation missile
AS antispoofing
ATC asset threat category
ATDL-1 Army Tactical Data Link-1
ATM antitactical missile
ATO air tasking order
aux auxiliary
AWACS airborne warning and control system
BATI battalion tactical initialization

BCAC battalion command and control
BDHI bearing-distance-heading indicator
BIT built-in test
BITE built-in test equipment
bn battalion
BNSCC battalion system coordination center
BRU battery replaceable unit
BTOC battalion tactical operations center
btry battery
C2 command and control

C3 command, control, and communications
CA course acquisition
CANTCO cannot comply alert
CARM counter-ARM
CBR chemical, biological, radiological
CDI classification discrimination identification
C-E communications-electronics
CEASF cease fire
CEP circular error probable
CESO communications electronics security officer
CFAR constant false alarm rate
Glossary-2
FM 3-01.87
CINC Commander in Chief

CK confirmed kill
CKW crypto key weekly
CKT circuit
CM cruise missile
CMND PLAN command plan
CMUP clutter map update program
cntl control
compl complete
COMSEC communications security
conf confirmed
contr control
CP command post
CPP communications patch panel
CRC control and reporting center
CRG communications relay group
CRL communications routing list
CRP control and reporting post
CRT cathode ray tube
CSIF conflict SIF
CUG control unit group
CWAR continuous-wave acquisition radar
D&C display and control

DACU digital azimuth and control unit
db decibel
dc direct current
DDL digital data link
DEFCON defense readiness condition
deg degree
DLRP data link reference point
DLT data link terminal
DLTM data link terminal module
Glossary-3
FM 3-01.87
DLU data link upgrade

DNVT digital non-secure voice telephone
DPLMA digital phase lock module assembly
DTIP doctrine and tactics impact package
DTS data terminal set
EAC echelons above corps

ECCM electronic counter-countermeasures
ECCM ASSIST electronic counter-countermeasures assist S/I (console button
used to turn on a function (the ECCM functions of the radar) that
has been allowed during initialization.
ECM electronic countermeasures
ECS engagement control station
EDR embedded data recorder
EDWA evaluation decision, and weapon assignment
EHOLD engage hold
EL elevation
EMCON emission control
EMMO electronics missile maintenance officer
EMP electromagnetic pulse
ENBND engage inbound
eng engage
ENSTAT engagement status
EPP electric power plant
EPU electric power unit
ESJ escort screening jammer
EVAL evaluation
ext external
EZ engagement zone
F friendly track identity

FB firing battery
FCO fire control order
FCS fire control section
Glossary-4
FM 3-01.87
FDC fire direction center

FEBA forward edge of the battle area
FIDOC firing doctrine
FLOT forward line of own troops
flt fault
FM field manual
FO fiber optics
FOC fiber optic cable
FORG friendly origin
FP firing platoon
frnd friend
FSCL fire support coordination line
FSK frequency shift key
FSOP field standing operational procedures
FU fire unit
FUFU fire unit to fire unit
GEHOC German Hawk operations center

GEM guidance-enhanced missile
GEOREF World Geographic Reference System
GIP ground impact point
GLIF ground level interference filter
GMT guided missile transporter
gnd ground
GNIO GPS-north reference system input/output
GPS global positioning system
GUK group unique key
H hostile track identity

HARM high-speed anti-radar missile
HCU hard copy unit
hdg heading
HE higher echelon
HEU higher echelon unit
Glossary-5
FM 3-01.87
HF high frequency
HIB Hawk input buffers
HIDACZ high-density airspace control zone
HIMAD high- to medium- altitude air defense
HIPIR high-powered illuminator radar
HOLDF hold fire
HORG hostile origin
horz horizon
host hostile
hrzn horizon
HSDIO high-speed data input/output
HWK Hawk
Hawk homing all the way killer
Hz hertz
I/O input/output
ICC information and coordination central
ID identification
IDR interface data record
IDS identification size
IFF identification, friend or foe
IFFOFF IFF off
IFFON IFF on
IFFPID IFF passive identification
IM intermediate maintenance
indep independent
int interrogated
IOCT input/output control terminal
IP intercept point or indicate position
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IPOUT impact point out of coverage
IR infrared
ISLB initial search lower bound
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
Glossary-6
FM 3-01.87
JFACC joint forces air component commander

