C I A ' s a n a ly s i s o f t h e Sov i e t U n i o n 1 94 7 - 1 9 9 1 4

Editors: Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett

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All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this work are those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an articles factual statements and interpretations.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface .................................................................................................................................. vii Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 Editors and Contributors to this Volume ........................................................................ 14 Origins of CIAs Analysis of the Soviet Union ................................................................. 17 Authors Comments: Donald Steury .................................................................................. 19 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. ORE 22-48, April 1948, Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action During 1948 ................................................................................................................. ORE 58-48, July 1948, The Strategic Value to the USSR of the Conquest of Western Europe and the Near East (to Cairo) Prior to 1950 ......................... ORE 22-48, September 1948, (Addendum) Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action During 1948-49 ..................................................................... ORE 46-49, May 1949, Possibility of Direct Soviet Military Action During 1949 ................................................................................................................. SE-16, October 1951, The Strength and Capabilities of Soviet Bloc Forces to Conduct Military Operations Against NATO .............................................. CIA Intelligence Report, March 1953, Intelligence on the Soviet Bloc ..........

21 22 25 29 33 35

Analyzing Soviet Politics and Foreign Policy ................................................................... 43 Authors Comments: Douglas Garthoff ............................................................................. 45 7. NIE 11-4-54, September 1954, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through Mid-1959 ............................................................................... 8. CIA/SRS-1, June 1956, The 20th CPSU Congress in Retrospect: Its Principal Issues and Possible Effects on International Communism ............. 9. NFAC/ORPA Memorandum for Director, 21 December 1961, An Appraisal of Soviet Intentions .......................................................................................... 10. NIE 11-69, February 1969, Basic Factors and Main Tendencies in Current Soviet Policy .................................................................................................... 11. NIE 11-72, April 1972, Soviet Foreign Policies and the Outlook for USSoviet Relations ...............................................................................................

46 50 67 85 88

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OPR Research Study, 1 October 1975, Changing Soviet Perceptions of World Politics and the USSRs International Role .......................................... 96 13. NFAC/ORPA Memorandum, 19 October 1978, The Impact of a Polish Pope on the USSR ..................................................................................................... 101 14. SNIE 11/2-81, May 1981, Soviet Support for International Terrorism and Revolutionary Violence ................................................................................... 105 15. SOVA Research Paper, December 1982, Soviet Society in the 1980s: Problems and Prospects .................................................................................. 108 16. Intelligence Assessment, February 1987, Gorbachevs Domestic Challenge: The Looming Problems ................................................................................... 111 CIAs Analysis of Soviet Science and Technology ........................................................... 115 Authors Comments: Clarence Smith ................................................................................. 117 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. Intelligence Memorandum No. 237, October 1949, Capabilities of the USSR in Air-to-Air Guided Missiles and Related Proximity Fuses ........................... 118 Scientific Intelligence Memorandum (SIM), December 1957, Future Soviet Earth Satellite Capabilities ............................................................................. 122 SIM, November 1958, Geophysical and Astrophysical Instrumentation of Soviet Sputniks I, II, and III ............................................................................. 125 NIE 11-5-59, September 1959, Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles ................................................................................................. 126 Memorandum, June 1964, The Soviet Reconnaissance Satellite Program ..... 136 NIE 11-8-64, October 1964, Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack ............ 142 NIE 11-3-65, November 1965, Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses ..... 150 NIE 11-67, June 1967, Soviet Military Research and Development ............... 153 Scientific and Technical Intelligence Report (STIR) 1391/64, March 1986, Soviet Laser Chemistry Research and Applications ........................................ 156 STIR, May 1986, Soviet Quest for Supercomputing Capabilities ................... 161 SWM 86-20036 Intelligence Memorandum, June 1986, The Krasnoyarsk Radar: Closing the Final Gap in Ballistic Missile Early Warning ................ 163 DI 86-10016, Intelligence Report, September 1986, The Soviets Weapon Industry: An Overview .................................................................................... 165 SWM 88-20026, Intelligence Memorandum, August 1988, US Stealth Programs and Technology: Soviet Exploitation of the Western Press ........... 169 SW 91-10069 Technical Intelligence Report, October 1991, The Flat Twin ABM Radar: Not as Capable as Previously Believed .................................... 170

12.

