TORTS and DAMAGES

Finals Reviewer
Legend: Case doctrines verbatim Provisions Textbook Notes (class discussions) Fides Notes Ivans Notes Gretas love notes xxx WARNING xxx Reader beware. Most of the notes written under the cases are taken verbatim from the original. This reviewer is arranged according to the syllabus provided by the professor. In case of doubt, please refer to the original text and your own notes. p.s. kung may mali, malamang galing kay Ivan. Week 1: Concept of a Tort v. Quasi-delict Damage, Damages and Injury 2176: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Aquino: Tort is an unlawful violation of a private right, not created by contract, and which gives rise to an action for damages. De Leon: Tort: a legal wrong that causes harm for which the violator is subject to civil liability Tortious Act: a wrongful act. The commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. Sir:

Tort is a common law term, its is not found in the NCC. No Philippine definition for tort. Code did not intend to have a law on torts. We have tort-like provisions. Purpose of tort: a. Reparation : policy of the State to allocate the cost of damages b. Deterrent: for future wrong behavior Naguiat v. NLRC Tort consist in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. Tort is a breach of a legal duty. Tort is a legal duty. There must be an individual injured. Alex: This definition is too broad; given this definition, everything in 1157 would be included. Vinzons-Chato v. Fortune Tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. Civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been rendered immaterial. Presence of good motive does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of anothers legal right; liability in tort is not precluded by the fact that the defendant acted without evil intent. It is the clear intention of the legislature to create a distinct cause of action in the nature of tort for violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or intent of the defendant. Barredo v. Garcia A concurrence in scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime and responsibility for cuasi-delictos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under Article 100 of the RPC or create an action for cuasidelictos under 1902-1903 (2176-2177) of the Civil Code. They overlap but such overlapping will not destroy the distinction because the same act may give rise to both. Court reasoned out that:

a. strict interpretation would extinguish culpa aquiliana because an application of the small scope would render it of no application in the real world b. it is harder to prove crime, such would make it easier for people to get redress; in crime, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required while in quasi-delict, preponderance of evidence is sufficient c. such strict construction would deny the injured expeditious relief Elcano v. Hill Culpa aquiliana (quasi-delict) includes acts which are criminal in character, whether voluntary or negligent. Elcano clarified Barredo and added intentional acts in quasi-delict because of the change in the wording of the CC which eliminated the phrase not punishable by law. Both ponentes in Elcano and Barredo were motivated by the concept of justice, the deeper reason of vicarious liability. Cinco v. Canonoy Quasi-delict is that of an independent source of obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony. The concept of quasi-delict is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no distinction between damage to persons on the one hand and damage to property in the other. The word damage is used in two concepts: the harm done and the reparation for the harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since harm is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. Baksh v. CA Article 2176 which defines quasi-delict is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of wilfulness or intent. Quasi-delict is a civil law concept, while torts is a common law cocept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the drafters of the Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain

exceptions, are to be governed by the RPC while negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the NCC. Coca-Cola Bottlers v. CA Quasi- delict is homologous but not identical to tort under the common law which includes not only negligence, but also intentional criminal acts. While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the law on quasi-delict, the liability itself may be deemed to arise from a quasi-delict, i.e., the act which breaks the contract may also be a quasi-delict. Otherwise put, the liability for quasidelict may still exist despite the presence of contractual relations. People v. Ballesteros Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise expressed, the pecuniary consequence which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Custodio v. CA To warrant a recovery for damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage or damage without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the inury caused by a breach or wrong. Injury: illegal invasion of a right Damage: loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury Damages: recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty (damnum absque injuria). The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. Week 2: Elements of a Quasi-delict Quasi-delict and Delict Quasi-delict and Contract

2176: Whoever by act or omission causes damages to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

2177: Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. 2177 makes clear Barredo which says that you can have both crime and quasi-delict for the same act provided one does not recover twice. PNR v. Brunty Requisites for claim based on quasi-delict: a. damage to plaintiff b. negligence, by act or omission, of which the defendant, or some person for whose acts he must respond was guilty c. connection of cause and effect between such negligence and damage. Most complete and consistent with 2176. But it should be injury resulting to damage. (benefit of the class) BPI v. Lifetime Elements of quasi-delict: a. fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond b. damages suffered by plaintiff c. connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Garcia v. Salvador Elements of actionable conduct: a. duty b. breach c. injury d. proximate causation

Violation of a statutory duty is negligence. Where the law imposes upon a person the duty to do something, his omission or non-performance will render him liable to whoever may be injured thereby. How to reconcile these elements with other jurisprudence? Sir says this is not a quasi-delict but more like a tort as there is NO mention of negligence. It mentions Article 20 which is a human relations tort. When asked, sir said its our problem daw. (coooool.) Gregorio v. CA Every TORT case filed under 2176 has to prove the following by a preponderance of evidence: a. damages suffered b. fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person to whose act he must respond c. connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and the damages incurred d. there must be No pre-existing contractual relations between the parties Note here that the court says Tort under 2176, here the court is equating tort with 2176 which in effect equates tort with QD. Barredo v. Garcia Quasi-delict: a. private concern b. indemnification is for reparation of damage c. broad scope; it includes all acts in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes Delict: a. concerns public interest b. punishes the wrongful act c. punishes only those indicated in penal law Andamo v. IAC Elements of quasi-delict: a. damages suffered by plaintiff b. fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond c. connection of cause and effect between the fault and negligence of the defendant and damages incurred by the plaintiff Article 2176 covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. But

there is still a distinction between criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of the law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence which is culpa aquiliana, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the RPC or create an action for QD. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil caase, unless, in an event of an acquittal where the court has declared the fact that from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of civil liability. Occena v. Icamina A person who is found to be criminally liable offends two entities. Crime has a dual character: a. as an offense against the State because of the disturbance of social order b. as an offense against the private person injured by the crime What gives rise to civil liability even in a criminal offense is the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. LG Foods v. Philadelfa An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender: 1) civil liability ex-delicto and 2) independent civil liabilities such as those: a. not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, or b. where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action. Either may be forced upon the offender, the victims having a choice which action to enforce. 1170: Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. 1171: Responsibility arising from fraud is demandable in all obligations. Any waiver of an action for future fraud is void. 1172: Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts,

according to the circumstances. 1174: Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which, could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. 2178: The provisions of Articles 1172-1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict. Cangco v. Manila Railroad (**note: I cannot find my copy of this case, all I have about this is my notes. Read and believe at your own risk.) In cases of non-contractual obligation, it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself that creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinulum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation. Culpa contractual and culpa aquiliana are concentric, contractual being the smaller, inner circle contained within the bigger, outer circle which is aquiliana. The main difference is in the defense: In culpa contractual, what one has to do is to prove that there is a contract and it has been breached, and such breach entitles the plaintiff to damages. In culpa aquiliana, proof of diligence precludes one from recovery for any damage or injury. FGU Insurance v. Sarmiento In culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of a contract and the failure of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. Unlike culpa aquiliana which requires that the claimant for damages prove negligence or fault on the part of the defendant. Calalas v. CA Culpa aquiliana has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor, while culpa contractual is premised upon the negligence in the performance of the contractual obligation. In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action. In breach of contract the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of a contract and the fact that the obligor failed to comply with the contract.

