G.R. No.

91374 February 25, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOHN GABRIEL GAMBOA, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Josefa K. Cauton for defendant-appellant.

GANCAYCO, J .:p
Essential in the success of the prosecution of an offense is the proof of the identity of the
offender. This is usually attained through the testimony of eyewitnesses during, before, or
even after the commission of the offense. In the absence of such primary evidence the
prosecution generally falls back on such other evidence as the ballistic examination of the
murder weapon, a handwriting expert, the extrajudicial confession or similar resources.
Otherwise, circumstantial evidence is resorted to which consists in the piercing together of
tiny bits of evidence with a view towards ascertaining the accused as the person
responsible for the commission of the offense.
In the case now before this Court the defendant-appellant John Gabriel Gamboa was
charged with the crime of murder together with Miguel Celdran in the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu. After arraignment but during the trial, the case against Celdran was dismissed.
Thereafter, a decision was rendered on August 30, 1989, finding Gamboa guilty of the crime
of murder as penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and imposing upon
him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P30,000.00, with costs against him. The fatal weapon, a
shotgun, was ordered forfeited in favor of the government.
1

The defendant-appellant interposed this appeal from said judgment alleging that the trial
court committed the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES CRISTINA
SOLEDAD, ENRICO ACRE AND MARIO GASCON.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT HAD BEEN POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED AS THE ASSAILANT
OF THE VICTIM RENE IMPAS.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT HAD CONFESSED TO OR ADMITTED THE KILLING.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REJECTING THE ALLEGED MURDER
WEAPON (EXHIBIT "A") AS INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT EXHIBIT "A" WAS THE
ACTUAL MURDER WEAPON.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT REJECTING THE PARAFFIN TEST
RESULTS AS INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUIRING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
2

At around 1:15 o'clock in the morning of August 21, 1988, Cristina Soledad, common-law
wife of Rene Impas, was conversing with the latter inside a bedroom in Rene's house
located at John Avenue, Cebu City. Suddenly someone kicked open the door and Soledad
saw the appellant and Celdran. From a standing position the appellant fired his shotgun at
Rene. Rene was hit on the right side of the chest so he slid slightly, his head leaning on the
wall the appellant fired a second shot hitting the victim on the abdomen. The victim fell face
upward on the bed and died immediately.
Soledad shouted for help. Rico Acre, a tenant in the same house, responded. He entered
the room as the appellant went out of the house. The former fired a third time.
Acre noticed the victim having difficulty in breathing, so he ran out of the house and shouted
for help. Mario Gascon, a neighbor, came and together with Acre they lifted the victim and
loaded him in the car of the victim's father, police Major Impas, which was parked in front of
the house.
As Gascon stepped out of his house to extend assistance, he saw the appellant and
another person running towards a yellow car. The appellant was still holding the shotgun
then. Soledad, together with Acre, Gascon and Maj. Impas, who was living in the house
nearest to the victim's house, boarded the latter's car and brought the victim to the Southern
Island Hospital, Cebu City.
The medico legal report of Dr. Jesus Cerna of the PC-INP, Cebu showed that the victim
suffered the following gunshot wounds:
Shotgun wounds:
(1) ENTRANCE. ovaloid, 2.0 x 1.8 cm., with 5 stray pellets wounds of
entrance around, in an area of the chest, right, 5.5 x 5.0 cm., edges inverted,
chest right anterior aspect, 6.0 cm. from the anterior median line and 128.0
cm. above right heel; directed backward, downward and medially, involving
skin and the underlying soft tissues, into thoracic cavity, lacerating
extensively the lungs, upper and lower lobes right extensively and the
ascending orta, and finally a plastic wad was embeded and recovered from
the upper lobe of right lung and three (3) pellets were recovered from the soft
tissue of the back, thoracic region, left, 5.0 cm. from the posterior median line
and 127.0 cm. above left heel.
(2) ENTRANCE, (pellets wounds) six in numbers, of varying sizes, ranging
from 0.6 x 0.5 cm. to 0.5 x 0.4 cm., edges inverted, dispersed in an area of
the abdomen, anterior aspect, right, 5.0 x 4.5 cm. 7.5 cm. from the anterior
median line and 108.0 cm. above right heel, directed backward, upward and
laterally involving skin and the underlying soft tissues, into a thoracic
abdominal cavity, lacerating extensively portion of small and large intestine,
liver, and finally 4 pellets wound were embeded and recovered from the soft
tissues back, left thoracic abdominal region, 10.0 cm. from the posterior
median line and 107.0 cm. above left heel, (one existed).
(3) ENTRANCE. ovaloid, 9.0 x 3.0 cm. irregular in shape, edges inverted,
hand, posterior aspect, right; directed forward, upward, thru and thru.
Heart: auricular and venticular chambers, filled with dark-red liquid and
clotted blood, with normal myocardium.
Gastrointestinal tract and other visceral organs pale.
Stomach, empty.
Hemothorax, approximately 1500 cm.
Hemoperitoneum, approximately 1000 cc.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Shot wounds, chest, abdomen and hand, right.
3

Under the first assigned error, the appellant raises the issue relating to the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses in that their testimonies are full of inconsistencies which elicit doubt
as to their truthfulness.
In the case of Soledad, the latter allegedly testified that the appellant shot the victim twice,
while the victim's father testified that he heard three successive shots. There is no
inconsistency here. It was established that the appellant shot the victim twice while inside
the house and fired the third shot when he was already outside the house. This accounts for
the three shots heard by Major Impas.
The appellant also stated that Soledad testified on direct examination that when the victim
was hit by the first shot his body leaned on the wall but on cross examination, she said that
the victim was lying flat on the bed after the first shot. Whether the victim was leaning on the
wall or lying down after the first shot is of no material consequence. The fact remains that
Soledad saw the appellant shoot the victim twice with a shotgun.
Another alleged contradiction is that Soledad said she knew Acre to be a cousin of the
victim but Acre himself denied such relationship. Again such inconsistency, if it is indeed an
inconsistency at all, is on a minor matter.
The appellant states that while Acre testified that at the time of the shooting he could clearly
be seen from the victim's room, Soledad never mentioned having seen Acre at or near the
door of the victim's room. It is also indicated that while Acre said that appellant made some
remarks to him in a loud voice before the shooting, Soledad on the other hand testified that
she did not hear any statement from the appellant before the shooting.
Suffice it to state that at the time of the shooting, the appellant and Celdran were standing
at the door, effectively blocking the view outside the room, hence Soledad did not see Acre.
Moreover, at the time Soledad's attention at that moment was focused on her common-law
husband who was shot twice and who fell on the bed. She was a witness to a startling
occurrence. It is not improbable that because of shock she did not hear any remarks made
by the appellant outside the room.
The appellant makes much capital of the fact that Acre did not reveal the identity of the
appellant to the victim's father when they were together in the car on the way to the
hospital. This is understandable considering that Soledad had already revealed the
appellant's identity to Major Impas when they boarded the car. There was no need for Acre
to give the same information to the victim's father.
In the case of Modesto Gascon, it is contended that he could not have seen the appellant
running away from the scene of the shooting since even before Gascon went down from his
house, the appellant was already running towards the get-away car and so it was allegedly
impossible for Gascon to identify the appellant.
On cross-examination, Gascon stated that after hearing gunshots he ran out of his house to
ascertain where the shots came from. He ran to the corner or to the "second bend" outside
the house of the victim's father and he saw the appellant at the "second bend." Gascon ran
into the appellant while running to the house of the victim. He was only four to five arms-
length away when he saw the appellant, thus his positive identification of the appellant.
Another alleged discrepancy is between the version of Major Impas that the appellant and
his companion were running towards the car and that of Gascon's testimony that the
appellant was back-tracking towards the car. The record discloses that what Major Impas
meant to convey was that he saw the appellant and his companion fleeing from the scene of
the crime to their get-away car while the description of Gascon that the appellant was
"back-tracking" towards the car was a description of how the appellant fled from the victim's
house to the car, to make sure that they were not being followed.
The alleged contradiction between Gascon's affidavit,
4
wherein he mentioned that he saw
the appellant and another person running towards the car, and his testimony on cross-
examination that he only saw the appellant, is of no material consequence considering that
the appellant has been positively identified as the assailant. Moreover, as it is generally
pointed out, an affidavit taken ex-parte almost always cannot be relied upon as oftentimes it
is inaccurate.
5

By and large, the Court is not persuaded that the appellant's claim of contradictions and
inconsistencies on the part of the prosecution witnesses puts into serious doubt their
credibility, Different persons who witnessed an incident from different angles and situations
could not be expected to give uniform details of what they saw and heard. Such minor
discrepancies and inconsistencies are to be expected because of the human differences in
perception. Such contradicting statements are on minor details, as hereinabove discussed,
and rather than affect the credibility of the witnesses, the same are badges of candor.
Nevertheless, under the second assigned error, the appellant alleges that his identification
by the prosecution witnesses cannot be relied upon considering that they did not
immediately inform the police investigators of the identity of the assailant upon their arrival.
Although it may be true that the eyewitnesses did not immediately identify the appellant as
the assailant to the responding policemen, it is also a matter of fact that Major Impas
informed Cpl. Petallar while they were on the way to the Southern Islands Hospital, where
the victim was brought, that the assailant is the appellant.
6
The second instance was when
Soledad went to the mobile patrol division and revealed to Cpl. Petallar that the appellant
was the one who shot her common-law husband.
7

It is quite understandable when the witnesses do not immediately report the identity of the
offender after a startling occurrence more especially when they are related to the victim as
they just had a traumatic experience. More so as in the case of Major Impas who is the
victim's father and Soledad, his common-law wife. Nevertheless, a delay of about a few
hours before the identification of the offender by the prosecution witnesses does not thereby
affect their credibility.
The inadmissibility of the alleged verbal confession of the appellant is raised on the ground
that he was maltreated as a result of which he suffered twenty-seven injuries in the form of
contusions, lacerations and abrasions. It does not appear, however, that the prosecution
proposed to rely on this alleged confession of the appellant, or that the trial court considered
the same at all in the resolution of the case. If it were to be considered at all, it would be
worthless because of the undeniable fact that the appellant was not only arrested without a
warrant and entry into his house was effected without a search warrant, but worse, he was
maltreated since his arrest so much so that he suffered multiple injuries. The police
investigators responsible for this manhandling should be investigated and held to account.
Such involuntary confession cannot help the case of the prosecution. It is a stain in the
record of the law enforcement agents who handled the case.
Under the fifth assigned error, the appellant questions the admissibility of the shotgun as
the alleged murder weapon. He says it was not found in his possession but his house was
searched and the shotgun was confiscated without a search warrant.
He also alleges that the three (3) empty shells that were submitted for the ballistics
examination were not recovered from the scene of the crime and their production is a
frameup by the police. Again, the Court observes that the police investigators confiscated
the shotgun from the premises of the residence of the appellant without a search warrant.
Such violation of the constitutional rights of a person should be investigated and inquired
into.
Nevertheless, the Court is not persuaded that the police investigators in this case would
willingly allow themselves to be instruments to frame the appellant for so serious a crime as
murder. It appears that the three empty shells were actually recovered from the vicinity of
the scene of the crime. The ballistics examination shows that it was fired from the very
shotgun of the appellant. This evidence corroborates the theory of the prosecution, very
strongly, that the appellant was the assailant of the victim.
Even if the Court disregards the shotgun as having been illegally secured as well as the
results of its ballistic examination in relation to the empty shells, still there is adequate
evidence in the record to justify a verdict of conviction. Indeed, the Court did not even
consider it necessary to inquire into the motive of the appellant in the light of his positive
identification by the prosecution witnesses.
As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises the question, under
the sixth assigned error, that it was not conducted in the presence of his lawyer. This right is
afforded to any person under investigation for the commission of an offense whose
confession or admission may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice.
8
His right against self-
incrimination is not violated by the taking of the paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional
right extends only to testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is
proposed to be examined as in this case.
9
Indeed, the paraffin test proved positively that he
just recently fired a gun. Again, this kind of evidence buttresses the case of the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the sole modification that the
indemnity to the heirs of the offended party is increased to P50,000.00, with costs against
the appellant. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Chairman of the Philippine
National Police for his information and appropriate action on the actuations of the law
enforcement agents hereinabove discussed.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.


PEOPLE V DUERO
G.R. No. L-52016 May 13, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SEVERINO DUERO, Accused whose death sentence is under automatic review.

AQUINO, J .:1wph 1.t
This is an automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo dated April
17, 1979, convicting Severino Duero of robbery with homicide, sentencing him to death and
ordering him to pay the heirs of Fausta Duero an indemnity of fifteen thousand pesos and
the sum of two thousand pesos which he took from her (Criminal Case No. 8860).
The issue is whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused of robbery with homicide
on the basis of his oral confession to the police station commander that he committed that
offense but which confession was repudiated by him on the witness stand and which was
taken during custodial interrogation when the accused was not informed of his rights to
remain silent and to have counsel, as required by section 20, Article IV of the Constitution.
There is no doubt as to the corpus delicti or the commission of robbery with homicide.
In the evening of Sunday, October 24, 1976, Fausta Condino Vda. de Duero, an
octogenarian housekeeper living alone, was feloniously killed in her house located at Barrio
Banguit, Cabatuan, Iloilo (Exh. A).
She sustained two gaping wounds on the right cheek, two gaping wounds on the neck,
another gaping wound on the right shoulder and a bruise on the cheek. A piece of wire,
which was used to strangle her was tied around her neck (Exh. A). A scythe was sticking in
her neck (Letter "B" in Sketch, p. 4, Record).
Regarded as fatal by the examining physician was the wound in the neck which pierced the
jugular vein and which was connected with the other wound in the neck and the shoulder
wound (14 tsn June 16, 1978).
The gruesome crime was discovered in the afternoon of the following day, October 25, by
Rodolfo Prevendido, the barangay captain. On noticing that the windows of the old woman's
house had not been opened in the morning, he suspected that there was something amiss.
He asked Doroteo Olmos, the grandson of the old woman, to peep through the bedroom
window.
When Olmos informed Prevendido that the old woman's things were scattered in the
bedroom, he requested Olmos to inform his uncle, Salvador Duero, a son of the old woman,
to come to the house (p. 8, Record).
Salvador entered the house through the bedroom window and saw his mother's lifeless and
bloodied body near the kitchen with a wire coiled around her neck and a scythe stuck in it.
He found that money and pieces of jewelry were missing (p. 7, Record). A mallet was found
on the floor near the victim's body.
The police and the rural health physician were notified. Patrolmen Tranquilino 0. Tormon,
Jr. and Cesar Moneva repaired to the scene of the crime. From the fact that cooked rice
and viands were found on the stove, Tormon concluded that the crime was committed at
supper time on the preceding night (p. 11, Record).
No eyewitness testified as to the commission of the offense. The principal evidence of the
prosecution is the testimony of Lieutenant Tomas C. Lujan, the chief of police of Cabatuan.
Lujan declared that Severino voluntarily confessed to him that he (Severino) committed the
robbery with homicide but Severino refused to sign a confession.
Severino implicated Rufino Macaya of Lambunao, Iloilo. Lujan an and his men brought
Severino to Macaya's house. Lujan an found that Macaya had nothing to do with the crime.
Lujan further testified that Severino said that the money stolen from the old woman was in
Severino's house at Sitio Rizal allowed Barrio Banguit. Lujan and his men went to
Severino's house. They did not find the stolen money.
Lujan was not the only police officer who heard Severino Duero's confession. Patrolman
Rolando N. Alag, a member of the arresting team that picked up Duero and brought him at
Lujan, stated in his sworn statement before the mayor that Duero admitted that he took part
in the robbery with homicide, that his companions were Macaya and a certain Junior (whose
parents were Severino's godparents) and that it was he (Severino) who induced the
commission of the crime (p. 9, Record).
Alag further swore that after Macaya denied any participation in the commission of the
crime, Severino Duero admitted sole responsibility for it and confessed that he took three
thousand pesos after hitting Fausta Duero on the head with a mallet strangling her with a
piece of wire and hacking her with a scythe (p. 9, Record).
According to Alag Severino said that the robbery with homicide was committed on
momentary impulse after Fausta Duero, who had plenty of money, refused to lend him fifty
pesos (Back of page 9, Record).
Alag confirmed his sworn statement at the preliminary examination when the municipal
judge interrogated him. Alag said that Severino Duero made his confession in the course of
their conversation on the way to the police station and not by reason of a formal
investigation (p. 22, Record).
Alag clarified that, according to Severino, he had to kill Fausta Duero because the old
woman recognized him as the intruder (p. 22, Record).
Patrolman Rufino Tormon. another member of the arresting team, corroborated in his swam
statement Alag's declaration as to Severino Duero's confession. Tormon declared at the
preliminary examination that Severino Duero knew that Fausta Duero had money because,
according to Severino, Fausta's daughter Maurine repaid to Fausta the sum of one
thousand one hundred pesos (which amount Fausta had not yet deposited in the bank),
another person named Alag Duero paid to Fausta her debt and Fausta had ten sacks of
palay (pp. 10 and 14, Record),
Tormon said that Severino met Fausta at a store in the morning of October 23, 1976 (the
day before the crime was committed). Fausta was willing to lend Severino one hundred fifty
pesos (p. 14, Record).
Buenaventura Hudieras, the barangay captain of Barrio Pamulogan, which adjoins Barrio
Banguit where the old woman resided, declared in his sworn statement that in the evening
of October 26 (two days after the commission of the crime) he was drinking liquor (biti-biti)
with Severino Duero in the house of Valentino Pambo, Hudieras' brother-in-law. On that
occasion, Severino told Hudieras that Fausta Duero was killed by clubbing her with a mallet
choking her with a piece of wire and hacking her with a scythe (p. 6, Record).
Hudieras stated that when he remarked that the best thing to do was to kill the killer of
Fausta Duero, Severino behaved in an unnatural manner and said that Hudieras could
testify that he saw daily Severino harvesting palay ("Si 'To boy nga dya, baryo kapitan dya,
sarang makatestigos nga adlaw-adlaw doon takon nagapanggarab") (p. 6, Record).
Hudieras confirmed his affidavit at the preliminary examination. He said that his suspicion
was that Severino Duero killed Fausta Duero (p. 16, Record).
The sworn statements of Alag, Tormon and Hudieras and others were the basis of the
criminal complaint for robbery with homicide filed by Lieutenant Lujan an in the municipal
court against Severino Duero. They did not testify at the trial most probably because Lujan
himself, the station commander, took the witness stand to give evidence on the same oral
confession allegedly made by Severino to the police.
To reinforce and render credible Lujan's testimony on Duero's oral confession of guilt,
Tranquilino Duero, a second cousin of the accused, testified that at about five o'clock in the
afternoon of October 24, 1976, he met the accused in Barrio Tabucan which is about two
kilometers away from the old woman's house in Barrio Banguit, In the course of their
conversation, Severino allegedly revealed to Tranquilino that he (Severino) would rob
his owaoor grandmother, Fausta Duero. Tranquilino said to Severino: "Are you an Idiot?"
In answer, Severino explained that Fausta Duero would not even lend him ten pesos or a
ganta of rice, a fact known to one Roman Sipaya. The next day when Tranquilino learned
from Severino that the old woman was killed, it occurred to Tranquilino that Severino was
responsible for the killing (2-3 tsn March 10, 1978).
Another prosecution witness, Jose Montao, testified that about six o'clock in the evening of
October 24, 1976, when he passed by the house of Fausta Duero, he saw Severino Duero
near the stairs of the house.
Severino was calling the old woman. Montao was just about three meters away from
Severino when Montao passed by him (6 tsn April 21, 1978). Montao's house was about
one hundred meters away from Fausta's house. He was going to watch television in his
uncle's house.
Montao had known Severino Duero for about four years. He was on friendly terms with
Severino. The latter used to gather mangoes for him. Montao was positive that Severino
killed the old woman (6 tsn April 21, 1978).
Another prosecution witness, Wilfredo Cenizal (Senesal), also a resident of Barrio
Pamulogan, testified that at six-thirty in the morning of October 25, 1976 or about ten hours
after the commission of the crime, Cenizal had a conversation with Severino Duero.
Severino spontaneously revealed to Cenizal that he (Severino) helped his grandmother
(owao, the colloquial term for grandmother) who was "held up by the bandit" and that her
money amounting to two thousand pesos was taken from her. Severino recounted to
Cenizal that the old woman was struck in the head with a hammer and wounded with a
scythe.
Cenizal's testimony was a confirmation of his affidavit taken on October 30, 1976 by a
policeman wherein he stated that, according to Severino, the old woman was killed by
striking her with a mallet strangling her with a piece of wire and wounding her with a scythe
and that the money taken from the old woman was in a purse (buon-buon) placed in a
bamboo basket (tabungos) (p. 5, Record). Cenizal confirmed his affidavit at the preliminary
examination (p. 17, Record).
The circumstantial evidence summarized above shows that the prosecution had a strong
case against Severino Duero in spite of the absence of the testimony of an eyewitness.
During the trial no objection was interposed by the defense to the evidence on Duero's oral
confession.
Indeed, the trial court on the basis of such evidence found Severino guilty of robbery with
homicide beyond reasonable doubt. He did not appeal from the trial court's decision.
But the trouble is that at the trial Severino repudiated his alleged oral confession and even
claimed that he was maltreated by the police. Lujan in his rebuttal testimony denied the
maltreatment.) Severino said that the victim was "the wife of my grandfather", meaning that
"the husband of Fausta Duero (the victim) was the grandfather of Severino Duero" (28 and
37 tsn January 5, 1979).
As alibi, Severino testified that he was in his house when the crime was perpetrated. His
wife Salvacion, his neighbor Adriano Lopez and his friends, the spouses Rufino Macaya
and Erlinda Macaya, confirmed his alibi.
Severino Duero's counsel de oficio in this Court contends that the trial court erred in
admitting the oral testimony on Severino Duero's oral confession, in giving credence to the
testimonies of Lujan, Cenizal, Montao and Tranquilino Duero, in finding that robbery with
homicide was committed and in not sustaining Severino's alibi.
The Solicitor General agrees with the counsel de oficio's contention that Severino's oral
confession is inadmissible in evidence by reason of Article IV of the Constitution which
provides: 1wph1 .t
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free
will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be admissible in evidence.
All the foregoing provisions are new except the first sentence, regarding the right against
self-incrimination (nemo tenetur seipsum accusare), which is the only provision found in
section 18 of the Bill of Rights of the 1935 Constitution, now revised or expanded in section
20 (See article 125 of the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 85-1 as to the right of
the accused, who is in police custody, to confer and communicate at anytime with his
counsel.)
If this case were to be decided under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court's judgment of
conviction could be affirmed. But we have to decide it under the rule in the 1973
Constitution as to a confession obtained while the confessant is under police custody. And
that rule applies squarely to this case (Magtoto vs. Manguera, Simeon vs. Villaluz and
People vs. Isnani L37201-02, L-37424 and L-38929, March 3, 1975, 63 SCRA 4.)
Inasmuch as the prosecution in this case failed to prove that before Duero made his alleged
oral confession he was informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel and
because there is no proof that he knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, his
confession is inadmissible in evidence.
After discarding Lujan's testimony on Duero's oral confession, the rest of the prosecution's
circumstantial evidence against him is not adequate for his conviction. His acquittal follows
as a matter of course.
The new provisions in section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution were adopted from the
ruling in Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2nd 694 ("an earthquake in the world
of law enforcement") which specifies the following procedural safeguards for in-custody
interrogation of accused persons: 1wph1 .t
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed.
The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that
he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no
questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does
not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him.
The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered
some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from
answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and
thereafter consents to be questioned.
As restated by Chief Justice Warren in the Miranda case, the following procedure should be
adhered to:
At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be
informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. 1wp h1. t
For those unaware of the privilege the warning is needed simply to make
them aware of it the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to
its exercise.
More important, such a warning is an absolute pre-requisite in overcome the
inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere. ... .
Further, the warning will show the individual that his interrogators are
prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it. ... .
The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the
explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in
court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the
privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it. ... .
An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer. While
such request affirmatively secures his right to have one, his failure to ask for
a lawyer does not constitute a waiver. No effective waiver of the right to
counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after
the warnings we here delineate have been given. The accused who does not
know his rights and therefore does not make a request may be the person
who most. needs counsel. ... .
If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel before any
interrogation occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his
request on the basis that the individual does not have or cannot afford a
retained attorney. ... .
In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under
this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to
consult with an attorney, but also that if lie is indigent a lawyer will be
appointed to represent him. ... .
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the
individual indicates in any manner, at anytime prior to or during questioning,
that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. ... . If the
individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one
before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent. ... .
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a
statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate
that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against
self-incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel. ... .
An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and
does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a
waiver. ... .
The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our
opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites
to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant.
In the Miranda case, the Federal Supreme Court made it clear that what is prohibited is the
"incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police dominated atmosphere, resulting in
self- incriminating statements without full warnings of constitutional rights."
The State's right to prosecute criminals may be a great right but, as Lord Chancellor Sankey
observed, it is not permissible "to do a great right by doing a little wrong".
The Miranda ruling does not mean that the police should stop a person who enters a police
station and states that he wishes to confess to a crime. It does not affect volunteered
statements of guilt by persons not in police custody.
At the risk of repetitiousness we reproduce hereunder Chief Justice Warren's summary of
the procedural safeguards for persons in police custody where the interrogation is regarded
as the commencement already of the trial or adversarly system: 1wp h1. t
He (the accused) must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the
right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any
questioning if he so desires.
Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the
interrogation.
After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the
individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to
answer questions or make a statement.
But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the
prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be
used against him.
The above procedure was not followed by the police in this case. Hence, Severino Duero's
oral confession is inadmissible in evidence. Without that confession, the prosecution's other
evidence is not sufficient to establish Duero's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the death penalty is set aside. The accused is acquitted. He should be
released immediately unless he is being detained for another offense. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De
Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.1wph1. t
Conception Jr,. J., is on leave.


PEOPLE V LAYUSO

G.R. No. L-69210 July 5, 1989
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- appellee,
vs.
GUILLERMO LAYUSO, accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J .:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 153,
convicting the accused, Guillermo Layuso of the crime of ROBBERY with HOMICIDE and
imposing on him the supreme penalty of death.
The information reads:
that on or about the 14th day of October 1980, in the municipality of Pateros,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and
consent of the owner thereof, that is by then and there entering the residence
of one Cesar C. Avila, thru an opening not intended for egress or ingress, thru
which he gained entrance, and once inside, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the following articles, to
wit:
One (1) Radio Digital Alarm Clock valued P2,310.00
One (1) JVC brand Portable Radio/Tape recorder cassette valued 1,500.00
One Plated Unisex wrist watch value 500.00
One (1) set of collector's silver coin (CBP) 500.00

P 4,810.00
all in the total amount of P 4,810.00 belonging to said Cesar C. Avila, to the
damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the aforementioned amount of
P4,810.00.
That on the said occasion, the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Lucresia R.
Dagsaan with bladed weapons (knives), thereby inflicting upon the latter stab
wounds which directly caused her death.
Contrary to law. (Rollo. P. 5)
Upon arraignment on April 22, 1981, the accused assisted by a counsel-de-oficio, pleaded
"NOT GUILTY." Trial on the merits ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered on
September 12, 1984. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and it appearing that the commission of
the crime was attended by the aggravating circumstances of dwelling, lack of
respect due the victim on account of her sex and that the accused took
advantage of his superior strength, without having been off-set by any
mitigating circumstance, the Court hereby sentences the accused Guillermo
M. Layuso to suffer the penalty of Death, to indemnify the heirs of Lucresia
Dagsaan in the sum of Twelve Thousand (P l2,000.00) Pesos; to return to
Cesar C. Avila the things robbed and/or their value, as follows:
1. One (1) Radio Digital Alarm Clock worth P2,310.00
2. One (1) JVC Brand Portable Radio/Tape Recorder cassette
worth
1,500.00
3. One (1) plated unisex wrist watch worth 500.00
4. One (1) set of collector's silver coin worth 500.00

P4,810.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 9, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, let the
records of the above-entitled case be forwarded to the Supreme Court of the
Philippines for review as law and justice shall dictate. (Rollo, P. 35)
The facts of the case are summarized by the trial court as follows:
From the evidence adduced by prosecution, it has been duly established that
the accused Guillermo Layuso was one of the carpenters, who worked in the
construction of Cesar C. Avila's house, located at Agujo St., Pateros, Metro
Manila. After completion of the house, Cesar Avila used to hire Guillermo
Layuso to do carpentry work in said house. The last work done by Guillermo
Layuso was the construction of the garage.
At about noontime of October 14, 1980, somebody entered into the house of
Cesar Avila and killed his maid named Lucresia Dagsaan. The injuries
sustained by Lucresia Dagsaan, who was pronounced dead on arrival by the
doctors at the Rizal Provincial Hospital, were established thru the testimony
of Dr. Ruben M. Angobung, who conducted the autopsy, post mortem
examination.
xxx xxx xxx
In a follow-up investigation, the police found out that the culprit is Guillermo
Layuso. Upon physical investigation and examination of the house by the
police investigators accompanied by Cesar Avila, they found the following
articles or things missing from the house: 'A digital alarm clock worth
P2,310.00; a unisex watch worth P500.00; a radio tape recorder worth
Pl,500.00, and silver coin collection of P500.00. They also found bloodstains
in the sala; in the kitchen; in the master's bedroom, particularly on the
carpets; on the handle of the door knob to the office on the ground floor of the
house; and in the carpet inside the bedroom at the second floor. A kitchen
knife was found in the sala and another was found in the kitchen. There were
broken bottles in front of the bar and a broken bottle of catsup was also found
in the kitchen.
Sometime after the incident, Cesar Avila received a letter from the accused.
This letter although previously marked as Exhibit "A, could not be found in the
record of the case. Neither was the same turned over to the Minutes Clerk
when the Prosecuting Fiscal made an oral offer of evidence on April 9, 1984.
Through the testimony of tricyle drivers Lorenzo S. Bagang and Restituto
Castillo, it has been established that the accused Guillermo Layuso, stripped
of clothes from the waist up, with blood on the left shoulder and wound on the
hand, boarded the tricycle, first of Lorenzo Bagang, at the place near the
house of Cesar Avila at about noontime of October 14, 1980. He was bringing
something in a plastic bag, the height of which was demonstrated to be about
twenty four inches. The contents of the plastic bag were not seen by these
witnesses because it was closed and the accused placed the same between
his legs. The accused asked Lorenzo Bagang to take him to Rosario but the
latter refused because he had to fetch a passenger from the Municipal Hall.
The accused disembarked from the tricycle of Lorenzo Bagang at Morcilla
Street.
The accused, who was described by witness Restituto Castillo as 'sporting a
long hair' with 'a high bridged nose' and 'bringing along a plastic bag',
boarded the latter's (witness) tricycle at P. Herrera Street and alighted near a
basketball court, near the river, in Buting. The plastic bag, according to this
witness, has blood all over it.
Both Lorenzo Bagang and Restituto Castillo categorically identified the
accused in open court as the person who boarded their respective tricycles
on October 14, 1980. (Rollo, pp. 74-78)
The appellant admits he is guilty of homicide but assigns the following errors:
1. THAT THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE HEREIN APPELLANT FOR A SERIOUS
CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE.
2. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONVICTING
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF SIMPLE HOMICIDE. (Rollo,
p. 103; Appellee's Brief, p. 5)
The only issue raised in the case at bar is whether or not the appellant should be convicted
of the crime of robbery with homicide instead of the crime of simple homicide.
The accused-appellant contends that the prosecution has failed to prove that the articles
allegedly stolen were in fact in the house of Cesar Avila and it was the appellant who took
them. He states that the finding was based on his extra-judicial statement which he claims
was extracted through the use of force and intimidation.
The appellant admits that the confession was taken in the presence of counsel, a certain
Atty. Casiano Atuel, Jr. However, he states that the counsel was not present during the
custodial interrogation which preceded the taking down of his statement. He also questions
the sufficiency of the lawyer's representation. He states in his appeal that the lawyer should
have participated by also asking him questions.
The alleged coercion and maltreatment are not sustained by the records. There was a
lawyer present while the statement was being taken. The appellant did not complain to the
Fiscal before whom the oath was administered. In fact, the allegations are in the form of
general conclusions. There is no specific statement as to what constituted the coercion and
maltreatment. (People v. Canete, 129 SCRA 451 [1984]; People v. Villanueva, 128 SCRA
488 [1984]; and People v. Dejaresco, 129 SCRA 576 [1984]).
We rule that the constitutional requirement on assistance of counsel was fulfilled. There is
no claim or showing that the accused asked for a lawyer from the moment he was
apprehended or that he was not informed of his right to counsel from the time that the
warning or information should have been given to him or that the alleged earlier questioning
was already part of his confession. The appeal is hazy on these points.
What is established was the presence of counsel during the taking of the confession. The
attempt to now discredit him has no merit. If the lawyer decided against advising the
accused not to admit the crime, he was only complying with his oath as a lawyer to abide by
the truth and with the expressed desire of the accused to unburden his conscience of the
load it was carrying.
This Court denounces in the strongest terms possible the widespread misconception that
the presence of a lawyer under the "right to counsel" provision of the Constitution is
intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him. The right to
counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit
something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth. Whether it is an extra-judicial statement or testimony in open
court, the purpose is always the ascertainment of truth.
Moreover, the judgment of conviction was not made solely on the basis of the disputed
extra-judicial confession. Layuso admits the killing. The physical evidence such as the ten
stab wounds and three lacerated wounds; the bloodied plastic bag and the testimonies of
Cesar Avila and two other disinterested persons, namely Lorenzo Bagang and Restituto
Castillo are all consistent with robbery with homicide. In fact, even if an extrajudicial
confession is disregarded, the accused may still be convicted if there is enough evidence
aside from the confession itself. (People v. Nillos, 127 SCRA 207 [1984]).
The narration of the appellant as to how he appropriated for himself the items mentioned as
well as the sequence of the struggle could not have been supplied by any of those
interviewed by police investigators and neither by the police themselves because it is
replete with details known only to the appellant. As held in People v. Ribadajo (142 SCRA
637 [1986]), confessions replete with details only the appellants could have known are
presumably voluntary.
In the accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession, he admitted taking the things from
Cesar Avila's house. Avila, in turn, identified these as the items which were lost. Avila's
testimony closely interlocks with the appellant's statement on how he took the missing
items. In his court testimony, the appellant denied taking anything. This inconsistency
cannot be given credence on account of the uncontradicted testimonies of the two tricycle
drivers who saw him bringing a bloodied plastic bag containing items inside. (tsn., July
20,1981, p. 23).
There is no evidence on record which would show that Lorenzo Bagang and Restituto
Castillo were actuated by improper motives. Their testimonies should, therefore, be entitled
to full faith and credit (People v. Patog, 144 SCRA 429 [1986]; People v. Adones, 144
SCRA 364 [1986]). Their testimonies were also corroborated by the testimony of Cesar
Avila and by Layuso himself. The credibility of the appellant suffers when taken against the
testimonies of the other witnesses. The appellant merely resorts to denial as to the robbery
and a claim of self-defense as to the killing.
The fact that no one saw the accused take the items is of no consequence. There is
credible testimony regarding the loss. It is established that there were such articles of value.
He ran away and boarded two tricycles carrying a plastic bag with items inside it. The extra-
judicial confession of the accused discloses that he took the missing items.
The appellant's contention of self-defense must fail. His narration of the sequence of events
is clearly illogical and unconvincing primarily on account of its inconsistency. The testimony
of the accused cited by the trial judge in eleven (11) pages of his decision (Rollo, pp. 325-
336) clearly shows its lack of credibility. In his testimony in court, Layuso claims that he and
the victim were sweethearts and that after telling her he was going abroad to work, she got
mad, tore his shirt, and the struggle ensued. On the other hand, he likewise claims in his
extrajudicial confession that when he was on his way down, he met the victim who must
have suspected that he had stolen something and that when he went near her to bid her
goodbye, she suddenly stabbed him.
Assuming that they were sweethearts, the victim's alleged violent objections to his trip to
Saudi Arabia was correctly held unbelievable. Under the same circumstances, a sweetheart
would normally have welcomed the idea for the sake of a better future for both of them.
Granting that the victim objected, the objection could not have taken such a violent form as
to move the victim to resort to stabbing the appellant to prevent him from leaving. It is
likewise unbelievable that the victim would suddenly stab him when he came near her only
to say goodbye. And it is even more inexplicable why he would inflict so many multiple
wounds on various parts of her body under the circumstances that he alleges.
In the case of People v. Pineda and Garcia (157 SCRA 71, January 15, 1988), this Court
once more recognized the necessity of resorting to circumstantial evidence. We quote:
Crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where
concealment is highly probable. To require direct testimony in all cases would
result in the acquittal of guilty parties leaving them free to once more wreak
havoc on society.
We find the circumstantial evidence attending this case sufficient to warrant a
conviction. Rule 134, Sec. 5 of the Rules of Court states that there is
sufficiency in circumstantial evidence when: 1) there is more than one
circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. The requirements are satisfied in this case.
The record further shows that not only dwelling aggravated the commission of the crime, but
there was also a very patent display of lack of respect due the victim on account of her sex
and the viciousness of the wounds inflicted upon her.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
the penalty of death is commuted to reclusion perpetua in accordance with the Constitution,
Section 19, Article III. The indemnity to the heirs of Lucresia Dagsaan is also increased to
THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) in consonance with the latest rulings of this
Court.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE V LOVERIA

G.R. No. 79138 July 2, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DAVID LOVERIA y SANTOS, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for defendant-appellant.

CORTES, J .:
The accused-appellant David S. Loveria was charged before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch CLIX (159) with the crime of Robbery with Homicide and Frustrated Homicide under
the following information:
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1985, in the Municipality of
Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together with three (3) John Does whose true name, identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and mutually helping and aiding one another,
armed with a knife, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, hold-up a
passenger jeepney with Plate No. NXG-150-Pil. '84, one of the passengers,
Richard Bales y Andres of his Seiko Wrist Watch worth P300.00 and a
colored brown wallet containing P50.00, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter in the aforementioned amount of P350.00; that on the occasion of said
robbery, said accused, with intent to kill, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said knife one
Ricardo Yamson y Malanon, thereby inflicting upon him stab wounds which
directly caused his death, and one Cerilo Manzanero y Nacion the driver of
the said passenger jeepney, on the vital parts of his body, thereby inflicting
upon him stab wounds which ordinarily would have caused his death, thus
performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of
homicide as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
cause independent of the will of the accused, that is, due to the timely and
able medical attendance rendered to the said Cerilo Manzanero y Nacion
which prevented his death.
Contrary to law. (Rollo, p. 3).
Upon being arraigned on July 3, 1985, the appellant entered a plea of not guilty (Record, p.
18.)
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
On February 25, 1985, at around 7:00 in the evening, Cerilo Manzanero was
driving a jeepney fully loaded with passengers en-route from Cubao, Quezon
City to Cogeo, Marikina, Metro-Manila. While crossing the bridge of Barangay
Baranca, Marcos Highway, Marikina, Metro Manila, accused shouted "hold-
up" and Manzanero stopped his jeep. Accused who was seated right behind
Manzanero, poked a knife on the latter's right side of his nape and then pulled
him off his seat with the assistance of another companion into the inner rear
portion of the jeep; at the same time, stabbing Manzanero with knives at the
front and back of his body. Accused had three (3) other companions. One
was seated on the right side of the jeep, opposite accused; the two others
were seated opposite each other at the rear side of the jeep. Accused and his
three other companions divested the passengers of their jewelries, watches,
rings and necklaces.
Manzanero had a companion-conductor by the name of Richard Bales who
was seated in front of the jeep at the right side. He was likewise stabbed by
the other companion of accused who he identified as Martin Castaneda but
he sustained only slight injury on his finger. His Seiko watch was taken from
him.
Passenger Ricardo Yamson was likewise seated on the front part of the
jeepney in between driver Manzanero and conductor Bales. He was stabbed
by one of the holduppers and died that same night. Testimonies of victim
driver Cerilo Manzanero; passenger Betty S. Apolinario; conductor and victim
Richard Bales; Patrolmen Jaime Agueda and Bill Ayun (TSN, Hearings of
August 14 and 21, 1985; October 9, 1985; November 13, 1985; May 5, 1986;
June 23, 1986; July 15, 1986; December 8 and 23, 1986; January 6, 1987;
Exhibits B and I, C and O)
Cerilo Manzanero was brought to Sto. Nio Hospital at Marcos Highway and
then transferred to Quezon City Medical Center where he was treated by Dr.
Antonio P. Ligot who issued a Medico-Legal Certificate with the following
diagnosis:
Multiple stab wound antero-posterior chest wall, Bilateral,
Penetrating, Bilateral Hemothoax Bilateral Thoracostomy
(Exhs. A and A-1). Dr. Ligot testified that these injuries would have caused
the death of Manzanero were he not treated medically. (TSN, hearing of
October 21, 1986).
Mrs. Amada Yaco, mother-in-law of Manzanero presented receipts for
medicine expenses in the amount of P2,051.80 (Exhs. J, J-1 to J-19; M-4 to
M-6) doctor's fee of P3,000.00 (Exh. K); payments for the blood in the amount
of P470.00 (Exhs. L and M); and P2,700.00 for the hospital bills (Exhs. M-1 to
M-3) or a grand total of P8,221.80.
Victim Ricardo Yamson was brought to the Quirino Memorial Hospital at 8:30
in the evening of February 21, 1985 where he died of profuse hemmorrhage,
secondary to stab wound at 9:20 in the same evening (Exhs. F, G and H;
Testimony of Mrs. Carmelita Yamson, Hearing of February 3, 1986).itc-
asl Carmelita Yamson, victim's mother, testified that for the funeral parlor
services, they spent P5,300.00; for cemetery expenses, P1,700.00; for
transportation expenses, P750.00; for interment, P12,000.00; for 40 days
prayer period, P4,500.00; for expenses incurred during the preliminary
investigation on the Fiscal's office in Marikina, Metro Manila, P1,500.00; or a
total expenses of P28,750.00 which witness rounded off to P29,000.00 (TSN,
Hearing of February 3, 1986).
(Trial Court Decision, pp. 2-3.)
The defense offered by the appellant is summarized by his counsel as follows:
The accused David Loveria, 25 years old, formerly residing at Sitio Maagay,
Antipolo, Rizal and a volunteer worker of the Share and Care for Poor
Settlers Pastoral (SCAP for short) declared that on February 18, 1985, he
was attending a live-in seminar at the Communication for Asia in Old Sta.
Mesa, Manila. The duration of the seminar was from February 18 to February
22, 1989. Between 8:00 and 8:30 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1985,
upon permission from their training officer, he went to the Farmers Market in
Cubao to ask money from his mother for transportation fare for the following
day. When he failed to meet his mother, he decided to go back to the
Communication Foundation for Asia. Fortunately, at the loading zone for
passenger vehicles bound for Sta. Mesa, he met his father who gave him
money. After that, he went back to the Communication Foundation for Asia
and stayed there the whole evening. (TSN, pp. 6-13, January 5, 1987)
(Appellants Brief, p. 6.)
After trial, the trial court found the appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the
decision dated May 26, 1987 reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the prosecution having established the
guilt of (the) accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Court hereby finds
accused David Loveria GUILTY of the complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide and Frustrated Homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal
Code with the aggravating circumstance of having been committed in band,
without any mitigating circumstance; and, in relation to Article III, Section
19(1) of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, hereby
imposes upon him to suffer life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua; and
orders said accused:
(1) to pay the compulsory heirs of deceased victim Ricardo Yamson,
represented by his mother Conchita Yamson, the amount of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) as an indemnity for Ricardo Yamson's
death; TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as and for actual damages;
TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as and for moral damages; TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) as and for exemplary damages:
(2) to pay victim Cerilo Manzanero the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND TWO
HUNDRED TWENTY ONE PESOS & 80/100 (P8,221.80) as indemnity for
actual damages; P5,000.00 as and for moral damages; and P5,000.00 as and
for exemplary damages; and
(3) to indemnify Richard Bales the amount of THREE HUNDRED PESOS
(P300.00) for the unrecovered watch.
[Trial Court Decision, p. 7]
From this judgment of conviction, the appellant filed the present appeal.
The first issue raised by the appellant pertains to the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses.
To prove the culpability of the appellant, the prosecution presented the following witnesses:
Cirilo Manzanero, the driver of the jeepney: Richard Bales, the companion/conductor of
Manzanero; Betty Apolinario, a passenger of the jeepney; Dr. Antonio Ligot, the physician
who examined Manzanero; Pat. Bill Ayun and Pat. Jaime Ganueda, of the Marikina Police
Station who conducted an investigation of the incident. The following witnesses were also
presented to prove the civil liability arising from the crime: (1) Carmelita Yamson, the
mother of the victim Ricardo Yamson; and (2) Amada Yaco, the mother-in-law of
Manzanero.
The appellant specifically assails the credibility of Cerilo Manzanero, Betty Apolinario and
Richard Bales, all of whom positively identified the appellant as one of the perpetrators of
the crime.
According to Manzanero, while he was driving his fully loaded passenger jeepney on the
evening of February 21, 1985 from Cubao to Cogeo, Marikina, he heard a person from the
back announce a hold-up, which made him pull the jeepney to a sudden stop. Whereupon,
the passenger immediately behind him, or on the extreme left side of the jeepney, poked a
bladed weapon on the right side of his neck (TSN, August 14, 1985, p. 5). Manzanero was
able to identify the person who poked the knife at him as the appellant David Loveria
because the former managed to turn his face towards the latter (TSN, August 21, 1985, p.
13).
Manzanero was then taken by the appellant and three other men inside the jeepney, at the
back portion thereof, and was stabbed several times (TSN, August 14, 1985, p. 6). After the
stabbing, Manzanero's wristwatch and earnings were taken from him (TSN, August 21,
1985, p. 17). Injured, Manzanero rolled down from the jeepney but was able to flee (TSN,
August 14, 1985, p. 11).
Richard Bales, the companion/conductor of Manzanero, who was seated on the front seat
corroborated the testimony of Manzanero on almost all its material points. He testified that
he saw the appellant stab Manzanero (TSN, June 23, 1986, pp. 3-4 & 16). However, Bales
added that after the four men were finished with Manzanero, they turned to him and Ricardo
Yamson, a passenger who was also seated on the front seat beside Bales (Id, pp. 6-7).itc-
asl One of the robbers, whom Bales identified as a certain Martin Castaeda, stabbed him,
injuring his finger, and took his watch (Id.). The other robbers chased Yamson, who
attempted to flee, and stabbed him on the neck (Id., pp. 16-17). Yamson was taken to the
Quirino Memorial General Hospital but died that same night. [Exh. "F" (Medico-Legal
Certificate) and Exh. "G" (Autopsy Report)].
Betty S. Apolinario, a passenger who was seated on the left side of the jeepney testified
that the four hold-up men boarded the jeepney in Cubao (TSN, October 9, 1985, p. 5) and
seated themselves on the four corners of the jeepney (Id, p. 6). Apolinario stated that she
saw the appellant David Loveria poke a knife at the driver, pull the latter from the driver's
seat, and stab him after taking him to the inner back portion of the jeepney (Id., pp. 4-5).
She was able to remember the appellant because she was the third passenger from the
driver's back. In other words, there was only one person between her and the appellant (Id.,
p. 4). Apolinario also testified that the hold-up men forcibly took valuable from the
passengers (Id., p. 8).
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of Cerilo
Manzanero, the driver because of its improbability. The appellant argues that "(i)f indeed
the purpose was to stab the jeepney driver, then there was no need to bring him to the rear
portion of the jeepney to accomplish the purpose. He could be stabbed while seated at the
driver's seat." (Appellant's Brief, p. 7).
The contention is without merit. It is true that Manzanero could have been stabbed by the
appellant while the former was at the driver's seat. But neither was it improbable for
appellant to have stabbed Manzanero in the manner described by the latter and
corroborated by witnesses Apolinario and Bales. The motive which impelled the appellant
and his companions in pulling Manzanero out of the driver's seat and stabbing him at the
inner rear portion of the jeepney is known only to them. The Court will not speculate as to
why the appellant and his companions executed the crime in the manner that they did.
Crimes are known to have been executed in odd and unusual ways. But in the instant case,
the Court is of the considered view that there was nothing strange nor improbable in tile
testimony of Manzanero. Apolinario and Bales that after the jeepney stopped, the appellant
poked a knife at Manzanero, pulled the latter out of the driver's seat, and together with his
companions took him to the rear portion of the jeepney where Manzanero was eventually
stabbed and robbed of his wristwatch and earnings.
The appellant next turns to witness Betty S. Apolinario, contending that she failed to
positively identify the appellant because when asked to identify any of the holdup men who
may be present in court, she stated the following in reference to the appellant:, "I think he is
the one wearing a white T-shirt" [TSN, October 9, 1985, p. 7 ]. However, Apolinario's use of
the expression "I think" does not necessarily indicate her uncertainty as to the identity of the
appellant. In fact, when the defense tried to exploit, during the cross-examination of
Apolinario, the seemingly tentative statement just quoted, it became apparent that she was
sure and positive about the identity of the appellant. The pertinent portion of the cross-
examination is quoted as follows:
Q Mrs. Witness you also testified last time in answer to the
question of the private prosecutor, I quote, "This person who
stabbed the driver if you will see him, will you be able to identify
him?" and you said "Yes, sir". The next question, "Will you
please tell us whether this person is present in this courtroom?"
and you said "I think he is the one wearing a white T-shirt."
What do you mean by "I think he is the one wearing a white T-
shirt"?
A What I have in mind he is the one there that is why I am
pointing to him. (Witness pointing to the accused David
Loveria.)
Q Are you positive about the identification of the accused
David Loveria or could it be also another person?
A No, I am not wrong.
(TSN, November 13, 1985, pp. 18-19.)
To impugn further the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the appellant cites alleged
inconsistencies between the sworn statements given separately by Manzanero and Bales to
the police on the one hand, and their testimonies in open court, on the other hand. The
appellant claims that Manzanero did not mention in his affidavit (Exh. "I") that the hold-up
men took his money and valuables but on cross-examination, he declared that the holdup
men took his wristwatch and the boundary for the day. The appellant further claims that
Richard Bales did not implicate him in his affidavit but pointed to him on the witness stand.
Affidavits, taken ex parte, are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony y given in
open court [People v. Pacola, G.R. No.
L-26647, August 14, 1974, 58 SCRA 370]. The Court has consistently held that an affidavit,
taken ex parte, is almost always incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from partial
suggestions, sometimes from want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which the
witness may be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the
correction of the first suggestions of his memory and for his accurate recollection of all that
belongs to the subject. (People v. Tan, 89 Phil. 337 (1951); People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. L-
40727, September 11, 1980, 99 SCRA 697; People v. Avanzado, Jr., G.R. No. 73116,
February 29, 1988, 158 SCRA 427).
It has likewise been held that inconsistencies between the testimonies given during the
investigation stage and during the court proceedings may be disregarded without impairing
the credibility of the witnesses, considering such factors as illiteracy [People v. Sato, G.R.
No. L-47911, July 27, 1988, 163 SCRA 602] or inability of the witness to read the language
in which the ex parte affidavit was written [People v. Capinpin, Jr., G.R. No. 67785, October
4, 1988, 166 SCRA 233]. In the instant case, Manzanero explained his failure to state in the
affidavit that certain things were taken from him, by the fact that at the time of the execution
of the affidavit, he had just checked out from the hospital and was still under medication
(TSN, August 21, 1985. p. 17).
As a final assault on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the appellant notes the
delay by the former in reporting the incident.
The crime was committed on February 21, 1985. Manzanero reported the matter to the
police on March 14, 1985 (Exh. "B"). However, Manzanero was confined at the Quezon City
Medical Center from February 21 up to March 2, 1985 [Exh. "A"]. Hence, it is evident that
the lapse of time between the commission of the crime and the filing by Manzanero of a
complaint with the police, was due to the fact that he was still recuperating from the wounds
inflicted on him.
Although Richard Bales executed his affidavit only on May 7, 1985 [Exh. "O"], while Betty
Apolinario remained silent until she was presented in court to testify, these circumstances
alone should not destroy their credibility. The rule is well-established that the failure to
reveal or disclose at once the identity of the accused does not necessarily affect much less
impair, the credibility of the witness [People v. Valdez, G.R. No. 75390, March 25, 1988,
159 SCRA 152]. The initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal
case and their unwillingness to be involved in criminal investigations due to fear of reprisal
is common and has been judicially declared not to affect credibility (People v. Rosario, G.R.
No. L-46161, February 25, 1985,134 SCRA 497).
In fine, the Court, after a thorough examination of the entire record of the case, especially
the transcript of stenographic notes, finds the trial court's reliance on the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses to convict the appellant, to be well-founded. The claims made by the
appellant have not impaired the credibility of the prosecution witnesses who positively
identified him as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
Finally, the appellant assails the manner in which he was identified by Manzanero at the
headquarters of the 225th Philippine Constabulary (PC) in Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal, claiming
violation of his constitutional right to counsel.
Sec. 20, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at the time the events under
review occurred reads:
Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled to be witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free
will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in the evidence.
Sec. 12(1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution provides similar guarantees by stating:
Sec. 12(1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services
of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
The court must emphasize that the so-called Miranda rights contained in the abovequoted
constitutional provisions may be invoked by a person only while he is under custodial
investigation [People v. Duero, G.R. No. 52016, May 13, 1981, 104 SCRA 379]. which has
been defined as the "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way" [People v. Caguioa, G.R. No. L-38975, January 17, 1980, 95 SCRA 2, 9 citing
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436]. Hence, for instance, these constitutional rights may no
longer be claimed by a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court [People v.
Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989] because he is no longer under custodial investigation.
The ruling enunciated in Gamboa v. Cruz, [G.R. No. 56291, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 642],
concerning the right to counsel of a person under custodial investigation finds application in
the instant case. In that case, the accused was arrested for vagrancy and taken to the
police station. The following day he was placed on a line-up and a female complainant
pointed to him as one of the persons who robbed her. While on trial, the accused filed a
motion to acquit or demurrer to evidence on the ground, among others, that he was
deprived of his constitutional right to counsel at the time the complainant was in the process
of accusing or identifying him for allegedly committing a crime. The motion having been
denied by the trial court, the accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Supreme Court, which ruled that the right to counsel of a person under custodial
investigation cannot be invoked until such time that the police investigators start
questioning, interrogating or exacting a confession from the person under investigation. The
Court held that in the police line-up conducted in that particular case, it was the complainant
who was being investigated and who gave a statement to the police while the accused was
not questioned at all. Thus, the Court concluded that the latter could not, during the line-up,
invoke his right to counsel because he was not under custodial interrogation. In the case at
bar, Manzanero, upon learning that certain hold-up men were being detained at the 225th
PC Company, Cogeo, Antipolo, Rizal in connection with another robbery, went there to
check. Having identified the appellant among the detainees, he reported the matter to the
Marikina police [See Exh. "B"]. Thereafter, Pat. Bill Ayun accompanied Manzanero back to
the PC headquarters in Antipolo where Manzanero identified to Pat. Ayun the appellant as
one of the persons involved in the incident. Pat. Ayun then took the sworn statement of
Manzanero which was presented in court as Exh. "B" [TSN, December 8, 1986, p. 3.] Since,
as in the Gamboa case, the appellant was not investigated when Manzanero was in the
process of identifying him, he cannot claim that his right to counsel was violated because at
that stage, he was not entitled to the constitutional guarantee invoked.
But even assuming that the process of identification of the appellant by Manzanero at the
PC headquarters was attended by constitutional infirmities, only Manzanero's sworn
statement (Exh. "B") where he identified appellant and which was taken by Pat. Ayun, would
be excluded for being inadmissible in evidence. The testimony of Manzanero made in open
court positively identifying the appellant, as well as those of Richard Bales and Betty
Apolinario, would not be affected. These testimonies, taken together with the other evidence
on record, would be sufficient to sustain the trial court's judgment of conviction.
The defense of alibi put up by the appellant has not helped him any for it has not destroyed
the damaging effects of the evidence for the prosecution. Courts look upon the defense of
alibi with suspicion and always receive it with caution, not only because it is inherently weak
but also because of its easy fabrication [People v. Badilla, 48 Phil. 718 (1926); People v.
Lumantas, G.R. No. 16383, May 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 157; People v. Genoguin, G.R. No.
23019, March 28, 1974, 56 SCRA 181; People v. Gaddi, G.R. No. 74065, February 27,
1989, 129 SCRA 649: People v. Salcedo, G.R. No. 78774, April 12, 1989; People v.
Somera, G.R. No. 65589, May 31, 1989]. For alibi to succeed, it must be shown not only
that the accused was at some other place but that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the site of the crime at the time of its commission. (U.S. v. Oxiles, 29 Phil. 587
(1915): People v. Alcantara, G.R. No. 26807, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 812; People v.
Pigon, G.R. No. 76048, May 29, 1989).itc -asl In People v. Lumantas (G.R. No. L-28355, July 17,
1969, 28 SCRA 764), where the accused claimed that at the time of the killing he was in
another barangay two kilometers away from the scene of the crime, the Court held that it
was not impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the
time of its commission. In the case at bar, the appellant admitted his presence in Cubao on
the night the crime was committed (TSN, January 6, 1987, p. 14).it c-a sl The Court notes the fact
that the four men who committed the crime boarded the jeepney in Cubao (TSN, October 9,
1985, p. 5). And although according to the appellant, he was in Cubao at 8:30 p.m. while
the crime was committed between 7:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. in Marikina, the Court rules that
the required physical impossibility of being at the scene of the crime has not been proved
for alibi as a sufficient defense to become available to the appellant.
Moreover, the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the
prosecution witnesses that the accused committed the crime (People v. Chavez, G.R. No.
L-38603, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 221; People v. Torres, G.R. No. 76711,
September 26, 1988, 165 SCRA 702; People v. Sabado, G.R. No. 76952, December 22,
1988, 168 SCRA 681.)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED


PEOPLE V TAYLARAN

G.R. No. L-49149 October 23, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO TAYLARAN alias "Goring" defendant-appellant.