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Assessing Soviet Economic Performance ......................................................................... 171 Authors Comments: James Noren .................................................................................... 173 31. CIA/RR 53, December 1954, Long-Run Soviet Economic Growth ................ 174 32. CIA/RR 87, January 1957, The New Lands Program in the USSR ................. 177 33. CIA/ER 61-15, April 1961, Soviet Military Expenditures by Major Missions, 1958-65 ............................................................................................................ 187 34. ER IR 70-10, March 1970, Investment and Growth in the USSR ................... 190 35. ER IR 74-2, Intelligence Report, February 1974, Soviet Economic and Technological Benefits from Dtente .............................................................. 197 36. Memorandum, S-Project, 16 September 1975, The Soviet Grain Deficit ....... 200 37. ER 77-10147, Intelligence Memorandum, March 1977, The Impending Soviet Oil Crisis .............................................................................................. 205 38. ER 77-10436U, July 1977, Soviet Economic Problems and Prospects .......... 207 39. ER 77-10769, December 1977, Organization and Management in the Soviet Economy: The Ceaseless Search for Panaceas .............................................. 213 40. SOV 82-10120, Intelligence Assessment, August 1982, Outlook for the Siberia-to-Western Europe Natural Gas Pipeline ........................................... 219 41. SOV 87-10036X Intelligence Assessment, July 1987, Gorbachev: Steering the USSR into the 1990s .................................................................................. 221 Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and Capabilities ................................................. 227 Authors Comments: Raymond Garthoff ........................................................................... 229 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. SNIE 11-14-61, November 1961, The Soviet Strategic Military Posture, 1961-1967 ........................................................................................................ 230 NIE 11-14-62, December 1962, Capabilities of the Soviet Theater Forces ... 239 Intelligence Memorandum, April 1972, Soviet Defense Policy, 1962-1972 ... 245 SR RP73-1, June 1973, Soviet Nuclear Doctrine: Concepts of Intercontinental and Theater War ................................................................... 270 Paper, February 1976, The Track Record in Strategic Estimating: An Evaluation of the Strategic National Intelligence Estimates, 1966-1975 ....... 278 NI IIM 80-10017JX, October 1980, The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: Implications for Warning ................................................................................ 288 SOV 89-10031, April 1989, Intelligence Forecasts of Soviet Intercontinental Attack Forces: An Evaluation of the Record .................................................. 290 SR 81-10035X, April 1981, Intelligence Assessment, The Development of Soviet Military Power: Trends Since 1965 and Prospects for the 1980s ....... 295

Preface
Controversy over the performance of the Central Intelligence Agency during the Cold War has raged since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union. From its origins in 1947, the Agency had, as one of its major missions, the responsibility of analyzing and explaining the intentions and capabilities of the Soviet Union to US policymakers. It was a daunting task. A tightly controlled society, the Soviet Union presented CIA analysts with major challenges as they struggled to make sense of its political, economic, military, and scientific developments. CIA was not always correct in its analysis but the Agency, over the decades, made a unique contribution in helping US policymakers understand Americas major adversary. As a long time intelligence analyst, then Deputy Director for Intelligence, and finally Director of Central Intelligence, I spent much of my career watching and analyzing the Soviet Union. In my judgment, overall, the CIA performed admirably in meeting the challenges of assessing Soviet strengths and weaknesses. Others disagree. I have always believed that the record of actual intelligence assessments represents the best defense of CIAs and the Intelligence Communitys analytical performance vis--vis the USSR the good, the bad and the ugly. Thus, as DCI, I began the systematic process of declassifying intelligence assessments from the Cold War, beginning with all National Intelligence Estimates on the USSR. My successors have continued this process. This latest compilation of key documents from CIAs files and the related declassification and release of a large amount of new material on CIA analysis of the USSR will further help scholars and the public assess for themselves CIAs analytical performance during the Cold War. Making these materials available to everyone is a major step in furthering the dialogue. Researchers may now judge the accuracy of CIA forecasts and with that judgment gain deeper insight into the impact of CIA analysis on US policymakers. As a strong believer in government openness, I applaud this effort and look forward to continuing declassification and release programs by the Agency. Robert M. Gates, former Director of Central Intelligence

