ETHICAL/MORAL REASONING SKILLS FOR ARGUMENT AND DEBATE1 Educational Objectives: After reading this chapter, the student

will be able to: 1. 2. 3. 4. Characterize the nature of opinions. Characterize the nature of arguments. Distinguish between arguments and opinions. Understand and appreciate the importance of Socratic humility in philosophical discussion and debate. 5. Explain inductive logic. 6. Explain how random selection and other sampling procedures are important to induction. 7. Contrast deductive arguments with opinions. 8. List the parts of a logical syllogism. 9. Explain the procedure of deductive logic. 10. Point out the differences between validity, truth, and soundness in logical syllogisms. 11. List the parts of a practical syllogism. 12. Compare practical and logical syllogisms. 13. Explain the use of practical syllogisms. 14. Test the validity of practical syllogisms at the level of conclusion, factual premise, and value premise. 15. Define and use the role-exchange test in evaluating principles and value premises. 16. Explain and use the new-case test. 17. Explain and use the consistency and universalizability test. 18. Explain and use the higher-order principle test. FOCUS QUESTIONS: When reading/studying and attempting to analyze, judge and summarize/synthesize a text, it is of utmost importance in philosophy/ethics to start with an inquiry in order to focus and center your subject: 1. How can you tell whether an individual is presenting an argument or stating an opinion? 2. What can be said about opinions? Do they have any value or are they worthless? 3. Are there any dangers in merely stating opinions? If so, what are they? 4. How should the term argument be understood in a philosophical context? How is this term generally understood? 5. What is meant by rational disinterest? What indicates to you that someone is arguing with rational disinterest? How do you know someone is not rationally disinterested? 6. What are some of the advantages of adopting the psychological stance of Socratic humility? 7. How are inductive and deductive logic dissimilar? 8. Can you give one or two examples of inductive reasoning by analogy?
1

Falikowsky, Anthony F. (1990). Moral Philosophy, Theories, Skills and Applications. In Prentice-Hall, Inc., Moral reasoning skills for argument and debate, pp. 104-114. New Jersey.

9. Can you identify any scientific, empirical studies where false conclusions were drawn because of unfair sampling procedures? If so, what caused the unfairness? 10. How is the logical syllogism different from the practical syllogism? 11. Can you distinguish between validity, truth, and soundness in the context of philosophical argumentation? 12. How can one evaluate a practical syllogism? 13. Can you identify one moral/ethical value principle by which you live? Evaluate it using the four (4) tests mentioned in the text. Does your principle hold up under close examination? If not, how should you modify the principle? Or, should you reject the principle entirely? ETHICAL/MORAL REASONING SKILLS FOR ARGUMENT AND DEBATE

PERSONAL OPINIONS
There are different kinds of opinions, some more acceptable than others. Judges and lawyers, for instance, may issue opinions on the legality of particular public policies. Such stated opinions are usually based on extensive research and careful thought. By contrast, the expressions of personal opinion we hear on a daily basis are typically less well thought out. In one respect these everyday, thoughtless opinions are cheap. We can all afford to have them on any topic, even if we know very little or nothing about the topic. Opinions are especially abundant when the topic is a controversial moral/ethical one. A characteristic about these everyday opinions is that they are often not accompanied by reasons.2 No grounds are stated for espousing them. Frequently, personal opinions are simply blurted out in a spontaneous fashion. They may be intended either to fill space in idle conversation, express emotions, or elicit reactions from others. This last function is certainly true of newspaper editorialists who express opinions all the time. By their opinionating, they often try to make people think about, or reconsider, their viewpoints on some contemporary social issue. To the extent that personally stated opinions initiate discussion and cause us to stop and think, they are worthwhile. In many cases, they serve as the first step to genuine philosophical argument and debate. They can act as a type of spring board for further indepth ethical analysis and deliberation. The problem, however, is that all too often discussions begin and end with statements of unreasoned opinion. Emotions are vented and viewpoints are stridently expressed, but little is accomplished by way of insight, further understanding, or clarification of the issues concerned. Unfortunately, many people tae great pleasure n forcing their opinions upon others, winning shouting matches, name-calling, and making others look foolish or stupid. The problem is that screaming and one-upmanship do not take us very far down the road of sober thought and rational ethical/moral understanding.

