1he Plan for Perpetual Peace: Irom Saint-Pierre to Rousseau

J
le |the Abb de Saint-Pierre| was een able
to aoid the reproach that occurs so easily to
the ignorant, who knows how to measure the
possible only by the existing.
2
In his larard Lectures as well as in 1be ar of Peote., Rawls entures a bold
interpretation o Rousseau in terms o realistic utopianism`. But what is exactly
Rousseau`s theory o international relations, and more precisely what did he think o
the idea o a perpetual peace plan ,a Luropean ederation, Coming beore his
]vagvevt of Mov.ievr t.bbe ae aivtPierre. Ptav for Peretvat Peace` ,published
posthumously,, the .b.tract of Mov.ievr t.bbe ae aivtPierre. Ptav for Peretvat Peace`
,161, is a peculiar text, in which Rousseau's own contribution remains diicult to
assess. 1o what extent was he ollowing Saint-Pierre 1o what extent was he trying to
clariy Saint-Pierre's thought, to render his principles more proound, and to deelop
his ideas in a way that brought out their ull worth
3
1he testimony o the Covfe..iov. is
tricky to interpret on this point: 'by not being limited to the unction o translator, I
was not orbidden to think or mysel sometimes, and I could gie such a orm to my
!
Lxtract rom C. Spector, Le Pro;et ae ai eretvette : de Saint-Pierre a Rousseau`, in Privcie. av aroit ae
ta gverre, crit. .vr te Pro;et ae Pai Peretvette ae t`abbe ae aivtPierre, ed. by B. Bachoen et C. Spector, Paris:
Vrin, 2008, p. 229-294 ,translated by Patrick Camillier,.
"
'Judgment on the Polysynody', in 1be Cottectea !ritivg. of Rov..eav |hereater C\R|, ol. 11, trans.
Christopher Kelly and Judith Bush, lanoer, Nl and London: Uniersity Press o New Lngland, 2005,
p. 91.
#
'1he Conessions', in C\R, ol. 5, trans. Christopher Kelly, lanoer, Nl and London: Uniersity
Press o New Lngland, 1995, Book IX, pp. 354-6. See S. Stelling-Michaud, 'Ce que Rousseau doit a
l`abb de Saint-Pierre', in tvae. .vr te Covtrat .ociat ae ]eav]acqve. Rov..eav, Paris: Les Belles Lettres,
1964, pp. 35-45, and our own analysis below.
!
work that ery important truths would pass in it under the Abb de Saint-Pierre's
cloak een more happily than under my own.'
4
1he question, then, is how much
importance should be attached to this 'writing under the cloak': which clandestine
truths is Rousseau trying to pass under Saint-Pierre's cloak Apart rom the art o
writing - Rousseau had to orego methodical extracts rom Saint-Pierre's works,
whose boldness the citizen o Genea could not dare to reproduce in lrance
5
- we
hae also to consider Rousseau's original input. 1he oreword by the editor, Jean-
lranois Bastide, should be mentioned here:
lrom the simplicity o the title it will appear at irst to many people that M.
Rousseau here has only the merit o haing made a good abstract. Do not
be deceied by this, bere, iv vav, re.ect., tbe .vat,.t i. tbe creator. I elt that a
part o the Public might be deceied about this, I desired a dierent
entitling. M. Rousseau, ull o a scrupulous respect or the truth and or the
memory o one o the most irtuous Citizens who eer existed, replied to
me: '\ith regard to the title, I cannot consent to it being changed to a
dierent one that would usurp or me any urther a Plan that does not
belong to me at all. t i. trve tbat bare .eev tbe ob;ect vvaer a aifferevt oivt of rier
tbav tbe .bbe ae aivtPierre aia, ava tbat bare .ovetive. girev aifferevt rea.ov.
tbav bi.. Nothing preents you rom being able, i you want, to say a word
about this in the loreword, as long as the principal honour still remains
with that respectable man.
6
aivtPierre or tbe fott, of rea.ov
1o gauge Rousseau's distance rom the abb de Saint-Pierre, we should thus
consider his repeated accusation that 'passion' or the 'olly o reason' led his
predecessor to reason well on the basis o alse principles.

Rousseau rejects Saint-

$
'1he Conessions', Book IX, p. 342. lor more inormation, see the annex below.
%
Ibid., p. 356.
&
'Abstract o Monsieur l'Abb de Saint-Pierre's Plan or Perpetual Peace', in C\R 5, pp. 26-.
'
Saint-Pierre 'would hae been a ery wise man i he had not had the olly o reason' ,'lragments and
Notes...', C\R 11, p. 109 - translation modiied,. 'le gae demonstrations, it is true, but he gae
demonstrations only o the eects o a cause impossible to produce and reasoned ery well based on
"
Pierre`s childish optimism and his policy o 'disinterested reason' that modern man,
and a fortiori the Prince, cannot understand
8
. le dismisses the sophistic system o
'perected reason',
9
which led Saint-Pierre to work or imaginary beings o reason:
... thorough examination o his political works showed me only supericial
iews, projects that were useul but impracticable because o the idea
rom which the author was neer able to depart that men were guided by
their intelligence |tvviere.| rather than by their passions. 1he high opinion
he had o modern knowledge made him adopt that alse principle o
perected reason, the basis o all the demonstrations he proposed, and the
source o all his political sophisms. 1his rare man, the honour o his
century and his species, and perhaps the only one since the human race
has existed who had no other passion than that o reason, neertheless did
nothing but proceed rom error to error in all his systems, out o haing
wished to make men similar to him, instead o taking them as they are and
they will continue to be.
10
1he question is both anthropological and political. Is the ailure o Saint-
Pierre's 'system o peace' inscribed in human nature and the nature o princes, or
should it be attributed to particular historical circumstances And, i the latter, can we
think that a 'republicanization' o the states o Lurope would open the way or the
project o a Luropean Republic 1hese issues - which concern the relationship
between principles o political right and principles o public right
11
- will be the main
theme o the present analysis. I will reassess the opposition between Saint-Pierre's
alse principles' ,ibid.,.
(
'1he Abb de Saint-Pierre, kindly and without passion, seemed a God among men but in wanting to
make them adopt his principles and make them relish his disinterested reason he made himsel more o
a child than they were' ,ibid., p. 110,. 'In addressing himsel to princes, he should not hae been
unaware that he was speaking to children who were much more children than the others and did not ail
to speak reason to them as i to wise men' ,ibid., p. 113,.
)
All Rousseau's judgments are important here. See also Rousseau's notes on part o a supplement that
appeared in April 158 in the scholarly ]ovrvat ae. .aravt. and ]ovrvat ae 1rerov ,C\R, pp. 119-20,.
|1ranslations slightly modiied| Later he would again mention 'the system o the Abb de Saint-Pierre,
who claimed that human reason would always go on perecting itsel' ,Rousseau to Mirabeau, 26 July
16, in C. \. lendel, Citiev of Cevera: etectiov. frov tbe etter. of ]eav]acqve. Rov..eav, New \ork:
Oxord Uniersity Press, p. 350,.
!*
'1he Conessions', Book IX, pp. 354-5 - translation modiied.
!!
In the eighteenth century, 'public law' |aroit vbtiqve| denoted 'interstate law'.
#
absolutism and Rousseau's republicanism, and between Saint-Pierre's idealism and
Rousseau's realism. As a matter o act, the subsequent debate in Kant and legel - in
which each accused his predecessors o utopianism, Kant condemning
Rousseau,Saint-Pierre,
12
and legel repeating the charge against Kant
13
- threatens to
lead us astray. I will show that Rousseau has the same theoretical position ri.ari. the
internal and the external question, when dealing with Saint-Pierre's proposals on a
Luropean Republic and the Polysynody. In both cases, Rousseau accuses Saint-Pierre
o a deect in his analysis and political judgment which, i he had been consistent,
would hae led to a reolutionary position in the strong sense - a position o which
the author o 1be ociat Covtract himsel disapproed. In short, not only was Saint-
Pierre ar rom being a coninced absolutist, Rousseau's own writings on the Abb do
not adocate a 'republican solution', which he regarded as impracticable or the
Lurope o his time.
J. 1he Abstract of Monsieur the Abbe de Saint-Pierre's Plan for Perpetual
Peace
1he .b.tract starts rom the diiculty that external relations entail or any
internal reorm o the state: the eorts deoted to its deense impede those that might
be spent on its administration. '1oo much or too little' has been done by ensuring an
internal peace that is always endangered by the risks o war. 1he expression used by
Rousseau in '1he State o \ar' and vite appears here too:
I the social order were, as is claimed, the work o reason rather than the
passions, would it hae taken so long to see that either too much or too
little has been done or our happiness in it, that since each o us is in the
ciil state with his ellow citizens and in the state o nature with all the rest
!"
See Immanuel Kant, 'Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch', in Potiticat !ritivg., op. cit.
!#
legel made un o Kant's paciist and uniersalist illusions. In his iew, an alliance or conederation
o states would ineitably remain contingent and gie rise to disagreements that could be soled only
through war. Pbito.ob, of Rigbt, London: Oxord Uniersity Press, 196, 330-340, pp. 212-6.
$
o the world, we hae orestalled priate wars only to ignite general ones,
which are a thousand times more terrible, and that by uniting ourseles to
seeral men, we really become the enemies o the human race
14
So, what remedy is there or international anarchy \hat is the way out rom
the state o war A conederation, resulting rom a contract, emerges straight away as
the only possible solution: 'I there is some way o resoling these dangerous
contradictions, this can only be by a orm o conederatie goernment, which, uniting
Peoples by bonds similar to those which unite indiiduals, equally subject both o
them to the authority o Laws.'
15
Rousseau is here aithul to the ideas o Saint-Pierre.
1he ederal orm inoles a treaty that is analogous, among peoples, to that which is
supposed to bind indiiduals by subjecting them to the authority o the law.
16
vt
Rov..eav .eev. to be roo.ivg a vviov avovg eote. ratber tbav avovg rivce. or .tate., as we
can see rom the re-writing inoled in the eolution o the manuscript: 'In order to
dispel the contradiction I hae just noted, no orm o goernment is more
adantageous than the conederatie, because it unites remoes the disunity o states
unites peoples by bonds similar to those that unite the indiiduals which it
encompasses.'
1be reatit, of vroe
Beore coming to Saint-Pierre's proposal, howeer, Rousseau makes a detour
through history. le points out that only the moderns ,Germanic Body, leletic
League, lrench States-General, hae properly understood the conederatie orm,
although the ancients ,Greeks, Ltruscans, Gauls, etc., were not ignorant o it. Apart
rom this adantage accorded to the moderns, rare enough in Rousseau's work, his
personal contribution has to do with his ri.iov of vroe. \hereas Saint-Pierre's Pro;et ae
ai eretvette had presered the classical ision o a balance o orces among rial
!$
'Abstract...', p. 28.
!%
Ibid.
!&
Abb de SaintPierre, Pro;et ovr revare ta ai eretvette ev vroe |~ PPP|, 1ours: layard, 1986.
pp. 122-3.
%
powers,
1
the .b.tract raises the possibility o pre-political ederations bound up with
united interests, interconnected maxims and corresponding customs: '1his is how all
the Powers o Lurope orm a sort o system among themseles which unites them by
one single religion, the same international law, morals, literature, commerce, and a sort
o equilibrium that is the necessary eect o all this, and which, without anyone in act
thinking about presering it, would not be as simple to break up as many people
think.'
18