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Origins of CIAs Analysis of the Soviet Union Authors Comments: Donald Steury
Berlin, the political flashpoint of the early Cold War, was a catalyst for the development of a strategic analysis capability in CIA. The end of World War II found the Allies in an increasingly tenuous quadripartite occupation of the city, which was complicated by its position deep inside the Russian occupation zone. As the wartime alliance fragmented, the continued Western presence in Berlin assumed a growing importance to the stability of the Western alliance: first, as a concrete symbol of the American commitment to defend Western Europe; and, second, as a vital strategic intelligence base from which to monitor the growing Soviet military presence in Germany and Eastern Europe. The continued division of the city offered no such advantage to the Soviet Bloc. Inevitably, the Kremlin came to regard the Western garrisons in Berlin as a more-or-less permanent challenge to the legitimacy of Soviet rule in Germany and Eastern Europe. Consequently, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin initiated a series of provocations and military demonstrations early in 1948 in an apparent effort to force the Western Allies out of Berlin. By March, the US Military Governor in Germany, General Lucius D. Clay, was sufficiently alarmed to warn Washington of a subtle change in Soviet attitude whichgives me a feeling that (war) may come with dramatic suddenness.1 Clay apparently had intended only to warn the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) of the need for caution in Central Europe, but the telegram caused considerable alarm in Washington. At the behest of JCS Chairman General Omar N. Bradley, the supervisory Intelligence Advisory Committee ordered CIA to chair an ad hoc committee to examine the likelihood of war.2 The result was a series of three estimates (documents 1, 2, and 3) that examined and dismissed the possibility of a planned Soviet assault on Western Europe in 1948-1949, despite the escalating Soviet saber-rattling over Berlin. Although the estimates were brief, each reflected a relatively sophisticated and broadly-based understanding of Soviet national power. The analysis contained therein went beyond the military dimensions of the problem to analyze the political and economic implications of the issue. Together, the documents indicated a need for an independent analytical capability in Washington. A fourth estimate, ORE 58-48 (document 4) provided a comprehensive assessment of the Soviet Unions potential to wage war. A highly controversial estimate at the time, this document nonetheless further validated OREs role as a source of overarching analyses.

William R. Harris, The March Crisis of 1948, Act I, Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 10, No. 4, Fall 1966, p.7 (National Archives and Record Administration [NARA] Records Group 263). 2 Ibid., p.10.

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The Berlin crisis sharply demonstrated the need for regular review of Moscows war potential. With the reorganization of CIA in 1950-1951, this responsibility was formally given to the newly created Board of National Estimates (see SE-16, document 5). Throughout much of the 1950s, CIAs analysis of the Soviet Union continued to be hampered by the lack of solid intelligence on Soviet military developments. Until the first remote sensors (such as the U-2 and the CORONA reconnaissance satellites) were deployed, CIAs analysis often was based on fragmentary sources at best. An essential component of the reorganization of CIAs analysis was the comprehensive review of the available intelligence on the Soviet Union completed in 1953 (document 6).