The content for this part of the discussion is largely derived from R. H. Johnson and J. A. Blair, Logical Self-Defense, 2nd ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1983).

MORAL/ETHICAL ARGUMENT:

In moral and philosophical discussions, arguments are not intended to be violent fights. They do not represent confrontations of egos filled with hostility and mutual resentment.3 The argument in a philosophical/ethical context is positive. Philosophers make a livelihood out of constructing and analyzing arguments. Arguments are ideally conducted in a friendly, level-headed way. They serve as a vehicle to further human understanding on whatever moral/ethical issue is being disputed. If one adopts a proper philosophical attitude of rational disinterestedness, and if one is firmly committed to the pursuit of knowledge and truth, one is not concerned with winning or losing debates. The objective of argument is increased insight and greater enlightenment achieved by all. If one develops the philosophical humility of Socrates one is actually aware of ones own ignorance and the distinct possibility that one may frequently be wrong. If we can learn only one thing from Socrates, perhaps it should be that we ought not to be presumptuous with respect to what we know and believe unquestioningly that we are right in our philosophical viewpoints. It would be better if we entered into ethical discussions and debates with Socratic humility and with the hope of learning, not with the aim of winning, furthering our reputations, or massaging our own egos. Adopting this psychological stance of Socratic humility will, interestingly enough, remove defensiveness and help one to focus on the issue at hand in a more rational and impartial fashion. This stance will also influence one to express viewpoints in a cautious and tentative way, not stridently or arrogantly. The beginning student of ethics wishing to master the skills of philosophical argumentation and critical analysis must become acquainted with at least two basic types of reasoning: (1) inductive logic and (2) deductive logic. Inductive logic is a rational process of thought used to support empirical claims, statements, or propositions. In an ethical context, it can be used to support factual premises which are contained within broader ethical/moral arguments. If one wishes to question the validity of a moral argument on the grounds that its factual premise is false, one should appreciate the mechanics of the reasoning process which led to that factual premise. One should also be able to pinpoint flaws in the application of that process in any particular moral argument. With respect to deductive logic, a distinction needs to be made between two of its variations. Deductive logic can be used in both ethical/moral and non-moral or nonethical contexts. Perhaps the most commonly used and recognized deductive argument is the syllogism. So, used in a non-moral or non-ethical context, it can be referred to simply as a logical syllogism. When employed in a moral/ethical or normative context, it will be referred here as practical syllogism. The descriptive adjective practical is appropriate as moral value making that affects all of our lives in real and concrete ways. Moral value decisions have practical consequences for us. The differences and similarities between logical and practical syllogisms will soon become apparent. First, let us examine the pattern of reasoning known as inductive logic.
3

Ibid.

 INDUCTIVE LOGIC:
Inductive logic is a form of reasoning that leads to probable conclusions, not necessary ones. Suppose, for instance, that we are informed that John has lied on his job application, on his income tax return, and to his wife. We might then conclude that he will probably lie about information provided on his medical history required to purchase a life insurance policy. Given the fact that he has lied in other contexts, he will likely lie in this one as well. However, since our inductive conclusion is based on facts of experience, because these facts are never complete, and because new facts tomorrow or the day after may have the effect of weakening or changing or contradicting todays assumptions, we can never be absolutely sure about our conclusion.4 Perhaps John has experienced some kind of religious or moral/ethical conversion which has led to a complete character transformation. Maybe John was a liar in his wayward youth but now he is a wise old man committed to the value of truth. Many empirical variables could weaken the soundness of the inductive inference made in this case. Inductive arguments supporting empirical claims sometimes proceed by analogy. For example, arguments for the probable existence of life on other planets are analogical.5 They are based on the presumed similarities between conditions found on earth and those on other planets. Mark Woodhouse provides for us a formal mode of analogical inductive argumentation:6 Items A, B, and C have characteristics X and Y A and B have characteristic Z Therefore, C probably has characteristic Z also A feature of analogical arguments (and inductive arguments more generally) is that they are stronger or weaker by degree. They are not usually rejected or accepted in an all-ornothing fashion. The soundness of analogical inductive reasoning in particular depends on such things as the number and variety of characteristics which appear to be similar in the samples, the number of samples used, and the strength of the conclusions relative to the premises.7 Still another form of induction is the inductive generalization.8 When we make an inductive generalization, we make a statement about all, some or none of a class based on our examination of only a part of that class. Inductive generalizations are not simply
4 5