Rov..eav, tbev, forvvtate. av origivat covcetiov of vroeav cirit .ociet,.
19
Although in
Antiquity the diisions between ree men and slaes, or between Greeks and
barbarians, made such a society impossible, the Roman empire did mark an early
adance: it constituted a 'political and ciil union' among member-cities by conerring
on the anquished the right to Roman citizenship and a single code o laws. 1his
juridical tie ,'chain o justice and reason', was subsequently compounded by a religious
bond. 1hus, 'the Priesthood and the Lmpire ormed the social bond or arious
Peoples, who, without haing any real community o interests, o rights or o
dependency, had one o maxims and opinions, whose inluence has still remained,
when its principle has been destroyed.'
20
1he Luropean union is social and moral ,in
the sense o mores, as well as juridical and economic. 1his passage, which has no
precedent in Saint-Pierre ,himsel the author o an outline history o the states o
Lurope, .vvate. otitiqve.,, is o critical importance. lor beyond the constitution o a
political sphere, Rousseau has in mind here a public or ciil sphere, a 'closer society
among the Nations o Lurope' than in any other part o the world, where arious
scattered peoples would be unable to unite into a eritable association.
1be cav.e. of rar
!'
According to Stelling-Michaud, Rousseau's liely sense o Luropean reality 'diers undamentally
rom the schematic, conentional idea that the Abb de Saint-Pierre had o Lurope' ,'Ce que Rousseau
doit a l`abb de Saint-Pierre', art. cit., p. 43,.
!(
'Abstract...', p. 29.
!)
As Bernardi's aorementioned article deals at length with this question, it is mentioned here only in
passing.
"*
'Abstract...', p. 30.
&
Neertheless, Lurope's 'real society' in no way guarantees in adance a reat
barvov, among its peoples: wars, usurpations and reolts are eatures o corrupt ciil
society, so that what could be the leaen o unity becomes the seed o real discord and
contradictions. Rousseau emphasizes the gul between the humanity o the maxims
and the iolence o the wars, a gentle religion and bloody intolerance, a 'politics so
wise in books and so harsh in practice'.
21
lor want o laws to regulate their conlicts,
the princes clash with one another to impose their interests and to deine their rights.
1he paradox is that, in Lurope, diisions are the more deadly, the closer are the links
between nations - so that the requent disputes 'are almost as cruel as ciil wars'. In a
sense, the .b.tract here joins by a dierent route Saint-Pierre's starting-point that the
impossibility o securing peace in Lurope has two major causes: the lack o treaty
guarantees, and an inability to lay down the rights o the arious powers once and or
all. But Rousseau brings in the concept o a 'state o war', which he had deeloped in
the Second Di.covr.e and the Privcie. av aroit ae ta gverre: 'Let us agree, then, that the
state o the Powers o Lurope in relation to one another is truly a state o war, and
that all the partial treaties among certain o these powers are rather momentary truces
than genuine peace.'
22

Rousseau irst notes the pernicious eects o a lack o general principles o
public right and the ineectieness o international law in Lurope.
23
Public right
consists o ariable and contradictory rules that can result in a erdict only through
the principle o might is right, since 'reason, without any secure guide, |would| always
yield to personal interest in doubtul matters, war would still be ineitable, een i
eeryone wished to be just.'
24
It is a striking ormulation: een i princes were men o
good will, peace would be impossible because no criterion would permit a erdict
"!
Ibid., p. 31. 1he 'Abstract' is here at one with the opening paragraphs o '1he State o \ar' ,C\R 11,
pp. 61-2,.
""
'Abstract...', p. 31 - translation modiied.
"#
See esp. '1he State o \ar' ,pp. 62-3, and the commentary by B. Bachoen in the lrench edition,
Privcie. av aroit ae ta gverre, op. cit. C. 'Considerations on the Goernment o Poland...' ,C\R 11,
p. 23,: 'I do not attribute any importance to the saety one procures or onesel externally by treaties....
All this is useless with the Christian powers. 1hey do not know any other bonds than those o their sel-
interest.' Also Rousseau to Malesherbes, 5 Noember 160, in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Chrtien-
Guillaume de Lamoignon de Malesherbes, Corre.ovaavce, Paris: llammarion, 1991, pp. 4-5. On this
point, see 1. lleury, 'Le droit des gens dans la pense de Jean-Jacques Rousseau', .vvate., Paris: Institut
Michel Villey, 2006,1, pp. 291-335.
"$
'Abstract...', p. 32 - translation modiied.
'
between their rial legitimate claims. Unlike Saint-Pierre, who approaches these
geopolitical issues case by case and beliees in the peaceul irtues o the status quo,
Rousseau thinks it impossible to take account o right and usurpation in territorial
disputes. 1his causes the perpetuation o the state o war, which is made worse by the
political situation: some hereditary states remain electie in appearance, some
parliamentary monarchies and republics hae hereditary leaders, peoples are not
goerned by the same laws, and each goernment ineitably tends to deteriorate.
Again Rousseau implicitly distances himsel rom Saint-Pierre's expectation that
reason, political science and goernance will all be perected together. 1he question,
then, is as ollows: gien the state o war, how is it possible to perect the art o
politics and to ind the remedy in the eil, as he puts it in Cevera Mavv.crit
25
1be reveaie.
Rousseau rules out a irst possible solution: a global empire or monarchy.
26
I a
Luropean equilibrium exists, it stems rom nature, rom the caring out o nations
bordered by mountains, seas or riers. 1his gies rise to a spontaneous order, which
has no need o a legislator to constitute or perpetuate itsel ,'whether one bears it in
mind or not, this equilibrium exists, and needs nothing outside itsel to be presered,
without anyone meddling in it, and i it were broken or a moment rom one side, it
would soon reestablish itsel on another',.
2
1his political order is 'in some respects the
work o nature', not the result o human crating. lrom this point o iew, the idea o
establishing a uniersal monarchy - that is, a orm o hegemony akin to that o Roman
empire - is doomed to ailure. 1he Lnlightenment 'ridicule' o the imperial project
appears in Rousseau's realist analysis o the orces present in Lurope. le lists seeral
reasons or the impossibility o such an empire, which Louis XIV aimed to establish
or lrance, like Charles V beore him or Spain. 1he ailure anticipated or any grand
policy o conquest has two strategic causes: 1, deelopments in the art o war mean
"%
Cevera Mavv.crit, trans. by Judith Masters, New \ork: St. Martin's Press, 198, I: 2, pp. 158-63.
"&
On these two 'solutions' and their critics, see the special issue edited by C. Spector on Montesquieu
and Lmpire`, Rerve Movte.qviev, No. 8, 2005-2006.
"'
'Abstract...', p. 33 - translation modiied. 1his whole passage ,ramed by asterisks, is a text deeloped
in the rough drat o the .b.tract and larded with inserts ,see the ariants in the lrench edition,.
(
that it has become ery diicult to create surprise eects or suiciently powerul
imbalances ,the standardization o military discipline makes inasion and ictory a
tricky proposition,, and 2, neither money nor alliances suice any more to win a war,
alliances generally ending in new conlicts o interest among the allies. Rousseau also
points to the importance o the Germanic Body at the center o Lurope, holding the
other parties at bay. \hereas Saint-Pierre had seen the Germanic empire as a model o
conederation, Rousseau makes it the true stumbling block or any conqueror: 'In spite
o the deects o this constitution o the Lmpire, it is certain that the Luropean
balance will neer be broken so long as it persists.'
28

loweer, there is an obious objection to this geopolitical analysis. \hy not
presere the Luropean balance i it proes to be stable and sel-regulating According
to Rousseau, it is the ery nature o this dynamic equilibrium that makes it pernicious,
since it does not lead to rest and peace. On the contrary, the action and reaction o the
orces present among the Luropean powers causes 'continuous agitation', 'eorts
|that| are always ain and always being reborn'. 1he equilibrium aimed at ensuring that
no nation becomes powerul enough to attain hegemony thereore operates to the
adantage o Lurope's soereigns. lollowing Saint-Pierre, Rousseau criticizes the
classical system o the balance o powers,
29
but his quite dierent account ocuses on
the ery nature o Lurope and its 'present state'. '1he State o \ar' allows us to see the
reason or this: it is because o their ,artiicial, nature that political bodies cannot
maintain themseles in equilibrium.
1he need or an art o politics also has its roots in another ailure. 1he
equilibrium system cannot be replaced as a way to peace with the ,also inoluntary,
system o economic transactions and 'aov covverce'.
30
Not only do economic
exchanges not bring peace , they do not make it possible to increase power to the
point where a lasting hegemony is established. \hereas Saint-Pierre saw trade as a
"(
'Abstract...', p. 35.
")
See G. Liet, `qvitibre evroeev ae ta fiv av `1
e
.iecte a ta fiv av `1
e
.iecte, Paris: P.U.l., 196 ,
G. Zeller, 'Le principe d`quilibre dans la politique internationale aant 189', in ..ect. ae ta otitiqve
fravai.e .ov. t`.vciev Regive, Paris: P.U.l., 1964, pp. 12-84.
#*
On this concept, see A. O. lirschman, 1be Pa..iov. ava tbe vtere.t., Princeton, NJ: Princeton
Uniersity Press, 19.
)
possible substitute or interstate iolence,
31
Rousseau regarded it as an obstacle to
lasting hegemony and, rather curiously, as a cause o 'political anaticism'. 1he
accusation was directed at goernments under the sway o alse and especially unstable
economic principles: 'since ideas about commerce and money hae produced a sort o
political anaticism, they cause the apparent interests o all Princes to change so
suddenly that one cannot establish any stable maxim based on their true interests,
because now eerything depends on economic systems, most o them extremely
bizarre, which run through the heads o ministers. Be this as it may, commerce, which
daily tends to put itsel into equilibrium, depriing certain powers o the exclusie
adantage they used to draw rom it, at the same time depries them o some o the
chie means they used to hae or laying down the law or others.'
32
Commerce is thus
the source o war rather than peace, since it does not do enough to satisy the desire
or hegemony. No more than the balance o power does the balance o commerce
allow the urge or domination to be curbed.
Consistently, the .b.tract successiely discards three possible ways to peace
among nations: empire, equilibrium and commerce. But, as in lobbes, relatie equality
is at the root o the state o war, since each seeks to increase his power but ails to
subjugate all his enemies.
33
1he task is thereore to deduce rom the equal distribution
o orces the possibility o a political orm other than Lmpire - the egalitarian and
oluntary orm o an association o nations. In short, i no one can win wars, and i it
is impossible in the present state o things to preent them rom breaking out,
conlicts can be resoled only through an end to the state o war - through an
institutionalized peace, which could not be jeopardized by each party's pursuit o its
particular interests. 'lor, in order to orm a solid and durable conederation, it is
necessary to put all its members into such a mutual dependence that none is capable o
resisting all the others by itsel, and particular associations that might harm the
principal member ace suicient obstacles to impede their implementation in practice:
#!
See C. Spector, Movte.qviev et t`evergevce ae t`ecovovie otitiqve, Paris: Champion, 2006, chap. 4.
#"
'Abstract...', p. 35 - translation modiied. 1he critique that Rousseau deelops in the 'Preace to
^arci..v.' rests upon dierent principles ,the necessary antagonism o interests,, see 1be Di.covr.e. ava
Otber art, Potiticat !ritivg., Cambridge: Cambridge Uniersity Press, 199, pp. 92-106.
##
See C. Larrere, 'L`tat de guerre et la guerre entre les Ltats: Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la critique du
Droit naturel', in a ataitte, t`.rvee, ta Ctoire, Actes du Colloque de Clermont-lerrand, 1983,
Association des Publications de Clermont II, 1985, pp. 135-48.
!
otherwise the conederation would be ain, and each would really be independent
under the appearance o subjection.'
34

