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R E A D I N G

The Real Self: From Institution to Impulse

Ralph H. Turner University of California, Los Angeles

It is proposed that people variously recognize their real selves either in feelings and actions of an institutional and volitional nature, such as ambition, morality, and altruism, or in the experience of impulse, such as undisciplined desire and the wish to make intimate revelations to other people. A shift toward the impulse pole seems to be under way and might be plausibly explained by changing cultural definitions of reality, modified terms of social integration, shifting patterns of deprivation, or new opportunities and consequences. Many standard sociological assumptions about social control are incompatible with the new pattern of self-identification.

he [...] idea of a self-as-object permits me to distinguish among the various feelings and actions that emanate from my person. Some emanations I recognize as expressions of my real self; others seem foreign to the real me. I take little credit and assume little blame for the sensations and actions that are peripheral to my real self (Turner, 1968). Others are of great significance, because they embody my true self, good or bad. The articulation of real selves with social structure should be a major link in the functioning and change of societies. This approach to linking person and social structure is especially compatible with symbolic interactionist and phenomenological perspectives, ihai stress the ongoing creation of reality by each member of society. The aim of this paper is to elaborate a dimension of self-conception that may have important implications for sociological theories of social control and other aspects of societal functioning. To varying degrees, people accept as evidence of their real selves either feelings and actions with an institutional focus or ones they identify as

strictly impulse. There are suggestive signs that recent decades have witnessed a shift in the locus of self away from the institutional pole and toward that of impulse. This shift may have altered substantially the world of experience in which people orient themselves, setting it apart from the one that much established sociological theory describes. [. ..]

Institution and Impulse of Loci of Self

The self-conception is most frequently described sociologically by naming the roles that are preeminent in ii. In a good example of ihis approach, Wellman (1971) finds that the self-conceptions of both black and white adolescents can be characterized on the basis of the same set of identities namely, their age, gender, family, religion, race, ethnic heritage, and their roles as students, athletes, and friends. Studies comparing the place of occupation and work in the life organizations of various groups of workers (Dubin, 1956; Wilensky,

1964) likewise relate the self-conception to particular roles in society. Self-conceptions can also be compared on the basis of distinctions at a more abstract level. The relationship between scl r and social order is put in more comprehensive terms when we distinguish between self as anchored in institutions and self as anchored in impulse. To one person, an angry outburst or the excitement of extramarital desire comes as an alien impetus that superficially beclouds or even dangerously threatens the true self. The experience is real enough and may even be persistent and gratifying, but it is still not felt as signifying the real self. The true self is recognized in acts of volition, in the pursuit of institutionalized goals, and not in the satisfaction of impulses outside institutional frameworks. To another person, the outburst or desire is recognizedfearfully or enthusiasticallyas an indication that the real self is breaking through a deceptive crust of institutional behavior. Institutional motivations are external, artificial constraints and super-impositions that bridle manifestations of the real self. One plays the institutional game when he must, but only at the expense of the true self. The true self consists of deep, unsocialized, inner impulses. Mad desire and errant fancy are exquisite expressions of the self. Again, conscientious acceptance of group obligations and unswerving loyalty can mean that the real self has assumed firm control and overcome the alien forces. But for those who find out who they really are by listening to the voice of impulse, the same behavior is a meaningless submission to institutional regimens and authoritarianism. A mother's self-sacrifice for her child is the measure of her real self when seen through institutional eyes, and it is a senseless betrayal of the parent's true being to those who find personal reality in the world of impulse. It is no accident thai this polarity parallels Freud's classic distinction between id and superego. To Freud, the id was more truly the person and the superego merely an external imposition. As he turned to examinations of society, he expressed the same conviction when he wrote, "Our civilization is entirely based upon the suppression of instincts" (1931, p. 13), and when he proposed a relaxation of social norms and standards as a

solution to the discontents of modern civilization (1930). This position sharply contrasts with a view shared by many writers and exemplified in Park's assertion that "the role we are striving to live up tothis mask is our truer self (1927, p. 139). Although in other writings Park sometimes expressed a different conviction, his statement epitomized the institutional locus of self, while Freud located the self chiefly in the world of impulse until his belated concessions to ego.