DE CASTRO, * J .:
Charged with murder ill the Court of First Instance of Bohol, appellant was convicted and
sentenced to life imprisonment and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P
12,000 and to pay costs. Appealing to this Court, appellant insists on his defense of
accidental, not deliberate killing.
We quote hereunder from the appealed decision the versions of both the prosecution and
the defense, as set forth therein:
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
At about 10:00 P.M. of November 5, 1976 accused called at the house of deceased
Ofremia Atup y Sarabosing located in barrio Binliw, Ubay, Bohol for the purpose of
submitting himself to the latter for treatment of his snake-bite located at this left foot. His
announced purpose being good, the deceased opened the door for him. Once inside, the
deceased took her medicine paraphernalia (she being a local quack doctor) and started
treating the accused. Then all of a sudden the accused drew his small bolo (Exhibit A)
and stabbed the deceased several times causing her to fall on the floor dead. After killing
the deceased, accused proceeded to the house of the son of the deceased for the
purpose of killing him and his wife but accused did not accomplish his purpose because
the deceased's son refused to left him enter his house. After that the accused
surrendered himself with his bolo to policeman Demetrio Basilad who was then on guard
at the municipal hall of Ubay. When asked why he killed the deceased who was also his
grandmother-in-law, accused answered, 'because she promised to kill me with a 'barang',
hence killed her first. (Testimonies of Salvador Atup, policeman Demetrio Basilad and
Juanita Busalla)
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE
At about 9:00 P.M. on November 5, 1976 accused went to tend to his carabao. On the
way, he was bitten by a snake at the smallest toe of his left foot. Hence, he proceeded to
the house of his grandmother-in-law, Ofremia Sarabosing which was located in barrio
Binliw Ubay, Bohol for treatment of snake-bite. Ofremia Sarabosing was a quack doctor
known to cure snake-bites. He arrived at deceased's house at about 10:00 P.M. The
deceased opened the door to let him enter. Once inside he and the deceased stood on
the floor facing each other. Then the deceased instructed accused to open his snake-bite
with a bolo (Exhibit A) so that the venom can be drained out. While he was opening his
snake-bite with a bolo, he accidentally put out the light of the kerosene lamp which was
placed on the floor, This prompted the deceased to re-light said lamp. She banded her
body down with her two hands extended towards the floor to light said lamp. At the very
time that deceased was bending her body downward, accused lifted his right hand which
was holding the bolo upward, so that the point of the bolo accidentally hit deceased's
right chest penetrating the nipple and resulting in her death. Upon realizing that the
deceased was fatally wounded, accused asked for her forgiveness and after that he ran
away. (Testimonies of accused himself and Elpidio Mendez).
1

As the trial court prefaced its decision, which version is correct?
That the deceased died from wounds inflicted by the appellant is not disputed. As gleaned
from the opposing versions set forth above, the conflict is in how the wounds were inflicted
whether with deliberate intent, or purely by accident.
It is extremely difficult to accept the accident version of appellant which he purveyed without
corroboration. More than one wound was found sustained by the deceased, on different
parts of the body. One single stroke could not have inflicted all of them. The first wound
could possibly have been accidentally inflicted, but the other, wounds could not have been
similarly inflicted if, as just pointed out, they did not result from the first blow. Their locations
preclude that a single blow produced all the wounds. This fact robs the accident theory of
appellant of any plausibility.
The explanation of appellant as to how the wounds other than that located on the right chest
was inflicted simply cannot inspire belief. In trying to succor the old woman when she fell
upon being hit accidentally with the point of the bolo, as appellant alleged, he could not
have kept on holding the bolo. He would have dropped it instantly, as instinct would have
made him do so. The infliction of more wounds after the first was therefore deliberate and
not by mere accident. It is, likewise, hard to believe that a mere accidental hitting with the
point of the small bolo, and therefore not with so much force, would inflict a wound that is so
fatal as that sustained on the chest.
That the wounding was with intent to kill is reflected by appellant's statement that he killed
the old woman because she had allegedly promised to kill him by "barang" or by witchcraft,
which he gave upon surrendering to Pat. Demetrio Basilad at the Municipal Building. It was
just natural for appellant to explain to the police why he was surrendering. For Pat. Basilad
to testify on what appellant said on this score is thus perfectly proper, and full credence
must be accorded to him, being obviously an impartial witness. It is not a matter of whether
the statement is a part of the res gestae to be admissible.
Appellant of course denies having made the admission, but in the light of the other evidence
of the prosecution, his denial is not convincing. As demonstrated earlier, his accident theory
of the killing merits not much credibility from the mere fact that more than one wound was
inflicted which could not have resulted from just one blow. Repeated blows easily negates
any claim of wounding by mere accident.
The fact that he was not allowed to enter the house of Juanita Busalla, daughter of the
deceased, when he went there directly from the old woman's house, would show that he
appeared, by his behavior or words, that he was dangerously in an angry mood, which is
indicative of being a deliberate killer rather than a sorrowful and harmless penitent for a
killing he has committed only by accident. As Juanita also testified, when appellant was
already in jail, he told her that he killed her mother because of witchcraft, corroborating Pat.
Basilad's testimony. It would, therefore, be of no avail for appellant to contend that the
court a quo erred in admitting appellant's statement he made upon surrendering that he
killed the deceased because the latter intended to kill him by witchcraft as part of the res
gestae. The testimony of both Pat. Basilad and Juanita Busalla on the inculpatory statement
of appellant is legally admissible not because the statement is part of the res gestae, but for
said witnesses having heard appellant made the statement on their own perception.
It is hard to see why the aforementioned witnesses testified on the admission of appellant
the way they did unless they were prompted only by the truth. If appellant had surrendered
with an admission of killing the old woman by accident, as he must have tried to impress
upon the authorities if such was the truth, Pat. Basilad had no reason to give the killing the
graver character than what it really was. As far as he is concerned, he had no more problem
relative to the solution of the crime, which is the usual cause for police twisting the truth or
other form of excesses when conducting investigations the desire to solve a crime by all
means.
That Dr. Silverio Gaviola who issued the post-mortem examination report failed to testify
thereon because he died before he could be called to the stand, so unduly stressed to show
the quality of his report as hearsay, does not affect the sufficiency of the evidence against
appellant to entitle him to the acceptance of his claim of accident to exempt him from
criminal liability. As already shown, such evidence is more than adequate to make the mind
rest at ease on appellant's guilt as charged. The autopsy report, if not admitted as such, is
part of the testimony of Pat. Sarabosing. He testified on the number and location of the
wounds, and his testimony, being that of a peace officer with basic knowledge in medico-
legal medicine, having taken a course therein (p. 26, tsn, May 21, 1978) may well serve the
purpose of the autopsy report, if the report is not itself admissible as independent evidence,
as appellant would insist.
Appellant has also invoked the provision of Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution in trying
to block the admission of his declaration to Pat. Basilad that he killed Ofremia Atup because
of her alleged vow to kill him by witchcraft, contending that the safeguards therefor have not
been made available to him. The cited provision reads:
Section 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such right No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free
will shall be used against himself. Any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The applicability of the foregoing provision does not seem to contemplate cases like the
print where no written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of
formal custodial investigation. What was testified to is only what appellant told the police
why he is surrendering to them. It is but natural for one who surrenders to the police to give
reason or explanation for his act of surrendering. It can hardly be said that under such
circumstance, the surrendered is already "under investigation within the meaning of the
constitutional provision. As the Solicitor General correctly observes on the circumstances of
this case: "If however, he voluntarily admits the killing and it was precisely because he
surrendered to admit the killing, the constitutional safeguards to be informed of his rights to
silence and to counsel may not be invoked."
In any case, as previously pointed out, another witness, Juanita Busalla, who is not a
policeman also testified to appellant telling her when he was already in jail, that he killed
Ofremia Atup because of her promise to kill him by means of witchcraft, the same
declaration he supposedly made to Pat. Basilad, upon surrendering after the killing. The
constitutional safeguard invoked can have no application to Juanita's testimony on what
appellant told her not in the course of a police investigation.
At any rate, even without the admission, the accident version of appellant is inherently
incredible. As already stated, that he was not allowed by Ofremia's daughter and husband
to enter their house when he went there direct from the old woman's house is a strong proof
that he did not exhibit the harmless mood of a repentant killer as he should visibly appear to
them if the killing was only accidental. On the contrary, he must have appeared so angry,
displaying unmistakable intent to kill then after killing their mother, as the daughter Juanita
Busalla, so testified. (pp. 30-39, tsn, Feb. 1, 1978).
Verily, the issue is one of credibility. The lower court gave more of it to the testimony of the
prosecution witnesses. We find no reason to disturb the lower court's appreciation of the
relative credibility of the opposing witnesses.
2
Moreover, appellant having admitted the
killing, the burden of proving the exempting circumstance he has invoked in his defense
calls for clear and convincing evidence, as is required of similar defenses as that of self-
defense.
3
This, he failed dismally to fulfill.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed, with costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concur in the result.



PEOPLE V DOMANTAY
G.R. No. 130612 May 11, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BERNARDINO DOMANTAY, @ "JUNIOR OTOT," accused-appellant.

MENDOZA, J .:
This case is here on appeal from the decision
1
of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City
(Branch 57), finding accused-appellant guilty of rape with homicide and sentencing him to
death, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P480,000.00, and to pay the
costs.
The facts hark back to the afternoon of October 17, 1996, at around 4 o'clock, when the
body of six-year old Jennifer Domantay was found sprawled amidst a bamboo grove in
Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan. The child's body bore several stab wounds. Jennifer had
been missing since lunch time.
The medical examination conducted the following day by Dr. Ma. Fe Leticia Macaranas, the
rural health physician of Malasiqui, showed that Jennifer died of multiple organ failure and
hypovolemic shock secondary to 38 stab wounds at the back. Dr. Macaranas found no
lacerations or signs of inflammation of the outer and inner labia and the vaginal walls of the
victim's genitalia, although the vaginal canal easily admitted the little finger with minimal
resistance. Noting possible commission of acts of lasciviousness, Dr. Macaranas
recommended an autopsy by a medico-legal expert of the NBI.
2

The investigation by the Malasiqui police pointed to accused-appellant Bernardino
Domantay, a cousin of the victim's grandfather, as the lone suspect in the gruesome crime.
At around 6:30 in the evening of that day, police officers Montemayor, de la Cruz, and de
Guzman of the Malasiqui Philippine National Police (PNP) picked up accused-appellant at
the Malasiqui public market and took him to the police station where accused-appellant,
upon questioning by SPO1 Antonio Espinoza, confessed to killing Jennifer Domantay. He
likewise disclosed that at around 3:30 that afternoon, he had given the fatal weapon used, a
bayonet, to Elsa and Jorge Casingal, his aunt and uncle respectively, in Poblacion Sur,
Bayambang, Pangasinan. The next day, October 18, 1996, SPO1 Espinoza and another
policeman took accused-appellant to Bayambang and recovered the bayonet from a tricycle
belonging to the Casingal spouses. The police officers executed a receipt to evidence the
confiscation of the weapon.
3

On the basis of the post-mortem findings of Dr. Macaranas, SPO4 Juan Carpizo, the
Philippine National Police chief investigator at Malasiqui, filed, on October 21, 1996, a
criminal complaint for murder against accused-appellant before the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Malasiqui. On October 25, 1996, Dr. Ronald Bandonill, medico-legal expert of the
NBI, performed an autopsy on the embalmed body of Jennifer. The result of his examination
of the victim's genitalia indicated that the child's hymen had been completely lacerated on
the right side. Based on this finding, SPO4 Carpizo amended the criminal complaint against
accused-appellant to rape with homicide. Subsequently, the following information was
filed:
4

That on or about the 17th day of October, 1996, in the afternoon, in barangay
Guilig, Municipality of Malasiqui, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with lewd design and armed with a bayonnete, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with Jennifer Domantay, a
minor of 6 years old against her will and consent, and on the same occasion,
the said accused with intent to kill, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously stab with the use of a bayonnete, the said Jennifer Domantay,
inflicting upon her multiple stab wounds, which resulted to her death, to the
damage and prejudice of her heirs.
At the trial, the prosecution presented seven witnesses, namely, Edward, Jiezl, Lorenzo, all
surnamed Domantay, Joselito Mejia, Antonio Espinoza, Celso Manuel, and Dr. Ronald
Bandonill, to establish its charge that accused-appellant had raped and killed Jennifer
Domantay.
Edward Domantay testified that in the morning of October 17, 1996, accused-appellant and
his two brothers-in-law, Jaime Caballero and Daudencio Macasaeb, had a round of drinks in
front of the latter's house in Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan. Edward Domantay said that he
was in front of Macasaeb's house, tending to some pigeons in his yard.
5
After the group had
consumed several bottles of San Miguel gin, accused-appellant gave money to Edward
Domantay and asked him to buy two bottles of gin and a bottle of Sprite.
6
Edward said he
joined the group and sat between Daudencio Macasaeb and accused-appellant.
7
Edward
said that accused-appellant, who, apparently had one too many then, rolled up his shirt and
said: "No diad Antipolo tan L[i]pa et walay massacre, diad Guilig wala, walay massacren
kod dia, walay onakis-akis" ("In Antipolo and Lipa, there were massacres; here in Guilig,
there will also be a massacre. I will massacre somebody here, and they will cry and cry").
Edward Domantay saw that tucked in the left side of accused-appellant's waistline was a
bayonet without a cover handle.
8
It was not the first time that Edward had seen accused-
appellant with the knife as the latter usually carried it with him.
9

Jiezl Domantay, 10, likewise testified. She said that, at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon on
October 17, 1996, she and four other children were playing in front of their house in Guilig,
Malasiqui, Pangasinan. Jiezl saw accused-appellant and Jennifer Domantay walking
towards the bamboo grove of Amparo Domantay where Jennifer's body was later found.
Accused-appellant was about two meters ahead of Jennifer. The bamboo grove was about
8 to 10 meters from the house of Jiezl Domantay.
10

Lorenzo Domantay, a relative of the victim, corroborated Jiezl's testimony that accused-
appellant had gone to Amparo Domantay's bamboo grove in the afternoon of October 17,
1996. Lorenzo said that afternoon, on his way to his farm, he saw accused-appellant about
30 meters away, standing at the spot in the bamboo grove where Jennifer's body was later
found. Accused-appellant appeared restless and worried as he kept looking around.
However, as Lorenzo was in a hurry, he did not try to find out why accused-appellant
appeared to be nervous.
11

Prosecution witness Joselito Mejia, a tricycle driver, said that, in the afternoon of October
17, 1996, he was about to take his lunch at home in Alacan, a neighboring barangay about
half a kilometer from Guilig, when accused-appellant implored Mejia to take him to
Malasiqui at once. Mejia told accused-appellant that he was going to take his lunch first, but
the latter pleaded with him, saying they will not be gone for long. Mejia, therefore, agreed.
Mejia noticed that accused-appellant was nervous and afraid. Accused-appellant later
changed his mind. Instead of going to the town proper, he alighted near the Mormon's
church, outside Malasiqui.
12

In addition, the prosecution presented SPO1 Antonio Espinoza and Celso Manuel who
testified that, on separate occasions, accused-appellant had confessed to the brutal killing
of Jennifer Domantay.
SPO1 Espinoza testified that he investigated accused-appellant after the latter had been
brought to the Malasiqui police station in the evening of October 17, 1996. Before he
commenced his questioning, he apprised accused-appellant of his constitutional right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel, in English, which was later
translated into Pangasinense.
13
According to SPO1 Espinoza, accused-appellant agreed to
answer the questions of the investigator even in the absence of counsel and admitted killing
the victim. Accused-appellant also disclosed the location of the bayonet he used in killing
the victim.
14
On cross-examination, Espinoza admitted that at no time during the course of
his questioning was accused-appellant assisted by counsel. Neither was accused-
appellant's confession reduced in writing.
15
Espinoza's testimony was admitted by the trial
court over the objection of the defense.
Celso Manuel, for his part, testified that he is a radio reporter of station DWPR, an AM
station based in Dagupan City. He covers the third district of Pangasinan, including
Malasiqui. Sometime in October 1996, an uncle of the victim came to Dagupan City and
informed the station about Jennifer Domantay's case.
16
On October 23, 1996, Manuel went
to Malasiqui to interview accused-appellant who was then detained in the municipal jail. He
described what transpired during the interview thus:
17

PROS. QUINIT:
Q Did you introduce yourself as a media practitioner?
A Yes, sir.
Q How did you introduce yourself to the accused?
A I showed to Bernardino Domantay alias "Junior Otot" my I.D.
card and I presented myself as a media practitioner with my
tape recorder [in] my hand, sir.
Q What was his reaction to your request for an interview?
A He was willing to state what had happened, sir.
Q What are those matters which you brought out in that
interview with the accused Bernardino Domantay alias "Junior
Otot"?
A I asked him what was his purpose for human interest's sake
as a reporter, why did he commit that alleged crime. And I
asked also if he committed the crime and he answered "yes."
That's it.
xxx xxx xxx
PROS. QUINIT:
Q You mentioned about accused admitting to you on the
commi[ssion] of the crime, how did you ask him that?
A I asked him very politely.
Q More or less what have you asked him on that particular
matter?
A I asked "Junior Otot," Bernardino Domantay, "Kung
pinagsisisihan mo ba ang iyong ginawa?" "Opo" sabi niya, "Ibig
mo bang sabihin Jun, ikaw ang pumatay kay Jennifer?", "Ako
nga po" The [l]ast part of my interview, "Kung nakikinig ang
mga magulang ni Jennifer, ano ang gusto mong iparating?",
"kung gusto nilang makamtan ang hustisya ay tatanggapin ko".
That is what he said, and I also asked Junior Otot, what was
his purpose, and he said, it was about the boundary dispute,
and he used that little girl in his revenge.
On cross-examination, Manuel explained that the interview was conducted in the jail, about
two to three meters away from the police station. An uncle of the victim was with him and
the nearest policemen present were about two to three meters from him, including those
who were in the radio room.
18
There was no lawyer present. Before interviewing accused-
appellant, Manuel said he talked to the chief of police and asked permission to interview
accused-appellant.
19
On questioning by the court, Manuel said that it was the first time he
had been called to testify regarding an interview he had conducted.
20
As in the case of the
testimony of SPO1 Espinoza, the defense objected to the admission of Manuel's testimony,
but the lower court allowed it.
Dr. Bandonill, the NBI medico-legal who conducted an autopsy of the victim on October 25,
1996, testified that Jennifer Domantay died as a result of the numerous stab wounds she
sustained on her back,
21
the average depth of which was six inches.
22
He opined that the
wounds were probably caused by a "pointed sharp-edged instrument."
23
He also noted on
the aforehead, neck, and breast bone of the victim.
24
As for the results of the genital
examination of the victim, Dr. Bandonill said he found that the laceration on the right side of
the hymen was caused within 24 hours of her death. He added that the genital area showed
signs of inflammation.
25

Pacifico Bulatao, the photographer who took the pictures of the scene of the crime and of
the victim after the latter's body was brought to her parents' house, identified and
authenticated the five pictures (Exhibits A, B, C, D, and E) offered by the prosecution.
The defense then presented accused-appellant as its lone witness. Accused-appellant
denied the allegation against him. He testified he is an uncle of Jennifer Domantay (he and
her grandfather are cousins) and that he worked as a janitor at the Malasiqui Municipal Hall.
He said that at around 1 o'clock in the afternoon of October 17, 1996, he was bathing his
pigs outside in the house of his brother-in-law Daudencio Macasaeb in Guilig, Malasiqui,
Pangasinan. He confirmed that Daudencio was then having drinks in front of his
(Macasaeb's) house. Accused-appellant claimed, however, that he did not join in the
drinking and that it was Edward Domantay, whom the prosecution had presented as
witness, and a certain Jaime Caballero who joined the party. He also claimed that it was he
whom Macasaeb had requested to buy some more liquor, for which reason he gave money
to Edward Domantay so that the latter could get two bottles of gin, a bottle of Sprite, and a
pack of cigarettes.
26
He denied Edward Domantay's claim that he (accused-appellant) had
raised his shirt to show a bayonet tucked in his waistline and that he had said he would
massacre someone in Guilig.
27

Accused-appellant also confirmed that, at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, he went to
Alacan passing on the trail beside the bamboo grove of Amparo Domantay. But he said he
did not know that Jennifer Domantay was following him. He further confirmed that in Alacan,
he took a tricycle to Malasiqui. The tricycle was driven by Joselito Mejia. He said he alighted
near the Mormon church, just outside of the town proper of Malasiqui to meet his brother.
As his brother did not come, accused-appellant proceeded to town and reported for work.
That night, while he was in the Malasiqui public market, he was picked up by three
policemen and brought to the Malasiqui police station where he was interrogated by SPO1
Espinoza regarding the killing of Jennifer Domantay. He denied having owned to the killing
of Jennifer Domantay to SPO1 Espinoza. He denied he had a grudge against the victim's
parents because of a boundary dispute.
28
With respect to his extrajudicial confession to
Celso Manuel, he admitted that he had been interviewed by the latter, but he denied that he
ever admitted anything to the former.
29

As already stated, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive
portion of its decision reads:
30

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused,
Bernardino Domantay @ "Junior Otot" guilty beyond reasonable doubt with the crime of
Rape with Homicide defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
in relation and as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and accordingly, the Court hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection, and to indemnify the heirs
of the victim in the total amount of Four Hundred Eighty Thousand Pesos
(P480,000.00),
31
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleges that:
32

I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION[S] MADE BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
First. Accused-appellant contends that his alleged confessions to SPO1 Antonio Espinoza
and Celso Manuel are inadmissible in evidence because they had been obtained in violation
of Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution and that, with these vital pieces of evidence excluded,
the remaining proof of his alleged guilt, consisting of circumstantial evidence, is inadequate
to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
33

Art. III, 12 of the Constitution in part provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this section or section
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence.
This provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation, that is, "when the investigation
is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular
person as a suspect."
34
R.A. No. 7438 has extended the constitutional guarantee to
situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been
"invited" for questioning.
35

Decisions
36
of this Court hold that for an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must
satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must
be in writing.
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the Malasiqui police station in
the evening of October 17, 1996,
37
he was already a suspect, in fact the only one, in the
brutal slaying of Jennifer Domantay. He was, therefore, already under custodial
investigation and the rights guaranteed in Art. III, 12(1) of the Constitution applied to him.
SPO1 Espinoza narrated what transpired during accused-appellant's interrogation:
38

[I] interrogated Bernardino Domantay, prior to the interrogation conducted to
him, I informed him of his constitutional right as follows; that he has the right
to remain silent; that he has the right to a competent lawyer of his own choice
and if he can not afford [a counsel] then he will be provided with one, and
further informed [him] that all he will say will be reduced into writing and will
be used the same in the proceedings of the case, but he told me that he will
cooperate even in the absence of his counsel; that he admitted to me that he
killed Jennifer Domantay, and he revealed also the weapon used [and] where
he gave [it] to.
But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was neither put in writing nor
made in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the waiver is invalid and his confession is
inadmissible. SPO1 Espinoza's testimony on the alleged confession of accused-appellant
should have been excluded by the trial court. So is the bayonet inadmissible in evidence,
being, as it were, the "fruit of the poisonous tree." As explained in People v. Alicando:
39

. . . According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to
have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the
"fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized
evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized
evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based the principle that
evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other
evidence because the originally illegal obtained evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained.
We agree with the Solicitor General, however, that accused-appellant's confession to the
radio reporter, Celso Manuel, is admissible. In People v.
Andan,
40
the accused in a rape with homicide case confessed to the crime during
interviews with the media. In holding the confession admissible, despite the fact that the
accused gave his answers without the assistance of counsel, this Court said:
41

[A]ppellant's [oral] confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section
12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not
concern itself with the relation between a private individual and another
individual. It governs the relationship between the individual and the State.
The prohibitions therein are primarily addressed to the State and its agents.
Accused-appellant claims, however, that the atmosphere in the jail when he was
interviewed was "tense and intimidating" and was similar to that which prevails in a
custodial investigation.
42
We are not persuaded. Accused-appellant was interviewed while
he was inside his cell. The interviewer stayed outside the cell and the only person besides
him was an uncle of the victim. Accused-appellant could have refused to be interviewed, but
instead, he agreed. He answered questions freely and spontaneously. According to Celso
Manuel, he said he was willing to accept the consequences of his act.
Celso Manuel admitted that there were indeed some police officers around because about
two to three meters from the jail were the police station and the radio room.
43
We do not
think the presence of the police officers exerted any undue pressure or influence on
accused-appellant and coerced him into giving his confession.
Accused-appellant contends that "it is . . . not altogether improbable for the police
investigators to ask the police reporter (Manuel) to try to elicit some incriminating
information from the accused."
44
This is pure conjecture. Although he testified that he had
interviewed inmates before, there is no evidence to show that Celso was a police beat
reporter. Even assuming that he was, it has not been shown that, in conducting the
interview in question, his purpose was to elicit incriminating information from accused-
appellant. To the contrary, the media are known to take an opposite stance against the
government by exposing official wrongdoings.
Indeed, there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting for the police or that the
interview was conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that accused-appellant
confessed to the killing our of fear. As already stated, the interview was conducted on
October 23, 1996, 6 days after accused-appellant had already confessed to the killing to the
police.
Accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession is corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti,
namely, the fact of death of Jennifer Domantay. In addition, the circumstantial evidence
furnished by the other prosecution witnesses dovetails in material points with his
confession. He was seen walking toward the bamboo grove, followed by the victim. Later,
he was seen standing near the bamboo grove where the child's body was found. Rule 133
of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. An
extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground
for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence ofcorpus delicti.
4. Evidence necessary in treason cases. No person charged with treason
shall be convicted unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt
act, or on confession in open court.
Accused-appellant argues that it was improbable for a brutal killing to have been committed
without the children who were playing about eight to ten meters from Amparo Domantay's
grove, where the crime took place, having heard any commotion.
45
The contention has no
merit. Accused-appellant could have covered the young child's mouth to prevent her from
making any sound. In fact, Dr. Bandonill noted a five by two inch (5" x 2") contusion on the
left side of the victim's forehead, which he said could have been caused by a hard blunt
instrument or by impact as her head hit the ground.
46
The blow could have rendered her
unconscious, thus precluding her from shouting or crying.
Accused-appellant also contends that the testimony of Jiezl Domantay contradicts that of
Lorenzo Domantay because while Jiezl said she had seen accused-appellant walking
towards the bamboo grove, followed by the victim, at around 2 o'clock in the afternoon on
October 17, 1996. Lorenzo said he saw accused-appellant standing near the bamboo grove
at about the same time.
These witnesses, however, did not testify concerning what they saw exactly the same time.
What they told the court was what they had seen "at around" 2 o'clock in the afternoon.
There could have been a between difference in time, however little it was, between the time
Jiezl saw accused-appellant and the victim walking and the time Lorenzo saw accused-
appellant near the place where the victim's body was later found. Far from contradicting
each other, these witnesses confirmed what each had said each one saw. What is striking
about their testimonies is that while Jiezl said she saw accused-appellant going toward the
bamboo grove followed by the victim "at around" 2 o'clock in the afternoon on October 17,
1996, Lorenzo said he had seen accused-appellant near the bamboo grove "at around" that
time. He described accused-appellant as nervous and worried. There is no reason to doubt
the claim of these witnesses. Lorenzo is a relative of accused-appellant. There is no reason
he would testified falsely against the latter. Jiezl, on the other hand, is also surnamed
Domantay and could also be related to accused-appellant and has not been shown to have
any reason to testify falsely against accused-appellant. At the time of the incident, she was
only 10 years old.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court is convinced of accused-appellant's guilt with respect
to the killing of the child. It is clear that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable
doubt that accused-appellant is guilty of homicide. Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code
provides:
Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 [parricide] shall
kill another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in
the next preceding article [murder], shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be
punished by reclusion temporal.
The killing was committed with the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength. The record shows that the victim, Jennifer Domantay, was six years old at the time
of the killing. She was a child of small build, 46" in height.
47
It is clear then that she could
not have put up much of a defense against accused-appellant's assault, the latter being a
fully grown man of 29 years. Indeed, the physical evidence supports a finding of abuse of
superior strength: accused-appellant had a weapon, while the victim was not shown to have
had any; there were 38 stab wounds; and all the knife wounds are located at the back of
Jennifer's body.
But we think the lower court erred in finding that the killing was committed with
cruelty.
48
The trial court appears to have been led to this conclusion by the number of
wounds inflicted on the victim. But the number of wounds is not a test for determining
whether there was circumstance.
49
"The rest . . . is whether the accused deliberately and
sadistically augmented the victim's suffering thus . . . there must be proof that the victim
was made to agonize before the [the accused] rendered the blow which snuffed out [her]
life."
50
In this case, there is no such proof of cruelty. Dr. Bandonill testified that any of the
major wounds on the victim's back could have caused her death as they penetrated her
heart, lungs and liver, kidney and intestines.
51

Second. There is, however, no sufficient evidence to hold accused-appellant guilty of raping
Jennifer Domantay. Art. 335. of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in part provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprive of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
As the victim here was six years old, only carnal knowledge had to be proved to
establish rape. Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual
intercourse or sexual bodily connections with a woman.
52
For this purpose, it is
enough if there was even the slightest contact of the male sex organ with the labia of
the victim's genitalia.
53
However, there must be proof, by direct or indirect evidence,
of such contact.
Dr. Ronald Bandonill's report on the genital examination he had performed on the deceased
reads:
54

GENITAL EXAMINATION; showed a complete laceration of the right side of
the hymen. The surrounding genital area shows signs of inflammation.
xxx xxx xxx
REMARKS: 1) Findings at the genital area indicate the probability of
penetration of that area by a hard, rigid instrument.
Hymenal laceration is not necessary to prove rape;
55
neither does its presence prove its
commission. As held inPeople v. Ulili,
56
a medical certificate or the testimony of the
physician is presented not to prove that the victim was raped but to show that the latter had
lost her virginity. Consequently, standing alone, a physician's finding that the hymen of the
alleged victim was lacerated does not prove rape. It is only when this is corroborated by
other evidence proving carnal knowledge that rape may be deemed to have been
established.
57

This conclusion is based on the medically accepted fact that a hymenal tear may be caused
by objects other than the male sex organ
58
or may arise from other causes.
59
Dr. Bandonill
himself admitted this. He testified that the right side of the victim's hymen had been
completely lacerated while the surrounding genital area showed signs of inflammation.
60
He
opined that the laceration had been inflicted within 24 hours of the victim's death and that
the inflammation was due to a trauma in that area.
61
When asked by the private prosecutor
whether the lacerations of the hymen could have been caused by the insertion of a male
organ he said this was possible. But he also said when questioned by the defense that the
lacerations could have been caused by something blunt other than the male organ. Thus,
he testified:
62

PROS. F. QUINIT:
Q Now, what might have caused the complete laceration of the
right side of the hymen,doctor?
A Well, sir, if you look at my report there is a remark and it says
there; findings at the genital area indicated the probability of
penetration of that area by a hard rigid instrument.
Q Could it have been caused by a human organ?
A If the human male organ is erect, fully erect and hard then it
is possible, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. VALDEZ:
Q In your remarks; finding at the genital area indicates the
probability of penetration of that area by a hard rigid
instrument, this may have also been caused by a dagger used
in the killing of Jennifer Domantay is that correct?
A Well, sir when I say hard rigid instrument it should not be
sharp pointed and share rigid, it should be a hard bl[u]nt
instrument.
Q Do you consider a bolo a bl[u] instrument, or a dagger?
A The dagger is a sharp rigid but it is not a bl[u]nt instrument,
sir.
Q This Genital Examination showed a complete laceration of
the right side of the hymen, this may have been possibly
caused by a dagger, is it not?
A No, sir. I won't say that this would have been caused by a
dagger, because a dagger would have made at its incision . . .
not a laceration, sir.
Q But this laceration may also have been caused by other
factors other the human male organ, is that correct?
A A hard bl[u]nt instrument, sir could show.
Q My question is other than the human male organ?
A Possible, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q You mentioned that the hymen was lacerated on the right
side?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q And if there is a complete erection by a human organ is this
possible that the laceration can only be on the right side of the
hymen?
A Yes, your Honor, its possible.
Q How about if the penetration was done by a finger, was it the
same as the human organ?
A Well, it defends on the size of the finger that penetrat[es] that
organ, if the finger is small it could the superficial laceration,
and if the finger is large then it is possible your honor.
Q How about two fingers?
A Possible, sir.
To be sure, this Court has sustained a number of convictions for rape with homicide based
on purely circumstantial evidence. In those instances, however, the prosecution was able to
present other tell-tale signs of rape such as the location and description of the victim's
clothings, especially her undergarments, the position of the body when found and the
like.
63
In People v. Macalino,
64
for instance, the Court affirmed a conviction for the rape of a
two-year old child on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
65

The Court notes that the testimony or medical opinion of Dr. Gajardo that the
fresh laceration had been produced by sexual intercourse is corroborated by
the testimony given by complainant. Elizabeth that when she rushed upstairs
upon hearing her daughter suddenly cry out, she found appellant Macalino
beside the child buttoning his own pants and that she found some sticky fluid
on the child's buttocks and some blood on her private part.(Emphasis in the
original)
In contrast, in the case at bar, there is no circumstantial evidence from which to infer that
accused-appellant sexually abused the victim. The only circumstance from which such
inference might be made is that accused-appellant was seen with the victim walking toward
the place where the girl's body was found. Maybe he raped the girl. Maybe he did not.
Maybe he simply inserted a blunt object into her organ, thus causing the lacerations in the
hymen. Otherwise, there is no circumstance from which it might reasonably be inferred that
he abused her, e.g., that he was zipping up his pants, that there was spermatozoa in the
girl's vaginal canal.
Indeed, the very autopsy report of Dr. Bandonill militates against the finding of rape. In
describing the stab wounds on the body of the victim, he testified:
66

[A]fter examining the body I took note that were several stab wounds . . .
these were all found at the back area sir . . . extending from the back
shoulder down to the lower back area from the left to the right.
Considering the relative physical positions of the accused and the victim in crimes of
rape, the usual location of the external bodily injuries of the victim is on the
face,
67
neck,
68
and anterior portion
69
of her body. Although it is not unnatural to find
contusions on the posterior side, these are usually caused by the downward
pressure on the victim's body during the sexual assault.
70
It is unquestionably
different when, as in this case, all the stab wounds (except for a minor cut in the
lower left leg) had their entry points at the back running from the upper left shoulder
to the lower right buttocks.
It is noteworthy that the deceased was fully clothed in blue shorts and white shirt when her
body was immediately after it was found.
71
Furthermore, there is a huge bloodstain in the
back portion of her shorts.
72
This must be because she wearing this piece of clothing when
the stab wounds were inflicated or immediately thereafter, thus allowing the blood to seep
into her shorts to such an extent. As accused-appellant would naturally have to pull down
the girl's lower garments in order to consummate the rape, then, he must have, regardless
of when the stab wounds were inflicted, pulled up the victim's shorts and undergarments
after the alleged rape, otherwise, the victim's shorts would not have been stained so
extensively. Again, this is contrary to ordinary human experience.
Even assuming that Jennifer had been raped, there is no sufficient proof that it was
accused-appellant who had raped her. He did not confess to having raped the victim.
From the foregoing, we cannot find that accused-appellant also committed rape. In the
special complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the homicide must be
established beyond reasonable doubt.
73

Third. The trial court ordered accused-appellant to pay the heirs of Jennifer Domantay the
amount of P30,000.00 as actual damages. However, the list of expenses produced by the
victim's father, Jaime Domantay, only totaled P28,430.00. Of this amount, only P12,000.00
was supported by a receipt. Art. 2199 of the Civil Code provides that a party may recover
actual or compensatory damages only for such loss as he has duly proved. Therefore, the
award of actual damages should be reduced to P12,000.00.
In addition, the heirs of Jennifer Domantay are entitled to recover exemplary damages in
view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Art.
2230 of the Civil Code provides for the payment of exemplary damages when the crime is
committed with one or more aggravating circumstance. An amount of P25,000.00 is
deemed appropriate.
74

In accordance with our rulings in People v. Robles
75
and People v. Mengote,
76
the
indemnity should be fixed at P50,000.00 and the moral damages at P50,000.00.
77

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE and another one is rendered
FINDING accused-appellant guilty of homicide with the aggravating circumstance of abuse
of superior strength and sentencing him to a prison term of 12 years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ORDERING him to pay the
heirs of Jennifer Domantay the amounts of P50,000.00, as indemnity, P50,000.00, as moral
damages, P25,000.00, as exemplary damages, and P12,000.00, as actual damages, and
the costs.1wphi 1.n t
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Purisima and Buena, JJ., no took part.

PEOPLE V TAN

[G.R. No. 117321. February 11, 1998]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. HERSON
TAN y VERZO, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J .:
May the confession of an accused, given before a police investigator upon invitation
and without the benefit of counsel, be admissible in evidence against him?
Accused-appellant Herson Tan, along with Lito Amido, were charged with the crime
of highway robbery with murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, of Gumaca,
Quezon Province, under an information
[1]
dated February 8, 1989, which reads as
follows:
That on or about the 5th day of December 1988, along the Maharlika
Highway at Barangay Tinandog, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping each other, armed with bladed and pointed weapons, with intent to
gain, by means of force, violence, threats and intimidation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away from one Freddie
Saavedra, a Honda TMX motorcycle with a sidecar bearing Plate No. DW
9961 valued at THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) Philippine
currency, belonging to the said Freddie Saavedra, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid amount; and that on the occasion of
said robbery and by reason thereof, the said accused, with intent to kill, with
evident premeditation and treachery, and taking advantage of their superior
strength and in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said weapon said
Freddie Saavedra, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple stab wounds on
the different parts of his body, which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
On arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge.
The relevant facts established by the prosecution are as follows:
On December 5, 1988, at about 7:00 oclock p.m., tricycle driver Freddie
Saavedra went to see his wife, Delfa, at Our Lady of Angels Academy in
Atimonan, Quezon, where the latter is a third year high school student, to
inform her that he will drive both accused to Barangay Maligaya. It was the
last time, however, that Freddie was seen alive. When the latter failed to
return that evening, Delfa, as early as 4:30 oclock a.m. of December 6, 1988
inquired on his whereabouts from relatives and friends. In the course of such
inquiry, a certain Arnel Villarama revealed that the lifeless body of her
husband was discovered on the diversion road at Barangay Malinao in
Atimonan. Forthwith, they proceeded to the said place and found him
sprawled on the ground with fourteen stab wounds in different parts of his
body.
Meanwhile, relying on the information that an abandoned sidecar of a tricycle was
sighted at Barangay Malinao, Lucena Philippine National Police (PNP) led by Lt. Carlos
Santos proceeded to the scene of the crime and recovered a blue sidecar which they
brought back with them to their headquarters. Subsequently, Lt. Santos, Cpl.
Numeriano Aguilar and Pat. Rolando Alandy invited appellant in connection with the
instant case and with respect to two other robbery cases reported in Lucena
City. During their conversation, appellant allegedly gave an explicit account of what
actually transpired in the case at bar. He narrated that he and co-accused Amido were
responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and the consequent death of
Saavedra. Moreover, he averred that they sold the motorcycle to a certain Danny
Teves of Barrio Summit, Muntinlupa for a sum of P4,000.00. With the help of appellant
as a guide, the Lucena PNP immediately dispatched a team to retrieve the same.
After admitting that it was purchased from both the accused and upon failure to
present any document evidencing the purported sale, Teves voluntarily surrendered it to
the police who turned it over, together with the sidecar, to the Atimonan Police Station
for safekeeping.
Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited appellant to their
headquarters, he had no warrant for his arrest. In the course thereof, he informed the
latter that he was a suspect, not only in the instant case, but also in two other robbery
cases allegedly committed in Lucena City. In the belief that they were merely
conversing inside the police station, he admitted that he did not inform appellant of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to the assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce
the supposed confession to writing.
[2]

Appellant, on the other hand, alleged that he had no participation in the offense
charged and contended that his only involvement in the matter was the referral of
accused Amido to Teves. He recounted that sometime in December 1988, Amido
sought him at his house and told him that the motorcycle he was riding on was being
offered for sale. Upon proof shown that it was indeed registered under Amidos name,
he accompanied the latter to Manila on board the said motorcycle and they approached
Antonio Carandang. The latter, thereafter, brought them to a certain Perlita Aguilar and
Danilo Teves with whom the sale was finally consummated. He allegedly
received P150.00 as his commission.
Amido presented alibi as his defense. He alleged that although a tricycle driver by
occupation, he was at Barangay Malusak, Atimonan on the day in question, some
seven kilometers from the town, busy assisting in the renovation of his mothers
house. He narrated that the victim was his friend and, therefore, he could not have
participated in the gruesome death of the latter.
In a decision dated April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premised in the foregoing considerations, this Court finds
Herson Tan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Highway
Robbery with Murder and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of
RECLUSION PERPETUA. He is further ordered to indemnify the family of the
deceased in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
Due to insufficiency of evidence, Lito Amido is hereby ACQUITTED of the
charges against him and the Provincial Warden of Quezon, Provincial Jail,
Lucena City, is hereby ordered to release from custody the person of said Lito
Amido, unless he is being detained thereat for some other lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
[3]

Appellant assails the finding of conviction despite failure of the prosecution to
positively identify him as the culprit of the crime and to present clear and convincing
circumstantial evidence that would overcome his innocence.
In light of the above facts and circumstances, the appealed decision is set aside
and appellant acquitted on the ground that his constitutional rights were violated.
It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or
admission and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as
inadmissible in evidence against the confessant. Article III, Section 12, paragraphs (1)
and (3) of the Constitution provides:
x x x x x x x x x
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
x x x x x x x x x
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible against him.
Republic Act No. 7438 (R.A. No. 7438),
[4]
approved on May 15, 1992, reenforced the
constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under custodial investigation, a
pertinent provision
[5]
of which reads:
As used in this Act, custodial investigation shall include the practice
of issuing an invitation to a person who is investigated in connection with an
offense he is suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of
the inviting officer for any violation of law.
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate
as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and
begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police
carries out a process of interrogations that tends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements that the rule begins to operate.
[6]

Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of
the investigating officer, the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that
there must correspondingly be a meaningful communication to and understanding
thereof by the accused. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to
the accused would thus not suffice.
[7]

Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be
admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must
be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be
express; and (4) it must be in writing.
[8]

While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however,
be voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with the
assistance of counsel.
[9]
To reiterate, in People v. Javar,
[10]
it was ruled therein that any
statement obtained in violation of the constitution, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in
whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a
grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible
in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily
given.
The records of this case do not indicate that appellant was assisted by counsel
when he made such waiver, a finding evident from the testimony of Lt. Santos on cross-
examination, thus:
Q Now, when you brought Herson Tan to the Headquarters, did you tell him that he is one
of the suspects in the robbery slain (sic) that took place in Atimonan on December 5,
1988?
A Yes, sir, and he was also suspect to the robbery case which was investigated at Lucena
Police Station. There were two (2) cases which were investigated on Herson Tan.
Q Now, so in addition to the Atimonan case, you also took Herson Tan to your custody in
connection with another case that happened in Lucena?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you happened to have Herson Tan in your list as suspect in both cases because
Herson was previously incarcerated at Lucena City Jail in connection with a certain
case, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Just for curiosity sake, you invited him in your headquarters, is that what happened in
this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q And it just happened that without applying third degree to him he gave you that
information?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you notify him of his constitutional right to counsel before you propounded questions
to him?
A No, sir, because we are asking question only to him.
Q Before propounding question or information you sought to elicit from him, did you inform
him of his constitutional right not to testify against himself because he is a suspect in
these two (2) cases?
A No, sir, because we were just conversing.
[11]
(Underscoring supplied)
The evidence for the prosecution shows that when appellant was invited for
questioning at the police headquarters, he allegedly admitted his participation in the
crime. This will not suffice to convict him, however, of said crime. The constitutional
rights of appellant, particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel, are impregnable
from the moment he is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to
have committed, even if the same be initiated by mere invitation. This Court values
liberty and will always insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a
condition sine qua nonagainst the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of
government.
[12]

What remains of the evidence for the prosecution is inadequate to warrant a
conviction. Considering the circumstances attendant in the conduct of appellants
investigation which fell short of compliance with constitutional safeguards, we are
constrained to acquit the appellant.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Gumaca, Quezon (Branch 62) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant HERSON
TAN y VERZO is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged and his immediate release
from confinement is hereby ordered, unless there is any other lawful cause for
continued detention. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, (Chairman), CJ., Kapunan, Francisco, and Purisima, JJ., concur.


PEOPLE V HERMOSO
[G.R. No. 130590. October 18, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RANILLO
PONCE HERMOSO alias ALLAN, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
Per Curiam:
For review is the decision
[1]
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Pagadian City, finding accused-appellant Ranillo Ponce Hermoso, alias
Allan, guilty of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
death with all the accessory penalties prescribed by law and to indemnify the
heirs of the victim, Glery P. Geoca, in the amount of P500,000.00 as actual
damages, P750,000.00 as moral damages, and P500,000.00 as exemplary
damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The amended information
[2]
against accused-appellant alleged
That on June 2, 1996 at about 9:30 oclock in the evening at Barangay Little Baguio,
Municipality of Imelda, Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Republic of the Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Glery Geoca, a minor, seven (7) years of
age, against the latters will and on said occasion and by reason of the rape, the said
Glery Geoca died as a result of personal violence inflicted upon her by the accused.
Act contrary to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No.
7659.
On September 11, 1996, accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, was
arraigned during which the information was read to him in the Cebuano dialect
which he confirmed to have understood. He then entered a plea of not
guilty. He was informed by the trial court of the names of the five prosecution
witnesses and their respective addresses. Then the case was tried.
The prosecution presented six witnesses, namely, Josephine Gonzales,
Naciansino Hermoso, Sonny Boy Altamera, Joveniano Pansacala, Ireneo
Geoca, father of the victim, and Dr. Atilano A. Ocampos, Chief of Hospital I of
the Alicia District Hospital in Alicia, Zamboanga del Sur.
The prosecution also offered the following object and documentary
evidence, to wit: the wallet (Exh. A) of accused-appellant containing his
personal identification, such as Social Security System I.D. Card No.
0462677-7 (Exh. B), a photocopy of his SSS personal record (Exh. D), and his
Community Tax Certificate No. 18046043 (Exh. E); five sweepstakes tickets
bearing No. 236458 with April 21, 1996 as draw date (Exh. C); a picture of
Miss Limpac (Exh. F), niece of Naciansino Hermoso, with a dedication at the
back of the picture reading Love, take care, good health, good luck, God
Bless You; a small picture (Exh. G); another picture (Exh. H); a picture of
accused-appellants younger sister (Exh. I) a picture of his younger brother
named Benjie (Exh. J); a group picture (Exh. K); and two coins (Exh. L) - a
P1.00 coin and a P0.10 coin; the birth certificate of the victim Glery P. Geoca
(Exh. M, with sub-markings) showing her date of birth as September 12, 1988;
and a Certification issued by Dr. Atilano A. Ocampos (Exh. N and its sub-
markings) on the postmortem examination conducted on the victim.
The prosecution evidence shows the following:
At about 6:00 p.m. of June 2, 1996, Ireneo Geoca, father of the victim
Glery P. Geoca, became worried as his daughter had not come home from
the Little Baguio Elementary School in Imelda, Zamboanga del Sur where she
was in Grade II. Ireneo Geoca sent his other daughter Girlie Geoca to look for
the victim. When the victim failed to be home at 7:00 p.m., Ireneo Geoca
sought the help of the barangay officials and his neighbors.
[3]
In response,
Barangay Captain Sonny Boy Altamera organized a search team composed
of barangay tanods and other civilians. On their way to look for Glery,
Altamera and his party met Josephine Gonzales who told them that she saw
the victim in the company of accused-appellant at about 5:30 p.m. of that day
as they passed by her house. The two were walking toward the house of one
Helen Dabasol, according to the witness. Altamera was likewise informed by
Lilia Bartido, who owned a nearby store, that she saw accused-appellant
handing some candies to the victim at about 6:00 p.m. of that day.
[4]

Altamera and his party, therefore, proceeded to the house of accused-
appellant where he met Federico Hermoso, father of the accused-
appellant. Altamera informed the elder Hermoso that Glery was missing and
that she was last seen with his son. Altamera was allowed inside the house
but he did not find accused-appellant. He later found accused-appellant under
a tree, about 10 meters away from the house. Accused-appellant denied
knowledge of the whereabouts of the missing girl. At about 9:30 a.m., with the
consent of his family, accused-appellant was taken by Altamera to his
house. Accused-appellant was accompanied by Federico Hermoso, Ernesto
Pardillo, Jave Tamac, and some neighbors.
[5]

At about 12:30 a.m. of June 3, 1996, Naciansino Hermoso and his group
went to the house of Altamera bringing with them a mans wallet, which
Naciansino said he found on a grassy area in Barangay Little Baguio. The
wallet contained, among other things, accused-appellants SSS identification
card, a photocopy of his SSS personal record, his Community Tax Certificate
No. 18046043, five sweepstakes tickets, pictures of accused-appellants
younger brother and sister, and two coins.
[6]
Naciansino turned over the wallet
and its contents to Barangay Captain Altamera. Upon seeing his wallet,
accused-appellant admitted raping and killing Glery P. Geoca and pointed out
the place where the body of the victim could be found, which is about 200
meters away from where the wallet was discovered.A team led by Joveniano
Pansacala found the body of the victim at about 1:00 a.m. of that day. The
body showed signs that Glery had been subjected to violence and raped.
Accused-appellant was thereafter turned over to the police. In the
meantime, upon instructions of the mayor, the body of the victim was
examined.
[7]
Per her Certificate of Death,
[8]
the cause of Glery P. Geocas
death was cardio-respiratory failure, the antecedent cause was rape and the
underlying cause was asphyxia by strangulation. Dr. Atilano A. Ocampos, who
conducted an autopsy on the body on June 3, 1996, found the following:
= Multiple punctuate hematoma temporal right, abrasions inner canthi, bilateral;
hematoma 8 inches in length, 1 inch in width, semi-circular, temporo-frontal area,
face left, extending to the zygomztic area; multiple abrasions of buccal mucosa
upper and lower lips
= Multiple abrasions 1x1 in diameter, average, neck
= Circular hematoma 2x3 in diameter, bilateral, mammary glands
= Massive hematoma 3x3 in diameter, circular, lateral arm left; linear abrasions
multiple, forearm right
= Abrasion 1 centimeter diameter 5
th
finger, left, dorsum
= Multiple abrasion lateral and medial aspect upper extending right
= Hematoma massive vulva and mons pubis
= Hematoma moderate 2 in number anterior thigh, right
= Hematoma 1x 1 in diameter middle anterior shin, left
= Linear abrasion 1 inch postero-lateral, level of the 10
th
posterior rib
= Linear abrasion 6 inches in length running oblique lumbo-sacral area, posterior
=Massive hematoma 4 inches in diameter level of the 10
th
thoracic vertebrae
=Hematoma labia minora right upper quadrant
= Laceration, entroitus, ruptured hymen
= Hematoma cervix left, laceration vaginal canal right
[9]

Dr. Ocampos testified that the body was in a state of rigor mortis when he
examined it. The victim sustained contusions and multiple hematoma and was
thereafter choked to death. He opined that the hymenal laceration could have
been caused by pressure or trauma such as sexual intercourse.
[10]

After the prosecution had offered its testimonial and documentary
evidence, accused-appellant filed a demurrer to which the prosecution filed a
reply. On January 9, 1997, the trial court denied accused-appellants demurrer
to evidence for lack of merit.
On March 17, 1997, the defense manifested in open court that accused-
appellant was changing his plea from not guilty to guilty. Defense counsel
Atty. Pablito Pielago, Jr. informed the trial court that he had prepared for trial
but accused-appellant insisted on changing his plea even after being told of
the consequences of pleading guilty to the charge, including the probability
that he would be sentenced to death should he be found guilty. Accordingly,
the trial court issued an order on the same day stating:
When the above-entitled case was called for continuation of trial for the purpose of
presenting evidence of accused Ranillo Ponce Hermoso alias Allan, Prosecutor
Edilberto Absin appeared for the state in collaboration with private prosecutor Atty.
Marcial Empleo, while Atty. Pablito Pielago, Jr., appeared as counsel de oficio for the
accused. In open court, Atty. Pablito Pielago, Jr., Manifested that the accused has
intimated to him on his desire to change his plea of Not Guilty to one of
GUILTY. When asked by the Court whether he has explained to the accused of the
seriousness of the crime he is charged, Atty. Pablito Pielago, Jr., confirmed to the
Court that he has explained in detail to the accused on the seriousness of the charge he
is facing, but he still insisted on his desire to admit his guilt. In fact, according to Atty.
Pielago, he went to the extent of telling the accused that it is possible that the Court
may render the penalty of death, but accused insisted on his desire to change his plea
of Not Guilty to one of Guilty.
With such manifestation of Atty. Pielago, the Court called on the accused and asked
him through the interpreter in Cebuano dialect, which he confirmed to have known
and understood, on his desire to change his plea of Not Guilty to one of Guilty, and in
open court, in the presence of his counsel, the public prosecutor and the private
prosecutor, accused voluntarily admitted his guilt of the charge filed against him in
this case.
WHEREFORE, with such desire of the accused to change his plea from Not Guilty
to one of Guilty, let him be arraigned anew.
SO ORDERED.
[11]

The defense then informed the court that it was not presenting any
evidence, for which reason the case was considered submitted for decision.
On June 10, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds accused RANILO PONCE HERMOSO alias
Allan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE WITH HOMICIDE,
and sentences him to the ultimate penalty of DEATH, with all the accessory penalties
prescribed by law, and orders him to pay the heirs of Glery Geoca the sum of
P500,000.00 as actual damages, P750,000.00 as moral damages and P500,000.00 as
exemplary damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[12]

Pursuant to Rule 122, section 10 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
case was elevated to this Court for automatic review in view of the imposition
of the death penalty on accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant maintains that, based on the evidence of the
prosecution, his guilt has not been shown beyond reasonable
doubt. Reiterating the grounds for his demurrer to the evidence, he contends
that while Josephine Gonzales said she saw the victim and accused-appellant
and other children pass by her house as they went towards the house of her
neighbor Helen Rabasol, there was no testimony showing that he was the
perpetrator of the crime. Accused-appellant also denies the testimony of
Naciansino Hermoso who claimed to have found the wallet belonging to
accused-appellant while looking for Glery P. Geoca. Accused-appellant avers
that the wallet does not constitute direct evidence to link him to the
crime. Naciansino Hermoso and accused-appellants father are
brothers. Accused-appellant claims that Naciansino had a grudge against
accused-appellants father because the latter had been occupying and
cultivating the agricultural land of their parents to the exclusion of
Naciansino.Accused-appellant alleges that Naciansino sought revenge
towards accused-appellants father by testifying against accused-
appellant. Accused-appellant alleges that the testimonies of Joveniano
Pansacala, Dr. Atilano A. Ocampos, and Ireneo Geoca are hearsay evidence
and do not prove his guilt. He argues that his confession is inadmissible in
evidence because it was given without counsel while he was under custodial
investigation by Barangay Captain Sonny Boy Altamera.
These contentions are without merit.
To be sure, a perusal of the records show that the trial court accepted
accused-appellants plea of guilty to a capital offense without making a
searching inquiry to determine whether he understood the consequences of
his plea. This is contrary to Rule 116, section 3 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure which makes it the duty of the court, when an accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, to undertake the following: (1) conduct a searching
inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accuseds comprehension of
the consequences thereof; (2) require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) ask the accused if
he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires.
[13]
To constitute a searching inquiry, the questioning must focus on (1)
the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) whether the accused understood fully
the consequences of his plea.
[14]
The judge must be convinced that in pleading
guilty, the accused is truly guilty by requiring the accused to narrate the
events leading to the crime, making him re-enact it, or asking him to supply
missing details.
In the present case, the records show that the trial court did not observe
these safeguards to ensure that the plea of guilty is not improvidently
made. There was no affidavit presented nor statement made in court to show
why accused-appellant changed his plea from Not guilty to guilty. The
records merely contain an order, dated March 17, 1997,
[15]
allowing accused-
appellant to be arraigned anew, the Certificate of Arraignment, dated March
17, 1997,
[16]
and the order, likewise dated March 17, 1997, making accused-
appellants plea of guilt of record. This last order states:
Accused Ranillo Ponce Hermoso alias Allan having manifested in court duly assisted
by his counsel to change his plea of Not Guilty to one of Guilty, the Court arraigned
him anew by reading the Information in Cebuano dialect, and in open court, duly
assisted by Atty. Pablito Pielago, Jr., his counsel de oficio, accused entered the plea of
Guilty, changing in effect his original plea of Not Guilty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and the Court having been satisfied on the
voluntariness of the change of plea of Guilty from one of Not Guilty by accused
Ranillo Ponce Hermoso, consider the above-entitled case as deemed submitted for
decision.
SO ORDERED.
[17]

In the case of People vs. Nadera,
[18]
we explained the importance of the
trial court conducting a searching inquiry, thus:
The warnings given by the trial court in this case fall short of the requirement that it
must make a searching inquiry to determine whether accused-appellant understood
fully the import of his guilty plea. As has been said, a mere warning that the accused
faces the supreme penalty of death is insufficient. (People v. Estomaca, 326 Phil. 429
(1996)). For more often than not, an accused pleads guilty upon bad advice or because
he hopes for a lenient treatment or a lighter penalty. The trial judge must erase such
mistaken impressions. (People v. Bello, G.R. Nos. 130411-14, October 13, 1999) He
must be completely convinced that the guilty plea made by the accused was not made
under duress or promise of reward. The judge must ask the accused the manner the
latter was arrested or detained, and whether he was assisted by counsel during the
custodial and preliminary investigations. In addition, the defense counsel should also
be asked whether he conferred with the accused and completely explained to him the
meaning and the consequences of a plea of guilt. Furthermore, since the age,
educational attainment and socio-economic status of the accused may reveal insights
for a proper verdict in the case, the trial court must ask questions concerning
them. (People v. Estomaca, supra) In this case, absent any showing that these
questions were put to accused-appellant, a searching inquiry cannot be said to have
been undertaken by the trial court.
However, although accused-appellants plea of guilty was improvidently
made, there is no need to remand the case to the lower court for the reception
of evidence in view of the fact that there exists other evidence on which
accused-appellants conviction may be based. Independently of his plea, there
is sufficient evidence showing that accused-appellant indeed committed the
crime with which is charged.
First. In the absence of eyewitnesses to the crime, a case of rape with
homicide poses difficulty of proving by direct evidence the culpability of the
accused because the victim can no longer testify. In such a case, the
evidence necessarily must be circumstantial.
[19]
Under Rule 133, section 4 of
the Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a
conviction if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
[20]
As has been said, facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and
inconsistent with innocence constitute evidence which, in weight and
probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the
court.
[21]

In this case, there is circumstantial evidence pointing to accused-appellant
as the author of the crime of rape with homicide, to wit:
1. Accused-appellant was seen with the victim Glery P. Geoca by
Josephine Gonzales and Lilia Bartido between 5:30 to 6:00 p.m. of June 2,
1996;
2. A wallet belonging to accused-appellant and containing the latters
identification cards and other personal effects was found near the scene of the
crime;
3. The body of the victim was found at about 1:00 a.m. of June 3, 1996 at
the exact location pointed by accused-appellant;
4. The grass in the place where the accused-appellants wallet was found
had been trampled upon as if there was a fight of pigs (maora ug gibugno-an
ug baboy), suggesting that a struggle took place between the accused-
appellant and the victim, as a result of which accused-appellant dropped his
wallet;
5. The postmortem examination conducted by Dr. Atilano A. Ocampos at
6:30 p.m. of June 3, 1996 showed hematoma and abrasions on different parts
of the victims body indicating that she had been strangled and lacerations on
her hymen indicating that she had been sexually abused.
Second. Accused-appellant confessed to Barangay Captain Sonny Boy
Altamera that he had raped and killed the victim. Accused-appellant contends,
however, that his confession before Barangay Captain Altamera is
inadmissible.
Article III, section 12 of the Constitution provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
The question in this case is whether the confession given to the barangay
captain was made while accused-appellant was under custodial
interrogation. It will be recalled that accused-appellant had been pointed to by
Josephine Gonzales and Lilia Bartido as the person Glery P. Geoca was with
shortly before the latter disappeared. Accordingly, the barangay captain and
his men looked for him in his house and, when they did not find him there,
they continued their search until they found him under a tree. When they
finally found him, they interrogated him in his house and, failing to get
anything from him, took him to the barangay captains house where they
continued questioning him. There, Naciansino produced a mans wallet
containing the personal effects of accused-appellant. At that point, accused-
appellant broke down and confessed to the crime.
The investigation had thus ceased to be a general exploratory
investigation of an unsolved crime. It had begun to focus on the guilt of
accused-appellant so much so that he was no longer allowed to leave. This
case therefore comes within the purview of Article III, section 12, paragraph
(1). It is distinguishable from cases in which we found the confession to have
been given under circumstances not constituting custodial interrogation.
In People vs. Andan,
[22]
the confession of the accused which he gave to the
municipal mayor was held to be admissible in evidence because it was shown
that the mayor was a confidant of the accused and he did not act as a law
enforcement officer when he heard the confession of the accused. We held
that constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a
spontaneous statement not elicited through questioning by the authorities but
given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admit having
committed the crime.
In another case, People vs. Marra,
[23]
the accused, a security guard of the
Lindas Ihaw-Ihaw restaurant, was charged with murder. A policeman, who
received a report of a shooting incident, proceeded to the scene of the crime
together with three other officers. They found the accused in a
restaurant. When they asked whether he was the security guard of the
restaurant, he answered in the affirmative. After answering several questions,
he told the policemen that he was the security guard pointed to by a witness;
that his tour of duty was from 7:00 p.m. of the preceding day to 6:00 a.m. of
the following day; that he was on duty at around 2:30 a.m. of March 7, 1992
when the victim was shot; and that the firearm issued to him was in his
house. Upon the request of the policemen to see the firearm, he took them to
his house and showed them a .38 caliber revolver which he took from inside
an aparador. The revolver had five bullets and one spent shell. The policemen
smelled gunpowder from the barrel of the gun. They asked accused when he
last fired the gun but the latter denied he ever did so. Then a police
investigator asked him point-blank why he shot the victim. At first the accused
denied the accusation, but when told that someone saw him shoot the victim,
he admitted having done so although he claimed he had acted in self-defense.
In that case, we ruled that the confession made by the accused was
admissible because the inquiry had not yet reached a stage wherein the
police considered the accused as a particular suspect. The police were just
looking into a number of possibilities, having been merely informed that the
suspect was wearing what could be a security guards uniform.
The case at bar is a far cry from these cases. As accused-appellants
confession was made without the assistance of counsel, we hold that it is
inadmissible in evidence under Article III, section 12, paragraphs (1) and (3) of
the Constitution. However, it appears that the defense failed to object, as
required by Rule 132, section 36, immediately when Altamera was presented
as a witness for the prosecution or when specific questions concerning the
confession were asked. Having failed to do so, accused-appellant is deemed
to have waived his right to object to the inadmissibility of Altameras
testimony.
It is noteworthy that accused-appellants confession is corroborated by
the corpus delicti. He in fact was even the one who informed the search team
of the exact location where the body of the victim could be found. It is not
necessary that an eyewitness should testify on having seen the accused
committing the crime or seeing him under circumstances indicating that he
committed the crime in order to hold the accused liable under his own
confession.
[24]

Third. Nor was it shown that the prosecution witnesses, particularly
Barangay Captain Altamera and his men, had any ill motive to testify falsely
against accused-appellant. In fact, the father of accused-appellant was the
kumpadre of Altamera.
[25]
Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses
for the prosecution were actuated by improper motive, their testimonies are
entitled to full faith and credit.
[26]
The trial judges evaluation of the testimony of
witnesses is generally accorded not only the highest degree of respect but
also finality, unless some circumstances of weight and substance, which could
change the result of the case, have been ignored or misunderstood. As the
trial judge had the opportunity to observe the witness on the stand, he was in
a vantage position to assess his demeanor and determine whether or not he
was telling the truth.
[27]

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
provides that, when by reason or on the occasion of the rape of a woman
under 12 years of age, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be
death. Being a single indivisible penalty an the only penalty prescribed by law
for the crime of rape with homicide, the Court is constrained to apply the same
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the crime in accordance with Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Four (4) Members of the Court, although maintaining their adherence to
the separate opinions in People vs. Echegaray
[28]
that R.A. No. 7659, insofar
as it prescribed the penalty of death, is unconstitutional, nevertheless submit
to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and that the death
penalty should accordingly be imposed.
With respect to the civil liability of accused-appellant, the trial court
awarded the heirs of the victim P500,000.00 as actual damages, P750,000.00
as moral damages, and P500,000.00 as exemplary damages, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
These awards are excessive. In accordance with our current rulings,
[29]
the
indemnity for the death of the victim Glery P. Geoca should be
P100,000.00. On the other hand, the award of P750,000.00 as moral
damages must be reduced to P50,000.00, also in line with recent
cases.
[30]
Moral damages are awarded to the heirs of the victim in a criminal
proceeding by reason of the death of the victim as a consequence of the rape
without the need for pleading or proving the basis thereof. The purpose of the
award is not to enrich the heirs of the victim but to compensate them for the
injuries to their feelings.Finally, the award of P500,000.00 for exemplary
damages must be disallowed, there being no aggravating circumstances
which attended the commission of the crime.
[31]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Pagadian City finding accused-appellant Ranillo Ponce Hermoso, alias
Allan, guilty of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
death is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim Glery P. Geoca in the amount of
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, amending Article 83 of
the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this
case be forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of
pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.


PEOPLE V JUNGCO
G.R. No. 78531 June 22, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HENRY JUNGCO y SANTIAGO, EDUARDO PALENCIA y GALLO, ORLANDO ORTEGA y MALINIA,
RAFAEL ZARAGOZA y DE IA CRUZ, and ROLANDO AGUILAR y SOMBRA, defendants, RAFAEL
ZARAGOSA y DE LA CRUZ and EDUARDO PALENCIA y GALLO, defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Assistance Office for defendants-appellants.

