JOURNAL OF CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY, 15(4), 295306 Copyright 2005, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.

ASHWORTH, DARKE, SCHALLER NO ONE WANTS TO LOOK CHEAP

No One Wants to Look Cheap: Trade-Offs Between Social Disincentives and the Economic and Psychological Incentives to Redeem Coupons
Laurence Ashworth
Queens University

Peter R. Darke
University of British Columbia

Mark Schaller
University of British Columbia

Existing research on price deals has largely demonstrated positive financial and nonfinancial consequences of obtaining a deal. In contrast, the research reported here suggests that certain price dealsin this case, couponscan also produce negative social consequences, such as creating an impression of cheapness or stinginess. Decisions to redeem coupons are shown to involve a trade-off between the social incentives to avoid coupons and competing economic and psychological incentives to redeem coupons. Consumers strategically adjusted their decision in response to factors that changed the relative strength of these incentives; specifically, they avoided coupons when they were concerned that coupon use would lead to negative social consequences but redeemed coupons when the circumstances reduced these concerns. Although decisions to refuse a coupon might violate principles of economic rationality, it is argued that such decisions are nevertheless functional as they serve important social goals. In this sense, it can be smarter for consumers to forgo a deal rather than obtain one.

Traditional economic theory suggests that consumers are interested in price deals primarily because of the financial incentives involved. A rational consumer should always choose to pay less money for a particular good, so long as the amount saved is large enough to offset any tangible costs (Stigler, 1950). In addition to these obvious utilitarian considerations, consumer researchers have identified a number of psychological benefits associated with price deals. For example, Thaler (1985) suggested that consumers may derive some positive utility from the price deal itself (transaction utility) in addition to the utility associated with obtaining the product at a particular price (acquisition utility). Other research has shown that consumers who receive a price deal may infer they are smart shoppers (Schindler, 1998) or may enjoy other hedonic benefits (e.g., Chandon, Wansink, & Laurent, 2000;
Requests for reprints should be sent to, Laurence Ashworth, Queens School of Business, Queens University, 143 Union Street, Kingston, Ontario, K7L 3N6, Canada. E-mail: lashworth@business.queensu.ca

Honea & Dahl, 2005). In short, there appear to be both economic and psychological rewards associated with price deals. This research adds to the literature by investigating the alternative possibility that price deals can sometimes be accompanied by social costs. Specifically, we predicted that consumers are concerned about the negative social impression that coupon use can convey and that such impressions do in fact carry a number of negative social consequences. This means that decisions to procure price deals can involve a conflict between the economic and psychological rewards and the social costs that attend a deal. This research was designed to examine the nature of these social costs and the conditions under which consumers will pursue or avoid price deals. We examined consumers decisions in the context of impression-management theory (Tedeschi, 1981). According to this theory, individuals often engage in behavior that is designed to create or avoid particular images to portray the self in a socially positive light (Leary, 1995; Schlenker, 1980).

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We argue that consumers are often concerned about using coupons because they believe this can convey the negative impression of appearing cheap or stingy. To the extent that consumers wish to avoid conveying such impressions, there is a social disincentive to use coupons. In contrast, there are economic and psychological incentives to the contrary, which means consumers have to trade off these competing interests. Consumers decisions should therefore be influenced by conditions that affect the relative strength of these competing social, economic, and psychological considerations. In particular, we predicted that consumers will avoid coupons when their use is particularly likely to convey a negative impression and when the cost of such evaluations is especially high. In contrast, consumers should be more likely to redeem coupons when the potential social costs are attenuated or the economic incentive is sufficiently large. Four studies are presented that largely supported these predictions. Our findings add to the promotion literature by suggesting that getting a deal can lead to both positive (smart shopper) and negative (cheap shopper) self-perceptions. Moreover, concerns about the negative perceptions generated by coupon use can be strong enough to cause a large proportion of consumers to avoid coupons, despite the financial benefits provided by coupon redemption. We argue that although the decision to forgo a coupon may seem economically irrational, this decision may nonetheless be adaptive because it allows consumers to satisfy important social goals: in this case, maintaining good impressions and fostering positive social interactions. Our studies highlight the need to distinguish conceptually between consumer decisions that are erroneous because they violate principles of economic rationality and decisions that are more socially adaptive where utilitarian benefits are sacrificed in favor of satisfying more important social goals (e.g., Bagozzi, 2000; Bagozzi & Dholakia, 1999).

low (Darke & Chung, in press). A rational consumer should refuse price deals when the amount saved is insufficient to offset economic costs, such as time and effort or low product quality (Stigler, 1950, 1970; Thaler, 1985). Besides these utilitarian costs and benefits, other research has demonstrated that there are a number of psychological benefits associated with price deals. For instance, consumers who receive a price deal might infer that they are smart shoppers (Schindler, 1989, 1998), or responsible buyers (Mittal, 1994). Chandon et al. (2000) further argued that such attributions can serve important value-expressive functions. Consistent with Katz (1960; see also Shavitt, 1990), they proposed that sales promotions may be valued partly because getting a deal allows the consumer to communicate economic savvy, or gain social recognition as a good shopper (Bagozzi, Baumgartner, & Yi, 1992; Shimp & Kavas, 1984). In addition, consumers appear to derive some transaction utility from price deals that is related to perceptions that the price was fair (Darke & Dahl, 2003; Thaler, 1985). Finally, price deals can also provide hedonic benefits, such as amusement (e.g., contests or scratch n win promotions), or the opportunity to try new products on the market (Chandon et al., 2000). Overall, the existing research has identified a number of positive economic, psychological, and social incentives related to getting a price deal. In contrast to this research, we argue that there can also be social costs associated with obtaining a price deal that relate to consumers impression-management goals. Specifically, we suggest that saving money can sometimes lead to negative social perceptions by making consumers appear to be cheap or stingy. These costs directly contradict consumers economic goals, meaning consumers have to trade off competing social and economic interests when deciding whether to use a coupon.