The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for QD and not in actions involving breach. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. Batal v. San Pedro Culpa or negligence may be understood in two senses: either as culpa aquiliana, which is the wrongful or negligent act or omission which creates a vinculum juris and gives rise to an obligation between two persons not formally bound by any other obligation, or as culpa contractual which is the fault or negligence incident in the performance of an obligation which already existed, and which increases the liability from such already existing obligation. Aquiliana is governed by 2176 while contractual is covered by Articles 11701174 of the civil code. But 2178 says that 1170-1174 also apply to quasi-delict. Fores v. Miranda The difference in conditions, defenses and proof, as well as the codal concept of quasi-delict as essentially extra contractual negligence, compel as to differentiate between an action ex contractu and actions ex delicto, and prevent us from viewing the action for breach of contract as simultaneously embodying an action on tort,. Far East v. CA A quasi-delict can be the cause for breaching a contract that might thereby permit the application of applicable principles of tort even when there is a pre-existing contract between the plaintiff and the defendant. But thus doctrine governs only where the act or omission complained of would constitute an actionable tort independently of the contract. The test (on whether a quasi-delict can be deened to underlie the breach of contract) can be stated as: Where, without a pre-existing contract between two parties, an act or omission can nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Air France v. Carrascoso The act that breaks the contract may also be a tort.

In this case, the contract between the parties is one attended with public duty. The violation of such is a quasi-delict. Note here that this case was decided on the basis of the contract, then later on discussed quasi-delicts. It seems then that if an act can be both a breach and a tort, apply the contract first. PSBA v. CA Court here ruled that circumstances show the existence of contractual relation, hence the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. (Court here is very pakyut not really!?!)Court here affirmed the previous doctrines in Air France and Cangco. But case at bar failed to pass the Cangco test as the negligence of PSBA would not be relevant absent a contract, A contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the schools liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently on the contract . Syquia v. CA Although a pre-existing contract does not preclude the existence of a culpa aquiliana, lack or absence of negligence does. Light Rail Transit v. Navidad A contractual obligation may be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, 2194 can well apply. Liability for a tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. When an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictal liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by a tort, thereby allowing the rules of tort to applu. Consolidated Bank v. CA While in culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a presumption that the defendant was at fault or negligent and the burden is on the defendant to prove he was not at fault or negligent, in culpa aquiliana, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent.

The defense of exercising the required diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a complete defense in culpa contractual, unlike in culpa aquiliana Week 3: Concept of Negligence Standard of Conduct: a. Children b. Experts c. Medical Professionals 1173: The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When the negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2 shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. Elements of negligence: a. omission b. diligence required with respect to time, person and place It is the absence of diligence depending on the circumstances: you may be negligent and diligent at the same time. How to determine negligence: a. Code b. Jurisprudence c. Other laws Standard of Conduct: a reasonably prudent man; an average person of average intelligence. It is an objective standard. Experts: acceptance of an undertaking entails a representation of possessing requisite skills of a reasonable professional engaged in such profession or business. But sir says an expert is not equal to a professional. An expert is someone who claims he can do the job. Picart v. Smith

TEST: Did defendant, in doing the alleged act, use the reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? PNR v. Brunty Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. Negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances. It is relative and comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. (Corliss v. Manila Railroad Company) Sicam v. Jorge Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The diligence which the law requires the individual at all times to govern his conduct varies with the nature of the situation in which he is placed and the importance of the act which he is to perform. PNR v. CA Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. There is no hard and fast rule whereby such degree of care and vigilance is calibrated; it is dependent upon the circumstances in which a person finds himself. All that the law requires is that its is perpetually compelling upon a person to use that care and diligence expected of sensible men under comparable circumstances. Corinthian Gardens v. Tanjangco Negligence is an inadvertent act; it may merely be carelessly done from a lack of ordinary prudence and may be one which creates a situation involving an unreasonable risk to another because of the expectable action of the other, a third person, an animal or a force of nature.

A negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the actors position, in the same or similar circumstances, would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act or to do it in a more careful manner. Uses the Picart test. Taylor v. Manila Railroad The conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same rule which governs an adult. The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and perhaps impossible to do so, for in the very nature of things the question of diligence necessarily depends on the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be dine by him. Jarco Marketing v. CA Negligence and accident are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary case, which is not caused by fault of any person which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by prudence. Ylarde v. Aquino The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity of the person endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult, but his conduct to which a child must coform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, ordinarily exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar circumstances. Culion v. Philippine When a person holds himself out as being competent to do things requiring professional skill, he will be held liable for negligence if he fails to exhibit the care and skill of one ordinarily skilled in the particular work which he attempts to do.

US v. Pineda The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands. A very high degree of care is required of druggist. When it involves them, mistake is negligence and care is not a defense. Mercury Drug v. De Leon Druggists must exercise the highest degree of prudence and vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of business, so that human life may not be constantly exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicines. Cruz v. CA Whether or not a physician has committed an inexcusable lack of precaution in the treatment of his patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science. In medical malpractice the expert testimony is essential to establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the physicians conduct in the treatment and care falls below such standard. In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach and the resulting death (or injury) of his patient. Professional Services v. Agana Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting consultant staff. While consultants are not, technically employees, x x x, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, hence, employer is liable for the negligence of its employees (doctors). Cantre v. Go

In cases involving medical negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows the mere existence of an injury to justify a presumption of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrument causing the injury. Cayao-Lasam v. Ramolete Medical malpractice is a particular form of negligence which consists in the failure of a physician or surgeon to apply his practice of medicine that degree of care and skill which is ordinarily employed by the profession generally, under similar conditions and in like surrounding circumstances. Four elements: a. duty b. breach c. injury d. proximate causation Expert testimony is essential. To qualify as such, one must have acquired special knowledge of the subject matter about which he or she is to testify, either by the study of recognized authorities on the subject matter or by practical experience. Lucas v. dr. Tuano A physician is under a duty to his patient to exercise that degree of care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood or in the same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases, which can be proven by expert testimony. There is breach when patient is injured and it must be shown that such injury is the legitimate consequence of the wrong done. "[t]he onus probandi was on the patient to establish before the trial court that the physicians ignored standard medical procedure, prescribed and administered medication with recklessness and exhibited an absence of the competence and skills expected of general practitioners similarly situated." Week 4: Degrees of Negligence Burden of Proof and Presumptions Res ipsa loquitur 2231: In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.

