This article was downloaded by: [Orta Dogu Teknik Universitesi] On: 24 September 2012, At: 02:08 Publisher:

Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Contemporary Arab Affairs

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcaa20

On the Arab Democratic Spring: lessons derived

Khair ElDin Haseeb Version of record first published: 21 Apr 2011.

To cite this article: Khair ElDin Haseeb (2011): On the Arab Democratic Spring: lessons derived, Contemporary Arab Affairs, 4:2, 113-122 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17550912.2011.577276

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-andconditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

Contemporary Arab Affairs Vol. 4, No. 2, AprilJune 2011, 113122

EDITORIAL On the Arab Democratic Spring: lessons derived

Over the last three months a wave of revolutions, uprisings and strikes aiming to realize democracy according to its primary concepts and which began with a peaceful, non-violent revolution in Tunisia that then spread to Egypt, has occurred in a number of Arab countries.1 As a result, regimes in both countries were brought down, and both countries are taking important steps in order to consolidate the primary elements of the revolution and establish a new system in each, despite some fears which have not ceased but which are diminishing. Subsequently, these peaceful uprisings spread to Yemen where they began with demands to undertake radical reforms which did not preclude negotiations with the regime as a means to achieve this aim. After the authorities used violence in confronting demonstrators, demands shifted to the overthrow of the regime of President Ali Abdullah Saleh; subsequently, the government on 23 March and after it was too late offered to submit to terms previously proposed which it had initially refused. Simultaneously, it declared a state of emergency, and the situation appears to be on the brink of a revolution. Demonstrations occurred in Oman; however, up to the present, the regime has wisely managed to contain them and to respond to and constrain principle demands. Similarly, a peaceful uprising occurred in Bahrain, undertaken primarily by groups deprived of their rights representative of the majority of the Bahraini people most of whom had reached a consensus to demand radical modifications to the system and transformation to a constitutional monarchy. These were confronted by an offer from the regime for dialogue along with stern repressive measures that pushed other factions to join the opposition under the banner of bringing down the regime. Subsequently, events developed until they reached the point where the Bahraini government sought and received military support from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), when it declared a state of emergency and martial law. The Bahraini regime deployed the mostly hybrid army and used excessive violence with the unquestioning support of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) regimes. There were signs of demonstrations and limited protests in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait; however these have, until now, been contained through the undertaking of a number of measures of a material nature, which involved too much money but little freedom. Yet this is a wound which has been bound only temporarily. This phenomenon has transitioned to Jordan but yet remains limited. Demands have vacillated between constitutional monarchy and overthrow of the regime. The Jordanian government is attempting to contain and placate elements seeking changes and has formed a dialogue committee to deal with the draft demands. Similarly, Syria is witnessing demonstrations in various cities, most of which are fielding demands for democracy, with a few local social and economic concerns, with some casualties in Dara and Latakia. The Syrian authorities promised to meet some of the demands of the demonstrators shortly, and seem to have contained the demonstrators for the time
haseebk@caus.org.lb Dr 0000002011 00 Khair Francis 2011 Article and Francis 1755-0912 (print)/1755-0920 Contemporary Arab Affairs (online) 10.1080/17550912.2011.577276 RCAA_A_577276.sgm Taylor & El-DinHaseeb

Downloaded by [Orta Dogu Teknik Universitesi] at 02:08 24 September 2012

ISSN 1755-0912 print/ISSN 1755-0920 online 2011 The Centre for Arab Unity Studies DOI: 10.1080/17550912.2011.577276 http://www.informaworld.com