JTIDS joint tactical information distribution system
K7 tactical operation software

KA kill assessment
KAA-63 IFF codes table for Modes 1 through 4
kbps kilobits per second
kft kilo feet
km kilometer
kmps kilometers per second
LAM launcher action message

LASHE low-altitude simultaneous Hawk engagement
LAT live air trainer
lat latitude
lat-lon latitude-longitude
lcl local
LCU launcher control unit
LGD launcher graph display
LGM loop group modem
LICC lateral ICC
LLTR low level transit route
LMR lower medium range
LMM launcher maintenance message
LNIP launch now intercept point
LNR low noise receiver
LICC local/lateral ICC
log logistic
LOS line of sight
LR long range
LRC logistics readiness center
LRM launcher response message
LRU line replaceable unit
LS launching station
Glossary-7
FM 3-01.87
LTBM lower TBM
M1 gunner's quadrant which is used to emplace both the RS and LS

M2 aiming circle which is used to emplace the RS and LS
MBU master bus unit
MCS maintenance control system
METT-TC mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available, and civil
concerns
MEZ missile engagement zone
MICC master ICC
MIM-104 standard missile
MIM-104A standard missile (modified)
MIM-104B antitactical ballistic missile (PAC-2)
MIR missile ignition request
mm millimeter
MOC method of control
MODEM modulator/demodulator
MOF method of fire
mps meters per second
MRCTS missile-round cable test set
MRT mission recording tape
MS manstation
msl missile
MSV minimum safe velocity
MTI moving target indicator
MTM masked terrain map
mult multiplexer
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NAVES navigational enhancement system
NBC nuclear, biological, chemical
NCO noncommissioned officer
neg negative
NFS north finding system
Glossary-8
FM 3-01.87
NK no kill
NLOS non-line-of-sight
nm nautical mile
NREF north reference
NSIF negative SIF
NTL non-tactical link
NTT non-tactical tape
OBHOJ on board home on jam

OD optical disk
ODS 1/2 optical disk system one or two
ODU optical disk unit
OIC officer in charge
OPDAT operational data
OPORD operation order
OSLB operational search lower bound
OTM on-line training mode
P (code) precise code

PABT presumed air-breathing threat
PAC Patriot ATM capability; Patriot advanced capability
PADIL Patriot digital information link
PADS position azimuth determining system
PAR pulse acquisition radar
PAS passive alignment system
PCF preclassification filter
PCP platoon command post
PDB-4 post deployment build-4
PDNL planned deployment net loading
PENG pending engagement
PFE process for engagement
PIDON passive identification on
PIP predicted intercept point
PIR priority intelligence requirements
Glossary-9
FM 3-01.87
Pk probability of kill
PL phase line; party line
PLGR precision lightweight GPS receiver
PMCS preventive maintenance checks and services
pos positive
PPI plan position indicator
PPO Patriot Project Office
PPS precise positioning service
PSIF positive SIF
PTBM presumed tactical ballistic missile
PTOD precise time of day
PTL primary target line
pts points
PTY party
PV prohibited volume
PVA prohibited volume attribute
pwr power
RAD radius
RAM radar action message
RCFD receive and compare FP data
RCS radar cross section
rcvr receiver
RDR radar data record
rdr radar
rdr radar
RF radio frequency
RHI range height indicator
RIP ripple fire
RISTA reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition
RLRIU routing logic radio interface unit
RMAX (maximum) range
RMC remote multiplexer combiner
Glossary-10
FM 3-01.87
RMIN (minimum) range