Gross v. Slight negligence: - presence of awareness of harm that might happen Gross Negligence v. Intentional Act - no intent in GN while intent is material in the latter Amedo v. Rio Notorious negligence has been helf to be tantamount to gross negligence. Gross negligence is the want of even slight care and diligence. It is meant such entire want of care as to raise a presumption that the person in fault is conscious of the probable consequences of carelessness and is indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury to person or property of others The negligence must amount to reckless disregard of the safety of person or property. Marinduque v. Workmens The violation of a rule imposed is not negligence per se, but it may be the best evidence for negligence. But such violation is not negligence when the rule or prohibition had nothing to do with the safety of the person. Gross/notorious negligence is the: - conscious indifference to consequences - pursuing a course of conduct which would naturally and probably result in injury - utter disregard of consequences Ilao-Oreta v. Ronquillo Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of the consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. It is characterized by want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. Rule 131 Sec 1 ROC: Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. 2184: In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had

been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next two preceding months. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provision of Article 2180 are applicable. 2185: Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. 2188: There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business. 1734: Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes: (1)Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity; (2)Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil; (3)Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; (4)The character of goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; (5)Order or act of competent public authority 1735: In all cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as required in Article 1733. Res ipsa loquitur: The things speaks for itself. Framework: 1. Definition (See Layugan) 2. Requisites a. Nature b. Control of the thing c. Lack of contributory negligence Absence of evidence 3. Effects a. presumption is created b. expert testimony 4. Rationale Citing Blacks Law dictionary:

The rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof that instrumentality causing the injury was in defendants exclusive control and that the accident was one which ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence.. It is a rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from mere fact that accident happened provided character of accident and circumstances attending it lead reasonably to the belief that in the absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that the thing which caused the injury is shown to have been under the management and control of alleged wrongdoer. Layugan v. IAC Res ipsa: When the thing which causes the injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. It is a rule of evidence peculiar to the law of evidence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. (It is for procedural convenience). It is not intended to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the part of the party charged. It determines and regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof and facilitates the burden of plaintiff of proving a breach of duty of due care. It can be invoked ONLY when DIRECT evidence is absent and unavailable. Once actual cause of injury is established beyond controversy, no presumption shall be involved and the doctrine is inapplicable. Ramos v. CA RIL is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or make out a plaintiffs prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with an explanation. Where the thing which caused the injury is show to be under the management of the defendants or his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of thing does not happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from or was caused by want of care. RIL is applied in conjuction with DOCTRINE of COMMON KNOWLEDGE. It is simply a recognition of the postulate that as a matter of common knowledge and experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls

the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself. Requisites of RIL: a. accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence b. it is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant/s c. the possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: If RIL applies, expert testimony is dispensed with as injury is proof of negligence. This is because expert testimony within the realm of science and not to matters within the common knowledge of man. How do we reconcile this with Cruz v. CA which states that expert testimony is essential in medical malpractice cases? We think that expert testimony is required once RIL is rebutted. I remember the discussion that it is better anyway to present expert testimony even if based on RIL just in case the presumption is rebutted and because RIL also does not dispense with the need to prove negligence. Besides, RIL does not automatically apply in all medical malpractice cases. Proof needed: Plaintiff must prove the nexus between the particular act or omission complained of and the injury sustained while being under the custody and management of the defendant without need to produce expert medical testimony to establish the standard of care. Test: Whether or not in the process of the operation any extraordinary incident or unusual event outside of the routine performance occurred which is beyond the regular scope of customary professional activity in such operations, which, if unexplained would themselves reasonably speak to the average man as the negligent cause or causes of the untoward consequence. Cantre v. Go Requisites of RIL: a. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence b. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant/s

c. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated Batiquin v. CA The doctrine of [r]es ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. Professional Services v. Agana Requisites: a. occurrence of an injury b. thing which cause the injury was under the control and management of the defendant/s c. the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things, would not have happened if those who had control or management used proper care d. the absence of explanation by the defendant cf. requirements in Ramos v. CA To rebut presumption, defendant must show due care and diligence. DM Consunji v. CA Theoretical bases: NECESSITY (the power of the defendant to show NO negligence and the direct proof of negligence is beyond the power of the plaintiff) (summarized) a. chief evidence is accessible to the defendant and unknown to the plaintiff so that the latter is compelled to allege on general terms and rely on the happening of the event b. furnishes a bridge which allows the plaintiff who is without knowledge to ask defendant who knows or should know the cause to provide an explanation of care exercised with respect to the matter complained of This adds another requirement for application: It must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of the accident. Such presumption may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable presumption, such as that due care or innocence, may outweigh inference. It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant, say due care, comes into play after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has been established.

College Assurance v. Belfranlt Requisites: a. accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent b. the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge c. injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured Week 5: Defenses against charge of negligence a. Plaintiffs negligence is proximate cause b. Contributory negligence of plaintiff c. Fortuitous event d. Plaintiffs assumption of risk (volenti non fit injuria) e. Prescription 2179: When the plaintiffs own negligence was immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. Manila Electric v. Remoquillo A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. The plaintiffs negligence being the proximate cause of the injury bars recovery. Bernardo v. Legaspi

Both plaintiff and defendant were negligent in handling their automobiles and that said negligence was of such a character and extent on the part of both as to prevent either from recovering. Where the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his own carelessness contributes to the principal occurrence, that is, to the accident, as one of the determining causes thereof, he cannot recover. Where the plaintiff in a negligence action, by his own carelessness contributes to the principal occurrence, that is, to the accident, as one of the determining causes thereof, he cannot recover. Bernal v. House The contributory negligence of the plaintiff does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the damages. But in this case, court found NO contributory negligence because the mother and child had a perfect right to be on the street and they could not reasonably foresee the child being frightened by an automobile and falling into a ditch full of hot water. PLDT v. CA The omission to perform a duty, such as the placing of warning signs on the site of the excavation, constitutes the proximate cause only when the doing of the said omitted act would have prevented the injury. A person claiming damages for the negligence of another has the burden of proving the existence of such fault or negligence causative thereof. NPC v. Heirs of Casionan Contributory negligence is conduct in the part of the injured property, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard which which he is required to conform for his own protection. There is contributory negligence when the partys act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could harm him or put his life in danger. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person inured which, concurring with the defendants negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury. The underlying precept is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the

consequences of his own negligence. If there is, the award fro damages must be reduced. Anonueva v. CA - a violation of a statute is not sufficient to hold that the violation was the proximate cause of the injury, unless the very injury that happened was precisely what was intended to be prevented by the statute. Plaintiffs violation should be construed in relation to the contemporaneous circumstances of the accident. Genobiagon v. CA "The defense of contributory" negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence. 2214: In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages he may recover. M.H. Rakes v. Atlantic Gulf Contributory negligence the negligence of the injured person contributing to his injury but not being one of the determining causes of the principal accident, does not operate to bar recovery, but only in the reduction of his damages. Each party is chargeable with damages in proportion to his fault. Where plaintiff contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence. The contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the injured party's negligence. Where an individual is civilly liable for negligence, it is not required that the injured party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right. The intervention of a third person cannot relieve one from the performance of its duty nor impose upon the other the consequences of an act or omission not his own. Lambert v. Heirs of Ray

The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. If the plaintiffs negligence is NOT the proximate cause of the injury, he may still recover. Proximate cause being the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. 1174: Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which, could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. Fortuitous Event Fortuitous event is a defense, unless: a. stipulated by a law b. stipulated in contract c. requires assumption of risk Juntilla v. Funtanar Essential characteristics of caso fortuito: a. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will b. It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid c. The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner d. The obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation (Lasam v. Smith) A passenger is entitled to recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in an appliance purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it appears that the defect would have been discovered by the carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which under the circumstances was incumbent upon it, with regard to inspection and application of the necessary tests. Fortuitous event is not a defense when there is active participation and/or neglect or inaction, which, humanizes the disaster. Southeastern College v. CA

In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may be occasioned. An Act of God cannot be invoked for the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its possible adverse consequences. When a persons negligence occurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to another, such person is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate and proximate cause of the damage or injury was a fortuitous event. When the effect is found to be partly the result of the participation of man whether from active intervention, or neglect, or failure to act the whole occurrence is hereby humanized, and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God. A typhoon or storm is a fortuitous event, a natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of foresight, diligence or care. In order that a fortuitous event preclude the payment of damages, their must not have been any negligence of the defendant which contributed to the injury. When a person's negligence concurs with a fortuitous event in producing Damage to another person, the defendant is not absolved of liability by showing the caso fortuito was the proximate cause of damage. Sicam v. Jorge The mere difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the same. To be free from liability for reason of fortuitous event, the debtor must, in addition to the casus itself, be free of any concurrent or contributory fault or negligence. Robbery is not a fortuitous event per se. It is not enough to allege robbery, the defendant must also prove that there was no negligence. College Assurance v. Belfranlt Article 1667 creates the presumption that the lessee is liable for the deterioration or loss of a thing leased. To overcome such legal presumption, the lessee must prove that the deterioration or loss was due to a fortuitous event which took place without his fault or negligence. Article 1174 defines a fortuitous event as that which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. Whether an act of god or an act of man, it must follow the requisites laid down in Lasam v. Smith.