PRICE DEALS AND IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT Impression-management theory (Leary, 1995; Tedeschi, 1981) suggests that consumers will strategically adjust their behavior to convey a positive social image. Positive social impressions promote rewarding social interactions (Chen, Shechter, & Chaiken, 1996), and positive social feedback serves as an important source of self-esteem (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). Moreover, effective impression management helps consumers to avoid negative feelings, such as embarrassment, that result from failing to maintain a desired image (Dahl, Manchanda, & Argo, 2001; Edelmann, 1981; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000). We predicted that coupon use can convey a negative impression of cheapness and stinginess because it can undermine positive impressions of financial wealth and a willingness to use or share that wealth. There is evidence that financial wealth is related to an individuals desirability (especially men; Kenrick, Sundie, Nicastle, & Stone, 2001), and wealthy indi-

BACKGROUND Perhaps the most apparent incentive for procuring a price deal is the monetary saving. Rational consumers should always prefer lower prices over higher prices for any identical good. Consistent with this, the larger the perceived price deal, the more likely consumers are to make a purchase (Raghubir, 1998). Price deals can also provide other utilitarian benefits for consumers. For example, consumers may be able to purchase a product of higher quality than they could otherwise afford (Chandon et al., 2000). Moreover, the size of a price deal can provide useful information relating to the chance of finding a lower priced product (Darke, Freedman, & Chaiken, 1995). There can also be economic costs associated with price deals. For instance, the effort required by consumers to get the price deal might be high (Stigler, 1970), or a price deal may signal to consumers that product quality is

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viduals, especially wealthy men, tend to be considered more attractive than less wealthy individuals (Buss & Shackelford, 1997). Furthermore, consumers sometimes spend exorbitant amounts of money on products to convey an impression of wealth (Belk, 1988; Solomon, 1983), and they may even deliberately exaggerate the value of their possessions to this end (Sengupta, Dahl, & Gorn, 2002). This suggests that financial wealth and the use or sharing of that wealth is generally regarded positively and may even confer adaptive advantages, such as attracting and retaining romantic partners (Buss & Shackelford, 1997; Leary, 1995). Consequently, we predicted that behavior that undermines these impressions is likely to lead to negative attributions of cheapness and stinginess and may lead to a number of negative social consequences, such as appearing less attractive or likable in the eyes of others. Consumers who are concerned about the impression they create, and are aware of the negative impressions coupon use can generate, may therefore choose to avoid using coupons. This leads to the following two hypotheses: H1: Coupon use will lead to elevated self-perceptions of cheapness compared with nonuse. H2: Observers will consider coupon users cheaper than nonusers and will consequently find them less attractive and less desirable. We argue that coupon redemption is especially likely to undermine impressions of wealth because it represents a deliberate and socially observable attempt to save money. Unlike other price promotions, coupon use involves a series of unambiguous behaviors on the part of the consumer designed to culminate in a monetary saving. Consumers have to find a coupon, cut it out, and bring it to the store before they can finally redeem it. Moreover, consumers typically redeem coupons in public settings, where other individuals can easily observe this behavior. In contrast, regular price discounts provide less evidence that a product was chosen to save moneythere are a multitude of other reasons a consumer may have chosen to purchase a discounted product. This suggests that regular price discounts are less likely than coupons to be perceived as deliberate attempts to save money. H3: Price reductions obtained in the form of a coupon will lead to elevated perceptions of cheapness relative to a regular price discount.

them. One objective of this research is to delineate conditions that affect the relative strength of these incentives. The social disincentive to redeem coupons is predicated on consumers impression-management concerns. These concerns should be affected by both the likelihood of creating a negative impression as well as the extent to which consumers are motivated to avoid creating such an impression. We have argued that coupon use creates an impression of cheapness because it can convey a deliberate attempt to save money. Therefore, coupon use should be less likely to create a negative impression when consumers appear less personally responsible for the coupon (consistent with the attributional logic of Kelley, 1973), as well as in private (vs. public) situations, where coupon users are less likely to be observed (Arkin, Applebaum, & Berger, 1980). We therefore predicted the following: H4: Consumers will be more likely to redeem a coupon when they appear less personally responsible for the coupon because it is less likely they will generate attributions of cheapness. H5: Consumers will be more likely to redeem coupons in private (vs. public) situations because they are less likely to convey an impression of cheapness to observers. The social disincentive to redeem coupons should also increase as consumers motivation to impression-manage increases, such as when individuals are interested in establishing a romantic relationship (Schlenker, 1980). Conversely, consumers should be more likely to redeem coupons when the motivation to impression-manage is reduced, such as when individuals are in the presence of an established friend (Bohra & Pandy, 1984; Hendricks & Brickman, 1974). H6: Consumers will be more likely to use a coupon in the presence of an established friend (vs. a romantic partner) because it is less important to create a positive impression in this case. In contrast, there are economic and psychological incentives to redeem coupons. As these incentives increase, the trade-off should favor coupon redemption. H7: Redemption rates should increase as the value of the coupon increases. As noted, previous research suggests that one important psychological benefit of price promotions is self-attributions of smartness (Schindler, 1989, 1998). However, when price promotions entail both positive and negative consequences, it is not always clear that consumers will consider it smart to obtain a bargain. Rather, we predicted that consumers perceptions of smartness will reflect both the positive economic consequences of a bargain and any negative social conse-

TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN SOCIAL DISINCENTIVES AND ECONOMIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INCENTIVES TO REDEEM COUPONS In the context of price deals, there are economic (e.g., Raghubir, 1998) and psychological (e.g., Schindler, 1998) incentives to redeem coupons and social incentives to avoid

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quences that might ensue. Consequently, perceptions of smartness should vary according to the relative strength of the economic and social consequences. This leads to the following hypotheses: H8: The cheaper consumers feel using a coupon, the less smart they will feel doing so. H9: Consumers will feel smarter using the coupon when the social disincentive to redeem the coupon is reduced or the economic incentive is increased. This is likely to occur when consumers appear less personally responsible for the coupon (H4), when redemption is done in private (H5), when consumers are less motivated to impression-manage (H6), and when the value of the coupon is increased (H7).