RMM remote maintenance monitor
rng range
RO radio operator; radar operator; range offset
ROE rules of engagement
RRM radar response message
RRT radio relay terminal
RS radar set
RSOP reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of position
rsps response
RSU recovery storage unit
RTYPE radar (message) type
RV restricted volume
RVA restricted volume attribute
RWCIU radar weapons control interface unit
S/I switch-indicator
S2 Intelligence Officer
S3 Operations Officer
S4 Logistics Officer
SA selective availability
SALVO salvo fire
SAR satellite access request
SATCOM satellite communications
SBC short broadcast
SBU slave bus unit
SEM strobe engagement mode
SEP spherical error probability
SICC subordinate ICC
SIF selective identification feature
SIGO Signal Officer
SINCGARS single-channel ground and airborne radio system
SLAR side-looking aircraft radar
SLCT selected subordinate elements
Glossary-11
FM 3-01.87
SLS shoot-look-shoot
SMT system maintenance technician
SMU switch multiplexer unit
SOC site-oriented correlation
SOE state of emissions
SOJ standoff jammer
SOJC standoff jammer counter
SOP standing operating procedures
SPC safe passage corridor
SPCA safe passage corridor attribute
spec special
SPOD seaport of debarkation
SPS standard positioning service
sq square
SRP short-range pop-up
SRPOP short-range pop-up
SSJ self-screening jammer
ST special text
STANAG Standardization Agreement (NATO)
std emp standard emplacement
STL secondary target line
STO standing tactical order
SYSCON system control
sz size
tab tabular display

TAC OPDAT tactical operations data
TAC OPORD tactical operations order
TAC OPS tactical operations
TACC tactical air control center
TACI tactical initialization
TACSAT tactical satellite
TADIL tactical data information link (replaced by appropriate alpha
character for data link, for example, TADIL-A/B/J)
Glossary-12
FM 3-01.87
TAN test action number

TAOC tactical air operations center (US Marines)
TASM tactical air-to-surface missile
TBE to-be-engaged
TBEQ to-be-engaged queue
TBM tactical ballistic missile
TBM-A tactical ballistic missile type A
TBM-B tactical ballistic missile type B
TCA tactical control assistant
TCO tactical control officer
TCS tactical command system
TD tactical director
TD-1065 high-speed serial data buffer
TD-660 communications multiplexer
TDA tactical director assistant
TDECC target display and engagement control console (Hawk)
TDR track data record
TF task force
TFLT time of flight
tgt target
THAAD Theater High-Altitude Area Defense
thrt threat
TIBS tactical information broadcast system
TLR time to launch release
TM technical manual
TMT terrain mapping trainer
TNT TPT netted trainer
TOC tactical operations center
TOD time of day
tol tolerance
TON threat order number
TPT troop proficiency trainer
TPTR TPT replacement (disk)
TPTL TPT library (disk)
Glossary-13
FM 3-01.87
TROPO troposcatter
TSD tactical storage device
TSOP tactical standing operating procedures
TSR time slot reallocation
TTFL time to first launch
TTLL time to last launch
TTLR time to launch release
TTP tactics, techniques, and procedures
TVM track via missile
TVM-AP track via missile-analog processor
TVM-CP track via missile-correlation processor
TWS track while scan
TWUD tactical weapon control computer unit diagnostics
UHF ultrahigh frequency

UMR upper medium-range
unk unknown
UPS universal polar stereographic
USAADASCH United States Army Air Defense Artillery School
USMC United States Marine Corps
UTBM unengageable TBM; upper TBM
UTM universal transverse mercator
VHF very high frequency