If the negligence or fault of the obligor coincided with the occurrence of a fortuitous event, and caused the loss or damage or aggravation thereof, the fortuitous event canot shield the obligor from liability for his negligence. Fire is not a fortuitous event if there was negligence on the part of the defendant and if the fire had a man-made source. Afialda v. Hisole This is the case involving the caretaker being gored by a carabao. Action is based on statute that says the possessor is responsible for damages caused by animal. Such liability ceasing only when damage results from force majeure or fault of the injured person. The risk of being gored is a a veritable accident of labor which should come under the labor laws rather than under the NCC. Volenti non fit injuria: to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury. Ilocos Norte v. CA When an act of God combines with defendants negligence to produce an injury, defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct. Volenti non fit injuria N/A because its tantamount to punishing her for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury. For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property. Nikko Hotel v. Reyes Volenti non fi injuria refers to a self-inflicted injury or to consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. Volenti non fit injuria prevents you from seeking damages from injuries when you assume the risk. Kramer v. CA

As to prescription, an action based on quasi-delict must be instituted within four (4) years from the date the quasi-delict was committed. C.f. from the time of discovery. Week 6: Proximate/Remote/Concurrent Cause Efficient intervening cause But for/Substantial factor test Cause v. Condition

Proximate Cause - there is a chain of events that lead to injury A B C INJURY For A to be proximate - w/o A, injury would not result - B and C must be natural probable consequences - It should have been foreseeable, if not foreseeable it is not fortuitous, therefore not proximate Concurrent Causes: Effects: a. does not exculpate the defendants b. solidary liability for joint tortfeasors Remote Cause: determined by efficient intervening cause (EIC) that breaks the chain of events. If there is an EIC, PC turns into RC and EIC becomes PC. Bataclan v. Medina

Proximate cause us that cause which, in natural and contiuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. Proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately affecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom. Gabeto v. Araneta When an appreciable interval of time elapsed between an act and the accident, the act may be considered too remote as to be the proximate cause of the accident. Far East v. CA Negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than the plaintiffs, is the proximate cause of the injury. Where several causes combine to produce injuries, a person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. Where several causes are concurrent and each is efficient cause of the injury, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actors negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. Their liability is joint and solidary. Phoenix Construction v. IAC

Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. The distinction between cause of the harm and existing conditions upon which that cause operated is now almost entirely discredited. As it is not the distinction between them which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause. Foreseeable intervening forces : If the cause is one which ordinary humanexperience is reasonably to be anticipated or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason. They are within the scope of original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. Dy Teban v. Ching There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause. It is based upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Plaintiff must, however, establish a sufficient link between the act or omission and the damage or injury. That link must not be remote or farfetched; otherwise, no liability will attach. The damage must be a natural and probable result. Mercury Drug v. Baking, Pilipinas Bank v. CA, Urbano v. IAC and McKee v. IAC (Same definition as Bataclan) Manila Electric v. Remoquillo A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because if the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. Teague v. Fernandez

Violation of an ordinance intended to promote safety is negligence. If by creating the hazard which the ordinance was intended to avoid it brings about the harm which the ordinance was intended to prevent, it is a legal cause of the harm. The test is to be found not in the number of intervening events or agents, but in their character and in the natural and probable connection between the wrong done and the injurious consequence. Philippine Rabbit v. CA Substantial Factor Test: If the actors conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable. Rodrigueza v. Manila Railroad Nobody is bound to anticipate and defend himself from the possible negligence of another. Rather he has the right to assume that the other would act like a prudent man. Week 7: Last Clear Chance The negligence of the plaintiff must precede the negligence if the defendant. Elements: a. claimants antecedent negligence created peril/danger b. defendants subsequent negligence c. defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the injury Sangco: d. time and opportunity e. defendant must be aware of the existence of peril. When to apply: a. when both are negligent but NOT concurrent b. collisions N/A when: a. breach of contract b. concurrent negligence c. suit NOT between owners/drivers (e.g. passengers)

d. not aware of the peril e. forced to act instantaneously (emergency rule) Picart v. Smith The person who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of the other party. Bustamante v. CA The negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided the injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiffs negligence. Sangco Even though a persons acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery. Sangco A person who had the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponents or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. Sangco The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiffs peril, or according to some authorities, should have been aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due case, had in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to avoid an accident. AmJur The principle applies in a suit between owners and drivers of colliding vehicles and does NOT arise where it is the passenger who demands responsibility from the carrier for it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and owner of the carrier on the ground that the other driver is likewise guilty. It cannot be invoked between defendants concurrently negligent. Phoenix v. IAC It is a common law theory adopted to mitigate the harshness of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff rule under which the plaintiff is barred

from recovery, unlike in our system where it merely reduces the amount recovered. The doctrine cannot be generally applied in civil cases. Under Article 2179, the task of the court, in technical terms, is to determine whose negligence was the legal proximate cause of the injury. The task is not simply or even primarily an exercise in chronology or physics. The relative location in the continuum of the time of the plaintiffs and the defendants negligent acts or omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account. Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or omission for the rest of the community. Phil. Bank of Commerce v. CA Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure.Banks are bound to the highest degree of care, owing to the extremely fiduciary nature of a bank. Glan v. IAC LCC provides as a valid and complete defense to accident liability today. Pantrangco v. Baesa The doctrine applies only in a situation where the plaintiff was guilty of a prior or antecedent negligence but the defendant who had the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made liable for all the consequences of the accident notwithstanding prior negligence of plaintiff. LCC does not apply when the person who allegedly had the last opportunity to avoid the accident was not aware of the existence of the peril. LCC does not apply where the party charged is required to act instantaneously and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered. LCC does not apply when the subsequent negligence becomes the proximate cause of the injury. Canlas v. CA cites Bustamante

Consolidated Bank v. CA We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the performance of its contractual obligation to L.C. Diaz. This is a case of culpa contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability. Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages Engada v. CA LCC does not apply when the Emergency Rule is applied: An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the emergency was brought by his own negligence. PNR v. Brunty NCC does not apply when the act or omission of one of the parties is the proximate cause of the injury. Lapanday v. Angala In this case, Deocampo had the last clear chance to avoid the collision. He had full control of the situation since he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him and had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. A U-turn is done at a much slower speed to avoid skidding and overturning, compared to running straight ahead. He could have avoided the vehicle if he was not driving very fast while following the pick-up. Deocampo was not only driving fast, he also admitted that he did not step on the brakes even upon seeing the pick-up. He only stepped on the brakes after the collision. Week 8: The Tortfeasor Vicarious Liability a. Parents/Guardians b. Teachers 2176: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasidelict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

