REN MARIO MICALLEF

Epistemology Tutor ial

W H A T I S K N OW L E D G E ? W H AT I S R I G H T A N D / O R WRONG ABOUT THINKING T H AT K N OW L E D G E I S J U S T I FIED TRUE BELIEF?

WHAT

WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE? IS RIGHT AND/OR WRONG ABOUT THINKING KNOWLEDGE IS JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF?
Heythrop College, University of London
Keywords: knowledge, justification, tripartite analysis, Gettier counter-examples, tracking.
1 . I N T RO D U C T I O N

THAT

Ren Mario Micallef

and when ones belief that x is justified.

The title question invites us to consider a definition and its appropriateness. The term in question is Knowledge, one of the most significant words in our every-day linguistic conception of the world and in Philosophy. Indeed, knowledge is an icon of Epistemology; it hallmarks the whole field just like good in Ethics or justice in Political Philosophy. We are all aware that such key notions are hard to define in a satisfactory way, hence it is rather surprising to note that the traditional definition of knowledge known as the tripartite definition sat unchallenged for many years till Edmund Gettier caused a whole outcry with a neat little three-page paper. The tripartite definition of knowledge is precisely the one stated in the title: knowledge is justified true belief. The three words after the copula state three individually-necessary and togethersufficient conditions for knowledge: knowledge is belief of a special kind, belief that is true and justified. More accurately, as we shall see, to know that x is to believe that x, when x (is true),

Before going any further, it is significant to note that we have already narrowed the field considerably by equating knowledge with knowledge that x. But what do we mean when we use the word knowledge in ordinary language?
2 . K N OW L E D G E I N O R D I NA RY L A N G UA G E

In a dictionary-thesaurus such as Wordsmyth (2001), knowledge would be thus defined:

DEF:

1.

familiarity, awareness, or understanding.

Synonyms: familiarity, awareness, acquaintance, comprehension, ken. Similar terms: understanding, sense, consciousness, cognisance. DEF:

2. a particular or specialized form of under-

standing or skill. Example: a knowledge of computers. Synonyms: understanding, experience, know-how, proficiency. Similar terms: expertise, skill, mastery, technique, command. DEF:

3. erudition; learning. Synonyms: erudition,

learning, education, intelligence, wisdom. Similar terms: ken, understanding. DEF:

4.

awareness or cognisance, as of a particular

fact or set of facts: Example: What knowledge did the president have of these events? Synonyms: cognisance, awareness, comprehension, familiarity. Similar terms: ken,

inkling, realization, sense, consciousness, understanding, acknowledgement, recognition.

ing it from similar terms (by stating proximate genus and specific difference, to put it Aristotelically). Terms like knowledge also have a geography, since they are etymologically or conceptually linked in a dynamic manner with parallel terms in other languages (such as German, Latin and French). Such languages are related to English in origin or due to overlap in areas of influence. In modern Philosophy, moreover, the transition to vernacular languages meant that theories developed around certain Latin and Greek terms have been transferred to equivalent terms in the vernacular language. Since no two terms in two different languages are perfectly equivalent (in connotations, breath of use) one may, at this point, start speaking of a Philosophical meaning; one actually means a Philosophic limitation (definition) of its meaning such that we can focus on that same concept (from among others) evoked by the English word as was focussed on by Plato, Kant, Descartes when they were using the equivalent words in their own languages.
2 . E T Y M O L O G Y, U S E I N T H E G R E E K PHILOSOPHICAL CONTEXT

The variety of ideas that the word expresses is surely remarkable. Probably, no native English speaker would normally go to look up such a term in the dictionary, since it is one of the first words one learns in a language. The dictionary entry serves rather to identify the different meanings and shades of meaning the word takes and to relate it to synonyms, which refer concepts surely not more basic than the one we are seeking to define. Some dictionaries try to go further. The Concise Oxford Dictionary (Allen, 1990) adds a meaning proper to philosophy: knowledge is justified true belief; certain understanding, as opposed to opinion. Hopefully, this does not entail that in Philosophy the word has a meaning that is clearly distinct from that in ordinary language, otherwise Philosophy would stand accused of uselessly increasing linguistic polysemy: Philosophers would be creating new meanings for old terms meanings that remain restricted to Philosophy and then provide themselves a job in trying to define them. One would rather think that Philosophy aims at providing some better understanding and more rigorous use of the words we use in everyday life by providing some ordering to the polysemy of terms (for instance by pinpointing the focal meaning, on which secondary meanings can be focussed and accounted for). Gettier challenges the philosophical definition using counter examples: this assumes that the Philosophical definition must match (or track, we may say) our intuitions on what knowledge is.