VT virtual target
WCC weapon control computer

WCS weapon control status
WF weapons free
WGS-84 World Geodetic System 1984
WH weapons hold
WILCO will comply
WSMR White Sands Missile Range
WT weapons tight
Glossary-14
FM 3-01.87
XMTR transmitter
XTBM extra high tactical ballistic missile
Glossary-15
FM 3-01.87
Glossary-16
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(Change 1, 1 August 1996).
TM 11-5825-291-13. Operations and Maintenance Manual for Satellite Signals Navigation Sets
AN/PSN-11 and AN/PSN-11 (v) 1. 15 September 1995 (Change 2, 26 Nov 97).
TM 9-1425-600-12. Operator’s and Organizational Maintenance Manual for System Description.
(Patriot Air Defense Guided Missile System). 30 December 1994 (Change 2,
28 June 1996).
TM 9-1425-602-12-1. Operator’s and Organizational Maintenance Battalion Software User
Guide, Volume 1, (Patriot Air Defense Guided Missile System), 15 August 1996.
TM 9-1425-602-12-2. Operator’s and Organizational Maintenance Manual Fire Platoon Software
User Guide, Volume 2 (Patriot Air Defense Guided Missile System). 15August 1996.
TM 9-1425-602-12-3. Operator’s and Organizational Maintenance Manual for On-Line
Maintenance Information, Volume 3 (Patriot Air Defense Guided Missile System).
15 August 1996.
TM 9-1425-602-12-4. Operator’s and Organizational Maintenance Manual for Off-Line
Maintenance Information, Volume 4 (Patriot Air Defense Guided Missile System).
26 May 1995. (Change 1, 12 July 1996).
TM 9-1430-600-10-1. Operator's Manual for Engagement Control Station, Truck Mounted,
AN/MSQ-104 (Patriot Air Defense Guided Missile System). 30 September 1996.
(Change 2, 26 April 1999).
TM 9-1430-601-10-1. Operator's Manual for Radar Set, Semitrailer Mounted, AN/MPQ-53
(Patriot Air Defense Guided Missile System). 31 August 1993 (Change 4, 9 May 1997).
TM 9-1430-602-10-1. Operator's Manual for Information and Coordination Central, Truck
Mounted/AN/MSQ-116 (Patriot Air Defense Guided Missile System). 30 August 1996.
TM 9-1440-600-10. Operators Manual for Launching Station, M901 Semitrailer Mounted
(Patriot Guided Missile System). 24 September 1993 (Change 3, 24 August 1998).
Bibliography-3
INDEX
battalion initialization structure, FP deployment support, 2-47
A 2-2 lateral ICC, 2-41
A-scope operations, 3-29 initialization sequence, 2-3, H-2 subordinate ICC, 2-40
ABT, 2-4, 2-11, 2-15, 1-16, 2-50, geographic data parameters, master ICC, 2-39, 4-3, 4-5
3-1, 3-23, 3-26, 3-47, G-2, I-13 2-3
connectivity, 4-18, 2-52
identification, 2-4, 2-10, 2-28, ICC mode and data base
external links, 4-3, 4-6
1-19, 3-34, 4-5, I-13, I-16 selection, 2-5
counter-antiradiation missile
kill assessment, 3-47, 3-48, initialization control, 2-6
operations, 3-104
3-82 requirements for direct links,
ARM countermeasures, 3-108
ABT/TBM defended assets, 2-16 2-38, 2-39
through 3-110
generalized volumes, 2-18 battalion FIDOC, 2-9
counter-ARM threat parameters,
air and missile defense task force, ID mode, 2-10 2-26
2-17, 3-25, I-2 ID weight set, 2-10, 2-29, I-16 launch decision parameters,
air battle management, 3-10, 4-1 IFF/SIF control, 2-11 2-26
Air Defense Artillery (ADA), 2-1, missile depletion rules, 2-27, identification parameters, 2-4,
2-8 2-87, 2-88 2-28
employment planning, 2-59 battery tactical initialization, 2-66
planning, 2-5, 2-30, 2-37, 3-65, data collection control, 2-66 D
4-18, 4-19 data initialization sequence, data buffer transfer, 2-79
airspace control measures, 2-18 2-68 data communications, 2-78
airspace control order (ACO), roll-crossroll alignment, 2-70 data communications control,
2-18, 2-20, 2-29, 2-59, 3-36 2-78,
alternate alignment, E-1 C ATDL-1, 2-32, 2-39, 4-14, 4-21
antihelicopter standoff jammer, clutter and chaff tracks, 3-32 PADIL, 2-38, 3-20, 4-2, 4-7,
3-31, 3-97, 3-99 4-15, 4-16
command and control, 2-1, 3-69,
assets and defended areas, 2-4 4-1 TADIL-A, 4-16, 4-17, 3-88