The Key Differences

Several crucial differences between the two contrasting loci of self can be briefly stated. 1. Under the institution locus, the real self is revealed when an individual adheres to a high standard, especially in the face of serious temptation to fall away. A person shows his true mettle under fire. Under the impulse locus, the real self is revealed when a person does something solely because he wants tonot because it is good or bad or noble or courageous or selfsacrificing, but because he spontaneously wishes to do so. , , , 2. To impulsives, the true self is something to be discovered. A young person drops out of school or out of the labor force in order to reflect upon and discover who he really is. To the institutional, waiting around for self-discovery to occur is ridiculous. The self is something attained, created, achieved, not something discovered. If vocational counseling to help the individual find his peculiar niche has elements of the impulse conception of self, the idea that a person can make of himself what he will, that one chooses a task and then works at it, is the view of institutionals. The contrast is well stated in a contemporary prescription for effective living, written from the institutional perspective:
So if we reach a point of insight at which we become disgustedly aware of how we stage ourselves, play games, and ingratiate others, to say nothing of using defense mechanisms and strategies, and if at this point we want to enrich life by finding honest, deeply felt, loving interactions with others, it is tempting to believe that we can change simply by opening a door and letting out

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our "true" unsullied impulses. Change is never so simple. What is really involved is not the releasing of a true self but the making of a new self, one that gradually transcends the limitations and pettiness of the old. (White, 1972, p. 387)

3. Under the institution locus, the real self is revealed only when the individual is in full control of his faculties and behaviors. Allport (1955) locates the self in planning and volition, in contrast to impulse. "When the individual is dominated by segmental drives, by compulsions, or by the winds of circumstances, he has lost the integrity that comes only from maintaining major directions of striving" (pp. 50-51). When control is impaired by fatigue, stress, alcohol, or drugs, an alien self displaces the true self. The danger of any of these conditions is that after repeated experiences the individual may lose the capacity to distinguish between the true self and the counterfeit and become progressively less able to resume control and reinstate the true self. If use of alcohol is viewed with favor, it is only on condition that the user is able to practice moderation or "hold his liquor," maintaining control in spite of alcohol. But under the impulse locus, the true self is revealed only when inhibitions are lowered or abandoned. In a magnificent statement of an institutional perspective, Wordsworth (1807) called upon Duty, "stern daughter of the voice of God," for relief from the "weight of chancedesires" and for "a repose that ever is the same." But let the barest suspicion arise that a good deed has been motivated by a sense of duty, and it loses all value as a clue to self in the eyes of the impulsive. For some impulsives drugs and alcohol are aidsoften indispensableto the discovery of self, for without them socially instilled inhibitions irresistibly overpower the true self. A participant in a Los Angeles "lovein" in 1971 said: "It's a place where people can get out, get smashed, get stoned, or whatever. A love-in is a place to get away from the apartment. It's like being out and touching people for a change, rather than working with paper and working with inanimate objects. It's like being out in the real world for a change." 4. Hypocrisy is a concern of both types, but the word means different things to each. For the institutionals, hypocrisy consists of failing to