114

K. El-Din Haseeb

Downloaded by [Orta Dogu Teknik Universitesi] at 02:08 24 September 2012

being. Demonstrations have spread to most population sectors in Iraq where most demands have revolved around public services with some others being political in nature; these have pervaded both Arab and Kurdish regions. In the countries of the Arab Maghreb and Morocco, in particular, King Muhammad VI anticipated demonstrations by forming a constitutional review committee to increase the powers of the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers in addition to other matters for the purpose of diminishing the present nature of the absolute monarchy and moving it towards a constitutional monarchy. Despite this, demonstrations were sparked on 21 March in more than 60 Moroccan cities, calling for political, constitutional and economic reforms. Tens of thousands participated in the demonstrations that took different forms of expression aiming towards realizing a constitutional monarchy. In Algeria, some demonstrations which were put down with force occurred; however, the situation differs dramatically from that in other previously mentioned Arab countries to the effect that it is often said: If every state has an army, the Algerian army has a state. The upshot of this is that the Algerian Army represents the liberation army that brought Algeria to liberation and independence, since which time it has exercised power sometimes directly, especially after Boumeddien, and at other times indirectly and clandestinely. The Algerian leadership is currently attempting to pre-empt events, being facilitated in this through its significant fiscal capabilities deriving from oil and gas revenues. It is attempting this by taking political and economic measures to contain probable demands by nullifying the state of emergency and undertaking other social and economic action. As for Mauritania, the tsunami has yet to reach its shores in a significant fashion, whereas Lebanon is a different case: there are impracticalities to undertaking popular action that transcend sectarian and confessional lines as well as the material interests of some of the ruling class. Lebanon is currently witnessing initial and limited, but diffuse, attempts, where there are weekly youth demonstrations on Sundays (this being the official day off in Lebanon) calling for: abolition of confessionalism and sectarianism; promulgation of a democratic elections law; and a unified civil-status law. These demonstrations have been increasing in number, but their future impact will depend to a large degree upon their ability to persevere. However, it is not anticipated that the tumultuous Arab democratic tidal wave will reach Lebanon due to the complicated nature of its political and social structure. In terms of lessons which may be drawn, it is possible to note the following: (1) There is an erroneous overgeneralization in the use of the term revolution with regard to all of the aforementioned events. The term revolution is seldom employed without confirmation of the proper significations of this expression when it is most typically employed to describe a military coup, an uprising or a temporary mass insurrection that leads to some sort of cosmetic change restricted to the existing ruling regime. Whereas, the precise definition of revolution connotes all actions and events that lead to radical changes in the political, social and economic reality of a given people or group in a comprehensive and persuasive way over an extended period of time and from which results a modification to the structure of social thought among the revolting people as well as the re-distribution of resources and political powers. Many social scientists insist on defining revolution as connoting a comprehensive fundamental change in the distribution of the sources of wealth and the production processes in society.2 While this definition is

Contemporary Arab Affairs

115

Downloaded by [Orta Dogu Teknik Universitesi] at 02:08 24 September 2012

applicable to a great extent to the revolutions of Egypt and Tunisia, it might also be applicable to the uprising in Yemen, provided that President Ali Abdullah Salehs regime is toppled, which is quite likely. As for Libya, the term may be appropriate if the opposition there is able to extirpate what still remains of al-Qadhafis regime, a mission that might take relatively longer to accomplish in comparison to the timeframes of Egypt and Tunisia. Until such occurs it is problematic to term what is currently transpiring in Yemen and Libya as revolutions, as until now they are more apt to be termed uprisings, which might later be considered revolutions if the regimes are deposed and the outcomes are radical changes in the nature of both systems. As for events taking place in other Arab states, these are not showing signs of being more than limited uprisings: expanding horizontally without discounting the possibility that they may transform into far-flung and total rebellions, and possibly into genuine revolutions. It is important to emphasize the peaceful and non-violent nature of these revolts and uprisings, even in cases of self-defense, with the exception of the Libyan opposition forces that were compelled to resort to violence in order to defend themselves. This represents a substantial and qualitative development in the means to which the Arab opposition movements can resort, which would never have achieved what they have today had they resorted to violence or had they been drawn into using it in their bid to achieve their demands.3 (2) Practical experience in Tunisia and Egypt, and contrary to the preconceptions of many, has shown that radical change from within is viable without resort to outside intervention, as in the case, for instance, where some have attempted to justify seeking foreign intervention for precipitating change in Iraq. (3) It is also evident that it is relatively simpler to topple a regime than to construct a new one, as is suggested by the experiences of Egypt and Tunisia. For the purpose of reaching a consensus among opposition forces whether they be individuals or groups agreement on overthrowing an autocratic regime is much easier than reaching agreement on the nature of the new system and the means to achieve it. Moreover, establishing the foundations of a new system is considerably more exposed to risks and threats of conflict between the revolutionary parties, which gives an opportunity to counterrevolutionary forcers to maneuver and sabotage the establishment of an alternative system. Until now, Egypt and Tunisia have been able to overcome some of these obstacles and succeed in imposing a timetable for undertaking parliamentary and presidential elections as well as drafting a new constitution. There are still, however, obstacles and challenges lying ahead of these two countries which they will need to surmount. (4) In an attempt to clarify and pursue the point raised above, it is necessary to stress that in order to attain social justice and real development that deals with the issue of unemployment, establishing a democratic regime alone is not sufficient to achieve the social and economic goals of the revolutions completed thus far and the ones expected in Yemen and Libya. Since democracy is an obligatory and requisite condition and not a sufficient one it is therefore necessary to accomplish the economic and social aims of every revolution, but democracy alone is not sufficient. These objectives of the