PADILLA, J .:
This is an appeal interposed by the accused Rafael Zaragosa y De la Cruz and Eduardo Palencia y Gallo
from the judgment * rendered in Criminal Case No. 17280 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City,
finding them and their co-accused Henry Jungco y Santiago, Orlando Ortega y Malinia, and Rolando
Aguilar y Sombra,
1
guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentencing each of them to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided for by law, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Dr. Lutgarda Rivera, jointly and severally, in the amounts of P30,000.00, as death
indemnity, P30,000.00 as actual damages, and P50,000.00, by way of lost earnings, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The incriminatory facts of the case, according to the Solicitor General, are as follows:
On December 20, 1981, at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Patrolman Eddie
Regalado of the Northern Police District was in Women's Club Street, Malabon, Metro
Manila conducting a surveillance on the group of accused Rafael Zaragoza, Henry
Jungco, Orlando Ortega, Rolando Aguilar and Eduardo Palencia, as part of his
assignment to monitor the drug pushing activities of the bystanders in the said area (pp.
6-9, 7-9, tsn, Aug. 23, 1983). At that time all the accused were at the store drinking beer
near the drugstore owned by Dr. Lutgarda Rivera (pp. 8-9, tsn, Ibid). One of them was
holding a wrapped newspaper more or less twelve (12) inches long and one (1) inch in
diameter (p. 9, Ibid). All the while that Regalado was watching the accused, he was
standing in front of the drugstore of Dr. Rivera (p. 7, Ibid). Later, at around 4:35 o'clock
in the afternoon, the accused finished their beer and then proceeded to the drugstore
of Dr. Rivera which is located at the Women's Club Street, Malabon. When they reached
the drugstore, Rolando Aguilar was left in front of the drugstore standing, while the four
accused were inside the drugstore (p. 12, Ibid). Regalado then left the place and went to
the nearby police outpost to take a rest (p. 11,Ibid). In a short while a person came to
him (Regalado) and told him that there was a killing committed in the drugstore of Dr.
Rivera (p. 11, Ibid). He hurriedly went to the scene and found the dead body of Dr.
Rivera prostrate on the floor (ibid). Immediately, he asked the sidewalk vendors that
gathered around the drugstore if they have seen persons that came out from the store
of Dr. Rivera (p. 11, Ibid). One of the sidewalk vendors said that he saw five male
persons hurriedly left the drugstore of the deceased (p. 35, Ibid).
Patrolman Eddie Regalado then relayed the information he gathered from the sidewalk
vendor to Sgt. Dante Buenaventura who arrived at the scene together with Patrolman
Leopoldo Simangan (p. 13, Ibid; p. 6, tsn, Sept. 6, 1983). Thereupon, they (Pat. Regalado,
Sgt. Dante Buenaventura and members of the Anti-Organized Task Force) proceeded to
arrest Henry Jungco and Orlando Ortega in their residence at Tambak, Navotas,
Malabon (pp. 6-7, 11, tsn, Sept. 6, 1983; p. 14, tsn, Aug. 23, 1983). On the other hand,
accused Rafael Zaragosa and Eduardo Palencia were apprehended inside Hulo Market,
while Rolando Aguilar was arrested the following day by members of the other elements
of the Malabon Police Force (pp- 11-12, tsn, Sept. 6, 1983). At the Malabon Police
Station, Patrolman Leopoldo Simangan conducted the investigation of the five accused.
In said investigation, after the accused were duly apprised of their constitutional rights
by Pat. Simangan, they executed and signed their respective sworn statements (Exhibits
I, J, K and L, pp. 8-17, records; pp. 12-19, tsn, Sept. 6, 1983), except Henry Jungco who
invoked his right to remain silent (p. 13, tsn, Ibid). Ortega and Palencia admitted having
stabbed the victim several times on the body with the use of an icepick and having
ransacked the cash register of the drugstore and that they thereafter fled away (Exhibits
I, L, pp. 8-10, 15, 17, record). After their statements were taken down they (Rafael
Zaragosa, Henry Jungco, Eduardo Palencia, Rolando Aguilar and Orlando Ortega) were
brought to Assistant Fiscal Eduardo Manalaysay where they swore to the truthfulness of
their confessions (Exhibits 1, J, K and L, Ibid; pp. 12-19, tsn, Ibid).
On December 23, 1981, the police investigators conducted a reenactment of the crime
at the place of the incident (pp-20-21, tsn, Ibid). Present at time were the Mayor of
Malabon Maynardo Espiritu, Station Commander Alfredo Cruz, Deputy Station
Commander Julio Duenas, Lt. Daniel B. Cruz and a People's Journal Reporter Bernie
Razon and hundreds of other people surrounding the vicinity (p. 21, tsn, Ibid). Before
Regalado started the re-enactment, he informed again the accused of their
constitutional rights, but nonetheless all the accused willingly participated in the re-
enactment (p. 24, tsn, Ibid). Pictures of the re-enactment then were taken (Exhibits N to
N24, pp. 22-30, tsn, Ibid). As depicted in the pictures of the re-enactment, accused
Henry Jungco, Eduardo Palencia and Orlando Ortega Went to the drugstore of the victim
Dr. Lutgarda Rivera to buy cough syrup (Exhibit N, p. 26, tsn, Ibid). The victim, however,
refused to sell them Ornacol cough syrup (p. 26, tsn, Ibid). A heated argument then
ensued between Ortega and the victim (pp. 26-27, Ibid). In the course of the argument,
Ortega pulled out an improvised dagger and stabbed the victim hitting her on the body
(Exh. N-1 2, p. 27, tsn, Ibid). Palencia then entered the store and likewise stabbed the
victim with an icepick (Exh. N-13, Ibid). Seeing what happened, Jungco grabbed the
icepick and dagger from the hands of Palencia and Ortega and without any hesitation
stabbed the victim three times with the use of an icepick (Exhs. N-14 to N-17, p.
28, Ibid). Then Jungco and Ortega pulled down the body of the victim (Exh. N-19, p.
29,Ibid), while Palencia proceeded to ransack the cash register of the victim and take
the money found therein (Exh. N-23, p. 30, Ibid).
On December 21, 1981, Dr. Alberto M. Reyes, NBI Supervising Medico-Legal Officer,
performed the post mortem examination on the cadaver of Dr. Lutgarda Rivera (Exhibit
E, pp. 6-7, 13- 20, tsn, July 12, 1983). According to his findings, the victim sustained
eleven (11) stabbed wounds caused by a sharp pointed instrument such as an icepick;
that the wounds on the aorta and upper and lower lobes of the left lung were fatal; that
the wounds sustained at the anterior chest wall of the victim indicate that the assailant
was in front of the victim when the said wounds were inflicted on her body (pp. 13-16,
tsn, Ibid).
Atty. Roberto Rivera, the son of the victim, testified that before 6:00 o'clock in the
afternoon of December 20, 1981, the son of the owner of the adjoining establishment
adjacent to the drugstore of her mother came to their house and informed him that
something bad happened to his mother; that immediately he went hurriedly to their
drugstore together with his father; that upon reaching the place, he saw hundreds of
people around the door of the drugstore; that he saw the dead body of his mother
covered with a white blanket being carried by persons working with the International
Funeral Homes; that inside the drugstore, he noticed that the shelves were forced
opened, many bottles of medicines and boxes were scattered on the floor; that the
store lost cash money in the sum of P2,000.00; that they spent P5,000-00 for the wake
and P10,000.00 for the funeral expenses; that his mother was earning Pl,000.00 per
month as a professor in the College of Medicine of the University of Santo Tomas; that
their drugstore had an average net income of P300.00 a day (pp. 5-13, tsn, Sept. 13,
1983).
2

The appellants denied having committed the crime charged. According to the appellant Rafael Zaragoza,
he was in the Hulo Market in Malabon on 20 December 1981. He arrived at the said market at about
6:00 o'clock in the morning of the said day after selling fish, and stayed thereat with his co-accused,
drinking until about 10:00 o'clock of the same morning, when he went home to Tangos, Navotas. Then,
on the following day, 21 December 1981, while he was inside the said market eating "mami", policemen
came and arrested him in connection with the death of Dr. Rivera.
According to appellant Zaragosa, he was brought to a salt bed ("asinan") at Tonsuya where he was
maltreated by the policemen and made to affix his thumbprint on a document the contents of which he
did not know. He was also laid on a wooden bed with his head hanging and his feet tied to the bed an
distilled water (for dry batteries) was poured over his mouth. He latter complained to the National
Police Commission,
3
but he does not know what happened to his complaint. He admitted that he had
also executed a statement
4
wherein he stated that he was not maltreated by the policemen. He
explained that he made such statement because he was given money by Atty. Rivera, the son of the
deceased, through Pat. Gungon.
5

The appellant, Eduardo Palencia, for his part, declared that he arrived at the Hulo Market at about 1:00
o'clock in the afternoon of 20 December 1981, and spent his time playing the jukebox, until 2:30 o'clock
of the same afternoon when he went to the Chinese restaurant at the back of the factory of Rufina Patis
and drank beer with his co-accused. After about thirty (30) minutes, they went back to the market place
where they read "komiks" at a store in the corner of said market until 3:30 o'clock when they parted.
We went home to Tanza, Malabon, while the others went to Cubao, Quezon City.
6
Then, in the morning
of the following day, he and Zaragoza were picked up by the police. He was brought inside a bodega in
Niugan, Malabon, where he was maltreated and made to sign a document the contents of which he did
not know. He also complained but he does not know what happened to his complaint.
7

In finding the appellants guilty of the crime with which they were charged, the trial court relied
principally upon the extrajudicial confessions executed by them on 21 December 1981,
8
and the
pictures taken during the re-enactment of the crime.
9

Counsel for the appellants, in this appeal, contends that the said extra-judicial confessions are
inadmissible in evidence because they were extracted from the appellants during custodial investigation
without the assistance of counsel and after the appellants had been subjected to different forms of
maltreatment, threats, and intimidation. Counsel further asserts that the pictures of the re-enactment
were taken in a manner contrary to law and are, therefore, inadmissible.
After going over the record of the case, we are convinced that the extra-judicial confessions in question
are inadmissible in evidence, the same having been executed by the appellants during custodial
investigation without the assistance of counsel, particularly, when the confessants manifested the
waiver of their right to counsel. The prevailing rule is still that laid down in People vs. Galit
10
as follows:
10. This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, laid down the correct procedure
for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a custodial
investigation, and which We reiterate:
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown
the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might
make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses
by the most expedient means--by telephone if possibleor by letter or
messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to
it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be
conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, or by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the
court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his
behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be
valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
We also find that the pictures taken during the re-enactment of the crime, are inadmissible in evidence
since the re-enactment was based upon the defendants' inadmissible extra-judicial confessions. Pictures
re-enacting a crime which are based on an inadmissible confession are themselves inadmissible.
11

However, in a sworn statement executed on 14 July 1982,
12
the appellant Rafael Zaragoza admitted that
he and his co-accused were responsible for the robbery and the death of Dr. Lutgarda Rivera. His sworn
statement reads, in part, as follows:
23. T: Ano ang inamin mo?
S: Inamin ko na kasama ako sa pagnanakaw at pagpatay kay Dra. Rivera.
24. T: Sabihin mo sa akin ngayon kung tutoo ngang kasama ka sa
pagnanakaw at pagpatay.
S: Iyon nga po ang pagkakamali ko dahil nasa labas lang po ako ng
botika. Hindi pumasok sa loob.
25. T: Isalaysay mo nga sa akin ang tunay na pangyayari?
S: Ganito po iyon, magka kasama po kami nina Butch (referring to
HENRY JUNGCO), si Lando (Referring to Orlando Ortega), si Labo
(referring to Rolando Aguilar), at Eding Hula (referring to Eduardo
Palencia), sa may harapan ng botika ni Dra. Rivera. Bumibili po kami ng
Corex D pero ayaw kaming pagbilhan. Ang ginawa namin ay nagpunta
kami sa palengke, tapos nagbigay ako ng katorse pesos kay LANDO
pambili ng Corex D, si Lando na po ang bahala doon sa kulang.
Naghanap siya ng mabilhan. Tapos, dumating na si Lando at may dala
siyang dalawang boteng siento bente bawat isa nang Corex. Naghati-
hati na kami. tapos, nagkuwentuhan kami sa palengke, tapos naisipan
naming balikan si doktora. May dalang kutsilyo si Lando, si Butch naman
po ay ice pick ang dala. Ang dating may dala ng ice pick noong nasa may
botika na kami ay Eding Hula, pero nakita kong kinuha iyon ni Butch
bago sila pumasok sa loob ng botika. Ako ppo ay nagbantay nalang sa
labas, dalawa kami, akot at si Labo. Nang lumabas na iyong tatlo na
tumatakbo, umalis na rin ako. Hindi na ako sumunod sa kanila sa
palengke. Tapos nga noon, nahuli na kaming lahat.
Rafael Zaragosa, during the trial, confirmed his execution of the said sworn statement. He claims,
however, that he was paid for it by Atty. Rivera, the son of the victim, who gave him the money through
Pat. Gungon,
13
but this was denied by Atty. Rivera and Pat. Gungon.
14

The trial court, therefore, did not commit an error in finding the appellants guilty of the crime with
which they were charged. Zaragosa's admission is supported by the physical facts of the case and the
testimonies of Pat. Eddie Regalado that he saw the appellants and their co-accused enter the drug store
of Dr. Lutgarda Rivera and later leave the place hurriedly, at about the time the crime was committed,
and of Atty. Roberto Rivera that upon his arrival at the drug store, he saw the dead body of his mother
and that the shelves of the drug store were forcibly opened and bottles and boxes containing medicine
scattered on the floor. Zaragosa's admission is further supported by the testimonies of the appellant
Eduardo Palencia and co-accused Orlando Ortega, and Rolando Aguilar that they were together in the
afternoon of 20 December 1981.
15
While admittedly no prosecution witness testified to have actually
seen the appellants and their co-accused in the act or robbing the drug store and killing the owner
thereof, the circumstantial evidence is consistent with each other, such that the appellants and their co-
accused, and no other, were the culprits and are guilty therefor.
Besides, the acceptance by co-accused Henry Jungco, Orlando Ortega and Rolando Aguilar of their
sentence proves, not only their guilt but also that of their companions, the herein appellants Rafael
Zaragosa and Eduardo Palencia.
16

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, with proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE V OLVIS
G.R. No. 71092 September 30, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANACLETO Q. OLVIS, Acquitted, ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS and
DOMINADOR SORELA,accused-appellants.

SARMIENTO, J .:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court to Zamboanga Del Norte
sitting in Dipolog City. 1The case was certified to this Court on January 19, 1985 following
the death sentences imposed on each of the three accused-appellants, Romulo Villarojo,
Leonardo Cademas, and Dominador Sorela (the accused first-named, Anacleto Olvis, was
acquitted), over which, under the Constitution then in force,
2
we exercised exclusive
appellate jurisdiction.
3
With the promulgation of the 1987 Charter, abolishing the death
penalty and commuting death penalties already imposed to reclusion perpetua
4
we, on May
14, 1987, issued a death penalty abolition resolution requiring the three accused-appellants
to file a statement, personally signed by them with the assistance of counsel, stating
whether or not they wished to continue with the case as an appealed case.
5
We have since
observed this procedure with respect to all pending capital cases.
In compliance with our resolution, the three accused-appellants, on May 28, 1987, filed a
statement informing us that they desire to continue with this case as an appealed case.
6

This appeal stemmed from an information dated November 11, 1976 charging all four
accused with the murder of Discredit Bagon. The same reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses ANACLETO Q.
OLVIS, as principal by inducement, ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO
CADEMAS and DOMINADOR SORELA, as principals by direct participation,
of the crime of murder, committed as follows:
That in the evening on or about the 7th day of September 1975, in title
Municipality of Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, consprising and confederating
with one another and acting upon the direction and instruction of ANACLETO
Q. OLVIS who mastermind the bizarre plot and directly induced ROMULO
VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS and DOMINADOR SORELA to
execute the conspiracy and who, armed with boloes and a hunting knife, with
intent to kill by means of treachery and evident premeditation, and for a
consideration of a price or reward, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, hack and stab one DISCREDIT BAGON, thereby
inflicting upon him multiple inc. (hack) and stab wounds which caused his
instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation and the generic aggravating circumstances of superior strength, nighttime
and in consideration of a price or reward.
7

xxx xxx xxx
The four accused entered Identical "not guilty" pleas.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the decision under appeal, the dispositive portion
whereof reads as follows:
FOREGOING CONSIDERED, and on the part of accused ANACLETO Q.
OLVIS, SR., there being no evidence, direct or indirect, whether testimonial,
documentary or physical evidence, that tend to establish his complicity in this
case, said accused has to be, as he hereby is, ACQUITTED.
On the part of the three (3) remaining accused ROMULO VILLAROJO,
LEONARDO CADEMAS, and DOMINADOR SORELA, the degree of moral,
certainty establishing their authorship of the crime is irreversibly positive. The
three (3) accused conspired and confederated with one another to
successfully achieve their ghastly, evil ends. Their guilt has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
Treachery and evident premeditation are qualifying circumstances in this
case of MURDER. But said offense was attended by the aggravating
circumstances of superior strength and nighttime. No mitigating circumstance
has been shown to offset the two (2) aggravating circumstances, as a
consequence of which, the Court hereby renders judgment sentencing the
accused ROMULO VILLAROJO, LEONARDO CADEMAS, and DOMINADOR
SORELA, to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH.
SO ORDERED.
8

We come to the facts.
On September 9, 1975, Alfredo and Estrella Bagon, brother and sister, arrived at the local
Integrated National Police station of Barrio Polanco, in Zamboanga del Norte, to report their
brother, Deosdedit Bagon, missing. The station commander, Captain Ruperto Encabo,
received their report.
Bagon had been in fact missing since two days before. He was last seen by his wife in the
afternoon of September 7, 1975, on his way home to Sitio Sebaca where they resided. She
did three probable places, but her efforts were in vain.
It was Captain Encabo himself who led a search party to mount an inquiry. As a matter of
police procedure, the team headed off to Sitio Sebaca to question possible witnesses.
There, Captain Encabo's men chanced upon an unnamed volunteer, who informed them
that Deosdedit Bagon was last seen together with Dominador Sorela, one of the accused
herein.
Encabo then instructed one of his patrolmen to pick up Sorela.
Sorela bore several scratches on his face, neck and arms when the police found him.
According to him, he sustained those wounds while clearing his ricefield. Apparently
unconvinced. Captain Encabo had Sorela take them to the ricefield where he sustained his
injuries. But half way there, Sorela illegally broke down, and, in what would apparently crack
the case for the police, admitted having participated in the killing of the missing Bagon. By
then, the police of Polanco knew that they had a murder case in their hands. Sorela
allegedly confessed having been with Deosdedit Bagon, a friend of his, in the evening of
September 7, 1976 in Sitio Sebaca after some marketing. They were met by Romulo
Villarojo and Leonardo Cademas, Sorela's co-accused herein and likewise friends of the
deceased, who led them to a secluded place in the ricefields. It does not appear from the
records how the three were able to have the deceased join them.
It was then that Villarojo allegedly attacked Bagon with a bolo, hacking him at several parts
of the body until he, Bagon, was dead. Moments later, Sorela fled, running into thick cogon
grasses where he suffered facial and bodily scratches.
The police soon picked up Villarojo and Cademas. Together with Sorela, they were turned
over to the custody of Captain Encabo.
The police thereafter made the three re-enact the crime. Patrolman Dionisio Capito directed
Sorela to lead them to the grounds where Discredit Bagon was supposed to have been
buried. But it was Villarojo who escorted them to a watery spot somewhere in the ricefields,
where the sack-covered, decomposing cadaver of Bagon lay in a shallow grave.
The actual exhumation of the body of the victim was witnessed by Polanco policemen and
Civilian Home Defense Forces volunteers, numbering about thirty. The body was
transported to the Polanco municipal hand the following day, September 10, 1975. It was
displayed, morbidly, in front of the building where Mrs. Catalina Bagon, widow of the
deceased, and her four children viewed it. The exhumation, as well as the transfer of
Bagon's cadaver, were captured by the lens of a photographer. (Exhibits "I", "J", "K", its "L",
"M", and "N").
The "ceremonies" continued in the parish church of the Polanco, where the body of the
victim was transferred. It was laid on the altar, in full public view. Again the proceedings
were recorded by the camera of a photographer. (Exhibits "R", "S".)
But it was only later on that the body itself was uncovered from the sack that had concealed
it. (Exhibits "T", "U", "VIP.) Thereupon, it was readied for autopsy.
The necropsy report prepared by the provincial health officer disclosed that the deceased
suffered twelve stab and hack wounds, six of which were determined to be fatal.
In the re-enactment, the suspects, the three accused herein, demonstrated how the victim
was boloed to death. Exhibit "Y," a photograph, shows the appellant Villarojo in the posture
of raising a bolo as if to strike another, while Solero and Cademas look on. Exhibit "X",
another photograph, portrays Villarojo in the act of concealing the murder weapon behind a
banana tree, apparently after having done the victim in.
The investigation yielded several effects of the offense: a twenty-inch long bolo, the shovel
used to inter the victim's remains, a nylon rope with which the dead body was tied, and the
sack itself.
Initial findings of investigators disclosed that the threesome of Solero, Villarojo, and
Cademas executed Discredit Bagon on orders of Anacleto Olvis, then Polanco municipal
mayor, for a reward of P3,000.00 each.
While in custody, the three executed five separate written confessions each. The first
confessions were taken on September 9, 1975 in the local Philippine Constabulary
headquarters. The second were made before the Polanco police. On September 18, 1975,
the three accused reiterated the same confessions before the National Bureau of
Investigation Dipolog City sub-office. On September 21, 1975 and September 25, 1975,
they executed two confessions more, again before the Philippine Constabulary and the
police of Polanco.
In their confessions of September 9, 1975, September 14, 1975, September 21, 1975, and
September 25, 1975, the said accused again pointed to the then accused Anacleto Olvis as
principal by inducement, who allegedly promised them a reward of P3,000.00 each.
In their confessions of September 18, 1975, sworn before agents of the National Bureau of
Investigation, however, they categorically denied Olvis' involvement in the knowing. We
note that the three were transported to the Dipolog City NBI sub-office following a request
on September 10, 1975 by Mrs. Diolinda O. Adaro daughter of Olvis, and upon complaint by
her of harassment against her father by his supposed political enemies.
Based on these subsequent statements, the court a quo rendered separate verdicts on the
three accused on the one hand, and Anacleto Olvis on the other. As earlier stated Olvis was
acquitted, while the three were all sentenced to die for the crime of murder.
In acquitting Olvis, the trial court rejected the three accused's earlier confessions pointing to
him as the mastermind, and denied the admissibility thereof insofar as far as he was
concerned. It rejected claims of witnesses that the three accused-appellants would carry out
Olvis' alleged order to kill Bagon upon an offer of a reward when in fact no money changed
hands. It likewise noted that Olvis had, two days after the murder, been in Cebu City, and
who, upon arriving in Dipolog City, was in fact informed by the Philippine Constabulary that
he was a "wanted" man, "to which said accused (Olvis) meekly complied"
9
(that is, he
assented, ambiguously, to the remark). According to the court, this was inconsistent with a
guilty mind.
The court repudiated claims that Olvis had motives to do away with the deceased arising
from alleged attempts on his (Olvis') part to eject the deceased from his landholding (the
deceased having been a tenant of his), the case in fact having reached the then Ministry of
Agrarian Reform. It dismissed insinuations that his children had a score to settle with the
victim, who had earlier brought a physical injuries suit against the former, that case having
been dismissed. It observed, furthermore, that he was not questioned by the police after the
killing, notwithstanding efforts by the three herein accused-appellants to implicate him. It
relied, finally, on the retraction of the accused themselves, absolving Olvis of any liability. It
was satisfied, overall, that he had a "clean bill of health" 10 in connection with the murder
case.
With the acquittal of Olvis, we are left with the murder cases against the three accused-
appellants. The accused-appellants subsequently repudiated their alleged confessions in
open court alleging threats by the Polanco investigators of physical harm if they refused to
"cooperate" in the solution of the case. They likewise alleged that they were instructed by
the Polanco police investigators to implicate Anacieto Olvis in the case. They insisted on
their innocence. The acused Romulo Villarojo averred, specifically, that it was the deceased
who had sought to kill him, for which he acted in self-defense.
The murder of Deosdedit Bagon was witnessed by no other person. The police of Polanco
had but the three accused-appellants' statements to support its claiming. The fundamental
issue then is whether or not these statements, as any extrajudicial confession confronting
us, can stand up in court.
We hold that, based on the recorded evidence, the three accused-appellants' extrajudicial
confessions are inadmissible in evidence.
It was on May 7, 1987 that we promulgated People v. Decierdo.11 In that decision, we laid
down the rule with respect to extrajudicial confessions:
xxx xxx xxx
... Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed. The defendant, may waive effectuation of indicates in
any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an
attorney before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the
individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be
interrogated, the police may not question him The mere fact that he may have
answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does
not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until
he has converted with an attorney and thereafter consent to be questioned.
xxx xxx xxx
In People v. Duero, we added:
xxx xxx xxx
At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he
must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to
remain silent.
For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to make
them aware of the threshold requirement for an intelligent decision as to its
exercise.
More important, such a warning is an absolute pre-requisite in overcoming
the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere
Further, the warning will show the individual that his interrogators are
prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it . . .
The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the
explanation that anything said can and WW be used against the individual in
court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the
privilege, but also of the consequences of foregoing it . . .
An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer. While
such request affirmatively secures his right to have one, his failure to ask for
a lawyer does not constitute a waiver. No effective waiver of the right to
counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after
the warnings we here delineate have been given. The accused who does not
know his rights and therefore does not make a request may be the person
who most needs Counsel
If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel before any
interrogation occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his
request on the basis that the individual does not have or cannot afford a
retained attorney . . .
In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under
this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to
consult with an attorney, but also that ff. he is indigent a lawyer will be
appointed to represent him . . .
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear, If the
individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning,
that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation impose cease. . . If the
individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he wants one
before speaking to policy, they must respect his decision to remain silent . . .
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is
taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incriminate tion and his right
to retained or appointed counsel ... 12
xxx xxx xxx
Like the Decierdo confessions, the confessions in the case at bar suffer from a
Constitutional infirmity. In their supposed statements dated September 9, 14, and 21, 1975,
the accused-appellants were not assisted by counsel when they "waived" their rights to
counsel. As we said in Decierdo, the lack of counsel "makes [those] statement[s], in
contemplation of law, 'involuntary,' even if it were otherwise voluntary, technically." 13
With reset to the confessions of September 18, 197 5, while it is stated therein that this
Office had just requested the services of Atty. NARVARO VELAR NAVARRO of the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office, Department of Justice, Dipolog District Office, are you
wining to accept the legal assistance of Atty. NAVARRO to handle your case, 14 the same
nonetheless call for a similar rejection. There is nothing there that would show that Atty.
Navarro was the accused-appellants' counsel of choice (specifically, the appellant Romulo
Villarojo who admitted therein having been the bolo-wielder). On the contrary, it is clear
therefrom that Atty. Navarro was summoned by the NBI. He cannot therefore be said to
have been acting on behalf of the accused-appellants when he lent his presence at the
confession proceedings. What we said in People v. Galit, 15 applies with like force here:
No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court
upon petition either of the dead 16 trainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. 16
We cast aside, for the same reason, the confessions of September 25, 1975.
But the accused-appellants were denied their right to counsel not once, but twice. We refer
to the forced re-enactment of the crime the three accused were made to perform shortly
after their apprehension.
Forced re-enactments, like uncounselled and coerced confessions come within the ban
against self- incrimination. The 1973 Constitution, the Charter prevailing at the time of the
proceedings below, says:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. 17
This constitutional privilege has been defined as a protection against testimonial
compulsion, 18 but this has since been extended to any evidence "communicative in
nature" 19 acquired under circumstances of duress. Essentially, the right is meant to "avoid
and prohibit positively the repetition and recurrence of the certainly inhuman procedure of
competing a person, in a criminal or any other case, to furnish the missing evidence
necessary for his conviction."
20
This was the lesson learned from the ancient days of the
inquisition in which accusation was equivalent to guilt.
21
Thus, an act, whether testimonial
or passive, that would amount to disclosure of incriminatory facts is covered by the inhibition
of the Constitution.
This should be distinguished, parenthetically, from mechanical acts the accused is made to
execute not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes
determinable by simple observation. This includes requiring the accused to submit to a test
to extract virus from his body,
22
or compelling him to expectorate morphine from his
mouth
23
or making her submit to a pregnancy test
24
or a footprinting test,
25
or requiring him
to take part in a police lineup in certain cases." In each case, the accused does not speak
his guilt. It is not a prerequisite therefore that he be provided with the guiding hand of
counsel.
But a forced re-enactment is quite another thing. Here, the accused is not merely required
to exhibit some physical characteristics; by and large, he is made to admit criminal
responsibility against his will. It is a police procedure just as condemnable as an
uncounselled confession.
Accordingly, we hold that all evidence based on such a re-enactment to be in violation of
the Constitution and hence, incompetent evidence.
It should be furthermore observed that the three accused-appellants were in police custody
when they took part in the re-enactment in question. It is under such circumstances that the
Constitution holds a strict application. As for the accused Dominador Sorela, we cannot
accept the trial judge's finding that he acted "with unexpected spontaneity"
27
when he
allegedly "spilled the beans
28
before the law enforcers on September 9, 1975. What is to be
borne in mind is that Sorela was himself under custody. Any statement he might have made
thereafter is therefore subject to the Constitutional guaranty.
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way.
29

We indeed doubt whether Sorela's admissions, under the circumstances, were truly his
voluntary statementsChavez v. Court of Appeals
30
tells us:
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of violence; it
may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his
will disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity for rational
judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion "tending to force
testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant.
31

In such a case, he should have been provided with counsel.
Indeed, the three accused-appellants had languished in jail for one year and two months
before the information was filed, and only after they had gone to court on an application
for habeas corpus. For if the authorities truly had a case in their hands, we are puzzled why
they, the accused, had to be made to suffer preventive imprisonment for quite an enormous
length of time.
What is more, there are striking aspects in the case that we find distressing. For one, there
was no trace of grief upon the faces of the deceased's bereaved relatives, more so his
widow and children, upon witnessing his cadaver-wrapped in a sack and all although it
was supposedly the first time that they saw his remains after two days of frantic
search.
32
Exhibits "K", "L", "M", "N", and "R", for another, depict the deceased's relatives in
fixed poses, while the deceased's corpse lay in the foreground.
33

Moreover, the victim was transferred to the municipal hand building and then subsequently,
to the parish church, again, for a photographing session unusual procedure when the
perfunctory police procedure should have been to bring the corpse to the health officer for
autopsy.
It was in fact only on September 10, 1975 that Discredit Bagon's remains were unwrapped,
at the parish church at that, as if pursuant to a script or as part of some eerie ceremony.
To the mind of, this Court, the disposition of the case was characterized by unusual
grandstanding, for reasons as yet unclear to us. It leaves us with an uncomfortable
impression that each scene was an act in some contrived tragedy.
We likewise find the authorities' haste in securing the accused Anacleto Olvis' acquittal, at
the expense of the present three accused, quite disconcerting. It should be noted that the
three appellants had initially implicated Olvis as the mastermind. Yet, Olvis was never
invited for the usual questioning.
To us, there is more to Exhibit "20," the request to transfer Olvis' case to the jurisdiction of
the National Bureau of Investigation for reinvestigation, than meets the eye. As it happened,
happily for Olvis, the three accused-appellants while under NBI custody, retracted their
earlier statements indicting him as a co-conspirator. Why the NBI should intervene in the
case when the Polanco police had apparently "solved" it, is, in the first place, suspicious
enough, but why the three appellants should, in an instant, make a turn-about there leaves
us even more disturbed.
While we do not challenge the verdict by acquittal rendered in favor of Olvis, for it is not
within our power to overturn acquittals,
34
what is our concern is the apparent design to use
three ill-lettered peasants,
35
the three herein accused, as fall guys in an evident network of
political intrigue.
Still, we are not prepared to hand down a judgment of acquittal upon all the three accused-
appellants.
In his counter-affidavit,
36
marked as Exhibit "44-A" for the defense, the accused Romulo
Villarojo admitted hacking the victim to death with a bolo. He stressed, however, that he did
so in self- defense. He pulled out a hunting knife in order to stab me and in order also to
defend my body, I hack[ed] him."
37
He completely absolved his co-accused Dominador
Sorela and Leonardo Cademas from any liability.
Villarojo's admission inflicting the fatal wounds upon the deceased is binding on him.
38
But
it is still our business to see whether his defense can stand scrutiny.
The records will disclose that the deceased suffered twelve assorted wounds caused by a
sharp instrument. The assault severed his right hand and left his head almost separated
from his body. This indicates a serious intent to kill, rather than self-defense.
39

In finding that Villarojo did take the life of the victim, we cannot, however, appreciate
superior strength or nocturnity. These qualifying circumstances were considered by the
court a quo on the basis of the extrajudicial statements executed by the accused,
statements we reject for the reasons earlier discussed. In the absence of any other proof,
the severity and number of wounds sustained by the deceased are not, by themselves,
sufficient proof to warrant the appreciation of the generic aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength. Hence, Villarojo should be liable for plain homicide.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered modifying the Decision dated November 30,
1984. The accused-appellants Leonardo Cademas and Dominador Sorela are ACQUITTED
on the ground of reasonable doubt. The accused-appellant Romulo Villarojo is found guilty
of homicide, and is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of eight years and one day
of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen years, eight months, and one day ofreclusion
temporal, as maximum. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify the heirs of Discredit Bagon
in the sum of P30,000.00. No special pronouncement as to costs.
Yap (Chairman), Paras and Padilla JJ, concur.


GAMBOA V CRUZ
G.R. No. L-56291 June 27, 1988
CRISTOPHER GAMBOA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALFREDO CRUZ, JUDGE of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Br.
XXIX, respondent.
Rene V. Sarmiento for petitioner.

PADILLA, J .:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for a temporary restraining order, to annul
and set aside the order dated 23 October 1980 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XXIX, in Criminal Case No. 47622, entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff vs.
Cristopher Gamboa y Gonzales, Accused," and to restrain the respondent court from
proceeding with the trial of the aforementioned case.
Petitioner alleges that:
On 19 July 1979, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, he was arrested for vagrancy,
without a warrant of arrest, by Patrolman Arturo Palencia. Thereafter, petitioner was brought
to Precinct 2, Manila, where he was booked for vagrancy and then detained therein together
with several others.
The following day, 20 July 1979, during the lineup of five (5) detainees, including petitioner,
complainant Erlinda B. Bernal pointed to petitioner and said, "that one is a companion."
After the Identification, the other detainees were brought back to their cell but petitioner was
ordered to stay on. While the complainant was being interrogated by the police investigator,
petitioner was told to sit down in front of her.
On 23 July 1979, an information for robbery was filed against the petitioner.
On 22 August 1979, petitioner was arraigned. Thereafter, hearings were held. On 2 April
1980, the prosecution formally offered its evidence and then rested its case.
On 14 July 1980, petitioner, by counsel, instead of presenting his defense, manifested in
open court that he was filing a Motion to Acquit or Demurrer to Evidence. On 13 August
1980, petitioner filed said Motion predicated on the ground that the conduct of the line-up,
without notice to, and in the absence of, his counsel violated his constitutional rights to
counsel and to due process.
On 23 October 1980, the respondent court issued the following order (assailed in the
petition at bar) denying the Motion to Acquit:
For resolution is a motion to acquit the accused based on the grounds that
the constitutional rights of the said accused, to counsel and to due process,
have been violated. After considering the allegations and arguments in
support of the said motion in relation to the evidence presented, the Court
finds the said motion to be without merit and, therefore, denies the same.
The hearing of this case for the purpose of presenting the evidence for the
accused is hereby set on November 28, 1980, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
Hence, the instant petition.
On 3 March 1981, the Court issued a temporary restraining order "effective as of this date
and continuing until otherwise ordered by the court".
1

Petitioner contends that the respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion, in issuing the assailed order. He insists that said order, in denying his
Motion To Acquit, is null and void for being violative of his rights to counsel and to due
process.
2

We find no merit in the contentions of petitioner.
To begin with, the instant petition is one for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the respondent judge in issuing the
questioned order dated 23 October 1980.
It is basic, however, that for certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and
whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of judicial prerogative in accordance with
centuries of both civil law and common law traditions.
3
To warrant the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of certiorari, the alleged lack of jurisdiction, excess thereof, or abuse of
discretion must be so gross or grave, as when power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion, prejudice or personal hostility, or the abuse must be so
patent as to amount to an evasion of positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all, in contemplation of law.
4
This is not the situation in the case
at bar. The respondent court considered petitioner's arguments as well as the prosecution's
evidence against him, and required him to present his evidence.
The rights to counsel and to due process of law are indeed two (2) of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, whether it be the 1973 or 1987 Constitution. In a democratic
society, like ours, every person is entitled to the full enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by
the Constitution.
On the right to counsel, Sec. 20, Art. IV of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution, reads:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The same guarantee, although worded in a different manner, is included in the 1987
Constitution. Section 12 (1, 2 & 3), Article III thereof provides:
Sec. 12 (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating
officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted
by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or
confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an
offense.
Any person under investigation must, among other things, be assisted by counsel. The
above-cited provisions of the Constitution are clear. They leave no room for equivocation.
Accordingly, in several cases, this Court has consistently held that no custodial investigation
shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested,
or by any person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver shall
not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
5

As aptly observed, however, by the Solicitor General, the police line-up (at least, in this
case) was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not yet entitled, at such
stage, to counsel. The Solicitor General states:
When petitioner was Identified by the complainant at the police line-up, he had not been
held yet to answer for a criminal offense. The police line-up is not a part of the custodial
inquest, hence, he was not yet entitled to counsel. Thus, it was held that when the
process had not yet shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory as when police
investigation does not elicit a confession the accused may not yet avail of the services of
his lawyer (Escobedo v. Illinois of the United States Federal Supreme Court, 378 US 478,
1964). Since petitioner in the course of his Identification in the police line-up had not yet
been held to answer for a criminal offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to
be assisted by counsel because the accusatory process had not yet set in. The police
could not have violated petitioner's right to counsel and due process as the confrontation
between the State and him had not begun. In fact, when he was Identified in the police
line-up by complainant he did not give any statement to the police. He was, therefore, not
interrogated at all as he was not facing a criminal charge. Far from what he professes,
the police did not, at that stage, exact a confession to be used against him. For it was not
he but the complainant who was being investigated at that time. He "was ordered to sit
down in front of the complainant while the latter was being investigated" (par. 3.03,
Petition). Petitioner's right to counsel had not accrued.
6

Even under the constitutional guarantees obtaining in the United States, petitioner would
have no cause for claiming a violation of his rights to counsel and due process. In Kirby vs.
Illinois,
7
the facts of the case and the votes of the Justices therein are summarized as
fellows:
After arresting the petitioner and a companion and bringing them to a police
station, police officers learned that certain items found in their possession had
been stolen in a recent robbery. The robbery victim was brought to the police
station and immediately Identified the petitioner and his companion as the
robbers. No attorney was present when the Identification was made, and
neither the petitioner nor his companion had asked for legal assistance or had
been advised of any right to the presence of counsel. Several weeks later, the
petitioner and his companion were indicted for the robbery. At trial in an
Illinois state court, the robbery victim testified that he had seen the petitioner
and his companion at the police station, and he pointed them out in the
courtroom and Identified them as the robbers. The petitioner and his
companion were convicted, and the Illinois Appellate Court, First District,
affirmed the petitioner's conviction, holding that the constitutional rule
requiring the exclusion of evidence derived from out-of-court Identification
procedures conducted in the absence of counsel did not apply to pre-
indictment Identifications (121 III App 2d 323, 257 NEE 2d 589).
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, although not agreeing on an
opinion, affirmed. In an opinion by STEWART, J., announcing the judgment of
the court and expressing the view of four members of the court, it was held
that the constitutional right to counsel did not attach until judicial criminal
proceedings were initiated, and that the exclusionary rule relating to out-of-
court Identifications in the absence of counsel did not apply to Identification
testimony based upon a police station show-up which took place before the
accused had been indicted or otherwise formally charged with any criminal
offense.
BURGER, Ch. J., concurring, joined in the plurality opinion and expressed his
agreement that the right to counsel did not attach until criminal charges were
formally made against an accused.
POWELL, J., concurred in the result on the ground that the exclusionary rule
should not be extended.
BRENNAN J., joined by DOUGHLAS and MARSHALL, JJ., dissented on the
grounds that although Supreme Court decisions establishing the exclusionary
rule happened to involve post-indictment Identifications, the rationale behind
the rule was equally applicable to the present case.
WHITE, J., dissented on the grounds that Supreme Court decisions establishing the
exclusionary rule governed the present case.
8

Mr. Justice Stewart, expressing his view and that of three other members
9
of the Court,
said:
In a line of constitutional cases in this Court stemming back to the Court's
landmark opinion in Powell v. Alabama, 287 US 45, 77 L Ed 158, 53 S Ct 55,
84 ALR 527, it has been firmly established that a person's Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that
adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him. See Powell v.
Alabama, supra; Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 82 L Ed 1461, 58 S Ct
1019, 146 ALR 357; Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 US 52, 7 L Ed 2d 114, 82 S Ct
157; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 US 335, 9 L Ed 2d 799, 83 S Ct 792, 93 ALR
2d 733; White v. Maryland, 373 US 59, 10 L Ed 2d 193, 83 S Ct 1050;
Messiah v. United States, 377 US 201, 12 L Ed 246, 84 S Ct 1199; United
States v. Wade, 388 US 218, 18 L Ed 2d 1149, 87 S Ct 1926; Gilbert v.
California, 388 US 263, 18 L Ed 2d 1178, 87 S Ct 1951; Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 US 1, 26 L Ed 2d 387, 90 S Ct. 1999.
This is not to say that a defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to counsel
only at the trial itself. The Powell case makes clear that the right attaches at the time of
arraignment and the Court has recently held that it exists also at the time of a preliminary
hearing. Coleman v. Alabama, supra. But the point is that, while members of the court
have differed as to existence of the right to counsel in the contexts of some of the above
cases, all of those cases have involved points of time at or after the initiation of adversary
judicial criminal proceedings whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing,
indictment, information, or arraignment. (Emphasis supplied).
10

As may be observed, the 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions go farther and beyond the
guarantee of the right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. For while, under the latter, the right to counsel "attaches only at or after the
time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him (the accused),"
under the 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions, the right to counsel attaches at the start
of investigation against a respondent and, therefore, even before adversary judicial
proceedings against the accused have begun.
Given the clear constitutional intent in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, to extend to those
under police investigation the right to counsel, this occasion may be better than any to
remind police investigators that, while the Court finds no real need to afford a suspect the
services of counsel during a police line-up, the moment there is a move or even an urge of
said investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may
appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there be
assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and
in the presence of counsel.
On the right to due process, the Court finds that petitioner was not, in any way, deprived of
this substantive and constitutional right, as he was duly represented by a member of the
Bar. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present evidence to
substantiate his defense; only that he chose not to, and instead opted to file a Motion to
Acquit after the prosecution had rested its case. What due process abhors is the absolute
lack of opportunity to be heard.
11
The case at bar is far from this situation.
In any event, certiorari and prohibition are not the proper remedies against an order denying
a Motion To Acquit. Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that, upon
arraignment, the defendant shall immediately either move to quash the complaint or
information or plead thereto, or do both and that, if the defendant moves to quash, without
pleading, and the motion is withdrawn or overruled, he should immediately plead, which
means that trial must proceed. If, after trial on the merits, judgment is rendered adversely to
the movant (in the motion to quash), he can appeal the judgment and raise the same
defenses or objections (earlier raised in his motion to quash) which would then be subject to
review by the appellate court.
An order denying a Motion to Acquit (like an order denying a motion to quash) is
interlocutory and not a final order. It is, therefore, not appealable. Neither can it be the
subject of a petition for certiorari. Such order of denial may only be reviewed, in the ordinary
course of law, by an appeal from the judgment, after trial. As stated inCollins vs.
Wolfe,
12
and reiterated in Mill vs. Yatco,
13
the accused, after the denial of his motion to
quash, should have proceeded with the trial of the case in the court below, and if final
judgment is rendered against him, he could then appeal, and, upon such appeal, present
the questions which he sought to be decided by the appellate court in a petition for
certiorari.
In Acharon vs. Purisima,
14
the procedure was well defined, thus:
Moreover, when the motion to quash filed by Acharon to nullify the criminal cases filed
against him was denied by the Municipal Court of General Santos his remedy was not to
file a petition for certiorari but to go to trial without prejudice on his part to reiterate the
special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if, after trial on the merits, an adverse
decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law. This is the
procedure that he should have followed as authorized by law and precedents. Instead, he
took the usual step of filing a writ of certiorari before the Court of First Instance which in
our opinion is unwarranted it being contrary to the usual course of law.
15

Conformably with the above rulings, whether or not petitioner was, afforded his rights to
counsel and to due process is a question which he could raise, as a defense or objection,
upon the trial on the merits, and, if that defense or objection should fail, he could still raise
the same on appeal.
On the other hand, if a defendant does not move to quash the complaint or information
before he pleads, he shall be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a
motion to quash, except where the complaint or information does not charge an offense, or
the court is without jurisdiction of the same.
16

Here, petitioner filed a Motion To Acquit only after the prosecution had presented its
evidence and rested its case. Since the exceptions, above-stated, are not applicable,
petitioner is deemed to have waived objections which are grounds for a motion to quash.
Besides, the grounds relied upon by petitioner in his Motion to Acquit are not among the
grounds provided in Sec. 2, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court for quashing a complaint or
information. Consequently, the lower court did not err in denying petitioner's Motion to
Acquit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued on 3
March 1981 is LIFTED. The instant case is remanded to the respondent court for further
proceedings to afford the petitioner-accused the opportunity to present evidence on his
behalf.
This decision is immediately executory. With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.


PEOPLE V ORDONO
[G.R. No. 132154. June 29, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PACITO
ORDOO Y NEGRANZA alias ASING and APOLONIO MEDINA Y
NOSUELO alias POLING, accused-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
COURTS are confronted, repeatedly, with the difficult task of
scrutinizing the sufficiency of extrajudicial confessions as basis for
convicting the accused. The drive to apprehend the culprits at any cost,
particularly in crimes characterized by brutality and savagery, not too
infrequently tempts law enforcement agencies to take unwarranted
shortcuts and disregard constitutional and legal constraints that are
intended to ensure that only the guilty are punished. In the delicate
process of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, courts play a
crucial role in assuring that the evidence gathered by government
agents scrupulously meets the exacting constitutional standards which if
not met impose a strict exclusionary rule, i.e., "any confession or
admission obtained in violation of Art. II, Sec. 12 (1), shall be
inadmissible in evidence."
This case is on automatic review of the 11 December 1997 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Br. 34, Balaoan, La Union, in Crim. Case No.
2415 finding both accused Pacito Ordoo y Negranza alias Asing and
Apolonio Medina y Nosuelo alias Poling guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of rape with homicide and imposing upon each of them two (2) separate
death penalties.
The records show that on 5 August 1994 the decomposing body of a
young girl was found among the bushes near a bridge in Barangay
Poblacion, Santol, La Union. The girl was later identified as Shirley
Victore, fifteen (15) years old, a resident of Barangay Guesset,
Poblacion, Santol, La Union, who three (3) days before was reported
missing. Post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Arturo Llavore, a
medico-legal officer of the NBI, revealed that the victim was raped and
strangled to death.
Unidentified sources pointed to Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina as
the authors of the crime. Acting on this lead, the police thereupon
invited the two (2) suspects and brought them to the police station for
questioning. However, for lack of evidence then directly linking them to
the crime, they were allowed to go home.
On 10 August 1994 the accused Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina
returned to the police station one after another and acknowledged that
they had indeed committed the crime. Acting on their admission, the
police immediately conducted an investigation and put their confessions
in writing. The investigators however could not at once get the services
of a lawyer to assist the two (2) accused in the course of the
investigation because there were no practicing lawyers in the
Municipality of Santol, a remote town of the Province of La Union. Be
that as it may, the statements of the two (2) accused where
nevertheless taken. But before doing so, both accused were apprised in
their own dialect of their constitutional right to remain silent and to be
assisted by a competent counselof their choice. Upon their
acquiescence and assurance that they understood their rights and did
not require the services of counsel, the investigation was conducted
with the Parish Priest, the Municipal Mayor, the Chief of Police and
other police officers of Santol, La Union, in attendance to listen to and
witness the giving of the voluntary statements of the two (2) suspects
who admitted their participation in the crime.
The first to confess was Apolonio Medina who in addition to the Parish
Priest, the Mayor, the Chief of Police and the other police officers was
also accompanied by his wife and mother. Apolonio Medina narrated
that in the morning of 2 August 1994 while he was walking towards the
house of Pacito Ordoo in Sitio Buacao, Poblacion, Santol, La Union,
he noticed a young woman walking towards the school at the Poblacion.
Upon reaching Sitio Buacao, he saw Pacito Ordoo standing along the
road. When the woman reached him he suddenly grabbed her, held her
tightly and covered her mouth with his right hand. As Medina neared
them, Ordoo turned to him and said, "Come and help me, I am feeling
uneasy."
Although Medina claimed he was surprised at the request, he
nonetheless went to Ordoo, helped him hold the legs of the young
woman including her bag and umbrella and together they carried her to
the bushes where they laid her down. Medina held her legs as
requested while Ordoo continued to cover her mouth with his hand and
boxing her many times on the head. When she was already weak and
weary Ordoo knelt near her, raised her skirt and lowered her panty
down to her knees. Medina continued to remove her panty as Ordoo
removed his short pants, then his briefs. Ordoo then raped her, boxed
her head continuously, with Medina continuously pinning her legs down
and boxing those legs every time she struggled.
After Ordoo had satiated himself Medina took his turn in raping the
same victim with Ordoo holding her legs. After they were through,
Medina left to watch out for intruders while Ordoo tied a vine around
the girl's neck, hanged her on a tree that ended her life. Then, they went
back to the road and parted ways.
After Medina said his piece, his wife and mother suddenly burst into
tears. He then affixed his signature on his statement and so did his wife,
followed by all the other witnesses who listened to his confession.
Pacito Ordoo narrated his story in the afternoon. According to him, in
the morning of 2 August 1994 he was on his way to Sitio Guesset,
Barangay Manggaan, Santol, La Union, when he saw a girl followed by
Apolonio Medina. When the girl was near him he immediately grabbed
her and covered her mouth. Medina drew near, held her two legs, bag
and umbrella and together they carried her into the thicket. After laying
her down Ordoo boxed her breasts and face while Medina boxed her
legs. When she became weak Ordoo raised her skirt and lowered her
panty while Medina completely, removed it. Ordoo then removed his
pants and walker briefs, went on top of Shirley and as Medina spread
her legs Ordoo immediately inserted his penis into her vagina. After
ejaculating Ordoo turned to Medina for him to take his turn in raping
the girl. Ordoo was now holding her legs. At the end of his narration
Ordoo affixed his thumbmark on his statement in lieu of his signature
as he did not know how to write.
Thereafter, Apolonio Medina and Pacito Ordoo were detained at the
Santol police station. News about the apprehension and detention of the
culprits of the rape-slay of Shirley Victore soon spread that Roland
Almoite, leading radio announcer of radio station DZNL, visited and
interviewed them. In the interview which was duly tape-recorded both
accused admitted again their complicity in the crime and narrated
individually the events surrounding their commission thereof. According
to Medina, his remorse in having committed the crime was so great but
his repentance came too late.
[1]
He and Ordoo hoped that the parents
of Shirley Victore would forgive them.
[2]
Upon conclusion of the interview,
Roland Almoite immediately went to radio station DZNL and played the
taped interview on the air. The same interview was played again on the
air the following morning and was heard by thousands of listeners.
A couple of days later, the police brought the two (2) accused to the
office of the PAO lawyer in Balaoan, La Union, for assistance and
counseling. In a closed-door session, PAO lawyer Oscar B. Corpuz
apprised each of the accused of his constitutional rights and, even
though their confessions were already written in their dialect, explained
to them each of the questions and answers taken during the
investigation. He likewise advised them to ponder the consequences of
their confessions, leading them to defer the affixing of their second
signature/ thumbmark thereon.
After a week or so, the two (2) separately went back to Atty. Corpuz and
informed him of their willingness to affix their signatures and
thumbmarks for the second time in their respective confessions. Once
again Atty. Corpuz apprised the two (2) accused of their constitutional
rights, explained the contents of their respective statements, and finally,
accompanied them to Judge Fabian M. Bautista, MTC judge of Balaoan,
La Union, who further apprised the two (2) accused of their
constitutional rights and asked them if they had been coerced into
signing their confessions. They assured Judge Bautista that their
statements had been given freely and voluntarily. Upon such assurance
that they had not been coerced into giving and signing their
confessions, Judge Bautista finally asked the accused Pacito Ordoo
and Apolonio Medina to affix their signatures/ thumbmarks on their
respective confessions, and to subscribe the same before him. Atty.
Corpuz then signed their statements as their assisting counsel, followed
by a few members of the MTC staff who witnessed the signing.
On arraignment, in a complete turnabout, the two (2) accused pleaded
not guilty.
In his defense, Pacito Ordoo testified that on 5 August 1994, while he
was cooking at home, the police arrived and invited him to the
headquarters for questioning. The police asked him his whereabouts on
2 August 1994 and he answered that he worked in the farm of Barangay
Captain Valentin Oriente. According to Ordoo, the questioning took
one (1) hour with the police boxing him several times on his stomach
and on his side. They even inserted the barrel of a gun into his mouth in
an effort to draw out answers from him. This being fruitless, he was
placed in jail and released only the following morning, 6 August 1994.
Three (3) days later, or on 9 August 1994, the police once again invited
him to the headquarters where he was told that he was responsible for
the rape and death of Shirley Victore.
Accused Pacito Ordoo insisted on his innocence and maintained that
he was working with a certain barangay captain; nonetheless, he was
detained. Later that night the police took him out from jail and brought
him to the room of investigator SPO4 Alfredo A. Ominga where he was
hit with the butt of an armalite and forced to admit to the rape and slay
of Shirley Victore. On 10 August 1994 SPO4 Alfredo A. Ominga took a
typewriter and asked questions from him for one (1) hour without a
lawyer assisting him nor a priest witnessing the investigation. A barrel of
a gun was placed inside his mouth forcing him to admit the commission
of the crime and to affix his thumbmark on the document. He was also
brought to the office of the PAO lawyer twice but did not affix his
thumbmark on any document because he could not understand its
contents. A radio announcer visited him inside his cell for an interview
but he declined to answer his questions. He only answered the radio
announcer during his fourth visit when SPO4 Alfredo A. Ominga
threatened to hit him if he did not admit to the commission of the crime.
As to Apolonio Medina, he heard from the police that he was also
detained but maintained that he (Ordoo) did not know Apolonio.
For his part, Apolonio Medina testified that on 5 August 1994 while he
was pasturing his carabaos at Barangay Guesset, in Santol, La Union,
the police came and invited him for questioning. They asked him where
he was on 2 August 1994 and he replied that he was carrying bananas
for his aunt Resurreccion. The interrogation lasted for about an hour
with neither a lawyer assisting him nor a relative being present, after
which he was placed in jail. Later, he was brought out and taken to a hut
near the headquarters where he was boxed, kicked and hit with a
nightstick. He lost consciousness and recovered only after he was
brought back to his cell. That same night he was returned to the hut
outside the police headquarters where he was again boxed. On 8
August 1994, with his legs tied to the ceiling beam, he was hanged
upside down. His breast was hit with the butt of a gun which was fired
near his ear. A barrel of a gun was inserted into his mouth. He was
threatened that he would be salvaged if he did not admit to killing the
victim. He was forced to sign a statement but could not recall its date of
execution. He was brought to the office of the PAO lawyer twice but he
did not sign the document. The investigator warned him that if he did not
sign he would be buried in the pit which he himself dug. On his third visit
to the office of the PAO lawyer he signed the document. He could not
remember having gone to the office of the MTC Judge of Balaoan; La
Union. He was interviewed by a radio announcer and was instructed by
the investigator to narrate those that were in his statement. He admitted
he knew Pacito Ordoo. He showed his bruises to his mother when the
latter visited him in jail, prompting the latter to request medical treatment
for her son but the request was denied.
On 11 December 1997 the trial court adjudged accused Pacito Ordoo
and Apolonio Medina guilty of the crime of rape with homicide attended
with conspiracy, and imposed upon each of them two (2) death
penalties on the basis of their extrajudicial confessions.
The accused are now before us assailing their conviction on the ground
that constitutional infirmities attended the execution of their extrajudicial
confessions, i.e., mainly the lack of counsel to assist them during
custodial investigation thereby making their confessions inadmissible in
evidence.
Under the Constitution
[3]
and the rules laid down pursuant to law
[4]
and
jurisprudence,
[5]
a confession to be admissible in evidence must satisfy
four (4) fundamental requirements: (a) the confession must be
voluntary; (b) the confession must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; (c) the confession must be
express; and, (d) the confession must be in writing.
[6]
Among all these
requirements none is accorded the greatest respect than an accused's
right to counsel to adequately protect him in his ignorance and
shield him from the otherwise condemning nature of a custodial
investigation. The person being interrogated must be assisted by
counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced
admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing
interrogation for the commission of the offense.
[7]
Hence, if there is no
counsel at the start of the custodial investigation any statement elicited
from the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him. This
exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the defendant is
thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs through menacing police
interrogation procedures where the potentiality for compulsion, physical
and psychological, is forcefully apparent.
[8]

In the instant case, custodial investigation began when the accused
Ordoo and Medina voluntarily went to the Santol Police Station to
confess and the investigating officer started asking questions to elicit
information and/or confession from them. At such point, the right of the
accused to counsel automatically attached to them. Concededly, after
informing the accused of their rights the police sought to provide them
with counsel. However, none could be furnished them due to the non-
availability of practicing lawyers in Santol, La Union, and the
remoteness of the town to the next adjoining town of Balaoan, La Union,
where practicing lawyers could be found. At that stage, the police
should have already desisted from continuing with the interrogation but
they persisted and gained the consent of the accused to proceed with
the investigation. To the credit of the police, they requested the
presence of the Parish Priest and the Municipal Mayor of Santol as well
as the relatives of the accused to obviate the possibility of coercion, and
to witness the voluntary execution by the accused of their statements
before the police. Nonetheless, this did not cure in any way the absence
of a lawyer during the investigation.
In providing that during the taking of an extrajudicial confession the
accused's parents, older brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal
mayor, municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister
of the gospel as chosen by the accused may be present, RA 7438 does
not propose that they appear in the alternative or as a substitute for
counsel without any condition or clause. It is explicitly stated therein that
before the above-mentioned persons can appear two (2) conditions
must be met: (a) counsel of the accused must be absent, and, (b) a
valid waiver must be executed. RA 7438 does not therefore
unconditionally and unreservedly eliminate the necessity of counsel but
underscores its importance by requiring that a substitution of counsel
with the above-mentioned persons be made with caution and with the
essential safeguards.
Hence, in the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish Priest of Santol,
the Municipal Mayor, the relatives of the accused, the Chief of Police
and other police officers of the municipality could not stand in lieu of
counsel's presence. The apparent consent of the two (2) accused in
continuing with the investigation was of no moment as a waiver to be
effective must be made in writing and with the assistance of
counsel.
[9]
Consequently, any admission obtained from the two (2)
accused emanating from such uncounselled interrogation would be
inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.
Securing the assistance of the PAO lawyer five (5) to eight (8) days later
does not remedy this omission either. Although there was a showing
that the PAO lawyer made a thorough explanation of the rights of the
accused, enlightened them on the possible repercussions of their
admissions, and even gave them time to deliberate upon them, this aid
and valuable advice given by counsel still came several days too late. It
could have no palliative effect. It could not cure the absence of counsel
during the custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statements
were being taken.
[10]

The second affixation of the signatures/ thumbmarks of the accused on
their confessions a few days after their closed-door meeting with the
PAO lawyer, in the presence and with the signing of the MTC judge, the
PAO lawyer and other witnesses, likewise did not make their
admissions an informed one. Admissions obtained during custodial
investigation without the benefit of counsel although reduced into writing
and later signed in the presence of counsel are still flawed under the
Constitution.
[11]
If the lawyer's role is diminished to being that of a mere
witness to the signing of a prepared document albeit an indication
therein that there was compliance with the constitutional rights of the
accused, the requisite standards guaranteed by Art. III, Sec. 12, par.
(1), are not met. The standards utilized by police authorities to assure
the constitutional rights of the accused in the instant case therefore fell
short of the standards demanded by the Constitution and the law.
It should further be recalled that the accused were not effectively
informed of their constitutional rights when they were arrested, so that
when they allegedly admitted authorship of the crime after questioning,
their admissions were obtained in violation of their constitutional rights
against self-incrimination under Sec. 20, Art. IV, of the Bill of Rights.
As testified to, the police informed the accused of their rights to remain
silent and to counsel in a dialect understood by them, but despite the
accused's apparent showing of comprehension, it is doubtful if they
were able to grasp the significance of the information being conveyed.
Pertinent portions of the extrajudicial confessions of Pacito Ordoo and
Apolonio Medina, translated into English, read -
PRELIMINARY -
Mr. Pacito Ordoo, I am informing you that you are
being investigated of an offense but before we
continue, I tell you that you have the right to remain
silent under the new Constitution of the Philippines.
And you are also herein reminded that all statements
you give may be used for or against you in any
Philippine court as evidence and it is herein likewise
reminded that you have the right to secure the
services of a lawyer of your own choice to represent
you in this investigation, do you understand all these?
A:....Yes, sir because all that I will state will only be the truth.
Q:....Do you want that we will continue with this investigation after
having been appraised of all your rights?
A:....Yes, sir.
Q:....And, do you want that we continue wit the investigation even
without a lawyer of your own choice to represent you?
A:....Yes, sir.
Q:....Are you now prepared to give your voluntary statement
consisting only the truth, without any lies whatsoever?
A:....Yes, sir x x x x
PRELIMINARY -
Mr. Apolonio Medina, I inform you that you are being
investigated of an offense but before we proceed with
this investigation, I am informing you that you have
the right to remain silent to all questions asked of you,
according to the new Philippine Constitution.
And you are likewise reminded that all statements you
give may be used for or against you in any Philippine
court and you have a right to have a lawyer of your
own choice to represent you in this investigation, do
you understand this?
ANSWER - Yes, sir.
Q:....After having known all your rights, do you want that we
continue with the investigation?
A:....Yes, sir.
Q:....Do you want that we continue with this investigation even
without a lawyer to represent you?
A:....Yes, sir because all that I will state are the truth.
Q:....Are you now prepared to give your voluntary statement
consisting only the truth, nothing but the truth?
A....Yes, sir.
The advice proffered by the investigating officer to Ordoo starkly
resembles that given to Medina, thus leading us to conclude that the
advice was given perfunctorily and belonged to the stereotyped class - a
long question by the investigator informing the appellant of his right
followed by a monosyllabic answer - which this Court has condemned
for being unsatisfactory.
[12]
The desired role of counsel in the process of
custodial investigation is rendered meaningless if the lawyer gives an
advice in a cursory manner as opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the
rights of the person undergoing questioning. If advice is given casually
and tritely as to be useless, understanding on the part of the accused is
sacrificed and the unconstrained giving up of a right becomes impaired.
To be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates
"the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle." It is not enough for the interrogator to merely enumerate to
the person under investigation his rights as provided in Sec. 12, Art. III,
of the Constitution; the interrogator must also explain the effect of such
provision in practical terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation
may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly understands.
[13]