Knowledge is composed of: know- from knowen (Middle English), from cnawan (Old English), from the Indoeuropean base en-/no-, meaning to know, to apprehend; and -ledge probably from -lcan (Old English), from -lc (as in wedlock). Compare: gnoscere (Latin), gignskein (Greek), cognoscere (Late Latin): to know (see Allen, 1990; Guralnik, 1974; Garzanti, 2001). Gnsis in Classical Greek denotes an inquiry, a

The use of term in language has a history; so has the philosophical attempt to de-fine it, i.e. to set-limits to its use, by comparing it and distinguish-

judgement especially of a judicial kind (Lat. cognitio). Evolving from this earlier legal use, the term comes to signify knowledge in a philosophical sense espe-

cially in Plato: as in Resp. 478C. In other classical texts, we find it to mean acquaintance with a person (e.g. in Aeschines) and also a knowing, a recognising (e.g. in Thucydides). A third Classical meaning is that of being known, being famous, having credit (see Liddell and Scott, 1864). Though etymologically related to the English knowledge, gnsis is not the only Greek term with which we are concerned in the Philosophical discussion of what is knowledge. There is another main term, epistm, that renders in Greek some of the concepts behind the English word knowledge and its use has been very significant in philosophy, such that we still find its root in Epistemo-logy: the understanding/ rational talk/ study (logos) of knowledge (epistm) 1. Epistm, in a more traditional sense means acquaintance with a matter, understanding, skill as in combat, archery. We find this meaning also in Plato (e.g. Phil. 55D, Gorg. 311C), though this philosopher also uses it to denote scientific 2 knowledge (e.g. Resp. 477B) as does Aristotle (An. Post. I 33; Eth. N. 6.3) as opposed to techn (artistic and technical
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skill, crafsmanship) and empeiria (practical experience, without the knowledge of principles). Other classical authors use the term to signify knowledge in a general way (e.g. Sophocles). Other Greek terms expressing knowledge are: *eid (to see) in the perfect form ida: to know (once having seen or perceived) in Homer it must be rendered sometimes by to know, have knowledge of, sometimes by to know, perceive; later to come to know, learn (Liddell and Scott, 1864:360); nosis: perception (mental), understanding,

thought (opposed to what is simply visible horaton, aisthton); sophia (originally meaning cleverness or skill in matters of common life): i. knowledge of, acquaintance with something; ii. sound judgement, intelligence, prudence, practical and political wisdom (also: cunning, shrewdness); iii. knowledge of a higher kind, as of the sciences, learning, wisdom, philosophy (see Liddell and Scott, 1864:1342).
3 . P R O P O S I T I O N A L K N OW L E D G E

In the theory of Knowledge, being mainly interested with knowledge in general, the term gnsis would seem most proper, since epistm (that in classic Greek Philosophy was used to refer to objective, rigorously definable knowledge) has come to denote scientific knowledge more specifically (in Modern Philosophy, and especially after the Enlightenment and after Positivism). Hence, on the Continent, we find terms like gnoseologa (Spanish), gnoseologia (Italian) used to denote this branch of philosophy (Cfr.: Erkenntnislehre/Erkenntnistheorie (German); thorie de la connaissance (French) and the other Spanish alternative teora del conocimiento.). In Italy, epistemologia would be our Philosophy of Science (see Cioffi et al., 2000:608)