asset defense, 3-47, 3-51, 3-63, structures, 4-1 TADIL-B, 2-15, 2-35, 2-38, 4-3,
3-69, 3-81 4-14, 4-18, 4-19
processing, 4-2
asset priority, 2-28, 3-45 TADIL-J, 2-35, 4-14, 4-19
command planning, 2-4, 2-6,
ATM mission, 3-85 2-30, H-5 data links, 4-2, 4-14, 4-16, 4-19
automatic emplacement, 2-62, command, control, and decentralized, 2-8, 3-5, 3-23, 4-5,
2-69, 2-72, 2-87, C-1 communications, 1-2, 2-2 defense design, 3-50, 3-69, I-2,
status monitor, 3-25, C-12 communications, 2-4, 2-31, 2-33, I-12
2-34, 2-37, 2-46, 2-55, 2-78, deployment/command planning,
B 4-3, 4-5 2-30, H-5
battalion initialization, 2-1, n2-2 battalion communications, display and control program, 3-12
2-31, 2-35, 2-46
automatic battalion initialization, doctrinal framework, 1-1
2-5 FP communications, 2-33
BATI and TACI flowcharts, communications operator, 3-5, E
H-1 3-9
early warning, 2-27, 4-18, I-13
battalion communications communications net loading,
control, 2-31, 2-35 2-37
Index-1
FM 3-01.87
ECCM engagement mode fight, G-5 local launcher, 3-56, 3-57, 3-65,
selection, 3-95 fight-while-fix, G-6 3-67
ECCM operations, 3-87 must fix, G-3 remote launcher, 3-56, 3-57,
ECCM wedges, 3-27, 3-89 3-62, 3-70
FP locations/boundaries, 2-63
emplacement configuration, D-1 location data confidence level, 2-
friendly origins, 2-18, 4-2
62, 2-74, 2-76, 3-14, E-6
engagement control, 2-13, 3-1,
3-78, I-7
G M
engagement operations, 2-86,
GPS, C-1, C-3, C-5, C-13
4-1, I-1, I-7 manual orentation and alignment,
GLIF threshold, 2-91
standoff jammer, 3-27, 3-88, data sheets, A-1
3-97 ground level interference filter
mapping display and control, B-4
(GLIF), 3-100 through 3-103
strobe engagement mode master ICC operations, 2-39, 4-3
(SEM), 3-62, 3-86
master ICC communications, 4-5
virtual target (VT), 3-86, 3-88, H
METT-TC, I-12, 2-29, 2-33
3-90 through 3-94 hostile criteria, 4-2
missile selection, 3-78, 3-83, 3-84
initial search lower bound weight sets, 2-10, I-10, I-16
(ISLB),3-82, B-1, B-3, B-5, D-4 missile engagement zone, 2-22
radar alignment procedures, I
2-72 N
ICC air battle operations, 3-10,
roll and crossroll tolerances, north finding system (NFS), 2-65,
2-75, E-3 Air defense functions, 3-10
2-69, 2-75, C-10
manual alignment, 2-74, E-3 firing doctrine, 3-11, 3-84, 3-88,
3-94
enable TBM A dive calculations, O
3-79 saturation alleviation, 3-18
operational search lower bound
extra-bn communication track management, 3-12, 4-4 (OSLB), 2-81, 2-83, B-6, B-8
control, 2-34, 2-35 triangulation, 3-16, 3-18, 3-86
ICC ECM operations, 3-87 P
F TBM and ABT defended passive ID line, 3-36
fault alert filter, G-1 assets, 2-15 Patriot crew responsibilities, 3-1
fiber optic cable deployment, D-5 identification, 2-4, 2-34, I-16 communications operator, 3-5,
FIDOC and operational identification processing, 3-39, 3-9
parameters, 2-9, 2-91 I-10 tactical control assistant, 3-3,
TBM A engagement mode, identification parameters, 2-28 3-4
3-78 manual ID, 3-43 tactical control officer, 3-1, 3-2
TBM B engagement mode, origin volume checks, 3-41 tactical director, 3-6, 3-7
3-78 safe passage corridors, 2-20, tactical director assistant, 3-7,
fire control configuration,D-1 2-21, 3-41, 3-8
fire unit tactical initialization, 2-60 IPB, 2-29, 3-80 Patriot missiles, 3-73
ABT search sectors, 3-27, ATM, 3-66, 3-75, 3-84
3-100 J ATM-1 (GEM), 3-48, 3-55, 3-73,
TBM search sectors, 3-28, JTIDS, 3-9, 4-19 through 4-21 3-75, 3-84
3-79 SOJC, 3-73, 3-74, 3-84
JFACC, 2-8
fire unit to fire unit operations, standard missile, 3-73, 3-74,
4-10 3-84
L
fix or fight criteria, G-1 PLGR, C-1, C-3, C-6, C-7
launcher emplacement, 3-59,
fix-or-fight guidance, G-1 PTL, 2-48, 2-81, 3-59, 3-79, B-1
3-66, 3-68, C-7, D-2
decision, G-1, G-4 point defense, 3-81
launcher dead zones, 3-68
Index-2
FM 3-01.87
R tactical recommendations, 3-69 missile engagement zone