2184: In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next two preceding months. If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provision of Article 2180 are applicable. 2194: The liability of two or more persons who are liablie for quasi-delict is solidary. Worcester v. Ocampo Joint tortfeasors includes all persons who command, instigate, promote, encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it, after it is done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful acts themselves. They are NOT liable pro-rata and the damages cannot be apportioned among them, except among themselves. Each us liable for the whole damage and it is not a defense for the one sues that the others who participated are not joint with him as defendant, nor is it an excuse that his participation is the tort was insignificant was compared with that of the others. This also means that there can be but one satisfaction of the claim. Release of one of them entails the release of all of them. Chapman v Underwood The owner of an automobile, present in the vehicle, is not liable for the negligent acts of a competent driver unless such acts are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct the driver to desist therefrom, and to fail to do so. The act if the driver must be a sudden act of negligence to absolve the owner present in the vehicle to absolve the latter from criminal and civil liability. Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai The basis for the liability of the owner of the vehicle is not repondeat superior but rather the relationship of pater familias. The theory is that ultimately the negligence if the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage. FC 216: In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following

persons shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated: 1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in 214; 2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and 3) The childs actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified. Whenever the appointment if a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed. FC 217: In case of foundlings, abandoned, neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of childrens homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency. FC 218: The school its administrators and teachers or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction and custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. FC 219: Those given he authority and responsibility under the preceding article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts and omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable. The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. FC 221: Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. FC 236: Emancipation for any cause shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.

Contracting marriage shall require parental authority until the age of twenty-one. Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from duty and responsibility of parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of article 2180 of the Civil Code. RPC 101: The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules: First. In cases of subdivisions 1, 2, and 3 of article 12, the civil liability for acts committed by an imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part. Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship, or control or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law. Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received. The courts shall determine, in sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable. When the respective shares cannot be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations. Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution. RPC 102: In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or

their employees. Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees. RPC 103: The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties. RA 9344 Sec 6: A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act. A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act. The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws. 2180: The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. Guardians are liable for the damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company. The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees or household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are

not engaged in any business or industry. The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case, what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trade shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody. The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. 2181: Whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents or employees nay recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim. Exconde v. Capuno The obligation on the parents for their children is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them , which imposes upon the parents the duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their means, while on the other hand, gives them the right to correct and punish them in moderation. The only way they are relieved of liability is if they prove that they exercised due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Salen v. Balce 2180 (2) covers not only obligations which arise from quasi-delict but also those which arise from criminal offenses. To hold otherwise would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervebes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her sin, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. If the child involved however is exempted due to insanity, imbecility or minority, the father becomes civilly liable in accordance with RPC 101, because ethe idea is to not leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority and control. Elcano v. Hill

Libi v. IAC The liability of parents for their minor children should be solidary rather than subsidiary to allow them to use the defense of due care and diligence. Tamargo v. CA The principle of parental liability is a species of vicarious liability or doctrine of imputed negligence under Anglo-American tort law. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is their custody and control. Parental liability is anchored upon parental authority coupled with parental dereliction. This presumption may be overturned by proof of exercise of diligence of a good father of a family. Retroactive effect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. No presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was committed. Mercado v. CA As to whether or not the teacher or head of the school should be held responsible instead of the parents based on 2180, the court said that the clause "so long as they remain in their custody," applies only to institution of arts and trades and not to academic institution as it contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Palisoc v. Brillantes

The student need not live with the school teacher for the latter to be liable under the formers tort. Exconde and Mercado cases now deemed abandoned. The phrase so long as they reman in their custody means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are in attendance in the school and includes recess time. The rationale of such liability of school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child." This is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the Civil Code. In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation to provide proper supervision over the students activities the whole time they are in school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect them from hazards which would be reasonably anticipated, including injuries that some students themselves may inflict wilfully or through negligence on their fellow students. Amadora v. CA Article 2180 applies to both academic and non-academic institutions as there is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the nonacademic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. The reason for the previous disparity may be traced historically : the head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly instructed them on the technique and secrets of their craft. However, such distinction is no longer present in contemporary times. The rule is that: As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the

responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. (this is just a presumption and can be overcome by evidence) Salvosa v. IAC A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the school activity is conducted. Recess by its nature does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the "protective and supervisory custody' of the school, as contemplated in the law. St. Marys Academy v. Carpitanos Article 218 applies when the school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care has a minor under its supervision, instruction or custody. This special parental authority and responsibility applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the school premises thus including field trips, excursions and other affairs of pupils and students outside the premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers. The Supreme Court clarified that in order for the person or entity exercising special parental authority to be solidarily and principally liable for the damages caused by the acts or omissions by the minor under supervision, instruction or custody, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident. Week 9: Vicarious Liability a. Owners/Managers of Establishments b. Employers c. State Phil. Rabbit v. Phil American The term employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise used in 2180 of the Civil Code do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the context of 2180 that the term manager is used in the sense of employer. No tortuous or quasi-delictal

liability can be fastened on the manager of the corporation because he himself may be regarded as an employee or dependiente of the corporation. Philtranco v. CA The liability of the registered owner of a pubic service vehicle for damages arising from the tortuous acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint and several or solidary with the driver. Since the employers liability is such, its only recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict. Note here that the Court did NOT discuss if it is under 2180 (4) or (5). Solidary liability was based on 2194 and 2187. The important rule here is that registered owner is strictly liable. Lampesa v. De Vera Once the negligence on the part of the employee is established, a presumption instantly arises that the ER was negligent in the selection and/or supervision of said employee. To rebut this presumption, the employer must present adequate and convincing proof that he exercised care and diligence in the selection and supervision of is employees. Sps Jayme v. Apostol To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees, the following requisites must be established: (1) That the employee was chosen by the employer personally or through another; (2) That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has the authority to give at all times; and (3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him. No negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee although the person may have the right to control the manner of the vehicles operation. In the absence of the EE-ER relationship establishing vicarious liability, negligence should not be attributed to a fellow employee who only happens to be an occupant of the vehicle. The solution should have been to sue the mayor under 2194 as a joint tortfeasor. Tan v. Jam Transit

Whenever an employees negligence causes damage or injury to another, the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees arises. To avoid such, defendant must present convincing proof of due care and diligence. Presumption of negligence arises if: a. EE is negligent, and; b. EE-ER relationship exists This is a rebuttable presumption BUT it is hard to prove as these are usually not documented. Saludaga v. FEU 2180 cannot be invoked because FEU is not the employer. It is a mere client of the agency who selects and supplies the guards. FEU should have been held liable under the contractual issue. Sir says failure to rule on this basis may be due to the PSBA ruling that when there us a contract, the rules on quasi-delict do not apply. Also, the facts proving the negligence are after the fact of the occurrence of the negligent act. Castilex v. Vasquez The mere fact that an employee was using a service vehicle at the time the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge his employer with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. Where there is paucity of evidence that an employee was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him when a tortuous act occurred, the employer has no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in providing the employee with a service vehicle, and the employer is thus relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of the negligence of the employee. The courts ruling here in effect makes 2180 (4) useless because 2180 (5) has already covered and expanded it, thus in effect, covering everything. 2180 (4) Owners and managers of establishments or industries. Tort in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions 2180 (5) Employers in general, whether engaged in such or not Acting within the scope of their assigned tasks (expands 2180 (4))