1hree conclusions bring the argument o this irst analysis to a close: 1, among
all the peoples o Lurope ,except 1urkey, there is 'a social relation which, though
imperect, is closer than the general and loose bonds o humanity',
35
2, paradoxically,
the imperection o this society makes the condition o its components worse than i
they lacked all society ,this is the 'too much or too little' that men hae added to nature
through the art o politics,, and 3, these irst bonds, which render this society harmul,
also make it 'easy to perect', so that 'all its members could draw their happiness rom
what at present constitutes their misery, and change the state o war that preails
among them into eternal peace'.
36
1he distance between Rousseau and Saint-Pierre
appears here at the last moment. It is clear that Rousseau cannot seriously beliee that
Lurope is 'easy to perect'. But should we detect irony at the ery point at which the
solution to the 'problem' is going to be set orth 1he question is how the work that
was begun by chance can be completed through reason and will , 'how the ree and
oluntary society which unites all the Luropean States, taking on the orce and the
solidity o a true Body Politic, can change itsel into a real conederation',
3
which will
orce all the parties 'to cooperate or the common good'.
38
1be vroeav revbtic
Only here, in act, does the .b.tract pick up again the explicit content o Saint-
Pierre's positions, by spelling out the conditions or a Luropean Republic.
39
1he
conederation has to be so general that no signiicant power can reuse to join it , it
must be endowed with a tribunal to establish rules and regulations incumbent on all
members , it must hae a orce o its own to compel each state to accept common
#$
'Abstract...', p. 36 - translation modiied.
#%
Ibid.
#&
Ibid. - translation modiied.
#'
C. the ormulation in the rough drat: 'lrom what I hae just established, it ollows that the powers
o Lurope hae among one another precisely the relations necessary to establish a to orm or the
solidity o a conederatie society.'
#(
'Abstract...', p. 36.
#)
1he history o the text shows, moreoer, that this passage was written at a later date.
!
deliberations , and it must be solid and durable, so that members cannot opt out at will
as soon as they think their special interests are being sacriiced to the general interest
o the association.
Rousseau remains aithul to the spirit o Saint-Pierre's .brege av Pro;et ae ai
eretvette ,a copy o which he had in one o his boxes,. 1he irst point is to make ull
use o the existing General Diets o the states o Lurope, mostly set up under the
treaties o \estphalia and Utrecht. 1he 'plenipotentiaries' at these congresses are
o.tev.ibt, .ivcere iv .ee/ivg tbe vbtic gooa ava evaorea ritb covvov .ev.e
40
- a presumption o
rationality and irtue that Rousseau denies in the ]vagvevt - and the idea is that they
would adopt a conederatie treaty consisting o ie articles.
Article 1 would propose the establishment o a eretvat ava irrerocabte attiavce
avovg tbe covtractivg .orereigv., institutionally underpinned by a permanent congress in
which all disputes would be settled through arbitration and binding judgments.
Article 2 would stipulate the number o plenipotentiaries, the orms o a
rotating presidency, the scale o contributions and the orms o taxation to und
common expenditure.
Article 3 would guarantee to soereigns the possession and goernance o all
states currently in their possession, and stipulate an electie or hereditary mode o
succession ,the political constitution remaining a soereign matter or each member-
state,. 1he basis would thus be the status quo: that is, current possessions and the
latest treaties would be taken as the basis or the mutual rights o the contracting
parties, and soereigns would be asked to renounce any uture claim to rights not
enshrined in the treaty ,except in special cases to be settled by arbitration and not by
orce o arms,.
Article 4 would speciy the cases in which any ally inringing the treaty would
be ostracized rom Lurope and proscribed as a public enemy: that is, reusal to
$*
1his passage was added later by Rousseau.
!
implement the rulings o the Alliance, preparations or war, negotiation o treaties
contrary to the conederation, and taking up arms to resist it or to attack one o the
allies. 1he article would also proide or common deense and action to secure
implementation o the Diet's rulings, as well as reparation or wrongs committed and
compensation or expenses incurred.
Article 5 would empower representaties o the states ,so-called
'plenipotentiaries o the Luropean bodies', to adopt regulations or the common
beneit o the 'Luropean republic' and each o its members, through a procedure that
would ary with the importance o the case: a simple majority or a qualiied majority
,three-quarters o the otes, , the treaty itsel could be amended only by a unanimous
ote.
So what modiications did Rousseau make to the statement o articles
contained in the original .brege Saint-Pierre had adocated a treaty o 'perpetual
alliance' among Christian soereigns that would include a list o objecties or
collectie security and prosperity.
41
In the .brege, the irst article had concerned the
revvvciatiov of att fvtvre ctaiv., 'adantageously oset by the nine equialents, that is, by
the nine great adantages that would result rom the impossibility o war and the
perpetual continuation o commerce and peace'.
42
1he second had concerned
covtribvtiov. to the costs o common security and deense.
43
1he third had set orth the
principle o deinitie renunciation o war and .etttevevt of ai.vte. tbrovgb arbitratiov.
44
1he ourth had laid down the sanctions to be applied in the eent o iolations
,ostracization, reimbursement o any expenditure undertaken,.
45
1he ith and last had
prescribed the forv. of arbitratiov within the permanent assembly - which would hae
the power to rule by unanimous or qualiied majority ote on matters concerning
$!
Saint-Pierre, Ovrrage. ae otitiqve, ol. 1, containing the Abrg du Pro;et ae ai eretvette, Amsterdam:
Jean Daniel Beman, 133, p. 21-2.
$"
Ibid., p. 25.
$#
Ibid., p. 26.
$$
Ibid., p. 2.
$%
Ibid., p. 30.
!
common security - and had made it impossible to alter any o the preceding articles
except unanimously.
46
\hen Rousseau spelled out the conditions or a Luropean conederation, he
was thus ollowing the spirit, i not the letter, o Saint-Pierre's plan. 1o compare the
.b.tract with the .brege is illuminating: not only does Rousseau place the statement o
the adantages o conederation at the end o the .b.tract ,instead o beore the ie
articles, as in Saint-Pierre, , he also reerses the order o the irst and third articles, so
that precedence is gien to the contractual moment whereby the arbitration tribunal is
ounded in the shape o a permanent congress. Indeed, this body now has to be set up
beore the principle o the renunciation o uture claims - the idea o a territorial
status quo - is established. As to the second article, Rousseau makes a slight change: it
now asserts the principle o a contribution to common expenditure, but also speciies
how the powers are to be organized - that is, the number o Plenipotentiaries and the
orms o the rotating presidency. 1he ourth and ith articles, on the other hand,
remain almost exactly the same as in Saint-Pierre's text. Moreoer, the dierences
between the two ersions should not be oerestimated. Rousseau could perectly well
draw on the slight ariation in the vtevevt a t`.brege, contained in olume two o the
Ovrrage. ae otitiqve, where Saint-Pierre does place the principle o mediation beore the
principle o the renunciation o all uture claims ,the questions o the number o
represented states and the contribution to common expenditure then moing to the
third article,.
4
Saint-Pierre gae many ersions o his Plan, and Rousseau's .b.tract
also coincides with the one in the .vvate. otitiqve. ,published in London in 15 but
preiously circulating in manuscript,, which contains a history o the states o Lurope
between 1658 and 140.
48

Neertheless, it has been argued that there is a crucial dierence o orientation
between the two authors. lor Giuseppe Roggerone, Rousseau plays in the irst article
on the polysemy o the word 'soereigns' ,'the contracting Soereigns shall establish
$&
Ibid., pp. 32-3.
$'
Saint-Pierre, 'Supplment a l' Abrg', Ovrrage. ae otitiqve, ol. 2, pp. 53-.
$(
Saint-Pierre, .vvate. otitiqve. ;1:110), Paris: lonor Champion, 1912, pp. 31-4. 1his text is
discussed and criticized by Voltaire in his iecte ae ovi. `1, in Gvrre. bi.toriqve., Paris, Gallimard, 195,
p. 952 , see also pp. 953, 966-0.
!
among themseles a perpetual and irreocable alliance',, which may be understood to
denote a popular assembly as well as a monarch - thereby indicating his own
preerences.
49
Moreoer, in the third article, Rousseau guarantees the possession o
states in accordance with the principle o a territorial status quo, whereas Saint-Pierre
enisaged that disputes would be settled through conciliation and that associated states
would be asked to guarantee each member's possession and rule oer the territories it
had at the time when the treaty was signed. In Roggerone's iew, thereore, Rov..eav
a..ea orer iv .itevce tbe qve.tiov of rbetber eacb .tate. otiticat forv rovta be re.errea, ava teft
oev tbe o..ibitit, tbat tbe vroeav vovarcbie. rovta be aevocratiea.
50
Saint-Pierre's
reerence to existing treaties on the issue o electie or hereditary succession became
incidental. linally, the ourth article supposedly gae Saint-Pierre's text a clearly
Rousseauean inlection , ostracization rom Lurope in the eent o treaty iolations
corresponded to the wish, expressed in 1be ociat Covtract, to compel people to be ree
and to punish them i they iolated the compact.
51
low much credence should be gien to Roggerone's thesis Did Rousseau
play on the ambiguity o the term 'soereign' to insert his own ideas beneath Saint-
Pierre's cloak \as he stating his own iew o the road to a good ederal association,
as he implied in vite when reerring to these works \e shall return to these
questions below. But irst it must be emphasized that, when Rousseau distinguishes
between soereignty and goernment in the Di.covr.e ov Potiticat covov, and
subsequently, he appears to exclude the hypothesis that the people should orm the
executie body o the nations inoled in the conederation
52
- and this makes it ery
unlikely that we was engaged in a two-sided discourse based on the ambiguity o the
term 'soereign'. So, what does this imply or the planned Lurope-wide contract 1he
.b.tract has a ormulation o its own or the consent that is supposed to allow a way
out o the state o nature between states. Rousseau here takes up again a key argument
in the .brege, according to which dependence on a common tribunal would not
$)
G. A. Roggerone, aivtPierre e Rov..eav. Covfeaeraiove, aevocraia, vtoia, Milan: lranco Angeli, 1985,
pp. 44-5.
%*
Ibid., p. 46.
%!
See OSC, II:5.
%"
In OSC ,II:2,, Rousseau insists that the declaration o war or the making o peace is an act o
goernment rather than o soereignty. See also L\lM, 'Seenth Letter', pp. 23.
!
weaken but actually strengthen the rights o soereignty, both internally ,against
rebellion on the part o the soereign's subjects, and externally ,by preenting acts o
aggression,. But he interenes with a urther argument to justiy the orm o the pact,
insisting that it is not an act o submission through which men alienate their liberty in
exchange or security: 'Moreoer, there is a great deal o dierence between depending
on someone else and depending only on a Body o which one is a member and o
which each is the leader in his turn, or in this latter case one does nothing but secure
one's reedom by the pledges one gies or it, it would be alienated in the hands o a
master, but it is strengthened in those o Associates.'
53
1he ormulation seems similar
to that in the Second Di.covr.e, which had appeared a little earlier: 'It is thereore
incontestable, and it is a undamental maxim o all political right, that peoples hae
gien themseles leaders in order to deend their liberty and not to enslae
themseles.'
54
A certain distance rom Saint-Pierre appears rom now on. \hen the
Abb deended the Luropean Union project, he said in eect that it would proide the
beneit o laws that imparted to eeryone their due, and that, by establishing an
association strong enough to enorce compliance among its members, it would create
a 'happy necessity' or men to respect their commitments.
55
\hat he enisaged was
thereore a purely lobbesian kind o contract. lear o punishment was the only
motie that made it possible to counterbalance the passions and interests running
counter to the lasting character o the association.
56
Now, Rousseau did not content himsel with this lobbesian ision o the
contract. On the one hand, he realized that orce was necessary to underpin the
association resulting rom the reconciliation o diergent or een conlicting interests:
'Leryone sees that eery society is ormed by common interests , that eery diision
is born rom opposed interests , that since a thousand ortuitous eents can change
and modiy both o them, as soon as there is a society, a compulsory orce is
necessary, which orders and concerts its members' moements, in order to gie
common interests and reciprocal commitments the solidity they cannot hae by
%#
'Abstract...', p. 44.
%$
'Discourse on the Origin o Inequality', in 1be a.ic Potiticat !ritivg., p. 2.
%%
Saint-Pierre, Ovrrage. ae otitiqve, ol. 1, p. 24.
%&
Ibid., p. 30.
!
themseles.'
5
But he equally maintained that association should now guarantee the
'liberty' o the associated political bodies.
1be qve.tiov of effectireve..
So Rousseau, ollowing Saint-Pierre, drew up a eritable plan or a 'Luropean
Republic' or 'Luropean Body', which would resole disputes and aoid as ar as
possible any recourse to arms. 1he useulness o this ederal solution must now be
assessed. 1he question o its eectieness was twoold. \ould the proposed
conederation sere its purpose and be suicient to gie Lurope a solid and perpetual
peace And was it in the interest o soereigns to establish such a conederation and to
achiee perpetual peace at the price o impairing their soereignty
On the irst point, the .b.tract asserts that a conederation o nineteen
member-states, with equal oting rights in a Luropean Diet, would nip a war among
them in the bud.
58
1he list o states is slightly dierent rom those in the vtevevt
and the .brege, but Saint-Pierre was himsel not consistent , his Plan initially included
1urkey and other non-Christian states, and allowed or the possibility o associating
less powerul states such as the Republic o Genoa or the Dukes o Modena and
Parma.
59
Rousseau stresses that this system should rule out two major dangers: the
possibility or one power to resist all the others together, and the ormation o a sub-
league capable o standing up to the Conederation ,an argument already used by
Saint-Pierre,. Peace may thereore be maintained through a kind o internal deterrence,
so that indiidual states do not dare to take up arms because they know that a
deensie alliance would take immediate action against them. Rousseau concludes that
the ederal institution, by underpinning the contract with common orce, would
%'
'Abstract...', p. 33.
%(
Ibid., p. 41.
%)
1he list is anyway contingent. See the ariation in the order and Rousseau's remark: 'It is pointless to
make the list more precise here, since, until the plan is implemented, eents may occur at any moment
which would make it necessary to rework it, but which would change nothing essential in the system.'
Ibid., pp. 39-40 - translation modiied.
!
establish a new balance o rights and orce among the Luropean powers and
completely ulill its objectie o putting an end to wars and rebellions.
60
Deterrence is not, howeer, all there is to Rousseau's ision o conederation.
In the new system, the causes o conlict would also disappear - something that Saint-
Pierre had neer really anticipated. Indiidual states may decide to use an armed
solution to carry through a conquest, to deend themseles rom a conqueror, to
weaken an oer-powerul neighbor, to deend rights that are under attack, to settle a
non-negotiable issue in dispute, or to ulill certain commitments under the treaty. But
none o these ca.v. betti could continue to exist in the properly constituted Luropean
Republic.
One inal unresoled question, which will proe decisie, concerns the
adantage that parties to the contract would gain rom signing the treaty o
conederation. 1he starting point is realistic: 'or one eels ery well that it would be in
ain to make the public interest speak to the prejudice o priate interest.'
61
Since one
must count not on irtue but on interest, it has to be shown that soereigns would
hae an interest not only in peace but in a peace established by means o the Luropean
Conederation. 1be ob;ectiov i. reigbt,: rb, rovta .orereigv. agree rotvvtarit, to gire v art of
tbeir .orereigvt,, ava to .vb.titvte ivteraeevaevce for tbe bitberto reraitivg .,.tev of ab.otvte
ivaeevaevce. It would seem that soereigns cannot be depried o the right to take the
law into their own hands or to enjoy the glory o conquests, nor prompted to gie up
their 'apparatus o power and terror' and to become equitable and peaceul. Rousseau
here challenges Saint-Pierre by arguing that there can be no 'compensation' or such
cruel priations. In act, this impossibility o proiding compensation - or power,
howeer unjust, or or honor, howeer ain - is the main point o diergence rom the
argument o Saint-Pierre's Pro;et ae ai eretvette. \hat reason do men hae to be just,
unless it is out o irtue, interest or a desire to enhance their reputation But, among
princes, a good name is not acquired through justice. 1he appearance o the irst
person pronoun has a resounding eect:
&*
Ibid., p. 42.
&!
Ibid., p. 41.
!
I would not dare respond along with the Abb de Saint-Pierre: 1hat the
genuine glory o Princes consists in procuring the public utility and their
Subjects' happiness, that all their interests are subordinate to their
reputation, and that the reputation that one acquires among the wise is
measured by the good one does or men, that, since perpetual Peace is the
greatest undertaking that has eer been done, it is the most capable o
coering its Author with immortal glory, that, since this same undertaking is
also the most useul or Peoples, it is also the most honourable or
Soereigns.
62
In this respect, Saint-Pierre desered his reception among those he tried to win oer:
'In the chambers o ministers these speeches hae coered the Author and his projects
with ridicule.'
63
1he theory o international relations should be based on the
soereigns' perceied interest, rather than on their hypothetical ri.b for evtigbtevea gtor,.
v.titvtiovatiea eace: a ratiovat cboice.
\et Rousseau does not here step into the breach as he will do in the ]vagvevt.
At the end o the .b.tract, he sticks to Saint-Pierre's argument in terms o 'interests'
and emphasizes the 'rational choice' model underlying his predecessor's political
science - a model based on the theory o probabilities in games o chance.
64
\hen
rightul action is not rewarded with ictory, it is better to keep what you hae than to
risk it or a thoroughly unpredictable beneit. 1his is why, in its plans or expansion,
each state 'must ind a resistance superior to its eort, rom which it ollows that, the
more powerul haing no reason to play, nor the weaker any hope o proit, it is a
good thing or all to renounce what they desire in order to secure what they possess.'
65
1he end o the .b.tract thus compares the expected losses and beneits o what Saint-
&"
Ibid., p. 42.
&#
Ibid.
&$
On Saint-Pierre's 'game theory', see Pro;et ovr revare ta ai eretvette ev vroe, op. cit., pp. 122-3.
&%
'Abstract...', p. 42, translation slightly modiied.
!
Pierre called 'system o war' and 'system o peace'. lor princes, the main adantages o
peace are a drastic cut in military spending, an end to the raages o depopulation, and
better use o wealth with a iew to the blossoming o trade, agriculture and the arts.
lor peoples, they are reduced taxation and increased prosperity.
66
In eoking the
beneits that would come rom a Luropean Republic, Rousseau also reers to the
dynastic interests ,more secure crowns and territorial rights, and, like Saint-Pierre, to
the greater protection against risks o rebellion.
6
1he conederation would make
things easier or state institutions, and this might increase the soereign's glory and
authority as well as public resources and 'the happiness o Peoples', without incurring
any real disadantages.
68
No doubt the man who wrote the ]vagvevt could not ully
embrace the ormulas in the .b.tract concerning the utility o conquests in terms o
interest calculation ,'I all Kings hae not yet recoered rom the olly o conquests, at
least it seems that the wisest are beginning to glimpse that they sometimes cost more
than they are worth'
69
,. As the ]vagvevt would show, Rousseau did not subscribe to the
idea that economic rationality would henceorth replace military rationality, and the
logic o utility or true glory the logic o ain prestige. 1here too, howeer, it is not so
simple to put things in perspectie, since the philosopher does share the critique o
conquests expressed in the .b.tract: that is, territorial expansion does not automatically
expand the soereign's power, especially i the pernicious eects o war ,loss o
human lie, lower birth-rates, higher taxes, trade interruption, rural depopulation,
decline o agriculture, are taken into account. lor Rousseau as or Saint-Pierre, only
'good laws' can result in power , the true strength o states lies in the size not o their
territory but o their population.
0

1his dense argument leads to the conclusion that the establishment o
perpetual peace depends solely on the consent o soereigns , that accordingly it 'does
not oer any diiculty at all to remoe other than their resistance' , and that, once
&&
1he argument was central in Saint-Pierre's Plan: see Pro;et..., p. 45.
&'
'Abstract...', pp. 40-5.
&(
Ibid., p. 48.
&)
Ibid., p. 43.
'*
Ibid. See C. Spector, 'Rousseau et la critique de l`conomie politique', in B. Bensaude-Vincent and
B. Bernardi, eds., Rov..eav et te. .cievce., Paris: L`larmattan, 2003, pp. 23-56.
"
established along the lines o the Plan, it would be lasting and would ulill its object
perectly.
1
Doubtless, this is not to say that the Soereigns will adopt this plan, ,\ho
can answer or anyone else's reason, but only that they would adopt it i
they consulted their own interests, or it should be well noted that re bare
vot at att a..vvea vev to be a. tbe, ovgbt to be, good, generous, disinterested,
and loing the public good out o humanity, bvt a. tbe, are, unjust, greedy,
and preerring their sel-interest to eerything. 1he only thing that is
assumed in them is suicient reason to see what is useul to them, and
enough courage to bring about their own happiness. I, in spite o all this,
the Plan has still not been implemented, it is not because it is anciul, it is
because men are demented, and because it is a sort o olly to be wise in
the midst o ools.
2
1hus, Rousseau subjects Saint-Pierre's texts to proound reision: not only
does he condense and reorder the arguments, employing rigorous rationalization and
abstraction , he puts orward a completely new conception o Lurope, which Saint-
Pierre by no means included in his Plan. Rousseau's genius does not appear only in his
ability to coney the spirit o the swollen and muddled text he was gien to read , he
manages to draw out the ounding principle o Saint-Pierre's thought - that is, a orm
o utilitarianism and 'rational choice theory' applied to international relations. 1his is
the theory that will be his target in the ]vagvevt.
2. 1he Judgment on the Plan for Perpetual Peace
Published posthumously ,182,, the ]vagvevt picks up at the point where the
.b.tract began and ended: 'I eer a moral truth was demonstrated, it seems to me that
it is the general and particular utility o this plan' , peoples and princes alike would gain
'immense' adantages rom it. But Rousseau highlights a paradox: the soereigns who
'!
'Abstract...', p. 48.
'"
Ibid., pp. 48-9 - translation modiied, emphases added,.
"
would deend the Luropean Republic once it had been established, seeing a
coincidence between their particular interest and the common good, would
neertheless oppose with all their might the establishment o such a republic. So,
should Saint-Pierre's plan be dismissed Although the work may strike the impatient
reader as 'useless or producing perpetual peace' and 'superluous or presering it', it
cannot be regarded as 'ain speculation'. 'No, it is a solid and well thought out book,
and it is ery important that it exists.'
3

lrom this starting-point, an answer must be gien to those who conront
reasons with realities, theory with practice. I the adantages o the plan are so eident,
it will be asked, why hae soereigns not adopted it beore now Rousseau's key
argument here is that princes eager to increase their power make mistakes about the
means to achiee their end. Carried away by avovrrore, they delude themseles about
their true interests: 'Let us distinguish, then, in politics as in morality, real interest rom
apparent interest , the irst would be ound in perpetual peace - that has been
demonstrated in the tav, the second is ound in the state o absolute independence
which remoes soereigns rom the empire o the law in order to subject them to that
o ortune.'
4
low should we interpret the opposition between real and apparent
interest 1he author o the Ptav had already used this classical distinction when he
argued that oensie and deensie leagues are always in peril since the promises are
prone to hae no eect:
1here is a change o will, because the ,real or apparent, interest that led to
the signing o the 1reaty has itsel changed. I call reat ivtere.t that which the
wisest normally pursue to increase their wealth, their reputation and their
power, to strengthen and enlarge either their house or their state. I call
aarevt ivtere.t a passing unstable interest that stems either rom a leeting
passion or rom a riolous and unounded hope, an unsettled
imagination is een enough or the ainest hopes and the most illusory
opinions to be admitted to the imagination.
5
'#
'Judgment o the Plan or Perpetual Peace', in C\R 11, p. 53. 1his point is an addendum.
'$
Ibid., p. 54.
'%
PPP ,layard,, p. 36.
"
Rousseau takes up the distinction between real and apparent interest, but turns it
against Saint-Pierre. 1he mechanics are inexorable: despotism ,which Rousseau
considers to be the destiny o monarchy, and een o a republic
6
, cannot but make
the perspectial error o seeing the world through the prism o the passions o
domination. '1he entire occupation o Kings, or o those they charge with their
unctions, relates to only two objects, extending their domination abroad and
rendering it more absolute at home.'

1his is the ery heart o Rousseau's critical

philosophy. \ithin the ramework o the 'tyrannical' economy that the Di.covr.e ov
Potiticat covov, counterposes to 'popular' economy, the reat interest o leaders is to
crush and ruin peoples in order to secure possession o their property.
8
In this way
Rousseau not only denounces the Machiaellianism o goernments that trample on
the rights o peoples and the rights o humanity,
9
he reerses Saint-Pierre's argument
according to which the power o kings is rationally based upon the happiness o
peoples.
1he ]vagvevt thereore establishes that the adances o despotism and
conquest are inextricably bound up with each other.
80
Monarchs extract money and
men rom enslaed peoples in order to subjugate other peoples, and conersely war
proides a pretext or the raising o taxes and armies to hold the people in check. 1he
argument here not only encompasses critiques o Louis XIV and the 'war king', who
aimed rather at an enlightened reorm o monarchy.
81
A denunciation o the
oppression o peoples is the heart o Rousseau's response to Saint-Pierre,
82
as it is o
'&
'Discourse on the Origins o Inequality', in 1be a.ic Potiticat !ritivg., p. 9.
''
'Judgment...', p. 54.
'(
On the critique o 'state maxims' and 'cabinet mysteries', see 'Discourse on Political Lconomy', 1be
a.ic Potiticat !ritivg., p. 120.
')
Ibid., p. 116.
(*
'Judgment...', p. 54.
(!
It is a recurrent argument: one inds it especially in lnelon's .arevtvre. of 1etevacbv., which Rousseau
quotes in vite ,op. cit., p. 404,.
("
It should be stressed that Leibniz already thought that Saint-Pierre set little alue on the ate o
subjects: 'M. l'Abb de S. Pierre is right to consider the Lmpire as a model o Christian society. But the
dierence is that the grieances o subjects against their soereign would not be admitted in the society
corresponding to his Plan, whereas in the Lmpire subjects subjects are able to plead against their
princes or against their magistrates.' ,'Obserations sur le Projet de paix perptuelle', in Corre.ovaavce ae
C. !. eibviCb. . Ca.tet ae aivt Pierre, A. Robinet d., Paris: Centre de philosophie du droit, 1995,
p. 38-9,.
"
his reutation o lobbes and Grotius. 1he ociat Covtract will take this urther, in an
ironical remark on a 'political sermonizer' who is undoubtedly Saint-Pierre:
Kings want to be absolute, and rom a distance one cries out to them that
the best way to be so is to make themseles loed by their peoples. 1his
maxim is ery noble and een ery true in certain respects. Unortunately it
will always be an object o derision in courts. 1he power that comes rom
the peoples' loe is undoubtedly the greatest, but it is precarious and
conditional. Princes will neer be satisied with it. 1he best kings want to be
able to be wicked i it pleases them, without ceasing to be the masters. A
political sermonizer might well say to them that since the people's orce is
their orce, their greatest interest is that the people should be lourishing,
numerous and ormidable. 1hey know perectly well that this is not true.
1heir personal interest is irst o all that the people should be weak and
miserable and incapable o eer resisting them.
83
1o proe that the Ptav for Peretvat Peace aors the enlightened interests o monarchs,
howeer powerul, Saint-Pierre argued that peace would strengthen them on their
throne and that the existence o a common army would reduce the risks o sedition or
usurpation.
84
1o the objection that subjects would lose out rom this while soereigns
would gain, Saint-Pierre retorted that tyranny in the 'system o peace' would not be
harsher or more oppressie than in the 'system o war'.
85