live up to one's standards. The remedy is not to lower standards but to make amends and adhere to the standards the next time. If one's failings persist, he ceases to represent himself as what he cannot be, so that he at least escapes the charge of hypocrisy by presenting himself only as what he is. For the impulsives, hypocrisy consists of asserting standards and adhering to them even if the behavior in question is not what the individual wants to do and enjoys doing. One who sets exacting standards for himself and by dint of dedicated effort succeeds in living up to them is still a hypocrite if he must suppress a desire to escape from these strict demands. Altruism, in the traditional sense of responding to duty and setting one's own interests aside, is a penultimate hypocrisy, compounded by the probability that it is a dissimulated self-seeking and manipulation. The institutional goal is correspondence between prescription and behavior; the goal of impulsives is correspondence between impulse and behavior: hypocrisy in either instance is a lack of the appropriate correspondence. 5. In the light of the foregoing differences, the qualities that make a performance admirable differ. The polished, error-free performance, in which the audience forgets the actor and sees only the role being played, is the most admired by institutionals. Whatever the task, perfection is both the goal and the means by which the real self finds expression. But impulsives find technical perfection repelling and admire instead a performance that reveals the actor's human frailties. They are in harmony with the motion picture star system, in which Gregory Peck, John Wayne, and Gina Lollobrigida, rather than the characters they play in a given picture, are the centers of attention. Ed Sullivan's popular appeal, generally attributed to his very awkwardness and ineptitude, is incomprehensible to the institutionals. Of course, the specific cues for spontaneity have changed, so a younger generation of impulsives no longer responds to these stars as did an older generation. 6. The difference between discovery and achievement also suggests a difference in time perspective. The self as impulse means a present time perspective, while the self as institution means a future time perspective. Institutionals, who

build themselves a real world by making commitments, have difficulty retaining a vital sense of self when the future perspective is no longer tenable. The malaise of retirement is a common indication of this pattern. In contrast, freedom from past commitments is heralded poetically in the popular song "Gentle on My Mind," by John Hartford. 7. Just as hypocrisy takes on different meanings within the two patterns, individualism is found in both settings with different implications. The individualist is one who rejects some kind of social pressure that threatens his true identity. But there are different kinds of pressure. In one view, social pressures can divert a person from achievement, from adherence to ethical standards, and from other institutional goals. The rugged individualists of 19th-century America thought in these terms. Children were imbued with an individualistic ethic in order to protect them from peer group pressures toward mediocrity or compromise of principle, either of which meant failure to realize the potential that was the true self. But individualism can also be a repudiation of the institutional and , interindividual claims that compete with impulse. The individualist may be protecting hinv self against a conspiracy to force'-him into institutional molds, to make him do his duty, or to aspire. Both types would agree that one must resist the blandishments of friends and the threats of enemies in order to be true to himself. But the institutional individualist is most attentive to pernicious pressures on the side of mediocrity and abandonment of principle; the impulsive individualist sees clearly the social pressures in league with a system of arbitrary rules and false goals. Both institution and impulse loci allow for individualistic and nonindividualistic orientations. We have found it useful to employ a crosscutting distinction between individual'and social anchorages for the self. Institutionals stress either achievement, a relatively individual goal, or altruism, a social aim, as the road to self-discovery. Somewhere between the two lies adherence to an ethical code which will vary according to whether ethics is viewed as applied altruism or a forum for individual achievement. Impulsives may stress the simple disregard of duties and inhibitions in order

to gratify spontaneous impulses; this is essentially an individual route to self-discovery. Or they may seek self-discovery through expressing potentially tabooed feelings to other persons and thereby attain a state of interpersonal intimacy that transcends the normal barriers between people. It is essential not to confuse these alternative anchorages with the question of whether people are preoccupied with maintaining appearances or conforming instead of "being themselves." Describing a mass gathering of youths, a student wrote, "People tend to forget how they would hope to come across, and instead act as their true selves." This is a terse statement of how participants felt in the situation and expresses the point of view of an impulse self-anchorage. But from an institutional perspective, the same youths appear to be tumbling over one another in their anxiety to comply with the latest youthful fad and to avoid any appearance of being square. The institutional hopes that after passing through this stage the youths will "find themselves," discovering their special niches in the institutional system. The self-anchorage determines which kinds of behavior seem genuine and which are concessions to appearances. [...] Concerning this initial statement of the two loci of self, the reader should bear in mind that specifying polar types such as these is merely a way to start thinking about variation in the sense of self. Except on the fringes of society, we are unlikely to find the extremes. Elements of both anchorages probably coexist comfortably in the average person. Yet differences among groups of people in key facets of self may be of sufficient importance that their experience of each other is noncongruent, and little true communication can occur.

