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Air Leak Testing Prior to Commissioning

Question : "I need to commission a plant and intend to use low pressure air for leak testing. Can I pressurise lines through a pump? In other words, if a line runs from the bottom of a tank, through a pump, and into another tank, can the whole line from bottom outlet on 1st tank to the inlet on 2nd tank be tested at once? Or, is it necessary to test the line in two sections (before and after the pump)? Can the same be done when testing for leaks using vacuum?" ANSWER: "If you're commissioning a plant, you can use clean, regulated compressed air for leak testing. Of course, as you know, this will only show that the joints and other leak-prone areas do not leak at the testing temperature -not at the process temperatures which can be higher. What I have done in the past is applied masking tape around the flanges' gasketed joint with a small pin hole made afterwards. Then I use "soap and bubble" technology with a fine brush, searching for the tell-tale bubbles that reveal an air leak. If the flange joint leaks, the pin hole will form a soap bubble. Be aware that before you undertake to subject your process or unit to a pneumatic pressure, you should have a thorough and detailed knowledge of the lowest pressure rating in your pressurized system. You must be careful not to surpass the lowest pressure rating. For example, you may be using cast iron casings on your centrifugal pumps and these are normally rated well below the pressure rating of the connected piping. If some of the equipment is rated below the pipe, you can isolate the equipment and test the pipe on its own rating, followed by testing the equipment one-by-one. I have seen what a misguided pneumatic test can cause with a ruptured piece of equipment. That is why I am very, very cautious of pneumatic testing and would use it only if I were in control of all the procedures. I am particularly of any cast iron equipment. Cast iron pieces or components can have foundry defects or flaws and this can be devasting if they fail under a pneumatic test because the net effect is the same as a grenade exploding. That is why I prefer to test plant equipment hydrostatically - with water. The result of a hydrostatic test failure is benign compared with a pneumatic one. A vacuum test is safer but is difficult to detect leaks. The only practical measure you have is loss of the vacuum as witnessed on a sensitive pressure gauge. This takes time and patience. Again, while you can pneumatically test an entire unit at one time, take time and trouble to make sure you are in complete control as to the safe, rated pressure on each component in your system before applying air pressure. I would recommend that you use a 2-stage air regulator to set the test pressure. This is much more accurate and is considered safer that a single stage regulator.

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Diffusion
Diffusion is the spontaneous spreading of particles in a gas or liquid, or inside a solid material. The diffusion process is caused by the random thermal motion of the individual atoms, molecules or nanosized material particles. This process leads to a mixing of all gasses or liquids in direct contact, and is essential for all chemical and biological processes. The speed of the process increases with the temperature. If a droplet of ink is carefully injected into a glass of water, the size of the coloured region will increase with the square root of the time since injection (normal diffusion). In many natural processes there are some sort of memory effects which lead to an increase in the size of the region affected by the particle mixing which grows faster than the normal square root of time - called super-diffusion. Diffusion at a lower speed than normal is also possible, and this is called subdiffusion. Usually, any deviation from the normal behaviour may be called anomalous diffusion, and is not so unusual as was commonly believed. Understanding the effects of diffusion is of crucial importance in many industrial technologies. Diffusion and anomalous dffusion are central topics in many of the research projects within the Complex group. Examples are diffusion of: - water in clay particles, - magnetic flux vortices in superconductors, - colloidal microparticles in liquids and magnetic fluids, - biopolymer in water, and - adsorbed atoms on surfaces.

The concept of Brownian motion is closely related diffusion. Brownian motion is the random movements of microscopic particles in a gas or liquid. This motion is caused by the collision of the microparticle with the moving atoms of the surrounding medium. The first complete theory of Brownian motion was formulated by Albert Einstein in 1905 but still diffusion and Brownian motion are active research areas. Ideas from the theory of Brownian motion can even be used in economy.

The hazards you need know: Process Hazard Analysis (PHA)

Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) is a method to evaluate and identify credible hazardous scenarios. PHA is a thorough, orderly, systematic approach for identifying, evaluating, and controlling the hazards of processes involving hazardous chemicals. Based on most U.S. state and federal standards, an initial PHA must be performed on all covered processes. Thereafter all PHAs must be updated and revalidated, based on their completion date, at least every 5 years. The process hazard analysis methodology selected must be appropriate to the complexity of the process and must identify, evaluate, and control the hazards involved in the process. One or more of the following methods is used, as appropriate, to determine and evaluate the hazards of the process being analyzed:

What-if, Checklist, What-lf/checklist,

Hazard and operability study (HAZOP), Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), Fault tree analysis, or An appropriate equivalent methodology.

The PHA must address the following:

The hazards of the process; The identification of any previous incident that had a potential for catastrophic consequences in the workplace; Engineering and administrative controls applicable to the hazards and their interrelationships, such as appropriate application of detection methodologies to provide early warning of releases. Acceptable detection methods might include process monitoring and control instrumentation with alarms, and detection hardware such as hydrocarbon sensors; Consequences of failure of engineering and administrative controls; Facility siting; Human factors; and A qualitative evaluation of a range of the possible safety and health effects on employees in the workplace if there is a failure of controls.