116

K. El-Din Haseeb

revolution cannot be attained without sustainable economic and social development in tandem with social justice. Social justice means the increase of production and a fair distribution, which is a more complicated and problematic matter than bringing down a despotic and corrupt regime. Furthermore, the revolution in both Egypt and Tunisia has temporarily eliminated country revenues from tourism, reduced production and services in some sectors as well as precipitated some capital flight from the country among other negative results, and this is among that which necessitates making people aware that they should not harbor excessively high economic and social expectations so as to prevent falling into major disappointment. (5) Tunisia ought to be granted a patent in pioneering the revolutionary movements as the Tunisians were the first to break the barrier of fear, which constituted the major obstacle in the face of unleashing popular fury and resentment over deteriorating economic, social and political conditions which needed only a spark to explode forth. The Tunisian revolution was the catalyst that instigated the Egyptian revolt and uprisings in other countries. Despite the limited significance of Tunisia in the regional Arab system, its role in breaking the barrier of fear was of paramount importance, which should not be underestimated, and which exceeded Tunisias traditional role in the regional scheme. (6) The most important event that has occurred in the Arab World until now is the revolution in Egypt due to its weight in the Arab regional system and which has long been absent and the absence of which constitutes one of the factors in the collapse of this system. It is temporarily both understandable and acceptable that the revolution in Egypt has yet to exhibit its Arab dimension so as not to incite opposition because, for the time being, Egypt is passing through a critical period that entails a grave need to mitigate and immobilize opponents. Therefore, we see no serious Arab criticism leveled at the absence of an Arab dimension to the revolution, and we see the announcement of its intention to abide by international agreements (which include the Camp David accords). Nevertheless, Egypt needs to send messages of reassurance to Arabs concerning its Arab viewpoint while at the same time avoiding new problems at the international level. Among these long-awaited messages and actions is the opening of the Rafah border crossing between Egypt and Gaza, and not on a temporary basis restricted only to individuals, as has been the case until now, but rather on a permanent footing for both people and goods alike. The second required message and action is to stop pumping gas from Egypt to Israel, regardless of whatever pretext might be offered for such, where some conflicting reports have been issued on this subject, and while realizing that the agreement between Egypt and the Israeli corporation involved does not fall under the rubric of international accords. Also among required measures is cessation of the joint IsraeliEgyptian industrial production initiative the Joint Qualifying Industrial Zones Agreement in Egyptian territory known as QIZ for the reason that it represents a form of normalization which is not binding on Egypt as per the Camp David accords. (7) What is currently transpiring of revolutions, uprisings and their symbolic implications suggests a total Arab awakening to unity and massive interaction in the Arab consciousness. If it is not the case, then why is it that these Arab events did not diffuse to some of the sub-Saharan African countries, some of