Vincent Barry, Philosophy: A Text with Readings, 2nd ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1983), p. 334 Mark Woodhouse, A Preface to Philosophy (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1984), p. 46. 6 Ibid., p. 47 7 For a further discusin of this and other points relating to analogical reasoning, see Woodhouse, A Preface to Philosophy, pp. 46-48. 8 Runkle, Theory and Practice: An Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 463-465.

generalized descriptions.9 Let us suppose, for example, that we surveyed the members of a neo-Nazi youth group organization in a particular county and discovered that 99 percent (99%) of the members hated blacks, Catholics and Jews. In stating this fact, one is not going beyond the facts; one is only presenting a generalized description of what is the case. However, if one were to conclude that 99 percent of the members of all youth group organizations in North America hated blacks, Catholics and Jews, one would be making and inductive generalization. As can be readily appreciated in the example above, inductive generalizations can easily be prone to error unless certain precautions are taken while arriving at them. If one wishes to make a generalization about a class of people or things based on samples taken from that class, one must take care to ensure that the sample is sufficiently large. If one had surveyed the feelings and attitudes of members belonging to one hundred youth group organizations in many counties and in many provinces and states, instead of in just one county, one state, or one province, then any generalization about the percentage of members hating blacks, Catholics, and Jews across North America would be placed on firmer ground. Inductive generalizations must be based on fair samples. One must ask whether the sampling is truly representative of the whole class (for example, youth groups). As has already been intimated, if the sample is large enough, it is likely to be more rather than less representative of the class. But if a large sample is unfair or distorted, then its size is irrelevant to the soundness of the generalization. Let us suppose, for instance, that only neo-Nazi youth groups were surveyed in our sampling of one hundred. Surely, these organizations are not representative of other major youth groups like the Boy Scouts and Girl Guides. It is important in the interests of fairness and objectivity, then, that our samples be randomly selected. Every segment of the class (for example, youth groups) about which we are generalizing must have an equal chance of being selected. If we wish to make inductive generalizations concerning youth group attitudes based on a limited sample, we must ensure that our sampling procedures allow for all youth groups being randomly selected. This includes not only neo-Nazi youth groups but athletic clubs and volunteer associations like the Candy Stripers, the Boy Scouts, and so on. Random sampling may be ensured by studying different geographic locations and by taking such things as socioeconomic factors, age, and education into account, amongst other pertinent ones.

DEDUCTIVE LOGIC:
The process of deduction is a pattern of reasoning essential to philosophical inquiry. Stating deductive arguments is not like stating opinions. Since opinions are groundless and unsupported, they seem to go nowhere. When one states an opinion, there is typically no indication of movement or progress in rational thought. By contrast, deductive logical argument is comprised of a series of statements which fit together as a syllogism. Deductive arguments begin with premises and end with conclusions.
9

Ibid., p. 463.

Conclusions obtained from deductive arguments can be said to follow, or be derived from, preceding premises. Below are two examples of deductive logical syllogisms: Example 1: Major Premise: All men are mortal Minor Premise: Socrates is a man Conclusion: Socrates is mortal Major Premise: If a person has an XX genotype, the person is female. Minor Premise: Dale has an XX genotype Conclusion: Therefore, Dale is female

Example 2:

The content and particulars of the syllogisms above may be removed so that the syllogism may be expressed in a purely formal way: Major Premise: All Ps are Qs Minor Premise: S is a P Conclusion: Therefore, S is a Q _

In the process of deductive reasoning, one attempts to argue for the truth of a conclusion by deducing a statement from a number of others which are assumed to be true. A problem arises, however, because arguments are not always expressed in a logical stepby-step fashion. Conclusions may sometimes be preceded and followed by supporting premises in a garbled or jumbled way.10 While some premises may be explicitly stated, others may be implied. When analyzing arguments, it is helpful therefore to extract from detailed discussions those relevant premises and conclusions which fit together to form logical syllogisms. The analysis and evaluation of the argument can thereby be facilitated. In the context of appraising and evaluating deductive arguments, a distinction needs to be made between validity and truth. Validity and truth are not the same thing when referring to logical syllogisms. If a deductive argument proceeds correctly to form, it is deductively valid.11 If an argument does not proceed correctly, then it is invalid. However, an argument can be valid even if its premises and conclusions are false. For example, Major Premise: All birds are black Minor Premise: Prince Philip is a bird Conclusion: Prince Philip is black

10 11

Woodhouse, A Preface to Philosophy, pp. 45-46. For a discusin of this, see Robert C. Solomon, The Big Questions: A Short Introduction to Philosophy (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich), p. 12.