target engagement, 3-21 (MEZ), 2-19, 3-54,
radar maping process, 3-102, B-1
ABT kill assessment, 3-47 safe passage corridors, 2-20
alternate search, 2-4, 2-50, 2-84
clutter mapping, B-15 engagement eligibility, 3-22,
3-43 W
data acquisition mode, 2-64
engagement status, 3-22 weather mode, 3-105
masked areas, 2-83, B-14
threat assessment, 3-22 World Wide UTM conversion
preliminary mapping
threat evaluation, 3-23 procedures and tables, F-1
procedures, B-2
radar mapping display, 2-81 time to first launch, 3-45
Display A, 2-83, B-4, B-5, B-10 time to last launch, 3-45
Display C, 2-83, B-4, B-5, B-8, weapon system selection, 3-23
Display D, B-6, B-7, B-13, B-14 target identification, 3-19
Display E, B-13 passive identification, 3-20,
3-36
range bias, 2-13, 2-14, 3-79, I-1,
I-8 tactical air to surface missile,
(TASM), 3-1, 3-106
ABT, 2-13
TCA, 3-3
TBM, 3-79
TCO, 3-1
RCS, 3-84
threat, 3-19, 3-22, 3-23, 3-43,
reconstitution, 3-72
3-44, 3-46, 3-51, 3-63
remote launcher employment, D-7
assessment process, 3-22
launcher emplacement, 3-59,
track management, 3-12, 4-4, I-20
3-66, 3-68, C-7, D-3
track while scan, 3-102
engagement zones, 3-66, 3-68
TROPO linkage, 4-15
RSOP, B-1, D-1, D-8,
rules of engagement, 2-1, 3-3, 3-5
U
S Universal Transverse Mercator
overview, F-1, F-3
self-defense, 3-5, 3-46, 3-78, 3-81
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV),
standard emplacement, 2-61, 2-64 3-1
status monitor, 3-25, C-12 RISTA, 3-104
urban low altitude trajectory
control, 3-80
T
tab index, H-8 V
tactical ballistic missile volume correlation, 2-10, 3-36,
considerations, 3-48 I-11
target classification, 3-31, 3-50 volumes, 2-4, 2-18, 2-49, 2-57,
threat assessment, 3-44, 3-46, 3-35
3-51 generalized volumes, 2-18
engagement zones, 3-54, 3-65 overlapping volumes, 3-35
target classification, 3-31 volume types, 3-35
classification process, 3-33 weapon control status, 3-43
identification, 3-34, 3-36, 3-39, compass rose tables, 2-24
3-39, 3-43, I-10 KAA 63 table, 2-24
target display control, 3-21
Index-3
FM 3-01.87
26 SEPTEMBER 2000
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
ERIC K. SHINSEKI
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
Official:
JOEL B. HUDSON
Administrative Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army
0022704
Distribution:
Active Army, Army National Guard, and U. S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with
the initial distribution number 115827, requirements for FM 3-01.87.
PIN: 078423-000