Downloaded by [Orta Dogu Teknik Universitesi] at 02:08 24 September 2012

Contemporary Arab Affairs

117

(8)

(9)
Downloaded by [Orta Dogu Teknik Universitesi] at 02:08 24 September 2012

(10)

(11)

(12)

which suffer from the likes of the despotism, poverty and corruption experienced in the Arab countries? It is arbitrary to term the revolutions of Egypt and Tunisia and all the revolts and uprisings currently being witnessed as youth revolutions. For while it is the youth who instigated these events, all or most classes of society who suffered the injustices of these regimes in Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen have participated and played a significant role in these revolts and uprisings. Thus, objectively, it is appropriate to term the revolts in Egypt and Tunisia as popular revolutions and those in Yemen and Libya as popular uprisings. Experience of what has transpired up to now confirms that the uprisings, which have succeeded and transformed into realized revolutions, are those which have been able to secure the neutrality of the army and preclude it from opposing or quashing them after the inability of other security apparatuses to do so. The Tunisian revolution succeeded because the Tunisian Army is small in size, poorly armed and not politicized. Similarly, the revolution in Egypt succeeded because it was able to secure the neutrality of the army initially to prevent an attempt to quash the uprising and subsequently to oblige it to accede to its goals once the revolution expanded and increased in scope and the dimensions of its success had become clear. The situation was different in Yemen and Bahrain where it appeared initially that the respective armies had stood by the regimes, but where subsequently in recent days in Yemen segments have broken away and a majority has sided in support of the uprisings, with the exception of the Republican Guards and the Supreme Command that has not ceased to support the Yemeni President. Likewise, the Bahraini Army, which is composed by a majority of non-Bahrainis, has backed the regime and acted to suppress the uprisings. Events have clarified the error of adopting slogans identical to those of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions in regard to regime overthrow in all cases of change. Where there were monarchial/royalist regimes (or what resembled such), the slogan of overthrowing the regime connotes overthrow of the King or the monarchy, which has impelled these monarchs to rely on every internal and external means, including foreign military bases, in order to quell these uprisings.4 What is more correct both theoretically and practically is the demand for constitutional monarchy, which bears the possibility of favorable reception among Arab peoples as well as foreign; and moreover, its implementation is considerably less complicated than other options. It can be inferred, with a measure of confidence, that that the role of Islamic fronts and currents with the exception of Bahrain has not been primary, without discounting their participation wherever they were found.5 Thus it is no longer possible for these regimes or the international forces which back them to operate on the pretext or maintain the claim of fear that Islamists will take control over these regimes. These recent events have also shown that the role of social communication means, such as Facebook and others, is surpassing that of the mosque in mobilizing people in uprisings. Similarly these revolutions, uprisings and have weakened al-Q a idah.6 There is an overemphasis on the role of social means of communication (Facebook, Twitter and others) in effecting these revolutions and uprisings. It is true that such means facilitated initiating and igniting these events;

118

K. El-Din Haseeb

however, these uprisings and revolutions could not have marshaled all these various social factions if there had not been a sufficient accumulation of consciousness for the requisite radical reforms in which different political and conceptual orientations have factored over the past 40 years. This is in addition to the fact that that revolutions have occurred in contemporary history in Iran and Indonesia without the availability of these and similar means of social communication. (13) The position of Arab media vis--vis these revolutions, uprisings and their effects and implications has been varied, and especially that of satellite channels. At a time when the Al Jazeera satellite channel played an important role in the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions and the opposition uprisings in Libya and Yemen, it has exercised considerable restraint in regard to what has occurred and is transpiring in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council especially in regard to Oman, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia and this has had an impact on its credibility among both Arab and foreign audiences. This applies to Arab satellite channels and media, in general, and in particular to Gulf news services as well as Moroccan and Algerian media where silence or partisanship and bias was overt, which regrettably led Arab viewers and readers to rely on satellite broadcasts of the Arabic-language BBC as being relatively more objective in the comprehensiveness of its coverage than Arab news media in general. (14) There is a fear that consensus will not be reached among the various social and political forces that participated in bringing down the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. That is, they do not agree on the characteristics of the new regime which they are attempting to establish and which might pave the way for a counter-revolution to exploit these differences and factions as well as derail the process of realizing the general goals of the revolution in the new system. This demands the establishment of a historical bloc or front or coalition through which agreement may be reached for an interim transitional program for a period of two to three years, to comply with this and enter into elections for parliaments, the promulgation of new constitutions as well as establishing a new system on this basis in general. In addition to the danger of leaving the way open for counter-revolutionary activity if this is not achieved, there is also the danger that there will be difficulty in holding new parliamentary elections due to the inability to achieve a concordant majority agreeing on a transitional program. Also, there is a risk that these elections may precipitate the formation of small parliamentary blocs that will stand in the way of the elected parliaments and keep them from adopting what is expected of them in terms of radical modifications; moreover, this is one of the possible and sometimes probable negative potentialities in democratic parliamentary elections. (15) The positions of regional Arab regimes towards these revolutions, uprisings and their implications is divergent and sometimes contradictory in accordance with the nature of their political structures and their interests and constitutes an expression of dichotomous dual standards, worthy of concern. At a time when Arab Gulf regimes kept silent about what occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Jordan and Syria, they enthusiastically supported the Libyan uprisings, while simultaneously standing by the current regimes in Oman and Bahrain. In particular, they supported the Bahraini regime and Saudi and UAE military intervention against a large segment of the Bahraini population. Likewise, with

Downloaded by [Orta Dogu Teknik Universitesi] at 02:08 24 September 2012

Contemporary Arab Affairs

119

the exception of Qatar, they took a negative stance towards the uprisings in Yemen and are vigilant about the continuity of the current regime. Iranian and Turkish positions towards events in the Arab World have diverged, with Iran supporting all that has transpired with a failed attempt to cast it in terms of a Middle East Islamic revolution and with Turkey remaining hesitant and neutral given the clear impact on its economic interests in the region. (16) As for Israel, it was panic-stricken over changes occurring in Egypt and Tunisia, and it took a negative position towards these incidents. As for the international positions, especially those of the United States, the European Union (EU), Russia and China, we must dispel illusions about the reality of the US position in particular, and that of the EU to a certain extent, towards Arab regimes and their willingness for these to transform them into democratic ones. Despite some of the slogans that they iterate at times, the essence of their genuine position is to preserve corrupt Arab autocratic and undemocratic regimes, as these realize their interests which conflict with those of the peoples of Arab countries. Transformation of these regimes into democratic ones which incorporate the participation of their peoples in primary decisionmaking processes will preclude their national security from remaining at the mercy of the United States and its allies as well as what is connected to this of imposed billion-dollar arms sales without defining the real enemy. Similarly, such a transition would adversely impact US military air- and naval bases which it maintains currently, the cost of which is paid by some Arab Gulf regimes. Likewise, these peoples will not permit the continued pilfering of oil and gas revenues by their rulers, with the exception of Kuwait, and to earmark and apportion whatever they will for the national budget of their populations. Additionally, investments will not remain with their public and private dividends what they are, without consideration of genuine interests. The people of these countries will not tolerate Westernization and distortion of their Arab identity through the imposition of English-language educational curricula at all levels as a first language, in addition to the role of non-Arab expatriate workers in misrepresenting and maligning this identity. The Arab peoples will demand just prices for their vital oil and gas resources, commensurate with the price increases of various goods in the West. They will not permit their regimes to continue to sell oil at current prices, which despite recent increases is still almost equivalent to 1970s real prices, after taking into account the inflation which has occurred during the intervening period. As for Russia and China, they will proceed essentially according to their economic interests in the Arab World, with concomitant consideration of their obligations to the United States and Europe and their interests which lie therein. (17) In general, the double standards of the US and the European Union have become clear vis--vis current democratic changes transpiring and those which might occur in other Arab countries. The US and EU remained silent then neutral until the fall of the regimes in Egypt and Tunisia became evident to them. Gradually, a change was precipitated in their position towards lukewarm support for the revolutions in both countries. They tentatively supported the Libyan uprising then adopted under the rubric of humanitarian objectives

Downloaded by [Orta Dogu Teknik Universitesi] at 02:08 24 September 2012

120

K. El-Din Haseeb

Downloaded by [Orta Dogu Teknik Universitesi] at 02:08 24 September 2012

and under the cover of the Arab League and a Gulf initiation the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya to prevent al-Qadhafis air forces from attacking civilians. Yet it has maintained silence over the hostilities of the Yemeni regime against demonstrators and many casualties and, similarly, has backed regimes in Oman, Bahrain7 and Saudi Arabia in their positions towards the uprisings in them, with modest reservations over the use of violence against demonstrators. N.D. Kristof says: Today the United States is in a vise caught between our allies and our values. And the problem with our pal Bahrain is not just that it is shooting protesters but also that it is something like an apartheid state. Sunni Muslims rule the country, and now they are systematically trying to crush an overwhelmingly Shiite protest movement.8 (18) As for Russia and China, they both avoided taking clear positions due to their desires to abide by economic interests. Furthermore, during the United Nations Security Council meeting they abstained from voting on the Libyan no-fly zone draft resolution, where if they had utilized their veto powers, the resolution would not have passed. As for the future and the possible development of these events in the relevant Arab countries and their related needs, the following may be reasonably asserted: (1) The success of the democratic revolution in Egypt and Tunisia and later in Yemen requires economic and fiscal support in order to realize its purpose and social and economic promises to the respective peoples, for the reason that their internal revenues do not enable them to achieve the necessary growth with the requisite speed which is in order. In order not to leave them at the mercy of the conditions of American and European aid and assistance which may or may not come with all the associated political and economic pressures which can be expected to accompany such there is certainly urgent and pressing need for the establishment of an Arab financial support fund that should be created swiftly through an Arab Economic Summit, in which Arab oil producing countries with financial surplus, such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Algeria, would create a fund as a reflection of their good intentions and in expiation and atonement for the negative positions of the majority of them towards the revolutions. (2) It is expected that the democratic spring will complete its course successfully and that the uprisings in Yemen will culminate in a revolution that will bring down the regime of Ali Abdullah Saleh in the near future. (3) As for Libya, it is predicted, unfortunately, that the current bloodbath will continue for some time and that Colonel Qadhafi will persist in destroying hearth and home. However, the regime will fall and come to an end after a high price in human lives and material is paid. It is incumbent upon the opposition, despite its understandable circumstances and its being compelled to resort to outside support to impose a no-fly zone against al-Qadhafis regime, to distance itself from seeking support of the West on the ground in the completion of its revolution. This must be the case no matter what it entails of extended time and greater sacrifices and casualties, as to seek the aid of the West on the ground would be the kiss of death for it. (4) In the case of Bahrain, wisdom may yet prevail, and the regime may transition to dialogue with the opposition in its entirety to realize essential graduated and

Contemporary Arab Affairs

121

(5)

(6)

(7)
Downloaded by [Orta Dogu Teknik Universitesi] at 02:08 24 September 2012

(8)

(9)

continuous constitutional reforms which will lead eventually to constitutional monarchy. In Morocco, it is anticipated that the perspicacity of the King and what he will undertake of immanent rapid changes towards constitutional monarchy will obviate the need of the Moroccan people to resort to revolution. As for Algeria, the lifting of the state of emergency indicates the awareness of the regime of the danger of situation; however, much depends on the extent of the limited scope of the capacity of the President to pre-empt matters and to achieve the minimum in terms of steps towards establishing genuine democracy in the country. In Jordan, it is hoped that the regime will act rationally in facilitating what will realize genuine reforms on the path towards constitutional monarchy. Perhaps establishing a committee of national leaders in Jordan to propose these amendments would constitute a step in this direction. In Syria, where the situation differs to a large degree from that of other Arab regimes due to the American stance towards it and its policies towards Palestine, it is compelled to introduce serious political and economic reforms and fight corruption within. It is hoped that it will comprehend the lesson from current events before it is too late. In the case of Saudi Arabia, it is doubtful that the nature of its regime and the mindset of its rulers will permit the realization of a sufficient measure of reforms that might be able to shield it from the winds of change in the Arab World.