In the example above, it is clear that not all birds are black. Some are red and others are blue. It is also clear that Prince Philip is a man, not a bird. Yet the conclusion follows necessarily from the two preceding premises. In short, valid arguments may some times lead to false conclusions. If an argument is valid in form and if its premises are true, then we have a good argument, one which can be described as sound.12 On the other hand, an argument can be described as unsound if its premises are false or if it is invalid in form. Thus, premises are regarded as true or false, while arguments are valid or invalid. Valid arguments based on true premises are sound, while invalid arguments or valid arguments based on false premises are unsound.

PRACTICAL SYLLOGISMS:
A practical syllogism is essentially the same in form as a logical syllogism, and its conclusions are derived from preceding premises. In this case, however, the major premise of the argument is a normative statement or some sort of [ethical] or value judgment. Hence, the major premise of a practical syllogism is not self-evidently or analytically true, that is, true by definition. Also, it cannot be verified as can empirical or factual premises by experiment and observation. The major premise of a practical syllogism, called the value premise, is not proven scientifically or empirically but rather justified by appeals to standards and principles. The process of justifying value premises is therefore a rational one. Since principles of right conduct and standards of goodness cannot be based on what is the case, for what is may frequently be evil, unethical and immoral, the ultimate basis for justification is reason, not experience. Using reason we can determine what ought to be or what is good regardless of what is. The equivalent of the logical syllogisms minor premise is the practical syllogisms factual premise. As the term implies, the factual premise makes some empirical claim about the world. The factual premise is either true or false. Though one may be unable at present to prove the truth or falsity of a particular factual premise, given our limited knowledge and technology, it must be possible in principle to do so. If someone made the factual claim, for example that there is gold on Pluto, we would likely have no way at this point to determine whether or not Pluto does in fact contain gold. The point is that factual premises contained within practical syllogisms are empirically verifiable in principle. If one accepts the value premise of a practical syllogism and if the corresponding factual premise is true, then it is possible to derive a conclusion about what is good or bad, right or wrong, or a conclusion about what ought or ought not to be done. Below are three examples of practical syllogisms:
Example 1: Value Premise: That which undermines the safety of individuals is wrong Factual Premise: Placing toxic waste dumps near populated areas under12

Ibid., p. 12.

mines the safety of individuals Conclusion: Placing toxic waste dumps near populated areas is wrong Example 2: Value Premise: Anyone who kills and steals to earn a living is evil Factual Premise: Bonnie and Clyde kill and steal to earn a living Conclusion: Bonnie and Clyde are evil Example 3: Value Premise: We should not commit acts which break the law Factual Premise: Acts of civil disobedience break the law Conclusion: We should not commit acts of civil disobedience

The practical syllogism can be evaluated at three levels: First, one may examine the conclusion to see whether it follows logically from preceding premises. If the wording of the conclusion is inaccurate or if the premises of the argument do not lead us to the stated conclusion, then the argument is invalid. The following example illustrates an incorrect conclusion:
Value Premise: We should not promote that which produces violence in the World Factual Premise: Rock music produces violence in the world Conclusion: Therefore, I should not let my son buy record albums

The correct conclusion, of course is: Therefore, we should not promote rock music. If we were to accept the value and factual premises stated above, we might by sympathetic to the son not being allowed to purchase rock-and-roll CDs, but this conclusion does not follow logically in the syllogism given the wording of the premises. Secondly, let us assume for a moment that the wording of the conclusion in the rockand-roll syllogism is correct. The question then arises as to whether or not we would be forced to accept the argument as stated. This brings us to the second level of evaluation. Even if the practical syllogism is valid in form and even if the conclusion follows logically from the preceding claims, we may still be able to reject it if the factual premise is incorrect, that is, false. Empirical studies could be conducted to determine whether rock music, in this instance, causes aggression or promotes violent conduct. Behavior at rock concerts could be observed and the behavior of rock-music listeners could be compared with the conduct of those who do not listen to such music. A number of observational and experimental techniques could be used to determine the truth or falsity of the factual premise. If the factual premise were discovered to be false, then the argument would have to be rejected. Though valid in form, its false premise would make it unsound. Lastly, practical syllogisms may be evaluated at the level of the value premise. An argument may be valid in form and the factual premise may also be true, yet it is still possible that the argument may have to be rejected. The value premises of practical syllogisms act as general rules or principles justifying the value particular value judgments found in the conclusions of those syllogisms. If the value premise of the