1he question o the Plan's implementation is now posed in all its sharpness.
\hy should soereigns, in a state o absolute independence, agree to respect legal
channels that restrict their soereignty ,een i they participate in the common
arbitration tribunal, \hy should they limit their power through being 'orced to be
just', at home and abroad 1aking up again the .b.tract's rational choice paradigm,
Rousseau prooundly suberts it by insisting that a kind o irrationality must be
integrated into relations among nations: 'A prince who trusts his cause to the hazards
(#
OSC, III: 6, p. 183. C. ibid., I: 4, pp. 144-6.
($
PPP ,layard ed.,, pp. 40-1.
(%
See below.
"
o war is not unaware that he is running some risks, but he is less struck by them than
by the adantages he promises himsel, because he ears ortune much less than he
hopes to gain rom his own wisdom.'
86
Belie in the success o a strategy here preails
oer an ealuation o the ,supposedly lesser, risks linked to the situation.
Rousseau thus lucidly reconstitutes another igure o rationality at work in the
realms o power. Counting on his own orces and alliances, or een on the beneicial
eects o deeat, the prince will not accept that it is better to reign justly oer a small
prosperous people than oer a ast empire o impoerished subjects, the irrationality
o the logic o glory inally carries the day. 1he really key point is that a despot always
has an interest in waging war to perpetuate his rule. 1be ecovovic ivtere.t to rbicb aivt
Pierre refer. i. tberefore vvti/et, to qvett avbitiov or tbe ae.ire for aovivatiov. Princes will not be
coninced by arguments that point to the breakdown o trade, depopulation, inancial
disturbances or real losses caused by a utile conquest: 'Always to ealuate the gains or
the losses o soereigns in money is a ery aulty calculation, the extent o power they
aim at is not at all counted by the millions one possesses.'
8

Rousseau reassesses the ery idea o interest, showing that one cannot trust in
the enlightened interest o princes. Soereigns wish to satisy both their ambition and
their cupidity, but these cannot be limited to purely pecuniary considerations: the
prince 'wants to command in order to get wealthy and to get wealthy in order to
command , he will sacriice each in turn to acquire whicheer one he lacks, but it is
only to possess the two together at the end that he pursues them separately , or in
order to be the master o men and o things he must hae empire and money at the
same time.' 1he conclusion suberts Machiaelli's argument in 1be Privce by suggesting
that, ar rom being able to be lucid about their true interests, the princes who are
misled by appearances would reject peace een i they preerred their interests. As or
ministers, they desire war een more than their princes, since it enables them to
increase their wealth and their power.
88
(&
'Judgment...', p. 55 - translation modiied.
('
Ibid.
((
Ibid., pp. 55-6. In 1be Privce, Machiaelli argued on the contrary that the people are led astray by
appearances, and that this perpetuates the ruler's domination oer them.
"
In the end, then, Rov..eav refv.e. to at, a .ivti.tic ratiovat cboice voaet to ivter.tate
retatiov.. I enlightened interest does not goern ordinary humans,
89
still less does it
goern princes.
90
Lspecially instructie in this regard is the letter o June 16 to
Mirabeau, in response to a copy o Le Mercier de la Riiere's `Orare vatvret et e..evtiet
ae. .ociete. that Mirabeau had sent in the hope o 'conerting' him to Physiocracy. 1o
know one's interest is not enough to ollow it, and the despot is not a wise man who,
mindul o the rational beneits o regulated administration, would readily accept the
rule o law.
91
Political realism is wrong to suppose that there is a predictable logic o
reasons o state or a 'political science o the Courts'. 1he paradox will appear most
clearly in the Cov.iaeratiov. ov tbe Corervvevt of Potava.
92
1his makes it easier to understand why Rousseau is today o interest to
international relations theorists considering the releance o rational choice doctrines.
Are these capable o accounting or the 'geopolitics o passions', which cannot be
reduced to interests and strategic calculation
93
lollowing Raymond Aron, Stanley
lomann analysed the writings on war in which Rousseau showed that it is utile to
try to reduce risk and uncertainty in international aairs by deining a rational oreign
policy.
94
Rational calculation - that is, a combination o means to ends, risk acceptance
in accordance with probabilities, and choice dictated by a hierarchy o preerences -
does not goern the conduct o diplomats or strategists, which remains irreducible to
()
See a ragment corresponding to the planned i.toire ae. voevr.: '1he error o most moralists was
always to take man or an essentially reasonable being. Man is but a sensuous being who consults only
his passions in order to act, and or whom reason seres only to palliate the stupidities they make him
commit.' Oevrre. covtete. III, p. 554.
)*
'I politicians were less blinded by their ambitions...' ,'Discourse on Political Lconomy'', p. 119,.
)!
ettre. bito.obiqve., ed. l. Gouhier, Paris: Vrin, 194, p. 16.
)"
See 'Considerations on the Goernment o Poland and Its Planned Reormation', in C\R 11,
pp. 23-8.
)#
See especially ,ollowing R. Aron and S. lomann, Pierre lassner's 1iotevce ava !ar, Budapest:
Central Luropean Uniersity Press, 199: ch. 3, 'Violence, Rationality and Unpredictability: Apocalyptic
and Paciic 1endencies in Studies o International Conlict', pp. 50-2, and the section 'De la dialectique
du bourgeois et du barbare a une gopolitique des passions', in idem, a 1errevr et t`vire, Paris: Seuil,
2003, p. 398-402. 1he same author has written an article on Rousseau that essentially agrees with the
conclusions o Stanley lomann: 'Rousseau and the 1heory and Practice o International Relations', in
C. Orwin and N. 1arco, eds., 1be egac, of Rov..eav, Chicago: 1he Uniersity o Chicago Press, 199,
pp. 200-19.
)$
S. lomann, Rov..eav ov vtervatiovat Retatiov., Oxord: Clarendon Press, 1991.
"
the actions o bovo ocovovicv.. 1he desire or power, and een more or glory, does not
subordinate itsel to the desire or security.
95
Reforv or rerotvtiov. 1be .tate of tbe qve.tiov ava tbe Revbticav b,otbe.i.
Should one thereore desire a proound transormation o the states o
Lurope, subordinating the progress o public right to the progress o political right
Interpreters seem unanimous that the main dierence between Saint-Pierre and
Rousseau concerns their theories o internal politics, the one accepting absolutism, the
other ceaselessly opposing it.
96
\hereas Saint-Pierre proposed a teagve of /ivg. to
deend the territorial status quo, Rousseau sought to feaerate .orereigv eote., belieing
that a ederation could be established only among equal nations in charge o their own
destinies. According to Stelling-Michaud, 'Rousseau's republicanism is here asserted as
the precondition or the institutional uniersalism which, through the channels o
democratic constitutions, will hae such a powerul impact on the minds and customs
o peoples',
9
'it is soereign peoples, not monarchs, that hae to be ederated.'
98
Other
authors stress that the ]vagvevt subordinates the problem o war to the problem o
despotism, so that the establishment o peace cannot happen with princes and
ministers who uel the icious circle o internal oppression and external war.
99
Should
it be said, then, that Rousseau acillated between 'legal utopianism' and 'historical
scepticism' It might almost seem that perpetual peace was no more than a norm o
)%
R. Aron, Peace ava !ar: . 1beor, of vtervatiovat Retatiov., Garden City, N\: Doubleday, 1966, pp. 2,
.
)&
See C. Carter, Rov..eav ava tbe Probtev of !ar, New \ork: Garland, 198, p. 15.
)'
S. Stelling-Michaud, 'Ce que Rousseau doit a l`abb de Saint-Pierre', art. cit., p. 43. See also Dictiovvaire
ae ]eav]acqve. Rov..eav, op. cit.: entries tat ae gverre, by S. Goyard-labre ,p. 319,, trait av ro;et ae ai
eretvette, by J. Roussel ,pp. 319-20,, and aivtPierre, by J.-L. Lecercle ,pp. 842-3,. See also Lecercle's
'L`Abb de Saint-Pierre, Rousseau et l`Lurope', Dibvitieve .iecte, No. 25, 1993, pp. 13-39.
)(
S. Stelling-Michaud, introduction to the crit. otitiqve., ol. 3 o Oevrre. covtete., pp. x, cxl-cxli.
S. Goyard-labre ollows this line o interpretation: i peace can result rom ederatie leagues, these
must unite peoples rather than princes ,'La guerre et le droit international dans la philosophie de
Rousseau', tvae. ]eav]acqve. Rov..eav, No. , 1995, pp. 45-8 , 'L`optimisme juridique de l`abb de
Saint-Pierre', in `.vvee 1. vr ta ai eretvette ae eibvi av beritier. ae Kavt, ed. by J. lerrari and
S. Goyard-labre, Paris: Vrin, 1998, pp. 19-41 , a Cov.trvctiov ae ta ai ov te trarait ae i.,be, Paris: Vrin,
1994,.
))
C. Larrere, 'L`tat de guerre et la guerre entre les Ltats: Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la critique du Droit
naturel', art. cit., pp. 135-48. 1he same erdict is ound in l. Guineret, ]vgevevt .vr te Pro;et ae ai
eretvette ae t`abbe ae aivtPierre, op. cit., p. 55.
"
reason, which would explain the incomplete or hesitant character o Rousseau's texts
on war and peace.
100
An important point is at stake here: whether the republicanization o
Luropean states was necessary beore a ederation o Luropean peoples could be
achieed. Starting rom a normatie position ,the position o the ociat Covtract,, J.-
L. \indenberger reconstituted Rousseau's theory o interstate relations. Single,
indiisible and inalienable, the General \ill seems by nature unamenable to the
representation o soereignty in a ederation, where it would be in danger o
dissolution as common rules imposed restrictions on its independence. Len i the
ederal state was more than a merely deensie alliance and constituted the most
eectie remedy or the danger o war, it seems a tricky matter to deelop a new
general will at the leel o the union, gien that such a orm 'ignores the undamental
rights o the peoples that it comprises'.
101
Rousseau thereore deended a dierent
paradigm o the covfeaeratiov as a ree and oluntary association o soereignties.
Although soereignty, is-a-is other powers, is a orer that cannot be alienated, it can
seek to associate itsel with and contribute to a new international contract analogous to
the social contract within indiidual countries.
102
1hus, the peoples o Lurope might
consent to a ederation that deended each one o them with common orces, since
the people would then be obliged only by its own will: '1here will be no alienation
here, no subjugation, only a reciprocal agreement among states arising rom the ree
will o each.'
103
Only a conederation does not undermine internal soereignty and
preseres the autonomy o peoples, while acting in international relations as a moral
person. It alone is a genuine republic, whose members are the peoples inoled in it,
the central authority has no power other than that which the members entrust to it as
to a delegate with a reocable mandate.
104
!**
See O. Asbach and D. lning, 'L`tat de nature et la ondation du droit. L`abb de Saint-Pierre
comme intermdiaire entre lobbes et Rousseau', in ]eav]acqve. Rov..eav, Potitiqve et ^atiov, op. cit.,
pp. 153-6, here pp. 166-.
!*!
J.-L. \indenberger, ..ai .vr te .,.teve ae otitiqve etravgere ae ].]. Rov..eav, a Revbtiqve covfeaeratire ae.
etit. tat., op. cit., pp. 204-5.
!*"
Ibid., pp. 211, 231.
!*#
Ibid., p. 198. \indenberger's thesis agrees with the 'Swiss' reading o Rousseau, which holds that,
although his examples o ederations were drawn rom antiquity, he really had in mind Switzerland and
the post-159 United Proinces ,p. 209,.
!*$
Ibid., p. 212.
"
In opposing Kenneth \altz's thesis that Rousseau's proposed solution to
international anarchy is a ederation o peoples, Stanley lomann comes to
somewhat dierent conclusions rom those set out by \indenberger.
105
Lmpirically
the nations seem condemned to the state o war, while normatiely Rousseau's
complex solution is neither a world state
106
nor een a Luropean ederation.
Paradoxical as it may seem, the author o 1be ociat Covtract does not attempt here to
regain the adantages o the pact that makes people ree and irtuous. A ederation
that had a legislatie body and coercie powers would conlict with the indiisible and
inalienable character o soereignty, the essence o the General \ill ,the impossibility
o its being represented, is such that any ormula or a shared legislatie power would
destroy liberty. 1he only possibility, then, would be a conederation with common
executie bodies but legislatie powers that remained separate within the national
entities, one can conceie o associations o goernments but not o peoples. In this
regard, the conederation 'does not put an end to the olly: it merely proides small
states with a way o being wise among the ools.'
10

\et, ar rom being restricted to a deensie alliance,
108
ederation seems to be
the precondition or any democratic state to be established and stabilized. 1his is the
iew o G. A. Roggerone, or whom \indenberger ailed to see that the indiisible,
inalienable and absolute character o soereignty made it impossible to conceie o the
ederation as a social contract among states. lor the multiplicity o states to regard the
ederal organization as an instrument against war as well as against tyranny, a culturally
homogeneous ciil society has to deelop - and that requires the republicanization o
the nations o Lurope. Only states goerned by popular soereignty can ensure that
the common interest has primacy oer particular interests. Unless the ederal system is
an idle antasy, then, its achieement is possible only i the principles o political right
!*%
S. lomann, Rov..eav ov vtervatiovat Retatiov., op. cit.
!*&
1he arguments are strong: such a state could not be republican, since the republic has sense only in
small states, the legislature would be unable to assemble in a world state. Moreoer, a large territory
goes together with the need or a strong executie, lessening the opportunity to arouse loe o the
atherland.
!*'
S. lomann, 'Rousseau on \ar and Peace', .vericav Potiticat cievce Rerier 5,2,, 1963, p. 330.
!*(
l. Ramel and J.-P. Joubert, Rov..eav et te. retatiov. ivtervatiovate., Paris: L`larmattan, 2000, p. 31.
"
are applied.
109
But, in that case, Rousseau should accept that the choice is limited to
utopia or reolution.
110
le allows or the possible eectieness o reolution ,lolland
and Switzerland arose through 'expulsion o the tyrants'
111
,, but considers it an
exceptional and dangerous path that is ruled out or peoples corrupted by long
seritude. It may be, thereore, that the only path which remains open is education.
According to G. Rooseelt, neither the paciist nor the realist reading o Rousseau
does justice to the richness o his thought. Neither pessimistic nor utopian, the
philosopher was aboe all a political educator.
112

1he argument o this paper is dierent. 1he aboe interpretations seem to
inole a contradiction when they counterpose the monarchism and idealism o Saint-
Pierre ,supposedly 'lobbesian' internally but utopian externally, to Rousseau's
republicanism ,supposedly realist externally, howeer utopian internally,. lor the act
is that Saint-Pierre did not support absolutism: he was keen to aoid abuses o power
through the spread o enlightenment and the electie depersonalization o public
unctions, and actually enisaged a thorough transormation o monarchy, so that the
administratie rationality associated with an elected aristocracy o merit would lead to
common prosperity.
113
And Rousseau, or his part, did not argue in these texts or the
establishment o a general will o the soereign peoples. A ragment on the plan or
perpetual peace is unambiguous on this score:
\hile examining the constitution o the States that make up Lurope I saw
that some were too big to be goerned well, others too small to maintain
themseles in independence. 1he ininite abuses that preail in all o them
appeared to me diicult to orestall but impossible to correct, because most
o these abuses are ounded upon the ery interest o those who could do
!*)
G. A. Roggerone, aivtPierre e Rov..eav. Covfeaeraiove, aevocraia, vtoia, op. cit., pp. 38, 55. C.
G. Larance, 'L`abb de Saint-Pierre et Jean-Jacques Rousseau', in `.vvee 1. vr ta ai eretvette ae
eibvi av beritier. ae Kavt, op. cit., pp. 55-61.
!!*
Roggerone, op. cit., p. 8.
!!!
Cevera Mavv.crit, II:3, p. 184.
!!"
G. G. Rooseelt, Reaaivg Rov..eav iv tbe ^vctear .ge, Philadelphia: 1emple Uniersity Press, 1990.
!!#
See 1. L. Kaiser, '1he Abb de Saint-Pierre, Public Opinion, and the Reconstruction o the lrench
Monarchy', ]ovrvat of Moaerv i.tor,, 55, 1983, pp. 618-43, N. O. Keohane, Pbito.ob, ava tbe tate iv
ravce, Princeton: Princeton Uniersity Press, 1980, chap. 13.
#
away with them. I ound that the connections which persisted among all the
powers would neer leae any o them the time and the security necessary
or recasting its constitution.
114
1he series o pieces on Saint-Pierre's Pot,.,voa, point in the same direction. Accusing
his predecessor o being an unwitting reolutionary ignorant o the risks that his
iolent reorm would impose on the 'masses' who make up the lrench monarchy,
Rousseau displays real prudence.
115
1he Polysynody would introduce a 'mixed
goernment', combining a republican and a monarchical orm. But vo revbticaviatiov
of vovarcb, i. o..ibte, and modern man cannot base himsel on irtue.
1hese diiculties did not escape the Abb de Saint-Pierre, but it may hae
suited him better to disguise them than to resole them. \hen he talks
about these contradictions and pretends to reconcile them, it is by such
absurd means and such unreasonable arguments that one sees ery well he
is perplexed or that he is not proceeding in good aith. . it creaibte tbat be vt
forrara tbe.e veav. .o ivaroriatet,, ivctvaivg avovg tbev tore of covvtr,, tbe vbtic
gooa, tbe ae.ire for trve gtor,, ava otber cbivera. tbat ravi.bea tovg ago, or of rbicb
tbere revaiv vo vore tbav trace. iv a fer .vatt revbtic.. Did he seriously think
that anything o all that could really hae inluence in a monarchical orm
o goernment And, haing cited the Greeks, the Romans and een a ew
moderns who had ancient souls, does he not himsel admit that it would be
ridiculous to base the constitution o the state on dead maxims \hat is
necessary, then, in addition to these alien means whose inadequacy he
recognizes le replaces one diiculty with another, establishes one system
on top o another, and ounds his Polysynody on his Luropean Republic.
116
A Luropean 'political body' thereore seems out o reach. Similarly, when he considers
in the Cevera Mavv.crit or the ociat Covtract the likely destiny o the corrupted peoples
!!$
'lragment', C\R 11, p. 49 - translation modiied.
!!%
'Polysynody', in C\R 11, pp. -90.
!!&
'Judgment on the Polysynody', C\R 11, p. 9 - translation modiied.
#
o Lurope, the philosopher dismisses both the path o reorm and the path o
reolution.
11

In reality, the idea o republicanizing the large Luropean states is not
ormulated anywhere in Rousseau's work. 1he Di.covr.e ov tbe Origiv. of veqvatit,
remains deliberately ague about a conersion o the despotic monarchies into
enlightened monarchies or republics, the analysis ocuses more on the possibility that
existing republics may become despotic.
118
\e should also note that, contrary to
lomann's iew, the small autarkic republic was not the path that Rousseau
necessarily considered ideal, since the natural tendency o states to expand meant that
the paciication o international relations would een then not be assured.
119
Republicanization would not guarantee peace, since war is inscribed in the ery nature
o the body politic. 1his applies as much to republics as to monarchies - een i the
ormer, to remain ree, aoid the spirit o conquest.
120
1he Di.covr.e ov Potiticat covov,
explicitly states that the general will, though just internally, may be unjust externally ,
the rule o justice, though sure in relation to all citizens, may be deectie in relation to
oreigners.
121
1his helps us to understand the conclusion to the ]vagvevt on Saint-
Pierre's plan or peace, which takes account o the historical and political conditions in
Lurope: 'Let it not be said, then, that i his system has not been adopted, it is because
it is not good, on the contrary one should say that it was too good to be adopted.'
122

Rousseau's diergence rom Saint-Pierre is due to the act that he reuses to

deelop a political science independent o a situational art o politics
123
. In his iew,
!!'
OSC, II:8, p. 166. C. the Cevera Mavv.crit, II:3, pp. 184.
!!(
'Discourse on the Origin o Inequality', p. 9.
!!)
See the Cevera Mavv.crit, II:3, pp. 184., OSC, II: 9,10.
!"*
OSC, III: 1, p. 14: 'the larger the state becomes, the less liberty there is.' C. 'Considerations on the
Goernment o Poland', C\R 11, p. 183.
!"!
'lor the will o the state, howeer general it may be in relation to its members, is no longer so in
relation to other states and to their members, but becomes or them a priate and indiidual will which
has its rule o justice in the law o nature, which enters equally into the principle established.'
,'Discourse on Political Lconomy', op. cit., p. 114.,
!""
'Judgment...', p. 60.
!"#
See also the 'Judgment on the Polysynody', op. cit.
#
two dimensions are necessary to judge whether reorms are opportune: the dimension
o man as a being o prejudices and passions, and the dimension o circumstances and
situations. 1his holds or internal as well as external reorm, as the already quoted
ragment against Saint-Pierre demonstrates:
\hile examining the constitution o the States that make up Lurope I saw
that some were too big to be goerned well, others too small to maintain
themseles in independence. 1he ininite abuses that preail in all o them
appeared to me diicult to orestall but impossible to correct, because most
o these abuses are ounded upon the ery interest o those who could do
away with them. fovva tbat tbe covvectiov. rbicb er.i.tea avovg att tbe orer.
rovta verer teare av, of tbev tbe tive ava tbe .ecvrit, vece..ar, for reca.tivg it.
cov.titvtiov. linally prejudices are so much against any sort o change that,
unless one had the orce ready to hand, one would hae to be as simple as
the Abb de St. Pierre to propose the slightest innoation in any
goernment at all.
124

Should we thereore regret that Rousseau did not ollow his thought through
to the end and adopt a Kantian-type solution
125
But Kant would hae to deploy a
philosophy o history and reintroduce a kind o teleology in order to conceptualize
perpetual peace. In this respect, Rawls, though an heir to Kant, made Rousseau his real
predecessor in seeking to build a 'realistic utopia' in international relations.
126
In his
ar of Peote., where he tries to theorize justice at an international leel, Rawls draws
on the idea that men and women might possibly be reormed by their institutions. But,
by a peculiar irony o history, it is the Rousseau o the ociat Covtract, not the one o
the texts on war and peace, who is enlisted in support o the idea o a society o
!"$
'lragment', C\R 11, p. 49 - translation modiied.
!"%
On the relationship between Kant and Rousseau on this point, see J. lerrari, 'Les mtamorphoses de
l`ide de Paix perptuelle de Saint-Pierre a Kant', in e. vviere. et ta .otiaarite ivtervatiovate: Papers o the
North-South Seminar on Condorcet, Uniersity o Burgundy, 1995, pp. 125-3 , 'La dcouerte de
Rousseau', in e. ovrce. fravai.e. ae ta bito.obie ae Kavt, Paris: Klincksiek, 199, pp. 11-261 ,on the
writings on Saint-Pierre, pp. 21-20, , and 'L`abb de Saint-Pierre, Rousseau et Kant', in P. Laberge,
G. Larance and D. Dumas, eds., `.vvee 1:. Kavt. ..ai .vr ta ai, Paris: Vrin, 199, pp. 25-40.
!"&
J. Rawls, 1be ar of Peote., Cambridge, Mass.: larard Uniersity Press, 2001, p. 6. Rawls then goes
on to quote rom 1be ociat Covtract.
#
peoples and an extension o international law. It may be, thereore, that his probings
o Luropean ciil society, howeer uninished, are not without releance or the
present day.
*
Annex: Who is the author of the Abstract and the Judgment of the Plan for
Perpetual Peace?
1he correspondence between author and editor at the time o publication is
reealing in this regard.
12
\hile reusing to hand oer the manuscript o a ^ovrette
eto.e to Bastide, Rousseau suggested that the .b.tract - which was due to appear irst
in Bastide's e Movae covve it ra - was merely a piece o 'scribbling' in the serice o
someone else's ideas:
It was six years ago that, Count de Saint-Pierre haing entrusted to me the
manuscripts o his uncle the late M. the Abb, I began to abridge his
writings .o a. to va/e tbev vore covrevievt for reaaivg, ava to va/e rbat i. v.efvt
iv tbev better /vorv. My plan was to make this abridgement in two olumes,
one o which would hae contained abstracts o the \orks, and the other a
detailed judgment on each plan: but ater some attempt at this labour, I saw
that it was not suited to me and that I would not succeed in it at all. 1hus I
abandoned this plan, ater haing executed it only on the Peretvat Peace and
on the Pot,.,voa,. I am sending you, Sir, the irst o these abstracts, as an
inaugural subject or you who loe peace, and whose writings breathe it.
!"'
On the publication details and general context o these works, see S. Stelling-Michaud's introduction
to olume 3 o Rousseau's Oevrre. covtete., pp. x-xi, cxx-cli, M. Cranston, 'Rousseau on \ar and
Peace', in Rov..eav ava tbe igbteevtb Cevtvr,, Oxord: Voltaire loundation, 1992, pp. 189-96 , and the
introduction by B. Bernardi and G. Silestrini to Privcie. av aroit ae ta gverre..., op. cit.
#
May we see it soon established among the powers , or among Authors it
has neer been seen, and today is not the time that one must hope or it.
128
1he Covfe..iov. relate the origins o the project. 1he suggestion or it came
rom the Abb de Mably, and was pursued by Mme Dupin, who wished to pay tribute
to the memory o Saint-Pierre. Rousseau had met the Abb at her .atov shortly beore
his death, in 142 or 143, but it was only in 156 that he let Paris or the lermitage
entrusted with the seenteen olumes o published works and ie boxes o
manuscripts , there he got down to the task that he considered 'useul in itsel' and
'ery suitable or a man who was hardworking in unskilled labour but lazy as an
author, who - inding the eort o thinking ery tiring - preerred to clariy and push
someone else's ideas in things to his taste oer creating ones o his own.'
129
\ithout
ruling on Rousseau's possible distance rom this sel-judgment, we should ollow the
continuation o his testimony. Beore calling o the task or ear o political
persecution, he was discouraged by its scale and complexity, as the 'excellent things' in
Saint-Pierre's writings were drowned in the diuse, conused whole.
130
Rousseau had
gathered the material or this major project, including or an introductory biography o
Saint-Pierre. And his own writings on the Abb made him think that he would not
hae badly ulilled the mission entrusted to him.
131