Requisites to raise presumption of employer liability: a. EE-ER Relationship b. EE acting within the scope of assigned tasks c. EE was negligent Defense: due care and diligence in selection and supervision Driving a company car does not mean that it is actually in performance of ones assigned tasks. Filamer v. IAC Even if somehow, the employee derived some benefit from the act which is not assigned, the existence of a presumption of liability of the employer is determined by answering W/N the servant was at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his masters business. The present case does not involve a labor dispute, hence the Labor Code does not govern. What is involved here is a claim for damages based on vicarious liability, hence the Civil Code should govern. Supervision should consist of adopting rules for the discipline of employees which Filamer failed to do. It was in furtherance but not an assigned task, hence, the ER is still supposed to supervise in tasks not assigned but allowed to do so. NPC v. CA Article 2180 of the Civil Code and not the Labor Code that determines the liability of the principal employer in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person for any negligent act of the employees of the labor-only contractor, consistent with the euling that a finding that a contractor was a labor-only contractor is equivalent to a finding that an employer-employee relationship existed between the owner and the labor only contractor, including the latters workers. Civil code and not Labor Code which applies to torts. Valenzuela v. CA The relationship between EE and ER is based on the principle of pater familias, in which the liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise due diligence in selection and supervision.

The employer is not expected to exercise supervision over either the employees private activities or during the performance of tasks either unsanctioned by the former or unrelated to the employees tasks. When a company issues a company car (either company-owned or purchasable), it in effect guarantees that he is satisfied that the EE will use it properly. The purpose of such being for a) an image of success and b) practical reasons. Therefore it is the companys responsibility to the pubic to see to it that the EEs will use it capably and responsibly. General rule: Supervision of ER over the EE I performance of his assigned task. Supervision depends on the kind of work of the EE and the circumstances surrounding his employment. Professional Services v. Agana Court found PSI liable on the basis of corporate responsibility. Such responsibility includes the proper supervision of the members of its medical staff. Accordingly, the hospital has the duty to make a reasonable effort to monitor and oversee the treatment prescribed and administered by the physicians practicing in its premises. Medyo sweeping ang generalizations nito. Times have changed. New concept of hospibusiness Mercury Drug v. Huang The liability of the employer under 2180 of the Civil Code is direct or immediate it is not conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent employee, or a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. It is also joint and solidary with the employer. Meritt v. Government No claim arises against government in favour of an individual, by reason of misfeasance, laches or unauthorized exercise of powers by its officers or agents. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not hereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favour, or extend its liability to any cause previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.

That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent, in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the regulations. Special agent has to be a public official. State has to consent to be sued and to consent to pay damages. Rosete v. Auditor General Cites Merritt and says: All others who are acting by commission of the government belong to the class of special agents, whether individual or juridical bodies. Mendoza v. De Leon A municipality is not exempt from liability for the negligent performance of its corporate or proprietary or business functions. In the administration of its patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a private corporation or individual so far as its liability to third persons on contract or in tort is concerned. With regard to the liability of a public municipal corporation for the acts of its officers, the distinction is between an exercise of those legislative powers which it holds for public purposes, and as part of the government of the country, and those private franchise which belong to it, as a creation of the law; within the sphere of the former, it enjoys, the exemption of the government, from responsibility for its own acts, and for the acts of those who are independent corporate officers, deriving their rights and duties from the sovereign power. But in regard to the latter, it is responsible for the acts of those who are in law its agents, though they may not be appointed by it. Fontanilla v. Maliaman NIA exercised both government and proprietary functions. Law creating the NIA vested a corporate personality of its own and it is self-sustaining because it can collect fees. Even if it serves the public, it allows itself to be sued and its charter is more akin to a private corporation.

Week 10: Independent Civil Actions Violation of Civil and Political Rights Defamation, Fraud, Physical Injuries Neglect of Duty 32: Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: 1) Freedom of religion; 2) Freedom of speech; 3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication; 4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention; 5) Freedom of suffrage; 6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of the law; 7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use; 8) The right to equal protection of the laws; 9) The right to be secured in ones person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures; 10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same; 11) The privacy of communication; 12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law; 13) The right to take part in a peacable assembly to petition Government for redress of grievances; 14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form; 15) The right of the accused against excessive bail; 16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness on his behalf; 17) Freedom from being compelled to become a witness against himself, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person professing becomes a State witness; 18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional, and 19) Freedom of access to the courts In any if the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendants acts or

omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted) and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence. The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated. The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation if the Penal Code or other penal statute. 33: In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. 34: When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefore. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action. Sir: This (34) is an exception to the States immunity from suit. 35: When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law, but the justice of peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complainant may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendants motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious. If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the termination of judicial proceedings. MHP Garments v. CA The protection afforded by 32 applies not only those who appear to be innocent but also to those who appear to be guilty but are nevertheless presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. It applies against both to public and private persons.

The purpose of 32 is the protection of individual rights and a deterrent to the authorities against abuse of office. They cannot hide under the guise of acting on government function and having good faith in doing their duties. According to the wording of the article, it is not the actor alone who is responsible (constabulary) but also the person who acts indirectly. The persons directly and indirectly liable are considered joint tortfeasors. Silahis v. Soluta A violation of a constitutional right may be a basis for recovery of damages under Art 32 in relation to 2219 (6) and (10) of the NCC. It also applies to private individuals, not necessary that they act in bad faith, it suffices that there us a violation of a right. VinzonsChato v. Fortune Public officers acting in personal capacity are not immune from suit and can be liable under Art 32 even without bad faith. Since bad faith and malice are not necessary in the action, failure to specifically allege such will not amount to failure of action. Court explained that article 32 is patterned under American Tort Law, which does not require bad faith but merely an act or omission of one, which violates the rights of another, is a ground for damages. Sec 38 of the Administrative code does not specify which acts give rise to a cause of action. Article 32 is the special provision that deals specifically with violation of constitutional rights by public officers. All other actionable acts of public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the Administrative Code Madeja v. Caro Art 33 is an action for damages filed ex-delicto. The term physical injuries in 33 is used in the generic sense. It is NOT the crime of physical injuries as stated in the RPC. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated and attempted homicide. Corpus v. Paje which states that reckless imprudence and criminal negligence is not included in Art 33 is NOT authoritative. Arafiles v. Phil Journalists A civil action for libel under Art 33 shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and

entirely independent of the institution, pendency and result of criminal action. It is axiomatic that the published work must be read as and examined as a whole. The presentation of the news item subject of petitioners complaint may have been in a sensational manner, but it is not per se illegal. To make journalists liable for human error in mistake of words would create a chilling effect. There was nothing sinister since the report was based on the police blotter and two interviews with the complainant This is also the case which said that newspapers should be given leeway. MVRS v. Islamic Defamation: the offense of injuring a persons name, character, fame or reputation through false and malicious imputations and statements. It tends to injure reputation and diminish esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings about him. It is a violation of relational interest. No defamation in this case as made to a large class with no specific identifiable subject. My problem here is that shouldnt defamation be used in a generic sense, and not follow the rules laid down in the RPC? Capuno v. Pepsi Cola Institution of a criminal action cannot have the effect of interrupting the civil action based on delict as it may be instituted separately and independently. International Flavors v. Argos Art 33 does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability. Any action brought against the employer based on such before the conviction of the employee is premature. Corpus v. Paje Reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Art 33. there is no independent action for damages that may be instituted in connection with such offense.