syllogism is itself unjustifiable, then so too must be the conclusion which follows from it. It is essential, therefore, that students learning to reason deductively in moral matters learn to evaluate and justify the value premises of moral arguments.

TESING VALUE PREMISES:

1. Role-Exchange Test: Value premises can be tested in a variety of ways. One way of determining the acceptability of a value premise is by using the role-exchange test.13 This test requires us to ask whether we would be willing to exchange places with the person or persons most disadvantaged by the application of a moral rule or principle in a particular set of circumstances. If one is not prepared to be the most disadvantaged in the application of the rule or principle, then it is probably unjustified or inadequate in some fashion. Let us suppose, for instance, that a number of trustees proposed that Vladimir Gorky and Fred Runningbear should not be allowed to enroll at an exclusive private boarding school. Further, let us assume that the only reason given is that these students are not white, Anglo-Saxon, and/or Protestant. If such were the case, the argument would run something like this:
Value Premise: Students who are not white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant should be prevented from attending this private school. Factual Premise: Vladimir and Fred are not white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant. Conclusion: Vladimir and Fred should be prevented form attending this private school.

Applying the role-exchange test forces us [you] to ask whether we would like to exchange places with Vladimir and Fred and still accept the principle which has been posited. Presumably, the school trustees would not like their options reduced or their freedom restricted simply because of their racial, ethnic, or religious background. The trustees would, no doubt, dislike being discriminated against, as would anyone else. If the school trustees could not accept being discriminated against themselves, or if they could not tolerate being treated unfairly if the principle proposed were applied to them, then the principle acting as the value premise of their argument would fail the role-exchange test. It would have to be rejected on this basis. 2. New Cases Test: If a general moral rule or principle is deemed acceptable and used as a premise to justify one value judgment in a particular set of circumstances, then it should be equally applicable to other similar sets of circumstances.14 If it is not, then there is something likely wrong with the rule or principle. For example, let us suppose that the general normative rule from which we are justifying a particular ethical/moral

13

Teachers Manual to Prejudice, by the Association for Values Education and Research, University of British Columbia (Toronto: The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1978), p. 10. 14 Ibid., p.11

judgment is, People should never lie. To test this principle, we examine not only the case in which it was applied, but also other cases where it should apply: Case #1: Maria tells her mother that she has not seen her mothers wallet, in reality she stole it to use the money inside to buy a new dress. In this case, Maria is lying only to satisfy her personal wants. She is using deception to further her own selfinterests. Intuitively, most of us would recognize such action as wrong. The general rule stated is thus upheld and strengthened. Suppose, however, that it is 1942 and Maria is harboring dissident Polish priests and Jewish refugees in her basement. Let us also imagine SS officers are knocking at Marias door, asking her is she knows the whereabouts of those same dissidents and refugees. If Maria tells the truth, the refugees and dissidents are likely to be killed. If she lies, then they are likely to be saved. No doubt most moral thinkers would argue that Maria should lie in order to preserve and protect life. But if this is the case, then it is not true that people should never lie. It could be strongly argued that people should lie if lying spares life. Case #2: Let us take yet another new case. Suppose, for instance, that one of our countrys spies is being interrogated by the enemy. This spy has information on the Star Wars technology designed as a defense system against missile attack. The enemy wants this information so that it may successfully undertake a first-strike offensive without hindrance. Our prisoner spy must make a choice, that is, to lie and say that s/he has no Star Wars information, or to tell the truth and give the enemy a military advantage which, in turn, would jeopardize the safety and security of our nation. Surely, most people would consider lying acceptable in this case. Thus we find that the more cases wherein the principle People should never lie can be shown not to apply, the less adequate or justifiable is this moral judgment. If many new cases can be presented which call into question the principle under consideration, then it must either be modified in some acceptable fashion or totally rejected. In this case, the general rule about lying could be modified to read, People should never like except when life and national security are at stake. Though this modification is l:ikely still not to be perfect, it transforms the original principle in such a way that it is now more adequate and justifiable. Further new cases might necessitate further modifications, however.