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Analyzing Soviet Politics and Foreign Policy Authors Comments: Douglas Garthoff
The documents in this section were selected to reflect different kinds of products, including analytic memoranda as well as research studies, assessments, and estimates. Unfortunately absent is any product by analysts at the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, who produced some of the finest analysis on Soviet politics and policies. In the wake of Stalins death in 1953, CIA sought to understand Nikita Khrushchevs rise to power and the USSRs less rigid policies. NIE 11-4-54, the first of the comprehensive annual Soviet estimates supporting the regularized NSC policy process of the Eisenhower era, was safely wary: the USSR was being conciliatory for the time being but remained expansionist. In 1956, a Senior Research Staff on International Communism report found much to discuss regarding the startling 20th congress of the ruling Communist Party. In late 1961, Board of National Estimates chairman Sherman Kent covered the highlights of CIAs views on Soviet matters including the critical issue of Sino-Soviet differencesin an analytic memorandum prepared for a new Director of Central Intelligence, John McCone. The next two documents are broad estimates of Soviet policy that captured CIAs view of the period of Brezhnevs ascendancy as East-West dtente began to flower. NIE 11-69 was done as President Richard Nixon was taking office, and NIE 1172 as he was about to depart for his summit meeting in Moscow at which the initial SALT accords were signed. As America began to view dtente more skeptically by the mid-1970s, CIA expended much analytic effort trying to divine Soviet intentions. One CIA study of Soviet perceptions from this period depicted a more confident and powerful USSR conflicted between simultaneous desires for stability and for change. Another political analysis written in 1978 looked at the problems that the election of a Polish pope might cause for the USSR. With new and disturbing Soviet actions in Afghanistan and elsewhere influencing American thinking, and with the advent of the Reagan administration, a different tone entered CIAs analysis of Soviet policy. One estimate selected from the early 1980s took up concerns about Soviet support for international terrorism (a particular concern of new Director of Central Intelligence William Casey). The last two documents of CIA political analyses in this volume were efforts to interpret what Mikhail Gorbachev and his policies meant for the United States. The first was an estimate done just before President Reagans meeting in Reykjavik with the Soviet leader, and the other tried to foresee how Gorbachevs policy initiatives would affect the Soviet system and Soviet foreign policy. They demonstrate a timeless theme of CIAs analysis of the USSR: the struggle to understand and depict change in a country whose leaders could not themselves foresee the consequences of their decisions.

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&,$V $QDO\VLV RI 6RYLHW 6FLHQFH DQG 7HFKQRORJ\

CIAs Analysis of Soviet Science and Technology Authors Comments: Clarence Smith
By the 1950s it was clear that the USSR possessed both nuclear weapons and long-range delivery methods. But key questions remained for US policymakers. How advanced and how effective were these capabilities? Could they be used against the continental United States and its Allies on the USSRs periphery? The answers were fundamental to the US strategic deterrent position. Technical intelligence was the primary tool used to address these questions because the USSR, Eastern Europe, and China were denied areas that presented difficult challenges to traditional human and military reconnaissance collection. These countries were repressive police states that severely restricted internal movement and foreign contacts; they also had effective air defenses. This meant traditional espionage and reconnaissance methods were too limited to provide the access or the information needed by the West to monitor Soviet Bloc weapons and remote test sites. To counter this, the CIA and the Intelligence Community (IC) invented innovative collection approaches using remote sensors. A lack of hard intelligence was the key driver in developing US satellite imaging and signals intelligence collection systems. In addition to the actual technical collection, it was necessary to develop ways of deriving analytical results from the raw products of these new collection sources. The ICs challenge was not only to create new collection methods but to derive useful information from the data. The CIAs Office of Scientific Intelligence, and later the Directorate of Science & Technology (DS&T), led technical intelligence collection and analysis activities. Those who had been involved in analyzing activities such as the Berlin Tunnel taps of Soviet military headquarters in East Germany, formed the original nucleus. Also included were analytical components dealing with science, technology, and weapons. These analysts had to answer key questions about Soviet strategic weapons: How many weapons did the USSR have? What were their capabilities? Where were they located? The intelligence reports and estimates selected for this volume from the early 1950s through the mid-1980s reflect the impact of advancements in technical collection and analysis. NIE 11-5-59, Soviet Capabilities in Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles, reflects a basic agreement within the Intelligence Community on Soviet capabilities. By October 1964 (NIE 11-8-64), however, there were debates within the IC about Soviet ICBM capabilities and the number of deployed sites. These disagreements were primarily the result of the fact that, while the United States now had more data, there were now more opportunities for different interpretations of the information. Similarly, in the defensive missile area, IC analysts disagreed over Soviet ABM capabilities. NIE 11-3-65 addresses the beginning of the SAM upgrade issue. These strategic offensive and defensive missile concerns stayed in the forefront of the challenges facing IC analysts well into the 1970s. The selected documents reflect these issues.