True, physical injuries resulted, but the thrust of 365 was the punishing of the negligent act, which is quite different if the charges were physical injuries. Hence the general rule applies that acquittal in the criminal action is a bar to recovery in the civil action notwithstanding the reservation of the right to institute separate proceedings. Bonite v. Zosa Civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal based on reasonable doubt. Hence under art 29 they can sue. They can also sue under 2176 since the article contemplates also criminal acts. Art 29 needs no reservation (rule 111, ROC). It allows an action for damages in case of acquittal on reasonable doubt. The requirement of reservation has been found to be not in accordance with law and was deleted in the 1985 CrimPro rules. Active participation is no bar. Determination of civil liability and criminal liability are two separate and independent actions. Jervoso v. People The filing of a separate suit for damages is authorized under art.33 (physical injuries in this case). Having reserved and filed in the RTC a separate action, the heirs of the deceased are precluded from recovering damages in the criminal case Dulay v. CA The term physical injuries in 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death. Rule 111 provides for the filing of a separate civil action independent of the criminal action (physical injuries) Petitioners are invoking their right to recover from the agency resulting from the agencys vicarious liability with the tortuous act of its employee. There is no justification to limit 2176 to quasi-offenses. Week 11: Human Relations Torts Abuse of Rights Acts Contra Bonus Mores Breach of promise to marry; seduction and Malicious prosecution Public Humiliation Unjustified Dismissal

sexual assault

Illegal Acts Dereliction of Duty Unfair Competition Violation of Human Dignity 19: Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. 20: Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully and negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same. 21: Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs and public policy shall compensate the latter for damage. 26: Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief. 1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence 2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another 3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends 4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition. 27: Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken. 28: Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage. Velayo v. Shell Art 21 would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. Every good law draws its breath of life from morals, from those principles which are written with words of fire in the conscience of man. Once can not but feel that it is safe and salutary to transmute, as far as may be, moral norms into legal rules, thus imparting to

every legal system that enduring quality which ought to be one of its superlative attributes. The civil code covers abuse of rights. Problem is, the acts were committed in 1948, well before the enactment of the CC in 1950. Court still held Shell liable for damages (cost of plane) and exemplary damages. Art 2252 says that implementation of the code would not be given retroactive effect if it did not impair vested rights. However, Shell did not have a vested right to betray its co-creditors. Hence the new provisions could be given retroactive effect. Globe Mackay v. CA The principle of abuse of rights sets standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. Article 19 sets down the standards, 20 and 21 provides for the action for damages. Albenson v. CA The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) Which is exercised in bad faith; (3) For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for their own sanction. Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1) There is an act which is legal; 2) But which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; 3) And it is done with intent to injure. Articles 19 and 21 = the act must be intentional.

Article 20 does not distinguish: the act may be done either "willfully", or "negligently". Elements of Malicious Prosecution: (1) The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself the prosecutor, and that the action was finally terminated with an acquittal; (2) That in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; (3) The prosecutor was actuated or impelled by legal malice Amonoy v. Guttierez The legitimate exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and the right disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others. Legitimate exercise of rights, even if it causes damage to another, does not automatically result in actionable injury. This does not apply if there is abuse of right or if the exercise of the right is suspended by a court order. Well-settled is the maxim that damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a person's rights is a loss without injury- damnum absque injuria - for which the law gives no remedy.9 In other words, one who merely exercises one's rights does no actionable injury and cannot be held liable for damages. damnum absque injuria, a principle premised on the valid exercise of a right.14 Anything less or beyond such exercise will not give rise to the legal protection that the principle accords. And when damage or prejudice to another is occasioned thereby, liability cannot be obscured, much less abated. UE v. Jader Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. Want of care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would make the erring party liable.

The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under conditions of civilized society. The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right, even when the act is not illicit. If mere fault or negligence in one's acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.

Barons v. CA Tolentinos Test of Abuse of Right: The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established, must not be excessively or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another. There is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. When the objective of the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot be concealed under the guise of exercising a right. The principle does not permit acts which, without utility or legitimate purpose cause damage to another, because they violate the concept of social solidarity which considers law as rational and just. Diaz v. Davao Malice or bad faith is at the core of the Human Relations provisions. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not it response to duty it implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Wassmer v. Velez Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

Tanjanngco v. CA

it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit." Baksh v. CA Breach of promise to marry is not actionable per se, but when that promise to marry was used as a means to gain sexual congress and there was no actual intent to marry in the first place, an award for damages is proper. Pe v. Pe Court found that Alfonso deliberately and with the use of a clever strategy (pretending to learn how to pray the rosary when he was screwing her instead) succeeded in winning the love of Lolita. The wrong is immeasurable since he was a married man. Court sentenced him to pay damages. (though how they got to the conclusion as to the amount is not shown) See? I told you Ivan is bastos. Que v. IAC The general rule is well settled that one cannot be held liable in damages for maliciously instituting a prosecution where he acted with probable cause. Mere dismissal of the criminal complaint by the fiscal's office did not create a cause of action because the proceedings therein did not involve an exhaustive examination of the elements of malicious prosecution. While we must look upon the plight of hapless victims of unfounded and malicious prosecutions with tolerance and sympathy, sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindications of their rights without fear of later on standing trial for damages whereby lack of sufficient evidence, legal technicalities or a different interpretation of the laws on the matter the case would lose ground and therein defendants acquitted. Proof and motive that the prosecution or institution of the action was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate a person and to cast dishonor and disgrace must be clearly and preponderantly established to entitle the victims to damages and other rights granted by law; otherwise, there would always be a civil action for damages after every prosecution's failure to prove its cause resulting in the consequent acquittal of the accused therein.

The adverse result of an action does not per se make the wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages. The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate, such right is so precious that moral damages may not be charged on those who may exercise it erroneously. Drilon v. CA Malicious prosecution is instituted with the intention of injuring the defendant, is filed without probable cause, and terminates in favor of the prosecuted person. The basis for damages arising from malicious prosecution are articles 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217, and 2219 (8). In order for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper: The fact of the prosecution and the further fact that the defendant was himself prosecutor and the action terminated in acquittal In bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause The prosecutor was impelled by legal malice Magbanua v. Junsay Malicious prosecution is an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit or other proceeding in favor of the defendant herein. The term MALICIOUS PROSECUTION has been expanded to include unfounded civil suits. The gist of the action is putting the legal process in force for the mere purpose of vexation or injury. No malicious prosecution because the prosecutor acted with probable cause. Probable cause is different from sufficiency of evidence. In this case, Rosemarie admitted committing the crime. She said that she received instruction to leave the barrel bold unlocked. The inadmissibility of the confession does not negate probable cause. GraNd Union v. Espino The acts of humiliation done by the supermarket staff were unjustified. They are liable under art. 19 and 21 in conjunction with 2219. Though the supermarket staff may have acted with probable cause and with good faith, the act of humiliating the person makes them liable for damages. Carpio v. Valmonte

Carpio confronted Valmonte in the presence of everyone in the suite and accused her of being the only one going out of the comfort room before the loss of the jewelry. The verbal attack was uncalled for considering that by her own account,nobody knew that she brought such jewelry in a paper bag. Though she had a right to find the malefactor, the acts of maligning Valmonte without an iota of proof is impermissible by law. Quisaba v. Sta Ines Civil law consists in a mass of precepts that determine or regulate the relations that exist between members of a society for the protection of private interests. The complaint is not per se asking for damages because he was dismissed. It does not even ask for backwages or reinstatement. The cause of action was based on the manner of dismissal (he was demoted from a position of dignity to a servile and menial job), which caused him mental anguish, besmirched reputation, and wounded feelings. Hence the case is under the jurisdiction of the regular courts. Garcia v. Salvador The elements of actionable conduct are: Duty Breach Injury Proximate causation St. Louis v. CA St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification ". Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish Gregorio v. CA Basic is the legal principle that the nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.