CONSISTENCY AND UNIVERSALIZABILITY TEST:

In order for rules and principles acting as value premises to be justifiable, they must be logically consistent and universalizable. Inconsistent principles and rules are those that are self-contradictory. Since they are irrational, they cannot serve as a sound and coherent basis for the justification of moral conduct and particular moral judgments. The following principle is inconsistent: People should make promises with the intention of breaking them. Some might claim that politicians actually live by this principle in their efforts to be elected. To the extent that they do, they are guilty of an inconsistency. The concept of promise keeping necessarily entails the intention of keeping ones word.

Making a promise with no intention of keeping it is self-contradictory. designed to be broken are not promises at all but rather deceptions or lies.

Promises

Apart from failing the consistency test, the principle about promise making and breaking fails the closely related universalizability test as well. If the principle were universalized and if it were deemed right that all people should make promises with the full intention of breaking them, then the institution of promise keeping would become self-defeating. Promises would become unbelievable. Nobody would ever trust someone making a promise. When applying the universalizability test, we ask, What if everyone acted according to this principle? or, Could I will that everyone should live by this principle? If one cannot will that a particular value premise be acted upon or accepted by all or if it is inconsistent and self-defeating, then the value premise is inadequate and unjustified.

HIGHER-ORDER PRINCIPLE TEST:

A fourth way to test value premises is by applying the higher-order principle test. We alluded briefly to this concept earlier when discussing normative claims. The point was made then that particular moral judgments the sort found in conclusions of practical syllogisms are justified by value premises, which represent more general moral judgments. I also indicated that these general value premises must themselves be justified by appeals to even higher-order principles if they are to be considered adequate and sound. If the higher-order principles used to justify value premises are inconsistent themselves or if they fail the role-exchange test, for example, then the value premises derived from these higher-order principles are unacceptable. Quite simply, the higherorder principle test is based on the notion that value principles (premises) we use in drawing particular moral conclusions are acceptable only if they can be derived or deduced from even more general principles which are acceptable. We frequently use the higher-order principle test in daily conversation or during informal arguments on controversial issues. An illustration of how we do this might be helpful: JEANETTE: MARK: JEANETTE: MARK: JEANETTE: You shouldnt butt your cigarettes on the colleges carpet Whats wrong with doing that? Well, youre obviously going to destroy public property So what? So what? Didnt anyone ever teach you that actions which destroy public public property are wrong?

At this point, Jeanettes claim about what Mark should not do can be expressed in syllogistic form:
Value Premise: Actions which destroy public property are wrong Factual Premise: Butting a cigarette on the colleges carpet is an action Destroying public property Conclusion: Butting a cigarette on the colleges carpet is wrong

Mark is not satisfied with Jeanettes argument for why he should not butt his cigarette on the college carpet: MARK: So what? Im destroying public property. Whats wrong with that?

In asking the question, Mark is demanding a further justification. In order to provide it, Jeanette appeals to a higher-order principle: JEANETTE: In destroying public property, youre making people work unnecessarily And ultimately forcing them to pay higher taxes MARK: So, whats the big deal about that? JEANETTE: Ill tell you what the big deal is. Paying higher taxes and making people Work unnecessarily makes people unhappy. MARK: So? JEANETTE: So? I think anything which makes people unhappy is wrong. Again, Jeanettes position can be worded in a valid syllogism:
Value Premise: Actions which make people unhappy are wrong Factual Premise: Actions like butting cigarettes on carpets destroy public property Conclusion: Actions like butting cigarettes on carpets which destroy public property are wrong

We see above that the conclusion is the same as the value premise of the first syllogism which began Jeanettes argument. The value premise of the second syllogism could in turn act as the conclusion of yet another higher-order syllogism, if required. The process of justification involving higher-order principles can be illustrated: Syllogism 3 Value Premise Syllogism 2 Factual Premise Value Premise ------------------Conclusion Syllogism 1 Factual Premise Value Premise--------- becomes ---------Conclusion Factual Premise Conclusion