With the extrajudicial confession of the accused rendered inadmissible
in evidence, we are left with the interview taken by DZNL radio
announcer Roland Almoite as evidence. The taped interview was
offered to form part of the testimony of witness Roland Almoite to whom
the admissions were made and to prove through electronic device the
voluntary admissions by the two (2) accused that they raped and killed
Shirley Victore. The defense objected to its acceptance on the ground
that its integrity had not been preserved as the tape could easily have
been spliced and tampered with.
[14]
However, as Roland Almoite testified,
it was the original copy of the taped interview; it was not altered; the
voices therein were the voices of the two (2) accused; and, the defense
never submitted evidence to prove otherwise. Under the circumstances,
we are inclined, as was the lower court, to admit the authenticity of the
taped interview.
A review of the contents of the tape as included in Roland Almoite's
testimony reveals that the interview was conducted free from any
influence or intimidation from police officers and was done willingly by
the accused. Despite allegations to the contrary, no police authority
ordered or forced the accused to talk to the radio announcer. While it
may be expected that police officers were around since the interview
was held in the police station, there was no showing that they were
within hearing distance nor within the vicinity where the interview was
being conducted. At most, the participation of the police authorities was
only to allow Roland Almoite to conduct an interview.
The taped interview likewise revealed that the accused voluntarily
admitted to the rape-slay and even expressed remorse for having
perpetrated the crime. We have held that statements spontaneously
made by a suspect to news reporters on a televised interview are
deemed voluntary and are admissible in evidence.
[15]
By analogy,
statements made by herein accused to a radio announcer should
likewise be held admissible. The interview was not in the nature of an
investigation as the response of the accused was made in answer to
questions asked by the radio reporter, not by the police or any other
investigating officer. When the accused talked to the radio announcer,
they did not talk to him as a law enforcement officer, as in fact he was
not, hence their uncounselled confession to him did not violate their
constitutional rights.
Sections 12, pars. (1) and (3), Art. III, of the Constitution do not cover
the verbal confessions of the two (2) accused to the radio announcer.
What the Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating
facts or confessions. The rights enumerated under Sec. 12, Art. III, are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as
would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him
from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
[16]

The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the relation between a
private individual and another individual.
[17]
It governs the relationship
between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are
primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They confirm that
certain rights of the individual exist without need of any governmental
grant, rights that may not be taken away by government, rights that
government has the duty to protect.
[18]
Governmental power is not
unlimited and the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the
individual against aggression and unwarranted interference by any
department of government and its agencies.
The admissions of the accused before the radio announcer and duly
tape-recorded are further bolstered and substantiated by the findings of
the NBI Medico-Legal Officer as reflected in the Autopsy Report/Post
Mortem Findings. The narration of the accused Apolonio Medina
that Asing boxed the victim, who was struggling as she was being
raped,
[19]
was proved by the Autopsy Report stating that the victim
suffered contusions on the leg, right, lateral aspect, middle third,
etc.;
[20]
that accused Pacito Ordoo boxed the face of the victim to make
her weak
[21]
was proved by the testimony of the NBI Medico-Legal Officer
that there was blackening on the face of the victim due to hematoma
caused by violence or boxing on her face;
[22]
and, that accused Pacito
Ordoo hanged the victim on a tree by tying a vine around her
neck,
[23]
was proved by the finding of a depressed mark involving the
anterior and lateral portions of the neck.
[24]

As to the assertion of the accused that they were tortured and subjected
to inhuman treatment, we find such allegations baseless. The accused
were given several opportunities to decry the maltreatment they
allegedly suffered in the hands of the police but at no time did they
complain about it. First, they could have told the radio announcer
outright of the abuses they were subjected to before signing their
confessions. Second, when they were brought before the PAO lawyer
they likewise did not make any such claims but instead chose to ponder
over the lawyer's advice and deferred the signing of their
confessions. Lastly, they had the chance to tell the MTC judge about the
fatal defect of their confessions, if there was any, when the latter asked
them whether they voluntarily signed the same and whether coercion
was used in extracting their confessions; however, they answered in the
negative. The accused cannot therefore on a later date make assertions
that they were maltreated when at no time - during their detention and
when they were in the presence of persons who could have helped
them - did they make such complaints.
The doctor who physically examined them further disproved their
assertions when she testified thus -
FISCAL TECAN:
Q:....Now, you said that you talked with the prisoners, Pacito
Ordoo and Apolonio Medina, what did you actually tell them?
A:....I said, "What do you feel on your body?" and I also said,
"What part of your body are (sic) painful?"
Q:....What did they answer?
A:....They did not answer me, sir.
Q:....More or less, how many questions did you ask?
A:....Only that, sir.
Q:....After you have observed the prisoners, did you notice any
injury?
A:....None, sir x x x x
Q:....x x x x You noticed any injury on their bodies?
A:....None, sir, that is why I looked to see what was really
painful.
[25]

Considering that the doctor was a witness for the defense, it was
surprising that she never mentioned about any maltreatment. She saw
not a single scratch on the bodies of the accused. She even inquired
into their physical well-being but they did not tell her of any pain or
injury. They could have easily asked the doctor for immediate treatment
if indeed they were physically harmed, but they did not. This puts their
claim of maltreatment into serious doubt. With this, the testimony of the
mother of the accused Apolonio Medina alleging that the police refused
treatment for her son despite his critical condition becomes a
fabrication, a mere figment of the imagination. As found by the lower
court, her tale of buying an antibiotic for her son, all on her own, without
the prescription of a doctor, is hard to believe since she is already an
elderly woman, seventy-three (73) years of age, unschooled and
illiterate.
[26]

To further exculpate themselves, the accused invoked alibi. Ordoo
testified that at the time of the incident he was at work in the place of
Barangay Captain Valentin Oriente,
[27]
while Medina claimed that he went
to carry bananas for a certain aunt Resurreccion.
[28]
However, such
allegations deserve no credit as alibi becomes worthless when it is
established mainly by the accused themselves.
[29]
The defense of alibi is
always considered with suspicion and received with caution, not only
because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but also because it can
easily be fabricated.
[30]

Quite interestingly, Bgy. Capt. Valentin Oriente was presented as a
witness for the prosecution, not for the defense, while "aunt
Resurreccion" was not presented at all. Bgy. Capt. Oriente testified that
Pacito Ordoo did not work with him on 2 August 1994; on the contrary,
he saw him on the bridge at Sitio Guesset.
[31]

Other than their lame assertions that they were with the above-
mentioned persons, the accused failed to substantiate their defense and
to give details on what transpired that fateful day, especially since they
were in the same town where the crime happened. For alibi to Prosper,
it must be convincing, enough to preclude any doubt about the physical
impossibility of the presence of the accused at the locus criminis or its
immediate vicinity at the time of the incident.
[32]
Since the accused failed
to convince the Court otherwise, their defense must fall.
The lack of prior design or plan to rape and kill the victim prior to the
commission of the crime does not negate conspiracy. For conspiracy to
exist, proof of an actual planning of the perpetration of the crime is not a
condition precedent. It is sufficient that at the time of the commission of
the offense the accused had the same purpose and were united in its
execution. From the foregoing, it is evident that the accused helped
each other in carrying out their beastly acts. The taped interview as
played in open court clearly revealed thus -
(STATEMENT OF ACCUSED APOLONIO MEDINA) -
INTERPRETER:
When I was walking there already about to be near
him, he was already holding the woman and said,
come and help me because I was (sic) not feeling
well. Well, I was shocked of what I saw, sir. But later
on, as usual I regained my composure and so I finally
went to help him, sir.
FISCAL TECAN: We will continue, Your Honor.
INTERPRETER:
And then we laid her down among the bushes then
Asing boxed her because she was struggling, Your
Honor. And Asing did what he wanted, sir. And then
he asked me to take my turn and then I went outside
to look and see if there are (sic) people and then
Asing went to get a vine, sir. And when I arrived at
their place, he was already tieing (sic). After that, we
left for home, sir.
[33]

x x x
(STATEMENT OF ACCUSED PACITO ORDOO)
Q:....But Apolonio Medina was already there as your companion?
A:....He was there already, sir. He was the one who held her legs,
sir.
Q:....Who was the first one to rape or use her?
A:....Me, sir. And after that, Apolonio Medina, sir.
Q:....And after you were through, what did you do, was she still
conscious?
A:....She was practically unconscious, sir.
Q:....What did you do then?
A:....We tied her neck and hanged her on a tree, sir.
[34]

The modifying circumstance of conspiracy being present, each of the
accused shall be liable for the other's acts as well. Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that "when by reason or on the occasion
of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death."
In 1971, in People v. Jose
[35]
this Court convicted the four (4) accused
with forcible abduction with rape, and three (3) counts of simple rape,
and imposed upon each of the accused four (4) death penalties in view
of the existence of conspiracy.
In 1981, in People v. Yutila
[36]
this Court affirmed the judgment of the
court a quo declaring each of the three (3) accused guilty of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide and sentenced each of them to
suffer a single penalty of death. However, Justice Barredo in his
separate opinion interposed that in accordance with the doctrine laid
down in the Jayme Jose case, three (3) death penalties should have
been imposed on each of the accused.
In People v. Vizcarra
[37]
where the four (4) accused were charged with
rape with homicide, the Court held that only one of them should be held
liable for the crime of rape with homicide and all the rest for simple rape.
But since four (4) successive offenses were charged and proved, each
of the accused was imposed four (4) death sentences for four (4)
separate and distinct crimes of rape. The existence of conspiracy
among them, the overwhelming evidence as to the nature and the
number of crimes committed, as well as the attendance of the
aggravating circumstances, fully justified the imposition of four (4) death
penalties.
In 1988, in People v. Dio
[38]
where the three (3) accused took turns in
ravishing the victim and thereafter killed her, the Court declared each of
them guilty of three (3) crimes of rape with homicide and sentenced
each of them to three (3) penalties of reclusion perpetua. The penalty in
fact should have been death but with its proscription in the 1987
Constitution the penalty imposed was reduced to reclusion perpetua.
In 1991, in People v. Flores
[39]
a registered nurse was successively raped
by four (4) men and then killed. The trial court convicted each of them
with the special complex,crime of multiple rape with homicide on four (4)
counts and as a consequence thereof sentenced each of them to four
(4) death penalties. This Court affirmed the decision of the lower court
with the modification that the accused should instead suffer four (4)
penalties of reclusion perpetua by reason of the constitutional
proscription on the imposition of the death penalty. The four (4) death
penalties for each of the appellants were explained to be ordained by
the fact that conspiracy had been established beyond reasonable doubt.
In 1996, in People v. Laray
[40]
this Court convicted two (2) of the accused
charged therein with multiple rape and sentenced each of them to suffer
two (2) counts of reclusion perpetua because of the existence of
conspiracy.
Accordingly, herein accused Pacito Ordoo and Apolonio Medina
should be held liable for the special complex crime of rape with
homicide on two (2) counts as defined and penalized in Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659.
We have held that the indemnification of the victim shall be in the
amount of P100,000.00 if the crime of rape is committed or effectively
qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is
authorized by the applicable amendatory laws.
[41]
In addition, this Court
has likewise ruled that in crimes of rape the amount of P50,000.00 as
moral damages must be awarded to the victim without need of proof nor
even pleading the basis thereof.
[42]

Four (4) Justices of the Court however continue to maintain the
unconstitutionality of RA 7659 insofar as it prescribes the death penalty;
nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority to the effect that
the law is constitutional and that the death penalty can be lawfully
imposed in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the 11 December 1997 Judgment rendered by the
Regional Trial Court-Branch 34, Balaoan, La Union, is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the two (2) accused PACITO ORDONO y
NEGRANZA alias ASING and APOLONIO MEDINA y NOSUELO
alias POLING are held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide on two (2) counts and are
sentenced each to two (2) DEATH PENALTIES. Each of the accused is
further ordered to indemnify the heirs of Shirley Victore in the amount
of P200,000.00 as civil indemnity andP100,000.00 for moral damages
for both counts of rape. Costs against both accused.
In consonance with Sec. 25 of RA 7659 amending Art. 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this Decision, let the records of this
case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the
possible exercise of his pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
___________________________________


PEOPLE V ZUELA
[G.R. No. 112177. January 28, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TITO ZUELA y
MORANDARTE, MAXIMO VELARDE y DE LOS REYES, and NELSON
GARCIA y TEMPORAS, accused-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J .:
The case is an appeal of accused Maximo Velarde y de los Reyes, Nelson Garcia y
Temporas and Tito Zuela y Morandarte from the decision
[1]
of the Regional Trial
Court, Camarines Sur, Libmanan, Branch 24, finding them guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of robbery with homicide and sentencing each of them to reclusion
perpetua, and to pay jointly and severally the amount of one hundred thousand
(P100,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Maria Abendao and John Abendao, and fifty
thousand (P50,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Hegino Hernandez, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
[2]

On July 29, 1985, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Julian C. Ocampo III filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Libmanan, Camarines Sur an information charging accused
Maximo Velarde y de los Reyes, Nelson Garcia y Temporas and Tito Zuela y
Morandarte with "robbery with triple homicide" committed as follows:
"That in the evening of April 27, 1985 in Camagong, Cabusao,
Camarines Sur, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually aiding each other, with intent to
gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with
violence and intimidation gainst [sic] persons, that is by shooting and
stabbing one Hegino Hernandez, Sr., Maria S. Abendao and John-John
Abendao, thereby inflicting upon them mortal injuries that caused their
instantaneous death, take, rob and carry away the following personal
properties belonging to the said Maria Abendao, to wit:
(1) Cash money. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .P21,000.00
(2) one gold ring. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .P 750.00
(3) one Seiko wrist watch. . . . . . . . . . . . . P 1,250.00
.---------------
................................... P23,000.00
"That as a consequence of the felonious act of the accused, the heirs of
the deceased suffered damages in the amount of P25,000.00 each,
representing indemnity for death, loss of earning capacity and moral
damages.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
[3]

On June 1, 1985, Maximo Velarde was arrested at Magallanes, Sorsogon, while
accused Nelson Garcia and Tito Zuela were arrested at Cabusao, Camarines Sur on
June 4, 1985 and June 9, 1985, respectively.
On March 26, 1987, all three accused, were arraigned with the assistance of their
counsel, and pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial ensued.
The evidence established the following facts:
Maria Abendao was engaged in business. She had a store, operated a passenger
jeepney and engaged in the buy and sale of palay. Her house cum store was beside
that of her sister Romualda Algarins house, by the roadside in Barcelonita, Cabusao,
Camarines Sur. Romualda also had a store.
Accused Nelson Garcia was Marias store helper. Accused Tito Zuela alias "Anting"
helped Romualda in her store during palay season. The other accused Maximo
Velarde was known to Romualda because she met him at a birthday party held at
Marias house on April 19, 1985. The three accused were friends.
On April 27, 1985, Maria made three (3) deliveries of palay on board her jeepney,
driven by Hegino Hernandez, Jr., to the ricemill of Gerardo Benitez in San Juan,
Libmanan, Camarines Sur. Every delivery costs seven thousand (P7,000.00) pesos.
The three deliveries were made at 9:00 in the morning, 2:00 in the afternoon and 7:30
in the evening.
[4]

Between 6:30 and 7:00 in the evening of that day, from a distance of five (5) arms
length, Romualda saw the three (3) accused board the jeepney of Maria, bound for
San Juan, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. Because the jeepney was filled with palay, they
merely held on the railing of the jeepney.
[5]
There were other passengers namely, Pablo
Abendao and Roberto Echiaca.
[6]

Gerardo Atienza, the buyer of palay, saw Maximo inside the jeepney during the
second and third delivery of palay to his ricemill.
[7]
For each delivery, Gerardo paid
Maria the amount of seven thousand (P7,000.00) pesos.
The following morning, the bodies of Hegino Hernandez, Maria and John-John
Abendao were found in rigor mortis condition at New Poblacion, Cabusao,
Camarines Sur.
[8]

Dr. Restituto Sampilo, municipal health officer of Cabusao, found Maria in a reclining
position on the front seat of the jeepney. John was in a semi-kneeling position, facing
his mother with both hands clasping her left hand. Hegino was at the steering wheel
with his body, from the abdomen up, resting on the side of the vehicle and his head
outside of it.
[9]
A bullet that exited from Heginos left eyebrow caused the wound near
his right ear.
[10]

Maria had a horizontal stab wound at the front part of her neck just above the xyphoid
process.
[11]
Her seven (7) year old son, John, had a three (3) inch slashed horizontal
wound at the front base of the neck, a two (2) inch wound on the left upper arm and
two (2) stab wounds on the lateral side of the neck at the junction of the right
shoulder.
[12]
Hegino had a small wound with slightly depressed edges, about an inch
from the highest tip of the right ear, a wound with everted and lacerated edges above
the middle part of the left eyebrow, and seven (7) stab wounds at the back.
[13]

Though there were no eyewitnesses, the prosecution established how the crime was
committed with the testimony of Romualda Algarin, which was in turn based on the
extrajudicial admission given by Maximo Velarde to Romualda when she visited the
latter at the Camaligan municipal jail on June 6, 1985.
Maximo, Tito and Nelson conceived the plan to hold-up Maria while drinking in front
of Romualdas store because Maximo needed money for his fare to Manila.
When the palay-laden jeepney of Maria left for Libmanan, Camarines Sur Maximo,
Tito and Nelson boarded it. They alighted at sitio Cagumpis, Camagong, Cabusao,
Camarines Sur to attend a wedding.
[14]
Maximo was supposed to board the jeepney on
its way back to Barcelonita, while the other two (2) accused, Tito and Nelson would
wait along the road at the crossing of New Poblacion and Camagong, Camarines Sur
to board the jeepney and hold-up Maria.
Everything went according to plan. Nelson and Tito hailed the jeepney at the crossing
of Cabusao, Camarines Sur. Upon reaching an uninhabited place, Tito alias "Anting"
told Velarde: "Oragui na ngaya ang driver."
[15]
Maximo poked a gun at the driver and
shot him. He also shot Maria at the neck when the latter shouted.
[16]
*11
Nelson and Tito alighted from the jeepney. Nelson went to the left front side of the
jeepney, while Tito approached the right front side of the jeepney, in the process
stepping on the sleeping John-John who was then awakened. The boy stood up and
said, "You will see I will tell my father that you killed my mother."
[17]
To avoid being
identified by the boy, Tito told Maximo "Oragui na ini."
[18]
Maximo took hold of the
boys hair and slashed his neck.
Tito took Marias money and divided it, each accused receiving about seven thousand
(P7,000.00) pesos from the loot.
Tito and Nelson went back to Barcelonita, Cabusao, Camarines Sur. Maximo
proceeded to Manila.
On June 1, 1985, Lt. Ernesto J. Idian, Station Commander, Cabusao Police Station,
Cabusao, Camarines Sur assisted by two (2) other policemen, arrested Maximo in
Magallanes, Sorsogon. Though no warrant of arrest had been issued, Maximo was
immediately brought to the Camaligan police station in Camaligan, Camarines Sur
where he was investigated and asked to give a written statement in the presence of
Atty. Jose Ocampo from the Citizens Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), Naga City.
[19]

On June 4, and 9, 1985, Tito and Nelson were taken into police custody without a
warrant. They underwent custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel
because no lawyer could be found in Cabusao, Camarines Sur.
On the last page of each accuseds confession appeared a statement, in their own
handwriting, to the effect that they voluntarily gave their statements and that no one
coerced or promised them anything to admit responsibility for the crime.
Maximo, Nelson and Tito signed their individual statements before Judge Lore R.
Valencia Bagalacsa, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Libmanan, Camarines Sur on
three (3) different dates.
[20]
She followed the same procedure and line of questioning,
using the local dialect, in ascertaining the voluntariness of the three (3) accuseds
confessions. She ordered Lt. Idian and his companions to leave her and the accused
inside the chamber.
[21]
Satisfied that they were properly apprised of their rights and that
they voluntarily executed their statements, she had them sign their individual
extrajudicial statements.
Antonio Abendao, the husband of Maria, was working at Saudi Arabia when his
family was killed. He came to know about the tragic death of his wife and son through
an overseas call from his brother Renato Abendao. When he learned about it, he
became unconscious. He arrived in the Philippines five (5) days after.
[22]
He knew
Nelson Garcia because he was the son of his cousin. He was also familiar with Tito
Zuela, but he did not know Maximo Velarde. He spent twenty thousand (P20,000.00)
pesos for the funeral of his wife and son. He gave one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos
financial assistance to the family of their driver, Hegino.
[23]
*11C
On the other hand, Maximo, Tito and Nelson interposed common defenses: (1) denial
and (2) that they were tortured and forced to make a confession. In addition, Tito and
Nelson claimed they were not assisted by counsel when their confessions were taken,
while Maximo alleged the defense of alibi saying that he did not leave Magallanes,
Sorsogon anytime in 1985.
On June 1, 1985, five (5) persons, led by Lt. Idian, went to the house of Maximo
Velarde in Magallanes, Sorsogon to fetch him because his parents wanted him at
Cabusao, Camarines Sur as his brother Benito Velarde died. He was shown the picture
of the cadaver of his brother. Maximo went with the group of Lt. Idian on board a red
car and traveled to Naga City, arriving there between 7:00 and 8:00 in the evening.
In a dark place before reaching Naga City, the driver stopped the vehicle to urinate.
Before the driver could return, Maximo felt a hard object hit his head and he passed
out. When he regained consciousness, he was already handcuffed. Pointing a gun at
him, Lt. Idian told him that he had two choices, either to die or sign the statement they
prepared because his brother had wronged them. He was warned not to tell anyone
that he was mauled. Thereafter, they proceeded to the Camaligan municipal jail.
Two days later or on June 3, 1985, Maximo was brought out of the jail and ushered
into a small room where he saw three persons, namely Lt. Idian, Atty. Jose Ocampo
from CLAO, Naga City and Pat. Gonsalo Refe, a police investigator from Cabusao,
Camarines Sur. Atty. Ocampo read to him the contents of a prepared statement, which
in substance mentioned that some people died and that he was responsible for their
death. Maximo refused to sign. Atty. Ocampo stepped out of the room, followed by
Lt. Idian and he overheard that he would be made to sign the statement in Atty.
Ocampos office in Naga City. Atty. Ocampo then left and Lt. Idian returned to the
room.
Upon Lt. Idians return to the smaller room, he kicked Maximo in the stomach and
poked a gun at him. Consumed by fear, Maximo promised that he would sign the
prepared statement. He was then handed a piece of paper and ordered to copy its
contents on the prepared statement. Found on page 5 of his extrajudicial confession
was this statement, in his own handwriting:111
"Opo binasa ko po ang apedabeth na ito na may 5# pahina na pawang
totoo at sasareling kagustohan at walang nantakot o nangako."
[24]

On June 4, 1985, Maximo again signed the statement before Judge Lore R. Valencia
Bagalacsa, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Libmanan, Camarines Sur. From the time
accused Maximo was arrested, he was never released. Maximo denied that he saw and
talked to Romualda on June 6, 1985 at the Camaligan municipal jail because he had
been detained at the Libmanan municipal jail since June 4, 1985.
For his part, Nelson Garcia denied any knowledge of the crime. On June 4, 1985, the
group of Pat. Gonsalo Refe went to his house and invited him to the office of Lt.
Idian. He was brought to the Camaligan Police Station. Upon their arrival, Lt. Idian
talked to him and tried to convince him to confess to the killing of the Abendaos.
Because Nelson refused, Lt. Idian brought him upstairs and mauled him. He was
transferred to Naga City jail, where he was detained for two (2) hours.
Thereafter, he was brought to the Cabusao Police Station where Pat. Rodolfo O.
Cario subjected him to another investigation. Because of his continued refusal to
confess, he was mauled again, this time by Pat. Cario.
To avoid further injury to his person, on June 5, 1985, Nelson Garcia was forced to
sign the prepared statement. He was neither informed of its contents nor assisted by
counsel. He was handed a piece of paper, the contents of which he was ordered to
copy, in his own handwriting, and in substance was similar to what Maximo was
ordered to copy as his own extrajudicial statement. He was brought to the office of
Judge Bagalacsa that same afternoon so that he could sign his extrajudicial statement.
From the time he was invited to the office of Lt. Idian, Nelson was never released
from police custody. He was first detained at the Libmanan municipal jail, and later
on transferred to the Tinangis Penal Farm in Pili, Camarines Sur. Though he suffered
physically from the beatings he got from the policemen, he was never permitted to see
a doctor. His relatives were not able to visit or talk to him because the policemen
prohibited visitors.
[25]

Like Nelson, Tito alias "Anting," denied participation in the crime. On July 9, 1985,
Pat. Refe invited him to the office of Lt. Idian in Cabusao, Camarines Sur. Upon
arrival at the police station, he was investigated about his knowledge of the crime.
Failing to elicit any information from him, he was brought to Libmanan jail where he
spent the night.*O1
The following day, Tito was again brought to Cabusao Police Station and presented to
Lt. Idian. In Lt. Idians office, he was investigated about his involvement in the crime.
When he could not provide any answer, he was made to board the police jeep, to be
brought back to the Libmanan jail.
Along the way, the police jeep stopped and Pat. Cabrera got off and kicked Tito who
fell to the ground. He heard a gunshot and was shown the piece of paper that he was
ordered to sign before Judge Bagalacsa. He was threatened with death should he
refuse to sign the prepared statement. Out of fear for his life, Tito promised to sign.
Thereafter, they boarded the police jeep and proceeded to the office of Judge
Bagalacsa in Libmanan, Camarines Sur.
Upon arrival at the office of Judge Bagalacsa, he was ordered to sign the statement
without the assistance of counsel and without being informed of its contents.
Thereafter, he was brought to Libmanan municipal jail and later to Tinangis Penal
Farm. Like his co-accused, he was never released from police custody from the time
of arrest.
On August 26, 1993, the trial court promulgated its decision convicting the three (3)
accused of robbery with homicide, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, after a careful and serious evaluation of the evidence
presented by the prosecution and the defense, the Court is morally
convinced beyond reasonable doubt, that the three (3) accused Maximo
Velarde, Tito Zuela and Nelson Garcia had committed the crime of
Robbery with Homicide and, therefore, sentences them to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to pay jointly and
severally an indemnity in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS for the Heirs of Maria Abendao and John
Abendao and FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS for the Heirs
of Hegino Hernandez, without imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to pay the costs.
"SO ORDERED.
"GIVEN this 26th day of July, 1993 at Libmanan, Camarines Sur,
Philippines.
"(Sgd.) SALVADOR G. CAJOT
.."Presiding Judge"
[26]

On the same day, all three (3) accused filed a notice of appeal with the trial court.
In their appeal, accused-appellants claim that the trial court erred in:
(1) relying on Maximo Velardes extra-judicial confession
notwithstanding the violation of his constitutional rights;OC
(2) giving full faith and credit to Romualda Algarins testimony; and
(3) finding all three (3) accused guilty as charged despite the
prosecutions failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Considering that there were no eyewitnesses to the commission of the crime, the
extra-judicial confessions of the three (3) accused play a pivotal role in the
determination of their culpability. The Court is duty-bound, therefore, to resolve the
issue of whether or not the extra-judicial confessions were executed in accordance
with the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, in light of the fact that the crime took
place in 1985.
The pertinent provision of the 1973 Constitution provides:
"Article IV, Section 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means, which vitiates the free will, shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence."
[27]

The right to counsel attaches the moment an investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information on the crime from the suspected offender. It is at this
point that the law requires the assistance of counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of
extorting forced or coerced admissions or confessions from the person undergoing
interrogation. In other words, "the moment there is a move or even urge of said
investigators to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information which may
appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from said suspect, he should then and there
be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right, but the waiver shall be made in
writing and in the presence of counsel."
[28]

Lt. Idians team apprehended appellant Maximo in Magallanes, Sorsogon on June 1,
1985 when no warrant had been issued for his arrest. Immediately thereafter, the
arresting peace officers investigated appellant Maximo. His statement was reduced in
writing when they were in Camaligan, Camarines Sur. It was in Camaligan that
CLAO lawyer Ocampo was summoned to assist appellant Maximo in the execution of
his written confession. Atty. Ocampo was not present during the entire duration that
accused Maximo was subjected to custodial investigation as could be inferred from
the testimony of Pat. Rodolfo Cario, to wit:
"Q: And after taking the statement of Velarde, what did you do with the
statement of Velarde?OscC
A: It was presented to Atty. Ocampo.
Q: Do you want to tell me that inspite of the fact that he was present
when the confession was made you still present the statement to Atty.
Ocampo?
A: In order to let him sign the statement.
Q: And where did Atty. Ocampo sign the confession of Velarde?
A: It was sign [sic] at Naga because he went ahead.
Q: Do you mean to tell me now that after the confession was made, the
confession was left to you and after the confession was brought to his
office at the CLAO Office in Naga, is that what you want to tell this
court.
A: We went to Naga with Lt. Idian and Velarde.
Q: But it remains a fact that Atty. Ocampo was already at Naga when the
statement of Velarde was presented to him for signature, is that correct?
A: Yes he went ahead to Naga."
[29]

There was no evidence that Maximo executed a waiver of his right to counsel. In light
of these facts, we are constrained to rule that Maximo Velardes extra-judicial
statement is inadmissible in evidence.
[30]
"An uncounselled extra-judicial confession
without a valid waiver of the right to counsel - that is, in writing and in the presence
of counsel - is inadmissible in evidence."
[31]

The respective sworn statements of appellants Tito and Nelson were likewise
inadmissible in evidence because they were executed without the assistance of
counsel. Despite the fact that the reason for the absence of lawyer during the custodial
investigation was the scarcity of lawyers in the area, the Court could not be lenient in
this case. The absence or scarcity of lawyers in any given place is not a valid reason
for defying the constitutional mandate on counseled confessions.
Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, the defect in the confessions of Tito and
Nelson was not cured by their signing the extra-judicial statements before Judge
Bagalacsa.cCCO
Nevertheless, the infirmity of accused-appellants sworn statements did not leave a
void in the prosecutions case. Accused-appellant Maximo repeated the contents of his
sworn statement to Romualda Algarin who, in turn, related these in court. Such
declaration to a private person is admissible in evidence against accused-appellant
Maximo pursuant to Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules of Court stating that the "act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence
against him." The trial court, therefore, correctly gave evidentiary value to
Romualdas testimony. In People vs. Maqueda,
[32]
we held:
"However, the extrajudicial admissions of Maqueda to Prosecutor Zarate
and to Ray Dean Salvosa stand on a different footing. These are not
governed by the exclusionary rules under the Bill of Rights. Maqueda
voluntarily and freely made them to Prosecutor Zarate not in the course
of an investigation, but in connection with Maquedas plea to be utilized
as a state witness; and as to the other admission, it was given to a private
person. The provisions of the Bill of Rights are primarily limitations on
government, declaring the rights that exist without governmental grant,
that may not be taken away by government and that government has the
duty to protect; or restrictions on the power of the government found
not in particular specific types of action prohibited, but in the general
principle that keeps alive in the public mind the doctrine that
governmental power is not unlimited. They are the fundamental
safeguards against aggressions of arbitrary power, or state tyranny and
abuse of authority. In laying down the principles of the government and
fundamental liberties of the people, the Constitution did not govern the
relationships between individuals.
"Accordingly, Maquedas admissions to Ray Dean Salvosa, a private
party, are admissible in evidence against the former under Section 26,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In Aballe vs. People (183 SCRA 196
[1990]), this Court held that the declaration of an accused expressly
acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against
him and any person, otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who
heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what
he heard if he heard and understood it. The said witness need not
repeat verbatim the oral confession; it suffices if he gives its substance.
By analogy, that rule applies to oral extrajudicial admission."
(Underscoring supplied.)
[33]
11
And in the recent case of People vs. Andan
[34]
the Court reiterated the doctrine
enunciated in the Maqueda case. In Andan, the Court said that "when the accused
talked with the mayor as confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his
uncounselled confession did not violate his constitutional rights. Constitutional
procedures on custodial investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not
elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner
whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime." Of course, accused-
appellant Maximo attempted to discredit Romualda's credibility as a witness when he
swore that he could not have been in Camaligan on June 6, 1985 because since June 4,
1985 until some three weeks later, he was detained at the Libmanan jail.
[35]
The trial
court correctly disregarded this self-serving uncorroborated assertion.
The defense failed to attribute any ill-motive on the part of Romualda for testifying on
accused-appellant Maximos admission and therefore the presumption that in so
testifying, she was impelled by no other reason than to tell the truth, stands. The fact
that she is related to two of the victims did not render her testimony incredible.
Relationship per se is not proof of prejudice.
[36]
She might have been mistaken as to the
date when she talked with accused-appellant Maximo while he was detained
considering the more than three-year gap between June 1985 and September to
October 1988 when Romualda testified. However, it is not necessary that the witness
should be able to fix accurately the date of the conversation in which the admission
was made. What is important is that the witness is able to state the substance of the
conversation or declaration.
[37]
LCO
Romualdas testimony on accused-appellant Maximos admission sealed not only the
latters fate but also that of appellants Tito and Nelson. The rule that an extrajudicial
confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-
accused because the latter has no opportunity to cross-examine the confessant and
therefore, as against him, the confession is hearsay,
[38]
is not applicable here. What is
involved here is an admission, not a confession. Wharton distinguished these terms as
follows:
"A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a
criminal case, of his guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a
statement by the accused, direct or implied, of facts pertinent to the issue
and tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt. In
other words, an admission is something less than a confession, and is but
an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is
insufficient to authorize a conviction and which tends only to establish
the ultimate fact of guilt."
[39]

Appellants Tito and Nelson were afforded the opportunity to cross-examine witness
Romualda on accused-appellant Maximos declaration. They could have questioned
its veracity by presenting evidence in support of their defenses of denial and alibi so
they could put to test Romualdas credibility. Having failed to do so, Romualdas
testimony, which the trial court correctly considered as credible, stands unscathed.
Romualdas testimony on the substance of accused-appellant Maximos admission
standing alone, may not be the basis for conviction of the appellants. However, such
testimony, taken with circumstances duly established by the prosecution, point
unerringly to accused-appellants culpability. These circumstances are: (1) accused-
appellants and the victims were all residents of Barcelonita, Cabusao, Camarines Sur,
a small barangay where everyone knew everybody; (2) accused-appellants Tito and
Nelson helped in the stores of the sisters Maria and Romualda a week before the
incident; (3) Romualda saw the three accused-appellants as they boarded Marias
jeepney during its lastpalay delivery to Libmanan; (4) Gerardo Atienza saw accused-
appellant Maximo with Marias group during the jeepneys second delivery of palay;
(5) Atienza saw accused-appellant Maximo riding in Marias jeepney after the last
delivery; (6) after the commission of the crime, accused-appellants Tito and Nelson
no longer went to the store of Romualda; (7) accused-appellants never attended the
wake of the victims, and (8) accused-appellant Maximo fled to Manila.Ls1CO
These circumstances form an unbroken chain, which, by themselves, lead to a fair and
reasonable conclusion that accused-appellants were the culprits in the robbery with
homicide.
[40]
Under the law, circumstantial evidence is sufficient basis for conviction as
long as: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proved, and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
[41]
These requisites were
present in this case.
Accused-appellants diverse courses of action after the commission of the crime, with
accused-appellant Maximo going to Manila and accused-appellants Tito and Nelson
staying in Barcelonita, do not negate their guilt. As regards accused-appellant
Maximo, his flight to Manila and to Magallanes, Sorsogon with no plausible
explanation therefor is a clear indication of guilt.
[42]
With respect to accused-appellants
Tito and Nelson, their decision to stay in Barcelonita did not mean that they were not
equally guilty as accused-appellant Maximo. As this Court once said:
"Accused-appellant argues that had he participated in the crime, his
natural reaction would have been to flee. We do not agree. Each culprit
behaves differently in externalizing and manifesting his guilt. Others
may escape or flee which circumstance is strongly indicative of guilt,
while others may remain in the same vicinity so as to create a semblance
of normalcy, careful not to arouse suspicion in the community."
[43]

Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of accused-appellants before, during and
after the commission of the crime, which indicate a joint purpose, concerted action
and concurrence of sentiments.
[44]
Whenever homicide is committed as a consequence
or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the
conspiracy are also guilty as principals in the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless there is proof
that they tried to prevent the crime.
[45]
There is no evidence that any of the accused-
appellants desisted from the malevolent intent of the others to kill the victims during
the robbery. As such, they shall equally bear the responsibility for the resulting crime.
Treachery was not alleged in the information but the suddenness of the assault upon
Hegino and Maria from behind was proven beyond reasonable doubt. As such,
treachery may be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance.
[46]
As regards
seven-year-old John, even if the manner by which he was attacked was not shown,
treachery may be deemed to have attended his killing. Treachery exists when an adult
person illegally attacks a child of tender years and causes his death.
[47]
LCCc
The crime committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide defined
and penalized in Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court correctly
considered the crime as robbery with homicide and not "robbery with triple homicide"
as charged in the information. The term "homicide" in Article 294(1) is used in its
generic sense, embracing not only the act which results in death but also all other acts
producing anything short of death.
[48]
Neither is the nature of the offense altered by the
number of killings in connection with the robbery.
[49]
The multiplicity of victims slain
on the occasion of the robbery is only appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
This would preclude an anomalous situation where, from the standpoint of the gravity
of the offense, robbery with one killing would be treated in the same way that robbery
with multiple killings would be.
[50]

Under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, robbery with homicide is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. By the presence of two aggravating circumstances,
namely, treachery and multiplicity of slain victims, the proper penalty should be death
in view of Article 63 (1) of the same Code.
[51]
However, considering that when this
case happened, the imposition of the death penalty was proscribed, the proper
imposable penalty was reclusion perpetua. The heinousness of the crime they
committed notwithstanding, accused-appellants may not be deprived of such favorable
factor in their case.
The Solicitor Generals plea for modification of the penalty in accordance with
Republic Act No. 7659 which "has already expressly converted reclusion
perpetua into a divisible penalty" and on account of the decision in People vs.
Lucas,
[52]
is untenable. It must be stressed that the Lucas ruling has been reconsidered
and, accordingly, the Court has held:
"After deliberating on the motion and re-examining the legislative
history of R.A. No. 7659, the Court concludes that although Section 17
of the R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from
twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear
legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible
penalty. It shall then remain as an indivisible penalty."
[53]

The trial court failed to award the heirs of Maria Abendao the amount of twenty
three thousand (P23,000.00) pesos in reimbursement of the stolen cash, ring and
wristwatch and the expenses amounting to twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos for
her wake and that of her son, which were duly proved.
[54]
The heirs are entitled to those
amounts as reparation of the damage caused by accused-appellants. They shall also be
liable for exemplary damages in view of the presence of two aggravating
circumstances in the commission of the crime.
[55]
C1CCc
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the decision of the trial
court. The Court renders judgment finding accused-appellants Tito Zuela y
Morandarte, Maximo Velarde y de los Reyes, and Nelson Garcia y Temporas guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide, defined and penalized under
Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences each of them to reclusion
perpetua with all its accessory penalties and to pay civil indemnity of one hundred
thousand (P100,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Maria Abendao and John Abendao
and fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos to the heirs of Hegino Hernandez, Jr.
In addition, the Court sentences each of the accused-appellants solidarily to pay the
additional amounts of forty three thousand (P43,000.00) pesos as reimbursement of
damages to the heirs of Maria Abendao, and fifty thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as
exemplary damages to the heirs of each of the three (3) victims.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.


PEOPLE V TAWAT
G.R. No. L-62871 May 25, 1984
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FELICITO TAWAT and LEO TAWAT, accused. FELICITO TAWAT, accused whose
death sentence is under review.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Julian B. San Juan, Jr. for accused.

PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes,
finding Felicito Tawat and Leo Tawat guilty of robbery with triple homicide, sentencing
Felicito to death and Leo to an indeterminate penalty within the range of reclusion
temporal and ordering them to pay solidarily damages of P32,000 to each set of heirs of the
three victims, Bernarda Salvador, Lito Siao and Jose Magdaraog. (Crim. Case No. 927.)
Leo did not appeal.
In the morning of January 23, 1980, Andrea Magdaraog-Siao and her nephew, Luis
Magdaraog, who were residing in the barrio proper of Agban, Baras, Catanduanes, went to
her hut located in Sitio Banog, a mountainous portion of Agban. They wanted to find out
what happened to her mother, Bernardo da Salvador Magdaraog, 79, and her two
grandchildren who were staying with the old woman. The horrible and gory sight, which
greeted them, beggars description (Exh. F):
Sprawled on the floor of the humble abode, four by two and a half meters, were the dead
bodies of Bernarda, Andrea's son Lito Siao, 13, and Luis' brother Jose, 15, bathed in their
own blood (Exh. B).
Bernarda had six stab wounds in the chest, two stab wounds in the abdomen (one gaping),
a hack wound in the forehead, fractures on the left temple, mandible and ribs and a hack
wound in the lower left leg, severing the bone with only a thread of skin remaining, or
fourteen wounds in all (Exh. A).
Lito had eight stab, gaping wounds in the chest, which penetrated his lungs, six stab
wounds in the neck, cutting the carotid arteries, and a hack wound in the head, fracturing
the skull, fifteen wounds in all (Exh. A-1 and A-3, p. 202, Record).
Jose Magdaraog had three stab wounds in the chest which injured his lungs, a hack wound
in the occipital region, fracturing the bone, and a stab wound which penetrated his heart,
five serious wounds in all (Exh. A-2).
Bernarda was prostrate on the floor with her teeth showing. Her waist was slashed. She
was naked from the waist down. The cloth-belt, where she kept her money, was missing.
Also missing were a pig, four chickens, a mosquito net, three kettles, one frying pan and
plates and spoons, all valued at P705.
The door of the hut wits destroyed. The belongings were scattered on the floor. There was a
black underwear with garter belt marked "Armin" and "No. 7" (Exh. D) which was later
proven to have been worn by accused Felicito Tawat.
Who were the perpetrators of the dastardly misdeeds? They were Felicito Tawat, 23, and
his first cousin, Leo Tawat, 16. At about three o'clock in the afternoon of the following day
January 23, 1980, they unexpectedly arrived at the hut of Floro Ogalesco, '"15, an abaca
and rattan stripper, in the remote and isolated forest of Sitio Capipian, Barrio Paraiso, San
Miguel, Catanduanes,
Felicito, in the presence of Leo, confessed to Ogalesco that they were taking refuge in his
secluded hut because the night before they had killed at Sitio Banog, Barrio Agban, Baras
an old woman and two boys, one of whom was Andrea Siao's son.
Felicito recounted that they were drunk. As they passed Siao's hut, a dog barked. Felicito
killed the dog. This provoked an old woman to shout at Felicito. He stabbed and killed her.
The two boys shouted also. Felicito killed one while Leo killed the other. They took the dead
dog, chickens, pork and other belongings in the hut and proceeded to the house of Julio
Tawat, father of Leo, in Barrio Agban, and from there they repaired to Capipian. that was
the story narrated in court by Ogalesco, linking Felicito and Leo to the robbery with triple
homicide committed on the evening of January 22, 1980.
The accused's confession to Ogalesco is in part corroborated by the sworn statement of
Alejo Tawat, father of Felicito. Alejo declared that at about eight o'clock in the morning of
January 23, 1980 he and his brother, Julio (father of Leo), went to their abaca plantation in
Sitio Calabiga. He found Felicito and Leo cooking chickens in a kettle. He saw a mosquito
net in the hut. A pig had been killed and was about to be cooked. (Nos. 11 and 12, Exh. C.)
After Felicito and Leo had finished eating, Alejo and Julio accompanied their sons to the
forest of Capipian. Alejo and Julio left them there and returned to Barrio J. M. Alberto,
Baras.
From his neighbors, Alejo learned that the mother-in-law of Jovito Siao, his son Lito and his
wife's nephew Jose were killed and that the pig, blanket, mosquito net, kettle and chickens
of Jovito Siao were stolen (Nos. 15-17 and 22-23, Exh. C).
Any doubt as to the connection of Felicito with the robbery with triple homicide was removed
by the finding at the scene of the crime of black shorts with belt (Exh. D). Luis Magdaraog
testified that the shorts were worn by Felicito in the morning of January 22, 1980 (the crime
was committed at night) when he gave cigarettes to Felicito and Leo (4 tsn October 8,
1981). Leo in his sworn statement confirmed that the shorts belonged to Felicito (No. 32,
Exh. G).
Felicito relied on an alibi. He testified that he was in Mercedes, Camarines Norte
from 1963 to October 1980. This claim is manifestly false because he was only seven years
old in 1963. He finished the sixth grade at Barrio Agban, Baras in 1972 (Exh. I, p. 211,
Rollo). His father saw him on January 22, 1980 at Barrio J.M. Alberto, Baras (No. 5, Exh. C;
p. 46, Record; 26 tsn Oct. 6, 1982).
The trial court concluded that although there was no eyewitness testimony to the
perpetration of the crime, nevertheless, the totality of the circumstantial evidence is so
overwhelming as to prove Felicito's guilt to a moral certainty.
Felicito was not immediately arrested. He, with Nestor Rojo and Jimmy Tarraya,
committed another robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide on November 30, 1980 at
Barrio Bugao, Bagamanoc, Catanduanes. Felicito stabbed to death with a dagger Jovita
Lim, a storekeeper, while a companion got the loot of P110.
He was convicted and sentenced to death. This court affirmed the judgment of conviction
but commuted the death penalty to reclusion perpetua (People vs. Tawat, G.R. No. 62547,
December 21, 1983).
In connection with that case, Felicito executed a confession on January 9, 1981 before the
chief of police of Bagamanoc, Catanduanes. Incidentally, he stated therein that he wanted
to get out of Catanduanes because he was wanted by the police for the killing of three
persons in Barrio Agban, Baras. he had hidden himself in the hut of Ogalesco in Capipian,
San Miguel. (Nos. 13 and 18, Exh. H-6, p. 163, Record.)
Counsel de oficio contends that the trial court erred in relying on that admission of Felicito in
his confession which he later repudiated. He argues that the confession during custodial
interrogation cannot be admissible in evidence, as held in Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, G. R.
No. 61016, April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538.
That admission was only alluded to in passing by the trial court. It was not the basis for
Felicito's conviction in this case. His guilt was predicated on his confession to Ogalesco
which was not taken during custodial interrogation. Ogalesco was not a peace officer.
While still a teenager, Felicito, who, as already stated, finished the elementary course in
1972, embarked on a criminal career. In 1975, he was charged in the Baras municipal court
with theft of two cocks, alimbuyogon andbalawon (Exh. J). He pleaded guilty. He was
sentenced to 15 days' imprisonment (Exh. J-2).
He was suspected of being implicated in a case of murder and frustrated murder committed
in December, 1979 in Tigaon, Camarines Sur (Exh. K and HH).
As already noted, for another robo con homicidio committed on November 30, 1980
(subsequent to the instant case), he was convicted and the judgment was affirmed
in People vs. Tawat, G.R. No. 62547, December 21, 1983,supra, where the death penalty
was commuted to reclusion perpetua.
The crime in this case may be mitigated by drunkenness but it was aggravated by dwelling,
abuse of superiority,despoblado and disregard of sex and old age in the case of the 79-
year-old woman victim. The second and third homicides may be also regarded as an
additional aggravating circumstance (People vs. Pedroso, L-32997, July 30, 1982, 115
SCRA 599, 609).
We agree with the learned trial judge that the guilt of the accused was established beyond
reasonable doubt. The testimony of Ogalesco on Felicito's oral confession is competent
evidence.
"The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged,
may be given in evidence against him" (Sec. 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court). What Felicito
told Ogalesco may in a sense be also regarded as part of the res gestae.
The rule is that "any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession,
is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all
of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in
its substance." (23 C.J.S. 196.)
"Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession may be made by the testimony of a
person who testifies that he was present, heard, understood, and remembers the substance
of the conversation or statement made by the accused." (Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 4th.
Ed., Niblack, sec. 278, p. 551.)
In U.S. vs. Corrales, 28 Phil. 362, a malversation case, Jose Corrales, clerk of the Court of
First Instance, received on June 6, 1913 P321.88 from a man named Melliza as payment of
the fine and costs imposed on Melizza. Corrales did not issue any receipt but merely gave
Melliza a copy of the judgment of conviction with a note at the bottom: "Multas y costas
pagadas".
A week later, or on June 13, the auditor examined Corrales' accounts. The sum paid by
Melliza was not turned over to him. On June 14, an information for misappropriation was
filed against Corrales. In the afternoon of that day, Corrales went to the auditor's house and
confessed to him that he placed that amount of P321.88 in the office safe only in the
afternoon of June 13 after the auditor's examination.
On the witness stand, the accused claimed that the amount .had always been in the drawer
for personal funds in his office safe. This testimony was contradicted by the auditor who
testified on Corrales' confession that he placed the amount only in the afternoon of June 13.
Corrales' counsel assailed the admissibility of the auditor's testimony.
It was held that the auditor's testimony was admissible and properly taken into
consideration by the trial. court.
Judge Graciano P. Gayapa. Jr. acted corrective in imposing the death penalty. In the annals
of criminal law, no one deserved the death penalty more than Felicito Tawat. Society must
protect itself against a dangerous criminal like him "by taking his life in retribution for his
offense and as an example and warning to others". "In these days of rampant criminality, it
should have a salutary effect upon the criminally minded to know that the courts do not shirk
their disagreeable duty to impose the death penalty in cases where the law so requires"
(People vs. Carillo and Raquenio, 85 Phil. 611; 635).
Justice Montemayor says: "We have no quarrel with the trial judge or with anyone else,
layman or jurist as to the wisdom or folly of the death penalty Today, there are quite a
number of people who honestly believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or
unwise or ineffective.
"However, as long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal
law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect
and apply the law regardless of their private opinions" (People vs. Limaco, 88 Phil. 35,43).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed with the slight modification that Felicito
Tawat is also ordered to pay the heirs of Bernarda Magdaraog the value of the articles
taken in the sum of P705. No costs.
SO ORDERED.


SEBASTIAN V GARCHITORENA
[G.R. No. 114028. October 18, 2000]
SALVADOR SEBASTIAN, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCIS E.
GARCHITORENA, HON. JOSE S. BALAJADIA, and HON.
NARCISO T. ATIENZA (SANDIGANBAYAN-First
Division), respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DE LEON, JR., J .:
Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
[1]
in conjunction with
Rule XIX of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan, seeking to annul the
Resolution
[2]
dated August 24, 1993 of the Sandiganbayan, First Division
which admitted the sworn statements of petitioner Salvador Sebastian, Sr.
and his co-accused in Criminal Case No. 17904 as evidence for the
prosecution, and the Resolution dated September 27, 1993 which denied the
motion for reconsideration of the said Resolution.
On July 28, 1992, Special Prosecution Officer III Teresita Diaz-Baldoz filed
with the Sandiganbayan an Information for the crime of Malversation of Public
Funds
[3]
, as defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, against Rosita C. Pada, Teresita B. Rodriquez, Rachel V. Torres,
Lourdes A. Enriquez and Salvador C. Sebastian. It reads:
That on or about the period comprised between January 1989 and June 21, 1990, in
the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, all public officers, ROSITA C. PADA, being then
the Regional Postage Stamps Custodian, and as such is accountable for the custody of
the postage stamps received and issued by her by reason of the duties of her office,
TERESITA B. RODRIGUEZ, being then the Senior Clerk in the Postage Stamps
Section, RACHEL V. TORRES, being then a Utility Man in the Postage Stamps
Section, LOURDES A. ENRIQUEZ, being then a Senior Clerk in the Mail Delivery
Section and SALVADOR C. SEBASTIAN, being then a Letter Carrier, all of the
Postal Services Office, Region IX, Zamboanga City, while in the performance of their
official functions, taking advantage of their position, committing the offense in
relation to their office, and conspiring and confederating with one another, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with grave abuse of confidence,
misappropriate, misapply, and embezzle and convert to their personal use and benefit
the amount of SIX HUNDRED FORTY NINE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
NINETY and 05/100 PESOS (P649,290.05), Philippine Currency, out of the postage
stamps in the custody of accused Rosita C. Pada, to the damage and prejudice of the
Government in the aforesaid sum.
Contrary to law.
Rosita C. Pada, Rachel V. Torres, and Salvador C. Sebastian entered
separate pleas of "Not Guilty" on October 13, 1992.
[4]

On April 22, 1993, the marking of the documents to be testified on by the
lone prosecution witness, Auditor Lilibeth Rugayan of the Commission on
Audit, who conducted the audit examination, took place before the Deputy
Clerk of Court of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan. The marking of the
exhibits was with the conformity of all of the accused and their respective
counsel.
Upon the completion of the testimony of Auditor Rugayan, the prosecution
rested its case
[5]
and formally offered its evidence on July 6, 1993.
[6]
Among
those offered as evidence were the sworn statements made by all the
accused, including that of petitioner, and previously marked as exhibits "Q",
"R", "S", "T", "U", and "U-1" for the prosecution. Said exhibits were offered as
part of the testimony of Auditor Rugayan.
On August 19, 1993, all the accused (including petitioner) filed their "Joint
Objections to Formal Offer of Evidence" on the principal ground that the sworn
statements were "hearsay" evidence.
[7]

The Sandiganbayan in its Minute Resolution
[8]
dated August 24, 1993,
admitted said evidence, thus:
Acting upon the "FORMAL OFFER OF EVIDENCE" dated July 5, 1993, of the
Prosecution and considering the "JOINT OBJECTIONS TO FORMAL OFFER OF
EVIDENCE" dated August 19, 1993, of accused, the Court RESOLVES the same as
follows:
Exhibits A, B, and C are admitted, they being certified true copies of official
documents; Exhibits D up to U and U-1 inclusive of submarkings are admitted as part
of the testimony of Lilibeth Rugayan as examining auditor under the State Auditing
Code (P.D. No. 1445).
Dissatisfied, the three accused, on September 13, 1993, jointly filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by the respondent court
in its Resolution
[9]
dated September 27, 1993. It ruled that:
Considering that under the Order of this Court dated April 22, 1993 (p. 85) the
exhibits "off-court" was admitted by the accused through counsel, among which were
exhibits "A", "B" and "C", the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the accused Pada,
Torres and Sebastian with regard to the admission of said exhibits dated September
10, 1993 is denied.
Hence, this petition.
The only issue to be resolved in the present petition is whether or not the
sworn statements of petitioner and his co-accused are admissible in evidence
"as part of the testimony of the prosecution witness".
Petitioner argues that the said issue should be resolved in the negative on
the ground that the subject sworn statements are hearsay evidence. Petitioner
contends that he and his co-accused were never presented as witnesses,
thus, they were not given the opportunity to identify and authenticate their
respective sworn statements and that Auditor Rugayan had no personal
knowledge of the contents thereof.
We disagree.
As a general rule, hearsay evidence is inadmissible. Thus, the rule
explicitly provides that a witness can testify only on those facts which he
knows of his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own
perceptions.
[10]
However, while the testimony of a witness regarding a
statement made by another person, if intended to establish the truth of the fact
asserted in the statement, is clearly hearsay evidence, it is otherwise if the
purpose of placing the statement in the record is merely to establish the fact
that the statement was made or the tenor of such statement.
[11]

In the present case, the sworn statements executed by the petitioner and
co-accused were offered not to prove the truth or falsity of the facts stated
therein but only to prove that such written statements were actually made and
executed. As stated in the Resolution dated August 24, 1993 of the
respondent court, Exhibits "D" up to "U" and "U-1" were admitted only as part
of the testimony of Lilibeth Rugayan as Examining Auditor. Title II, Chapter I,
Section 55 of P.D. 1445, otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code
provides that "the auditor shall obtain through inspections, observation,
inquiries, confirmation and other techniques, sufficient competent evidential
matter to afford himself a reasonable basis for his opinions, judgments,
conclusions and recommendations".
It is also the contention of petitioner that he never admitted the said sworn
statements during the pre-trial conference; that he agreed merely to the
"marking" of the said sworn statements as exhibits of the prosecution; and
that "marking" is different from "admission".
The main purpose of a pre-trial is to expedite the trial. Thus, the
respondent court in its Order dated April 22, 1993 ruled that:
By agreement of the parties, the sub-marking of the documents to be testified to by
Auditor Lilibeth Rugayan has been completed and only the other sub-markings will
take place during the proceedings. Additionally, the parties have informally agreed
that all the documents marked today are deemed authenticated except for the alleged
responses of the various postmasters as to the request for confirmation which the
accused dispute both as to their authenticity as well as to their accuracy assuming that
they are authentic. In view of this, subject to confirmation this afternoon, the direct
examination will be waived and the cross-examination by the accused will take place
primarily to dispute the statement above-mentioned.
This Order of the Sandiganbayan reciting the actions taken, the facts
stipulated, and evidence marked, binds the parties and limits the trial to
matters not disposed of and shall control the course of the action during the
trial, unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
[12]
The record
does not show that petitioner and his co-accused objected to the above-
mentioned Order. In any event, any evidence presented during the pre-trial
conference cannot be considered by the court if not formally offered. It has
been held that any evidence which a party desiring to submit for the
consideration of the court must be formally offered by him.
[13]
Such a formal
offer is necessary because it is the duty of the judge to rest his findings of
facts and his judgment only upon the evidence offered by the parties at the
trial.
Petitioner in his supplemental pleading claims to have been deprived of
his constitutional rights under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner alleges that nothing in his sworn statement shows
compliance with the constitutional provisions on the right to counsel, the right
to remain silent and the right to waive these rights in the presence of counsel.
Entrenched is the rule that the rights provided in Section 12, Article III of
the Constitution may be invoked only when a person is under "custodial
investigation" or is "in custody investigation." Custodial investigation has been
defined as any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person
has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way.
[14]
The fact-finding investigation relative to the missing
postage stamps at the Postage Stock Section of Zamboanga City conducted
by a Enrique G. Saavedra, Chief Postal Service Officer, is not a custodial
investigation. It is merely an administrative investigation.
While an investigation conducted by an administrative body may at times
be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a
party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity to
represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person
being investigated with counsel.
[15]
It has been held in the case of Lumiqued v.
Exevea
[16]
that the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative
investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine
whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public
officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of
government service.
Petitioner, likewise contends that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse
of discretion in filing the Information for malversation against him. He argues
that in its first Resolution dated March 18, 1992 of the Office of the
Ombudsman, Graft Investigation Officer Rodolfo Rojas, Jr. recommended the
filing of an Information for Malversation of Public Funds against Rosita C.
Pada only. However, in its subsequent resolution dated July 28, 1992, Special
Prosecution Officer Teresita Daiz-Baldos recommended the prosecution of the
four other accused, including petitioner, stating that:
Thus, for purposes of prosecution, it would be more expedient to indict all the
respondents for Malversation and let them explain in court the actual extent of their
individual accountability. x x x x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the undersigned respectfully recommends the
prosecution of Rosita Pada, Teresita Rodriguez, Rachel Torres, Lourdes Enriquez and
Salvador Sebastian, for Malversation of Public Funds, and the exclusion for liability
of Florecita Doromal."
Hence, petitioner now questions the disposition of the Ombudsman as
merely engaging in a fishing expedition in this case.
This Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the exercise by
the Ombudsman of his constitutionally mandated investigatory and
prosecutory power. Otherwise stated, it is not for this Court to review the
exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing a
complaint filed before his Office. Such initiative and independence are
inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion
of the people and preserver of the integrity of the public service.
[17]

Lastly, the Court noted that the petition, as described therein, is one filed
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. However, under Rule 45, a petition for
review on certiorari is a mode of appeal from judgments or final orders or
resolutions and limited to questions of law. Petitioner's choice of remedy
therefore is clearly an error. The resolutions of the Sandiganbayan herein
sought to be reviewed or set aside are not in any sense judgments or final
orders or resolutions; they are interlocutory in nature and from which no
appeal lies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.


PEOPLE V CABILES
[G.R. No. 112035. January 16, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PANFILO
CABILES alias NONOY, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
MELO, J .:
Accused-appellant, Panfilo Cabiles, alias Nonoy, seeks the reversal of the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region (Branch 124, Kalookan City),
finding him guilty of the crime of Robbery with Rape, as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused
Panfilo Cabiles alias Nonoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with
Rape as charged and hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment
of Reclusion Perpetua in accordance with Paragraph 2 of Art. 294 of the
Revised Penal Code to indemnify the victim Luzviminda Aquino in the amount
of P30,000.00 as consequential damages. Said accused is also ordered to
return to Marites Nas Atienza the stolen Seiko Wrist watch worth P1,500.00
and one gold ring worth P500,00 and if unable to do so, to pay said victim the
corresponding prices of these articles as shown above to reimburse Marites
Nas Atienza the amount of P1,000.00 in cash and to pay the costs.
The accused shall be entitled to the full period of his preventive imprisonment,
pursuant to Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code provided with the conditions
enumerated thereon have been complied with.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 86-87, Rollo)
Through an Amended Information accused-appellant, together with the additional
accused, was charged as follows:
That on or about the 5
th
day of November 1989, in Caloocan City, Metro
Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused by means of force and violence, with intent of gain, conspiring
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, rob, and carry away one (1) gold ring
worth P500.00, one (1) ladies seiko watch worthP1,500.00, cash money
worth P1,000.00, one (1) bracelet worth P1,500.00 and one gold ring
worth P500.00 and if unable to do so, to pay the said victim the corresponding
prices of these articles as shown above to reimburse Marites Nas Atienza the
amount of P1,000.00 in cash and to pay the costs.
(p. 7, Rollo)
Accused-appellants co-accused, Jaime Mabingnay, was neither apprehended nor
arraigned, whereas accused-appellant was arraigned on both original and amended
informations. After trial, following the entry of a not guilty plea, the above quoted verdict
was rendered. Hence, the instant appeal.
As deduced from the prosecutions evidence which came primarily from the
testimony of Marites Nas Atienza and Luzviminda Aquino, the inculpatory facts are as
follows:
Marites Nas Atienza, a housewife whose husband was abroad, was residing at No.
224 Malambing St., Amparo Subdivision, Kalookan City. On the eve of November 5,
1989, she was asleep with her 1 -year old daughter, Erica Dianne Atienza, inside her
room at her house. Approximately two steps away from her bed, Luzviminda Aquino,
Marites housemaid, was sleeping on a sofa. The house has an area of about 29
square meters. The main door is located at the kitchen. In the kitchen, there is a
stairway leading to the store. To the left of the house is the bedroom where the three
were asleep. The place was illuminated by the light coming from a 25-watt electrical
bulb which was outside the rooms window (tsn, March 5, 1990, p. 6; tsn April 5, 1990,
pp. 20-24, 28; tsn, April 26, 1990, pp. 4, 6, 8, 10, 17).
At around 1:15 oclock on the morning of November 5, 1989, a man suddenly
barged into the house of Marites by destroying the kitchen door and removing the
lawanit wall thereof, thus enabling him to reach the lock inside. The man suddenly
poked a 6-inch knife on the right side of Marites neck. This awakened her. She was
told not to shout otherwise she would be killed. Then the man placed a masking tape
on her mouth and ordered her to bring out her money and jewelry. At the point of the
knife, Marites, while carrying her baby, went to the cabinet outside the room, took cash
amounting toP1,000.00, a Seiko watch worth P1,500.00, a ladys wristwatch with the
trademark Chanel (also referred to in the records as Chanel) worth P850.00, a
bracelet worth P500.00, and a ring worth P500.00 and gave them to the
man. Afterwards, they went back inside the bedroom and Marites sat on her bed, still
cuddling the baby (tsn, March 5, 1990, pp.7-8, 11-12, 40; tsn, April 5, 1990, pp.19, 30,
31). Marites later identified the man as accused appellant.
Meanwhile, Luzviminda was awakened by the crying of Marites baby. When she
was about to shout, the man poked the knife on her left side, causing her an injury. The
man then told her, Huwag kang sisigaw kundi papatayin kita. Meanwhile, Marites sat
on her bed, trembling with fear, as she cuddled her baby. The man also placed
masking tape on Luzvimindas mouth. Thereafter, he forcibly held both of her arms in
front of her. Notwithstanding her struggle to hide her hands at her back, accused-
appellant succeeded in tying her hands at the front with the use of a piece of shoestring
(tsn, March 5, 1990, pp. 9-10, 16; tsn, April 5, 1990, pp. 34-35; tsn, April 26, 1990, pp.
6-9 27, 34, 44). Luzviminda likewise later identified the man as accused-appellant.
The man then went to the store which was only about 4-5 steps away from Marites
bed. He ransacked the same in search for more valuables. Thereafter, he took a bottle
of beer from the refrigerator and began drinking. Afterwards, he returned to the room
and sat beside Luzviminda (tsn, March 5, 1990, p. 10; tsn, April 5, 1990, p. 25.)
While the man continued to hold the knife, he tapped Luzvimindas thigh. When he
was about to consume the beer, he started removing Luzvimindas pants and
underwear while still holding the knife with his right hand. The man then rolled down his
short pants to his thighs. He poked the knife on Luzvimindaa right side and despite the
latters resistance, he succeeded inserting his sexual organ into Luzvimindas private
parts and forcibly lying on top of her. Luzviminda struggled and kicked, accidentally
hitting with her right foot the knife thus causing her injury. All the while, Marites was still
cuddling her daughter, as she sat on her bed in extreme fear. She was witnessing
Luzviminda being raped by the man. While on top of Luzviminda and continuously
doing the sexual act, the man uttered: Isusunod ko ang Ate mo pagkatapos ko sa
iyo. Upon hearing those words, Marites tried to escape by asking permission to
prepare milk for her baby (tsn, March 5, 1990, pp. 11-14, 16-17; tsn, April 5, 1990, pp.
36, 38, 40, 42; tsn April 26, 1990 pp. 10-11, 13-14, 27).
While carrying her child, Marites was able to run to the house of her neighbor, Arnel
Cericos, from whom she asked for help. Cericos house was approximately twelve
steps away from Marites house. Marites decided to hide at Cericos house. When
Cericos entered the room, the man was still on top of Luzviminda. However, upon
seeing Cericos, the man stood up right away and stabbed Cericos four
times. Afterwards, they chased each other outside the house. Meanwhile Luzviminda
put on her pants and ran toward Cericos house (tsn, March 5, 1990, pp. 18-19; tsn,
April 26, 1990, pp. 15,18).
When Marites learned that Cericos was injured, she rushed back to her house to
administer first aid to him. Cericos sustained a stab wound on his chest, two stab
wounds on his left arm, and a stab wound on his right arm. Cericos then complained of
difficulty in breathing. Consequently, Marites brought him to a physician, one Col.
Javier, for treatment. When Cericos complaints continued, Marites decided to bring
him to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City at about 4 oclock that morning (tsn, March
5, 1990, pp. 19-22).
Attending physician Dr. Emmanuel Quedding noted that Cericos sustained four stab
wounds of different sizes, the most serious of which was the lacerated wound on the
interior chest which required Cericos to be placed under observation for 8-12 hours. Dr.
Quedding found that the wounds, if deep enough, could result in the laceration of the
lung, heart and some arteries and consequently, the victims death. After advising
Cericos not to work for about one week or more, he was permitted to leave the hospital
at about 1 oclock that afternoon (tsn, April 5, 1990, pp. 4-5, 10, 12)
For her part, Luzviminda, at 9 oclock that morning, went to the Kalookan Police
Department and reported what happened to her. On November 6, 1989, upon referral
by the chief of Northern Police District, Kalookan City, Luzviminda subjected herself to a
physical examination conducted by Dr. Carmelita Belgica, a medico-legal
officer. Resultantly, Dr. Belgica found on Luzvimindas right foot a laceration, healing,
measuring 3.5 c.m., with scab formation and peripheral edema at the medine melcolus,
right side Her genital examination results showed an old healed laceration
indicative of sexual intercourse possibly occurring three months before the date of
examination. Dr. Belgica expounded that although the physical examination results
manifested that the occurrence of sexual intercourse also took place on November 5,
1989 without any injury at the genital area, as it cannot be consulted medically because
the opening is wide enough (tsn, January 10, 1990, pp. 3-6, 8-10).
Later, on November 8, 1989, at about 1:40 oclock in the afternoon, Corporal
Luciano Caeda and Pfc. Manuel Rodriguez of the Kalookan City Police Station, along
with Romeo Nas, brother of Marites, went to a sash factory warehouse at the Marivic
Compound, Kalookan City. Outside the factory edifice, they saw accused-appellant
sleeping on a bench. Romeo Nas saw the accused-appellant wearing a bracelet which
the former recognized as the bracelet taken from Marites. Upon being awakened,
accused appellant, told the three men that the other things he took from Marites were
inside a plastic bag at the factory building. Consequently, Pfc. Rodriguez went inside
the building to get the plastic bag and it was found to contain a womans undershirt, a
light blue shirt, and a wristwatch with the brand name Chanel which was the one taken
from Marites (tsn, April 10, 1990, pp. 4-5, 7-8, 11, 14, 16, 25).
The following day, November 9, 1989, at about 3:30 oclock in the afternoon,
Marites saw accused-appellant at the Kalookan City Police Station. The latter admitted
his guilt and pointed to Jaime Mabingnay, Marites further recalled that she saw
accused-appellant at Mabingnays house on November 5, 1989, before the crime took
place (tsn, March 5, 1990, p. 30; April 10, 1990, pp. 33-36).
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, relied and banked on denial and alibi.
Accused-appellant denied even having raped Luzviminda Aquino. He said that the
first time he ever saw Marites was at the Kalookan City Police Station on November 9,
1989. He said the same thing about Luzviminda (tsn, August 23, 1990, pp. 4-6).
Regarding the day of the incident, accused-appellant testified that on November 5,
1989, at 1:30 oclock in the morning, he was at Marivic Subdivision, sleeping with his
wife. He had been residing at the Marivic Compound starting October 30, 1989 as he
was designated by the owner of the place to watch over the premises (tsn, August 23,
1990, p.4).
As to accused-appellants arrest which took place on November 8, 1989 at around 1
oclock in the afternoon, he testified that he was lying on the bench at the Marivic
Compound when three men in civilian clothes arrived. He did not know the reason for
his arrest. He, however, admitted that a Chanel ladys watch was recovered from him
at the time of the arrest but insisted that he owns the watch, the same having pledged
to him by his cousin Elizabeth Abantao when he was still at Wright, Samar, and which
was later sold to him. He denied that a plastic bag with stolen contents of the bag
when he was under detention at the Kalookan City Jail. As regards his sworn statement
containing a confession to the commission of the crime, he said he was forced by the
policemen at the station to execute the same. He did not read it and was just forced to
sign it. He was not assisted by counsel during that time (tsn, August 23, 1990, pp. 6-9).
Accused-appellants version of the event was corroborated by: (a) his wife Soledad
Cabiles who testified that she slept with accused-appellant at Marivic Subdivision in the
evening of November 4, 1989; (b) Conrado Bacoy, Sr., owner of the woodcarving
factory watched over by accused appellant, who testified that accused-appellant and his
wife were allowed to sleep within the factory premises; and (c) Melchor Mabini who
aside from supporting accused-appellants alibi, also said that accused-appellants
captors did not have a warrant when they made the arrest.
The trial court found no merit in accused-appellants defense. It found that his
identity was well established, based on the testimony of Marites and Luzviminda who
were adjudged as credible witnesses. From the testimony of said witnesses, the trial
court likewise observed that: (1) at the time of accused-appellants arrest, he was
wearing a bracelet which was said to be owned by Maritess; (2) that a shoestring was
found inside the plastic bag which accused-appellant stated as his own when he led the
arresting officers to the factory compound at Marivic, Baesa, Kalookan City; and (3) that
said shoestring was the one used by accused-appellant in tying Luzvimindas hands
before she was raped. The trial court likewise noted accused-appellants confession
before Marites and in the presence of Amy Maliwanag, a council woman of Amparo
Subdivision and Linda Pilahan, that accused-appellant robbed and raped Luzviminda,
and that Jaime Mabingnay instructed him to do so, to cause the blindness of Marites,
and to kill her. Mabingnay was said to have promised to help accused-appellant get a
job abroad and to help the latter financially. However, accused-appellant took pity on
Marites child.
As regards the crime of serious physical injuries, which, as charged in the Amended
Information, was allegedly committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the trial
court found that the evidence is insufficient to prove the commission of the same or any
of the physical injuries penalized in Subdivision 1 of Art. 263 of the Revised Penal
Code.
We affirm that trial courts decision.
Accused-appellant argues as his sole assignment of error that the trial court erred in
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. He stressed the
following arguments, to wit: (1) that the medico-legal officer said several times that the
sexual intercourse occurred three months before the incident complained of; (2) that
verbal admissions are inadmissible against the accused; (3) that the bracelet and the
Chanel watch and even the improbable shoestring were the products of a poisonous
tree, not having fruits of a lawful warrantless arrest; and (4) that his identification based
on his built and voice is not an effective one.
We shall first discuss the procedural matters and circumstances surrounding the
charge.
Accused-appellant, corroborated by defense witness Melchor Mabini, contends that
his arrest was an alleged warrantless one. However, such irregularity was only raised
during trial. In regard to this delay, this Court has consistently ruled that any objection
involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction
over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise the
objection is deemed waived (People v. Lopez, Jr., 245 SCRA 95 [1995]; People vs.
Rivera, 245 SCRA 421 [1995]). Verily, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient
complaint after trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the
conviction of the accused (People vs. Manzano, 248 SCRA 239 [1995]). And it is much
too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after a valid information had
filed and accused arraigned and trial commenced and completed and a judgment of
conviction rendered against him (People vs. Llenaresas, 248 SCRA 629 [1995]).
As regards the evidentiary weight of accused-appellants sworn statement wherein
he confessed to the crime charged, and his verbal confession made before robbery
victim, Marites Nas Atienza, we rule against the validity of the written confession but
uphold the admissibility of the verbal confession.
In People vs. Deniega, 251 SCRA 626 [1995], we laid down the four fundamental
requirements needed of admissibility of a confession, to wit: (1) the confession must be
voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must
be in writing.
Accused-appellant testified that he was forced to execute the sworn statement
containing his confession (tsn, August 23, 1990, p.9). Although this assertion is
uncorroborated, accused-appellants free will and volition in signing his confession will
not cure the defect that it was made without assistance of counsel. An admission made
without the assistance of counsel during custodial investigation is inadmissible in
evidence (People vs. Cascalla, 240 SCRA 482 [1985]). Even if the confession of an
accused speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is
inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been
voluntarily given (People vs. Agustin, 240 SCRA 541 [1995]). An uncounselled
extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel that is, in writing
and in the presence of counsel is inadmissible in evidence (People vs. Cabintoy, 241
SCRA 442 [1995]).
In contrast, accused-appellants verbal confession before Marites Nas Atienza is,
however, admissible in evidence. The case in point is People vs. Andan (G.R. No.
116437, March 3, 1997) where we ruled that the accuseds verbal confession made in a
private meeting with the municipal mayor, spontaneously, fully and voluntarily done, is
admissible in evidence since it is to covered by the requirements of Section 12(1) and
(3) of Article III of the Constitution. When said accused talked with the mayor as a
confidant and as not a law enforcement officer, uncounselled confession did not violate
his constitutional rights. Constitutional procedures on custodial investigation do not
apply to spontaneous statement, not elicited trough questioning by authorities, but given
in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admitted having committed the crime
as in the case at bar.
In any event, we agree with the prosecutions contention that accused-appellants
conviction was deduced not on the basis of his admission of guilt, but on the trial courts
assessment of the evidence presented before it.
We find no reason to disturb the trial courts finding as to the credibility of
prosecution witnesses Marites Nas Atienza and Luzviminda Aquinio, the victims of
robbery and rape, respectively. The time tested jurisprudence is that the findings and
conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy a badge of respect for
the reason that trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses
as they testify (People vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA 254 [1995]; People vs. Ramos, 240
SCRA 191 [1995]; People vs. Cajambab, 240 SCRA 643 [1995]; People vs. Moran, 241
SCRA 709 [1995]). A perusal of the testimony of witness convenience us even more
that there is no strong and cogent reason to disregard the trial courts finding .
We agree that the identity of accused-appellant was sufficiently established through
the following circumstances:
1. The room where the crime was committed covered a very small area of
29 square meters (tsn, April 5, 1990, p. 24). It was illuminated by a lighted
electric bulb outside the jalousie window of said room (tsn, April 26, 1990,
p. 17). The victims could have easily noticed the physical features of their
assailant, who was later identified as accused-appellant.
2. Two witnesses (Marites Nas Atienza and Corporal Luciano Caeda)
testified that at the time of accused-appellants arrest, he was wearing a
bracelet (Exh. F) which Marites recognized as the one she surrendered to
accused-appellant during the robbery on November 5, 1989 (tsn, March 5,
1990, p. 35).
In this light, we are swayed by Marites spontaneous and straightforward testimony
on how she recognized the culprit, to wit:
Q Now, what was your basis in saying that it was the accused who was the one who
poked a kitchen knife on you?
A His height, his built, especially his voice, were my basis, sir, in saying that he was the
person who poked a knife on me.
Q What is so particular in his voice that you know that it was the voice of the accused-
appellant?
ATTY. CHAVEZ:
The question has already been answered, your Honor, his height, his built and his voice are
the basis for her knowing accused Panfilo Cabiles.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
A Because I have seen him once and I heard his voice when he went to the house of my
brother-in-law, Jaime Mabingnay, on the last week of October, 1989.
FISCAL SISON:
Q When you said Jaime Mabingnay, he is one of the accused in this case?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, tell us how far is that house of Jaime Mabingnay to your house?
A About six (6) steps away from our house, sir.
Q And when you heard the voice of Panfilo Cabiles, what were they doing then inside the
house of Jaime Mabingnay?
A They were having a drinking spree in the sala of the house of Jaime Mabingnay which is
just in front of the door of my house, sir.
Q When you saw them drinking, what time was that?
A Around 8:00 oclock in the evening, sir.
Q And up to what time did you see him inside the house of Jaime Mabingnay?
A I saw him there for about an hour and I dont know whether or not he slept there.
Q Before last week of October, have you seen him?
ATTY. CHAVEZ:
We object to the question on the basis of, first, there is no basis; second, the Fiscal
interpreting in Tagalog gives an advance sign for an answer to the witness, your Honor.
FISCAL SISON:
Q So that at the time in October, that was the first time you saw the accused in this case, I
am referring to Panfilo Cabiles?
A Yes, sir.
Q Have you heard what he said?
A No, sir. But I heard his voice when he greeted my sister Imelda Nas.
Q When he greeted your sister Imelda Nas, where was he?
A He was there sitting at the sala while he was drinking with Jaime Mabingnay.
Q Where was your sister there at that time?
A She was standing at the door of Jaimes house and I was behind her.
Marites identification of accused-appellant is corroborated by Luzvimindas identification of
accused appellant as her rapist as follows:
Q Aside from that admission, what other basis have you to say that the accused was that
person if there is still any?
ATTY. ILAGAN:
I object your Honor, because there is no basis and after the witness answered that the only
sign she knows of the accused is when at the police headquarters he admitted before
De Leon to have allegedly sexually played on her, so I object.
FISCAL SISON:
If she has other basis, your Honor,aside from that admission he made.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
WITNESS (A):
His voice and his built, sir.
FISCAL SISON:
You mentioned about his built, when he had sexual intercourse with you that was you said at
about 1:15 in the morning, how come you were able to see the built of the accused at
that time?
A Because the light coming inside thru the jalousie window illuminates the inside of the
room, sir.
(tsn, April 26, 1990,pp. 16-17)
Q What awakened you?
A Because the baby of Ate Tes was crying and that awakened me sir, and when I opened
by eyes I saw that there was somebody standing.
Q And that person that you saw standing was facing his back to you, correct?
A No, sir. He was facing my direction.
Q So this person you said was facing in your direction was between you and your Ate
Marites, is that what you want us to understand?
A Yes, sir.
(tsn, April 26, 1990, p. 34)
3. Aside from the bracelet, the arresting officers found a Chanel ladys
wristwatch (Exh. G) which Marites likewise recognized as another of the
objects taken by accused appellant during the robbery. Accused-appellants
assertion that said watch is his own is not peruasive. Aside from the fact that
his testimony is not corroborated, we likewixe make the practical observation
that Chanel is not an ordinary watch brand. It would be too much of a
coincidence that a watch of the same not very ordinary brand as that involved
in the robbery subject thereof was pledged to accused-appellant.
The trial court correctly cited the evidentiary presumption that a person found in
possession of thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer
of the whole act (Sec. 3[7], Rule 131, Revised Rules of Evidence). In People vs.
Newman (163 SCRA 496 [1988]), we ruled that where the accused offers no
satisfactory explanation as to the fact of his possession of stolen properties, such
evidence would abundantly incriminate him and proves that he took them with animus
lucrandi. In the case at bench, all that accused-appellant could offer as defense was
denial which is a weak defense. The defense of denial, if uncorroborated by clear and
convincing proof, is considered self-serving evidence undeserving of any weight in law
(People vs. Macario, 240 SCRA 531 [1995]).
Accused-appellant strongly relies on the finding of NBI medico-legal Officer,
Carmelita Belgica, that upon physical examination of the rape victim, it was found that
the hymenal lacerations took place three months before the date of examination, to rule
out his commission of the crime of rape. We are not persuaded.
Any prior sexual intercourse which could have resulted in hymenal laceration is
irrelevant in rape cases for virginity is not an element of rape (People vs. Delovino, 247
SCRA 519 [1995]). Hence, it is of no moment that there is a finding that sexual
intercourse occurred three months earlier than November 5, 1989. Too, the rape could
have been so slight as to leave no traces upon examination, for complete penetration of
the female organ is not necessary to constitute rape (People vs. Soan, 243 SCRA
622). The mere penetration of the penis by entry thereof into the labia minora of the
female organ suffices to warrant a conviction for rape (People vs. Sanchez, 250 SCRA
14 [1995]). The following circumstances are significant:
1. Luzviminda testified that she was raped by accused appellant. No young
Filipina would publicly admit that she had been criminally abused and
ravished unless that is the truth, as it is her natural instinct to protect her
honor (People vs. Delovino, supra; People vs. Namayon, 246 SCRA 646
[1995]; People vs. Rivera, 242 SCRA 26 [1995]).
2. Luzvimindas testimony is corroborated by that of Marites who herself
witnessed the rape (tsn, March 5, 1990, p. 16).
3. The shoestring that was found inside the plastic bag is also an indication
of accused-appellants commission of the crime rape. Luzviminda
identified said shoestring as that which was used on her to effect the crime
of rape.
Lastly, accused-appellants defense of denial and alibi must fail considering that he
was positively identified by Marites and Luzviminda as the author of the crime. We
have consistently ruled that alibi, like denial, is inherently weak and easily fabricated. In
order to justify an acquittal based on this defense, the accused must establish by clear
and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
crime scene during the commission (People vs. Pontilar, G.R. NO. 104865, July 11,
1997; People vs. Sumbillo, et al., G.R. No. 105292, April 18, 1997; People vs.
Gamiao, supra).
In the case at bench, accused-appellant admitted being at Marivic Compound at
Baesa, Quezon City, during the night of the incident. He was allegedly with his wife
(tsn, August 23, 1990, p. 4). Defense witness Melchor Mabini even attested that the
couple spent the night at the compound on the eve of November 5, 1989. But did
Mabini watch over the couple the whole night? It is not impossible for accused-
appellant to sleep at the Marivic Compound on the night of November 4, 1989 and
surreptitiously leave the premises at midnight to get to Kalookan City. The distance
between Quezon City and Kalookan City is not significant.
Anent the award of consequential damages, we increase the indemnity in favor of
the rape victim Luzviminda Aquino from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with recent
jurisprudence. We affirm the awards concerning the amounts corresponding to the
value of the items stolen, the same having been established through the testimony of
Marites Nas Atienza, including the P1,000.00 awarded for costs.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellant justified by the evidence
on record, the assailed decision is hereby affirmed with the modification above-stated.
SO ORDERED.


PEOPLE V ENDINO
[G.R. No. 133026. February 20, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDWARD ENDINO
(at large) and GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused.
GERRY GALGARIN alias TOTO, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J .:
YIELDING to mans brutish instinct for revenge, Edward Endino, with the aid of
Gerry Galgarin alias Toto, slew Dennis Aquino in the presence of a lady whose love
they once shared.
On a busy street in Puerto Princesa City in the evening of 16 October 1991, an
emboldened Gerry Galgarin, uncle of accused Edward Endino, suddenly and without
warning lunged at Dennis and stabbed him repeatedly on the chest. Dennis girlfriend
Clara Agagas who was with him, stunned by the unexpected attack, pleaded to
Galgarin to stop. Dennis struggled and succeeded momentarily to free himself from
his attacker. Dennis dashed towards the nearby Midtown Sales but his escape was
foiled when from out of nowhere Edward Endino appeared and fired at Dennis. As
Dennis staggered for safety, the two (2) assailants fled in the direction of the airport.
Meanwhile, Dennis, wounded and bleeding, sought refuge inside the Elohim
Store where he collapsed on the floor. He was grasping for breath and near
death. Clara with the help of some onlookers took him to the hospital but Dennis
expired even before he could receive medical attention. According to the autopsy
report of Dr. Josephine Goh-Cruz, cause of death was "cardio-respiratory arrest
secondary to hypovolemic shock secondary to a stab wound which penetrated the
heart."
[1]

On 18 October 1991, an Information for the murder of Dennis Aquino was filed
against Edward Endino and accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin and warrants were
issued for their arrest. However, as both accused remained at large, the trial court
issued on 26 December 1991 an order putting the case in the archives without
prejudice to its reinstatement upon their apprehension.
On 19 November 1992, Gerry Galgarin was arrested through the combined efforts
of the Antipolo and Palawan police forces at a house in Sitio Sto. Nio, Antipolo,
Rizal. He was immediately taken into temporary custody by the Antipolo
Police. Early in the evening of the following day, he was fetched from the Antipolo
Police Station by PO3 Gaudencio Manlavi and PO3 Edwin Magbanua of the Palawan
police force to be taken to Palawan and be tried accordingly.
On their way to the airport, they stopped at the ABS-CBN television station where
accused Galgarin was interviewed by reporters. Video footages of the interview were
taken showing Galgarin admitting his guilt while pointing to his nephew Edward
Endino as the gunman. According to Galgarin, after attacking Aquino, they left for
Roxas, Palawan, where his sister Langging who is Edward's mother, was
waiting. Langging gave them money for their fare for Manila. They took the boat for
Batangas, where they stayed for a few days, and proceeded to Manila where they
separated, with him heading for Antipolo. Galgarin appealed for Edward to give
himself up to the authorities. His interview was shown over the ABS-CBN evening
news program TV Patrol.
The case against accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was established through the
testimony of Clara Agagas who said that she was with the victim Dennis Aquino
standing outside the Soundlab Recording Studio, a barhouse owned by him, when
Galgarin suddenly approached them and without any prior warning stabbed
Dennis. Dennis tried to run away, but Edward, a spurned lover who harbored ill-
feelings towards her and Dennis, shot Dennis. She recognized Edward and Gerry
because the street was sufficiently lighted.
[2]

The testimony of Clara Agagas was corroborated by Anita Leong, next-door
neighbor of Dennis, who testified that a little past six oclock in the evening of 16
October 1991 Gerry Galgarin together with a companion went to her house looking
for Dennis. She instructed them to proceed to the Soundlab Recording Studio as
Dennis might still be there. But a few minutes later she heard a Instinctively, she
instructed her two (2) young daughters to duck for cover while she anxiously waited
for her seven (7)-year old daughter Josephine who was out of the house for an errand
for her. Soon enough she heard Josephine knocking at their door. She was crying
because she said her KuyaDennis had been shot and stabbed.
[3]

Josephine confirmed her mothers testimony and even said that she had seen
Gerry Galgarin stab her Kuya Dennis and she could remember Gerry very well
because of the mole below his nose.
[4]

For his part, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin disclaimed having taking part in
the slaying of Dennis. Gerry asserted that on 14 October 1991 he was in Antipolo to
help his common-law wife Maria Marasigan give birth to their first born. He stayed
with her until the 16th of October when she was discharged from the Pedragoza
Maternity Clinic.
[5]

Clarita Florentino Pedragoza, the midwife who delivered his son, supported the
alibi of accused-appellant. However, she admitted that when she registered the childs
birth on 13 December 1993 or more than two (2) years after the delivery, she
informed the civil registrar that the childs father was "unknown."
[6]
His story was also
confirmed by Dolores Arciaga and Maria Tomenio, his co-workers at the Kainan sa
Kubo Sing Along Restaurant, who testified that accused-appellant was fetched by a
neighbor from the restaurant in the early afternoon of 14 October with the news that
his wife was having labor pains.
[7]

Accused-appellant disowned the confession which he made over TV Patrol and
claimed that it was induced by the threats of the arresting police officers. He asserted
that the videotaped confession was constitutionally infirmed and inadmissible under
the exclusionary rule provided in Sec.12, Art. III, of the Constitution.
[8]

The trial court however admitted the video footages on the strength of the
testimony of the police officers that no force or compulsion was exerted on accused-
appellant and upon a finding that his confession was made before a group of newsmen
that could have dissipated any semblance of hostility towards him. The court gave
credence to the arresting officers assertion that it was even accused-appellant who
pleaded with them that he be allowed to air his appeal on national television for
Edward to surrender.
The alibi of Galgarin was likewise rejected since there was no convincing
evidence to support his allegation that he was not at the locus criminis on the evening
of 16 October 1991. Accordingly, accused-appellant Gerry Galgarin was convicted
of murder qualified by treachery
[9]
and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Additionally,
he was ordered to indemnify the heirs of Dennis Aquino P50,000.00 as compensatory
damages and P72,725.35 as actual damages. The case against his nephew and co-
accused Edward Endino remained in the archives without prejudice to its
reinstatement as soon as he could be arrested.
[10]

In his Appellants Brief, Gerry Galgarin assails the trial court for rejecting his
alibi and admitting his videotaped confession as evidence against him.
The argument that accused-appellant could not be at the scene of the crime on 16
October 1991 as he was in Antipolo assisting his wife who was giving birth on the
14th of that month, is not persuasive. Alibi is a weak defense. The testimony of
Cornelio Tejero Jr.,
[11]
Philippine Airlines Load Controller of the Puerto Princesa City,
that the name of "Gerry Galgarin" did not appear on their passenger manifest for the
16 October 1991 Manila-Puerto Princesa flight, could not be relied upon inasmuch as
he himself admitted that they could not be sure of their passengers real
identities. The testimonies of accused-appellants co-workers that he was in Antipolo
on 14 October 1991 did not fortify his defense either since these witnesses did not
categorically state that they saw him in Antipolo in the evening of 16 October 1991.
With accused-appellant having been positively identified by the prosecution
witnesses as the one who stabbed Dennis, his bare denial proves futile and
unavailing. Josephine Leongs identification of accused-appellant was given in a very
categorical and spontaneous manner. Her confidence as to the attackers identity was
clearly shown by her vivid recollection of him having a mole below his nose, which is
correct. Moreover, it is inconceivable for Josephine and Anita to implicate accused-
appellant, a complete stranger to them, if there was no truth to their assertion. As for
Clara, her naming of accused-appellant as her boyfriends assailant was not done out
of spite, but was impelled by her desire to seek justice for Dennis.
Corroborating further accused-appellants guilt, probably with intense
incriminating effect, were his immediate flight after the slaying, and his attempt at
jailbreak
[12]
revealing a guilty conscience, hence, his persistent effort to evade the
clutches of the law.
Apropos the court a quos admission of accused-appellants videotaped
confession, we find such admission proper. The interview was recorded on video and
it showed accused-appellant unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in
the presence of newsmen. Such confession does not form part of custodial
investigation as it was not given to police officers but to media men in an attempt to
elicit sympathy and forgiveness from the public. Besides, if he had indeed been
forced into confessing, he could have easily sought succor from the newsmen who, in
all likelihood, would have been symphatetic with him. As the trial court stated in its
Decision
[13]
-
Furthermore, accused, in his TV interview (Exh. H), freely admitted that he had
stabbed Dennis Aquino, and that Edward Endino had shot him (Aquino). There is no
showing that the interview of accused was coerced or against his will. Hence, there is
basis to accept the truth of his statements therein.
We agree. However, because of the inherent danger in the use of television as a
medium for admitting ones guilt, and the recurrence of this phenomenon in several
cases,
[14]
it is prudent that trial courts are reminded that extreme caution must be taken
in further admitting similar confessions. For in all probability, the police, with the
connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced
extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an
accused admit an offense on television. Such a situation would be detrimental to the
guaranteed rights of the accused and thus imperil our criminal justice system.
We do not suggest that videotaped confessions given before media men by an
accused with the knowledge of and in the presence of police officers are
impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper and invalid police techniques and
conduct is a difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as this where it is
essential to make sharp judgments in determining whether a confession was given
under coercive physical or psychological atmosphere.
A word of counsel then to lower courts: we should never presume that all media
confessions described as voluntary have been freely given. This type of confession
always remains suspect and therefore should be thoroughly examined and
scrutinized. Detection of coerced confessions is admittedly a difficult and arduous
task for the courts to make. It requires persistence and determination in separating
polluted confessions from untainted ones. We have a sworn duty to be vigilant and
protective of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
With all the evidence tightly ringed around accused-appellant, the question that
next presents itself is whether the trial court correctly denominated the crime as
murder qualified by treachery. Doubtless, the crime committed is one of murder
considering that the victim was stabbed while he was simply standing on the
pavement with his girlfriend waiting for a ride, blissfully oblivious of the accused's
criminal design. The suddenness of the assault on an unsuspecting victim, without the
slightest provocation from him who had no opportunity to parry the attack, certainly
qualifies the killing to murder.
[15]

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellant
GERRY GALGARIN alias Toto guilty of Murder qualified by Treachery, sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Dennis Aquino
in the amount of P50,000.00 as compensatory damages and P72,725.35 as actual
damages, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is further
ordered to compensate the decedents heirsP50,000.00 as moral damages for their
emotional and mental anguish. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.


PEOPLE V GALIT
G.R. No. L-51770 March 20, 1985
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO GALIT, defendant-appellant.

CONCEPCION, JR., J :
1. The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had been
detained and interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently
maintained his innocence. There was no evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously,
something drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely necessary. So the
investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner
insisted on his innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So
they continued to maltreat and beat him. 'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his
face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not take any more. His body
could no longer endure the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His will
had been broken. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he
signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as
directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a reenactment.
2. This incident could have happened in a Russian gulag or in Hitler's Germany. But no it
did not. It happened in the Philippines. In this case before Us.
3. The Revised Penal Code punishes the maltreatment of prisoners as follows:
ART. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. The penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, in addition to his
liability for the physical injuries or damage caused, shall be imposed upon
any public officer or employee who shall over do himself in the correction or
handling of a prisoner or detention prisoner under his charge, by the
imposition of punishments in a cruel and humiliating manner.
If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a confession, or to obtain some
information from the prisoner, the offender shall be punished by prision
correccional in its minimum period, temporary special disqualification and a
fine not exceeding 500 pesos, in addition to his liability for the physical
injuries or damage caused.
4. This Court in a long line of decisions over the years, the latest being the case of People
vs. Cabrera,
1
has consistently and strongly condemned the practice of maltreating
prisoners to extort confessions from them as a grave and unforgivable violation of human
rights. But the practice persists. Fortunately, such instances constitute the exception rather
than the general rule.
5. Before Us for mandatory review is the death sentence imposed upon the accused
Francisco Galit by the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, in Crim. Case No. CCC-VII-
2589 of said court.
6. The record shows that in the morning of August 23, 1977, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a
widow, was found dead in the bedroom of her house located at Barrio Geronimo,
Montalban, Rizal, as a result of seven (7) wounds inflicted upon different parts of her body
by a blunt instrument.
2
More than two weeks thereafter, police authorities of Montalban
picked up the herein accused, Francisco Galit, an ordinary construction worker (pion) living
in Marikina, Rizal, on suspicion of the murder. On the following day, however, September 8,
1977, the case was referred to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further
investigation in view of the alleged limited facilities of the Montalban police station.
Accordingly, the herein accused was brought to the NBI where he was investigated by a
team headed by NBI Agent Carlos Flores.
3
NBI Agent Flores conducted a preliminary
interview of the suspect who allegedly gave evasive answers to his questions.
4
But the
following day, September 9, 1977, Francisco Galit voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting
participation in the commission of the crime. He implicated Juling Dulay and Pabling Dulay
as his companions in the crime.
5
As a result, he was charged with the crime of Robbery
with Homicide, in an information filed before the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of August 1977 in the municipality of
Montalban, province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together with Juling Doe and Pabling Doe, whose true Identities and present
whereabouts are still unknown and three of them mutually helping and aiding
one another, with intent of gain and by means of force, intimidation and
violence upon the person of one Natividad Fernando while in her dwelling,
did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously take, steal and carry
away from the person of said Natividad Fernando, cash money of an
undetermined amount, belonging to said Natividad Fernando, thereby
causing damage and prejudice to the latter in an undetermined amount; that
by reason or on the occasion of said robbery, and for purpose of enabling
them (accused) to take, steal and carry away the said cash money in
pursuance of their conspiracy and for the purpose of insuring the success of
their criminal act, with intent to kill, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault and stab with a dagger said Natividad Fernando on
the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting multiple injuries on the head
and extremities, which directly caused her death, and the total amount of the
loss is P10,000.00 including valuables and cash.
Trial was held, and on August 11, 1978, immediately after the accused had terminated the
presentation of his evidence, the trial judge dictated his decision on the case in open court,
finding the accused guilty as charged and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty; to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P110,000.00, and to pay the costs. Hence,
the present recourse.
7. The incriminatory facts of the case, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
From the evidence adduced in this case, it was gathered that in the early
morning of August 23, 1977, a 70-year old woman named Natividad
Fernando, widow, in the twilight of her life, was robbed and then hacked to
death by the accused and two others in her (victim's) own residence at
Montalban, Rizal.
Prosecution witness Florentino Valentino testified that he heard accused
Francisco Galit and his wife having an argument in connection with the
robbery and killing of the victim, Natividad Fernando. It appears that on
August 18, 1977, accused Galit and two others, namely, Juling Dulay and a
certain "Pabling" accidentally met each other at Marikina, Rizal, and in their
conversation, the three agreed to rob Natividad Fernando; that it was further
agreed among them to enter the premises of the victim's house at the back
yard by climbing over the fence; that once inside the premises, they will
search every room, especially the aparador and filing cabinets, with the sole
aim of looking for cash money and other valuables.
Witness Valentino further testified that on August 22, 1977, at around 6:00
o'clock in the afternoon, accused Francisco Galit and his two companions,
Juling Dulay and Pabling, as per their previous agreement, met at the place
where they formerly saw each other in Mariquina, Rizal; that the three
conspirators took a jeepney for Montalban and upon passing the Montalban
Municipal Building, they stopped and they waited at the side of the road until
the hour of midnight; that at about 12:00 o'clock that night, the three repaired
to the premises of the victim, Natividad Fernando; that they entered the said
premises through the back wall of the house; that while entering the premises
of said house, Juling Dulay saw a bolo, lying near the piggery compound,
which he picked up and used it to destroy the back portion of the wall of the
house; that it was Juling Dulay who first entered the house through the hole
that they made, followed by the accused Galit and next to him was "Pabling",
that it was already early dawn of August 23, 1977 when the three were able
to gain entrance into the house of the victim; as the three could not find
anything valuable inside the first room that they entered, Juling Dulay
destroyed the screen of the door of the victim, Natividad Fernando; that upon
entering the room of the victim, the three accused decided to kill first the
victim, Natividad Fernando, before searching the room for valuables; that
Juling Dulay, who was then holding the bolo, began hacking the victim, who
was then sleeping, and accused Galit heard a moaning sound from the victim;
that after the victim was killed, the three accused began searching the room
for valuables; that they helped each other in opening the iron cabinet inside
the room of the victim, where they found some money; that when the three
accused left the room of the victim, they brought with them some papers and
pictures which they threw outside; that after killing and robbing the victim, the
three accused went out of the premises of the house, using the same way by
which they gained entrance, which was through the back portion of the wall;
that the three accused walked towards the river bank where they divided the
loot that they got from the room of the victim; that their respective shares
amount to P70.00 for each of them; and that after receiving their shares of the
loot, the three accused left and went home.
When witness Florentino Valentino was in his room, which was adjoining that
of accused Francisco Galit, he overheard accused Galit and his wife
quarreling about the intention of accused Galit to leave their residence
immediately; that he further stated that he overheard accused Galit saying
that he and his other two companions robbed and killed Natividad Fernando.
As a result of the killing, the victim, Natividad Fernando, suffered no less than
seven stab wounds. There was massive cerebral hemorrhage and the cause
of death was due to shock and hemorrhage, as evidenced by the Medico-
Legal Necropsy Report (Exhs. 'C' and 'C-2'), and the pictures taken of the
deceased victim (Exhs. 'E', 'E-1' and 'E-2').
8. The accused, upon the other hand, denied participation in the commission of the crime.
He claimed that he was in his house in Marikina, Rizal, when the crime was committed in
Montalban, Rizal. He also assailed the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession
extracted from him through torture, force and intimidation as described earlier, and without
the benefit of counsel.
9. After a review of the records, We find that the evidence presented by the prosecution
does not support a conviction. In fact, the findings of the trial court relative to the acts
attributed to the accused are not supported by competent evidence. The principal
prosecution witness, Florentino Valentino merely testified that he and the accused were
living together in one house in Marikina, Rizal, on August 23, 1977, because the mother of
his wife is the wife of the accused; that when he returned home at about 4:00 o'clock in the
morning from the police station of Marikina, Rizal, the accused and his wife were quarreling
(nagtatalo); that he heard that the accused was leaving the house because he and his
companions had robbed "Aling Nene", the owner of a poultry farm and piggery in
Montalban, Rizal; that the wife of the accused was imploring him not to leave, but the latter
was insistent; that he saw the accused carrying a bag containing about two handfuls (dakot)
of coins which he had taken from Aling Nene; that upon learning of what the accused had
done, he went to the Montalban police the next day and reported to the police chief about
what he had heard; and that a week later, Montalban policemen went to their house and
arrested the accused.
6

10. This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile,
7
laid down the correct procedure for
peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation,
and which We reiterate:
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer
to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant
of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used
against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his
lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by
telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility
of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by
the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his
behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid
unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in
violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
11. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state
witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only
evidence against the accused is his alleged confession. It behooves Us therefore to give it a
close scrutiny. The statement begins as follows:
I. TANONG: Ipinagbibigay-alam ko sa inyo ang inyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang-
Batas ng Pilipinas na kung inyong nanaisin ay maaaring hindi kayo magbigay ng isang
salaysay, na hindi rin kayo maaaring pilitin o saktan at pangakuan upang magbigay ng
naturang salaysay, na anuman ang inyong sasabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring
laban sa inyo sa anumang usapin na maaaring ilahad sa anumang hukuman o tribunal dito
sa Pilipinas, na sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring katulungin mo ang isang manananggol at
kung sakaling hindi mo kayang bayaran ang isang manananggol ay maaaring bigyan ka ng
isa ng NBI. Ngayon at alam mo na ang mga ito nakahanda ka bang magbigay ng isang
kusang-loob na salaysay sa pagtatanong na ito?
SAGOT: Opo.
12. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the
requirements of the law that the accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution
and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear questions and every right
explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under investigation.
Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at
the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative,
or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been brought to
the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed
the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even
contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted
by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his
choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.
13. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible
as evidence because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law.
14. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding the taking
of any confession, especially where the prisoner claims having been maltreated into giving
one. Where there is any doubt as to its voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.
15. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice for whatever action he
may deem proper to take against the investigating officers.
16. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, SET ASIDE, and
another one entered ACQUITTING the accused Francisco Galit of the crime charged. Let
him be released from custody immediately unless held on other charges. With costs de
oficio.
17. SO ORDERED.


PEOPLE V BAGANO
G.R. No. 77777 February 5, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DOMINGO BAGANO Y SALI-EN, accused appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ernesto Wagang for accused-appellant.

BIDIN, J .:
Before Us on appeal is a decision * of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Br. IV, in Criminal
Case No. 2472-R, convicting the accused/appellant of violation of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, the decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused, Domingo Bagano y Sali-en, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and hereby imposes on him
the penalty of life imprisonment, as well as a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00). The ten (10) kilos of marijuana are ordered forfeited in favor of
the government which shall be transmitted to the Dangerous Drugs Board,
through NBI Sub-office Baguio, as custodian, for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.
The facts, as presented by the Solicitor General, are as follows:
On August 1, 1985, Atty. Lolito Utitco of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) in Baguio City and Steven F. Bostick, a special agent of the U.S. Air
Force at Clark Air Base, arranged a "buy-bust" operation against appellant
who was a suspected narcotics dealer. The plan was for Bostick to pose as
buyer. A civilian informer named Clayton Emateo was to aid Bostick by
introducing him to appellant.
At around 2:45 in the afternoon of the same day, Bostick and Emateo
proceeded to the residence of the latter in Baguio City to meet appellant who
was there waiting. They were followed by an NBI surveillance team. Upon
reaching their destination, Emateo introduced appellant and an unnamed
friend to Bostick. Shortly thereafter, negotiations for the purchase of ten (10)
kilos of marijuana began between Bostick and appellant, with Emateo acting
as interpreter. Bostick and appellant finally agreed on P800.00 as the price
per kilo of the marijuana. The group then proceeded to appellant's house at
Irisan, Benguet, where he kept the marijuana. They were all the time being
trailed by the NBI team. At Irisan appellant left Bostick and Emateo in the car.
He went back to them after about fifteen minutes, carrying a large white nylon
sack (Exhibit "B"). Bostick opened the trunk of the car and appellant placed
the sack inside. Bostick opened the sack and saw several packages
containing marijuana. Bostick told appellant that he will pay for the marijuana
after it has been weighed in his hotel. Appellant agreed. On the way back to
his hotel in Baguio City, Bostick activated the beeper which signalled the NBI
team following them that the transaction had taken place. The NBI team then
blocked Bostick's car and arrested appellant and Emateo.
Based on the foregoing, an information for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act, was filed against appellant alleging:
xxx xxx xxx
That on or about the lst day of August, 1985, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without any authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attempt to sell to another ten (10) kilos, more or
less, of dried marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug, for P800.00 per kilo, in
violation of the afore-cited provision of law.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. His earlier motion to admit bail was
deferred and later denied. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. On August 9, 1986, the
trial judge rendered the assailed decision (Rollo, pp. 19-36) sentencing appellant, among
others, to reclusion perpetua. Hence, this appeal.
Appellant denies any knowledge anent the ownership and sale of marijuana to Bostick and
in support thereof, he declared that:
(H)e farms at Irisan, Baguio City; on August 1, 1985, at around 3:00 o'clock in
the afternoon, he went to the house of Clayton Emateo, located along
Bonifacio St., to collect the amount of P4,000.00 which the latter borrowed
from him on July 1, 1985; on this latter date Clayton went to him and pleaded
for the loan, saying that he needed it to replace the money he took from his
wife which he lost in gambling; Clayton was at his residence when he saw
him on August 1, 1985; Clayton told him to wait for his visitor from whom he
would get the money to pay his debt; the American visitor arrived, and he was
introduced to him in English, as Steven; after the introduction, they rode in the
car of the American and he was told by Clayton that they were proceeding to
Irisan to get the bag which Clayton would give to the American as a
gift; Clayton sent him to get the bag because he did not want to get wet, he
went to get the bag and placed it in the car of the American; Clayton asked
him to ride with them again; while they were maneuvering the car towards
Baguio, two cars stopped and one of the passengers (NBI agent) came out,
brought out his gun and pointed it at him; (Decision, p. 11; Rollo, p. 29;
Emphasis supplied).
In this appeal, appellant contends that the lower court erred:
1. IN FINDING THAT THE APPELLANT AGREED TO SELL TEN (10) KILOS
OF MARIJUANA TO STEVEN BOSTICK WHEN IN FACT, THE APPELLANT
HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OR DOES NOT KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT THE
ALLEGED MARIJUANA SALE;
2. IN NOT HOLDING AS HEARSAY THE ALLEGED CONVERSATION
BETWEEN BOSTICK AND APPELLANT WHEN IN FACT, CLAYTON
EMATEO, THE CIVILIAN INFORMANT WHO INTERPRETED THEIR
CONVERSATION WAS NEVER PRESENTED TO TESTIFY;
3. IN APPRECIATING THE "BAG" AND NOT SACK AGAINST APPELLANT
THAT WHICH CLAYTON OWNED AND DEPOSITED IN THE QUARTER OF
THE APPELLANT AT IRISAN THAT 10:00 A.M. OF AUGUST 1, 1985 WHEN
IN FACT, EVEN BOSTICK LIKE WISE REFERRED TO THE SACK AS
"BAG" MANY TIMES IN HIS TESTIMONY;
4. IN NOT APPRECIATING THE DEFENSE OF THE APPELLANT THAT IT
WAS CLAYTON, THE CIVILIAN INFORMER, WHO OWNS THE
MARIJUANA IN QUESTION. (Appellant's Brief, pp. 12; Rollo, pp. 49-50)
It is the contention of the prosecution that appellant was apprehended as a result of a "buy-
bust" operation which was conducted on the strength of an information supplied by a certain
Clayton Emateo. It is alleged that according to the informer, appellant would only sell to a
foreigner, preferably an American. Immediately, Atty. Utitco, the NBI Chief of Baguio City,
sought assistance from the Clark Air Base which in turn sent Steven Bostick for the
purpose.
The "buy-bust" operation involved Bostick and Emateo to proceed to the latter's residence
and therein meet with the suspect for the purchase of marijuana. Acting as the "poseur"
buyer, Bostick testified that he was provided counterfeit money by the NBI which was
combined with his own US $200.00 converted to pesos because appellant only accepts
payment in local currency (TSN, November 7, 1985, p. 16).
Upon arrival at Emateo's residence, Bostick was introduced by Emateo to appellant and a
certain Arman Perez. As to how the "buy-bust" transaction was initiated may be gleaned
from the following testimony of Bostick:
FISCAL CARBONELL:
Q: What was the plan then?
A: The plan that I was to go with the informer to the informant's
residence and meet with the suepct (suspect) who is
supposedly waiting there for us and I was to try and arrange for
the purchase of marijuana.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Who started the conversation?
A: I started through the informant translating what I was saying
to Domingo.
Q: What did you say to your informant which was translated to
Domingo?
A: Due to the prior arrangement or agreement that we had, I
told him that I wanted to purchase ten (10) kilos of marijuana.
Q: And this statement of yours to the effect that you wanted to
buy ten (10) kilos of marijuana, to whom was it directed?
A: It was directed to Mr. Domingo.
Q: But you said Clayton participated. What was the
participation of Clayton?
A: He was speaking for me because I wasn't sure Domingo
understood what I was saying because of the language.
Q: Is it your testimony that your statement was translated into
the dialect by Clayton to Domingo?
A: Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q: What dialect was that: Do you know?
A: No, I have no knowledge.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL CARBONELL:
Q: Now, when your statement was translated by Clayton to Mr.
Domingo to the effect that you wanted to purchase marijuana,
do you know if Domingo made any answer?
A: I was told by the informant that there will be no problem. The
ten kilos was ready.
ATTY. WAGANG:
I object to that. That would be hearsay.
xxx xxx xxx
FISCAL CARBONELL:
Q: What again was that answer which Domingo said or
uttered?
A: I was told by Clayton that ten (10) kilos would be no
problem.
Q: And who said that?
A: It was told to me by Clayton because I don't understand the
language on which they talked.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, who quoted the price?
A: I was told it will cost one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos per
kilo, which I didn't agree.
COURT:
Q: Did they speak in English or in another dialect?
A: They spoke in the dialect.
Q: So, it was again interpreted to you by Clayton.
A: Yes, sir.
(TSN, November 7,1985, pp. 17-20; Italics supplied)
Evident from the foregoing is the fact that Bostick's testimonies, as principal witness for the
prosecution, are mere translations and/or interpretations of what the appellant supposedly
said in the dialect to and interpreted by informant Emateo. As such, they are pure hearsay.
With the exception of that portion of Bostick's testimony that he saw the accused-appellant
carry the sackful of marijuana, Bostick testified not on his personal knowledge regarding the
alleged ownership thereof and the appellant's purported offer to sell the same. Bostick
never understood the Kankanai dialect spoken by appellant and Emateo and is therefore
not qualified to testify against appellant in the imputation of the crime charged. Thus, "where
a witness is offered testify to the statements of another person, spoken in a language not
understood by him, but translated for him by an interpreter, such witness is not qualified,
because he does not speak from personal knowledge. All that he can know as to the
testimony which is in fact given in such a case is from the interpretation thereof which is
given by another person." (F. Wharton Evidence in Criminal Cases 697-698 [11th ed., ed.,
1935])
Indeed, a confession cannot be received in evidence by the testimony of a witness who,
although present when it was made, learned its purport through an interpreter (US v. Chu
Chio, 8 Phil. 269 [1907]).
The impropriety of introducing the testimony of Bostick is plainly evident. What the
prosecution should have done was to present Emateo himself to testify on what actually
transpired between appellant and Bostick and thereafter be cross-examined. Yet, the
court a quo chose to ignore appellant's constitutional right to meet the witnesses face to
face (Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14 [21). In an attempt to circumvent said right, prosecution
witness Atty. Utitco reasoned:
FISCAL CARBONELL:
Q: Now, Atty. Utitco, is there any possibility for you to bring
before this court this Clayton who was your informer?
A: I do not think that is possible for the following reasons; First,
we do not usually expose our informants in public, second, we
do not know where he is staying and third, we do not keep in
constant contact with this informer. He only comes to the office
when there is work to do. As a matter of fact since this
operation was accomplished, I have never seen him again.
(TSN, December 4, 1985, p. 10)
Atty. Utitco's revelation that he knew nothing of his supposed informant's background is
rather disturbing. Appellant's limb and liberty at stake, Utitco discarded all what a prudent
and thinking man would have taken in order to establish the veracity of a story of one
virtually unknown to him. Appellant should have been, at the least, placed under
surveillance (See People v. Perodica, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 73006, September 29, 1989).
The Court is not unaware of the policy behind non-disclosure of an informant's identity and
would generally uphold the exercise of such privilege as the circumstances may warrant. In
the instant case, however, said privilege cannot be invoked given the factual setting that led
to the incarceration of accused-appellant. For one thing, the identity and even the address
of the supposed informant are already known to appellant. More, he was an active
participant of the crime charged and is in fact the person whom appellant insists is the
owner of the prohibited merchandise. In point of fact, the informer (Emateo) was arrested
together with appellant by the NBI team after the latter had blocked Bostick's car. If indeed
Emateo is an informer and not the owner of the prohibited drug, why was he arrested?
Nonetheless, whatever reason the prosecution may have had in shielding the informant
vanished and ceased to exist by the time his identity was made public in the course of the
trial by the prosecution witnesses themselves.
As pointed out by the appellant, the informant's failure to take the witness stand to confirm
the correctness of his interpretations not only rendered the testimonies of Bostick as
hearsay and therefore, inadmissible in evidence, but also deprived appellant of his right to
cross-examine him (Appellant's Brief, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 59- 60).
The right of cross-examination is a substantial right, the preservation of which
is essential to a proper administration of justice, and extends to all matters
within the knowledge of the witness, the disclosure of which is material to the
controversy. (Crosby v. State 82 S.E. 2d 38 [1954]; citing News Publishing
Co. v. Butler, 22 S.E. 282 [1985]; Richards v. Harpe 155 S.E. 85 [1930])
Emateo's testimony is not merely corroborative and cumulative and hence, may be
dispensed with (People v. Extra, 72 SCRA 199 (1976]; People v. Cerelegia, 147 SCRA 538
[1987]; People v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 533 [1988]; People v. Asio, G.R. No. 84960,
September 1, 1989), but is direct and material to the defense of appellant who claims
innocence of the offense imputed against him and is entitled to have the former take the
witness stand (Appellant's Brief, pp. 11-12; Rollo, p. 60; TSN, November 8, 1985, p. 22),
considering appellant's disclaimer of ownership of the prohibited drug.
In People v. Rojo (G.R. No. 82737, July 5, 1989), the Court, in acquitting the accused-
appellant, stamped a note of disapproval on the prosecution's refusal to present the
supposed informant whose identity has already been known, to wit:
Thus, the identity of the informant was known to the appellant all the time and
when immediately thereafter the appellant was apprehended and arrested by
the police officers and the informant was not similarly taken into custody, the
only logical conclusion is that the appellant right then and there found out that
he was the victim of an entrapment and that the informant was in collusion
with the police authorities.
There is, therefore, no reason why the prosecution could not and did not
present the informant as a prosecution witness. He is the best witness to
establish the charge against the appellant who denies the charge (citing Pp.
v. Ale, 145 SCRA 50, [1986] where the accused was likewise acquitted).
(Emphasis supplied)
In an earlier case of People v. Caboverde (160 SCRA 550 [1988]) where the prosecution
refused to identify the informer, the Court stated:
The witnesses for the prosecution refused to divulge the identity of said
informer, who could have been a very vital corroborating witness to their
testimonies and thus strenghthen the position of the prosecution. Prosecution
maintained that to expose the identity and to bring this informer to court as
witness would pose grave danger to the life of such informer. What danger
did the prosecution fear,when the identity of said informer and his
involvement in the entrapment of appellant was already made known to the
appellant during the alleged exchange of the marijuana stuff and money.
(Emphasis supplied)
Non-presentation of an informer is a privilege that has its own inherent limitationthat of
fairness in the administration of criminal justice. Thus, where the disclosure of an informer's
Identity is relevant and helpful to the defense of the accused, or is essential to a proper
disposition of the case, the privilege must give way (Wilson v. United States, 59 F. 2d 390
[1932]).
Trial courts must always bear in mind that the right to meet the accuser and to have him
examined is a fundamental right. The constitution (Section 14 [2], Art. III) so mandates and
they cannot do otherwise, especially so in instances where the party sought to be presented
and examined possesses vital information essential to the defense in vindicating the
accused's plea of innocence. Such violation of appellant's fundamental right calls for the
reversal of his conviction. Thus:
Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of his
communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is
essential to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way. In
these situations, the trial court may require disclosure and, if the Government
withholds the information, dismiss the action (Roviaro v. United States, 353
US 53, 1 L ed 2d 639 [1957]).
In the case at bar, while the identity of the informer is disclosed, nevertheless, the
prosecution failed to present him as a witness on the dubious assertion that his
whereabouts are unknown. As no subpoena appears to have been issued by the
prosecution to the said informer, the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would
be adverse if produced (Section 5 [e], Rule 131) arises.
Emateo's non-production as a witness could have been excused had he merely played the
part of a true informer. An informer is one who communicates knowledge of someone
having committed or about to commit a crime to the proper authorities who by themselves,
acting independently, may obtain the evidence necessary for the prosecution of the
offender. On the contrary, he did more than that. He played a substantial part in the act
complained of and is in fact claimed by the appellant as the real owner of the subject
marijuana.
The case of Sorrentino v. U.S. (163 F. 2d 627 [19471), provides the distinction between one
who played the part of a mere informer and a decoy. There, the defendant was charged for
an illegal sale of opium in favor of a person, the identity of whom the US Government claims
to be confidential. Objections as regards questions seeking to ascertain his identity were
sustained by the trial court on the ground that it will violate the privilege of withholding the
identity of informers. In reversing the trial court, it was held that:
If the person whom Grady called an informer had been an informer and
nothing more, appellant would not have been entitled to have his identity
disclosed but the person whom Grady called an informer was something
more. He was the person to whom appellant was said to have sold and
dispensed the opium described in the indictment. Information as to this
person's identity was therefore material to appellant's defense. . . .
The Solicitor General, however, contends that appellant's disclaimer of having no
knowledge about the sale of marijuana is not worthy of credence. According to him, the best
proof is the fact that appellant delivered a sackful of marijuana to Bostick and that the sale
by appellant of marijuana to Bostick is shown by evidence independent of Clayton Emateo's
testimony. (Appellee's Brief, p. 7; Rollo, p. 125).
We disagree. Appellant's denial of the ownership of marijuana and his testimony that he
took the sack the contents of which turned out to be marijuana from the place where
Emateo previously deposited it because he was only requested by Emateo to do so (TSN,
March 20, 1986, pp. 7-8; March 31, 1986, pp. 8 & 14), was never contradicted by the
prosecution. Thus:
ATTY. WAGANG:
Q: You made mention of a gift of bag which Clayton will give as
a gift to that American; where did this bag come from?
A: He, Clayton Emateo brought that bag earlier that morning of
the same day.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And what happened when you reached Irisan?
A: When we reached Irisan it was raining.
Q: And were you able to get that bag left?
A: Clayton sent me to get the bag because that time it was
raining and they did not want to be wet.
Q: Where did you bring that bag'?
A: I went to get the bag and loaded the bag on the car of that
American.
(TSN, pp. 7-8, March 20,1986)
On cross-examination:
FISCAL CARBONELL:
Q: Is it your testimony that in the morning of August 1, 1985
Clayton Imateo came to your residence driving his taxicab and
brought the bag to your residence?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Is it your testimony that when Clayton Imateo came (to) your
residence at Irisan in the morning of August 1, 1985 he just
deposited the bag at your residence without conversing to you?
A: He told me that he has no money at that time by(u)t he had
to wait for his visitor whom he will give that bag and from whom
he will get money to pay me.
(TSN, pp. 8-9, March 31, 1986)
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, immediately after the American parked his vehicle, you
alighted from the vehicle, is that correct?
A: Yes, I was sent by Clayton to go to our quarters to get the
bag because it was raining.
Q: Now, is it your testimony Mr. Witness that Clayton just sent
you to fetch the bag from a place which is about ten minutes
walk from the place where the vehicle was parked when in fact
he was the one who has a debt of gratitude to you because of
the P4,000.00 you lent him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You readily acceeded to that order for you to go and get the
bag from your quarters?
A: Yes, because when I saw him (h)e was well-dressed and he
was wearing leather shoes.
(TSN, pp. 14-15, March 31, 1986; Emphasis supplied)
The prosecution witnesses' bare assertions, including that of Bostick's, anent appellant's
delivery of the sack/bag of marijuana cannot, by itself, indicate ownership nor even illegal
possession as contemplated by law under the circumstances in the absence of any other
evidence.
Neither is there any reason for us to believe, as advanced by the Solicitor General, that
appellant even acknowledged ownership of the seized marijuana by identifying them and
affixing his signature on the back and on each and every parcel inside it (sic) (Appellee's
Brief, p. 8; Rollo, p. 126). Appellant testified that he affixed his signature because he was
asked and forced to do so (TSN, March 20, 1986, p. 11; March 31, 1986, pp. 18 & 22).
Nowhere in the cited testimony of Atty. Aurellado relied upon by the prosecution (Appellee's
Brief, p. 8; Rollo, p. 126; TSN, November 8, 1985, pp. 9-15) was there any indication that
appellant did acknowledge ownership of the prohibited merchandise.
Appellant's signature appearing on the sack and individual bundles containing marijuana do
not signify, much less evidence, guilt for they are mere procedural steps normally
undertaken after effecting arrest (People v. Sariol, G.R. No. 83809, June 22, 1989).
Furthermore, it appearing that appellant was not informed of his right to counsel at the time
he affixed his signature, the same has been obtained in violation of his right as a person
under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense and is therefore inadmissible
(Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 12 [1], [3]).
And there is the question of money involved. While the prosecution took time to prepare
counterfeit money to the extent that Bostick even shelled out his own, the same turned out
to be not really necessary it appearing that appellant never even got hold of it, much less
saw the same. It defies credulity that in a carefully orchestrated "buy-bust" operation such
as in the case at bar, no money changed hands between the alleged buyer and seller. It
may then be asked, was there really an attempt to sell on the part of appellant of a
merchandise he does not even own?
It is a cardinal rule in this jurisdiction that in order to merit conviction, the prosecution must
rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of evidence presented by
the defense. An accused must always be deemed innocent until the contrary is proved
beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to so establish the guilt
of herein appellant.
WHEREFORE, the challenged judgment is REVERSED and appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.


PEOPLE V LINSANGAN
G.R. No. 88589 April 16, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CARLITO LINSANGAN y DIAZ, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Camilo R. Murillo for accused- appellant.

GRIO-AQUINO, J .:p
This is an appeal from the decision dated April 26, 1988, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XLIX, Manila, in Criminal Case No. 87-58968-SCC, finding the accused guilty of the crime
of Violation of Section 4 of Article II in relation to Section 21, Art. IV of Republic Act 6425
(The Dangerous Drugs Law), as amended, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with all the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay a fine of P20,000 plus costs.
The information dated November 13, 1987, charged:
That on or about November 13, 1987 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, give away to
another or distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there wilfully and
unlawfully sell, deliver or give away to another ten (10) handrolled sticks of
marijuana cigarettes, which is a prohibited drug. (p. 15, Rollo.)
Upon arraignment on November 27, 1987, the appellant, assisted by counsel de parte,
pleaded not guilty to the charge.
It was established during the trial that in early November, 1987, police operatives of the
Drug Enforcement Unit, Police Station No. 3 of the Western Police District were informed
that there was rampant drug using and pushing on Dinalupihan Street, Tondo, Manila. The
pusher was described to them as a boy of about 20 years, 5'5" in height, and of ordinary
build. He allegedly sold marijuana to anybody, regardless of age ("walang gulang"). In light
of these reports, Police Lieutenant Manuel Caeg and the other members of the unit
organized a "buy-bust" operation on November 13, 1987 at Dinalupihan St., Tondo, Manila,
to effect the arrest of the notorious drug pusher. Patrolman Roberto Ruiz, a member of the
WPD since October 1, 1978 and assigned to the Drug Enforcement Unit since October,
1987, doing surveillance and arrest operations, was designated as the team leader, Pfc.
Eleazar Lahom, Patrolmen Tomasito Corpuz and Jesus Saulog were designated as team
members (pp. 1-19, t.s.n., December 16, 1987).
Five (5) days before the appointed date, the police operatives conducted a "test-buy"
operation on Rizal Avenue, Sta. Cruz, Manila. They arrested a person for violation of
Section 8 of Republic Act 6425, as amended (Possession or Use of Prohibited Drug). Under
questioning by the police operatives, the person informed them that he bought marijuana at
Dinalupihan Street in Tondo.
On November 13, 1987 at 10 o'clock in the morning, before the group left the office for the
area of operation, two (2) ten-peso bills were given to Pat. Corpuz who had marked them
with his initials "T.C." He gave one of the marked bills to the informer. Then, they proceeded
to Dinalupihan, using an owner-type jeep driver by Pat. Lahom. They were all in civilian
clothes. Pat. Corpuz wore a pair of maong shorts and a white t-shirt placed over his
shoulders. They parked the jeep on Dinalupihan Street near Pampanga Street in Tondo.
After briefing by the teamleader, Pat. Corpuz and the confidential informant approached the
appellant. Pat. Lahom and Saulog remained in the jeep while Pat. Ruiz stood beside the
jeep to watch the transaction.
As Patrolman Corpuz and the confidential informant walked together, they conversed about
the suspect. Pat. Corpuz asked the informant where the suspect was and the informer
pointed to the appellant, who was seated by the gutter about six (6) meters away from
them, seemingly waiting for someone. He was wearing blue-and-green shorts and a sando
(undershirt). The informer raised his hand as a signal to the appellant, who rose and walked
toward them. They walked toward a wooden house with a wooden fence and a store on the
left side. The informer told the appellant: "Kukuha ako." The informer asked? "Magkano?"
The informer told the accused that he would buy P10 worth of marijuana while his
"compadre" (referring to Patrolman Tomasito Corpuz), would also get P10 worth. P20 would
fetch ten (10) cigarette sticks of hand-rolled marijuana at P2.00 per stick. The policeman
and the informer impressed upon the accused that they were in dire need of marijuana. The
accused took the P20 from Pat. Corpuz and tucked it in his front waist. The accused went
inside the wooden house, while Pat. Corpuz and the informer waited outside. The accused
emerged shortly and handed over to Pat. Corpuz ten (10) cigarette sticks of handrolled
marijuana. Pat. Corpuz took them with his right hand and at the same time he grabbed the
accused with his other hand, saying: "Pulis ito, h'wag kang pumalag!" Pat. Ruiz saw the
signal and rushed over to them. The accused tried to resist but was overpowered. The
informer took to his heels (pp. 1-35, t.s.n., Jan. 13, 1988).
Pat. Ruiz frisked Linsangan and retrieved the marked ten-peso bills (Exhs. A-1 and A-2)
tucked in his waist. He asked the appellant to sign his name on the two P10 bills. They
boarded the jeep and returned to the police station. Pat. Ruiz prepared a letter-request to
the NBI for the laboratory examination of the ten suspected marijuana sticks. The appellant
also put his initials "C.L." on each stick (December 18, 1987, t.s.n.).
Before Pat. Ruiz investigated the appellant, he prepared the booking sheet and arrest
report, the affidavit of arrest, crime report, and referral letter to the Fiscal's Office. Just when
the appellant was being apprised of his constitutional rights, his uncle, a neighbor, and the
barangay chairman arrived. According to Pat. Ruiz, Linsangan's uncle offered P500 to Pat.
Corpuz in the presence of Pat. Lahom, to let the accused go. He was requested by the
barangay chairman, who is allegedly a compadre of Major Yangquiling, commander of the
arresting officers, not to proceed with the case.
The ten (10) handrolled cigarette sticks were referred to the NBI's forensic chemist, Carina
Javier, for examination. She found them positive for marijuana. As soon as Pat. Ruiz
received the NBI report on the examination, he booked the appellant for violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Law and filed the case with the fiscal's office.
Linsangan denied the charge. He alleged that at around 10:30 in the morning of November
13, 1987, he was in the vendor's stand of his neighbor Emeterio Balboa, alias Rey
Galunggong, on Dinalupihan Street to buy his breakfast, for he had just awakened. He lived
with his widowed mother, Erlinda, on the ground floor of a two-storey house on the alley at
1284 Dinalupihan Street, Tondo, Manila. The upper floor was occupied by his mother's
brother, Geosito Diaz, who is engaged in the second-hand tire business. Although once in a
while, his uncle helped them financially, he earned his living by driving a tricycle on a 5 p.m.
to 12:00 p.m. shift. He admitted that he had witnessed some men in Dinalupihan engaged in
drinking sprees and smoking marijuana.
The appellant alleged that the police officers fabricated the charge against him for in the last
week of September, 1987, Patrolmen Corpuz and Ruiz tried to board his tricycle, which he
was driving that night, to arrest someone, but he did not allow them to board his tricycle, for
fear of being involved in the case.
Appellant's neighbor Emeterio Balboa testified that at around 10:30 a.m. on November 13,
1987, two persons alighted from an owner-type jeep parked near his store. They asked the
appellant, who was standing about one-and-a-half-arms-length away if he was Carlito
Linsangan, and when the appellant said "yes," they introduced themselves as policemen,
frisked him and took him away.
The appellant presented a Certification from his Barangay Chairman, Crisanto Guansing of
Brgy. 206, Zone 19, attesting to his good moral character. Nevertheless, the trial court
found him guilty of the charge of drug pushing. The dispositive part of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the Accused CARLITO
LINSANGAN Y DIAZ guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation
of Section 4 of Republic Act 6425, as amended and hereby sentences him to
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of
the law, and to pay a fine of P20,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The ten (10) cigarette sticks of handrolled marijuana (Exhibits "F-2" to "F-11")
subject matter of this case are hereby confiscated in favor of the government.
The Accused shall be entitled to the full period of his detention at the City Jail
provided that he agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the
rules and regulations of the City Jail. (pp. 32-33, Rollo.)
The accused appealed to this Court alleging that the lower court erred:
1. in not finding that the prosecution witnesses, Pfc. Ruiz and Corpuz, were
motivated by ill-feelings against the appellant, and that their testimonies were
fraught with contradictions and inconsistencies;
2. in not finding that it was the informer and not the accused, who handed ten
sticks of hand-rolled marijuana cigarettes to Pat. Corpuz;
3. in not holding that the marked money was planted evidence; and
4. in not holding that when the policemen required him to initial the P10-bills,
they violated his constitutional right to counsel, to remain silent, and not to
incriminate himself while under custodial investigation.
The appeal has no merit.
The court's assessment of the credibility of the prosecution's witnesses is entitled to great
respect unless and until they are clearly shown to be arbitrary, which the defense failed to
do (People vs. Caldito, 182 SCRA 554). Although some inconsistencies were noted by the
appellant in the affidavit of arrest prepared by Pat. Corpuz, they involve minor details which
do not affect the over-all picture of the case.
The alleged motive of the policemen for fabricating the charge against him and planting
marked money on his person is not credible. The Court is unable to imagine that a lowly
tricycle driver would have the temerity to defy a pair of armed policemen by refusing to give
them a ride in his tricycle to pursue a law violator.
The appellant was not denied due process during the custodial investigation. Although he
was not assisted by counsel when he initialed the P10-bills that the police found tucked in
his waist, his right against self-incrimination was not violated for his possession of the
marked bills did not constitute a crime; the subject of the prosecution was his act of selling
marijuana a cigarettes (People vs. Layuso, 175 SCRA 47; People vs. Macuto, 176 SCRA
762; Mejia vs. Pamaran, 160 SCRA 457). His conviction was not based on the presence of
his initials on the P10-bills, but on the fact that the trial court believed the testimony of the
policemen that they arrested him while he was actually engaged in selling marijuana
cigarettes to a member of the arresting party. The trial court gave more credence to their
categorical declarations than to the appellant's denials (People vs. Tan, 145 SCRA 614).
That is as it should be for as law enforcers, they are presumed to have performed their
official duties in a regular manner (People vs. de Jesus, 145 SCRA 521; People vs. Ale, 145
SCRA 50). Their task of apprehending persons engaged in the deadly drug trade is difficult
enough without legal and procedural technicalities to make it doubly so.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is dismissed for lack of merit. The judgment of the trial court in
Criminal Case No. 87-58968-SCC is hereby affirmed except the penalty imposed on the
accused, Carlito Linsangan y Diaz, which shall be life imprisonment and a fine of
P20,000.00 with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.


PEOPLE V MAHINAY
[G.R. No. 122485. February 1, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LARRY MAHINAY
Y AMPARADO, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
A violation of the dignity, purity and privacy of a child who is still innocent and unexposed
to the ways of worldly pleasures is a harrowing experience that destroys not only her future but
of the youth population as well, who in the teachings of our national hero, are considered the
hope of the fatherland. Once again, the Court is confronted by another tragic desecration of
human dignity, committed no less upon a child, who at the salad age of a few days past 12 years,
has yet to knock on the portals of womanhood, and met her untimely death as a result of the
"intrinsically evil act" of non-consensual sex called rape. Burdened with the supreme penalty of
death, rape is an ignominious crime for which necessity is neither an excuse nor does there exist
any other rational justification other than lust. But those who lust ought not to lust.
The Court quotes with approval from the People's Brief, the facts narrating the horrible
experience and the tragic demise of a young and innocent child in the bloody hands of appellant,
as such facts are ably supported by evidence on record:
[1]
*
"Appellant Larry Mahinay started working as houseboy with Maria Isip on November
20, 1993. His task was to take care of Isip's house which was under construction
adjacent to her old residence situated inside a compound at No. 4165 Dian Street,
Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela , Metro Manila. But he stayed and slept in an apartment
also owned by Isip, located 10 meters away from the unfinished house (TSN,
September 6, 1995, pp. 5-10).
"The victim, Ma. Victoria Chan, 12 years old, was Isip's neighbor in Dian Street. She
used to pass by Isip's house on her way to school and play inside the compound yard,
catching maya birds together with other children. While they were playing, appellant
was always around washing his clothes. Inside the compound yard was a septic tank
(TSN, August 22, 1995, pp. 29-31; September 6, 1995, pp. 17; 20-22).
"On June 25, 1995, at 8 o'clock a.m., appellant joined Gregorio Rivera in a drinking
spree. Around 10 o'clock in the morning, appellant, who was already drunk, left
Gregorio Rivera and asked permission from Isip to go out with his friends (TSN,
September 6, 1995, pp. 9-11).
"Meantime, Isip's sister-in-law, Norgina Rivera, who also owned a store fronting the
compound, saw Ma. Victoria on that same day three to four times catching birds
inside Isip's unfinished house around 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The unfinished house
was about 8 meters away from Rivera's store (TSN, September 18, 1995, pp.9-11).
"On the other hand, Sgt. Roberto Suni, also a resident of Dian Street, went to his in-
law's house between 6 to 7 o'clock p.m. to call his office regarding changes on the trip
of President Fidel V. Ramos. The house of his in-laws was near the house of Isip. On
his way to his in-law's house, Sgt. Suni met appellant along Dian Street. That same
evening, between 8 to 9 o'clock p.m., he saw Ma. Victoria standing in front of the gate
of the unfinished house (TSN, September 27, 1995, pp. 3-7; 14-17).
"Later, at 9 o'clock in the evening, appellant showed up at Norgina Rivera's store to
buy lugaw. Norgina Rivera informed appellant that there was none left of it. She
notice that appellant appeared to be uneasy and in deep thought. His hair was
disarrayed; he was drunk and was walking in a dazed manner. She asked why he
looked so worried but he did not answer. Then he left and walked back to the
compound (TSN, September 18, 1995, pp. 4-8; 12-14).
"Meanwhile, Elvira Chan noticed that her daughter, Ma. Victoria, was missing. She
last saw her daughter wearing a pair of white shorts, brown belt, a yellow hair ribbon,
printed blue blouse, dirty white panty, white lady sando and blue rubber slippers
(TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 22, 33).
"Isip testified that appellant failed to show up for supper that night. On the following
day, June 26, 1995, at 2 o'clock in the morning, appellant boarded a passenger jeepney
driven by Fernando Trinidad at the talipapa. Appellant alighted at the top of the
bridge of the North Expressway and had thereafter disappeared (TSN, September 20,
1995, pp. 4-9; September 27, 1995; pp. 14-17).
"That same morning, around 7:30, a certain Boy found the dead body of Ma. Victoria
inside the septic tank. Boy immediately reported what he saw to the victim's parents,
Eduardo and Elvira Chan (TSN, September 6, 1995, p. 13).
"With the help of the Valenzuela Police, the lifeless body of Ma. Victoria was
retrieved from the septic tank. She was wearing a printed blouse without underwear.
Her face bore bruises. Results of the autopsy revealed the following findings:
Cyanosis, lips and nailbeds,
Contusions, supra pubic area, 6.0 x 3.0 cm., thigh right,
Anterior aspect, middle third, 4.5 x 3.0 cm.
Contused-abrasions on the forehead, 5.0 x 5.0 cm, angle of the left eye, lateral aspect,
2.5 x 1.5 cm. left jaw, 13.5 x 7.0 cm. neck, antero-lateral aspect, right, 2.0 x 1.0 cm.
and left, 7.0 x 6.0 cm., left iliac area, 9.0 x 5.5 cm. intraclavicular area, left, posterior
aspect, 4.0 x 2.0 cm. scapular area, right 4.0 x 4.0 cm. subscapular area, left, 1.5 x 1.5
cm. lumbar area, left 7.0 x 8.0 cm. arm, left, posterior aspect, middle third, 11.00 x
4.0 cm. elbows, right, 4.0 x 3.0 cm. and left 6.0 x 5.0 cm. forearms, left, posterior
aspect, lower rd, 5.2 x 4.0 cm. hand, left, dorsal aspect, 0.8 x 0.9 cm. thighs; right
antero-lateral aspect, upper 33
rd
, 12.0 x 10.0 cm. right anterior aspect, lower 3
rd
5.0 x
2.0 cm. and left antero-lower 3
rd
, 5.5 x 2.5 cm. knee, right, lateral aspect, 1.5 x 1.0
cm. lateral mallcolum, left, 3.0 x 3.5 cm. foot, left, dorsal aspect 2.2 x 1.0 cm.
Hematoma, forehead, and scalp, left, 3.5 x 3.0 cm.
Hemorrhage, interstitial, underneath nailmarks, neck, subepicardial, subpleural
petechial hemorrhages.
Hemorrhage, subdural, left fronto-parietal area.
Tracheo-bronchial tree, congested.
Other visceral organs, congested.
Stomach, contain 1/4 rice and other food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH - Asphyxia by Manual Strangulation; Traumatic Head Injury,
Contributory.
REMARKS: Hymen: tall, thick with complete lacerations at 4:00 and 8:00 o'clock
position corresponding to the face of a watch edges congested with blood clots. (TSN,
August 18, 1995; p. 4; Record, p. 126)
"Back in the compound, SPO1 Arsenio Nacis and SPO1 Arnold Alabastro were
informed by Isip that her houseboy, appellant Larry Mahinay, was missing. According
to her, it was unlikely for appellant to just disappear from the apartment since
whenever he would go out, he would normally return on the same day or early
morning of the following day (TSN, September 6, 1995, pp. 6-11-27).
"SPO1 Nacis and SPO1 Alabastro were also informed that a townmate of appellant
was working in a pancit factory at Barangay Reparo, Caloocan City. They proceeded
to said place. The owner of the factory confirmed to them that appellant used to work
at the factory but she did not know his present whereabouts. Appellant's townmate, on
the other hand, informed them that appellant could possibly be found on 8
th
Street,
Grace Park, Caloocan City (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 8-9).
"The policemen returned to the scene of the crime. At the second floor of the house
under construction, they retrieved from one of the rooms a pair of dirty white short
pants, a brown belt and a yellow hair ribbon which was identified by Elvira Chan to
belong to her daughter, Ma. Victoria. They also found inside another room a pair of
blue slippers which Isip identified as that of Appellant. Also found in the yard, three
armslength away from the septic tank were an underwear, a leather wallet, a pair of
dirty long pants and a pliers positively identified by Isip as appellant's
belongings. These items were brought to the police station (TSN, August 14, 1995,
pp. 10-13; August 18, 1995, pp. 3-8; August 23, 1995, pp. 21-25).
"A police report was subsequently prepared including a referral slip addressed to the
office of the Valenzuela Prosecutor. The next day, SPO1 Virgilio Villano retrieved the
victim's underwear from the septic tank (TSN, August 23, 1995, pp. 3-8; 14-17).
"After a series of follow-up operations, appellant was finally arrested in Barangay
Obario Matala, Ibaan, Batangas. He was brought to Valenzuela Police Station. On
July 7, 1995, with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes, appellant executed an
extra-judicial confession wherein he narrated in detail how he raped and killed the
victim. Also, when appellant came face to face with the victim's mother and aunt, he
confided to them that he was not alone in raping and killing the victim. He pointed to
Zaldy and Boyet as his co-conspirators (TSN, August 14, 1995, pp. 13-21)."
Thus, on July 10, 1995, appellant was charged with rape with homicide in an Information
which reads:
[2]

"That on or about the 26
th
day of June 1995 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, by means of force
and intimidation employed upon the person of MARIA VICTORIA CHAN y
CABALLERO, age 12 years old, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously lie with and have sexual intercourse with said MARIA VICTORIA
CHAN y CABALLERO against her will and without her consent; that on the occasion
of said sexual assault, the above-named accused, choke and strangle said MARIA
VICTORIA CHAN y CABALLERO as a result of which, said victim died.
"Contrary to law."
[3]

to which he pleaded not guilty. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision convicting
appellant of the crime charged, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to pay a total
of P73,000.00 to the victim's heirs. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision states:
"WHEREFORE, finding accused Larry Mahinay y Amparado guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged, he is hereby sentenced to death by
electricution (sic). He is likewise condemned to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Ma.
Victoria Chan the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the further sum of P23,000.00 for
the funeral, burial and wake of the victim.
"Let the complete records of the case be immediately forwarded to the Honorable
Supreme Court for the automatic review in accordance to Article 47 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659.
"SO ORDERED."
[4]

Upon automatic review by the court en banc pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended,
[5]
appellant insists that the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution against him is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In his
testimony summarized by the trial court, appellant offered his version of what transpired as
follows:
(T)hat on June 25, 1995, around 9:30 a.m. on Dian Street, Gen. T. de Leon,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, he joined Gregorio Rivera and a certain Totoy in a
drinking spree. Gregorio Rivera is the brother of Maria Isip, appellants employer.
After consuming three cases of red horse beer, he was summoned by Isip to clean the
jeepney. He finished cleaning the jeepney at 12 oclock noon. Then he had lunch and
took a bath. Later, he asked permission from Isip to go out with his friends to see a
movie. He also asked for a cash advance of P300.00 (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 4-
5).
At 2 oclock in the afternoon, appellant, instead of going out with his friend, opted to
rejoin Gregorio Rivera and Totoy for another drinking session. They consumed one
case of red horse beer. Around 6 oclock p.m., Zaldy, a co-worker, fetched him at
Gregorio Riveras house. They went to Zaldys house and bought a bottle of gin. They
finished drinking gin around 8 oclock p.m. After consuming the bottle of gin, they
went out and bought another bottle of gin from a nearby store. It was already 9
oclock in the evening. While they were at the store, appellant and Zaldy met Boyet.
After giving the bottle of gin to Zaldy and Boyet, appellant left (TSN, October 16,
1995, pp. 6-7).
On his way home, appellant passed by Norgina Riveras store to buy lugaw. Norgina
Rivera informed him that there was none left of it. He left the store and proceeded to
Isips apartment. But because it was already closed, he decided to sleep at the second
floor of Isips unfinished house. Around 10 oclock p.m., Zaldy and Boyet arrived
carrying a cadaver. The two placed the body inside the room where appellant was
sleeping. As appellant stood up, Zaldy pointed to him a knife. Zaldy and Boyet
directed him to rape the dead body of the child or they would kill him. He, However,
refused to follow. Then, he was asked by Zaldy and Boyet to assist them in bringing
the dead body downstairs. He obliged and helped dump the body into the septic tank.
Thereupon, Zaldy and Boyet warned him that should they ever see him again, they
would kill him. At 4 oclock the following morning, he left the compound and
proceeded first to Navotas and later to Batangas (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 4-13).
Subsequently, appellant was apprehended by the police officers in Ibaan, Batangas.
The police officers allegedly brought him to a big house somewhere in Manila. There,
appellant heard the police officers plan to salvage him if he would not admit that he
was the one who raped and killed the victim. Scared, he executed an extra-judicial
confession. He claimed that he was assisted by Atty. Restituto Viernes only when he
was forced to sign the extra-judicial confession (TSN, October 16, 1995, pp. 9-11).
[6]

This being a death penalty case, the Court exercises the greatest circumspection in the
review thereof since there can be no stake higher and no penalty more severe x x x than the
termination of a human life.
[7]
For life, once taken is like virginity, which once defiled can never
be restored. In order therefore, that appellants guilty mind be satisfied, the Court states the
reasons why, as the records are not shy, for him to verify.
The proven circumstances of this case when juxtaposed with appellants proffered excuse
are sufficient to sustain his conviction beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the absence of
any direct evidence relative to the commission of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
Absence of direct proof does not necessarily absolve him from any liability because under the
Rules on evidence
[8]
and pursuant to settled jurisprudence,
[9]
conviction may be had on
circumstantial evidence provided that the following requisites concur:
1. there is more than one circumstance;
2. the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
Simply put, for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and
at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt.
[10]
Facts and circumstances consistent with guilt and inconsistent
with innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force, may surpass even
direct evidence in its effect upon the court.
[11]

In the case at bench, the trial court gave credence to several circumstantial evidence, which
upon thorough review of the Court is more than enough to prove appellants guilt beyond the
shadow of reasonable doubt. These circumstantial evidence are as follows:
FIRST Prosecution witness Norgina Rivera, sister-in-law of Maria Isip, owner of
the unfinished big house where the crime happened and the septic tank where the
body of Maria Victoria Chan was found in the morning of June 26, 1995 is located,
categorically testified that at about 9:00 in the evening on June 25, 1995, accused
Larry Mahinay was in her store located in front portion of the compound of her sister-
in-law Maria Isip where the unfinished big house is situated buying rice noodle
(lugaw). That she noticed the accuseds hair was disarranged, drunk and walking in
sigsaging manner. That the accused appeared uneasy and seems to be thinking deeply.
That the accused did not reply to her queries why he looked worried but went inside
the compound.
SECOND Prosecution witness Sgt. Roberto G. Suni, categorically, testified that on
June 25, 1995 between 6:00 and 7:00 in the evening, on his way to his in-laws house,
he met accused Larry Mahinay walking on the road leading to his in-laws residence
which is about 50 to 75 meters away to the unfinished big house of Maria Isip. That
he also saw victim Maria Victoria Chan standing at the gate of the unfinished big
house of Maria Isip between 8:00 and 9:00 in the same evening.
THIRD Prosecution witness Maria Isip, owner of the unfinished big house where
victims body was found inside the septic tank, testified that accused Larry Mahinay is
her houseboy since November 20, 1993. That in the morning of June 25, 1995, a
Sunday, Larry Mahinay asked permission from her to leave. That after finishing some
work she asked him to do accused Larry Mahinay left. That it is customary on the part
of Larry Mahinay to return in the afternoon of the same day or sometimes in the next
morning. That accused Larry Mahinay did not return until he was arrested in Batangas
on July 7, 1995.
FOURTH Prosecution witness Fernando Trinidad, a passenger jeepney driver
plying the route Karuhatan-Ugong and vice versa which include Diam St., Gen. T. de
Leon, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, pinpointed the accused Larry Mahinay as one of the
passengers who boarded his passenger jeepney on June 26, 1995 at 2:00 early
morning and alighted on top of the overpass of the North Expressway.
FIFTH Personal belongings of the victim was found in the unfinished big house of
Maria Isip where accused Larry Mahinay slept on the night of the incident. This is a
clear indication that the victim was raped and killed in the said premises.
There is no showing that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses (sic) fabricated
or there was any reason for them to testify falsely against the accused. The absence of
any evidence as to the existence of improper motive sustain the conclusion that no
such improper motive exists and that the testimonies of the witnesses, therefore,
should be given full faith and credit. (People vs. Retubado, 58585 January 20, 1988
162 SCRA 276, 284; People vs. Ali L-18512 October 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 756).
SIXTH Accused Larry Mahinay during the custodial investigation and after having
been informed of his constitutional rights with the assistance of Atty. Restituto
Viernes of the Public Attorneys Office voluntarily gave his statement admitting the
commission of the crime. Said confession of accused Larry Mahinay given with the
assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed to have been freely and voluntarily
given. That accused did not complain to the proper authorities of any maltreatment on
his person (People vs. delos Santos L-3398 May 29, 1984; 150 SCRA 311). He did
not even informed the Inquest Prosecutor when he sworn to the truth of his statement
on July 8, 1995 that he was forced, coersed or was promised of reward or leniency.
That his confession abound with details know only to him. The Court noted that a
lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office Atty. Restituto Viernes and as testified by
said Atty. Viernes he informed and explained to the accused his constitutional rights
and was present all throughout the giving of the testimony. That he signed the
statement given by the accused. Lawyer from the Public Attorneys Office is expected
to be watchful and vigilant to notice any irregularity in the manner of the investigation
and the physical conditions of the accused. The post mortem findings shows that the
cause of death Asphyxia by manual strangulation; Traumatic Head injury
Contributory substantiate. Consistent with the testimony of the accused that he pushed
the victim and the latters head hit the table and the victim lost consciousness.
Pagpasok niya sa kuwarto, hinawakan ko siya sa kamay tapos tinulak ko siya, tapos
tumama iyong ulo niya sa mesa. Ayon na, nakatulog na siya tapos ni-rape ko na
siya.
There is no clear proof of maltreatment and/or tortured in giving the
statement. There were no medical certificate submitted by the accused to sustain his
claim that he was mauled by the police officers.
There being no evidence presented to show that said confession were obtained as a
result of violence, torture, maltreatment, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or
leniency nor that the investigating officer could have been motivated to concoct the
facts narrated in said affidavit; the confession of the accused is held to be true, correct
and freely or voluntarily given. (People v. Tuazon 6 SCRA 249; People v. Tiongson 6
SCRA 431, People v. Baluran 52 SCRA 71, People v. Pingol 35 SCRA 73.)
SEVENTH Accused Larry Mahinay testified in open Court that he was not able to
enter the apartment where he is sleeping because it was already closed and he
proceeded to the second floor of the unfinished house and slept. He said while
sleeping Zaldy and Boyet arrived carrying the cadaver of the victim and dumped it
inside his room. That at the point of a knife, the two ordered him to have sex with the
dead body but he refused. That the two asked him to assist them in dumping the dead
body of the victim in the septic tank downstairs. (Tsn pp8-9 October 16, 1995). This is
unbelievable and unnatural. Accused Larry Mahinay is staying in the apartment and
not in the unfinished house. That he slept in the said unfinished house only that night
of June 25, 1995 because the apartment where he was staying was already closed.
The Court is at a loss how would Zaldy and Boyet knew he (Larry Mahinay) was in
the second floor of the unfinished house.
Furthermore, if the child is already dead when brought by Zaldy and Boyet in the
room at the second floor of the unfinished house where accused Larry Mahinay was
sleeping, why will Boyet and Zaldy still brought the cadaver upstairs only to be
disposed/dumped later in the septic tank located in the ground floor. Boyet and Zaldy
can easily disposed and dumped the body in the septic tank by themselves.
It is likewise strange that the dead body of the child was taken to the room where
accused Larry Mahinay was sleeping only to force the latter to have sex with the dead
body of the child.
We have no test to the truth of human testimony except its conformity to aver
knowledge observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the
miraculous. (People vs. Santos L-385 Nov. 16, 1979)
EIGHT If the accused did not commit the crime and was only forced to
disposed/dumpted the body of the victim in the septic tank, he could have apprise Col.
Maganto, a high ranking police officer or the lady reporter who interviewed him. His
failure and omission to reveal the same is unnatural. An innocent person will at once
naturally and emphatically repel an accusation of crime as a matter of preservation
and self-defense and as a precaution against prejudicing himself. A persons silence
therefore, particularly when it is persistent will justify an inference that he is not
innocent. (People vs. Pilones, L-32754-5 July 21, 1978).
NINTH The circumstance of flight of the accused strongly indicate his
consciousness of guilt. He left the crime scene on the early morning after the incident
and did not return until he was arrested in Batangas on July 7, 1995.
[12]

Guided by the three principles in the review of rape cases, to wit:
[13]

1). An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for
the person accused, though innocent, to disprove;
2). In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape, where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution; and
3). The evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the defense.
the foregoing circumstantial evidence clearly establishes the felony of rape with homicide
defined and penalized under Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11,
R.A. 7659, which provides:
When and how rape is committed Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances.
1.) By using force or intimidation;
2.) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3.) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two
or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the
penalty shall be death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on
the occasion thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty
shall be death.
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1.) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
2.) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
3.) When the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other
relatives within the third degree of consanguinity.
4.) When the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.
5.) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) disease.
6.) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or Philippine
National Police or any law enforcement agency.
7.) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical
mutilation.
[14]

At the time of the commission of this heinous act, rape was still considered a crime against
chastity,
[15]
although under the Anti-Rape Law of 1997 (R.A. No. 8353), rape has since been re-
classified as a crime against persons under Articles 266-A and 266-B, and thus, may be
prosecuted even without a complaint filed by the offended party.
The gravamen of the offense of rape, prior to R.A. 8353, is sexual congress with a woman
by force and without consent.
[16]
(Under the new law, rape may be committed even by a woman
and the victim may even be a man.)
[17]
If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of force and
consent becomes immaterial
[18]
not only because force is not an element of statutory rape,
[19]
but
the absence of a free consent is presumed when the woman is below such age. Conviction will
therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is be proven. But if the woman is 12 years of age or
over at the time she was violated, as in this case, not only the first element of sexual intercourse
must be proven but also the other element that the perpetrators evil acts with the offended party
was done through force, violence, intimidation or threat needs to be established. Both elements
are present in this case.
Based on the evidence on record, sexual intercourse with the victim was adequately
proven. This is shown from the testimony of the medical doctor who conducted post mortem
examination on the childs body:
Q: And after that what other parts of the victim did you examine?
A: Then I examined the genitalia of the victim.
Q: And what did you find out after you examined the genitalia of the victim?
A: The hymen was tall-thick with complete laceration at 4:00 oclock and 8:00 oclock position and
that the edges were congested.
Q: Now, what might have caused the laceration?
A: Under normal circumstances this might have (sic) caused by a penetration of an organ.
Q: So, the laceration was caused by the penetration of a male organ?
A: Adult male organ, sir.
Q: You are very sure of that, Mr. Witness?
A: I am very sure of that.
[20]

Besides, as may be gleaned from his extrajudicial confession, appellant himself admitted
that he had sexual congress with the unconscious child.
15. T: Ano ang nangyari ng mga sandali o oras na iyon?
S: Natutulog po ako sa itaas ng bahay ni ATE MARIA, yung malaking bahay na ginagawa, tapos
dumating yung batang babae. Pag-pasok niya sa kuwarto hinawakan ko siya sa kamay tapos
tinulak ko siya. Tapos tumama yung ulo niya sa mesa. Ayon na, nakakatulog na siya tapos ni rape
ko na siya.
16. T: Ano ang suot nung batang babae na sinasabi mo?
S: Itong short na ito, (pointing to a dirty white short placed atop this investigators table. Subject
evidence were part of evidences recovered at the crime scene).
17. T: Bakit mo naman ni rape yung batang babae?
S: Eh nasobrahan ako ng lasing. Hindi ko na alam ang ginagawa ko.
18. T: Ano ba ang inyong ininom bakit ka nasobrahan ng lasing?
S: Red Horse po at saka GIN.
19. T: Saan lugar ng malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA mo ni rape yung batang babae?
S: Sa kuwarto ko po sa itaas.
20. T: Kailan ito at anong oras nangyari?
S: Mga bandang alas 8:00 ng gabi, araw ng Linggo, hindi ko na matandaan kung anong petsa, basta
araw ng Linggo.
21. T: Saan lugar ito nangyari?
S: Sa Diam, Gen. T. de Leon, Valenzuela, M.M.
22. T: Alam mo na ba ang pangalan ng batang babae na ni rape mo?
S: Hindi ko po alam.
23. T: Ngayon, nais kong ipaalam sa iyo na ang pangalan ng batang babae na iyong ni rape at pinatay
ay si MA. VICTORIA CHAN? Matatandaan mo ba ito?
S: Oho.
24. T: Nung ma-rape mo, nakaraos ka ba?
S: Naka-isa po.
25. T: Nais kong liwanagin sa iyo kung ano ang ibig sabihin ng NAKARAOS, maaari bang
ipaliwanag mo ito?
S: Nilabasan po ako ng tamod.
26. T: Nung nakaraos ka, nasaan parte ng katawan ng batang babae yung iyong ari?
S: Nakapasok po doon sa ari nung babae.
27. T: Natapos mong ma-rape si MA. VICTORIA CHAN, ano pa ang sumunod mong ginawa?
S: Natulak ko siya sa terrace.
28. T: Ano ang nangyari kay MA. VICTORIA matapos mong itulak sa terrace?
S: Inilagay ko po sa poso-negra.
29. T: Saan makikita yung poso-negra na sinasabi mo?
S: Doon din sa malaking bahay ni ATE MARIA.
30. T: Bakit mo namang naisipang ilagay si MA. VICTORIA sa poso-negra?
S: Doon ko lang po inilagay.
31. T: Bakit nga doon mo inilagay siya?
S: Natatakot po ako.
32. T: Kanino ka natatakot?
S: Natatakot po ako sa ginawa kong masama, natatakot ako sa mga pulis.
33. T: Buhay pa ba si MA. VICTORIA nung ilagay mo siya sa poso-negra?
S: Hindi ko po alam dahil nung pagbagsak niya inilagay ko na siya sa poso-negra.
34. T: Nung gawin mo ba itong krimen na ito, mayroon ka kasama?
S: Nag-iisa lang po ako.
35. T: Noong mga oras o sandaling gahasain mo si MA. VICTORIA CHAN, buhay pa ba siya o
patay na?
S: Buhay pa po.
36. T: Papaano mo siya pinatay?
S: Tinulak ko nga po siya sa terrace.
[21]

In proving sexual intercourse, it is not full or deep penetration of the victims vagina; rather
the slightest penetration of the male organ into the female sex organ is enough to consummate
the sexual intercourse.
[22]
The mere touching by the males organ or instrument of sex of the labia
of the pudendum of the womans private parts is sufficient to consummate rape.
From the wounds, contusions and abrasions suffered by the victim, force was indeed
employed upon her to satisfy carnal lust. Moreover, from appellants own account, he pushed the
victim causing the latter to hit her head on the table and fell unconscious. It was at that instance
that he ravished her and satisfied his salacious and prurient desires. Considering that the victim,
at the time of her penile invasion, was unconscious, it could safely be concluded that she had not
given free and voluntary consent to her defilement, whether before or during the sexual act.
Another thing that militates against appellant is his extrajudicial confession, which he,
however, claims was executed in violation of his constitutional right to counsel. But his
contention is belied by the records as well as the testimony of the lawyer who assisted, warned
and explained to him his constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial rights. As
testified to by the assisting lawyer:
Q Will you please inform the Court what was that call about?
A We went to the station, police investigation together with Atty. Froilan Zapanta and we were told
by Police Officer Alabastro that one Larry Mahinay would like to confess of the crime of, I think,
rape with homicide.
Q And upon reaching the investigation room of Valenzuela PNP who were the other person
present?
A Police Officer Alabastro, sir, Police Officer Nacis and other investigator inside the investigation
room and the parents of the child who was allegedly raped.
Q- And when you reached the investigation room do you notice whether the accused already there?
A The accused was already there.
Q Was he alone?
A he was alone, sir.
Q So, when you were already infront of SPO1 Arnold Alabastro and the other PNP Officers, what
did they tell you, if any?
A They told us together with Atty. Zapanta that this Larry Mahinay would like to confess of the
crime charged, sir.
Q By the way, who was that Atty. Zapanta?
A Our immediate Superior of the Public Attorneys Office.
Q Was he also present at the start of the question and answer period to the accused?
A No more, sir, he already went to our office. I was left alone.
Q But he saw the accused, Larry Mahinay?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, when Atty. Zapanta left at what time did the question and answer period start?
A If I am not mistaken at around 4:05 of July 7, 1995 in the afternoon, sir.
Q And when this question and answer period started, what was the first thing that you did as
assisting lawyer to the accused?
A First, I tried to explain to him his right, sir, under the constitution.
Q What are those right?
A That he has the right to remain silent. That he has the right of a counsel of his own choice and
that if he has no counsel a lawyer will be appointed to him and that he has the right to refuse to
answer any question that would incriminate him.
Q Now, after enumerating these constitutional rights of accused Larry Mahinay, do you recall
whether this constitutional right enumerated by you were reduced in writing?
A Yes, sir, and it was also explained to him one by one by Police Officer Alabastro.
Q I show to you this constitutional right which you said were reduced into writing, will you be able
to recognize the same?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please go over this and tell the Court whether that is the same document you
mentioned?
A Yes, sir, these were the said rights reduced into writing.
ATTY. PRINCIPE:
May we request, Your Honor, that this document be marked as our Exhibit A proper.
Q Do you recall after reducing into writing this constitutional right of the accused whether you
asked him to sign to acknowledge or to conform?
A I was the one who asked him, sir. It was Police Officer Alabastro.
Q But you were present?
A I was then present when he signed.
Q There is a signature in this constitutional right after the enumeration, before and after there are
two (2) signatures, will you please recognize the two (2) signatures?
A These were the same signatures signed in my presence, sir.
Q The signature of whom?
A The signature of Larry Mahinay, sir.
ATTY. PRINCIPE:
May we request, Your Honor, that the two (2) signatures identified by my compaero be encircled and
marked as Exhibit A-1 and A-2.
Q After you said that you apprised the accused of his constitutional right explaining to him in
Filipino, in local dialect, what was the respond of the accused?
A- Larry Mahinay said that we will proceed with his statement.
Q What was the reply?
A He said Opo.
Q Did you ask him of his educational attainment?
A It was the Police Officer who asked him.
Q In your presence?
A In my presence, sir.
Q And when he said or when he replied Opo so the question started?
A Yes, sir.
Q I noticed in this Exhibit A that there is also a waiver of rights, were you present also when he
signed this waiver?
A Yes, sir, I was also present.
Q Did you explain to him the meaning of this waiver?
A I had also explained to him, sir.
Q In Filipino?
A In Tagalog, sir.
Q And there is also a signature after the waiver in Filipino over the typewritten name Larry
Mahinay, Nagsasalaysay, whose signature is that?
A This is also signed in my presence.
Q Why are you sure that this is his signature?
A He signed in my presence, sir.
Q And below immediately are the two (2) signatures. The first one is when Larry Mahinay
subscribed and sworn to, there is a signature here, do you recognize this signature?
A This is my signature, sir.
Q And immediately after your first signature is a Certification that you have personally examined
the accused Larry Mahinay and testified that he voluntary executed the Extra Judicial Confession,
do you recognize the signature?
A This is also my signature, sir.
[23]
(emphasis supplied).
Appellants defense that two other persons brought to him the dead body of the victim and
forced him to rape the cadaver is too unbelievable. In the words of Vice-Chancellor Van Fleet of
New Jersey,
[24]

Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness,
but must be credible in itself- such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the
truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and
experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous, and is outside
of judicial cognizance.
Ultimately, all the foregoing boils down to the issue of credibility of witnesses. Settled is
the rule that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to
the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable
evidence of the witnesses department on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied
to the appellate courts.
[25]
In this case, the trial courts findings, conclusions and evaluation of the
testimony of witnesses is received on appeal with the highest respect,
[26]
the same being
supported by substantial evidence on record. There was no showing that the court a quo had
overlooked or disregarded relevant facts and circumstances which when considered would have
affected the outcome of this case
[27]
or justify a departure from the assessments and findings of
the court below. The absence of any improper or ill-motive on the part of the principal witnesses
for the prosecution all the more strengthens the conclusion that no such motive exists.
[28]
Neither
was any wrong motive attributed to the police officers who testified against appellant.
Coming now to the penalty, the sentence imposed by the trial court is correct. Under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by R.A. 7659 when by reason or on
occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. This special complex
crime is treated by law in the same degree as qualified rape -- that is, when any of the 7 (now 10)
attendant circumstances enumerated in the law is alleged and proven, in which instances, the
penalty is death. In cases where any of those circumstances is proven though not alleged, the
penalty cannot be death except if the circumstance proven can be properly appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance under Articles 14 and 15 of the RPC which will affect the imposition
of the proper penalty in accordance with Article 63 of the RPC. However, if any of those
circumstances proven but not alleged cannot be considered as an aggravating circumstance under
Articles 14 and 15, the same cannot affect the imposition of the penalty because Articles 63 of
the RPC in mentioning aggravating circumstances refers to those defined in Articles 14 and
15. Under R.A. No. 8353, if any of the 10 circumstances is alleged in the information/complaint,
it may be treated as a qualifying circumstance. But if it is not so alleged, it may be considered as
an aggravating circumstance, in which case the only penalty is death subject to the usual proof
of such circumstance in either case.
Death being a single indivisible penalty and the only penalty prescribed by law for the crime
of rape with homicide, the court has no option but to apply the same regardless of any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have attended the commission of the
crime
[29]
in accordance with Article 63 of the RPC, as amended.
[30]
This case of rape with
homicide carries with it penalty of death which is mandatorily imposed by law within the import
of Article 47 of the RPC, as amended, which provides:
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under
existing laws, except when the guilty person is below eighteen (18) years of age at the
time of the commission of the crime or is more than seventy years of age or when
upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court, the required
majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in which cases
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua. (emphasis supplied).
In an apparent but futile attempt to escape the imposition of the death penalty, appellant
tried to alter his date of birth to show that he was only 17 years and a few months old at the time
he committed the rape and thus, covered by the proscription on the imposition of death if the
guilty person is below eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the crime.
[31]
Again,
the record rebuffs appellant on this point considering that he was proven to be already more than
20 years of age when he did the heinous act.
Pursuant to current case law, a victim of simple rape is entitled to a civil indemnity of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) but if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any
of the circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by present amended law, the
civil indemnity for the victim shall be not less than seventy-five thousand pesos
(P75,000.00).
[32]
In addition to such indemnity, she can also recover moral damages pursuant to
Article 2219 of the Civil Code
[33]
in such amount as the court deems just, without the necessity
for pleading or proof of the basis thereof.
[34]
Civil Indemnity is different from the award of moral
and exemplary damages.
[35]
The requirement of proof of mental and physical suffering provided
in Article 2217 of the Civil Code is dispensed with because it is recognized that the victims
injury is inherently concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape to
warrant per se the award of moral damages.
[36]
Thus, it was held that a conviction for rape
carries with it the award of moral damages to the victim without need for pleading or proof of the
basis thereof.
[37]

Exemplary damages can also be awarded if the commission of the crime was attended by
one or more aggravating circumstances pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code
[38]
after proof
that the offended party is entitled to moral, temperate and compensatory damages.
[39]
Under the
circumstances of this case, appellant is liable to the victims heirs for the amount of P75,000.00
as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Lastly, considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that the evidence
against and accused were obtained through lawful means, the Court, as guardian of the rights of
the people lays down the procedure, guidelines and duties which the arresting, detaining,
inviting, or investigating officer or his companions must do and observe at the time of making an
arrest and again at and during the time of the custodial interrogation
[40]
in accordance with the
Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act No. 7438:
[41]
It is high-time to educate our law-
enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda
rights which had become insufficient and which the Court must update in the light of new legal
developments:
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a
language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown
the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or communication must be in
a language known to and understood by said person;
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may
be used as evidence against him;
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of
an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one
will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf,
or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his
behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial
investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a
valid waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or
confer by the most expedient means telephone, radio, letter or messenger with his lawyer
(either retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor,
priest or minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel,
or be visited by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-government
organization. It shall be the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it
must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that
the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or
stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes
such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or
the interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain
silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time
during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or
volunteered some statements;
11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be,
obtained in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole
or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Four members of the Court although maintaining their adherence to the separate opinions
expressed in People v. Echegaray
[42]
that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty, is unconstitutional nevertheless submit to the ruling of the Court, by a majority vote,
that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should accordingly be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of appellant is hereby AFFIRMED except for the award of
civil indemnity for the heinous rape which is INCREASED to P75,000.00, PLUS P50,000.00
moral damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forthwith
forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.


PEOPLE V JEREZ
[G.R. No. 114385. January 29, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EFREN
JEREZ, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
ROMERO, J .:
Appellant Efren Jerez, along with Joselito Quijan, Zaldy Victa and Efren Bola (at
large), were charged with the crime of robbery with double homicide in Criminal Case
No. 6755 before the Regional Trial Court
[1]
of Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 38, under
an information
[2]
dated October 15, which reads as follows:
That on or about 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of May 23, 1990 within the
Basit Compound at barangay Sta. Rosa, municipality of Jose Panganiban,
province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named (accused) armed with revolvers and
bladed weapons conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping with
one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent
of gain and by means of violence take from REYNALDO OCHOA and
JOSELITO BALBASTRO the following personal properties, to wit: cash money
amounting to P45,000.00, two (2) gold plated Seiko 5 wristwatch(es), one (1)
golden Horseshoe type ring and one (1) gold plated Ray-ban with the total
value of P52,000.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to said Reynaldo Ochoa
and Joselito Balbastro; that on the occasion of said robbery and for the
purpose of enabling the said accused to take, steal and carry away the
aforesaid articles, the herein accused in pursuance of their conspiracy, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate intent to kill,
with treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of their superior
number and strength, assault, attack and stab said Reynaldo Ochoa and
Joselito Balbastro, thereby inflicting upon them multiple mortal wounds on the
different parts of their bodies, and as a result thereof, the said Reynaldo
Ochoa and Joselito Balbastro died instantly, to the damage and prejudice of
the heirs of the victims.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
A concise narration of the factual circumstances that led to appellants conviction
follows:
On May 23, 1990, while waiting for passengers near Josies Restaurant in the
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte, tricycle driver Gil Villafranca was
approached by a person, later identified as appellant, informing him that he
was looking for a carabao buyer.
[3]
Subsequently, Villafranca accompanied the
latter to the house of one Reynaldo Ochoa. When apprised of the purpose of
the visit, Julian, the son of Reynaldo, sought his father near Kathleen
Pawnshop and advised him about the four carabaos allegedly for sale at
Barangay Teddy, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
[4]

Appellant, together with Reynaldo and another carabao buyer, Joselito
Balbastro, boarded a motorcycle and proceeded to Barangay Teddy to check
the condition of the carabaos. It was the last time, however, that the two were
seen alive. When the latter failed to return the following day, a search, led by
Julian, was conducted. In the course of their inquiry, it was learned that the
motorcycle owned by Reynaldo was in the custody of the barangay captain of
Teddy, Jose Panganiban who told them that it was recovered from the Basit
Compound. Forthwith, they proceeded to the said compound and found
Reynaldo and Joselito lifeless, having sustained several mortally-inflicted stab
wounds in different parts of their bodies. The victims were divested of their
watches, rayban glasses, and a sum of money amounting to P37,000.00.
Police Major Roberto Rosales of the Camarines Norte Integrated National
Police testified that upon appellants arrest, the latter was apprised of his
constitutional rights. On June 25, 1990, in the presence of Atty. Augusto
Schneider, an investigation conducted by the police ensued and statements
therein were reduced to writing, signed and sworn to before Jose Panganiban
Municipal Mayor Arnie Arenal, who likewise inquired whether or not appellant
understood the consequences of his confession.
[5]

Appellant, on the other hand, proffered alibi as his defense and that the extra-
judicial confession was allegedly obtained through the use of physical
violence, coercion and intimidation.
He contended that on the day the incident in question occurred, he was with
his common law wife, Mercedes Sarical, at the house of a certain Felix
Rellolosa from 9:00 oclock a.m. to 4:00 oclock p.m. drinking liquor with some
friends.
[6]
He further tried to buttress his alibi by declaring that no one saw him
as a participant in the slaying nor was any property of the victims recovered
from him.
In a decision dated April 19, 1993, the trial court convicted appellant, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding accused EFREN JEREZ
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with double homicide,
he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua and to
indemnify and/or reimburse the heirs of the following:
To the Heirs of Reynaldo Ochoa
1. P 50,000.00 damage for death
2. 100,000.00 loss of earning capacity
(estimated income x life span)
3. 25,000.00 articles/money lost
(P20,000.00, watch, others)
4. 50,000.00 burial and other expenses
----------------
P225,000.00
To the Heirs of Joselito Balbastro
1. P 50,000.00 damage for death
2. 100,000.00 loss of earning capacity
(estimated income x life span)
3. 27,000.00 articles/money lost
(P17,000.00, watch, Ray-Ban)
4. 50,000.00 burial and other expenses
----------------
P227,000.00
But for insufficiency of evidence, Joselito Quijan and Zaldy Victa are hereby
acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
[7]

Appellant assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the extra-judicial
statement, stating that at the time of the taking thereof, he was assisted by an
ineffectual counsel who could not safeguard his constitutional rights and interests.
We affirm appellants conviction.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that for a confession to be admissible, it must
satisfy all four fundamental requirements: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the
confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
(3) the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in
writing.
[8]
Appellant argued that the first and second requirements were not complied
with. The records of the case, however, reveal otherwise.
It must be borne in mind that when appellant executed the extrajudicial confession,
it was done in the presence of his counsel, Atty. Schneider, and sworn to before Mayor
Arenal. If indeed his confession were obtained as a result of coercion and intimidation
by policemen at the police station, he could have informed the Mayor of the
maltreatment he suffered. Having failed to convince the authorities, the extra-judicial
confession voluntarily made by Jerez is admissible in evidence. The presumption,
therefore, of spontaneity and voluntariness stands unless the defense proves
otherwise.
[9]

Appellant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his right to have an
independent counsel of his own choice. The records show that at the time the
extrajudicial confession was executed, appellant disclosed to the police officers that his
counsel of choice was Atty. Freddie Venida but that the latter would not be available as
he is due to depart for Manila on the same day. Subsequently, Major Rosales
suggested that Atty. Schneider, supposedly the only lawyer available in Jose
Panganiban, appear as the counsel of appellant during investigation and the latter
answered in the affirmative, as shown from the excerpts of his extrajudicial confession,
thus:
PASUBALI:- Ginoong Jerez, ikaw ay kukunan namin ng malayang salaysay tungkol sa
isang usapin na aming sinisiyasat. Subalit, bago ang lahat, nais naming malaman mo
na ikaw ay may mga karapatan susog sa ating Saligang Batas. Ito ay ang mga
sumusunod:
Una: Ikaw ay may karapatang tumangging magbigay ng salaysay o kaya ay magbigay ng
salaysay, sapagkat ang anumang sasabihin mo sa pagtatanong na ito ay maaaring
gamitin laban sa iyo sa harap ng hukuman. Nauunawaan mo ito?
Sagot: Opo.
Ikalawa: Ikaw ay may karapatang ding kumuha ng isang manananggol na sarili mong pili
upang siyang maging gabay mo sa pagtatanong na ito. Nauunawaan mo ito?
Sagot: Opo.
Nais mo bang maging gabay mong manananggol ang ating kaharap na manananggol na si
Atty. Augusto B. Schneider?
Sagot: Opo.
Pangatlo: Nais din naming malaman mo at ng lahat na ikaw ay hindi namin
pinangangakuan, sinasaktan o tinatakot upang magbigay ng iyong sariling salaysay,
kundi, ito ay pawang katotohanang kusang loob mong sasabihin at
isasalaysay. Nauunawaan mo ito?
Sagot: Opo.
Tanong: Kung nauunawaan mong lahat itong mga pasubaling ito, ikaw ba ay nakahanda ng
magbigay ng iyong sariling malayang salaysay?
Sagot: Opo.
[10]

While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under custodial
investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer or (where the preferred lawyer is
unavailable as in the case at bar) is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the
accused has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for
another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the
accused where he never raised any objection against the formers appointment during
the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of
his statement before the swearing officer.
[11]
Thus, once the prosecution has shown that
there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation
advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the
burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and untrue. The burden is on the
accused to destroy this presumption. A confession is admissible until the accused
successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or
promise of reward or leniency.
[12]

Although appellant thereafter claimed that the confession he gave was made under
duress, there is, however, no evidence on record to support the same. In People v.
Villanueva, this Court declared that voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from
its language such that if upon its face the confession exhibits no sign of suspicious
circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details, which
could possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaniety and coherence
which psychologically cannot be associated with a mind to which violence and torture
have been applied, it may be considered voluntary.
[13]
A scrutiny of the sworn statement
discloses in detail relevant facts surrounding the commission of the offense charged
which the accused himself could only have known.
The Court, therefore, finds that appellants constitutional right to counsel was not
breached when he agreed to be represented by Atty. Schneider.
Appellant likewise argued that the trial court should have admitted his defense of
alibi considering that he was not properly identified and physical evidence like
properties, money, fingerprints were not discovered by the arresting officers.
[14]

This contention is simply unavailing in the case at bar. It is settled in this jurisdiction
that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the accused prove that he
was somewhere else when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he
could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or in its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission.
[15]
Appellant testified that on the day in question,
he was engaged in a drinking spree with his friends at the house of Felix Rellolosa at
Talobatib, Labo, Camarines Norte and he went home at 4:00 oclock
p.m. staying thereat for the rest of the night. Unfortunately, this version
of the appellant was contradicted by prosecution witnesses, Julian Ochoa and Gil
Villafranca, who positively identified him in court as the person scouting for carabao
buyers in the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte at around 9:00 oclock a.m. on May
23, 1990. Needless to say, where an accuseds alibi is established only by himself,
his relatives and friends, his denial of culpability should be accorded the strictest
scrutiny. They are necessarily suspect and cannot prevail over the testimonies of the
more credible witnesses for the prosecution.
[16]

The Court is, therefore, convinced that appellants culpability of the offense charged
was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The computation, however, of the damages awarded by the trial court for loss of
earning capacity fixing the same at P100,000.00 for each victim is
erroneous. The formula consistently used by the Supreme Court in determining life
expectancy is (2/3 x [80 - age of the victim at the time of death]).
[17]
Thus, the
award for loss of earning capacity for each victim shall be as follows:
Joselito Balbastro
P36,000.00 - gross annual income (P3,000.00 x 12 mos.)
Multiply: 30 - life expectancy (2/3 x 45 [80 - 35 age at time of
death])
P1,080,000.00 - total loss of earning capacity
Reynaldo Ochoa
P36,000.00 - gross annual income (P3,000.00 x 12 mos.)
Multiply: 21 - life expectancy (2/3 x 31 [80 - 49 age at time of
death])
P756,000.00 - total loss of earning capacity
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DISMISSED
and the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant EFREN JEREZ
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that appellant shall indemnify Joselito Balbastro and Reynaldo
Ochoa in the amount of P1,080,000.00 and P756,000.00, respectively, for losses
of their respective earning capacity. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.



PEOPLE V TALIMAN
[G. R. No. 109143. October 11, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PEDRO G.
TALIMAN, BASILIO M. BAYBAYAN, AMADO B. BELANO,
DANILO OBENIA and RUFINO VALERA, JR., accused,
PEDRO G. TALIMAN, BASILIO M. BAYBAYAN and AMADO B.
BELANO, accused-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
PARDO, J .:
The case is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Camarines Norte, Branch 40, Daet
[1]
finding accused Pedro Taliman, Basilio
Baybayan and Amado Belano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder,
sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua and ordering them to pay the
heirs of the victim, Renato Cuano, indemnity of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), funeral expenses of ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and
actual damages for unrealized income in the amount of one million forty six
thousand pesos (P1,046,000.00). The trial court also ordered
that alias warrants of arrest be issued against accused Danilo Obenia and
Rufino Valera, Jr. who are at large.
[2]

We state the facts.
The victim was Renato Cuano (hereinafter referred to as
Renato). Prosecution witness Ernesto Lacson (hereinafter referred to as
Lacson) was the uncle and employer of Renato, who was the caretaker of
his gravel and sand truck.
[3]

On July 21, 1990, Renato came to see Lacson and informed him that
armed and hooded persons
[4]
were asking for money amounting to six
thousand pesos (P6,000.00). The amount was reduced to six hundred pesos
(P600.00) and finally to two hundred pesos (P200.00).
[5]

On July 22, 1990, Lacson arrived home from church. His wife handed him
a letter delivered to her by a child. In the letter, purportedly members of the
N.P.A. demanded eight thousand pesos (P8,000.00) from him.
[6]
We quote the
letter:
[7]

Sayo TaTay Erning
Rebolusyonaryong pagbati sa yo/
sa inyo layunin ng sulat kong ito upang ipahiwatig sa yo na ang pakikibaka pang
kalawakang pakikibaka ay humihingi ng tulong sa iyo Tay Erning Siguro alam
mo na amg aming pakay lalo na sa aming pangangailangan pinansyal upang
magamit sa kilusan bigyan mo po kami ng halagang 8,000.00 at ito po ang aming
inaasahan okey inaasahan ko po at maghihintay kami doon sa kabilang ilog
papuntang nalisbitan dalhin mo ang jeep mo iyan ang aming palatandaan alas
4:00 p.m. July 22,90 inaasahan po namin ang iyong pakikipakaupira at
inaasahan po namin na walang ibang makakaalam.
Okey salamat sigi po maghihintay kami alas 4:00 mamaya.
MELCO GROUP
KA BONG
MABUHAY ANG N.P.A.
On the same day, at around eight oclock in the morning (8:00 a. m.),
Lacson instructed Renato to take his passenger jeep and to proceed to his
gold field in Nalisbitan to get his collectibles from the field. This was the last
time Lacson saw Renato alive.
[8]

Also on the same day, Lacson told his employee,
[9]
prosecution witness
Elizer Obregon (hereinafter referred to as Elizer), to go to the crossing of
Nalisbitan,
[10]
the place mentioned in the letter to investigate who the persons
demanding money were.
[11]

Elizer complied and reached the place at around five oclock in the
afternoon (5:00 p.m.) of the same day.
Upon reaching the place, Elizer saw Renato and spoke with him. In the
vicinity, Elizer saw accused Basilio Baybayan, Pedro Taliman and Amado
Belano. At that time, accused Sgt. Pedro Taliman and C1C Basilio M.
Baybayan were members of the Camarines Norte Constabulary/Integrated
National Police Command.
[12]
Elizer saw two other civilians in their company.
[13]

Elizer then saw accused Pedro Taliman and Basilio Baybayan take
Renato
[14]
to a hilltop, where he was guarded by accused who were
armed. Elizer heard one of the accused say that Renato must be taken as he
must be acting as a lookout (for Lacson).
[15]

Elizer then proceeded to Bagong Silang and reported to Lacson that
Renato was taken by accused Pedro Taliman, Basilio Baybayan and Amado
Belano.
A custodial investigation was conducted.
On July 23, 1990, Attorney Nicolas V. Pardo was mayor of Labo,
Camarines Norte. He went to the police station upon invitation of police
corporal Cereno to assist accused during their custodial
investigation.
[16]
Accused executed extra-judicial statements, confessing to the
commission of the crime.
It was during this custodial investigation that accused Basilio Baybayin
confessed to prosecution witness Sgt. Bonifacio Argarin that he participated in
the killing of Renato because Renato did not give them the money they were
demanding. This confession was given without the assistance of counsel and
was not reduced to writing.
[17]

On July 23, 1990, police authorities, accompanied by accused Basilio
Baybayan went to the place indicated in a sketch prepared by accused Pedro
Taliman.
[18]
It was in the place indicated that they found the cadaver of
Renato.
[19]
This was the same place or hilltop where prosecution witness Elizer
saw Renato being guarded.
[20]

On July 24, 1990, a medical officer of Labo, Camarines Norte issued a
certificate of death of Renato Lacson Cuao, stating as cause of death, the
following:
[21]

Immediate cause : a. Irreversible shock due to massive hemorrhages
Antecedent cause : b. Internal and External secondary to
Underlying cause : c. Gunshot wound and multiple stab wounds.
On December 18, 1990, Provincial Prosecutor Pascualita Duran-Cereno
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Norte an information for murder
against accused Pedro Taliman, Basilio Baybayan, Amado Belano, Danilo
Obenia and Rufino Valera, Jr. alleging:
That on or about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of July 22, 1990, at Crossing of sitio
Malisbitan, Brgy. Exiben, municipality of Labo, province of Camarines Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate intent to kill, with
treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, assault,
attack, stab and shoot one RENATO CUAO alias LAPOY, thereby inflicting upon
the latter gunshot wound and multiple stab wounds on the different parts of his body,
and which injuries were the proximate cause of the death of said Renato Cuano alias
Lapoy, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.

[22]

On February 26, 1991, accused Pedro G. Taliman, Basilio M. Baybayan
and Amado B. Belano were arraigned. They pleaded not guilty.
[23]
Accused
Danilo Obenia
[24]
and Rufino Valero, Jr. were not arraigned because they
remained at large.
On March 21, 1991, accused waived the pre-trial conference
[25]
and trial
ensued.
[26]

On May 29, 1992, the trial court declared the case submitted for
decision.
[27]

On September 24, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, the decretal
portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the accused Pedro Taliman, Basilio
Baybayan and Amado Delano are all found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder as charged, and are hereby each sentence (sic) to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua (or life imprisonment) (sic). The accused are furthermore jointly
and severally ordered to pay the heirs of the victim for his death the amount of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and for funeral expenses the amount of ten thousand
(P10,000.00) pesos, and considering that the deceased victim was only 27 years old
when killed and applying the formula (2/3 x [80-27] - life expectancy of the American
Table of Mortality, said deceased victim has still 44 years more to live were he not
killed by the accused. Therefore, since he was employed and receiving monthly salary
of P2,000.00 his unrealized income for the 44 more years of his life is P1,046,000.00
for which the accused likewise are jointly and severally ordered to pay.
Considering that accused Danilo Obenis and Rufino Valera, Jr., are still at large, let
an alias Warrant of Arrest be issued against them. In the meantime, let the records of
the case be archived and reinstated as soon as they are apprehended.
SO ORDERED.
[28]

On October 28, 1992, the decision was promulgated.
[29]
However, accused
Basilio M. Baybayan was not present,
[30]
despite due notice.
[31]

On October 30, 1992, the trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of
accused Basilio M. Baybayan.
[32]
The warrant of arrest was returned unserved
as he could not be found.
[33]

On November 11, 1992, accused Pedro G. Taliman filed a notice of
appeal with the trial court.
[34]

On May 26, 1993, we resolved to accept the appeal.
[35]

We state at the onset that while counsel for accused represents all five
accused in this appeal, the benefit of this appeal is only accorded accused-
appellants Pedro G. Taliman, Basilio M. Baybayan
[36]
and Amado B. Belano.
The other two accused Danilo Obenia and Rufino Valera, Jr., were not
arraigned.
[37]
Thus, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons.
The rule on trial in absentia cannot apply to Danilo Obenia and Rufino
Valera, Jr. In People v. Salas,
[38]
the Court declared that one of the requisites
for trial to proceed in absentia is that the accused had been arraigned.
Now, the merits.
Accused-appellants submit that the extra-judicial confessions on which the
trial court relied were inadmissible in evidence because they were obtained in
violation of their constitutional rights.
[39]
We agree with accused-appellants on
this point. The extra-judicial statements alone cannot be a basis for conviction.
Article III, Section 12 (1) of the Constitution provides:
Any person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel (underscoring ours).
Mayor Pardo cannot be considered as an independent counsel for
accused during their custodial investigation.
In People v. Culala,
[40]
we held that the extra-judicial confession of the
accused-appellant was inadmissible as he was assisted by the incumbent
municipal attorney. In People vs. Bandula,
[41]
we held that a municipal attorney
could not be an independent counsel as required by the Constitution. We
reasoned that as legal officer of the municipality, he provides legal assistance
and support to the mayor and the municipality in carrying out the delivery of
basic services to the people, including the maintenance of peace and order. It
is therefore seriously doubted whether he can effectively undertake the
defense of the accused without running into conflict of interests.
Besides, lawyers engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given
as proof of their probity and supposed independence, are suspects. In many
areas, even less obvious than that obtaining in the present case, the
relationship between lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be
symbiotic.
[42]

If in the aforecited cases, we disregarded the extra-judicial statements of
the accused, how much more must we do so now, given that it was the mayor
himself, and not just the provincial attorney, that assisted accused-appellants?
Even assuming that the right to counsel was orally waived during custodial
investigation,
[43]
still the defect was not cured. The Constitution expressly
provides that the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
[44]
This, accused-appellants did not do.
However, while we agree that the extra-judicial statements of the accused
are inadmissible in evidence, we find that there is still sufficient evidence to
convict.
While no one saw the actual killing of Renato, circumstantial evidence
proved its commission. Resort to circumstantial evidence is essential, when to
insist on direct testimony would set felons free.
[45]

Rule 133, Section 4 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
[46]

SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient - Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
In the present case, we find the following circumstances attendant:
First, Renato was last seen alive in the company of accused-
appellants. This was the substance of Elizers testimony. The trial court did
not find reason not to believe him. Neither do we.
It is the trial court and not this Court that had the opportunity to observe
Elizers manner of testifying, his furtive glances, his calmness, sighs or the
scant or full realization of his oath.
[47]
The trial courts assessment of the
credibility of witnesses is entitled to respect.
[48]

Second, accused-appellants, two other civilians, Renato and Elizer were
the only persons present at the Nalisbitan crossing, on July 22, 1990, at five
oclock in the afternoon. The place and the time are significant. This was the
very place, the very date and more or less the time of day indicated in the
letter of demand that Lacson received.
[49]
While Renatos and Elizers presence
in the area was explained, the presence of accused-appellants in that area
and during that crucial time can be only explained by the fact that accused-
appellants were the very ones demanding money from Lacson.
Facts or circumstances which are not only consistent with the guilt of the
accused but also inconsistent with his innocence, constitute evidence which,
in weight and probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect
upon the court.
[50]

Third, motive is apparent. Renato was first approached by accused-
appellants with an oral demand. Renato relayed the demand to Lacson.

[51]

The oral demand was followed up with a written demand.
[52]

When Renato passed through the Nalisbitan crossing, he was driving
Lacsons jeepney. This was the very jeepney indicated in the letter. The letter
instructed Lacson to bring money and to drive a specific jeepney to
Nalisbitan. Yet, when accused-appellants confronted Renato, he did not have
the money they demanded.
The fact that Renato was the driver of the jeepney indicated in the letter
can explain accused-appellants reason for killing him.
This conclusion is supported by Elizers testimony. We quote the pertinent
portions:
[53]

q. Now, you said you were requested by Mr. Lacson to proceed to that crossing of Nalisbitan
for you to see the person who was demanding money and identified themselves as
members of NPA. Were you able to go to that place?
a. Yes, sir.
q. What time was that?
a. I reached the place more or less 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of that same date July 22,
1990, sir.
q. What did you do when you reached that Nalisbitan Crossing?
a. Upon reaching the place at the crossing of Nalisbitan I have talked with Renato Cuao
who asked where I was going. I have not confided to him that I was doing surveillance
work on the person demanding money from Ernesto Lacson and so I proceeded. I
walked and upon reaching a point I have seen Basilio Naybayan in the company of two
(2) civilians and I continued with my walk and ahead of them I saw Mr. Taliman with
Belano and I did not notice that I was followed by Mr. Renato Cuao.
xxx
a. I saw, sir, Renato Cuao was taken by Mr. Taliman and Belano, sir.
xxx
q. Now, when you go back taking the same route what did you see if any?
a. When I was on my way back taking the same route my way was blocked by Belano and
Taliman accompanied by civilian and inquired from me whether I was the driver of the
jeep.
q. What was your answer if any?
a. I denied being the driver of the jeep, sir.
q. Why did you deny being the driver of the jeep?
a. I denied being the driver of the jeep because I saw already Renato Cuao on top of the hill
on a cut guarded by Baybayan with a ccivilian in their company, sir.
xxx
q. The question of this Court is why did you say that this Renato Cuao is being guarded?
a. They are guarding Renato Cuao, sir, because that is the person they have conferred with
to whom they have relayed the demand of money and he is the driver of the jeep. He is
the one who pretended to be the driver of the jeep.
xxx
q. Now, when Amado Belano asked you whether you know Renato Cuao and you denied it,
what more did Amado Belano ask you if any?
a. Amado Belano further made a statement that it is better for them to take along that man,
referring to Renato Cuao, because Renato Cuao might be acting as a lookout.
The letter
[54]
provided that no one else should know
[55]
about the demand.
Thus, Renatos presence would naturally alarm accused-appellants.
Motive is a key element when establishing guilt through circumstantial
evidence.
[56]
Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which
it may be reasonably inferred that the accused was the malefactor, motive
may be sufficient to support a conviction.
[57]

Fourth, Renatos corpse was discovered in the same place where he was
held and guarded by accused-appellants.
[58]

Fifth is the facts of death of Renato, which is the corpus delicti of the
crime.
However, while Renatos death in the hands of accused-appellants was
proven, we find that the manner of killing was not so evidenced. There was no
showing of treachery.
Treachery exists when the accused employs means, methods, and forms
which directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make.
[59]
Treachery, like the
crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
[60]

In the absence of proof as to how the killing was perpetrated, the crime
committed was homicide.
[61]

The imposable penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. In the absence
of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty is imposed in its
medium period.
[62]
The Indeterminate Sentence Law applies.
The trial court awarded the heirs of Renato Cuao one million forty six
thousand pesos (P1,046,000.00) as actual damages for unrealized
income. We delete this award as it is not supported by receipts. The testimony
of Renatos father as to how much Renato was earning at the time of his
death is self-serving and hearsay.
The trial courts award of actual damages for funeral expenses in the
amount of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos is likewise deleted. The claim is
not supported by any receipt. The rule is that every pecuniary loss must be
established by credible evidence before it may be awarded.
[63]

An award of moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) is proper.
[64]
Renatos father testified that because of his sons
death, he felt great pain and his wife suffered some sleepless nights and
cried for several days.
[65]

The trial courts award of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as civil
indemnity for wrongful death is affirmed. This can be awarded without need of
proof other than the death of the victim.
[66]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Norte,
Branch 40, Daet, dated September 24, 1992 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellants Pedro G. Taliman, Basilio M. Baybayab
and Amado B. Belano are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
HOMICIDE, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, and in the absence of any modifying circumstance, are sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Accused-appellants are jointly and severally ordered to pay the heirs of
Renato Cuao, moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) and civil indemnity in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00). The award of actual damages for funeral expenses and
unrealized income is DELETED.
The case is archived as to accused Danilo Obenis and Rufino Valera, Jr.,
until their arrest and submission to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.


LUMIQUED V EXEVEA
G.R. No. 117565 November 18, 1997
ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED (deceased), Regional Director, DAR CAR, Represented by
his Heirs, Francisca A. Lumiqued, May A. Lumiqued, Arlene A. Lumiqued and Richard
A. Lumiqued, petitioners,
vs.
Honorable APOLONIO G. EXEVEA, ERDOLFO V. BALAJADIA and FELIX T.
CABADING, ALL Members of Investigating Committee, created by DOJ Order No. 145
on May 30, 1992; HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, HON.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CHIEF Presidential Legal Adviser/Counsel; and HON.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the
President, and JEANNETTE OBAR-ZAMUDIO, Private Respondent, respondents.

ROMERO, J .:
Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an
administrative inquiry?
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed him
from that position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of
Lumiqued's death on May 19, 1994, his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and
mandamus, questioning such order.
The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier
and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR.
The first affidavit-complaint dated November 16, 1989,
1
charged Lumiqued with
malversation through falsification of official documents. From May to September 1989,
Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts of falsification by padding gasoline
receipts. He even submitted a vulcanizing shop receipt worth P550.00 for gasoline bought
from the shop, and another receipt for P660.00 for a single vulcanizing job. With the use of
falsified receipts, Lumiqued claimed and was reimbursed the sum of P44,172.46. Private
respondent added that Lumiqued seldom made field trips and preferred to stay in the office,
making it impossible for him to consume the nearly 120 liters of gasoline he claimed
everyday.
In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22, 1989,
2
private respondent accused
Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules and regulations, alleging that
during the months of April, May, July, August, September and October, 1989, he made
unliquidated cash advances in the total amount of P116,000.00. Lumiqued purportedly
defrauded the government "by deliberately concealing his unliquidated cash advances
through the falsification of accounting entries in order not to reflect on 'Cash advances of
other officials' under code 8-70-600 of accounting rules."
The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15, 1989,
3
charged Lumiqued with
oppression and harassment. According to private respondent, her two previous complaints
prompted Lumiqued to retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier without
just cause.
The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to the Department of Justice
(DOJ) for appropriate action. On May 20, 1992, Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo G.
Montenegro issued Department Order No. 145 creating a committee to investigate the
complaints against Lumiqued. The order appointed Regional State Prosecutor Apolinario
Exevea as committee chairman with City Prosecutor Erdolfo Balajadia and Provincial
Prosecutor Felix Cabading as members. They were mandated to conduct an investigation
within thirty days from receipt of the order, and to submit their report and recommendation
within fifteen days from its conclusion.
The investigating committee accordingly issued a subpoena directing Lumiqued to submit
his counter-affidavit on or before June 17, 1992. Lumiqued, however, filed instead an urgent
motion to defer submission of his counter-affidavit pending actual receipt of two of private
respondent's complaints. The committee granted the motion and gave him a five-day
extension.
In his counter-affidavit dated June 23, 1992,
4
Lumiqued alleged, inter alia, that the cases
were filed against him to extort money from innocent public servants like him, and were
initiated by private respondent in connivance with a certain Benedict Ballug of Tarlac and a
certain Benigno Aquino III. He claimed that the apparent weakness of the charge was
bolstered by private respondent's execution of an affidavit of desistance.
5

Lumiqued admitted that his average daily gasoline consumption was 108.45 liters. He
submitted, however, that such consumption was warranted as it was the aggregate
consumption of the five service vehicles issued under his name and intended for the use of
the Office of the Regional Director of the DAR. He added that the receipts which were
issued beyond his region were made in the course of his travels to Ifugao Province, the
DAR Central Office in Diliman, Quezon City, and Laguna, where he attended a seminar.
Because these receipts were merely turned over to him by drivers for reimbursement, it was
not his obligation but that of auditors and accountants to determine whether they were
falsified. He affixed his signature on the receipts only to signify that the same were validly
issued by the establishments concerned in order that official transactions of the DAR-CAR
could be carried out.
Explaining why a vulcanizing shop issued a gasoline receipt, Lumiqued said that he and his
companions were cruising along Santa Fe, Nueva Vizcaya on their way to Ifugao when their
service vehicle ran out of gas. Since it was almost midnight, they sought the help of the
owner of a vulcanizing shop who readily furnished them with the gasoline they needed. The
vulcanizing shop issued its own receipt so that they could reimburse the cost of the
gasoline. Domingo Lucero, the owner of said vulcanizing shop, corroborated this
explanation in an affidavit dated June 25, 1990.
6
With respect to the accusation that he
sought reimbursement in the amount of P660.00 for one vulcanizing job, Lumiqued
submitted that the amount was actually only P6.60. Any error committed in posting the
amount in the books of the Regional Office was not his personal error or accountability.
To refute private respondent's allegation that he violated COA rules and regulations in
incurring unliquidated cash advances in the amount of P116,000.00, Lumiqued presented a
certification
7
of DAR-CAR Administrative Officer Deogracias F. Almora that he had no
outstanding cash advances on record as of December 31, 1989.
In disputing the charges of oppression and harassment against him, Lumiqued contended
that private respondent was not terminated from the service but was merely relieved of her
duties due to her prolonged absences. While admitting that private respondent filed the
required applications for leave of absence, Lumiqued claimed that the exigency of the
service necessitated disapproval of her application for leave of absence. He allegedly
rejected her second application for leave of absence in view of her failure to file the same
immediately with the head office or upon her return to work. He also asserted that no
medical certificate supported her application for leave of absence.
In the same counter-affidavit, Lumiqued also claimed that private respondent was corrupt
and dishonest because a COA examination revealed that her cash accountabilities from
June 22 to November 23, 1989, were short by P30,406.87. Although private respondent
immediately returned the amount on January 18, 1990, the day following the completion of
the cash examination, Lumiqued asserted that she should be relieved from her duties and
assigned to jobs that would not require handling of cash and money matters.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but
Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its
resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee
granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself
had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution.
On August 12, 1992, Lumiqued filed an urgent motion for additional hearing,
8
alleging that
he suffered a stroke on July 10, 1992. The motion was forwarded to the Office of the State
Prosecutor apparently because
the investigation had already been terminated. In an order dated September 7, 1992,
9
State
Prosecutor Zoila C. Montero denied the motion, viz:
The medical certificate given show(s) that respondent was discharged from
the Sacred Heart Hospital on July 17, 1992, the date of the hearing, which
date was upon the request of respondent (Lumiqued). The records do not
disclose that respondent advised the Investigating committee of his
confinement and inability to attend despite his discharge, either by himself or
thru counsel. The records likewise do not show that efforts were exerted to
notify the Committee of respondent's condition on any reasonable date after
July 17, 1992. It is herein noted that as early as June 23, 1992, respondent
was already being assisted by counsel.
Moreover an evaluation of the counter-affidavit submitted reveal(s) the
sufficiency, completeness and thoroughness of the counter-affidavit together
with the documentary evidence annexed thereto, such that a judicious
determination of the case based on the pleadings submitted is already
possible.
Moreover, considering that the complaint-affidavit was filed as far back as
November 16, 1989 yet, justice can not be delayed much longer.
Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee rendered a report
dated July 31, 1992,
10
finding Lumiqued liable for all the charges against him. It made the
following findings:
After a thorough evaluation of the evidences (sic) submitted by the parties,
this committee finds the evidence submitted by the complainant sufficient to
establish the guilt of the respondent for Gross Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct.
That most of the gasoline receipts used by the respondent in claiming for the
reimbursement of his gasoline expenses were falsified is clearly established
by the 15 Certified Xerox Copies of the duplicate receipts (Annexes G-1 to G-
15) and the certifications issued by the different gasoline stations where the
respondent purchased gasoline. Annexes "G-1" to "G-15" show that the
actual average purchase made by the respondent is about 8.46 liters only at
a purchase price of P50.00, in contrast to the receipts used by the respondent
which reflects an average of 108.45 liters at a purchase price of P550.00.
Here, the greed of the respondent is made manifest by his act of claiming
reimbursements of more than 10 times the value of what he actually spends.
While only 15 of the gasoline receipts were ascertained to have been
falsified, the motive, the pattern and the scheme employed by the respondent
in defrauding the government has, nevertheless, been established.
That the gasoline receipts have been falsified was not rebutted by the
respondent. In fact, he had in effect admitted that he had been claiming for
the payment of an average consumption of 108.45 liters/day by justifying that
this was being used by the 4 vehicles issued to his office. Besides he also
admitted having signed the receipts.
Respondent's act in defrauding the government of a considerable sum of
money by falsifying receipts constitutes not only Dishonesty of a high degree
but also a criminal offense for Malversation through Falsification of Official
Documents.
This committee likewise finds that the respondent have
(sic) unliquidated cash advances in the year 1989 which is in violation of
established office and auditing rules. His cash advances totaling to about
P116,000.00 were properly documented. The requests for obligation of
allotments and the vouchers covering the amounts were all signed by him.
The mere certification issued by the Administrative Officer of the DAR-CAR
cannot therefore rebut these concrete evidences (sic).
On the third complaint, this committee likewise believes that the respondent's
act in relieving the complainant of her functions as a Regional Cashier on
December 1, 1989 was an act of harassment. It is noted that this was done
barely two weeks after the complainant filed charges against her (sic). The
recommendation of Jose G. Medina of the Commission on Audit came only
on May 11, 1990 or almost six months after the respondent's order relieving
the complainant was issued. His act in harassing a subordinate employee in
retaliation to a complaint she filed constitute(s) Gross Misconduct on the part
of the respondent who is a head of office.
The affidavits of Joseph In-uyay and Josefina Guting are of no help to the
respondent. In fact, this only show(s) that he is capable of giving bribes if only
to have the cases against him dismissed. He could not have given a certain
Benigno Aquino III the sum of P10,000.00 for any other purpose.
Accordingly, the investigating committee recommended Lumiqued's dismissal or removal
from office, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges against him.
Acting on the report and recommendation, former Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon
adopted the same in his Memorandum to President Fidel V. Ramos dated October 22,
1992. He added that the filing of the affidavit of desistance
11
would not prevent the
issuance of a resolution on the matter considering that what was at stake was not only "the
violation of complainant's (herein private respondent's) personal rights" but also "the
competence and fitness of the respondent (Lumiqued) to remain in public office." He opined
that, in fact, the evidence on record could call for "a punitive action against the respondent
on the initiative of the DAR."
On December 17, 1992, Lumiqued filed a motion for reconsideration of "the findings of the
Committee" with the DOJ.
12
Undersecretary Ramon S. Esguerra indorsed the motion to the
investigating committee.
13
In a letter dated April 1, 1993, the three-member investigating
committee informed Undersecretary Esguerra that the committee "had no more authority to
act on the same (motion for reconsideration) considering that the matter has already been
forwarded to the Office of the President" and that their authority under Department Order
No. 145 ceased when they transmitted their report to the
DOJ.
14
Concurring with this view, Undersecretary Esguerra informed Lumiqued that the
investigating committee could no longer act on his motion for reconsideration. He added
that the motion was also prematurely filed because the Office of the President (OP) had yet
to act on Secretary Drilon's recommendation.
15

On May 12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos himself issued Administrative Order No. 52
(A.O. No. 52),
16
finding Lumiqued administratively liable for dishonesty in the alteration of
fifteen gasoline receipts, and dismissing him from the service, with forfeiture of his
retirement and other benefits. Thus:
That the receipts were merely turned over to him by his drivers and that the
auditor and accountant of the DAR-CAR should be the ones to be held liable
is untenable. The receipts in question were signed by respondent for the
purpose of attesting that those receipts were validly issued by the commercial
establishments and were properly disbursed and used in the official business
for which it was intended.
This Office is not about to shift the blame for all these to the drivers employed
by the DAR-CAR as respondent would want us to do.
The OP, however, found that the charges of oppression and harassment, as well as that of
incurring unliquidated cash advances, were not satisfactorily established.
In a "petition for appeal"
17
addressed to President Ramos, Lumiqued prayed that A.O. No.
52 be reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his former position "with all the benefits
accorded to him by law and existing rules and regulations." This petition was basically
premised on the affidavit dated May 27, 1993, of a certain Dwight L. Lumiqued, a former
driver of the DAR-CAR, who confessed to having authored the falsification of gasoline
receipts and attested to petitioner Lumiqued's being an "honest man" who had no
"premonition" that the receipts he (Dwight) turned over to him were "altered."
18

Treating the "petition for appeal" as a motion for reconsideration of A.O. No. 52, the OP,
through Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, denied the same on
August 31, 1993.
Undaunted, Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration, alleging, among other
things, that he was denied the constitutional right to counsel during the hearing.
19
On May
19, 1994,
20
however, before his motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died. On September
28, 1994,
21
Secretary Quisumbing denied the second motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal of the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Committee, the October 22, 1992,
Memorandum of then Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52 issued by President Ramos,
and the orders of Secretary Quisumbing. In a nutshell, it prays for the "payment of
retirement benefits and other benefits accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued by law,
payable to his heirs; and the backwages from the period he was dismissed from service up
to the time of his death on May 19, 1994."
22

Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to
counsel during the hearing. They maintain that his right to counsel could not be waived
unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert that the
committee should have suspended the hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time
within which to secure a counsel of his own. If suspension was not possible, the committee
should have appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him.
These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The right to counsel, which cannot be
waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a
suspect or an accused during custodial investigation.
23
It is not an absolute right and may,
thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an
administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in
criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice.
Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The
investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the
purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the
complaints filed against him. The order issued by Acting Secretary of Justice Montenegro
states thus:
In the interest of the public service and pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, a
Committee to conduct the formal investigation of the administrative complaint for
oppression, dishonesty, disgraceful and immoral conduct, being notoriously undesirable
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service against Mr. ARSENIO P.
LUMIQUED, Regional Director, Department of Agrarian Reform, Cordillera Autonomous
Region, is hereby created . . .
24

As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a
criminal prosecution. This was even made more pronounced when, after finding
Lumiqued administratively liable, it hinted at the filing of a criminal case for
malversation through falsification of public documents in its report and
recommendation.
Petitioners' misconception on the nature of the investigation
25
conducted against Lumiqued
appears to have been engendered by the fact that the DOJ conducted it. While it is true that
under the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall "administer the criminal justice
system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of
the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional
system,
26
conducting criminal investigations is not its sole function. By its power to "perform
such other functions as may be provided by law,"
27
prosecutors may be called upon to
conduct administrative investigations. Accordingly, the investigating committee created by
Department Order No. 145 was duty-bound to conduct the administrative investigation in
accordance with the rules therefor.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative
inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and
of the respondent's capacity to represent himself, and no duty rests on such a body to
furnish the person being investigated with counsel.
28
In an administrative proceeding such
as the one that transpired below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of
engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of Section 32,
Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260
29
(otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and
Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on Discipline) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book
V of Executive Order No. 292
30
(otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987).
Excerpts from the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings attended by
Lumiqued
31
clearly show that he was confident of his capacity and so opted to represent
himself . Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because
such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit
disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of
maintaining the dignity of government service.
Furthermore, petitioners' reliance on Resolution No. 94-0521 of the Civil Service
Commission on the Uniform Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative Investigation
stating that a respondent in an administrative complaint must be "informed of his right to the
assistance of a counsel of his choice,"
32
is inappropriate. In the first place, this resolution is
applicable only to cases brought before the Civil Service Commission.
33
Secondly, said
resolution, which is dated January 25, 1994, took effect fifteen days following its publication
in a newspaper of general circulation,
34
much later than the July 1992 hearings of the
investigating committee created by Department Order No. 145. Thirdly, the same committee
was not remiss in the matter of reminding Lumiqued of his right to counsel. Thus, at the July
3, 1992, hearing, Lumiqued was repeatedly appraised of his option to secure the services of
counsel:
RSP EXEVEA:
This is an administrative case against Director Lumiqued.
Director Lumiqued is present. The complainant is present,
Janet Obar-Zamudio. Complainant has just been furnished with
a copy of the counter-affidavit of the respondent. Do you have
a counsel, Director?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
I did not bring anybody, Sir, because when I went to see him,
he told me, Sir, that he has already set a hearing, morning and
afternoon today.
RSP EXEVEA:
So, we will proceed with the hearing even without your
counsel? You are willing to proceed with the hearing even
without your counsel?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
Yes, I am confident. . .
CP BALAJADIA:
You are confident that you will be able to represent yourself?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
That is my concern.
35
(Emphasis supplied)
In the course of private respondent's damaging testimony, the investigating committee once
again reminded Lumiqued of his need for a counsel. Thus:
CP BALAJADIA:
Q. (To Director Lumiqued) You really wish to go through with
this even without your counsel?
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
A. I think so, Sir.
CP BALAJADIA:
Let us make it of record that we have been warning you to proceed with
the assistance of counsel but you said that you can take care of yourself
so we have no other alternative but to proceed.
36
(Emphasis supplied).
Thereafter, the following colloquies transpired:
CP BALAJADIA:
We will suspend in the meantime that we are waiting for the
supplemental affidavit you are going to present to us. Do you
have any request from the panel of investigators, Director
Lumiqued?
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
I was not able to bring a lawyer since the lawyer I requested to
assist me and was the one who prepared my counter-affidavit
is already engaged for a hearing and according to him he is
engaged for the whole month of July.
RSP EXEVEA:
We cannot wait . . .
CP BALAJADIA:
Why don't you engage the services of another counsel. The
charges against you are quite serious. We are not saying you
are guilty already. We are just apprehensive that you will go
through this investigation without a counsel. We would like you
to be protected legally in the course of this investigation. Why
don't you get the services of another counsel. There are plenty
here in Baguio . . .
DIRECTOR LUMIQUED:
I will try to see, Sir . . .
CP BALAJADIA:
Please select your date now, we are only given one month to
finish the investigation, Director Lumiqued.
RSP EXEVEA:
We will not entertain any postponement. With or without
counsel, we will proceed.
CP BALAJADIA:
Madam Witness, will you please submit the document which we asked
for and Director Lumiqued, if you have other witnesses, please bring
them but reduce their testimonies in affidavit form so that we can
expedite with the proceedings.
37

At the hearing scheduled for July 10, 1992, Lumiqued still did not avail of the services of
counsel. Pertinent excerpts from said hearing follow:
FISCAL BALAJADIA:
I notice also Mr. Chairman that the respondent is not being
represented by a counsel. The last time he was asked to invite
his lawyer in this investigation. May we know if he has a lawyer
to represent him in this investigation?
DIR. LUMIQUED:
There is none Sir because when I went to my lawyer, he told
me that he had set a case also at 9:30 in the other court and he
told me if there is a possibility of having this case postponed
anytime next week, probably Wednesday so we will have good
time (sic) of presenting the affidavit.
FISCAL BALAJADIA:
Are you moving for a postponement Director? May I throw this
to the panel. The charges in this case are quite serious and he
should be given a chance to the assistance of a
counsel/lawyer.
RSP EXEVEA:
And is (sic) appearing that the supplemental-affidavit has been
furnished him only now and this has several documents
attached to it so I think we could grant him one last
postponement considering that he has already asked for an
extension.
DIR. LUMIQUED:
Furthermore Sir, I am now being bothered by my heart ailment.
38

The hearing was reset to July 17, 1992, the date when Lumiqued was released from the
hospital. Prior to said date, however, Lumiqued did not inform the committee of his
confinement. Consequently because the hearing could not push through on said date, and
Lumiqued had already submitted his counter-affidavit, the committee decided to wind up the
proceedings. This did not mean, however, that Lumiqued was short-changed in his right to
due process.
Lumiqued, a Regional Director of a major department in the executive branch of the
government, graduated from the University of the Philippines (Los Baos) with the degree
of Bachelor of Science major in Agriculture, was a recipient of various scholarships and
grants, and underwent training seminars both here and abroad.
39
Hence, he could have
defended himself if need be, without the help of counsel, if truth were on his side. This,
apparently, was the thought he entertained during the hearings he was able to attend. In his
statement, "That is my concern," one could detect that it had been uttered testily, if not
exasperatedly, because of the doubt or skepticism implicit in the question, "You are
confident that you will be able to represent yourself?" despite his having positively asserted
earlier, "Yes, I am confident." He was obviously convinced that he could ably represent
himself. Beyond repeatedly reminding him that he could avail himself of counsel and as
often receiving the reply that he is confident of his ability to defend himself, the investigating
committee could not do more. One can lead a horse to water but cannot make him drink.
The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution
or the law. In Nera v.Auditor General,
40
the Court said:
. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such
representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of
lawyers; while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not
engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its
members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen
is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer
at his side.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to
explain one's side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and
perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through
pleadings.
41
An actual hearing is not always an indispensable aspect of due process.
42
As
long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course; he cannot
be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very
essence of due process.
43
Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a
person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of.
44
Lumiqued's appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured
whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee.
45

The constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property.
46
In the
early case of Cornejo v.Gabriel and Provincial Board of
Rizal
47
the Court held that a public office is not property within the sense of the
constitutional guarantee of due process of law for it is a public trust or agency. This
jurisprudential pronouncement has been enshrined in the 1987 Constitution under Article XI,
Section 1, on accountability of public officers, as follows:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives.
When the dispute concerns one's constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public
office is deemed analogous to property in a limited sense; hence, the right to due process
could rightfully be invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute. Of
equal weight is the countervailing mandate of the Constitution that all public officers and
employees must serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
48
In this case, it
has been clearly shown that Lumiqued did not live up to this constitutional precept.
The committee's findings pinning culpability for the charges of dishonesty and grave
misconduct upon Lumiqued were not, as shown above, fraught with procedural mischief. Its
conclusions were founded on the evidence presented and evaluated as facts. Well-settled
in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that findings of fact of administrative agencies must be
respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is
not overwhelming or
preponderant.
49
The quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative
cases is only substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
50

Consequently, the adoption by Secretary Drilon and the OP of the committee's
recommendation of dismissal may not in any way be deemed tainted with arbitrariness
amounting to grave abuse of discretion. Government officials are presumed to perform their
functions with regularity. Strong evidence is not necessary to rebut that
presumption,
51
which petitioners have not successfully disputed in the instant case.
Dishonesty is a grave offense penalized by dismissal under Section 23 of Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. Under Section 9
of the same Rule, the penalty of dismissal carries with it "cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture
of leave credits and retirement benefits, and the disqualification for reemployment in the
government service." The instant petition, which is aimed primarily at the "payment of
retirement benefits and other benefits," plus back wages from the time of Lumiqued's
dismissal until his demise, must, therefore, fail.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED and
Administrative Order no. 52 of the Office of the President is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.


PEOPLE V JIMENEZ
G.R. No. 82604 December 10, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MARCOS P. JIMENEZ and ROBERT JIMENEZ, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Sisenando Y. Famoso for accused-appellants.

NARVASA, J .:p
The failure of the police authorities to observe the constitutional safeguards governing
custodial interrogation impels rejection of the extrajudicial confession ascribed to one of the
appellants and consequent reversal of the Trial Court's verdict of conviction chiefly based
thereon.
On August 13, 1985 the pohce officers at the Ginatilan, Cebu station received a report that
one Pelagio Jimenez had been found dead at barangay Guiwanon, "below the cliff near
the balite tree." Without much loss of time, Pat. Reynaldo Cinco and other policemen went
to the scene to conduct an investigation. The Municipal Circuit Judge of Ginatilan, Hon.
Palmacio Calderon, accompanied them, as did Dr. Trifina M. Ferraren. They came upon the
lifeless body of Pelagio Jimenez at the place indicated, with stab and lacerated wounds on
the head and leg; and apparently the corpse was beginning to decompose since there were
maggots crawling over the face, arms, hands and feet.
The police investigators learned that the deceased Pelagio Jimenez had been living
separately from his family; that in the early morning of August 12, 1985, Marcos Jimenez,
who was wont to spend the night at his father's house, told his mother that Pelagio Jimenez
had not come home the previous night; that inquiries were immediately made about Pelagio
and a search for him undertaken by his relatives and friends; that although the search
lasted the whole day and proceeded well into the night of the 12th, it proved unsuccessful,
and it was not until the morning of the following day, August 13, 1985, that Pelagio Jimenez
was finally found, murdered, the searchers having been led to the place where he lay by the
foul already being exuded by his corpse.
The investigators also learned from the persons that interviewed of other circumstances that
drew their suspicion to the sons of Pelagio Jimenez, Marcos and Robert, viz.: that was a
trail of drops of dried blood leading from the porch (pantawan) of the dead person's
residence to the cliff by balite tree where he was ultimately found; that at some the point the
trail of blood was interrupted by a patch of freshly plowed soil, and Robert Jimenez said that
it was he who had plowed that part of the field and before doing so, had indeed noticed
some blood on the ground but had attached no significance to it; that midway between
Pelagio's house and the cliff, there we signs as of a body having been dragged through
some bushes; that the brothers, Marcos and Robert Jimenez, were seen by neighbors
bathing at the artesian well in that place at midnight, "as if washing away stains of blood;"
and that Pelagio Jimenez often had violent quarrels with his children, and had been known
to complain that there were even occasions when he had been boxed and hit by his
children, particularly Marcos and Robert, who had been accused of surreptitiously selling
copra belonging to their father's brother, a Dr. Mario Jimenez.
On the 16th of September, 1985, the police invited Pelagio's widow, Albina Jimenez, and
her sons, Marcos and Robert Jimenez, for questioning about their father's killing. The
circumstances attendant upon and subsequent to the questioning Marcos Jimenez are
succinctly narrated in the People's brief as follows:
... At first, ... (Marcos) denied any participation on the of his father. However,
after Lt. Bancog confronted Marcos Jimenez of his observations during the
ocular inspection (id. [TSN, May 26, 1986], p. 23) the latter admitted that it
was his brother Roberto who hacked their father on the right leg. Thereafter,
they (Marcos and Roberto) carried their father near the balite tree by the cliff
and left him there (id., p. 30). Initially, Lt. Bancog took down appellant's
confession in a piece of paper (Exh."C") (id., p. 24; Tsn, December 19, 1985,
p. 7). Thereafter, Lt. Bancog gave the draft (Exh. "C") to Pat. Cavalida to
enable the latter to type the same (id., p. 47).
Pat. Cavalida continued the investigation conducted by Lt. Bancog (Tsn,
March 6, 1986, p. 8) in the presence of Ex-Judge Jabagat who acted as
counsel for appellant Marcos Jimenez (id., pp. 10-11; Tsn, May 26, 1986, p.
22). He typed appellant's confession (Exh. "B") which was contained in the
draft (Exh. "C") prepared by Lt. Bancog while at the same time, injecting
some questions of his own (ibid., pp. 4-5). Appellant was unable to sign his
confession (Exh. "B") since Judge Calderon, before whom the confession
was supposed to be sworn to and signed, had earlier left (id., p. 6). Hence,
appellant agreed to come back the next day to sign his statement (Exh. "B")
(id., p. 7).
The next day, appellant Marcos Jimenez failed to come back as promised,
and the authorities were unsuccessful in fetching him since they were
informed that appellant had left for Cebu City (id., p. 7). Marcos Jimenez
returned thereafter, but refused to sign his statement (Exh. "B") (id., p. 8).
At about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of August 16, 1985 (Tsn, March 7, 1987,
p. 4) Manolita Castaares, a relative of appellants, overheard a conversation
between appellant Marcos Jimenez and his mother Albina, while they were
on their way toward the house of Dr. Jimenez (ibid). She heard Albina tell
Marcos that the way he answered the questions during the examination
before the authorities were wrong. Marcos replied. "It is just the same
because if I don't admit, you will be the one pressured" (id., pp. 4-5). Albina
remarked, "You should have denied about the circumstances why it
happened like that"(id., p. 5). Marcos answered, "(I)t is just the same. Had
somebody seen the one mentioned in the affidavit when I admitted?" (id.).
Lt. Bancog asked a policeman to invite ex-Judge Jabagat so that, to use her own words,
she could "assist the accused whose confession has been taken before the Office of the
Chief of Police." According to Judge Jabagat, when she arrived at the station. what
happened was, again in her own language, Marcos Jimenez
... was asked about the written confession, and it was read to him. He was
(also) apprise (sic.) of his Constitutional right, and I ask him about the
contains (sic) of his written confession, I said to him "are these true?" and he
said, Yes, alright I said, you sign. I am here to assist you, but if you think you
are hesitant to sign it, you think it over and ask me (for) time, (saying) I would
like to confer with my uncle Engineer Marcos Jimenez and that we summon
(sic) his uncle who was just around, and after that, he told me he was not
going to sign the confession and I ask (sic) him, if you will not sign, you have
the privilege not to sign, if you don't like to sign its' (sic) just OK.
Subsequently, an information dated October 22, 1985 was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of
Cebu with the Regional Trial Court accusing Pelagio's widow, Albina Jimenez, and her son
by Pelagio, Marcos, Robert, and Wilkins, of the felony of parricide in that
. . . on or about August 11, 1985 at around 8'clock P.M. a barangay
Guiwanon, Ginatilan, Cebu, ... said accused, confederating together and
helping one another, with intent to kill and during night time, and without just
cause, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and hack Pelagio Jimenez ... with bolo, inflicting upon the said Pelagio
Jimenez mortal injuries on varoius parts of his body, that soon caused his
death thereafter.
All the accused entered a plea of innocent when arraigned. At the trial, the prosecution
presented eight (8) witnesses whose evidence established substantially the facts above
summarized. The four defendants took the witness stand and gave evidence in their behalf.
They all maintained their innocence of the crime.
Marcos Jimenez' testimony, substantially corroborated by his brother, Robert, is outlined by
the Trial Court as follows:
... that on August 11, 1985, he was at the house of his uncle, Dr Marcos
Jimenez. His mother (Albina) and his two brothers, (Robert & Wilkins) were
also there. He claims that they were overseeing the house of their uncle. At
about 6. P.M. of that day, his father came an asked for dry coconut leaves to
light his way in going home. At past P.M., he went home while the rest stayed
behind. When he arrived home, he did not see his father. He slept until the
following morning. When he still did not see his father the following morning,
he went back to his uncle's house to inform his mother and brothers that their
father did not arrive home that night. So, they agreed to look for him. They
looked for him in the bushes and towards the sea the whole day and the
following day until the body was found near the cliff. It was then that he went
to the poblacion to notify the authorities about the death of his father.
Continuing, ... (Marcos) admitted having been investigated by Lt. Bancog on
August 16. They were only two in the room. He likewise admitted that Judge
Jabagat arrived but only after his statement has been typed by Pat. Cavalida.
He admitted that Lt. Bancog wrote down what he stated, and this handwritten
statement was handed to Pat. Cavalida. ... (He also) admitted the existence
of blood near the house and plenty of it in the bushes ... ; the existence of
blood in the plowed area ... (and) it was he and Robert who plowed the same.
In the matter of his confession (Exh. "B"), he claims that what is stated there
is in accordance with what his uncle, Marcos Jimenez, wanted him to tell; that
he was pressured to admit the crime under threat of punishment.
The defense rested its case on July 21, 1986, at which time the Trial Court gave the parties
thirty (30) days "from receipt of the stenographic notes within which to submit simultaneous
memoranda." The Court, declaring that it was "cognizant of the fact that the accused had
been incarcerated and detained for almost one year"' also issued the following Order
absolving, for lack of proof, Albina Jimenez and her son, Wilkins, from liability under the
indictment, viz.:
The court after appreciating all the facts and the law in this case, finds no
evidence whether direct or circumstantial that may tend to establish the guilt
of two of the accused in this case, namely: Albina Jimenez and Wilkins
Jimenez. Considering the rule that judgment of conviction should be imposed
only after the guilt of the accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt,
the said two accused should be acquitted.
Wherefore, without prejudice to an extended decision, the Court finds the said
two (2) accused: Albina Jimenez and Wilkins Jimenez NOT GUILTY of the
charge against them. Accordingly, they are hereby ordered released from
custody unless there are other causes which would warrant their further
detention.
This Order serves as a partial decision in this case. The Court, aware of the
long detention suffered by the said accused, hereby orders the promulgation
of this judgment upon the two accused immediately in open Court.
Then on December 19, 1986, the Trial Court promulgated its Decision (dated November 21,
1986) finding "the defendants Marcos Jimenez and Robert Jimenez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide as defined and penalized under Article 246 of the
Revised Penal Code," and condemning "the said defendants to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua." The Trial Court stressed that "the revelations ... in the confession all
tally with the evidences adduced during the trial, viz.: the hacking by Robert of his father
with a bolo is confirmed by the doctor who examined the cadaver; the carrying of the body
from the house to the cliff is confirmed by the evidences of the bloodstains found along the
way from the house to the cliff and of the signs of a body being dragged along the bushes."
The Court then made the following legal pronouncements:
The Court agrees with the ... prosecution that a confession, although
unsigned and/or involuntarily given, is admissible an evidence if in
consequence of such confession facts are discovered which confirm it. As
correctly pointed out, jurisprudence sustains the admission of such an
involuntary confession (People v. Fontanilla [CA] O.G. 1313), and where
details as described in such confession is corroborated by
evidence aliunde which dovetails with the essential fact contained in the
confession (People v. Elizaga, 23 SCRA 449).
The evidence, likewise, show conspiracy on the part of both accused, Marcos
and Robert. While an extra-judicial confession is under certain conditions,
admissible only as against the person made it and not as against his co-
defendants, it becomes admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts
that stand to establish the guilt his co-defendants (People v. Simbajon, et al.,
L-18073-75, Sept. 20, 1965).
From this judgment the defendants have taken an appeal this Court and here ascribe the
following errors to the Trial Court, to wit:
1) not giving credit to the claim of accused Marcos Jimenez that what he stated in the
alleged confession is in accordance with what his uncle, Marcos Jimenez, wanted him to tell
and that he was pressured to admit the crime under threat of punishment;
2) not giving credence to the testimony of accused Robert Jimenez to the effect that he had
nothing to do with the death of his father ...;
3) holding that Pelagio Jimenez was found in the house near the cliff on August 13, 1985;
4) giving credence to the testimony of ex-Judge Pacita Jabagat to the effect that she was in
the office of the Station Commander of Ginatilan, Cebu, in the afternoon of August 16, 1985
and she was then the counsel of accused Marcos Jimenez for the purpose of the
confession and that she read the confession to him and when asked whether he admitted to
be true all the allegations as stated in the confession, confirmed that everything is true;
5) holding that the evidence shows conspiracy on the part of both accused ... ; and
6) finding and holding both accused ... guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
parricide by mere circumstantial evidence, there being no eyewitness available.
The Constitution explicitly declares that a person being investigated by the police as a
suspect in an offense has the right, among others, "to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice" and if he "cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one;" and that said right "cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel. 1 The lawyer who assists the suspect under custodial investigation
should be of the latter's own choice, not one foisted on him by the police investigators or
other parties. In this case, former Judge Jabagat was evidently not of Marcos Jimenez' own
choice; she was the police officers' choice; she did not ask Marcos if he was willing to have
her represent him; she just told him: "I am here because I was summon(ed) to assist you
and I am going to assist you." This is not the mode of solicitation of legal assistance
contemplated by the Constitution.
In one case, the confession of an accused was rejected there being no showing that the
lawyer of the Citizens' Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) called by the National Bureau of
Investigation to assist the accused was his counsel of choice. 2 In another case, the
confession given during custodial investigation was invalidated where it appeared that the
lawyers called to be present at the interrogation were members of the police organization
investigating the suspects and did not actively assist and advise them, being there merely to
give a semblance of legality to the proceedings. 3 In still another case, the confession of the
defendant was disregarded upon a showing that he had been assisted by an assistant fiscal
(public prosecutor), who "cannot exercise the function of defense counsel even during
custodial investigation," and to allow such a practice "would render illusory the protection
given to the accused." 4
Furthermore, the evidence discloses that Judge Jabagat was not present at the critical time
that interrogation of Marcos Jimenez by the police was actually taking place. She came only
after the questioning had been completed, and the handwritten record of Marcos Jimenez'
answers already typewritten; and all she did was to show the typewritten document to
Marcos and ask him if he had voluntarily given the statements therein contained. This is far
from being even substantial compliance with the constitutional duty of police investigators
during custodial interrogation, supra. It follows that neither the handwritten summary of
Marcos Jimenez' answers made by two investigating officers nor the typewritten statement
based thereon is admissible.
The typewritten confession is, in any event, unsigned, as are the handwritten notes from
which the former was derived. The confession was in fact expressly rejected by Marcos
Jimenez as riot reflective of his own perceptions and recollection, but as containing only
what his uncle, Marcos Jimenez, had instructed him to tell the police "under threat of
punishment." Hence. the supposed waiver made therein of his constitutional right to counsel
of his own choice is void.
The interrogation of Marcos Jimenez having been conducted without the assistance of
counsel, and no valid waiver of said right to Counsel having been made, not only the
confession but also any admission obtained in the course thereof are inadmissible against
Marcos Jimenez. This, too, is the explicit mandate of the Constitution: any confession or
admission obtained in violation among others of the rights guaranteed in custodial
investigations shall be inadmissible in evidence against the person making the confession
or admission. This is so even if it be shown that the statements attributed to the accused
were voluntarily made, or are afterwards confirmed to be true by external circumstances.
Equally obvious is that any confession or admission ascribed to Marcos Jimenez in the
premises is inadmissible against his brother, his co-accused, Robert Jimenez, not only
because obtained in violation of the Constitution and therefore void, but also because of the
familiar principle of res inter alios acta. 5 "The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another; " 6 the confession of an accused is admissible only
against him, but not against his co-defendants. 7
Now, without the confession or the admissions imputed to Marcos Jimenez, the rest of the
evidence of the prosecution is inadequate to overcome the presumption of innocence raised
by the fundamental law in favor of both the accused.
For instance, proof of the presence of the appellants at or near the place of the commission
of the crime is innocuous. They were after all children of the deceased, one of whom usually
slept in the same house as the latter. And the fact that there might have been some
animosity and quarrels between the deceased, on the one hand, and his wife and children,
on the other, would indicate at the most that the latter might have reason to wish him ill, but
would not be proof that they actually attacked and killed him. Furthermore, the witnesses
who gave evidence of said quarrels were close relatives of the deceased, i.e., his brothers,
a sister-in-law, his cousins, who were not themselves on good terms with at least one of the
appellants. Eng. Marcos Jimenez, brother of the victim, was the one who requested Lt.
Bancog, the Police Chief of another town, to investigate close members of the victim's
family on the basis, according to him of "rumors" and "gossips" 8 circulating in the
barrio. Another brother of the victim, Dr. Mario Jimenez, who together with Eng. Jimenez,
testified as to previous quarrels between the deceased and appellant, had a previous
misunderstanding with appellants concerning the latter's unauthorized sale of the former's
copra. Jacinta Jimenez who testified to a recent quarrel between the victim and his wife and
sons Marcos and Robert, is the wife of Eng. Marcos Jimenez. Another relative of the
deceased, Manolita Castaares, testified to having heard a conversation between the
victim's wife Albina and the latter's son Marcos wherein the mother chided her son for giving
wrong answers during the investigation.
The information gathered by the police to the effect that Marcos and Robert Jimenez had
been seen by neighbors bathing at the artesian well at midnight of the day of the crime,
ostensibly washing away blood from their bodies and clothing, is patently speculative and
arrant hearsay. Not one of the persons who had supposedly seen the appellants washing
themselves ever took the witness stand to affirm this.
It is not correct to say, as the Trial Court does in its judgment under review, that the
appellants had tried to cover up the commission of the crime by not reporting it immediately
to the authorities and by attempting, during the search for the deceased, to prevent others
from going to the precise spot where the slain man was eventually found. That the
appellants did not immediately notify the authorities that Pelagio Jimenez was missing
cannot be taken as an inculpatory circumstance against them. The truth is that the victim's
family and neighbors first looked everywhere for him, and when he was finally found after a
day's search, Marcos Jimenez forthwith reported his father's death to the police. The truth
is, too, that as disclosed by the evidence, Robert Jimenez had indeed conducted a search
for his father in the vicinity of the cliff near the balite tree where his father's body was found
the following day. Marcos Jimenez knew this, and this is why he afterwards told other
persons involved in the search not to proceed to that place any more. It bears stressing that
the area covered by the search has been described as a "vast" area, and there were many
large boulders and thick bushes about the balite tree. This might explain why the corpse
could not be immediately located. In fact, were it not for the foul odor emanating from the
direction of the balite tree, the searchers would not have proceeded thereto as the place
was so secluded.
In fine, all the evidence considered, it appears that the prosecution has failed to
demonstrate the guilt of the appellants the crime with which they are charged beyond
reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Trial Court dated November 21, 1986 is REVERSED,
and the appellants, Marcos P. Jimenez and Robert Jimenez, are ACQUITTED, with
costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.


PEOPLE V LUCERO
G.R. No. 97936 May 29, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ALEJANDRO LUCERO y CORTEL, accused-appellant.

PUNO, J .:
If the Constitution has any value, it is because it stands up for those who cannot stand up
for themselves. Thus, it protected those under custodial investigation with the all-important
right to counsel. We hold that the right to counsel cannot be diluted without tampering the
scales of justice. For denial of his right to counsel, we acquit accused-appellant.
Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and
John Doe were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. The Information against
them reads:
That on or about the 7th day of May, 1988, in Quezon City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another , did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob one DR. DEMETRIO Z.
MADRID, in the manner as follows: on the date and in the place
aforementioned, the said accused, one armed with handgun, pursuant to their
conspiracy blocked the way of the said complainant who was on board a
Mercedez Benz crusing along Road 14 near (the) corner (of) Mindanao
Avenue, Pag-asa, this City, and did then and there, by means of violence and
intimidation against persons, take, rob and carry away his cash money
amounting to P6,600.00; one gold necklace with cross pendant, 7 karat,
worth P45,000.00; one (1) gold Rolex watch worth P155,000.00; one (1) 3
karat gold ring worth P80,000.00; one 2 karat gold ring, domino style, worth
P27,000.00; one (1) solid gold bracelet worth 363,600.00, Philippine
Currency, belonging to said DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party in the total amount aforementioned; that
on the occasion of the robbery and pursuant to their conspiracy, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill, and taking advantage the(ir) superior
strength, with the use of handgun, shot LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA, a
driver of the said offended party, thus inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wounds which resulted to the insta(n)taneous death of the said LORENZO
BERNALES y ALERIA, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said
LORENZO BERNALEZ y ALERIA in such amount as may be awarded to
them under the provisions of the Civil Code.
Contrary to law.
1

Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended. The others
remained at large.
Trial proceeded only as against the three.
The evidence on record shows that on May 6, 1988, private complainant DR. DEMETRIO Z.
MADRID spent the night at his boarding house, located at #35 Ilocos Norte Street, Bago-
Bantay, Quezon City. He wanted to return that night to his residence at Project 6, Quezon
City. However, his driver, Lorenzo Bernales, advised him not to leave that night for Bernales
overheard that the group of Balbino and Bienvenido Echavez would rob him on his way
home. He heeded the advice.
It was around 7:00 a.m., the next day, that Dr. Madrid again asked his driver to bring him to
his main residence in Project 6, Quezon City. While traversing Road 14, a gray-reddish car
overtook the Mercedes Benz he was riding and blocked their way. Three (3) men swiftly
alighted from the car blocking them and barged into his Benz. The first grabbed the driver's
seat and pushed his driver to the other side of the seat. The second occupied the right side
of his driver. The third sat beside Dr. Madrid at the back sent and punched him.
Simultaneously, the man at the right side of his driver pulled out his gun and announced a
hold-up.
2

The man beside Dr. Madrid divested him of the following: a gold Rolex watch, studded with
diamonds, worth P155,000.00, a three (3) carat diamond ring worth P80,000.00, another
two (2) carat domino-style ring, surrounded with diamonds worth P27,000.00, a necklace
worth P27,000.00, a bracelet worth P50,000.00, and his wallet containing P6,600.00.
3

After driving them around the area for a couple of hours, the malefactors stopped his car
and alighted. The worst came. The man at the right side of his driver shot the latter at the
chest before fleeing. Dr. Madrid and his driver were rushed by concerned citizens to the
Veterans Memorial Hospital. Two hours later, his driver died of hemorrhage as a result of
the gunshot wound he sustained.
4
Dr. Madrid survived.
5
He reported the incident to the
Quezon City police. When no action was taken on his case, he filed his complaint with the
Special Operations Group of the Central Intelligence Service (CIS).
6

Two months later, the CIS efforts paid-off. On July 23, 1988, the Special Operations Group
headed by Capt. Raul Boac, after a surveillance of the suspects, interrogated Bienvenido
Echavez in Camp Crame. Two days later, they apprehended Balbino Echavez and
Alejandro Lucero. They turned them over to the Investigation Department of the CIS.
7

Pfc. Alberto Pursal was assigned to conduct the investigation of the suspects. He declared
that even before the investigation started, Lucero verbally admitted his participation in the
crime and that he was the one who shot Bernales, the driver of Dr. Madrid.
8

In any event, Pfc. Pursal went thru the motions of investigation. He informed Lucero of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. When Lucero told him that he had no
lawyer, Pursal informed that CIS Legal Department about Lucero's need for a lawyer.
9
In
due time, Atty. Diosdado Peralta appeared at the investigator's office at around 9:00 p.m.
He identified himself as the lawyer who was requested to assist Lucero and inquired about
the latter's whereabouts. He was then directed to where Lucero was.
Atty. Peralta conferred with Lucero. He also apprised Lucero of his constitutional rights. He
explained to Lucero that he has the right to remain silent, that he is not obliged to give any
statement to the investigators, and that even if he has already given a statement, he may
refuse to sign it. He observed no reaction from Lucero. Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered
the impression that Lucero understood his advice.
Thereafter, the CIS investigator began taking down Lucero's statement. When the
investigator started asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend the wake of
his friend, Capt. Emilio Dacanay, at Fort Bonifacio. He gave word that in case of need, he
could be reached at his residence.
The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by two (2) CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house.
The extrajudicial statement of Lucero (Exhibit "C"), was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was
already signed by Lucero. In the presence of the two (2) CIS agents, Atty. Peralta examined
Exhibit "C" and explained to Lucero its Legal implications. He asked Lucero whether he
gave the statements voluntarily. Lucero replied in the affirmative. Atty. Peralta then signed
Exhibit "C".
10

The three (3) accused denied complicity in the in the crime charged.
Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. He testified that on May 7, 1988, he was at his house in
Caloocan City. He woke up at 6:30 a.m., stayed at his house the whole day repairing the
upholstery of a customer's chair. He was then with his cousin Marcelino Seneta and his wife
Mylen Lucero. He worked until 5 p.m. that day.
Lucero was apprehended on July 25, 1988, more than two (2) months after the commission
of the crime. He said he was surprised when several unidentified men accosted him while
he was walking towards his house. They chased him, handcuffed and blindfolded him and
pushed him into a jeep. He was He was blindfolded the whole night and did not know where
he was taken. The men turned out to be police officers. Later, he identified one of the men
to be Capt. Boak, head of the CIS Special Operations Group.
The next day, he learned he was in Camp Crame. He claimed that he was tortured. He was
not informed of the offense for which he was being investigated. Neither did they reveal the
identity of the complainant. A couple of days lapsed and a CIS agent brought him to a clinic
inside Camp Crame. The doctor saw the contusions on his body. He advised that he be
treated. The CIS agent refused and they left the clinic.
Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers and the other accused in this
case. He said he only met Dr. Madrid at the CIS Office during the police line-up. He was
made to line-up four (4) times before Dr. Madrid finally identified him on the fourth time.
Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession (Exhibit "C")
11
under duress. He
denied engaging the services of Atty. Peralta. He likewise confirmed that Atty. Peralta was
not present during his actual custodial interrogation.
12

After trial, the court a quo acquitted the Echavez brothers for insufficient evidence. The trial
court, however, convicted accused Lucero. The dispositive portion of the Decision
13
reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The accused brothers BIENVENIDO ECHAVEZ y VALIDA and BALBINO
ECHAVEZ y VALIDA are hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence;
and
2. Accused ALEJANDRO LUCERO y CORTEL is hereby found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation of Robbery with
Homicide. Alejandro Lucero is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment
term of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
On the civil aspect, Alejandro Lucero is hereby ordered a) to pay the heirs of
the deceased victim Lorenzo Bernales y Aleria the sum of P30,000.00 as
actual damages and P50,000.00 as moral damages for the mental anguish
suffered by his family; and b) to pay Dr. Demetrio Z. Madrid the sum of
P363,600.00 representing the cash money, and money value of the jewelries
and wristwatch he lost due to the robbery at bar.
SO ORDERED.
14

Hence this appeal by Lucero, raising the following assignments of error:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE
EVIDENCES (SIC) OF THE PROSECUTION WHICH WERE
INCONSISTENT, NOT CREDIBLE, UNRELIABLE, DOUBTFUL AND
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S CONVICTION
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE ALLEGED CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT CONSPIRACY WAS NOT PROVEN IN THIS
CASE.
3. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED ON THE BASIS OF HIS ALLEGED
EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION (MADE IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION)
WHICH WAS OBTAINED THRU FORCE, VIOLENCE AND WITHOUT THE
PRESENCE OF COUNSEL OF HIS OWN CHOICE OR ENGAGED BY ANY
PERSON ON HIS BEHALF OR APPOINTED BY THE LOWER COURT AND
THEREFORE SUFFERED CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES.
4 THAT THE LOWER ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
THE CRIME CHARGED INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED WITH CERTITUDE BY
THE PROSECUTION.
5. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED PRIMARILY ON THE BASIS OF
THE WEAKNESS OF HIS DEFENSE OF ALIBI AND NOT ON THE
STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE; AND INSPITE OF THE
LACK OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
6. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT AND NOT ACQUITTING HIM LIKE HIS CO-ACCUSED AND
ALLEGED CO-CONSPIRATORS [THE ECHAVEZ BROTHERS] OF THE
CRIME CHARGED.
We find the appeal meritorious.
The conviction of appellant rests on two (2) facts: (a) his positive identification by the
complainant, and (b) his extra-judicial confession admitting his participation in the crime. We
find that the evidence proving these facts cannot stand scrutiny.
Firstly, the credibility of the main prosecution eyewitness, Dr. Demetrio Madrid who
identified appellant, is seriously open to doubt. It stands unrebutted on the record that
appellant had to participate at the police line-up four (4) times before he was finally
identified by Dr. Madrid. There is no reason for the ambivalence. The robbery took place in
broad daylight and the three malefactors wore no mask. They drove them around for three
(3) hours. Considering these circumstances, there is no reason for Dr. Madrid's failure to
immediately identify appellant.
We are also disconcerted by the vacillating testimony of Dr. Madrid during the trial. Initially,
Dr. Madrid claimed that he could identify only one of the robbers who staged the hold-
up.
15
At another point, Dr. Madrid said he could identify two of the malefactors.
16
In his
affidavit, Dr. Madrid presented he could identify all three.
17
Appellant's conviction cannot be
made to rest on this nebulous identification by Dr. Madrid.
Secondly, appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extra-judicial confession.
The 1987 Constitution
18
requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a
crime should be provided with counsel. We have constitutionalized the right to counsel
because of our hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting
confessions from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions and render them
inadmissible.
19
We take pride in constitutionalizing this right to counsel even while other
countries have desisted from elevating this right to a higher pedestal. We have sustained
the inviolability of this precious right with vigor and without any apology.
The trial court did not display the required sensitivity to appellant's right to counsel. Indeed,
it did not impose a rigorous respect for the right. It was satisfied that there was "substantial"
compliance with the requirements of right to counsel. This is far from the intent of the
Constitution. The records show that Atty. Peralta's, who was not the counsel of choice of
appellant, arrived at the CIS Office an the second night of appellant's detention. More
exactly, he arrived at the CIS Office at around 9:00 p.m. and talked with appellant about his
rights. Atty. Peralta himself admitted he received no reaction from appellant although his
impression was that appellant understood him.
20
Worse, Atty. Peralta left appellant in the
custody of the CIS agents when his real interrogation started. He said he had to attend the
wake of a friend. His attitude did not speak well of the importance he gave to his role as
counsel to a person under custodial interrogation for the commission of a very serious
offense. It was during his absence that appellant gave an uncounselled confession. They
tried to cure his uncounselled confession for the next day, appellant was brought by two (2)
CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. In the presence of these agents, Atty. Peralta asked
appellant if he understood the statements he gave and if he signed it voluntarily. Appellant,
of course, affirmed the voluntariness of the execution of the confession. Atty. Peralta was
satisfied and the trial court ruled that appellant's right to counsel was not infringed. We
disagree.
We hold that when the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of
counsel but effective and vigilant counsel. The circumstances in the case at bench clearly
demonstrate that appellant received no effective counseling from Atty. Peralta. In People v.
De Guzman,
21
we held that in custodial investigation, the right to counsel attaches from the
moment the investigation starts, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask questions to
elicit information and confessions or admissions from the accused. In this case, at the
crucial point when the interrogation was just starting, Atty. Peralta left appellant to attend
the wake of a friend . At that critical stage, appellant gave his uncounselled extra-judicial a
confession. Surely, such a confession where appellant was unprotected from mischief
cannot convict.
Neither can the trial court convict appellant on the ground that alibi is inherently a weak
defense. Chiseled in our jurisprudence is the rule that the onus is on the prosecution to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Given the uncertainty of
appellant's identification and the inadmissibility of his uncounselled confession, there is no
thread of evidence to criminally inculpate appellant.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. Q-88-201 of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City , Branch CIII, convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y Cortel of
robbery with homicide is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE V TAMPUS
G.R. No. L-44690 March 28, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE TAMPUS Y PONCE, accused whose death sentence is under review.
Cipriano Azada (Counsel de Oficio) for the accused.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and
Solicitor Rameo C. de la Cruz for appellee.