Cev.or.bi ava avtboriat re.ov.ibitit,
\hen it was published in 161, with Charles Duclos acting as intermediary, the
.b.tract immediately aced the ordeal o the censorship, which asked or the question
o its authorship to be reopened. At irst Bastide gae assurances to Rousseau that
there would be no major changes, although, together with Duclos, he asked him to
modiy his characterization o 'Christianity' as a 'sect' ,
132
Rousseau agreed to use only
!"(
'Letter rom M. Rousseau to M. de Bastide', 5 December 160, C\R 11, p. 25 - translation
modiied , emphases added.
!")
'1he Conessions', Book IX, p. 342 - translation modiied.
!#*
Ibid., pp. 342-3.
!#!
Ibid., p. 355.
#
the irst term instead o the second.
133
In lebruary 161, Bastide explained that a cabal
against e Movae and rialry between dierent journals preented him rom publishing
the .b.tract there ,
134
he thereore suggested bringing it out separately, with a Cochin-
engraed rontispiece o a monument in Reims by Pigalle showing the ruits o peace.
1he publisher said that he had persuaded Malesherbes to deal personally with
censorship o the .b.tract, and that he had receied requests only or some minor
changes. Rousseau protested indignantly that the proposed cuts were ar rom triial,
and that all his other writings contained 'much stronger things'. \hile listing the
changes to which he agreed and leaing the rest to Duclos's judgment, Rousseau
dwelled on two that he considered particularly signiicant. 1he irst concerned the
point at which he dissociated himsel rom Saint-Pierre, where the censor seemed to
want to make him say the opposite o what he had intended: 'I would not dare
respond along with the Abb etc. I absolutely cannot say that rovta aare gien that it
is not true that rovta aare. But I suggest we come to an arrangement about this:
rovta vot aare is let in the text, and rovta aare is put in the list o errata. 1he text will
be my thought, the erratum will be the censor's.' So, Rousseau counterposes 'his'
thought to the censor's at the ery point where he ironically diers rom the optimistic
thought o his predecessor: 'I would not dare respond along with the Abb de Saint-
Pierre: 1hat the genuine glory o Princes consists in procuring the public utility and
their Subjects' happiness.'
135
Lqually telling is the second passage challenged by the
censor, which ollows soon ater the irst: 'I cannot say at the end o the tirade rbite vot
forgettivg tbe rirtve. of Privce., gien that there is nothing to be recalled. But i you preer I
will say: ava, rbaterer tbe rirtve. of Privce. va, be, tet v. .ea/ of tbeir ivtere.t.. Or else: iv
otitic. ove .bovta vot .ea/ of tbe rirtve. of Privce. ; ove .bovta .ea/ ovt, of tbeir ivtere.t.. Or
some similar turn o phrase.'
136
Rousseau's objection to the censor's proposal is
reealing, but one wonders about this erbal distance that again allows him to assert
his political realism. Did Saint-Pierre really trust in the irtue o princes, or was he
!#"
Corre.ovaavce covtete ae Rov..eav, henceorth CC, Leigh ed., Genea: Institut et Muse Voltaire, ol.
VII, 1969, No. 118, p. 345.
!##
Rousseau to Bastide, 18 December 160, No. 1196, p. 356.
!#$
CC, ol. 8, 1969, No. 1284, p. 91.
!#%
'Abstract...', p. 42. 1he ull text o this passage will be considered below.
!#&
Rousseau to Bastide, 13 lebruary 161, CC, No. 1285, pp. 94-5.
#
content to appeal to their interests Did Rousseau himsel ground his political
approach on the interests o soereigns \e shall return to these controersial issues.
!b, vbti.b tbe Abstract ritbovt tbe Judgment.
1he other key question concerns the relationship between the .b.tract and the
]vagvevt, which was posthumously published in 182 in Moultou's and Du Peyrou's
edition o the complete works.
13
In act, Rousseau did not demur when Bastide
associated his thought with Saint-Pierre's - een i the citizen o Genea reused to
take his predecessor on board and insisted on their dierences.
138
Although Rousseau
would not alsely claim a glory to which he was not entitled,
139
he seemed in no hurry
to publicize his disagreement with Saint-Pierre. 1he philosopher een said he was 'ery
happy' not to hae mentioned the ]vagvevt to Bastide, who had been badgering him
or such a text.
140
1his reticence has been the cause o some conusion, rom Voltaire
down to the present day, since Rousseau's theoretical position was considered close to
Saint-Pierre's, and the success o the .b.tract enhanced the author's reputation.
141
Kant
is a reealing example: in his iew, Rousseau shared with Saint-Pierre the plan or
perpetual peace, which, though ridiculed as 'wild and anciul', would through the
cunning o reason come to appear rational in the eyes o people raaged by the
experience o wars.
142

!#'
In ol. 23, pp. 62 to 82. 1he original signed manuscript, not yet a clean copy, is kept at Neuchatel: R.
34,
o
1-6
o
.
!#(
'As to the title, I cannot accept that it should be changed or one that would adapt me to a Project
that is not my own.' ,Rousseau to Bastide, about 22 lebruary 161, CC, No. 131, pp. 153-4., 1he elided
passage contains the terms that appear in the aboe-mentioned oreword.
!#)
'M. de Bastide here gies me all the credit or the work, and een the credit or reusing it, that is not
just. I am not at all modest, and there are kinds o praise to which I am ery susceptible. Indeed, I am
ery proud o haing no wish or undesered glory.' CC, No. 1321, p. 165.
!$*
'1he Conessions', Book XI, p. 459.
!$!
It was mainly through Rousseau that Saint-Pierre's ideas were disseminated in Lurope. 1he .b.tract
was printed in two thousand copies in January 161, and Bastide soon had to order another run
,ollowed by Lnglish and German translations,. Publication o the .b.tract gae resh impetus to the
debate on perpetual peace, as we know rom the work o arious academies. 1he Acadmie ranaise
proposed the subject or inestigation in 166.
!$"
Kant, 'Idea or a Uniersal listory with a Cosmopolitan Purpose', in Potiticat !ritivg., Cambridge:
Cambridge Uniersity Press, 1991, p. 4.
#
It is thereore legitimate to ask why Rousseau agreed to publish only one part
o his thought, at the risk o creating a huge misunderstanding. \hat truth-alue
should be gien to the tract 1he question is all the more important because,
especially in the etter. !rittev frov tbe Movvtaiv, Rousseau would relect on the idea o
the author and the responsibilities it implies.
143
Among the select number o books
written to speak the truth and to be o public utility, he argues, many hae been
published anonymously. A writer may or may not acknowledge their authorial unction
according to the preailing circumstances in religion and politics, but also in the
society and culture.
144
\e should thereore consider closely the subtle inocation o
the 'author' in the opening words o the .b.tract: 'Since no greater, iner, or more
useul Plan has eer occupied the human mind than the one o a perpetual and
uniersal Peace among all the Peoples o Lurope, no Author has eer better desered
the attention o the Public than the one who proposes the means or implementing
this Plan.'
145
1he next sentence leads Rousseau to justiy his interest in Saint-Pierre: 'a
sensitie and irtuous man' cannot remain cold or without 'enthusiasm' or the Abb's
enterprise. It is thereore sensitiity o mind and an ardent wish to contribute to the
good o humanity, rather than cold reason, 'harsh and repellent' and indierent to the
public good, which impel the author o the two Di.covr.e. to enter the territory o his
predecessor.
146