STUDY 1: SELF-PERCEPTIONS OF COUPON USE AND DISCOUNTS Study 1 was designed to examine consumers self-perceptions of coupon use. Participants read a scenario that described a first date at a restaurant at which they paid for the meal and either used a coupon, received a regular price discount, or paid full price. We predicted that coupon use would be more likely than nonuse to generate self-perceptions of cheapness (H1). Furthermore, regular price discounts differ from coupons in that they accompany a purchase without any additional action on the part of the consumer. Consequently, discounts are less likely to convey a deliberate attempt to save money and should therefore be less likely to lead to self-attributions of cheapness (H3).

OVERVIEW OF THIS RESEARCH To examine these predictions, we conducted a series of studies using coupon use scenarios. The scenario studies were set in the context of a first date at a restaurant. This is a consumer context in which coupon-based promotions are common and can confer reasonably large monetary rewards. It is also a social context that is both public and interpersonally meaningful and so is likely to inspire impression-management concerns. Moreover, this situation is sufficiently familiar to research participants that their responses to the hypothetical scenarios are likely to offer a reasonable indication of their responses in real-life situations (Robinson & Clore, 2001). Study 1 demonstrated that coupon use was more likely to generate self-attributions of cheapness than either nonuse (H1) or regular price discounts of an equivalent value (H3). Moreover, the cheaper consumers felt using the coupon, the less smart they felt it was to do so (H8). Study 2 showed that coupon use actually led to unfavorable social consequences by lowering evaluations of the consumer in the eyes of others (H2). This suggests there may be real social costs to using coupons and therefore that it may be reasonable to avoid them. In Study 3 we experimentally manipulated elements of the situation that lowered attributions of personal responsibility for coupons. This reduced self-perceptions of cheapness and increased redemption rates (H4). When self-perceptions of cheapness were reduced, consumers felt smarter using the coupon (H9). Finally, Study 4 showed that both the likelihood of creating a negative impression (H5) and consumers motivation to impression-manage (H6) were important determinants of coupon usage. Moreover, consumers felt smarter using the coupon when the situation meant it was less likely to create a negative impression (H9). Contrary to expectations, the value of the coupon had little demonstrable effect on decisions to redeem coupons (H7), perhaps in part because it was insufficient to compensate for the negative impression created.

Method One hundred ten students (34 men and 76 women) were recruited in return for course credit. Participants were presented with a dating scenario in which they imagined going on a first date with someone of the opposite sex. Participants were told to imagine that they had asked a close friend to arrange a date with a person whom they had seen around school a few times. They met at a coffee shop for a drink and then proceeded to a restaurant for dinner. They had previously seen a recommendation for the restaurant in the local newspaper. It was explained that the dinner went well and that participants offered to pay for the meal as they had initiated the date. Three versions of the scenario were created that corresponded to the full-price, coupon use, and regular price discount conditions. In the full-price condition, the scenario stated that participants paid $40 for the meal (no discount of any sort was mentioned). The ending read as follows:
The dinner goes well. The food is excellent and you and Jackie [Michael] have a good conversation. You think to yourself how much youve enjoyed spending time with Jackie [Michael], and you suspect that you will see her [him] again. Once youve eaten dinner, you tell Jackie [Michael] that youre paying since you initiated the date. The waiter brings the bill, which totals $40.

In the coupon use condition, an additional section was included that described participants use of a coupon:
You happen to remember that you have a coupon in your wallet that you clipped a few days ago, when you first saw the advertisement for the restaurant in the local paper. The coupon is for 10% off the price of the dinner, which means you save $4. Imagine that when the waiter brings the bill, you decide to use the coupon.

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In the discount condition, this ending was modified to describe a regular price discount:
You happen to remember when you first saw the advertisement for the restaurant in the local paper that they are having a promotion this week. When the waiter brings the bill he explains that there is 10% off the price of the dinner, which means you save $4.

After participants read the scenario, they completed several measures of their self-perceptions. Three items were designed to capture perceptions of cheapness ( = .85). Participants rated the extent to which they perceived themselves to be cheap, stingy, and generous, along 7-point scales from 1 (not at all cheap/not at all stingy/not at all generous) to 7 (cheap/stingy/generous); generous was reverse scored. An additional three items were designed to capture perceptions of smartness (smart, rational, and resourceful; = .81). Participants in the coupon and discount conditions also completed a two-item manipulation check assessing perceptions of personal responsibility for the price reduction ( = .84). An additional set of measures was given only to the participants in the coupon condition. These participants were asked to consider an alternative, counterfactual situation in which they had the coupon but chose not to use it when paying for the restaurant meal. They then completed additional measures of cheapness and smartness, based on this alternative decision. Results The manipulation check showed only a main effect of experimental condition on attributions of responsibility, F(1, 71) = 13.03, p < .001. As expected, participants were less likely to feel personally responsible for the discount than for the coupon (Ms = 3.92 vs. 5.24). Analyses of the cheapness and smartness measures were conducted with 3 (payment method: full price vs. coupon use vs. discount) 2 (gender) between-subjects analyses of variance (ANOVAs). There was a main effect of experimental condition on self-perceptions of cheapness, F(2, 104) = 33.62, p < .001. Consistent with H1 and H3, coupon use led to higher ratings of cheapness compared with either the discount or full-price conditions (Ms = 4.63 vs. 3.03 and 2.27, ps < .001). The discount also appeared to lead to somewhat elevated ratings of cheapness compared with the full-price condition (Ms = 3.03 vs. 2.27, p < .05), perhaps because participants felt there was a chance they could be viewed as having chosen that restaurant in order to obtain the discount (the scenario did explain that they had read about the discount beforehand). No other effects on the cheapness measure were significant. There were no statistically significant effects on perceptions of smartness (Fs < 1). However, consistent with H8, there was a negative correlation between perceptions of cheapness and smartness for participants in the coupon con-

dition (r = .46, p < .01). Overall, these results indicated that coupons were particularly likely to generate self-perceptions of cheapness and that the cheaper participants felt using the coupon, the less smart they felt it was to do so. Additional analyses focused just on participants in the coupon-use condition. These participants completed the cheapness and smartness measures twice (once assuming that they had used the coupon and again assuming they had not used the coupon). The results provide an additional within-subject test of the hypothesis that there is a social stigma that attends coupon use. A 2 (coupon use: use vs. nonuse) 2 (gender) repeated measures ANOVA of the cheapness measure revealed a main effect of coupon use, F(1, 41) = 66.04, p < .001. Consistent with H1, participants felt cheaper using the coupon than not using it (Ms = 4.63 vs. 2.12). Conceptually similar effects were obtained on the smartness measure. A weak main effect of coupon use, F(1, 41) = 3.09, p = .086, revealed that participants felt somewhat smarter using the coupon than not using it (Ms = 4.70 vs. 4.21). This effect was further qualified by a statistically significant interaction with gender, F(1, 41) = 5.88, p < .05, that indicated that only women felt smarter using the coupon (M = 4.93 vs. 3.75), F(1, 41) = 11.75, p < .001. Men appeared to feel equally smart whether they used the coupon or not (M = 4.48 vs. 4.67, F < 1). Discussion Consistent with the framework developed in this article, it appears that there are incentives to both use and avoid coupons. There is always an economic incentive to redeem the coupon (especially when there are no additional costs associated with redemption). However, coupon use also appears to generate attributions of cheapness. This trade-off is illustrated by consumers perceptions of smartness. There was no evidence that coupon use was considered smarter than paying full price (contrary to smart-shopper predictions). Moreover, the cheaper consumers felt using the coupon, the less smart they felt. Together, these results suggest that consumers have mixed feelings about coupon use. Decisions to redeem coupons are therefore likely to entail a conflict between economic incentives and social disincentives to use them. In Studies 3 and 4 we directly examined the impact of these trade-offs on the decision to use a coupon. The results of this study also suggest that coupons can be more stigmatizing and generate more negative self-perceptions than standard discounts that connote less apparent effort and forethought. One of the potential problems with coupon redemption is that it makes it clear that the consumer has undertaken a series of actions designed to save money. An advantage that other types of discounts offer over coupons is that they are less clear in connoting volition and planning and so are less likely to generate attributions of consumer stinginess. Of course, there may be situations in which it is more obvious that consumers are trying to avail them-

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selves of a discount (e.g., rummaging through a bargain bin). Under these circumstances, discounts might be just as likely to lead to perceptions of cheapness as coupons.

STUDY 2: HOW ARE COUPON USERS ACTUALLY PERCEIVED? Although coupon use inspires self-perceptions of cheapness, it is not clear that it will actually result in negative social consequences. In Study 2, we examined the possibility that coupon use leads to a number of negative social consequences and that decisions to avoid coupons may therefore be functional in terms of accomplishing important social goals. In the context of a first date, it is presumably important to convey a positive impression and make oneself seem attractive to the date. In this study, we examined observers reactions to coupon users. Men and women were presented with the same basic scenario used in Study 1; however, this time participants were asked to imagine they were the ones who had been asked out on a first date. As before, they went to a restaurant for dinner, except this time their date paid for the meal. The experimental manipulation consisted of whether their date used a coupon when he or she paid for the meal. Method Ninety students (36 men and 54 women) participated in return for credit toward their introductory marketing course. Participants were presented with a scenario in which they were asked on a first date to a restaurant. In half of the cases, their date paid using a coupon that reduced the price of the meal by 10%. In the remaining cases, their date paid the full price (no mention was made of any coupon). After participants read the scenario, they completed several measures to assess their reactions. In this context, there were two social consequences of particular importance: (a) participants desire to see their date again and (b) their attraction to their date. Consequently, participants completed measures of the likelihood they would want to go on a second date, on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all likely) to 7 (very likely), and their attraction to their date, ranging from 1 (not at all attracted/uninterested/displeased/dislike/negative) to 7 (attracted/interested/pleased/like/positive), = .93. Finally, participants completed the cheapness measure used in Study 1. Results Analyses of the likelihood of a second date, attraction, and cheapness measures were conducted with 2 (coupon use: date used coupon vs. date paid full price) 2 (gender) between-subjects ANOVAs. The results revealed a main effect of coupon use on all of the measures, Fs(1, 86) = 18.67,

13.72, and 14.83, respectively, ps < .001. Participants indicated they would be less likely to go on a second date with someone who used a coupon (Ms = 5.67 vs. 6.53), they were less attracted to them (Ms = 5.47 vs. 6.11), and they judged them to be cheaper than a date who did not use a coupon (Ms = 2.94 vs. 2.06). Gender had some effects as well. A statistically significant main effect of gender emerged on the attraction measure, F(1, 86) = 4.64, p < .05, indicating that male participants were generally more attracted to their date than female participants (Ms = 5.98 vs. 5.60). There was also a statistically significant Gender Condition interaction on the cheapness measure, F(1, 86) = 6.60, p < .05, that indicated that coupon use exerted stronger effects on perceptions of their dates cheapness for female participants (Ms = 3.29 vs. 1.83), F(1, 86) = 25.88, p < .001, than male participants (Ms = 2.58 vs. 2.29, F < 1). No other gender effects were significant. Mediation analyses revealed that perceived cheapness mediated the effect of coupon use on both attraction and likelihood of a second date. Separate regression analyses showed that coupon use predicted cheapness ( = .42, p < .001), attraction ( = .37, p < .001), and the likelihood of a second date ( = .44, p < .001). When both cheapness and coupon use were used to predict attraction, the effect of coupon use was no longer significant ( = .12, p > .15). When both cheapness and coupon use were used to predict likelihood of a second date, the effect of coupon use remained significant ( = .26, p < .01). However, the indirect effect of coupon use on likelihood via cheapness was also significant (Sobel statistic = 3.10, p < .01; Baron & Kenny, 1986; Sobel, 1982). Discussion In the context of a first date at a restaurant, coupon use led to a number of negative social consequences: Users were perceived to be less attractive, were less likely to inspire interest in a continued relationship, and tended to be considered cheaper. Thus, it appears that decisions to avoid coupons may sometimes be functional in the sense that they avoid these negative social consequences despite the fact such decisions are economically suboptimal. It also appeared that men who used coupons were judged to be cheaper than women who did the same, perhaps in part because of normative expectations that it should be men who pay for the meal on a first date. Nonetheless, women who used coupons suffered the same negative social consequences as men, namely, they were considered less attractive and less desirable.

STUDY 3: ATTRIBUTIONS RELATING TO CHEAPNESS The previous studies show that coupon use led to elevated perceptions of cheapness and inspired a number of negative

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social consequences. These studies further suggest that there was some conflict between consumers economic goals (saving money) and their social goals (appearing in a positive light), as neither coupon use nor nonuse appeared to constitute a clearly smarter alternative. However, the effect of the social disincentive and economic incentive to redeem coupons on consumers decisions has not yet been experimentally examined. The final two studies address this issue. The purpose of Study 3 was to examine consumers decisions in a context that attenuated the social disincentive to redeem coupons. Hypothesis 4 predicted that when consumers appear less personally responsible for a coupon, usage will be less likely to generate self-attributions of cheapness and will lead to an increase in redemption rates. Study 1 provided evidence consistent with this hypothesis, that discounts (for which consumers were considered less personally responsible) generated fewer self-attributions of cheapness than coupons. However, the coupon-discount manipulation was not a direct manipulation of personal responsibility. In Study 3, personal responsibility was directly manipulated by varying the source of the coupon. In one condition, the source of the coupon was internal (i.e., presented by the participant). In the other condition, the source of the coupon was external (i.e., presented by the merchant). Coupon use should be less likely to generate self-attributions of cheapness in the external condition and therefore should be more likely to occur. Method Seventy-one students (32 men and 39 women) participated in return for credit toward their introductory marketing course. Participants were presented with the same first-date scenario used in Study 1. At the end of the scenario, a manipulation was introduced that pertained to the origin of the coupon. In one condition (identical to the coupon use condition in Study 1), participants brought the coupon to the restaurant themselves, having clipped it earlier from a newspaper advertisement (internal source condition). In the other condition, participants had no coupon at the time they entered the restaurant but were presented with one by the waiter when he brought the bill (external source condition). The primary dependent variable was whether participants decided to use the coupon. (An additional sentence was included informing participants that if they chose not to use the coupon, they could save it and use it at some future time.) Participants also completed a measure in which they rated the likelihood that they would use the coupon on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (definitely would not use it) to 6 (definitely would use it). Measures of cheapness and smartness also were completed. Two sets of cheapness and smartness ratings were made: Participants completed one set of ratings following their actual choice and another set following instructions to imagine a counterfactual alternative in which they made the opposite choice. These ratings were used to calculate cheapness and smartness scores assuming consumers had

used the coupon and assuming they had not used it (within-subject assumed-usage factor). In addition, participants completed a single-item attributional manipulation check designed to assess the extent to which they felt use of the coupon was a result of their own actions on a 6-point scale, ranging from 1 (not due to my actions) to 6 (totally due to my actions). Results The manipulation check showed only a main effect of experimental condition on attributions of responsibility, F(1, 67) = 47.31, p < .001, that indicated participants were less likely to make an internal attribution for use of the coupon when it was provided by the waiter (Ms = 3.06 vs. 5.78). Overall, 45% of participants redeemed the coupon; however, this redemption rate varied greatly depending on the experimental condition, 2(1, N = 71) = 25.98, p < .001. As expected, more participants used the coupon when the waiter brought it (77%) than when they had clipped it themselves (16%). The same effect occurred on the rated likelihood of using the coupon: Participants were more likely to use the coupon when the waiter brought it than when they clipped it themselves (Ms = 4.93 vs. 2.32), F(1, 66) = 64.07, p < .001. There was also a main effect of gender, F(1, 66) = 4.53, p < .05, that indicated that men were less likely than women to use the coupon (Ms = 3.28 vs. 3.97). The decision measures, broken down by experimental condition, and the cheapness and smartness measures, broken down by experimental condition and assumed usage (assumed use vs. assumed nonuse), are presented in Table 1. The cheapness and smartness measures were analyzed with 2 (source of coupon: waiter vs. consumer) 2 (assumed usage: assumed coupon use vs. assumed nonuse) 2 (gender) ANOVAs, where assumed usage served as a within-subject factor and source and gender were between-subjects factors. As expected, there was a main effect of assumed usage on
TABLE 1 Study 3: Effect of Source of Coupon on Decisions to Redeem Coupons, Personal Responsibility, and Attributions of Cheapness and Smartness Assuming the Coupon Was Used and Assuming It Was Not Used Experimental Condition Consumer Clipped Coupon 16 2.02 4.86 4.49 3.26 4.30 Waiter Provided Coupon 76 4.93 3.30 5.44 3.15 3.46

Variable Percentage use Likelihood of use Assumed use Cheapness Smartness Assumed nonuse Cheapness Smartness

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cheapness, F(1, 67) = 26.52, p < .001, that indicated that coupon use was associated with greater cheapness than nonuse (Ms = 4.11 vs. 3.00). This was qualified by a significant Source of Coupon Assumed Usage interaction, F(1, 67) = 8.06, p < .001, that indicated that coupon use was perceived to be cheaper than nonuse when participants had clipped the coupon themselves (Ms = 4.77 vs. 3.04), F(1, 67) = 33.85, p < .001, but not when the coupon was provided by the waiter (Ms = 3.46 vs. 2.96), F(1, 67) = 2.52, p > .10. Consistent with H4, an additional analysis indicated that coupon use was considered cheaper when participants had clipped the coupon themselves than when it was brought by the waiter (Ms = 4.77 vs. 3.46), F(1, 67) = 16.73, p < .001. There was also a main effect of assumed usage on smartness, F(1, 67) = 30.04, p < .001, that indicated that coupon use was associated with higher ratings of smartness than nonuse (Ms = 4.97 vs. 3.88). This effect was also qualified by experimental condition, F(1, 67) = 20.42, p < .001. Coupon use was associated with higher smartness ratings than nonuse when the waiter provided the coupon (Ms = 5.44 vs. 3.46), F(1, 67) = 47.27, p < .001, but not when participants had clipped the coupon themselves (Ms = 4.49 vs. 4.30, F < 1). In direct support of H9, an additional analysis indicated that coupon use was considered smarter when it was provided by the waiter than when participants had clipped it themselves (Ms = 5.44 vs. 4.49), F(1, 67) = 19.00, p < .001. Consistent with H8, there was a negative correlation between perceptions of cheapness and smartness (r = .42, p < .001) that provided further evidence that participants considered the social consequences of their decision when judging its smartness. A mediation analysis was conducted to examine whether the effect of the source of the coupon (waiter vs. consumer) on coupon redemption was mediated by perceptions of cheapness. A binary logistic regression predicting redemption decisions from the source of the coupon, gender, and the interaction showed that source of the coupon was a significant predictor of coupon redemption (Wald = 6.79, p < .01). A second regression using the same independent variables demonstrated that source of the coupon also predicted ratings of cheapness using the coupon ( = .34, p = .037). A final binary logistic regression predicting redemption decisions from the independent variables and cheapness showed that the effect of the source of the coupon was no longer significant (Wald = 3.72, p > .05), whereas the effect of cheapness was significant (Wald = 11.53, p < .001). Regression analyses of the likelihood of use measure showed similar effects. The source of the coupon predicted both cheapness ( = .43, p < .001) and the likelihood of use ( = .70, p < .001). The mediated path was also significant (Sobel statistic = 2.16, p < .05), although the effect of source on likelihood remained significant when cheapness was included ( = .59, p < .001). Overall, these analyses suggest that both explicit decisions concerning coupon redemption and the rated likelihood of coupon use were mediated by self-perceptions of cheapness resulting from the source of the coupon.

Discussion The results of this study suggest that attributions for coupon use are important in moderating the trade-off between the social disincentives and the economic and psychological benefits of obtaining the savings. Consistent with the attributional logic of impression-management theory, external attributions for coupon use (i.e., when the waiter presented the coupon) reduced self-attributions of cheapness and thereby increased the likelihood of redemption. In contrast, internal attributions for coupon use (i.e., when consumers presented the coupon themselves) increased self-attributions of cheapness, thereby reducing the likelihood that consumers would redeem the coupon. This meant that consumers strategically altered their decision to account for the strength of the social disincentive to use the coupon. When they could save money without creating a negative impression, they would do so; however, when saving money came at the expense of appearing cheap, a large percentage of consumers avoided the coupon. Consistent with H8, the cheaper consumers felt redeeming the coupon, the less smart they judged the decision to do so. Consistent with H9, consumers further indicated it was smarter to use the coupon in a situation in which they were less likely to appear cheap (i.e., when the coupon was presented by the waiter). When coupon use led to perceptions of cheapness (i.e., when they presented it themselves), consumers indicated it was less smart to use the coupon. Apparently, smart decisions were determined by the extent to which consumers considered all relevant costs and benefits and not just the economic incentives of the particular price deal.

STUDY 4: ADJUSTING ELEMENTS OF THE TRADE-OFF In the final study we examined a more comprehensive set of predictions based on the proposed trade-off surrounding consumers decisions to use coupons. We examined both conditions that should affect the social disincentive to redeem coupons and factors that should affect the economic incentive. In the first instance, we distinguished between factors that should affect the likelihood of appearing cheap versus factors that should affect the importance of conveying a good impression. We predicted that consumers would view coupon redemption as more likely to generate an impression of cheapness in public than in private (Arkin et al., 1980) and, as these negative impressions become more likely, the trade-off should be altered in favor of not redeeming the coupon. We further predicted that in certain situations consumers should be less concerned about the impression they create. This would reduce the social disincentive to redeem coupons. For instance, there is evidence that the motivation to impression-manage is lower in the presence of established friends (Bohra & Pandy, 1984; Hendricks & Brickman, 1974). Con-

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sequently, in Study 4 we manipulated the social context such that participants either had dinner with a first date or with a longtime friend. We predicted that consumers would be more willing to use a coupon in front of a longtime friend, even if this were likely to generate perceptions of cheapness. In this case, the importance of the impression goal, rather than the likelihood of generating an impression of cheapness, was predicted to affect the decision to redeem coupons. Finally, the size of the saving offered by the coupon was manipulated so we could examine whether this was sufficient to persuade consumers to redeem the coupon in spite of their impression-management concerns. Method One hundred eighty-three students (75 men and 108 women) participated in return for course credit. Participants were presented with a scenario similar to the one used in Studies 1 and 3. The price of the meal was adjusted to $50 to account for inflation. The financial incentive manipulation pertained to the size of the coupon. In one condition, the coupon was for 10% off, or a saving of $5. In the other condition, the coupon was for 50% off, or a saving of $25. The public condition of the public and private manipulation was the same as the previous scenarios: It was clear that participants were paying for the bill in front of the other person. In the private condition, the other person excused him- or herself from the table to visit the restroom just before the waiter brought the bill; consequently, participants could use the coupon without the other persons knowledge. The social context manipulation was designed to affect the importance of participants impression-management concerns. In one condition, participants were on a first date, where impression-management concerns should be important. In the other condition, participants were out with a longtime friend, where impression-management concerns should be less important. The primary dependent variable was the decision to use the coupon or not. Participants also rated perceptions of cheapness and smartness associated with using the coupon as before. In addition, the importance of creating a good impression was measured with four items ( = .86). Two of these pertained to how important and concerned participants were about creating a good impression in front of the other person, whereas the two other items pertained to how worried and concerned participants would be about creating a negative impression. Results Manipulation checks showed that 95% of participants correctly identified the size of the coupon, and 91% correctly identified whether they had dinner with a first date or a friend. A binary logistic regression was conducted predicting participants decision from the three experimental manipula-

tions, gender, and their interactions. The independent variables were added in a stepwise fashion, proceeding from the main effects to the interactions of increasingly higher order. There were significant effects of the social context (Wald = 23.76, p < .001, supporting H6), the public and private manipulation (Wald = 20.26, p < .001, supporting H5), and gender (Wald = 9.77, p < .01). As expected, these effects indicated that fewer participants chose to use the coupon in front of a date (50% vs. 83%) and in public (52% vs. 82%). Furthermore, men were less likely to use the coupon than women (57% vs. 75%). Contrary to H7, there was no evidence that the size of the coupon affected participants choice (Wald < 1, ns). The decision measure and the cheapness and smartness measures, broken down by the social context and the public and private manipulations, are presented in Table 2. Analyses of the cheapness and smartness measures were conducted with 2 (social context: date vs. longtime friend) 2 (privacy: public vs. private) 2 (financial incentive: 10% off coupon vs. 50% off coupon) 2 (gender) between-subjects ANOVAs. These revealed only main effects of the privacy factor, Fs(1, 167) = 12.00 and 6.63, ps < .001 and < .05, which indicated that participants felt cheaper (Ms = 4.37 vs. 3.60, supporting H5) and less smart (Ms = 4.81 vs. 5.30, supporting H9) redeeming the coupon in public than in private. An ANOVA on the importance of creating a good impression measure revealed only a main effect of the social context factor, F(1, 180) = 38.45, p < .001. As predicted, participants felt it was more important to create a good impression in front of a date than in front of a friend (Ms = 4.17 vs. 3.42). These findings demonstrated that public redemption of a coupon generated perceptions of cheapness and that this was true regardless of the social context. However, despite the
TABLE 2 Study 4: Effect of Different Observers and the Public and Private Manipulation on Decisions to Redeem Coupons and on Attributions of Cheapness and Smartness Observer Condition Public Percentage use Cheapness Smartness Importance of impression Private Percentage use Cheapness Smartness Importance of impression Overall Percentage use Cheapness Smartness Importance of impression Date Friend Overall

28 4.56 4.65 4.33 72 3.66 5.28 4.05 50 4.12 4.96 4.19

74 4.13 4.93 3.32 91 3.55 5.28 3.51 83 3.83 5.11 3.42

52 4.34 4.79 3.81 82 3.60 5.28 3.77 67 3.97 5.04 3.79

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fact participants felt equally cheap in both contexts, they appeared to be more concerned about conveying this negative impression to a date than to a friend, consistent with H6. These findings are consistent with our predictions concerning the distinction between factors that generate perceptions of cheapness (H5) and factors that determine how important it is to convey a good impression (H6). We conducted additional analyses to examine whether these perceptions mediated the effects of the social context and privacy manipulations on coupon redemption. In support of H5, the indirect effect of the privacy manipulation on coupon redemption via cheapness was significant (Sobel statistic = 2.91, p < .01), although the direct effect of privacy on coupon redemption remained significant (Wald = 9.34, p < .01). Similarly, the mediated effect of the social context manipulation on coupon redemption via the importance variable was also significant (Sobel statistic = 2.65, p < .01), supporting H6. The direct effect of social context on coupon redemption remained significant in this case as well (Wald = 8.82, p < .01). Overall, H5 and H6 were supported by partial mediation of the predicted variables. Discussion These findings further support the notion that coupon redemption involves trade-offs between social concerns and the benefits of the deal. This study demonstrated that coupon redemption can be increased both by factors that minimize impressions of cheapness (public vs. private) and by factors that reduce the importance of such impressions (date vs. friend). Both of these elements of impression management seem to be important in determining the social disincentives relevant to coupon redemption. Moreover, in this context the size of the economic incentive offered by coupons appeared to have little positive effect on redemption rates. Although manipulation checks indicated that participants recognized that they could save more money by redeeming a larger coupon, this did not appear to be sufficient to overcome concerns about making a negative impression.

GENERAL DISCUSSION The results of four studies generally supported the prediction that coupon use has both positive and negative consequences and that consumers will sometimes avoid coupons because the negative social consequences that stem from redemption outweigh the economic rewards. Study 1 showed that coupon use led to perceptions of cheapness and that such concerns were greater for a coupon than for a standard discount. Study 2 showed that social observers agreed that coupon redemption conveyed an impression of cheapness, which lowered the social desirability of the coupon user. Together, these studies demonstrated that there were real social costs attached to coupon redemption that contradicted the economic rewards.

A number of factors were also shown to alter the trade-off between incentives to use coupons and concerns about appearing cheap. For instance, consumers were more likely to redeem coupons when provided directly by the marketer at the time of purchase (waiter condition in Study 3). This was due to a reduction in the extent to which redemption could be attributed to the consumer, which thereby lowered the likelihood of conveying an impression of cheapness. Redemption rates were also increased when coupons could be used in private (Study 4), because this reduced the likelihood that consumers would appear cheap to others. Consumers were also more willing to redeem coupons in situations where they were less motivated to impression-manage (friend condition in Study 4). This finding reveals a subtle distinction between factors that reduce the likelihood coupon use will generate perceptions of cheapness (e.g., external attributions, privacy) and factors that reduce the level of concern about appearing cheap (e.g., ones relationship with the observer). Finally, there was little evidence that the size of the saving was capable of overcoming concerns about appearing cheap. Although consumers recognized a larger saving when one was available, this had no significant impact on redemption (Study 4). In this context, social concerns seemed to dominate decisions about coupon redemption even when there were reasonably large financial incentives. These findings also have implications for the notion that price deals lead consumers to think of themselves as smart shoppers (Chandon et al., 2000; Darke & Freedman, 1995; Schindler, 1998). The general conclusion in the smartshopper literature has been that getting a price deal produces positive self-perceptions in the form of attributions to skill or savvy. However, most of the existing research has focused on price deals in the form of discounts, and these studies do not include measures of cheapness. Although our findings show that price deals certainly can lead to positive self-perceptions, there were also some important limits to the smart-shopper effects we observed. For instance, price deals actually led to a combination of positive (smart-shopper) and negative (cheap-shopper) self-perceptions. Furthermore, negative self-perceptions were more likely to occur when the deal was received in the form of a coupon rather than a discount. Finally, the consumers who refused the coupon actually viewed this decision to be just as smart as taking the deal, possibly because they thought it was also smart to avoid appearing cheap. Overall, getting a deal in the form of a coupon appeared to produce a combination of smart-shopper and cheap-shopper perceptions. The preceding discussion raises the more general question of whether the decision to refuse a coupon should be considered a mistake. It is common to use traditional economic standards to determine the quality of consumer decision making (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). In our studies, an exclusive focus on the utilitarian benefits and the lack of tangible costs should have always led participants to take the coupon. Nevertheless, a substantial proportion of

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participants failed to do so. This decision makes more sense when the costs of making a negative social impression are taken into account (Study 2). When such costs are considered, it may be better to refuse the coupon in order to maintain social approval and encourage future interactions. Furthermore, Studies 3 and 4 showed that consumers recognized situations in which coupon redemption was particularly likely to produce social costs, and they traded these costs against economic incentives in a sensible way. This view is consistent with recent suggestions that the quality of consumer judgment should be broadly considered in the context of all the relevant goals in the decision context (Bagozzi, 2000). It seems reasonable for consumers to refuse the small amount of money offered by the coupon in order to satisfy more important social goals. Our findings also have implications for the practical question of how to increase coupon redemption. One approach is to simply increase the financial value of the coupon, as suggested by existing research indicating that higher value coupons are more likely to be redeemed (Bawa & Shoemaker, 1987; Krishna & Shoemaker, 1993; Ramaswamy & Srinivasan, 1998). However, Study 4 found that increasing the value of the coupon was not sufficient to overcome the social costs in the current context. It seems possible that an even larger financial incentive might prove to be more effective. However, this strategy would also increase the costs of the promotion to the marketer. An alternative strategy for increasing coupon redemption would be to focus on reducing or avoiding the social costs themselves. Our findings suggest that marketers could increase coupon usage by helping to shape the attributions that are likely to be made. For instance, coupons could be attached to the packing itself, so that consumers automatically get the savings when they purchase the item, without making it obvious they were trying to save money. In addition, the results of Study 4 suggest that making coupon redemption more covertfor instance, by arranging it so redemption is hidden from public viewshould help reduce concerns about appearing cheap. Self-serve coupon redemption counters may be effective in this respect, as long as they are discreetly located (i.e., away from other people). Coupons may also be better suited to online purchases, because this is a private purchase setting, and impression-management concerns should be relatively low. Finally, it may be possible to combat undesirable social impressions by arranging it so that coupon use conveys more socially desirable values. For example, if coupon redemption is explicitly linked to corporate support for a charity, then consumers may feel less ashamed and more proud to present coupons, even in conspicuous contexts. The scenario method used in these studies allowed precise control of the social context of coupon usage to examine the hypotheses. This method has some limitations as well. One could argue, for instance, that participants responses to these imagined situations may not conform to their actual responses in real life. However, the scenario used here was

highly familiar to participants, and research suggests that familiarity helps participants give responses that bear closer resemblance to their reactions in real life (Robinson & Clore, 2001). A related concern is that the use of scenarios may have induced experimental demand. Although demand cannot be entirely ruled out, there are a number of arguments against a demand interpretation of the findings. First, it is not clear what directional effects demand would be expected to have on the results. Demand seems as likely to increase coupon usage to appear smart as it does to decrease usage to avoid appearing cheap. Furthermore, relatively subtle manipulations that were included in the scenarios (e.g., the waiter providing the coupon, dinner with a friend) caused large shifts in the proportion of participants who were willing to redeem the coupon. Finally, we conducted an additional study to examine coupon redemption when consumers purchased a pen in a real store. The results of this study replicated the basic finding that some consumers would avoid coupons to avoid appearing cheap. The possibility of experimental demand should have been lower in this case because participants gave up real money when they refused the coupon, and the availability of the coupon was made to appear incidental to the goals of the study. Study 4 suggests that these findings are most likely to generalize to other situations in which it is especially important for consumers to impress others. There are many such situations, even outside of a restaurant context, such as corporate executives entertaining potential business partners, or when consumers check out at the local grocery store with a neighbor standing behind them. In addition, some people may be especially concerned about impression management across a broad range of consumer contexts, even situations that appear fairly anonymous and benign. Adolescents, for instance, are famously concerned about the impressions they make even on total strangers, and so impression-management concerns may influence their use of coupons even when making retail purchases in ostensibly unimportant consumer contexts. Consumers may not always worry about looking cheap, but they are likely to have this concern in many common situations, especially when the subjective value of making a good impression is relatively high. These studies make it clear that consumer behavior is motivated not only by the desire to maximize utilitarian outcomes, such as saving money, but also by the desire to satisfy social goals. We examined situations in which economic goals were often in conflict with important social goals and showed that consumers perform a complex balancing act between the economic and social benefits provided by alternative courses of action. The choice to forgo monetary savings by choosing not to use a coupon may seem irrational in a traditional economic sense, but it is far from wrong. In the broader context, many consumers correctly recognized the negative social consequences that existed for coupon users, and they acted appropriately by avoiding coupon redemption in order to maintain positive social perceptions.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We acknowledge the financial support of the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada. We also thank the associate editor and two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments.

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Received: May 7, 2003 Revision received: November 3, 2004 Accepted: February 6, 2005