Most Western-European languages distinguish knowledge-that from other forms of knowledge, using a different term for knowledge: wissen da in German (vs. wissen, kennen, erkennen, unterscheiden, erlebe, erfahren...); saber que in Spanish (vs. saber, conoscer, reconoscer, distinguir, entender de, enterarse de...); savoir que in French (vs. savoir, connatre, se render compte, reconnatre, entendre,

i.e. rigorously definable, objective; from Lat. scire, scientia opposed to spere, sapientia. Spere, used also to mean to (possess a) taste (cfr. in-sipid) is more indicative of experiential knowledge.
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tre au courant de); sapere che /conoscere che in Italian (vs. sapere, conoscere, rendersi conto di, riconoscere, intendere, intendersi di, essere al corrente di...). In English, the conjunction that following the verb to know (/noun knowledge) is the main linguistic feature that distinguishes that use of to know which expresses propositional knowledge: that introduces a phrase (proposition), which one is claiming to know or not know. Knowledge-that (S knows-that Paul is taller than Anne) is often distinguished from knowledge-how (S knows how to get to Moscow from St Petersburg; S knows how to play football) 3 and from knowledge-of (S knows Paul; S has a good knowledge of Moscow) 4. Why therefore
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concentrate on knowledge-that in a theory of knowledge? Knowledge-of does in fact lie at the basis of some theories of knowledge whereby knowledge is considered to be the possession of an adequate (mental) image of the object being known; such a model (sometimes called the iconic model) has its origins in the Stoics 5; we find it prevalent in Modern Philosophy (e.g. Descartes mentis inspectio, Kants phainomenon) and in 19th century German idealism. Such a model finds considerable difficulty in accounting for mathematical and logical knowledge, which lacks iconic character. The other model that has prevailed in history is the propositional model whereby knowledge is the possession of a true proposition regarding the relations between things (facts) rather than the things themselves. (This model traces its origin to Aristotle; we find it prevalent in Medieval Philosophy and in Contemporary Philosophy (1900s to present), especially due to the influence of Positivism. It was also present in Modern Philosophy, e.g. in Leibniz). The challenge facing the propositional model is that of representing justification convincingly (see entry gnoseologia in Redazioni Garzanti (1993)).

G. Ryle has argued strongly in favour of the distinction between knowledge-that (theoretical) and knowledge-how (practical) in his book The Concept of Mind (1949). He claims that not all knowledge-how presupposes knowledge-that (since this would imply infinite regress because we need know-how to formulate and apply the propositions of knowledge-that), rather, priority should be given to knowledge-how. Hamlyn distinguishes further between knowledge-how (which entails knowledge of principles even if one may not be able to formulate them) and mere ability to do something (this somewhat reminds us of the theria praxis poiesis distinction in Aristotle); he also expresses doubts whether it is correct to insist that in between knowledge-how and knowledge-that there one that is prior (see Hamlyn, 1970:104). The distinction has recently sparked further debate (e.g. Williamson and Stanley, 2001).

One has further to distinguish between acquaintance with a person and acquaintance with a thing. The distinction between knowledge-that and knowledge-of is further sustained by the fact that some languages have distinct words for the two (e.g. connatre and savoir in French). Hamlyn comments:
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The reference to a confrontation between subject and object, however, may suggest a distinct state of mind involved in that confrontation a state of awareness. There is indeed such a state as an awareness of a thing, although it is something more special than simply having knowledge of the thing. Such a state of awareness is implied by the Greek term gnsis nd there was a tendency in Plato and Aristotle to think of such awareness the direct intuition of an object as the paradigm of knowledge. Even so, the content of any such awareness could be expressed only in terms of what a subject knows about the object, what relevant facts he knows; hence, once again, what a person knows when he has direct awareness of an object is knowledgethat. (Hamlyn, 1970:105) This seems to assume that we know only what we can express. We seem to have a lot of problems with expressing what (footnote continued)

knowledge itself is: does this mean that we do not know what knowledge is? When we discuss the problems concerning the tripartite definition we are not doing this on the basis of our having a better way of expressing what knowledge is, but rather on our intuitively having a knowledge of what knowledge is, and intuitively knowing that the tripartite definition does not express well what we intuitively know. Russell distinguishes between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description in his book The problems of Philosophy (1912), but this distinction seems internal to knowledge-of, rather than a distinction between knowledge-of and knowledgethat. Knowledge by acquaintance is said to be certain, direct, incorrigible, immediate.
5 In Plato we find the theory of reminiscence, that is somewhat particular. It is proposed in conjunction with the Socratic view (footnote continued)

We shall not go into the merits of each of these models since this is beyond the scope of the present paper; it is however important to note that the tripartite definition assumes the propositional model given that this is deemed more plausible in Contemporary Philosophy. Hence, the tripartite definitions attempt to define knowledge-that is one of its weaknesses (it is a limited definition of knowledge) but also one of its strengths (it has a great appeal for a Contemporary Philosopher of the sort which considers the scientific proposition as the model of true knowledge, and believes that this is the knowledge we are mainly concerned with in Philosophy). Consider now the following propositions: 1. S knows that {London lies to the north of Paris}. 2. S knows that {in Euclidian geometry, a triangle with sides 3:4:5 must necessarily have a right angle}. 3. S knows that {wanton cruelty is wrong}. 4. S knows that {Vivaldis Four Seasons is an exceedingly beautiful musical composition}. 5. S knows that {Jesus Christ is God}. The tripartite definition does not have the pretence of dealing with the propositional knowledge involved in examples 2 (Mathematical and Logic knowledge), 3 (Ethical knowledge), 4 (Aesthetic
that knowing something means being able to define it (to say what it is: ti esti), and with Platos theory of ideas.

knowledge) and 5 (Religious knowledge) at least not in the consideration of the tripartite definition we are undertaking in the present work. Many epistemologists would be happy with a suitable definition of knowledge (e.g. an emended version of the tripartite definition) that would provide an understanding of our knowledge of empirical facts about the world, even though its account of knowledge not be fully adequate to the other types of propositional knowledge. Again, this limitation of scope can be at once a strength and a weakness. It is doubtful whether we can ever find a definition that could be applicable to all the five cases; focussing on what interests us most in Epistemology (that is more closely related to Philosophy of Science than to Philosophy of Mathematics, Aesthetics, Ethics or Philosophy of Religion) promises to be more fruitful. Another issue regards the use of the first person: 1. S knows that {I wrote this}. 2. I know that {I wrote this}. De se knowledge causes considerable complications and we shall avoid these by restricting the use and scope of the tripartite definition and its critique to third-person, empirical, propositional knowledge, as epistemologists usually do in order not to engage in problems better dealt with in such disciplines as Philosophy of Mind.

4 . T H E T R I PA RT I T E D E F I N I T I O N A N D GETTIER EXAMPLES

would be a true opinion 6 accompanied by reason (epistme = dxa alths meta logou). Knowledge seems therefore to bring together two ideas: the strictly objective notion of truth; and the more subjective requirement of justified belief. This asymmetry seems to cause problems: some solutions to the Gettier problem have tried to do away with justification (e.g. Nozick) or with evidence-transcendent truth (anti-realism). But before coming to this, let us provide some Gettier examples. 1. Jones is justified in believing that his colleague, Smith, owns a Renault (he has seen Smith driving it this very morning, he had accompanied him to the car dealer when he bought it and seen him sign the contract). Hence, Jones is justified in believing that one of his colleagues owns a Renault. It so happens that Smiths car has just been stolen; however, unknown to Jones, his other colleague, White has just bought a Renault. Jones has therefore a justified true belief that one of his colleagues owns a Renault, but we wouldnt say that he knows this, since its truth is purely a matter of coincidence. 2. Jane seems to perceive a key in front of her, and is justified in believing that there is in fact a key in front of her. Actually, all there is is a hologram of a key, generated by a special projector. It so happens that the switch that activates the projector lies in

The tripartite definition can be expressed logically in this form: sKp (sBp & p & sJp) where: sKp = Subject S Knows Predicate P sBp = sJp = p= = &= Subject S Believes Predicate P Subject S is Justified in believing Predicate P Predicate P is true If and only if connector And connector

As we have otherwise stated above, the three separately necessary and together sufficient conditions for knowledge, according to the tripartite definition, are: 1. a state of mind of the subject: a belief, which regards facts stated as a proposition, and which holds that proposition to be true; 2. the facts believed being true (i.e. being actually in the way one believes them to be) 3. the subjects having justification, warrant, reason to hold what s/he believes. Plato, in Theaetetus (200d ff.), reaches a similar definition of knowledge, which he does not however accept. According to this definition, knowledge

6 Opinion (dxa), for Plato, is what is held true; is distinguished from knowledge (epistme) since dxa does not exclude the possibility of error, while knowledge does. Dxa has two levels: immagination (eikasia) and belief (pistis). See Cioffi et al. (2000:448-9)

front of Jane, well hidden, and is activated by a key identical in appearance to the hologram. Janes justified belief is thus true, though Jane lacks knowledge. 3. Mr. Morgan has just returned home to London after a short holiday in Kent, and is eager to open the mail for news of her husband who she is justified in believing to be in Pakistan. His company sent him there on a special assignment for six months, and Mrs Morgan is very worried about this, given the recent war. Mr Morgan, knowing that his wife is undergoing special medical treatment, wants her to calm down and feel reassured; he therefore writes letters to his wife saying that he has been transferred unexpectedly to the head office in New York, and sends them to a friend in this city in order to have them posted from there. As she picks up the pile of letters, Mrs. Morgan is justified in believing that her husband is in Pakistan, and this is true. Nevertheless we wouldnt say that she knows this: her knowledge is undermined by evidence she does not yet possess 7.
5 . S O M E R E S P O N S E S TO G E T T I E R

2.

accept the counter-examples and search for a supplement to the tripartite analysis which excludes them

3. accept the counter-examples and alter the tripartite analysis to suit rather than adding anything to it A. REJECTING THE COUNTER-EXAMPLES

A first reaction to these counter-examples could be that of saying they do not work, since the justification of Jones, Jane and Mrs Morgan is not sufficient: for knowledge, one requires certainty, infallible justification. This would however be too stringent a requirement; it tends to give leeway to the sceptic and allows h/er to conclude that we cannot know anything. It is also important that we allow justified belief the possibility of being, in some cases, false. Otherwise, judges, political leaders, scientists, , we ourselves would probably never be justified in deciding or doing anything. The spectre of error is always present however solid our evidence and reasons may be, hence we must at some point decide that our justification is sufficient, that it is satisfactory for us and for whoever else may require it (e.g. a jury in court). As Brena (1995:40) states:
Even though we invoke and presume absolute truth in our statements, we do not demand absolute or exhaustive justification neither from ourselves, nor from others. [] Justification that resolves the relevant questions actually open is hence reasonable and sufficient.

Dancy (1985:26) three possible ways of responding to Gettier counter-examples. One may:
1. find some means to show that the counter-examples do not work;
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After all, it is important that we keep justified belief distinct from knowledge; and at least to a first approximation, the objective fact that a justified

See Harman (2000) for a discussion of such examples.

belief is free of error is what promotes it from the status of justified belief to that of knowledge. If truth is built into justification, we would simply be converting our problem of defining knowledge in one of defining justification. Some have concluded, on analysis of cases such as that of Jones, that the problem is one of inferring from a falsehood (Smith owns a Renault), and have tried to put into question the principle of closure whereby {(sKp) & (sK(pq))} sKq [if {S knows P}, and {S knows that P entails Q}, then S knows Q]; or {(sJBp) & (sJB(pq))} sJBq [if {S is justified in believing P}, and {S is justified in believing that P entails Q}, then S is justified in believing Q]. We shall return to this when discussing Nozicks account of knowledge as tracking, however, in cases of knowledge from perception (such as Janes case), it is not evident that there has been inference from a false proposition. 8
B. SUPPLEMENTING THE TRIPARTITE ANALYSIS

are not jointly an accident (see Sturgeon 1995:17). Several have proposed conditions to fill in C4. One proposal is that of requiring the absence of relevant falsehood (e.g. taking the hologram of the key for the key in Janes case). But what beliefs are relevant? Possibly those, failing to believe which one would fail to believe the final conclusion (there is a key in front of Jane). But there could be further gratuitous beliefs that neutralise the effect of the relevant falsehoods (e.g. Jane could have heard on the radio that a power cut planned for this morning at the very moment she sees the hologram, and that hologram machines need electricity to work). Then there could be other falsehoods relevant to these beliefs that neutralise the neutralisation (the electricity company decided to delay the power cuts due to complaints against daytime cuts from the manufacturing industry). This web of beliefs tends to expand such that it would make too many false beliefs relevant, and risks plunging us into scepticism. 9 A similar approach is that requiring undefeatedly justified belief, i.e. that no be other truth such that if one believes it, ones justification for believing the conclusion ends up defeated 10. This would

Consider the following: sKp (sBp & p & sJp & C4) where : C4 (condition 4) = sJp ensures that {sBp and p}

Audi (1998:218) uses the lottery paradox against the relevant falsehood proposal: you believe you will loose (you have a chance in 10 million, say), though you do not know it, and this does not depend on any falsehood!