A Contemporary Trend
It is my speculative hypothesis that over the past several decades substantial shifts have occurred away from an institution and toward an impulse emphasis. Accounts of the "new sensibility" in American culture (Bell, 1970, p. 59) or of "consciousness III" (Reich, 1970) already associate many of the same features with the youthful protest of the 1960s. But it would be shortsighted not to see the shift in a more extended historical context or to overlook the possibility of rural-urban differences, class differences, and differences

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among national cultures, as well as generational differences. A revolutionary consciousness often unwittingly adopts perspectives that have been growing in established society, frees them from accommodation to other aspects of fUi'Vsu/iety, and applies them to a contemporary aisis. There is nothing novel in attending to changing values over the last few generations. But I suggest that the changes be viewed as a shift in what are conceived as valid indications of what is real about ourselves and our associates, telling us whether we really know a person or not. Distinguishing the real from the unreal is a matter of intuition, not of logic. Faultless logic that concerns unreal objects falls on deaf ears. A shifting locus of self means that successive generations are talking about different worlds of reality. At the heart of each are the shared and socially produced intuitions through which people identify their true selves. Literary themes often presage shifts in popular consciousness. Examining the writings of James Frazer, Friedrich Nietzsche, Joseph Conrad, Thomas Mann, and Sigmund Freud, Lionel Trilling (1961) traces the theme that we must accept the reality of those human impulses that were judged unacceptable by an artificial and unreal civilization. He identifies "a certain theme which appears frequently in modern literatureso frequently, indeed, and in so striking a manner, that it may be said to constitute one of the shaping and controlling ideas of our epoch. I can identify it by calling it the disenchantment of our culture with culture itselfit seems to me that the characteristic element of modern literature, or at least of the most highly developed modern literature, is the bitter line of hostility to civilization which runs through it" (p. 26). I have already noted Freud's penchant for the impulse perspective. Perhaps the greatest impact Freud had on the modern world was to discredit normative behavior and conscience as manifestations of our i'rue selves and to elevate impulses to that position. Under his aegis, guilt has ceased to be the redemptive experience through which the real self reasserts itself and has become an external impediment to personal autonomy. Lynd (1958) exemplifies this newer intuition of reality when she writes, "Living in terms of guilt and righteousness is living in terms of the sanctions and taboos of one immediate culture. To some extent such living is necessary for everyone. Living in terms of the confronting of shameand allowing shame

to become a revelation of oneself and one's societymakes way for living beyond the conventions of a particular culture. It makes possible the discovery of an integrity that is peculiarly one's own nn:i of those characteristically human qualities that are at the same time most individualizing and most universal" (p- 257). Concern with discovery of the true self, vaguely identified as a set of impulses that have been repressed or dissipated under institutional constraint, turns up as a novel element in the political process of recent years. It became a prominent theme in youth movements, minority movements, and women's movements during the 1960s (Turner, 1969). Miller (1973) traces the "politics of the true self" back to the poet William Blake and shows that violence is conceived of as the ultimate form of self-expression and self-discovery in the writings of Fanon and Sartre. The term "soul" has often been used in much the same sense as our term "true self." It can be found in the work of poets as different as Richard Lovelace and William Wordsworth. But its meaning has changed to suit prevailing conceptions of personal reality. A century ago the soul was essentially a moral force. As secular psychology brought the term into disrepute, it disappeared, sank into obscurity, reemerging to describe a special quality attributed to blacks. It retains its character as a dynamic force, but a supposed lack of inhibition is a crucial criterion of "soul." Miller and Swanson (1958) documented changing conceptions of child rearing as new middleclass parents evinced less concern about internalized controls and more about social adjustment than did parents from the old middle class. In studies of another stage in life, students, as they progressed through college or university, were found to look more favorably on the expression of impulses (Feldman and Newcomb, 1969, p. 34). If the inner-directed person of Riesman et al. (1950) has much in common with our institutional, the other-directed person may have been a transitional type, clinging to the institutional framework for his identity but finding a way to accept constant change. Perhaps the total repudiation of institutional identities is the product of a growing sense of unreality in all roles that comes from the otherdirected person's efforts to be all his roles. In the world of business, the shift is from the view that human relations take care of themselves when tasks are effectively managed to the position that human-