The PHA is performed by a team with expertise in engineering and process operations. The PHA team should include at least one employee who has experience with and knowledge of the process being evaluated. One member of the team must be knowledgeable in the specific analysis methods being used. In performing a PHA, the first step is to define the purpose, scope and objectives of the study. The purpose defines why the PHA is being performed, e.g. to identify hazardous scenarios, to meet a regulatory requirement, etc. The scope defines the boundaries of the process being studied. The objectives define the expectations of the PHA results. Next step is amass all the pertinent Process Safety Information (PSI) [see The more you know: Process Safety Information (PSI)] and appropriate Standard Operating Procedures. To plan the PHA, the process is divided into smaller manageable sections. The PHA is conducted by identifying deviations from the design intent. The design intent includes values for operating conditions (e.g. temperature, pressure, flow, etc.), equipment (e.g. materials of construction, etc.) or external events (e.g. general loss of electrical power, etc.). There may be one or several causes of deviations. Causes are categorized as: 1.) Human Error, 2.) Equipment Failure or 3.) External Events. The team brainstorms and decides the credible causes of these deviations. If one of these deviations may occur, there are consequences that may result. The consequences may impact operability, quality or may be hazardous. Each scenario (deviation/cause

4 consequence combination) is evaluated further, particularly the hazardous scenarios. In evaluating these scenarios, existing safeguards are documented that prevent, detect or mitigate the scenarios. The team then determines if a recommendation is appropriate to prevent, detect or mitigate the scenarios. Explosion in a Salt Bath of a Synthetic Fiber Plant Synthetic fiber plants like Nylon and Polyester use a salt bath consisting of a mixture of sodium nitrate and sodium nitrite for cleaning metering pumps, spinnerette assemblies, valves, and fittings coming in contact with polymer melts. These accessories are placed in a hot salt bath for a specified time and the polymer melt sticking to the surfaces is dissolved via the oxidizing nature of this bath. After a specified time, the components are taken out and receive a final cold water wash before being placed back in service. The incident explained here relates to an explosion that took place while the cleaning of these accessories was in progress. Despite the best efforts of the management, one person involved in the accident died while the other escaped with serious burn injuries to both hands.

What Happened?
The plant had initiated an annual shutdown to its Polymerization plant. Due to the inherent nature of the polymer melt, jacketed steam valves are provided to ensure fluidity of the melt. One such valve was removed for cleaning and boxup before resuming polymerization as a part of the planned shutdown activities. This large valve was lowered into the salt bath via a thick metallic wire. As soon as the valve contacted the saltbath, there was a loud explosion followed by spraying of the hot salt bath liquid through the openings of the transparent shutters enclosing the exhaust hood. Two people, one operator and his supervisor, were in the path of the hot solution spray. Both sustained around 50% burns and the men were immediately transported to a nearby medical facility with a burn unit. After a week the operator expired and the supervisor had to undergo a series of plastic surgeries to his hands for almost an year.

How It Happened
As per standard operating procedure, the piping on the jacket portion of these valves are to be blinded before cleaning. Upon inspection of this valve after explosion, the ruptured gaskets were hanging on the flange bolts on both the sides of this valve.

What Went Wrong?

The fitter who carried out the blinding of the inlet and outlet flanges on the steam jacket had exhausted the metallic gaskets specified for blinding such jacketed valves. To ensure that there was no time delay in handing over this valve, he put asbestos gaskets to the two flanges and sent it for cleaning. The oversight was not corrected prior to cleaning the valve.

The Investigation and Analysis

The large jacketed valve was heated with steam at 5.5 kg/cm2 (approx. 80 psig). The trapped condensate in the jacket had not been drained fully. With blinds on both the sides, the condensate flashed when placed in the bath. The specific volume changed from 915 kg/m3 to 2.67 kg/m3, increasing almost 350 times resulting in an abnormal rise in pressure. The asbestoss gaskets could not withstand such a huge rise in pressure and burst open. This sonic boom waves carried along with it the hot saltbath liquid spraying all over the two victims.

Lesson Learned
Never compromise on design specifications even with a minor item like a gasket. It can mean serious consequences. Never bypass any safety procedures. In this case,the transparent shutter was kept partially open and the hot liquid came out through this opening. Preparation of checklists and ensuring compliance is an important activity in any shutdown. Such checklists prepared by an operator/technician have to be verified by a supervisor and authorized by a competent authority before proceeding.

Passivation of Stainless Steel

Passivation describes the treating of a metal with a mild oxidant (such as nitric acid) to remove surface iron or iron compounds by dissolution. This action forms a protective passive film on the surface of the metal. The trace iron left behind from machining and fabrication can provide sites for corrosion if left untreated. The process is performed by first cleaning the surface with solvents or an alkaline solution to remove organic or metallic residues. Next, the parts are placed into passivation solutions. The choice for this solution is usually nitric acid. The process is controlled by three key variables: time, temperature, and concentration.

6 Typical Range of Key Variables Time: 20-120 minutes Temperature: 60 - 160 0F Concentration: 20 - 50% Nitric Acid by volume The key variables are typically determined by the type of stainless steel alloy being processed. For example, 316 stainless steel would have different conditions than 317L stainless steel. After the passivation bath, a sodium dichromate bath is often used to promote the formation of a chromic oxide film. After this final treatment, the sample is placed into a copper sulfate solution. Any remaining iron will show up as pink spots on the sheet. This would be considered unacceptable. Other testing methods can include a two hour salt spray or a 24 hour high humidity test