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HEADQUARTERS

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FM 3-01.87

Field Manual Headquarters

Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION TO PATRIOT TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES 1-1

This publication implements the following international standardization agreements (STANAGs)

STANAG TITLE EDITION

Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD). This FM is first and foremost

STAFF AND BATTLE CREWS

COMMUNICATIONS AND LIAISON

POST DEPLOYMENT BUILD-4

POST DEPLOYMENT BUILD-5

FUNCTION OF BATTALION INITIALIZATION

operations. BATI is a setup process that must be performed prior to tactical

PURPOSE OF BATTALION INITIALIZATION

BATTALION INITIALIZATION STRUCTURE

Figure 2-1. BATI Structure, Categories, and Tabs

GEOGRAPHIC DATA PARAMETERS

FIRING DOCTRINE AND IDENTIFICATION PARAMETERS

COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL AND TRACK REPORTING PARAMETERS

IDENTIFICATION, FRIEND OR FOE PARAMETERS

PATRIOT FIRE PLATOON SURVEILLANCE PARAMETERS

ASSETS AND DEFENDED AREAS

DEFINITION AND ASSIGNMENT OF WEAPONS CONTROL AND ID VOLUMES

DEPLOYMENT PLANNING DATA

INITIALIZATION PROCESS CONTROL

DISPLAY CONTROL AND REPORTED INFORMATION

AUTOMATIC BATTALION INITIALIZATION

TAB 13—ICC MODE AND DATA BASE SELECTION

ICC MODE AND DATABASE SELECTION *13*

Figure 2-2. Screen Display of Tab 13

TAB 50—INITIALIZATION CONTROL

INITIALIZATION CONTROL *50*

DATA COLLECTION CONTROL - INTERNAL PAGE 1 OF 2 *90*

(1)=DATA COLLECTION DEVICE: 1= EDR, *TAPE*, 2=ODS2 *DISK*

COLLECTION DEVICE WILL BE FULL IN: nn : nn HOURS:MINUTES

DATA COLLECTION CONTROL - INTERNAL PAGE 2 OF 2 *90*

(1)=EXTERNAL DATA COLLECTION 0= OFF, 1=ON

GEOGRAPHIC CONTROL PARAMETERS

BN GEOGRAPHIC CONTROL PARAMETERS *58*

SYSTEM+WEAPON CONTROL TAB

( ) ADRS: 1=ALL, 2=SUBS, 3=ICC, 4-SLCT SYSTEM=WEAPON S/I

Figure 2-6. Screen Display of SYSTEM + WEAPON CONTROL Tab

BATTALION FIDOC AND OPERATIONAL PARAMETERS

( )ADRS: 1=ALL SUBORD FP , 2=SLCT FIDOC+OPNL PRMTRS PAGE 3 *1*

subordinate to the ICC to automatically identify ECM emitters as hostile.

TAB 6—IFF/SIF CONTROL

TAB 10—LOCAL ENGAGEMENT CONTROL PARAMETERS

risk engagement against a low-level threat. It is important to note that a

TAB 14—TARGET DISPLAY CONTROL

TARGET DISPLAY CONTROL PAGE 1 *14*

TARGET DISPLAY CONTROL PAGE 2 *14*

TAB 70—TBM AND ABT DEFENDED ASSETS, (ICC)

• More flexibility to tailor the defense for current mission

TB( ) =IDENTITY CENTER PT IN UTM

ABT DEFENDED ASSETS *ABT ASSETS PGS 19-54* PG 1 OF 54 *70*

AT( ) =IDENTITY CENTER PT IN UTM

ABT/TBM DEFENDED ASSETS

be designated ATC 1 also to ensure self-defense. THAAD batteries in an air

UTM CENTER RADIUS Asset Numbers

Figure 2-12. Asset Display

TAB 71—ALL VOLUMES AND POINTS DATA

STANDARD USE ARMY AVIATION FLIGHT ROUTE

ICC MODE AND DATABASE SELECTION 13

INITIALIZATION CONTROL 50

DATA COLLECTION CONTROL - INTERNAL PAGE 1 OF 2 90

(1)=DATA COLLECTION DEVICE: 1= EDR, TAPE, 2=ODS2 DISK

DATA COLLECTION CONTROL - INTERNAL PAGE 2 OF 2 90

BN GEOGRAPHIC CONTROL PARAMETERS 58

( )ADRS: 1=ALL SUBORD FP , 2=SLCT FIDOC+OPNL PRMTRS PAGE 3 1

TARGET DISPLAY CONTROL PAGE 1 14

TARGET DISPLAY CONTROL PAGE 2 14

ABT DEFENDED ASSETS ABT ASSETS PGS 19-54 PG 1 OF 54 70

( )=ID ( )=STAT;A/I/T =CURRENT STAT VOLUMES PG 1/150 71

KAA-63 TABLE-AM TABLE PAGE 1 * OF 2* 73

KAA-63 TABLE-PM TABLE PAGE 2 * OF 2* 73

COUNTER ARM THREAT PARAMETER PAGE B 76

DEPLOYMENT/COMMAND PLANNING CONTROL 51

BATTALION COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL DATA ENTRY 67

EXTRA-BN COMM CNTRL DATA + TRACK FILTER PAGE nA 69