relations engineering is essential to effective production. In education the progressive movement promoted a conception of the child in terms of his impulses, and not merely his learning and conduct. Rieff's (1966) depiction of cultural change as "the shifting balance of controls and releases" (p. 233) and his account of the "triumph of the therapeutic" describe a historical change toward greater impulsiveness. Lifton (1970) has described a type of personality he believes is becoming much more common throughout the developed world. His "protean man" has no true shape of his own but assumes varied shapes according to circumstance. Except for the fact that Riesman et al. describe other-direction as a mode of conformity, "protean man" may be a new name for the same kind of person. But the idea that rapid social change makes fixed identities unworkable has also inspired Zurcher (1972, 1973) to identify the "mutable self as a phenomenon unique to the present generation. Zurcher cites as evidence for the "mutable self his discovery that students no longer answer Kuhn's TST as they used to. Early use of the procedure produced mostly "B mode" responses, meaning that the subject identified himself with various institutionalized roles and statuses. Now students give principally "C mode" responses, which specify characteristic modes of acting, feeling, and responding. "C mode" responses clearly attenuate the linkage between self and institutional anchorage. The real self is marked by characteristic orientationsattitudes, feelings, desiresrather than characteristic placement in social organization. Young people find self-realization in patterns that are viewed apart from their institutional settings. Consistent with this evidence is the contemporary view that, on meeting a stranger, it is inappropriate to ask where he comes from, what he does, and whether he is married, or to categorize him in other ways. Instead, one seeks to know him through his tastes and his feelings. [. ..]

behavior that may be contrived, people seek agreement on signs by which to tell genuine from false sentiment. The choice of cues reflects the anchorage of self. Self-as-impulse can feel love as genuine, as a true reflection of self, only when it arises and persists as a spontaneous attachment, untrammeled by promises, covenants, and codes of behavior. Sentiment is not helped along by a facilitative social order: it erupts in spite of the order and threatens it. The less organization and preparation, the more easily can the individual discover his true sentiments. Institutional, on the other hand, understand love as something that requires effort to attain and preserve. The infatuation that explodes impulsively is undependable and unreal. The institutional seeks to learn how to achieve true love and turns for guidance to such documents as Paul's chapter on love in the New Testament (1 Cor. 13). The contrasting perspectives are represented in the analysis of popular sex manuals by Lewis and Brissett (1967). Manuals popular with married middle-class people in the 1940s and 1950s are institutional in orientation. They offer readers an opportunity to enhance the vitality and mutuality of sexual experience, leading to a deeper union of the two selves. But Lewis and Brissett read the manuals from the impulsive perspective. Stripped of the institutional perspective, the quest for mutual self-attainment becomes sheer, meaningless "work." Thus, they write of "sex as work." To the extent to which the self-locus has moved away from institutions, the correlations found by Burgess and Cottrell (1939), Burgess and Wallin (1953), and Locke (1951) with persistence and love in marriage may become increasingly invalid, and new and different indicators may become relevant.

The Meaning of Ritual

In 1930, an article entitled "Ritual the Conserver" (Cressman) appeared in the American Journal of Sociology. It elaborated the crucial part played by ritual in sustaining the Catholic church and its doctrines. To a contemporary reader, the paper seems peculiarly unconvincing. To those who find not only religious ritual but also marriage ceremonies, funeral and memorial services, initiation ceremonies, and graduation exercises devoid of meaning, it is unclear how ritual could add vitality and reality to anything. Yet plainly many people have

Sentiments
Much of the spontaneous joy that lubricates the functioning of social orders resides in the social sentiments. Love is of paramount importance among the sentiments. Because sentiment seems to express the inner person, in contrast to external

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The Self in Social Psychology Burgess, E. W., & Cottrell, L S. Jr. (1939). Predicting success or failure in marriage. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Burgess, E. W., & Wallin, P. (1953). Engagement and marriage. Chicago: Lippincott. Oressman, L. S (1930). Ritual the conserver. American Journal of Sociology, 35, 564572. Dubin, R. (1956). Industrial workers' world. Social Problems, 3, 131-142. Feldman, K. A., & Newcomb, T. M. (1969). The impact of college on students. Vol. 1. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Freud, S. (1930). Civilization and its discontents. London: Hogarth. Freud, S. (1931). Modern sexual morality and modern nervousness. New York: Eugenics. Klapp, O. E. (1969). Collective search/or identity. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Lewis, L. S., & Brissett, D. (1967). Sex as work: A study of avocational counselling. Social Problems, 15, 8-17. Lifton, R. J. (1970). Boundaries: Psychological man in revolution. New York: Random House. Locke, H. J. (1951). Predicting adjustment in marriage. New York: Holt. Lynd, H. M. (1958). On shame and the search for identity. New York: Harcourt, Brace. Miller, D. R., & Swanson, G. E. (1958). The changing American parent. New York: Wiley. Miller, S. (1973). The politics of the 'True Self.' Dissent, 20, 93-98. Park, R. E. (1927). Human nature and collective behavior. American Journal of Sociology, 32, 733-741. Reich, C. A. (1970). The greening of America. New York: Random House. Rieff, P. (1966). The triumph of the therapeutic. New York: Harper & Row. Riesman, D., Glazer, N., & Denney, R. (1950). The lonely crowd. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Trilling, L. (1961). The modern element in modern literature. Partisan Review, 28, 9-25. Turner, R. H. (1968). The self in social interaction. In C. Gordon and K. Gergen (Eds.), The self in social interaction (pp. 93-106). New York: Wiley. Turner, R. H. (1969). The theme of contemporary social movements. British Journal of Sociology, 20, 390^05. Wellman, B. (1971). Social identities in black and white. Sociological Inquiry, 41, 57-66. White, R. W. (1972). The enterprise of living: Growth and organization in personality. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Wilensky, H. L. (1964). Varieties of work experiences. In H. Borow (Fd ), Man in c; world </.' work (pp. \ ?."> 1 5 W Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Wordsworth, W. (1807). Ode to Duty. Zurcher, L. A. (1972). The mutabie self: An adaptation to accelerated sociocultural change. Et al, 3, 3-15. Zurcher, L. A. (1973). Alternative institutions and the mutable self: An overview. Journal of Applied Behavioral Sciences, 9, 369-380.

been, and continue to be, moved deeply by participation in collective ritual, and for many people dedication to institutional goals and forms is strengthened in this way. The locus of self must be closely intertwined with the ability to gain a vital experience from engaging in collective rituals. It would be premature to label one cause and the other effect, but the impulsive's self-fulfilling prophecy that he will not experience his real self thought participation in institutional ritual contrasts with the equally self-fulfilling prophecy from the institutional. But the matter cannot be reduced to a differential receptivity to ritual. Writing on the "collective search for identity," Klapp (1969) describes the contemporary poverty of ritual, then insists that "ritual is the prime symbolic vehicle for experiencing emotions and mystiques together with othersincluding a sense of oneself as sharing such emotions ..." (p. 118). In the place of traditional forms, there have arisen new rituals that participants experience as spontaneous outpourings instead of institutional routines. Sitting on the floor in a circle and singing to the accompaniment of guitars takes the place of sitting in rows on pews and listening to an organ. Rock festivals and loveins are only the more dramatic rituals, for even the conventional partying rituals of middle-class establishmentarians are experienced as a welcome contrast to institutional routine. Here, then, is another set of rituals that have meaning and vitality as opportunities for experiencing a self that contains more impulse than institution. Ritual is commonly viewed as a support of the institutional order, and Klapp's "poverty of ritual" does indeed characterize many of the forms that have been employed to strengthen a collective sense of institutional commitment. But it is doubtful that there is any poverty of ritual today in those forms that increase the vitality of an impulsive view of self.
REFERENCES Allport, G. W. (1955). Becoming: Basic considerations for a psychology of personality. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Bell, D. (1910). Quo warranto. Public Interest, 19, 53-68.

Roy F. Baumeister (coord.) (1999). THE SELF IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Colectia "Key Readings in Social Psychology")Philadelphia: Psychology Press.