Conclusion In conclusion, it might be said that whatever the extent of difficulties and hardships in consolidating the successes that have been achieved up to now, what has happened is significant and there is no going back. The new Arab renaissance is knocking on the door of all Arab regimes where the choice is between that of the regimes submitting themselves to gradual peaceful and orderly transition towards democracy or a revolutionary change. It is our hope that this will be without violence and imposed from within by the peoples who are still under the yoke of tyranny. Thus, some of the corrupt and autocratic Arab regimes have met their fate, and there are those that are still awaiting it. And as it is said in the holy Quran: And We did not wrong them, but they wronged themselves.9 The revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt have shown us that the nights are yet pregnant with all manner of wonders. Khair El-Din Haseeb Editor-in-Chief, Contemporary Arab Affairs Email: haseebk@caus.org.lb Notes
1. I completed writing this editorial on 24 March 2011. Therefore I could not attend to the

development of events after this date and before the publication of this issue of Contemporary Arab Affairs. 2. Ar ur, Nassr (2011). 3. It is not obvious from the interviews that I conducted recently in Egypt that the youths of the revolution in Tunisia and Egypt were aware of Gene Sharps literature on the subject of non-violent revolutions. However, an article by Ruaridh Arrow (2011) indicated that
u]a [c m r m i]a [c r m i]a [c r

122

K. El-Din Haseeb
when he visited the liberation square in Cairo on 2 March 2011, he found that some of those who were trained in Genes work were either under arrest or under surveillance. Also see Sharp (19842005). In his article Is Arab spring over for youth?, Michael Slackman (2011) says that the Arab Spring is not necessarily over, but it has run up against dictators willing to use force to preserve their power. Slackman (2011) adds, what surprised many was the absence of religious discourse and the embrace of pluralism. See Scott (2011). It is worth noting that its almost impossible for Shiites to be hired by the army or police (Kristof 2011, p. 7); he adds: The Arab democracy Spring that began with such exhilaration in Tunisia and Egypt is now enduring a brutal winter in Libya, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Kristof (2011). Reference is made to qur anic verse 101 of surat hud (Q 11:101).
a]a m [c r ua [c m ]r ua [c m ]r

4. 5. 6. 7.

Downloaded by [Orta Dogu Teknik Universitesi] at 02:08 24 September 2012

8. 9.

Bibliography
Ar ur, Nassr, 2011. Istishraf lima alat al-Thawrat al- Arabyah. Available from: http:// www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/61D2E551-B85B-470B-BB9F-C0F22648B8BB.htm [Accessed 30 March 2011]. Arrow, R, 2011. Gene Sharp: author of the nonviolent revolution rulebook. Available from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12522848 and in Arabic in Al-Quds AlArabi, 7 March 2011, p. 10 [Accessed 30 March 2011]. Kristof, N.D., 2011. Bahrain pulls a Qaddafi. International Herald Tribune, 18 March. Available from: http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/11077/1132725-109.stm [Accessed 30 March 2011]. Shane, S., 2011. As regimes fall in Arab World, Al Qaeda sees history fly by. New York Times, 27 February. Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/28/world/middleeast/28qaeda.html?_r=1 [Accessed 30 March 2011]. Sharp, G., 19822005. The politics of nonviolent action. 3 vols. Boston, MA: Porter Sargent Publishers. Slackman, M., 2011. Is Arab Spring over for youth? International Herald Tribune, 18 March. Available from: http://www.pressdisplay.com/pressdisplay/viewer.aspx [Accessed 30 March 2011].