Undeniably, Gregorios civil complaint, read in its entirety, is a complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code, rather than on malicious prosecution.

Week 12: Possessor of Animals Thrown/Falling from a Building Death/injuries in the course of employment Product Liability Interference with contractual relations Liability of local government units Proprietors of buildings Engineer/Architect of collapsed building 2183: The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the fault of the person who has suffered damage. Vestil v. IAC: What must be determined is the possession of the dog that admittedly was staying in the house in question, regardless of the ownership of the dog or of the house. Possessor liable even if the animal should "escape or be lost" and so be removed from his control. What matters in 2183 is possession and NOT ownership. Exercise of remote control is of no moment. The basis is on natural equity and on the principle of social interest that he who possesses the animal for his utility, pleasure and service must answer for the damage which such animal may cause. 2193: The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same. Dingkong v. Kanaan Jose Dingcong, on the other hand, did not practice the diligence of a good father of family to prevent these damages, nevertheless he was aware that the tubes were under repair; therefore, should have presumed that

Echavarria would use the faucet and should have provided him with a container with a drain. 1171: Owners of enterprises and other employers are obliged to pay compensation for the death of or injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other employees, even though the event may have been purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause, if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The employer is also liable for compensation if the employee contracts any illness or disease caused by such employment or as the result of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was due to the employee's own notorious negligence, or voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not be liable for compensation. When the employee's lack of due care contributed to his death or injury, the compensation shall be equitably reduced. 1172: If the death or injury isdue to the negligence of a fellow worker, the latter and the employer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If a fellow worker's intentional malicious act is the only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it should be shown that the latter did not exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiff's fellow worker. Afable Employer is not an insurer "against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment", and as a general rule an employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment, because such an accident does not arise out of and in the course of his employment. The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. By the use of these words it was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment, but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's employment of incidental to such employment, and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by reason of such employment. "To come within the term "injury received in the course of employment " it must be shown that the injury originated in the work, and, further, that it was

received the employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs of the employer. The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident takes place. Alarcon v. Alarcon The terms "capital", "management", "industrialist", "manager" and "owners of enterprises", used to describe the employers alluded to in said section 2, indicate that they contemplate those engaged more or less in business or industry. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, said "other employers" must be construed to refer to persons who belong to a class analogous to "owners of enterprises", such as those operating a business or engaged in a particular industry or trade. Laborer' is used as a synonym of 'Employee' and means every person who has entered the employment of, or works under a service or apprenticeship contract for an employer. 2187: Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists between them and the consumers. (n) Consumer Act 97: Liability for the Defective Products. - Any Filipino or foreign manufacturer, producer, and any importer, shall be liable for redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects resulting from design, manufacture, construction, assembly and erection, formulas and handling and making up, presentation or packing of their products, as well as for the insufficient or inadequate information on the use and hazards thereof. A product is defective when it does not offer the safety rightfully expected of it, taking relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to: (a) presentation of product; (b) use and hazards reasonably expected of it; (c) the time it was put into circulation. A product is not considered defective because another better quality product has been placed in the market. The manufacturer, builder, producer or importer shall not be held liable when it

evidences: (a) that it did not place the product on the market; (b) that although it did place the product on the market such product has no defect; (c) that the consumer or a third party is solely at fault. Consumer Act 99: Liability for Defective Services. - The service supplier is liable for redress, independently of fault, for damages caused to consumers by defects relating to the rendering of the services, as well as for insufficient or inadequate information on the fruition and hazards thereof. The service is defective when it does not provide the safety the consumer may rightfully expect of it, taking the relevant circumstances into consideration, including but not limited to: (a) the manner in which it is provided; (b) the result of hazards which may reasonably be expected of it; (c) the time when it was provided. A service is not considered defective because of the use or introduction of new techniques. The supplier of the services shall not be held liable when it is proven: (a) that there is no defect in the service rendered; (b) that the consumer or third party is solely at fault.

Consumer Act 106:. Prohibition in Contractual Stipulation. - The stipulation in a contract of a clause preventing, exonerating or reducing the obligation to indemnify for damages effected, as provided for in this and in the preceding Articles, is hereby prohibited, if there is more than one person responsible for the cause of the damage, they shall be jointly liable for the redress established in the pertinent provisions of this Act. However, if the damage is caused by a component or part incorporated in the product or service, its manufacturer, builder or importer and the person who incorporated the component or part are jointly liable. 1314: Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. Gilchrist v. Cuddy -- no need for malice in tortious interference BUT: So Ping Bun v. CA Elements of tortuous interference with contractual relations:

(a) existence of a valid contract - existence of a valid contract must be duly established (b) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of the contract - requires that there be knowledge on the part of the interferer that the contract exists, and (c) interference of the third person without legal justification or excuse Here, malice is essential na. While lack of malice precludes damages, it does not relieve the interferer of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing one. (the legal liability here being the injunction and not anymore the damages) Lagon v. CA To sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or must have been driven by purely impious reasons to injure the plaintiff in other words, his act of interference cannot be justified. 2189: Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. 2190: The proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs. 2191: Proprietors shall also be responsible for damages caused: (1) By the explosion of machinery which has not been taken care of with due diligence, and the inflammation of explosive substances which have not been kept in a safe and adequate place; (2) By excessive smoke, which may be harmful to persons or property; (3) By the falling of trees situated at or near highways or lanes, if not caused by force majeure; (4) By emanations from tubes, canals, sewers or deposits of infectious matter, constructed without precautions suitable to the place. 2192: If damage referred to in the two preceding articles should be the result of any defect in the construction mentioned in Article 1723, the third person suffering damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor in accordance with said article, within the period therein fixed.

1723: The engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications for a building is liable for damages if within fifteen years from the completion of the structure, the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects in the ground. The contractor is likewise responsible for the damages if the edifice falls, within the same period, on account of defects in the construction or the use of materials of inferior quality furnished by him, or due to any violation of the terms of the contract. If the engineer or architect supervises the construction, he shall be solidarily liable with the contractor. Acceptance of the building, after completion, does not imply waiver of any of the cause of action by reason of any defect mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The action must be brought within ten years following the collapse of the building. Guilatco v. Dagupan It is not necessary that the road or street belong to the municipality so long as the municipality is the one exercising supervision and control over such. Quezon City v. Decara

Week 13: Damages Definition, concept Actual or Compensatory Interest Mitigation of Liability Week 14: Moral Damages Week 15: Nominal Damages Temperate damages Liquidated damages Exemplary/Corrective damages