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$VVHVVLQJ 6RYLHW (FRQRPLF 3HUIRUPDQFH

Assessing Soviet Economic Performance Authors Comments: James Noren

The CIA documents excerpted in this section illustrate the range of CIAs coverage of economic intelligence that supported US policymakers during the Cold War. The first document, Long-Run Soviet Economic Growth, used an innovative analytical approach to address a much-debated question in the 1950s-1960s. Soviet agriculture, the Achilles heel of Soviet economic development, was also an ongoing focus of CIA analysis. The New Lands Program in the USSR suggests the depth of research devoted to this subject. It was arguably the most important initiative of the 1950s. CIA work on Soviet military spending was necessary to research on the Soviet Gross National Product (GNP). US defense planners enthusiastically read such material, asking for disaggregated estimates like those in the third document, Soviet Military Expenditures by Major Missions, 1958-65. Monitoring Soviet crop prospects also attracted intense interest, especially after the USSR began to buy grain after poor harvests. The Soviet Grain Deficit is a typical report intended for the Washington audience. Searching for the causes of the slide in economic productivity, CIA tried to find alternative relations between output and inputs of labor and capital in the USSR. Investment and Growth in the USSR identifies one plausible source of the problem. CIA analysts also raised questions about the impact of technology transfer on Soviet capabilities during the Cold War. Soviet Economic and Technological Benefits from Dtente is an example of the many papers issued in response to this question. As a warning of the Soviet Unions impending descent into economic stagnation, Soviet Economic Problems and Prospects, issued in 1977, was a paper of first importance. Reprinted by the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, it set out the reasons why the Soviet economy was in trouble and why its future was so grim. In addition, CIA singled out problems in Soviet oil production as a major factor in the outlook for the economy. See the selection, The Impending Soviet Oil Crisis. The next document Organization and Management in the Soviet Economy: The Ceaseless Search for Panaceas, represents CIAs consistently negative appraisal of Soviet attempts at economic reform, one prong of Moscows efforts to jump-start the Soviet economy. CIAs involvement in heated policy issues was evident in the Reagan administrations determination to stop the Siberia-to-Western Europe gas pipeline. The Agencys unwelcome evaluation of the chances for success were set out in Outlook for Siberia-to-Western Europe Natural Gas Pipeline, a paper typical of the numerous assessments of various proposed sanctions and embargoes. The final selection, Gorbachev: Steering the USSR in the 1990s, described the impasse Gorbachevs economic policies reached by 1987, considered the options open to him, and concluded that he could be deposed because of failure to deliver on his promises.

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Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and Capabilities

Estimating Soviet Military Intentions and Capabilities Authors Comments: Raymond Garthoff

The documents in this volume dealing with CIAs analysis of military affairs during the Cold War were selected with several considerations in mind. First, they provide illustrative examples of analyses of Soviet intentions and military doctrine, as well as of military forces and capabilities. Second, they include materials on strategic forces and theater or general purpose forces for nuclear and non-nuclear warfare. For reasons of space, however, some subjects regrettably are not covered, such as Soviet naval forces and civil defense. Third, they provide a balance, including CIA Directorate of Intelligence analyses on current Soviet military affairs (and post-mortems on past analyses and estimates), as well as CIA-drafted National Intelligence Estimates forecasting future developments. Finally, the documents selected highlight new materials, omitting many relevant documents released earlier and published in previous collections. As a result, less attention is given to the 1960s and 1970s, and to the early period of concern over possible Soviet initiation of war in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the missile gap of the late 1950s, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Team B competitive analysis on strategic estimates in the late 1970s, and the end game of the Cold War in the late 1980s.

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Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency