Duilio Guerrero Dr. Bruce Hauptli English Empiricism 04MAR2013 TITLE 8. Critically consider T.E.

Wilkersons discussion of the distinction between real and nominal essences in his Natural Kinds (available in the Library in the journal Philosophy v. 63 [1988], pp. 29-42). In writing the paper clarify what Lockes distinction between real and nominal essences is, what problem Wilkerson finds with the distinction, what the seriousness of this critique would be for Lockes orientation, and whether you find the critique to be solid.

In her Introduction, Vere Chappell notes that ...the terms nominal essence and real essence do not, as Locke uses them, stand for two coordinate species of a single genus. Nominal essences belong to one ontological categorythey are ideas in peoples mindsand real essences to anotherthey are physical objects somehow belonging to individual bodies.7 Cf., T.E. Wilkersons Natural Kinds, for an excellent background discussion of this topic.8

III iv 2 Names of simple ideas refer (to the ideas). Names of substances refer (though he means that they refer to complexes of simple ideas, not to things), but names of mixed modes need not refer. III iv 4 Names of simple ideas are undefinable. III iv 12 Names of complex ideas are definable. Chapter v. Of the names of mixed modes and relations: III v 2 Locke says that these are names for abstract ideasideas which are made by the mind.

2 Chapter vi. Of the names of substances: *III vi 1 Locke contends that the common names for substances stand for sorts of thingsthey are names for complex ideas. *III vi 2 The different common substances are marked out by essencesand here, of course, it is nominal essences which we are talking about (not the real essences of thingsabout which we know nothing). *III vi 8-29 Locke points out that we cant sort species according to real essences, and points to a large number of difficulties in attempting to do so: -III vi 8 Locke points out that the discussion of substances can not be presumed to mark out real essences. We know not real essences: ...the species of things to us, are nothing but the ranking them under distinct names, according to the complex ideas in us; and not according to precise, distinct, real essences in them.... -9. Nor indeed can we rank, and sort things, and consequently...denominate them by their real essences, because we know them not. Our faculties carry us no further towards the knowledge and distinction of substances, than a collection of those sensible ideas, which we observe in them; which however made with the greatest diligence and exactness, we are capable of, yet is more remote from the true internal constitution, from which those qualities flow, than, as I said, a country-mans idea is from the internal contrivance of the famous clock at Strasburg.9 --Garrett Thomson offers a good summary criticism of Lockes willingness to adhere to a substance metaphysics: the notion of pure substance in general appears to be an anomaly in Lockes usually Empiricist philosophy. It is difficult to see how such a concept could be acquired from experience, as Lockes Empiricism asserts that all ideas must be. Yet Locke apparently argues that we need such a concept. Thus, logic and reason seem to require such a concept, while experience appears to deny it. There is clearly a conflict between Lockes Empiricism and what he takes to be a demand of reason.10 -12. There is probably a far greater variety of spiritual species than we generally acknowledge. -16. We would need to know that nature always produces each kind of thing. -17. There would have to be no middle-ground cases (monsters, etc.). -18. We would have to be aware of the real essences of things (and through them we would have to make our distinctions). -19. We would have to know the real essences to accomplish natural sorting, but these are beyond us. *III vi 22-29 The essences which we talk about are made by the mind and not by nature. 2

3 -22. Our abstract ideas are our measure of the species. -26. They are made by the mind, and not by nature. -27. The definitions we employ are imperfect, inexact, and allow for loose cases. -*28. But, the essences which we speak of are not as arbitrary as what we find in the case of mixed modes. The substances (co-subsisting simple ideas) have a character, and the nominal essences which we arrive at here are important. We use common language to accomplish the ordinary affairs of life: --...though men may make what complex ideas they please, and give what names to them they will: yet if they will be understood, when they speak of things really existing, they must, in some degree, conform their ideas to the things they would speak of; or else mens language will be like that of Babel; and every mans words, being intelligible only to himself, would no longer serve to conversation, and the ordinary affairs of life.... III vi 32 Locke contends that the more general our ideas are, the more incomplete and partial they are. The process of increasingly general generalizations leads to less and less specificity in the complex idea.

The kinds oak, stickleback and gold are natural kinds, and the kind stable, nation and banknote are not I shall attempt to find a defensible distinction between natural and non-natural kinds. If an account of natural kinds is to be at all interesting two conditions must be fulfilled. First, the notion of a natural kind must be tied to that of a real essence.

LOCKE
III.vi16. Secondly, we would need to know whether nature always attains the essence that it designs in the production of things. The irregular and monstrous births that have been observed in various sorts of animals will always give us reason to doubt one or both of thesethat is, that an essence is intended, and/or that the intention is always fulfilled. (Darwain) III.vi.9. We dont know the real essences of things, and so we cant use real essences as the basis on which to rank and sort things and so to name them (for what sorting is for is naming). The nearest our faculties will let us get to knowing and distinguishing substances is a collection of the perceptible ideas [here = qualities] that we observe in them. And even if we collect these as carefully and precisely as we possibly can, that collection wont be anywhere near to the true internal constitution from which those qualities flow. . . . There is no plant or animal, however lowly and insignificant, that doesnt baffle the most enlarged understanding. Though our familiar dealing with things around us stops us from wondering about them, it doesnt cure our ignorance. (points out

not to use for sorting) 3

III.vi.6. I have often mentioned a real essence that is distinct in substances from those abstract ideas of them that I call their nominal essence. By this real essence I mean the real constitution of a thing, which is the foundation of all those properties that are combined in and constantly found to co-exist with the nominal essence; that particular consti- tution that every thing has within itself, without reference to anything else. But essence, even in this sense, relates to a sort and presupposes a species. It is that real constitution on which the properties depend, so it necessarily presupposes a sort of things, because properties belong only to species and not to individuals.
[Here, and on some later occasions and perhaps on a few earlier ones, Locke uses property in an old technical sense
according to which a property of iron means a quality or attribute that has to be possessed by all specimens of iron; it is supposed to follow from the essence of iron without actually being part of that essence. In this sense of the word, a property of thissaid by someone who is pointing to a piece of ironis meaningless.]

(difference between real &

nominal- abstract idea and the reality)

III.vi.2. The measure and boundary of each sort or species, by which it is constituted as that particular sort and distin- guished from others, is what we call its essence. This is nothing but the abstract idea to which the name is attached; so that everything contained in the idea is essential to that sort. Although this is the only essence of natural substances that we know, and the only one by which we can distinguish them into sorts, I give it the special name nominal essence, to distinguish it from the real constitution of substances. [See note at end of iii.15.] The latter is the source of the nominal essence and of all the properties of that sort or species; and so it can be called the real essence of the sort. For example, the nominal essence of gold is the complex idea that the word gold stands forsomething like a body that is yellow, of a certain weight, malleable, fusible, and fixed. But the real essence is the constitution of the imperceptible parts of that body, on which those qualities and all the other properties of gold depend. Although both of these are called essence, you can see at a glance how different they are.

Real essences: these are the supposed real constitution of the sorts of things which there are. -Nominal essences: these are the abstract ideas or sortals which we employ in our use of kinds, sorts, or species. Primary qualities are the inseparable features of a body, e.g., its size, shape, solidity, mobility, texture, weight, etc. (II.viii.9). Secondary qualities are the colors, sounds, smells, tastes, etc., of any object. These are secondary because these features of objects do not exist in the objects themselves, but rather are nothing but the power of the primary qualities of the object to produce an idea in us of a certain kind (II.viii.10). So, for example, the color of the table is not in the table, rather, it is part of how the matter and texture of the table (i.e., its primary qualities), as it reflects, absorbs and refracts light, has the power to produce ideas in us of that color. Finally, the tertiary qualities of a body are those powers in it that, by virtue of its primary qualities, give it the power to produce observable changes in the primary qualities of other bodies, e.g., the power of the sun to melt wax is a tertiary quality of the sun (II.viii.23). nominal essence an essence is that it contains both the necessary and sufficient conditions for something to belong to its species or genus. Nature provides us with similarities and we create definitions of species and genera. However, no matter how dependent general names are on our definitions, we are answerable to nature and

5 must keep our definitions as close as we can to what nature provides. It is in this sense that species and genera are the workmanship of the human understanding; we take what nature gives us and we create our own definitions and taxonomical categories. On the other hand, a real essence is an essence because it makes the object to be what it is. It is real in that it does not include human choice for it to be what it is, rather, it is precisely as nature made it. In the case of a piece of gold, the real essence is that collection of particles that make up that particular piece of gold and give it its qualities of color, weight, electrical conductivity, malleability, etc.. It is universally agreed that Locke thinks that we sort things into species and genera based on nominal essences and species and genera are a kind of human linguistic categorization process. On the other hand, one might think, Locke has no reason to reject natural kinds (which concern the metaphysics of nature, and not the meanings of names) simply because our sorting process is arbitrary. In other words, there are those who argue that Locke was a natural kind realist, even though he was convinced that taxonomies are the workmanship of the understanding. Whether Locke thinks that there are natural kinds, i.e., types of real essences independently of human sorting activities, is an interpretive issue we shall address in 4.3 below. To be sure, there are passages in the Essay that seem to indicate that Locke was a natural kind realist even if he was a conventionalist about taxonomical practices. For example: The other, and more rational Opinion, is of those, who look on all natural Things to have a real, but unknown Constitution of their insensible Parts, from which flow those sensible Qualities, which serve us to distinguish them one from another, according as we have Occasion to rank them into sorts, under common Denominations. (III.iii.17) In other words, one might argue, if real essences cause the observable qualities of bodies, and we sort things into species based on observable similarities, then if we assume that similarities among the real essences always results in similar observable qualities, and similar observable qualities are always caused by similar real essences, there is reason to think that Locke assumed that our nominal essences track, at least to some degree, real kinds in nature. Indeed, there are passages where Locke speaks of the imperfection of our species ideas and the need to make them better conform to nature. For example, in III.xi.24 he says that: And therefore in Substances, we are not always to rest in the ordinary complex Idea, commonly received as the signification of that Word, but must go a little farther, and enquire into the Nature and Properties of the Things themselves, and thereby perfect, as much as we can, our Ideas of their distinct Species There is no reason, so one may argue, to suspect that our species ideas could be either perfected or imperfect if there is no natural kind archetype. On the other hand, there is some evidence that Locke anticipated this kind of account and rejected it. For example, he says:

6 That we find many of the Individuals that are ranked into one Sort, called by one common Name, and so received as being of one Species, have yet Qualities depending on their real Constitutions, as far different one from another, as from others, from which they are accounted to differ specifically. This, as it is easy to be observed by all, who have to do with natural Bodies; so Chymists especially are often, by sad Experience, convinced of it, when they, sometimes in vain, seek for the same Qualities in one parcel of Sulphur, Antimony, or Vitriol, which they have found in others. For though they are Bodies of the same Species, having the same nominal Essence, under the same Name; yet do they often, upon severe ways of examination, betray Qualities so different one from another, as to frustrate the Expectation and Labour of very wary Chymists. But if Things were distinguished into Species, according to their real Essences, it would be as impossible to find different Properties in any two individual Substances of the same Species, as it is to find different Properties in two Circles, or two equilateral Triangles. (III.vi.8) This argument is a modus tollens: if the members of a nominally defined species had the same type of real essence, then they should all exhibit the same qualities (including those not included in the nominal essence), but they do not exhibit all of the same qualities, therefore they do not all have the same type of real essence.

Given that there are real and nominal essences for modes and that a general knowledge consists in knowledge of essences, then Locke needs some way to distinguish the essences of modes from those of substances. According to Locke, one of the main differences between substances on the one hand and simple ideas and modes on the other is that the real essences of substances are distinct from their nominal essences, whereas for simple ideas and modes, they are the same. Essences being thus distinguished into Nominal and Real, we may farther observe, that in the Species of simple Ideas and Modes, they are always the same: But in Substances, always quite different. Thus a Figure including a Space between three Lines, is the real, as well as nominal Essence of a Triangle; it being not only the abstract Idea to which the general Name is annexed, but the very Essentia, or Being, of the thing it self, that Foundation from which all its Properties flow, and to which they are all inseparably annexed. But it is far otherwise concerning that parcel of Matter, which makes the Ring on my Finger, wherein these two Essences are apparently different. For it is the real Constitution of its insensible Parts, on which depend all those properties of Colour, Weight, Fusibility, Fixedness, etc. which are to be found in it. Which Constitution we know not; and so having no particular Idea of, have no Name that is the Sign of it. But yet it is its Colour, Weight, Fusibility, and Fixedness, etc. which makes it to be Gold, or gives it a right to that Name, which is therefore its nominal Essence. (III.iii.18) So the real essences of a triangle, or gratitude, or murder, or yellow, or sweet, etc., are exactly the same as their nominal essences. There is nothing more to being a triangle than being a plane, closed three-sided figure. Similarly, there is nothing more to being a particular species or shade of yellow than the nominal definition.[7]

7 While it is clear that Locke envisioned some analogy between the real and nominal essences of substances with those of modes, it is unclear, however, just how that analogy should be cashed out. For example, Roger Woolhouse argues that it is a mistake for Locke to say that mode ideas have a real essence at all because there is nothing like a corpuscular structure that is analogous to the definition of a concept like triangle or lying. Moreover, there is, according to Woolhouse, nothing that binds the nominally essential qualities of modes together, whereas, for substances there is an underlying physical structure (see Woolhouse 1971, pp. 125128). Indeed it is quite difficult to see how a mode could have a real essence if the model for what a real essence is comes from corpuscular structures. If Woolhouse is right, then Locke has no way to make good on his intended analogy and he is unable to adequately differentiate modes from substances. P. Kyle Stanford (1998), on the other hand, suggests that the analogy between real and nominal essences was intended to be based in their entailment relations. Stanford argues that, just as every property of a substance flows from the real essence with geometrical necessity (IV.vi.11), so too does every property of a triangle follow from its definition with geometrical necessity. And this fact is what all real and nominal essences have in common for Locke. By his way of thinking, even though the connection between the real essence of a piece of gold is the causal ground of the nominally essential properties of gold, and the real essence of a triangle is the logical ground for the nominally essential properties of a triangle, they are alike in that all nominally essential properties can be deduced from the idea of the real essence; if we knew the real essence of a triangle, then we could deduce from it any of the properties of a triangle. To make this analogy work, Stanford argues that the real essence of a substance is more than a corpuscular structure, it must also include the causal powers that produce the observable qualities of the substance; in like fashion, the real essence of modes includes the logical ground from which the nominally essential properties of the term flow. If Stanford is correct, then there is a possible analogy between the real and nominal essences of modes and substances that yields an interesting interpretation of the real essences of both modes and substances. On either reading, however, it appears that Locke is saddled with the view that in cases of simple ideas, ideas of modes and mixed modes, if we understand the meanings of the words, we know all that there is to know regarding those concepts. Moral and mathematical concepts and ideas are mere trifling propositions, analytic truths and uninformative. However, it will be difficult for many moral philosophers to accept that all they are doing is cashing out the definitions of terms and dealing with uninformative analytic truths; asserting that lying is wrong seems to be more than a trifling opinion. Moreover, it is unclear how Locke thinks moral terms can be normative, i.e., how they can constitute commands we ought to obeyif his position is correct. In a similar vein, since many mixed modes, which include all moral concepts, are arbitrary mental constructs, it follows that we create moral concepts by producing their definitions. Since the real and nominal essences of mixed modes are the same, it follows that if we know the real essence of lying (knowingly and falsely asserting that p with the intention to mislead someone whom we ought not to mislead, etc), we can deduce from that idea all the components of lying, and so there is nothing more to know about lying than the ideas contained within its definition. A problem with Locke's account here is that, as John Mackie points out, social scientists seek out the real essences of social phenomena such as adultery, incest, jealousy, lying and suicide, but understanding these complex phenomena involves more than simply understanding the meaning 7

8 of the word. If we are to understand why people lie, we must know more than a definition of lying. Of course, it is possible for Locke to argue that once we understand all that is included in lying, we have uncovered its real essence, why people lie, and the many ways they do so, however, are separate questions that we cannot expect to be decided by a semantic theory. It is unclear how he would solve the normative problem