Rousseau here immediately outlines both the reasons why he has taken up
Saint-Pierre's text and the reasons why he will ultimately distance himsel rom it: on
the one hand, inectious enthusiasm or the good o humanity , on the other, the
illusory character o the heartelt project. Rousseau's dual impulse changes Saint-
Pierre's orientation, which claimed to address reason and humanity as inseparable
rom each other - reason as constitutie o humanity - by reusing to treat as illusory a
!$#
See 'Letters \ritten rom the Mountain' |~L\lM|, in Cottectea !ritivg. of Rov..eav 9, 'lirst Letter',
pp. 13-9, '1hird Letter', pp. 182-4, 'lith Letter', pp. 211-21, and the Groupe Jean-Jacques Rousseau
collection: B. Bernardi, l. Gunard and G. Silestrini, eds., a Retigiov, ta iberte, ta ]v.tice. |v
covvevtaire ae. Lettres crites de la montagne ae Rov..eav, Paris: Vrin, 2005. 1he Diatogve. are also a long
and sly relection on the concept o the author.
!$$
L\lM, 'lith Letter', p. 219.
!$%
'Abstract...', p. 2 - translation modiied. lor urther eidence that Rousseau admired Saint-Pierre's
liberty, see L\lM, 'Sixth Letter', p. 236.
!$&
'Abstract...', pp. 2-8.
#
project that was in his iew perectly argued. In a sense this says eerything, and
Rousseau's genius was that he could 'extract' the quintessence o the project only by
suberting it. In so ar as the plan or perpetual peace appealed to the heart rather than
the mind, to sentient man rather than rational man, Rousseau could work to publicize
it and to gain people's covrictiov in its aour. But, in so ar as the plan sowed illusions
and could not really keep its promise at the court o reason - that is, despite its claims,
could not genuinely er.vaae - Rousseau would take it upon himsel to criticize it. So,
his address to the public inoles a quite unusual use o the irst person pronoun, in
which 'I' is the sentient subject rather than the instantiation o a uniersal reason
always quick to object and to criticize:
I do not doubt that many Readers might arm themseles in adance with
incredulity in order to resist the pleasure o persuasion, and I pity them
or so sadly mistaking stubbornness or wisdom. But I hope that some
honest soul will share the delightul emotion with which I take up the pen
on a subject so interesting or humanity.
14
A comparison with the opening o 1be tate of !ar brings out a major
conergence: it is because the horrors o war moe the 'human entrails' that Rousseau
undertakes there to 'plead the cause o humanity' by seeking to establish justice.
148
\et
it is exactly as i the irony o the understanding immediately negated the enthusiastic
Plan o the beautiul soul. Rousseau presents the hope coneyed by the idea o eternal
harmony and raternal happiness as a mere pipe dream , the 'touching tableau' is no
more than an illusory ision o bliss. \ithout yielding too long to the inluence o
eeling, it is necessary 'to reason coolly', 'not to put anything orward without proing
it', and to beg the Reader in turn to stick to a rational process o reutation and
objection.
149
1he irst three paragraphs o the .b.tract thereore reeal to us Rousseau's
complex theoretical posture, rom which he will no longer depart. In this respect, the
]vagvevt will not contradict the .b.tract ,as i the 'reasons or' in the latter were those
!$'
Ibid., p. 28.
!$(
'1he State o \ar', in C\R 11, p. 61.
!$)
'Abstract...', p. 28.
#
o eeling, while the 'reasons against' in the ormer were those o reason, , he will
accomplish the judgment by pursuing the demands o the rational posture that were
laid down right at the beginning. In this way, the sequence rom .b.tract to ]vagvevt
shares the aim o a genuine 'critique', as ormulated at this time by Marmontel in an
article in the vc,ctoaeaia: that is, 'the enlightened examination and air judgment o
human output' should shape public opinion.
1wo other texts shed light on the status o the .b.tract and its relationship to
the ]vagvevt. lirst, ater speaking o the duty to gie an author his due, a passage in the
Covfe..iov. reers to Rousseau's judicious decision 'to present separately' his own and
Saint-Pierre's ideas and, 'to do so, to enter into his intentions, to clariy them, to
extend them, and to spare nothing to make them alued at their ull worth'.
150
In this
perspectie, the ]vagvevt was meant to counter the arguments o the .b.tract - which
would already hae been published and 'had its eect' - and, so to speak, exposed it
'to the ate o the sonnet in 1be Mi.avtbroe'.
151
1wo symmetrical mistakes had to be
aoided: one was simply 'to let the author's isions pass' ,which would not hae been
'useul', , the other was 'to reute them rigorously' ,which would hae been
'dishonorable', in iew o the task Rousseau had accepted and his duty to treat the
author honourably,. \ishing to combine useulness with honour, he thereore split his
analysis into two, without troubling himsel too much oer publication o the ]vagvevt:
I made my attempt on the Peretvat Peace, the most substantial and the
most polished o all the works that made up this collection, and, beore
abandoning mysel to my relections, I had the courage to read absolutely
eerything the Abb had written on this ine subject, without eer
becoming discouraged by his tedious passages and unnecessary
repetitions. 1he public has seen this abstract, thus I hae nothing to say
about it. As or the judgment I brought to bear on it, it has not been
!%*
'1he Conessions', p. 355. 1he issue is partly ,though o course not only, one o style, as in the
'lragments and Notes on the Abb de Saint-Pierre' ,C\R 11, pp. 109.,.
!%!
Moliere, 1be Mi.avtbroe, Act I, Scene 2, . 36.
$
printed and I do not know whether it eer will be: but it was written at
the same time as the abstract.
152
So, what are the reading guidelines to be adopted A irst point is that,
although Rousseau claimed to hae had 'the courage to read absolutely eerything the
Abb had written' on perpetual peace, it is necessary to ocus on the manuscripts and
printed texts that he had in his possession, especially olumes 1 and 2 o the 133
Ovrrage. ae otitiqve.
153
1he .brege av Pro;et ae ai eretvette and the vtevevt a t.brege,
which eature at the ront o the Ovrrage., were doubtless Rousseau's aourite texts,
although it is not sure that they are the only ones he had on the subject.
154
1he second
point is that the .b.tract requires a critical reading: although it is impossible to comb
through it sorting eerything o Saint-Pierre's rom eerything o Rousseau's, nor
should we strip Rousseau o all 'authority' oer the arguments that he gies in aour
o the Plan. 1he arguments that he places at the serice o Saint-Pierre must not be
conused with those that he sets out on the basis o his own principles - otherwise it
would be easy to catch him in the act o contradicting himsel, especially on the
question o trade. Should his positions in the ]vagvevt thereore be taken as the
criterion o truth 1hat is not a satisactory solution either, since Rousseau does not
deelop his own positions in the judgments he makes on the Ptav for Peretvat Peace or
!%"
'1he Conessions', p. 355. |lor the sake o consistency, the translation o the word ' etrait' has here
been changed rom 'abridgement' to 'abstract' - trav.. vote.| According to Stelling-Michaud, it was only in
163 that Rousseau expressed a wish to include the ]vagvevt in a collection o his works, an outline o
which he sent to Du Peyrou in January 164 ,'Introduction' to Gvrre. covtete., ol. 3, pp. cxxxiii-
cxxxix,.
!%#
1he printed matter placed at Rousseau's disposal included, in ol. 1, the .brege av Pro;et ae ai
eretvette and, in ol. 2, the vtevevt a t .brege, but also a Pro;et ovr arrevir a ta ai in ol. 8, a plan
or perpetual peace between Spain and Lngland in ol. 15, and a relection 'on the system o perpetual
peace' in ol. 15 ,see the list compiled by Rousseau, in olume 3 o his Oevrre. covtete., pp. 62-82,. A
systematic study has not yet been made o the manuscripts kept in Neuchatel ,Ms. RI,. Among those
not immediately accessible to Rousseau, howeer, were certain objections and replies to objections
concerning early ersions o the Pro;et ae ai eretvette. ,See Pro;et ovr revare ta ai eretvette ev vroe,
Paris: layard, 1986, text reised by S. Goyard-labre, which has made aailable again the two olumes
published in Utrecht by A. Schouten in 113 as well as a third olume, Pro;et ae 1raite ovr revare ta ai
eretvette ev vroe, which appeared in Utrecht in 11.,
!%$
According to A. Robinet, Rousseau knew really well only the .brege, rom which the 'ie articles' are
drawn. 'Corps social et souerainet nationale dans le conlit Saint-Pierre - Leibniz - Rousseau', in ]eav
]acqve. Rov..eav, Potitiqve et ^atiov, Actes du II
e
Colloque international de Montmorency ,1995,, Paris:
Champion, 2001, pp. 143.
$
the Pot,.,voa, , rather, he tries to do justice, both positiely and negatiely, to a plan
that is not his own.
155

In act, only vite proides a complete iewpoint on the sequence rom
.b.tract to ]vagvevt, by inserting it into the whole o his work. laing said that his
work on 'Political Institutions' will examine 'how a good ederatie association can be
established, what can make it durable, and how ar the right o conederation can be
extended without jeopardizing that o soereignty', he eectiely brings in Saint-Pierre
when he describes the opposition between .b.tract and ]vagvevt as one between
'reasons or' and 'reasons against':
1he Abb de Saint-Pierre proposed an association o all the states o
Lurope in order to maintain perpetual peace among them. \as this
association easible And i it had been established, can it be presumed
that it would hae lasted | Since I wrote this, the arguments or hae
been expanded in the extract rom the Abb's project , the arguments
agaiv.t - at least those which appeared solid to me - are to be ound in the
collection o my writings that ollows this extract.| 1hese inestigations
lead us directly to all the questions o public right which can complete the
clariication o the questions o political right.
156

Beyond the dismissal o Saint-Pierre's plan in the ]vagvevt, we hae to consider
the ate o the idea o a 'good ederatie association', both in Book 1, Chapter 2 o the
Cevera Mavv.crit, which is contemporaneous with the .b.tract, and in 1be ociat
Covtract and vite. It is scarcely surprising that Rousseau was not content to reute
Saint-Pierre but returned elsewhere in his work to the question o conederations: the
lack o a solution to the problem o international relations threatened to jeopardize the
ery principles o political right. 1o put it briely, the internal 'solution' remains
unsatisactory so long as the risk o insecurity is so great or republics. low can small
!%%
See the article by B. Bernardi in Privcie. av aroit ae ta gverre, op. cit.
!%&
vite, trans. by Allan Bloom, London: Penguin, 1991, pp. 466-.
$
states - whose necessity is linked to the principle o popular soereignty and an
eectie general will - resist the ambitions o the great powers except through a
deensie ederal-style solution
15
1he suggestion that Rousseau entrusted at least part
o a work on conederations to one o his republican admirers, the Comte
d'Antraigues, seems implausible.
158
But Book 5 o vite, which includes a rsum o
1be ociat Covtract and the planned 'Political Institutions', certainly takes the idea
seriously.
159
It is worth quoting extensiely rom the text, which proides a ramework
or the preious note:
Once we hae thus considered each species o ciil society in itsel, we
shall compare them in order to obsere their dierse relations.... Is it not
this partial and imperect association which produces tyranny and war,
and are not tyranny and war the greatest plagues o humanity
ivatt,, re .batt eavive tbe /iva of reveaie. for tbe.e ai.aaravtage. roriaea b,
teagve. ava covfeaeratiov., rbicb teare eacb .tate it. orv va.ter ritbiv bvt arv it
agaiv.t erer, vv;v.t aggre..or frov ritbovt. !e .batt ivre.tigate bor a gooa feaeratire
a..ociatiov cav be e.tabti.bea, rbat cav va/e it avrabte, ava bor far tbe rigbt of
covfeaeratiov cav be etevaea ritbovt ;eoaraiivg tbat of .orereigvt,.
1he Abb de Saint-Pierre proposed an association o all the states o
Lurope in order to maintain perpetual peace among them. \as this
association easible And i it had been established, can it be presumed
that it would hae lasted | ivce rrote tbi., tbe argvvevt. for bare beev
eavaea iv tbe etract frov tbe .bbe. ro;ect ; tbe argvvevt. agaiv.t - at tea.t
tbo.e rbicb aearea .otia to ve - are to be fovva iv tbe cottectiov of v, rritivg. tbat
fottor. tbi. etract.| 1hese inestigations lead us directly to all the questions
o public right which can complete the clariication o the questions o
political right.
!%'
'On the Social Contract' |hereater OSC|, in 1be a.ic Potiticat !ritivg. of ]eav]acqve. Rov..eav, trans. by
Donald A. Cress, Indianapolis: lackett, 1988, III: 15, pp. 199-200. See also vite, pp. 466-.
!%(
See J.-L. \indenberger, ..ai .vr te .,.teve ae otitiqve etravgere ae ].]. Rov..eav, a Revbtiqve covfeaeratire
ae. etit. tat., Paris 1899, Genea,Paris: Slatkine, 1982.
!%)
Rousseau also says, howeer, that he neer integrated his theory o the conederation into v.titvtiov.
otitiqve. ,OSC, IV:9, p. 22,.
$
linally, we shall lay down the true principles o the right o war, and
we shall examine why Grotius and the others presented only alse ones.
I would not be surprised i my young man, who has good sense, were
to interrupt me in the middle o all our reasoning and say, 'Someone
might say that we are building our ediice with wood and not with men, so
exactly do we align each piece with the ruler!' 'It is true, my riend, but
keep in mind that right is not bent by men's passions, and that our irst
concern was to establish the true principles o political right. Now that
our oundations are laid, come and examine what men hae built on
them , and you will see some ine things!'
1hen I make him read 1etevacbv. while proceeding on his journey. ...
\e know that 1elemachus and mentor are chimeras.
160
So, vite reeals a o.teriori the key place o the '\ritings on the Abb de Saint-Pierre'
in the architecture o Rousseau's system: internal and external policy, the principles o
political right and public right, can only be theorized together. In the sequel to
'Political Institutions', Rousseau would hae posed a problem ,as he did in 1be ociat
Covtract
161
,: 'how ar can the right o conederation be extended without jeopardizing
that o soereignty' Does his solution exist \es: leagues and conederations do make
it possible to leae the state its own 'master within' while deending it against unjust
attack rom without. 1he reerence to the Abb de Saint-Pierre here suggests an
association that somehow reproduces the solution o the social compact ,which ends
the state o war among indiiduals, at the leel o Luropean states. 1he question that
remains unresoled is whether such an association is 'practical' and, i so, whether it
can endure. vite sounds a inal cautionary note, in the orm o an objection by the
young man o 'good sense', who asks whether human nature is not being orgotten in
this ormulation o public right and political right. 1he goernor's reply is at the leel
o principles: right does not bend to human passions, and so the laying o oundations
does not amount to building a utopia or taking men as one would wish them to be.
!&*
vite, pp. 466-.
!&!
OSC, I: 6.
$
Proo o this is the reerence to lnelon's .arevtvre. of 1etevacbv., whose reorm
project is regarded as a wild dream. 1he ery question o the nature o Rousseau's
'realism' is here posed in all its sharpness. In particular, the quoted passage rom vite
tells us that, ar rom being a commission that he undertook more or less willingly but
regarded as alien to his central concerns as a philosopher, Rousseau's critical
examination o Saint-Pierre's works was integral to the project o his 'Political
Institutions'. It was in a sense the prolegomenon to 'all the questions o public right'
that were to clariy the uture questions o political right.
$