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An account of knowledge using probabilistic rules of acceptance could also exclude such an inference from other types of knowledge, but it risks facing the lottery paradox and other problems (see Harman 2000:67-9)

Klein (2000) would put it: there is no true proposition such that if it became evident to S at t, p would no longer be evident to S. Harman (2000) replies with examples similar to that of Mrs Morgan: Mr Morgan wrote her letters saying he is in New York (this is a true proposition), if this became evident to Mrs Morgan on picking the pile of letters (t), she would no longer have believed that her husband was in Pakistan. But now suppose that for some reason the letters were lost in the mail, or were destroyed, or that Mr Morgan after writing the letters, decided not to send them. Would Mrs Morgan know that her husband is in Pakistan in these circumstances?

bring us into infallibilism on justification, since no false justified beliefs could ultimately be undefeatedly justified. Besides, unless one considers at once all beliefs that could possibly defeat the conclusion (which would be to stringent a condition) the proposal presents the same difficulties with piecemeal additions of truths that overturn one another as in the case of relevant falsehoods. F. Dretske has proposed a weaker account of the conclusive reasons approach which originally held that conclusion G must be sustained by conclusive reasons A, B, , F which could not be true if N is false. The could is too stringent a condition, hence Dretske proposes the use of would instead. The use of the subjunctive conditional (A, B, , F would not be true if N were false) is a very interesting move: we shall see it adopted in Nozicks account. However, as Dancy (1985:33) notes, an account not based on reasons is preferable, especially since we need to account for perceptual knowledge. We cannot expect Jane to provide reasons to justify her seeing a key in front of her. Another approach requires that our justified true beliefs be derived from a reliable method in order to be called knowledge. Unfortunately, we cannot envisage a belief-gathering method that is perfectly reliable (even if the method itself were infallible, we couldnt but apply it fallibly); yet, if we were to accept only general reliability this would not ensure knowledge. Alvin I. Goldman has proposed the introduction of a causal mechanism in C4: the fact that P should cause Ss belief that P. But how are we to

understand this causality? In Janes case, the key in front of her does cause the system to project the hologram and cause Janes belief: without that key, the system wouldnt work and Jane would not have that belief. One may object that the key is not the fact that there is a key: this raises the spiny issue whether facts (rather than things) can cause anything. Goldmans position also encounters difficulties in accounting for knowledge of the future (how can future facts cause justification of present beliefs?) and for universals (how can the fact that all chalk is white justify my belief that this piece of chalk is white?).
C. ALTERING THE TRIPARTITE ANALYSIS

Nozick (2000) removes justification from his account of knowledge (hence it is not simply an addition of a fourth condition to the tripartite definition); he links the truth of P with Ss belief using a subjunctive conditional: sKp (sBp & p & {p sBp}& {p sBp}) where: {p sBp} = if it were the case that not P, then S would not believe P; {p sBp}= if it were the case that P, then S would believe P. Nozick calls this account of knowledge tracking, since the belief tracks the truth like a column of mercury in a thermometer. Causation theories, such as that of Goldman, can be seen as special cases of the tracking view, which itself offers to link

facts and beliefs in a more general, less committed way. The use of the subjunctive/counterfactual construction reflects our everyday comparisons of the actual situation to possible situations resulting from slight modifications of certain conditions that account for the actual situations: had I not taken that extra piece of toast at breakfast, I wouldnt have missed the bus etc. In an exceedingly different situation, where time travel were possible, or where I were a brain in a vat being fed all sorts of simulated sensations, one could not say that s/he wouldnt have missed the bus. The scenario is so radically different that s/he would not be able to do our everyday sort of games with postulating slightly different conditions to see what would obtain: the factors to consider ex novo in our calculation of the new situation would be too many to allow any would prediction. Nozick, following David Lewis, puts this in terms of close possible worlds: tracking involves consistently believing that P when P, and that not P when not P, in relatively different, though also relatively similar, conditions. This idea brings Nozick to refute the preservation of knowledge under closure. Clearly, if P, and if P entails Q, then Q. But it does not follow that we can track all of the components of this deduction: P, (P entails Q) and Q. One may be able to track P (I have a hand) but not Q (I am not a brain in a vat), even though P logically implies Q, since you could have P and P in close possible worlds but not Q and Q: Q entails a radically different world than Q and hence excludes the possibility of being tracked.

