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Apple Inc
Date: 28 February 2013
Buy
Fair value Previous FV Share price Yield Capital gain Total return Conviction Stock code Market cap USD600 USD600 USD450 +2% +33% +35% High AAPL US USD476bn
Robin HU
robin@nonameresearch.com
Furthermore, Greenlight is interested in more than the above. Greenlight prefers that 5 iPrefs be issued per common share. At this higher iPrefs distribution, each shareholder will then sell 5 iPrefs in the market for USD50 each or USD250 in total Again, as before, EPS will decline to USD35 (more this time due to the higher number of iPrefs issues) or share price of USD350 at 10x PE Under this scenario, shareholder would have increased the value of their share USD250+USD350=USD600
Hence, according to Greenlight, distributing iPrefs could "unlock value" by increasing AAPL value to the shareholder to USD480 to USD600 from current price of USD450. Greenlight goes on to say that iPrefs are the best option for AAPL as it allows AAPL to "keep the cash" while "rewarding shareholders in a big way". We seek to show that iPrefs are not a good option for both AAPL and the shareholders by showing that iPrefs surreptitiously introduced interest rate risks to the shareholders reduces AAPL capital management flexibility
This difference in capitalisation rate is precisely what iPrefs exploit to enable it to unlock value.
The cash flow carved out needs to be redirected into the fixed income market and this is achieved by listing the iPrefs. This is important for without a market, shareholders could not exit their iPrefs and realise the higher capitalisation of the fixed income market and no value will be "unlocked". So there you have it, iPrefs force a carve out of AAPL cash flow, pump it into the fixed income market, capitalise it at 25x and then cash out. No problem, then? Well, not quite again. There is just that other bit; risk.
Note: Before turning to iPrefs risk, it is worth mentioning that it can be hard to agree with Greenlight that "iPrefs are equity, not debt" and "[iPrefs] have no maturity and no refinancing risk" . Firstly, if iPrefs are equity, one should expect voting rights, share of residue income, etc instead of being limited to a fixed payment. Also, note that the expected buyers of iPrefs would be institutional fixed income funds, pension funds, insurance funds and endowment funds. All these entities are in the market for fixed income. So if the buyers are buying fixed income instruments, won't this mean that the seller is selling fixed income instruments as well? Even Greenlight itself was comparing iPrefs to Microsoft and IBM long dated debt and 30 year US bonds. Secondly, it is not quite true that there is no maturity on the iPrefs. As mentioned, AAPL can not absolve itself from iPrefs without a redemption. There is a maturity date, it is just not set in stone. Thirdly, it is also incorrect to say that there is no refinancing risk. Far from it, the iPrefs are refinanced at the market yield whenever it is distributed to shareholder.
shareholders "should not expect"). Stopping the payment temporarily does not absolve AAPL from the commitment but merely delays it as iPrefs are cumulative. Because AAPL is committed to the iPrefs payment, it will have less FCF (around USD10bn less with 5 iPrefs). This restricts capital management option in a number of ways. Even more cash needs to be hoarded on the balance sheet because AAPL management now knows that is has less FCF to fall back on after iPrefs. There is now a ceiling on dividend to common shareholders because AAPL cash flow needs to be redirected to serve the iPrefs AAPL has less flexibility to pursue opportunistic share buyback in the event of large decline in share price What happens if AAPL P/E expands? If the expansion is large enough, it may now be more desirable to have higher EPS but here iPrefs EPS drag will now be a negative factor
Conclusion
It is rather hard to see the point in Greenlights iPrefs proposal. At the heart of iPrefs is the exploitation of the difference in capitalisation rate between the fixed income and equity market. This may seem ingenious but the corresponding introduction of interest rate risks and reduction in capital management flexibility are hardly great trade-off. Furthermore, there are a myriad of inputs that affect the return of iPrefs such as current yield, expected spread of iPrefs, P/E of AAPL, AAPL current share price, amount committed to iPrefs, etc. All these create a lot of uncertainties and do not appear to be something the shareholder should trade off just so that AAPL share could go to USD600. Instead of reward, risks take precedence here. However, having said that, Greenlight does have a point about too much cash on Apple balance sheet. Imagine you own a restaurant (perhaps one with aluminum cutlery) and you hired great managers to run it. Business is doing wonderful and cash just keep piling up but at the end of the month, the managers refused to remit the earnings back to you but let it sit in the till instead. Would you not be mad? You would probably tell the managers that unless they clearly explain why they are hoarding cash, they must remit it back to you. Hoarding should be the exception and not the rule. It is your money after all. And that is, unfortunately, something that AAPL management does not seem to understand very well.
nonameresearch.com | 28 February 2013 Rating structure The rating structure consists of two main elements; fair value and conviction rating. The fair value reflects the security intrinsic value and is derived based on fundamental analysis. The conviction rating reflects uncertainty associated with the security fair value and is derived based on broad factors such as underlying business risks, contingent events and other variables. Both the fair value and conviction rating are then used to form a view of the security potential total return. A Buy call implies a potential total return of 10% or more, a Sell call implies a potential total loss of 10% or more while all other circumstances result in a Neutral call.
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