D. FURTHER POSSIBILITIES

Another possibility beyond those listed by Dancy is that of considering the tripartite definition not as a definition of knowledge but rather as a view regarding what is understood in our everyday understanding of knowledge. It does give a complete analysis, the three elements may not be togethersufficient, but is useful for the purposes of a critical grasp on such a basic concept as knowledge admitting the difficulties in defining such concepts. Similarly, Nozicks concept of knowledge captures a good deal of what we understand by knowledge and is very useful, though it may not be completely satisfactory as a definition. All this discussion of knowledge, however, presupposes a very Socratic understanding of knowledge itself, whereby knowing something means being able to define it rigorously. But maybe knowledge is wider than that, and we can know what knowledge itself is without being able to define it. Dancy puts a position similar to this rhetorically:
Hasnt Wittgenstein shown us anyway that a concept can be perfectly healthy without being definable, arguing that there need be no element common to all instances of a property (e.g. instances of knowledge) other than that they are instances (e.g. that they are knowledge)? Dancy, 1985:26

9. CONCLUSION

Tracking is very useful concept; Nozick uses it effectively against a sceptical argument. It counters Getter-typer counter-examples better than any addition to the tripartite definition. Maybe, it is not completely satisfactory as a definition of knowledge

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as we ordinarily understand it since it does not include some notion of evidence or justification on the part of the subject. A tracker may hold beliefs true in a totally irrational way, yet as long as his beliefs track the truth we must admit that s/he knows the propositions believed. At this point, we could either let go of our ordinary understanding of knowledge and accept that knowledge is nothing but tracking, or else accept the concept of tracking as a useful tool to use in the place of knowledge in epistemology while retaining knowledge as an inspiring intuitive idea without seeking to define it rigorously, accepting the tripartite account as a rough idea of what knowledge is.
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Allen, Robert Edward (ed.). 19908. The concise Oxford dictionary of current English. Oxford University Press. Oxford. xxxix+1454 pp. Audi, R. 1998. Epistemology: a contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge. Routledge. London New York. xii+340 pp. Brena, Gian-Luigi. 1995. Forme di verit. Introduzione allepistemologia. Ed. San Paolo. Cinisello Balsamo (Milan). 322 pp. Cioffi, F., Luppi, G., Vigorelli, A., Zanette, E. 2000. Il testo filosofico: Storia della filosofia: Autori, opere, problemi. Vol I: Let antica e medievale. Ediz. Scol. Bruno Mondadori. Milan. 1216 pp. Dancy, J. 1985. Contemporary xii+259 pp. Epistemology.

to Philosophy. Oxford University Press. Oxford. xx+1009 pp. Klein, P. 2000. A proposed definition of propositional knowledge. in Sosa and Kim (2000). Liddell, Henry George and Scott, Robert. 18645. A Greek-English Lexicon. Clarendon Press. Oxford. xiv + 1644 pp. Nozick, R. 2000. Knowledge and Scepticism. in Sosa and Kim (2000). [This is a reprint of part of Nozicks book Philosophical explanations.] Redazioni Garzanti/Di Luciano. A. (ed.). 1993. Enciclopedia Garzanti di Filosofia. Garzanti Editore. Milan. viii+1268 pp.

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Sosa, E. and Kim, J. 2000. Epistemology: an anthology. Blackwell. Malden (Massachusetts) Oxford. x+590 pp. Sturgeon, S. 1995. Knowledge. in Grayling (1995) ch. 1 Epistemology. Williamsom, T. and Stanley, J. 2001. "Knowing How", Journal of Philosophy, 98: 411-44. Wordsmyth. 2001. Wordsmyth English DicitionaryThesaurus. On the www at site: http://machaut.uchicago.edu/cgibin/WEDT_WN.sh?word=knowledge&subquery= Search&searchtype=default

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