AQUINO, J .:
This is an automatic review of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati
Branch 36, convicting Jose Tampus of murder, sentencing him to death and ordering him to
pay the heirs of the victim Celso Saminado, an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos
(Criminal Case No. 18510).
In the same decision, Rodolfo Avila, the co-accused of Tampus, was convicted of the same
offense and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of fourteen years and eight months
of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to
pay the same indemnity. Avila did not appeal. (He was sentenced to death, together with
Frankisio Aro and Pedro Lasala, in another case. Criminal Case No. 1187. The death
sentence is under review in L-38141).
The evidence shows that at around ten o'clock in the morning of January 14, 1976, Celso
Saminado, 37, a prisoner in the national penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Rizal and a patient in
the emergency ward of the prison hospital, went to the toilet to answer a call of nature and
to fetch water.
The accused, Tampus, 27, and Avila, 28, prisoners in the same penal institution, who were
tubercular patients in the hospital, followed Saminado to the toilet and, by means of their
bladed weapons, assaulted him. Tampus inflicted eight incised wounds on Saminado while
Avila stabbed him nine times. Saminado died upon arrival at eleven o'clock on that same
morning in the prison hospital.
After emerging from the toilet, Tampus and Avila surrendered to a prison guard with their
knives (Exh. B and D). They told the guard: "Surrender po kami, sir. Gumanti lang po kami."
The motive of the killing was revenge. Tampus and Avila, both members of the Oxo gang,
avenged the stabbing of Eduardo Rosales in December, 1975 by a member of the Batang
Mindanao gang, a group hostile to the Oxo gang. Saminado was a member of the Batang
Mindanao gang. Rosales was a member of the Oxo gang.
The officer of the day investigated the incident right away. In his written report submitted on
the same day when the tragic occurrence transpired, he stated that, according to his on-the-
spot investigation, Avila stabbed Saminado when the latter was armed in the comfort room
and his back was turned to Avila, while Tampus stabbed the victim on the chest and neck
(Exh. J dated January 14, 1976).
Two days after the killing, or on January 16, another prison guard investigated Tampus and
Avila and obtained their extrajudicial confessions wherein they admitted that they assaulted
Saminado (Exh. A and C).
There is no question that the guilt of Tampus was established beyond reasonable doubt. He
and Avila, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded guilty to the charge of murder
aggravated by treachery, evident premeditation and quasi recidivist
At the arraigmment or after they had pleaded guilty, the trial court called their attention to
the gravity of the charge and informed them that the death penalty might be imposed upon
them. They reiterated their plea of guilty. The trial court required the fiscal to present the
prosecution's evidence. Tampus and Avila took the witness stand, affirmed their
confessions and testified as to the manner in which they repeatedly wounded Saminado.
In this review of the death sentence, the counsel de oficio, assigned to present the side of
defendant Tampus, contends that he was denied his right to a public trial because the
arraignment and hearing were held at the state penitentiary.
The New Bilibid Prison was the venue of the arraignment and hearing, and not the trial
court's session hall at Makati, Rizal because this Court in its resolution of July 20, 1976 in L-
38141, where Rodolfo Avila was one of the accused-appellants, refused, for ty reasons, to
allow him to be brought to Makati. So, this Court directed that the arraignment and trial in
the instant case, where Avila was a co-accused of Tampus, be held at the national
penitentiary in Muntinlupa.
The record does not show that the public was actually excluded from the place where the
trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of the trial in the national
penitentiary.
There is a ruling that the fact that for the convenience of the witnesses a case is tried in
Bilibid Prison without any objection on the part of the accused is not a ground for reversal of
the judgment of conviction (U.S. vs. Mercado, 4 Phil. 304).
The accused may waive his right to have a public trial as shown in the rule that the trial
court may motu propioexclude the public from the courtroom when the evidence to be
offered is offensive to decency or public morals. The court may also, upon request of the
defendant, exclude from the trial every person except the officers of the court and the
attorneys for the prosecution and defense. (Sec. 14, Rule 119, Rules of Court. See 21 Am
Jur 2d 305, sec. 270).
The other contention of counsel de oficio is that the confession of Tampus was taken in
violation of Article IV of the Con constitution which provides:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness at himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain anent and to court and to be informed of such right. No force,
violence, threat, intimidation, or any other m which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall
be inadmissible in evidence.
As the confession in this case was obtained after the Constitution took effect, section 20
applies thereto (People vs. Dumdum, L-35279, July 30, 1979).
There is no doubt that the confession was voluntarily made. The investigator in taking it
endeavored, according to his understanding, to comply with section 20, as shown in the
following parts of the confession.
Ang may salaysay matapos maipabatid sa kanya ang kanyang mga
karapatan tungkol sa pagbibigay ng malayang salaysay sa ngayon sa ipinag-
uutos ng panibagong Saligang Batas ay kusang loob na nagsasabi ng mga
sumusunod bilang sagot sa mga tanong ng tagasiyasat:
xxx xxx xxx
6. Katulad sa mga bagay-bagay na ipinaliwanag ko saiyo kanina ay uulitin ko
sa iyo na ikaw ay aking tinawagan dito sa aming tanggapan dahil sa ibig
kitang maimbistiga tungkol sa pagkakapatay sa isang bilanggo rin na
nagngangalan ng Celso Saminado noong petsa 14 ng buwan ding ito ngunit
bago tayo magpatuloy ay uulitin ko rin saiyo na sa imbistigasyon naito, ikaw
ay hindi ko maaaring pilitin, takutin o gamitan ng puwersa para
makapagbigay ng salaysay o statement.
Na sa imbistigasyon naito ikaw ay may karapatan na magkaruon ng isang
abogado na magtatanggol saiyo.
Na ikaw ay may karapatan na manahimik o tumanggi na paimbistiga.
Ngayon at maulit ko saiyo ang mga karapatan mong ito, ikaw bay
magpapatuloy pa sa pagbibigay ng salaysay bilang sagot sa alin mang
itatanong ko saiyo Sagot Opo, sir. (Exh. A).
However, counsel de oficio points out that before the confession was taken by investigator
Buenaventura de la Cuesta on January 16, 1976, Tampus was interrogated two days
before, or on the day of the killing, by the officer of the day, Vivencio C. Lahoz, and that at
that alleged custodial interrogation, Tampus was not informed as to his rights to have
counsel and to remain silent.
The truth is that, even before Lahoz investigated the killing, Tampus and Avila had already
admitted it when, after coming out of the toilet, the scene of the crime, they surrendered to
Reynaldo S. Eustaquio, the first guard whom thuy encountered, and they revealed to him
that they had committed an act of revenge. That spontaneous statement, elicited without
any interrogation, was part of the res gestae and at the same time was a voluntary
confession of guilt.
Not only that. The two accused, by means of that statement given freely on the spur of the
moment without any urging or suggestion, waived their right to remain silent and to have the
right to counsel. That admission was confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plea of
guilty and testimony in court. They did not appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Under the circumstances, it is not appropriate for counsel de oficio to rely on the rulings
in Escobedo vs. Illinois,378 U.S. 478,12 L. ed. 2nd 977 and Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 16 L. ed. 2nd 694, regarding the rights of the accused to be assisted by counsel and to
remain silent during custodial interrogation.
It should be stressed that, even without taking into account Tampus' admission of guilt,
confession, plea of guilty and testimony, the crime was proven beyond reasonable doubt by
the evidence of the prosecution.
It is further contended that after the fiscal had presented the prosecution's evidence and
when counsel de oficio called upon Tampus to testify, the trial court should have advised
him of his constitutional right to remain silent. That contention is not well-taken considering
that Tampus pleaded guilty and had executed an extrajudicial confession (U.S. vs. Binayoh,
35 Phil. 23).
The court during the trial is not duty-bound to apprise the accused that he has the right to
remain silent. It is his counsel who should claim that right for him. If he does not claim it and
he calls the accused to the witness stand, then he waives that right (U.S. vs. Rota, 9 Phil.
426; U.S. vs. Grant, 18 Phil. 122; 4 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p.
196).
The crime was correctly characterized by the prosecutor and the trial court as murder. The
two accused, Tampus and Avila, as co-conspirators, made a deliberate and sudden attack
upon the unarmed victim, while he was inside the toilet, three meters wide and three meters
long. The accused resorted to a mode of assault which insured the consummation of the
killing without any risk to themselves arising from any defense which the victim could have
made. Indeed, because of the unexpected attack, he was not able to make any defense at
all (61 tsn). Hence,alevosia qualifies the killing as murder.
Evident premeditation is also aggravating. The evidence shows beyond peradventure of
doubt that Tampus and Avila planned the killing by providing themselves with bladed
weapons and waiting for an opportunity to kill Saminado and thus satisfy their desire for
revenge.
As alleged in the information and as shown in his prison record, Exhibit H, Tampus was a
quasi-recidivist. At the time of the assault, he was serving sentences for homicide and
evasion of service of sentence. Because of the special aggravating circumstance of quasi
recidivist the penalty for murder, which is reclusion temporal to death, should be imposed in
its maximum period and that is death (Art. 160, Revised Penal Code).
The mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender to the authorities,
which can be appreciated in favor of Tampus, cannot offset quasi-recidivism nor reduce the
penalty. When death is prescribed as a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied
regardless of any generic mitigating circumstances (Art. 63, Revised Penal Code).
However, for lack of the requisite ten votes, the death penalty cannot be affirmed. Hence, it
should be commuted to reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's judgment as to Jose Tampus is modified. He is sentenced
to reclusion perpetua.The lower court's judgment as to his civil liability is affirmed. Costs de
officio
SO ORDERED.



PEOPLE V MARCOS
G.R. No. L-65048 January 9, 1987
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
MOISES MARCOS Y DE LA ROSA, accused.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff.
Magdangal B. Elma for accused Marcos.

ALAMPAY, J .:
In Criminal Case No. CCC-2873 of the defunct Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Metro
Manila, appellant MOISES MARCOS, together with Danilo Castro, Jun alias "John Doe"
and "Peter Doe," were charged with the crime of kidnapping, said to have been committed
as follows:
That on or about the 20th day of February, 1979 in Caloocan City, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
being the private individuals, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping and aiding one another, for the purpose of extorting ransom
from Benito Gonzales, father of Benedict Gonzales @ "Cocoy" did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away in a motor
vehicle and detain the latter in an isolated hut for two (2) nights and one (1)
day.
That accused Moises Marcos y de la Rosa, cooperated in the execution of
the offense by previous simultaneous acts, that is, by pointing to Benedict
Gonzales @ "Cocoy" to his co-accused and writing a ransom note demanding
the amount of P200,000.00 from the father of the victim, Benito Gonzales but
were able to get only the amount of P20,000.00 as ransom.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellant's co-accused, Danilo Castro, Jun alias "John Doe" and "Peter Doe" escaped
arrest and for this reason only appellant Moises Marcos was arraigned and tried.
Thereafter, the court rendered its decision, dated July 24, 1979, with the dispositive portion
thereof reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused MOISES
MARCOS, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping, as
charged in the Information, and hereby sentences him with the penalty of
Death: to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P25,000 and another
P25,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary damages.
The evidence for the prosecution as summarized in the appellee's brief tend to establish
that;
At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of February 20, 1979, Benedict
Gonzales, a 9 year old pupil of the St. Martin de Porres Catholic School in
Paombong, Bulacan, while on his way home from school was approached by
three (3) men on board an owner-type jeep. On the pretext that the boy's
father, Benito Gonzales met an accident, the men asked Benedict to go with
them to the hospital (TSN., July 24, 1979, pp. 51-11).
The unsuspecting Benedict went with the three (3) men who brought him to
an isolated hut situated at Baesa, Caloocan City, about one (1) kilometer from
the North Diversion Road. At said hut, Benedict was detained for two nights
and one day, guarded during the day by two of the men (TSN., July 24, 1979,
pp. 13-18; p. 19).
At about 8:00 o'clock p.m of the same day, Benedict's brother found a note
(Exhibit A) at the gate of their residence. The note in full, reads as follows:
F
e
b
.

2
0
,

'
7
9
MR. BEN:
Our mission in Paombong, is to get you Mang Ben. But don't
worry about your son, just give us P200,000.00 cash tomorrow
night, if you dislike, you will not see him anymore.
INSTRUCTION
Let your driver alone to bring the money. Tell him to travel the
Highway going to N. Ecija see our car with red flag, stop on the
rear, go down, (sic), on the car with hands up and with lights on
inside the car. Mr. Ben don't tell this to the authority or to
anybody, if you want to see your son alive. P200,000.00 or
your own son?
That same night, Benito Gonzales, Benedict's father, sought the help of
appellant. Appellant is Benito's first cousin and resides just across the street
from the Gonzales' residence (TSN., July 23, 1979, p. 4).
The next morning, February 21, 1979, appellant and Benito went to the house
of Engr. Cesar Gonzales (Benito's brother) who referred them to Atty.
Santiago Toledo, a former NBI agent, who in turn advised them to report the
kidnapping to the National Bureau of Investigation (TSN., July 23, 1979, p. 5).
At the NBI, Benito was briefed by NBI Supervising Agents Nestor Gonzales
and Emeterio Manalo as to what course of action to take with the advice that
Benito should in the meantime vie for time by negotiating with the kidnappers
to reduce the ransom money (TSN., July 23, 1979, p. 5).
From the NBI, appellant Benito proceeded to the office of Engr. Cesar
Gonzales at Ayala Avenue, Makati where appellant advised Benito to
disregard the NBI original plan. He volunteered to talk with the kidnappers to
reduce the ransom money to P20,000.00 and proposed the raise the amount
through a loan from a friend. Benito fearful for the life of his son and having
no ready cash at the time, readily agreed to appellant's proposal (TSN July
23, 1979, pp. 5-6).
From there, appellant and Benito proceeded to the store of Romeo Castro
(appellant's friend) in Caloocan City, purportedly to secure a loan of
P20,000.00. Appellant alone talked to Castro inside The latter's store and,
about three (3) minutes later, invited Benito. After the usual introductions,
Benito believing that appellant was able to secure a loan from Castro,
proceed to pay the same within the week (TSN., July 23, 1979, p. 6).
Thereafter, at about 7:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day, February 21, 1979,
appellant and Benito went home to Paombong, Bulacan. As planned,
appellant left purportedly to meet with the kidnappers at the highway going to
Nueva Ecija (TSN., July 23, 1979, pp. 6-7).
At about 2:45 o'clock in the early morning of February 22, 1979, appellant
together with Benedict, arrived at the Gonzales' residence.
Amidst the tearful reunion, appellant, when questioned how he was able to
get back Benedict, related that on his way to Nueva Ecija, he was signalled to
stop with a red flag by persons on board a red car; with guns aimed at
appellant, the persons asked him for the money; appellant allegedly handed
them the P20,000.00 with an apology that said amount was the only money
that the family of Benedict could afford, afterwards, they proceeded to
Novaliches, Quezon City where Benedict was detained (TSN., July 23, 1979,
pp. 78).
On March 5, 1979, Benito Gonzales reported the above developments to the
NBI Noting some suspicious circumstances in appellant's story, the NBI
conducted further investigation - The NBI agents questioned not only Benito
and Benedict Gonzales but also appellant and Romeo Castro, appellant's
friend, who allegedy loaned the amount of P20,000.00 ransom money.
Appellant also pointed to the NBI agents the isolated hut in Baesa, Caloocan
City where Benedict was detained, and reenacted the incident.
In his sworn statement (Exhibit E) dated July 10, 1979 voluntarily given
before NBI Agent Esteban Libit appellant admitted that he, together with
Danilo Castro, "Jun" and alias "Peter Doe," planned and executed the
kidnapping of Benedict.
After the investigation, the NBI indorsed the case to the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Pasig, Metro Manila for the filing of the appropriate
information against appellant Danilo Castro, "Jun" and "Peter Doe" (Exhibit
G). (Appellee's Brief, Rollo, pp. 76-81).
On the other hand, appellant offers as his version of the same incident the following.
Appellant Marcos, 49 years old, married, government pensionado and
residing at Sto. Nino Paombong, Bulacan, testified as follows:
That the father of the victim is his first cousin. (TSN., Hearing of July 24,
1979, p. 54).
That he wrote the ransom letter (Exhibit A) because he was instructed at the
town plaza of Paombong, Bulacan by Danilo Castro to write said letter and
after Danilo Castro and his companions have taken the boy (Benito
Gonzales) he was instructed to write the ransom letter, (TSN., Hearing of July
24, 1979, pp. 56-57).lwphl@it
That Danilo Castro is his friend while the "John Doe" and "Peter Doe" were
the companions of Danilo Castro whom he does not know. (TSN., Hearing of
July 24, 1979, pp, 57-58).
That he was forced or intimidated to write the ransom note because if he will
not do so, they (Danilo Castro and companions) will get his children who are
studying in Manila (TSN., hearing of July 24, 1979, pp. 58-59).
That he was told by Danilo Castro that if he will not make the ransom note,
his two children will be "madisgracia." (TSN., Hearing of July 24, 1979, p. 64),
That Danilo Castro gave him the pen to write the ransom note and -although
instructed to give the ransom, note to his cousin, he placed the ransom note
in the gate of his cousin's house. (TSN., Hearing of July 24, 1979, pp- 67-68).
That he did not report the latter to the authorities because he thinks that he
can get his grandson (TSN., July 24, 1979, p. 70). (Appellant's Brief, pp. 10-
11).
In seeking the reversal of the decision rendered against him, appellant herein attributes to
the trial court its commission of the following assigned errors:
I
THE CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF PASIG METRO MANILA ERRED IN
FINDING APPELLANT MARCOS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING WITH RANSOM, CONSIDERING THAT:
a) SAID COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE EXTRA-
JUDICIAL CONFESSION OF APPELLANT MARCOS
(EXHIBIT E) WHICH WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THE STATEMENT OF
ROMEO CASTRO (EXHIBIT C) WHO WAS NOT PRESENTED
AS A WITNESS;
b) THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT CONSPIRACY OR THAT APPELLANT
MARCOS WAS GUILTY AS CO-PRINCIPAL AND/OR
MASTERMIND; and
c) SAID COURT BASED ITS DECISION ON FACTS AND
MATTERS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORDS.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT APPELLANT MARCOS PARTICIPATED IN
THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING WITH RANSOM THE CIRCUIT CRIMINAL
COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF DEATH, CONSIDERING
THAT:
a) THE PARTICIPATION OF APPELLANT MARCOS WAS
MERELY THAT OF AN ACCOMPLICE;
b) UNDER THE THIRD PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 268 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, THE PENALTY IMPOSABLE
SHOULD ONLY BE PRISION MAYOR IN ITS MINIMUM AND
MEDIUM PERIODS AND A FINE NOT EXCEEDING SEVEN
HUNDRED PESOS;
c) UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF THE CASE OF PEOPLE VS.
ACOSTA AND BRAVO 107 PHIL. 361, APPELLANT MARCOS
DOES NOT BELONG To THAT TYPE OF KIDNAPPERS WHO
DESERVE THE S UPREME PENALTY OF DEATH
CONSIDERING THE SMALL AMOUNT INVOLVED AND THE
CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH IT (KIDNAPPING) WAS
COMMITTED; and
d) THE DEATH PENALTY CONSTITUTES A CRUEL OR
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT PRESCRIBED BY SECTION 21,
ARTICLE IV OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION.
Appellant maintains that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible as evidence against him
because the same was obtained from him without the assistance of a counsel. He avers
that although he waived his right to counsel, this waiver is without legal effect as such was
made without the assistance of a lawyer, a requisite which should have been complied with
as was stressed in the case of Morales vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 538 and reiterated inPeople
vs. Galit, 135 SCRA 465.
The Court in this regard, finds that appellant's protestations do not warrant reversal of the
appealed judgment. When appellant gave his sworn statement before the NBI agent
Esteban Libit on July 10, 1979 he was not then under police custody. He was merely invited
for questioning so he can shed light on the kidnapping of Benedict. He was even allowed to
go home after the investigation. Appellant who is a retired First Lieutenant in the Philippine
Constabulary and who had studied up to third year in mechanical engineering, admitted
having voluntarily given his sworn statement, Exh. E, to the NBI.
It is significant to consider that appellant Moises Marcos was duly informed of his right to
remain silent. He was warned that any statement he make may be used against him and
that he is entitled to be assisted by a lawyer of his choice. From the case records, are
reflected the following:
1.QUESTION This investigation concerns the alleged kid
napping of a certain BENEDICT GONZALES y SANTOS, an 8-
year-old son of MR. BENITO GONZALES of Paombong,
Bulacan. Before we proceed, however, we are now making it
clear to you that it is your right to give or not give any statement
or to answer or not to answer the questions to be propounded
to you in this investigation. In other words, you have a perfect
right to remain silent. You are also entitled to be informed here,
as we are informing you, now, that whatever you may say here
may be used as evidence against you in any criminal or civil
proceedings, You are also entitled to be assisted by a lawyer of
your own choice and should you not be able to engage the
services of a lawyer, the government will appoint one for you. Is
this clear to you?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
2. Q Would you like to be assisted by a lawyer now?
A No more, sir.
3. Q In that case, are you willing to give a statement without a
lawyer helping you?
A Yes, sir.
4. Q Would you, therefore, sign a waiver of signifying that you
have been informed of your constitutional rights and that you
are waiving your rights under the same?
A Yes, sir.
In the sworn statement of appellant Moises Marcos, dated July 10, 1979, marked as Exhibit
E, his waiver of his right to counsel is clearly expressed:
WAIVER
This is to certify that I have been informed of my constitutional rights to remain silent and
to be assisted by a lawyer in this investigation. I am, however, waiving my rights to
remain silent and I am also waiving my rights to be assisted by a lawyer in narrating to
the NBI investigators what I know about the kidnapping of BENEDICT GONZALES.
Manila, July 10, 1979.
SGD. MOISES R. MARCOS.
Testifying before the trial court, appellant expressly acknowledged that he voluntarily signed
his sworn statement, which was marked as Exhibit "E." In this regard, his testimony is as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Q By the way, there are some signatures in this document
(referring to Exhibit E is this your signature?
A Yes, your Honor.
Q You were not coerced by the NBI agents to sign your
signature here?
A No, your Honor.
Q You gave this voluntarily?
A Yes, your Honor
... (TSN., July 24, 1979, pp. 65-66).
Considering all the foregoing circumstances, the Court is of the view that appellant's
admissions, voluntarily made, and confirmed by him in open court during his trial, render
worthless the challenge now interposed by him to the admissibility of appellant's sworn
statement, Exhibit E. The facts and circumstances attendant in this instance, excludes the
case at bar from the scope and application of the pronouncements made in the case
of People vs. Galit, 135 SCRA 465 and Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 538, which
appellant invoked.
The findings and conclusions of the trial court receive fullest support from the evidence
adduced by the prosecution aside , from appellant's admissions made before the trial court.
We find no reason to set aside and reject the evidence which the court below had properly
appreciated.
Consequently, this Court should extend faith and credit to the factual findings of the court
below that appellant Moises Marcos was an active participant and was even the one who
had inspired the commission of the kidnapping of the son of his first cousin. Apart from the
extrajudicial statements of the accused, the other evidence submitted by the prosecution
include the testimony of Benedict Gonzales, a nine-year old kidnap victim who attested to
and confirmed the fact that it was the accused Moises Marcos, as his "lolo Nito" who had
taken him from the place of detention in Barrio Baesa and brought him back home to his
parents, The declarations of Benito Gonzales, father of the kidnapped child indicate the role
played by appellant Moises Marcos in obtaining the amount of P20,000.00 supposedly to
re-pay the purported loan secured from one Romy Castro and which was to be utilized to
pay for the ransom of the kidnapped boy. All the above mentioned evidence, separate and
independent from the extrajudicial statement Exhibit E, executed by the appellant, are
likewise proof establishing beyond reasonable doubt the appellant's guilt.
Appellant submits that he was an unwilling participant in the crime and that he was forced to
write the ransom note because of his fear that his children in Manila will be hurt by his co-
accused. Appellant claims that his cooperation was not given voluntarily and therefore he
should not be regarded as a principal for even assuming that he participated in the
commission of the crime, his participation was merely that of an accomplice.
We cannot give credence to the claim of the appellant that he was coerced into writing the
ransom note. There is no averment nor is there even mention of any such alleged coercion
exerted on him when appellant executed his sworn statement, Exhibit E, wherein it
described the role he played in the kidnapping of Benedict Gonzales. What appears is that
appellant wrote the ransom note while in his residence and without any of his co-accused
being present. In his extrajudicial statement, Exhibit E, appellant stated:
19. Q What did you do then in your house?
A I wrote a letter, a ransom letter, addressed to Mr. Ben and
telling him to prepare P200,000.00 in cash which must be
delivered the following night to us as a ransom for his son. I
remember that I instructed him in that ransom note to ask his
driver to drive his car towards the highway going to Nueva Ecija
at about midnight. The driver must bring with him the ransom
money and we will intercept him, I mean the money. I also
mentioned in that ransom note that along the highway, at about
midnight he will see a car with a red flag and upon seeing that
car he must stop and go down hands up and he must light the
inside of the car.
To mitigate somehow his criminal liability, appellant submits that he merely acted as a "go-
between" between kidnappers and the victim's father and where there is doubt as to
whether one participated as a principal or as an accomplice, the milder form of criminal
liability should be favored. Appellant asks that he be given the benefit of doubt and that he
be regarded, almost only as an accomplice (Appellant's Brief, pp. 19-20).
The Court agrees with the conclusion arrived at by the trial court that appellant's
participation in the said felony was as a principal. It was appellant who informed his co-
accused Danilo Castro and the other persons named only as; "John Doe" and "Peter Doe,"
that Benito Gonzales, father of the kidnapped victim, is among the richest residents of
Paombong, Bulacan. It was no less appellant Moises Marcos who pointed out Benedict
Gonzales to his other co-accused who later duped said boy into going along with them on
the pretext that the boy's father was then in a hospital. It was appellant who wrote the
ransom note and he himself placed said note at the gate of the house of the father of the
kidnapped child. Appellant made it appear that he borrowed money in the amount of
P20,000.00 from one Romeo Castro which was to be used in paying the ransom and
although appellant did not actually obtain that loan, he nevertheless caused the boy's father
to agree to re-pay that alleged loan and this the latter did afterwards. Appellant, by himself,
went to Baesa, Caloocan City, where the kidnapped boy was detained. He then brought
back the latter to his parents in Paombong, Bulacan. It is undisputed that appellant received
from Benito Gonzales the amount of P 20,000.00 which was intended to serve as
reimbursement for the money alleged borrowed and which Benito Gonzales was made to
believe was paid for the release of his kidnapped son.
The narration of the kidnapping incident by the herein appellant is replete with details which
could not possibly be known by anyone else other than those actually and principally
involved in the kidnapping and in the execution thereof.
Finally, appellant contends that the death penalty should not have been imposed on him
because the amount of the ransom money involved is small. He maintains that the death
penalty constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment, disallowed by Section 21, Article IV of
the 1973 Constitution.
The crime committed by appellant and his co-accused is defined and penalized in Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act Nos. 18 and 1084, which
provides:
Art. 267 Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual
who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his
liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
x x x x x x x x x
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female, or a public
officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed
for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other persons,
even if none of the circumstances above mentioned were present in the
commission of the offense.
There is no question at all that Benedict, the victim, was then a minor and that he was
kidnapped for the purpose of extorting ransom.
Appellant's argument that death is a cruel and unusual punishment does not deserve
consideration. In People vs. Camano, 115 SCRA 688, We already held that the death
penalty, as such is not excessive, unjust or cruel, within the meaning of that word in the
Constitution. In said case, this Court stated, citing Harden vs. Director of Prisons, 81 Phil.
741
The penalty complained of neither cruel, unjust or excessive. In Ex Parte
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, the United States Supreme Court said that
punishments are cruel when they involved torture or lingering death but the
punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used in
the Constitution. It implies there somethig inhuman and barbarous, something
more than the mere extinguishment of life.
What can be gleaned from a review of the evidence on record is that apparently there was
an abrupt and increasing remorse or contrition on the part of the herein appellant after the
kidnapping was an accomplished fact but there no longer was any way, of turning back from
his assigned role. Appellant's change of heart could have been brought about by appellant's
realization of the anxiety and suffering inflicted on the parents of the child those father is the
first cousin of the appellant. The vacciliation of appellant is understandable because, as
submitted by appellant's counsel in this case, ". . . appellant is not a professional wrong
doer (he has not been guilty of any other previous offense)." (Appellant's Brief, p. 23).
In our assessment of the facts of this case and upon considering the conduct and
actuations of the herein appellant, We are inclined to agree with the observations of the
appellant's counsel de oficio, who went to the National Penitentiary to interview the
accused. The Court's impression is that when appellant Moises Marcos began to realize the
extent of the grief and torment being undergone by the family of Benedict Gonzales (the
kidnapped child), he must have even at that time, already regretted his felonious act and
thus he voluntarily returned the kidnapped boy to his parents although full payment of the
P200,000.00 being demanded in the ransom note was not given by the boy's family. It is
indicated that when his other co-accused were later grumbling about the small sum of
P20,000.00 received by them (herein appellant had no share in the ransom paid), appellant
then sold his car for P5,000.00 and gave this money to his co-conspirators to appease them
(Q. 65-67, Sworn Statement of Appellant, Exh. E).lwphl@it
Considering the foregoing circumstances, the Court is disposed to accept the urging of
appellant's counsel de oficio, that if appellant's conviction is sustained, the appropriate
penalty that he should suffer must not be the extreme penalty of death.
Appellant has already been detained for almost eight years now and is presently confined at
the National Penitentiary awaiting the outcome of our review of the judgment rendered by
the trial court. The facts of this case tend to show that the crime in this case was not the
result of any deliberate and well formed nefarious conspiracy of a criminal group. It was
rather a crime clumsily conceived on the spur of the moment. Appellant obviously did not
fully realize the gravity of the crime he and his companions were embarking upon. Thus, We
find the extreme penalty of death imposed on appellant, Moises Marcos, to be
inappropriate, In the view of the Court, under the given circumstances in this case, the
penalty that should be imposed should be reduced to life imprisonment. Furthermore, if the
record of appellant's behavior while under detention in the National Penitentiary during the
years he has been imprisoned is satisfactory and indicative of his worthiness to rejoin the
society of law-abiding citizens, then the proper recommendation in his behalf should be
made by the prison officials concerned for the further commutation of his prison term.
The Court also notes that only P20,000.00 was paid by the father of the kidnapped child for
ransom but the amount of P25,000.00 was decreed in the decision of the court below. It
should be therefore reduced to P20,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision, being in accordance with the evidence is AFFIRMED
but with modification, as to the penalty of death imposed on the accused-appellant Moises
Marcos which is hereby reduced to Reclusion Perpetua. The indemnity to be paid to the
offended party is also reduced to P20,000.00. In all other respects, the said judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.



PEOPLE V ALBERCA
[G.R. No. 117106. June 26, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JIMMY
ALBERCA, accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT OF A PERSON
UNDER INVESTIGATION FOR THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE;
NOT VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR.- Accused-appellant signed a
document, which shows that he was informed that he had a right to remain
silent and not to give any statement; that any statement he gave could be
used against him in court; that he had a right to retain counsel of his
choice and that if he could not afford to hire the services of counsel he
would be given a competent and independent one. After being thus
informed, he said he was nonetheless willing to give a statement and tell
the truth. His claim that the constitutional rights stated in the document
were not read to him because he was merely forced to sign that document
is improbable. This document was signed not only by him but also by his
wife. It is noteworthy that accused-appellant failed to call on his wife to
corroborate his allegation of coercion. After all, accused-appellant does
not claim that she, too, was made to sign under duress.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT TO COUNSEL; AFFORDED IN CASE AT BAR.- It
was unnecessary to tell accused-appellant that he had a right to have a
counsel of his choice who was competent and independent since he was
told he could choose his own counsel. What was necessary was to
assure him that if he could not afford to hire the services of counsel he
would be provided by the investigator with a lawyer who was competent
and independent, which was what was done in this case. Nor was it
necessary to ask him whether he had counsel or give him an opportunity
to look for counsel since he had waived the right to counsel and pointed to
Atty. Abrenica as the counsel he wanted to assist him in making the
waiver. There is therefore no basis for the plea of accused-appellant that
his extrajudicial confession should have been excluded from the evidence
because it was obtained in violation of his rights under Section 12 of Art.
III.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION, VOLUNTARILY GIVEN.-
Accused-appellant claims that he signed the extrajudicial confession
because he had been "threatened" with harm if he did not. However, he
did not elaborate as would naturally be his wont had he really been
coerced to sign his confession. On the contrary, there are circumstances
belying his claim that he had been coerced into signing the
confession. The confession of accused-appellant is replete with details,
which makes it improbable that it was not voluntarily given.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; DEFENSE OF ALIBI, BELIED.- The
defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused. In this case, positive identification of accused-appellant was
made by victim Joey Rodriguez. Furthermore, the claim that accused-
appellant was somewhere else at the time of the crime was contradicted
by one of the prosecution witness. For the defense of alibi to prosper,
accused-appellant must establish by clear and convincing evidence not
only that he was not present at the scene of the crime but also that it was
physically impossible for him to have been present there at the time of its
commission. This accused-appellant failed to do.
5. ID.; ID.; WITNESS; CREDIBILITY; NOT AFFECTED BY DELAY IN
REPORTING THE CRIME.- The reluctance of some people to be involved
in criminal trials is a matter of judicial notice. Failure to volunteer what one
knows to law enforcement officials does not necessarily impair a witness'
credibility. In any event the trial court, which had the opportunity to
observe this witness' demeanor, found his testimony to be truthful and we
find no reason to disregard its finding on this matter.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; CONSEQUENCE THEREOF.- There
was conspiracy in this case as shown by the concerted manner in which
accused-appellant and his companions entered the Saycon compound
and later withdrew from it and the way they attacked the security guard
and the houseboy. Regardless of the part of accused-appellant in the
stabbing of the guard and the wounding of the houseboy, he is liable
because of the rule in conspiracy that the act of one is the act of all.
7. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY;
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; WHEN SUFFICIENT.- What the
prosecution lacked by way of an eyewitness was made up by the
circumstantial evidence in the record of this case. As provided in Sec. 4 of
Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. And accused-appellant's flight is evidence of
his guilt. As noted in People vs. Abitona, facts or circumstances which are
not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but also inconsistent with
his innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and probative force,
may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court.
8. CRIMINAL LAW; COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE;
COMMITTED IN CASE AT BAR.- Upon the facts thus established the
Court is convinced that accused-appellant is guilty of robbery with
homicide. While accused-appellant and his companions failed to rob the
Saycons, the fact is that they took the gun of the security guard for the
purpose of gain. Since the group in addition killed the guard, the crime
committed is the complex one of robbery with homicide. It is not
necessary that the person robbed be the same person whom the
malefactors originally intended to rob. Nor is it necessary to show that the
sole purpose was robbery and by reason thereof homicide was
committed. Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is
robbery with homicide not only when "by reason of the robbery" homicide
is committed but also when "on the occasion" thereof homicide is
committed. If robbery and homicide are committed on the same occasion,
the special complex crime is deemed committed.
9. ID.; ID.; DEATH PENALTY; WHERE REQUIRED MAJORITY VOTE NOT
OBTAINED.- The votes of the five (5) Justices fall short of the majority of
eight (8) votes needed to affirm the sentence of death of the trial
court. Thus, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on
accused-appellant in accordance with Article 47 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
This case is here on appeal from the judgment dated August 11, 1994
[1]
of
Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, finding accused-
appellant Jimmy Alberca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide and Physical Injuries
[2]
and sentencing him to
death. Accused-appellant was in addition ordered to indemnify the heirs of
Felipe Climaco in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the Triad Security and
Allied Services, Inc. the amount of P10,000.00 for the value of one (1) .38 cal.
Revolver, which had been taken from the victim by one of the malefactors,
and the costs.
The information against accused-appellant alleged-
"That on or about the 11th day of April 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with several others
whose true names and real identities have not as yet been ascertained, did then and
there, willfully unlawfully and feloniously entered the compound of Rebecca Saycon
located at No. 99 Tandang Sora Avenue, this City, with intent to kill and with the use
of bladed weapons stabbed FELIPE CLIMACO, a security guard on his body several
times and JOEY RODRIGUEZ, a house boy thereat on his chest, respectively, thus
inflicting upon FELIPE CLIMACO serious and mortal wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death and injuries to JOEY RODRIGUEZ and thereafter
said accused with intent to gain, by means of such violence and intimidation against
persons, did then and there, wilfully, and unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and
carry away the service firearm of FELIPE CLIMACO, 1.38 caliber revolver with
Serial No. 31897 with six (6) rounds of ammunitions of still undetermined value,
belonging to Triad Security & Allied Services, Incorporated, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of Felipe Climaco, Joey Rodriguez of the injuries sustained [sic]
and Triad Security & Allied Services, Incorporated.
"Contrary to law."
The crime took place in the first hour of April 11, 1994, at the compound of
Pastor and Rebecca Gaskell-Saycon at No. 99 Tandang Sora Avenue,
Quezon City. At that time, only Rebecca, her two sons and their "yaya"
(nursemaid), security guard Felipe "Philip" Climaco and houseboy Joey
Rodriguez were in the house.
[3]

According to Joey's testimony,
[4]
he was sleeping in the servant's quarters
when he was awakened around midnight by the footsteps of Climaco. He
asked Climaco what the matter was ("Ano po yon?") but the latter did not
answer as he proceeded to the closet to get a gun. Joey saw Climaco
running towards the swimming pool. After a while, he heard a gunshot. He
got up and followed Climaco to the swimming pool where Joey heard
shouts. Intending to ask help from neighbors, Joey opened the gate when he
was suddenly attacked by a person whom he identified as accused-
appellant.
[5]
He fought back but he was stabbed. He ran towards the
house. Along the way he met another person with a gun in one hand and a
knife in the other, and inside the house he saw Climaco lying on the floor,
wounded. Climaco was in pain and asked to be taken to the
hospital. Climaco said his gun
[6]
had been taken by a person whom he
described was "fatter," "taller," and heavier than Joey and who wore his hair
long. Thereafter, several persons, arrived, including Danilo Saycon, Arnold
Agustin, and Joey's twin brother Jonathan Rodriguez, and the police. Found
dead in the garden by the police was one of the intruders, who was later
identified as Diego Aruta.
[7]

Climaco was taken to the Lanting General Hospital but he was dead on
arrival.
[8]
The autopsy report
[9]
showed that he suffered several wounds in
various parts of the body, to wit:
"Fairly developed, fairly nourished male cadaver, in rigor mortis with postmortem
lividity over the dependent portions of the body. Conjunctivae, lips and nailbeds were
pale.
"EXTERNAL INJURIES: TRUNK AND UPPER EXTREMITIES:
"(1) Stab wound, anterior left upper thorax, 130 cms. from heel, 11 cms. from
anterior midline, measuring 7 x 2.5 x 6 cms. depth, directed upwards, slightly
backwards, towards midline, thru the muscle tissue.
"(2) Stab wound, anterior right thorax, 121 cms. from heel, 9.5 cms. from anterior
midline, measuring 5 x 1.5 x 13 cms. depth, directed slightly upwards, backwards,
slightly towards lateral, fracturing the 5th right thoracic rib along the midclavicular
line, piercing the middle and lower lobes of the right lung.
"(3) Stab wound, anterior right lumbar region, 107 cms. from the heel, 11 cms. from
anterior midline, measuring 4 x 2 x 12 cms. depth, directed upwards, backwards,
towards rnidline, fracturing the 9th right thoracic rib along the midclavicular line,
piercing the loops and mesenteries of small intestines and portal vein.
"(4) Stab wound, right scapular region, 126 cms. from the heel, 12 cms. from
posterior midline, measuring 5 x 1.5 x 12 cms. depth, directed upwards, slightly
forwards, towards midline, thru the muscle tissue.
"(5) Incised wound, anterior proximal 3rd left arm, measuring 8 x 2 cms., 4 cms.
from anterior midline.
"(6) Linear abrasion, anterior left lumbar region, measuring 6 x 0.1 cm., 11 cms. from
anterior midline.
"(7) Abrasion, anterior left lumbar region, measuring 0.6 x 0.3 cm., 15 cms. anterior
midline.
"(8) Linear abrasion, anterior left lumbar region, measuring 7 x 0.1 cm., 4 cms. from
anterior midline.
"(9) Linear abrasion, anterior proximal 3rd right forearm, measuring 5 x 0.2 cm., 4
cms. from anterior midline.
"(10) Stabwound, posterior middle 3
rd
right arm, measuring 2.8 x 1.2 cms. x 10 cms. depth,
directed upwards, forwards, towards lateral, thru the muscle tissue.
"(11) Stab wound, posterior proximal 3rd right forearm, 4 cms. from posterior
midline, measuring 2.5 x 0.8 x 5 cms. depth, directed slightly downwards, towards
lateral.
"(12) Stab wound, posterior proximal 3rd right forearm, 4 cms. from posterior
midline, measuring 3.5 x 1 x 5 cms. depth, directed upwards, backwards, towards
midline, thru the muscle tissue.
"(13) Incised wound, dorsum of the right hand, measuring 1.7 x 0.3 cms., 6 cms. from
posterior midline.
"INTERNAL FINDINGS:
"(1) Recovered from the right thorax and abdominal cavity about 1,000 cc and 500 cc
of blood and blood clots, respectively.
"(2) Recovered from the stomach 1 glass of partially digested food particles
consisting mostly of rice.
"CONCLUSION:
"Cause of death is stab wounds, body."
On the other hand, Joey was taken to the Quezon City General
Hospital. The medico-legal certificate of the attending physician stated that
Joey suffered a "stab wound, 4 cm., 5th ICS, Ant. axillary line, chest (R)"
which would require medical attendance for seven days under normal
condition.
[10]
The wound would not have caused his death even if Joey had
not been given immediate medical attendance as it did not penetrate his
lungs.
[11]

Accused-appellant, a "taho" vendor, was arrested by NBI agents on April
17, 1994 in San Miguel, Bulacan, in the house of his aunt, Priscilla
Dagandang Mabuhay. He was taken to the NBI Headquarters on Taft Avenue
in Manila where he gave an extrajudicial confession in the presence of his
wife Noemi and of an assigned counsel, Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica.
[12]

In his confession, given on April 19, 1994, accused-appellant said that the
plan to rob the Saycons had been conceived by Diego Aruta and Darius
Caenghog and that he had been told of it on the night of Saturday, April 9,
1994. According to accused-appellant, the following night, April 10, 1994, at
around 7:00, Jhonny "Almar" Alcober, Oscar "Lucas" Clariza and Bengie
"Benny" Demson arrived in his house. (Accused-appellant and his family lived
in a house which was just outside the Saycon compound in Tandang Sora,
Quezon City.) Diego and Darius arrived at about 10:00 in the evening. The
accused-appellant and the group drank two bottles of gin. All the while, they
were looking over the wall which separated accused-appellant's house from
the Saycon compound ("Sinisilip nila sa pader ang bahay ni Mr. Saycon"). At
around midnight, the group went into action. Diego climbed over the wall,
followed by Darius and accused-appellant and then by the three, Almar, Lucas
and Benny. But they were noticed by the security guard who shot Diego
Aruta. Diego charged ("sinugod"), embraced the security guard and then
stabbed him. Diego was Joined by Darius who also stabbed the guard at the
front and by accused-appellant who stabbed the guard at the back. The
security guard staggered into the house. Accused-appellant then noticed a
little man coming from a small room near the gate. He followed the man and
stabbed him. The man, though stricken, was able to run inside the
house. Accused-appellant then escaped by going over the wall, while Darius,
who took the security guard's gun, escaped through the gate. Greatly
weakened by his wound, Diego was left behind, eventually to die from his
gunshot wound.
After the incident, the group dispersed. Accused-appellant stayed in his
house until 4:00 in the morning and then left for Pasay City. On April 13, 1994
he proceeded to Barrio Tibagan, San Miguel, Bulacan, where NBI agents
eventually found him.
Accused-appellant claimed that he signed the confession (Exhibits "B-1" to
"B-3") because he had been "threatened" with harm if he did not
[13]
and that
Atty. Abrenica, who assisted him in the execution of the confession, was not
his counsel of choice but had merely been provided him by NBI Special
Investigator Ramon Yap.
[14]
Accused-appellant claimed that he could not have
committed the crime because at that time he was in San Miguel, Bulacan,
having gone there on April 10, 1994 to visit an aunt.
[15]

The trial court dismissed accused-appellant's alibi. It held that even
without the extrajudicial confession, the prosecution's other evidence
established beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellants guilt. Hence this
appeal based on the following assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS INADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE THE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION EXECUTED BY ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO
THE UNRELIABLE, IMPLAUSIBLE AND UNPERSUASIVE TESTIMONY OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND IN DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE
PROFERRED BY THE DEFENSE.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF
THE CRIME CHARGED AND IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF
DEATH DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
1. Art. III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution provides in part:
"Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
"(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate
the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
"(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
xxx xxx xxx
Accused-appellant signed a document, marked Exhibit "B", which consists
of two parts. The first part, marked Exhibit "B-4," shows that accused-
appellant was informed that he had a right to remain silent and not to give any
statement; that any statement he gave could be used against him in court;
that he had a right to retain counsel of his choice and that if he could not
afford to hire the services of counsel he would be given a competent and
independent one. After being thus informed, he said he was nonetheless
willing to give a statement and tell the truth. Thus, written in Filipino, the first
part of the document reads:
"0.1 TANONG: Bago and lahat, nais kong ipaalam sa iyo Ginoong JIMMY ALBERCA Y
MABUHAY na ikaw ay aming iniimbistigahan sa kasong Robbery with Homicide na
nangyari noong madaling araw ng Abril 11, 1994 sa tahanan ni MR. PASTOR
SAYCON sa #99 Tandang Sora Avenue, Quezon City, naiintindihan mo ba ito?
SAGOT : Opo, sir.
"02. T: Nais ko rin na ipaalam sa iyo ang iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng ating saligang
batas, na ikaw ay may karapatan na manahimik at huwag magbigay ng anumang
pahayag sa pagsisiyasat na ito at anumang pahayag na iyong sasabihin ay maaaring
gamitin laban sa iyo sa harap ng ating husgado, nauunawaan mo ba ito?
S: Opo, sir. Nauunawaan ko po at nais ko pong magbigay ng aking salaysay.
0 3. T: Ibig ko rin ipaalam sa iyo na ikaw ay may karapatang magkaroon o kumuha ng
iyong sariling abogado na pili mo at kung ikaw naman ay wala at hindi mo kayang
magbayad ng isang abogado upang tumulong sa pagsisiyasat na ito, ikaw ay bibigyan
namin ng isang abogado na may sapat na kakayahan para pangalagaan ang iyong
karapatan, ito ba ay naiintindihan mo?
S: Opo, sir. Naiintindihan ko. Naririto po ngayon si Atty. ERLANDO ABRENICA at ang
aking asawa na si NOEMI ALBERCA na siyang aalalay sa akin sa pagbibigay ko ng
aking salaysay na ito.
"04. T: Pagkatapos mong malaman ang iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng ating Saligang
Batas, at matapos na ikaw ay paliwanagan ng iyong abogado na si Atty. ERLANDO A.
ABRENICA kaharap ang iyong asawa na si NOEMI ALBERCA Y JATULAN, nais mo
pa rin bang magbigay ng iyong pahayag sa pagsisiyasat na ito at magbigay o magsabi
ng katotohanan at pawang katotohanan lamang?
S: Opo, sir. Pagkatapos kong marinig at maintindihan ang aking mga karapatan sa ilalim
ng ating Saligang Batas, ako po ay kusang loob na magbibigay ng aking salaysay at
magsasabi ng katotohanan at pawang katotohanan lamang sa pagsisiyasat na ito.
"05. T: Kung gayon, ikaw ba ay nakahanda na lumagda sa kasulatang pagpapaubaya sa
mga karapatang mong ito?
S: Opo, sir.
"PAGPAPAUBAYA
"Ako ay pinagpayuhan ng aking mga karapatan na manahimik at magkaroon ng
sariling abogado. Lubos ko itong naiintindihan at nais kong ipaubaya ang mga
karapatan kong ito kaharap ang aking abogado na si Atty. ERLANDO ABRENICA at
ang aking asawa na si NOEMI J. ALBERCA. Nais kong magbigay ng aking kusang
loob na salaysay at alam ko rin na anumang aking sasabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay
maaaring gamitin laban o pabor sa akin.
"Nauunawaan ko ang aking mga karapatan at nakahanda akong sumagot sa anumang
mga katanungan. Hindi ako tinakot, pinilit o pinangakuan ng anumang bagay o may
ginawa laban sa akin na makakagambala sa aking malayang pagpapaubaya.
"(SGD) JIMMY ALBERCA Y MABUHAY
"Nilagdaan sa harap ni:
"(SGD) NOEMI ALBERCA Y JATULAN
"CERTIFICATION
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Affiant JIMMY ALBERCA Y MABUHAY voluntarily
waived all his right under the law after the same were satisfactory explained to him
including whatever consequences his statements may do.
(SGD) Atty. ERLANDO A. ABRENICA
#5 Goldhill Tower, Annapolis St.,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila"
Accused-appellant claims that, contrary to what is recited in the document,
the rights were not read to him and that Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica, who
assisted him in waiving the constitutional rights, was not his counsel of
choice. But his part of Exhibit "B" was signed and thumbmarked by accused-
appellant, apart from the second part, which is his confession. He did so in
the presence of his counsel, Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica, and of his wife Noemi
Jatulan Alberca.
Accused-appellant makes much of the fact that Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica
was not presented by the prosecution. He is joined in this regard by a
dissenting member of the Court who contends that Atty. Abrenica should have
been presented in order to testify on the extent of services he had rendered to
accused-appellant. But beyond seeing to it that the suspect in custodial
investigations had been informed of his constitutional rights and that he
understood these rights before he waived them-and thus insure that the
waiver was knowing, voluntary and intelligent - the assigned counsel does hot
have anything more to do.
In this case accused-appellant does not claim he did not understand what
the document states. What he claims is that the constitutional rights stated in
the document were not read to him because he was merely forced to sign that
document. This is improbable, given the fact that as already stated, this
document was signed not only by him but also by his wife. Additionally,
accused-appellant affirmed the document before the Assistant City
Prosecutor.
In People v. Llenaresas,
[16]
it was also alleged by the defense that
accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession should have been excluded from
evidence because the counsel, who assisted him in executing his confession,
did not testify in court. Rejecting this contention, we held:
"It is true that the prosecution did not present Atty. Meliton Angeles as a witness to
confirm his presence during the custodial investigation of Jabil and Llenaresas. Such
failure is not, however, fatal to the case of the Prosecution since the testimonies of the
police officers and of Prosecutor Pedro S. Nantes, in conjunction with the statements
found in the extrajudicial confession itself, were quite adequate to sustain the
conclusion reached by the trial court."
Indeed, what is noteworthy is not the prosecution's failure to present Atty.
Abrenica but accused-appellant's failure to call on his wife to corroborate his
allegation of coercion, After all, accused-appellant does not claim that she,
too, was made to sign under duress.
Another member of the Court also dissents, arguing that in any event it
does not appear from the document signed by accused-appellant that he was
informed that it was his right to have a competent and independent counsel of
his own, that he had been asked whether he had one, and that he had been
given time to look for one.
Question No. 3 (quoted above) shows that accused-appellant was told that
it was his right to have counsel chosen by him and that if he could not afford
to hire one, he would be given a competent counsel in order to protect his
rights. ("[I]kaw ay may karapatang magkaroon o kumuha ng iyong sariling
abogado na pili mo at kung ikaw naman ay wala at hindi mo kayang
magbayad ng isang abogado upang tumulong sa pagsisiyasat na ito, ikaw ay
bibigyan namin ng isang abogado na may sapat na kakayahan para
pangalagaan ang iyong karapatan.")
It was unnecessary to tell accused-appellant that he had a right to have a
counsel of his choice who was competent and independent since he was told
he could choose his own counsel. What was necessary was to assure him
that if he could not afford to hire the services of counsel he would be provided
by the investigator with a lawyer who was competent and independent, which
was what was done in this case. Nor was it necessary to ask him whether he
had counsel or give him an opportunity to look for counsel since he had
waived the right to counsel and pointed to Atty. Abrenica as the counsel he
wanted to assist him in making the waiver.
There is therefore no basis for the plea of accused-appellant that his
extrajudicial confession should have been excluded from the evidence
because it was obtained in violation of his rights under Section 12 of Art. III.
Accused-appellant also claims that he signed the extrajudicial confession
because he had been "threatened" with harm if he did not. He made this
claim twice in his testimony in the trial court, once during his direct
examination
[17]
and again in his cross-examination.
[18]
If true, this would render
his confession inadmissible under paragraphs (2) and (3) of Section
12. However, apart from saying that he was "threatened," he did not
elaborate as would naturally be his wont had he really been coerced to sign
his confession. He did not say he was beaten up or subjected to third degree
methods. He did not even say what he was told would be done to him if he
refused to sign the confession. Neither did he say who allegedly made the
threat.
On the contrary, the following circumstances belie his claim that he had
been coerced into signing the confession:
(a) Accused-appellant signed the confession (Exhibits "B-1" to "B-3") in the presence
of his wife Noemi Jatulan Alberca and counsel, Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica, who
signed the confession as witnesses thereto. The confession comprises the second
part of the document marked Exhibit "B". Like the first part, which is the waiver of
constitutional rights, the second part was also signed by him, with his wife by his
side. The presence of Noemi could only have worked to prevent accused-
appellant's will from being overborne by pressure, let alone intimidation. However,
Noemi was never presented to corroborate accused-appellant's claim that he had
been threatened into signing the confession.
(b) As already noted, before answering the questions of the investigator, accused-
appellant was informed in Filipino of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel of his choice and warned that any
statement he gave could be used against him. Nonetheless he willingly gave a
statement in order, according to him, to tell the truth.
(c) The NBI investigator Ramon Yap testified on the due execution of the extrajudicial
confession and on the fact that accused-appellant was informed of his constitutional
rights but he waived his rights and decided to proceed with the investigation, which
lasted morning and afternoon of April 19, 1994.
[19]
He denied that the confession had
been prepared beforehand and that accused-appellant was simply made to sign it.
(d) On April 22, 1994, accused-appellant was taken to the Assistant City Prosecutor of
Quezon City, before whom accused-appellant affirmed his confession. Although
accused-appellant claims that he told the prosecutor that the content of the
extrajudicial confession was not true, he does not claim that he complained of any
threat, intimidation or force used against him to make him sign the confession and
waiver of rights.
[20]

Indeed to disregard the foregoing circumstances and give credence
instead to the accused-appellant's claim that he was forced to sign his
confession would be to suggest that accused-appellant's wife, Noemi, the
assigned counsel, Atty. Abrenica, the investigator Ramon Yap and the
Assistant City Prosecutor conspired to railroad him to conviction.
The confession of accused-appellant in the case at bar is replete with
details, which makes it improbable that it was not voluntarily given. This is
evident in the following portion of the confession:
"09. T: Kung gayon, maaari mo bang sabihin sa akin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ang iyong mga
nalalaman na may tungkol sa nangyari sa bahay ni Mr. PASTOR SAYCON doon sa
#99 Tandang Sora Avenue, Quezon City, noong ika-11 ng Abril 1994?
S: Ang nasabi pong bahay ay aming pinasok, at nilooban at ninakawan, noong mga
bandang alas dose ng madaling araw ng Abril 11, 1994, araw po ng Lunes.
"10. T: Maaari mo bang isalaysay ng maigi ang mga pangyayari?
S: Noon pong araw ng Sabado, petsa 9, 1994, bandana alas dose ng tanghali ay nagplano
sina DIEGO ARUTA at DARIUS CAENGHOG sa aking tinitirhan sa 101 Tandang Sora
Avenue, Quezon City na papasukin at pagnanakawan ang bahay ni Mr. SAYCON na
nasa kabila lamang ng pader ng aking tirahan. Sinabi nila ito sa akin bandang alas
7:00 ng gabi noon ding po Sabadong iyon. Kinabukasan araw ng linggo, petsa Abril
10, 1994, bandang alas 7: 00 ng gabi ay dumating sina JHONNY ALCOBER @
"Almar," OSCAR CLARIZA @ "Lucas," at BENGIE DEMSON @ "Benny." Sila po ay
nagtuloy sa aking tinitirhan at doon pa po sila naghapunan. Bandang alas 10:00 ng
gabi ay dumating na rin sina DIEGO at DARIUS sa aking bahay. Kami po tatlo nila
DIEGO at DARIUS ay uminom ng dalawang boteng Ginebra habang sina ALMAR,
LUCAS at BENNY ay nagpapahinga sa itaas ng bahay ko. Habang kami ay nag-
iinuman ay panay ang labas nila DIEGO at DARIUS at sinisilip nila sa pader ang bahay
ni Mr. Saycon. Ang plano ni DIEGO ay pasukin namin ang bahay ni Mr. Saycon ng
bandang ala-una petsa Abril 11, 1994 pero nainip po sina DARIUS at ALMAR at sinabi
nila na pasukin namin ang nasabing bahay ng bandang alas dose."
Accused-appellant claims that this portion of his confession was supplied by
Ramon Yap, the NBI investigator. Yap would not know who the members of
the group were if accused-appellant did not give their names. Accused-
appellant does not deny that he knows these persons. In fact it would seem
that Alcober, Clariza and Demson were accused-appellant's townmates
because it was to Barogo, Leyte, where according to the confession, the three
fled after the crime. On the other hand, Caenghog was from Carigara, also in
Leyte, according to the confession.
2. Accused-appellant's defense is alibi. He claims that at the time of the
commission of the crime on April 11, 1994 he was in San Miguel,
Bulacan. He claims that he went to San Miguel, Bulacan in the morning of
April 10 and stayed there until he was picked up by NBI agents on April
17.
[21]
Accused-appellant would have called on his relatives Priscilla
Dagandang Mabuhay and Antonio Dagandang, as well as Isa Joson, a
neighbor in Bulacan, to testify, except that the prosecution agreed that if
presented their testimonies would corroborate accused-appellant's alibi.
[22]

Now the rule is settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the accused.
[23]
In this case, positive identification of
accused-appellant was made by Joey Rodriguez. Joey was a houseboy of the
Saycons. He engaged accused-appellant in a fight and was stabbed by the
latter.
[24]
He did not know accused-appellant personally but neither was the
latter a "total stranger" to him. For the fact was that accused-appellant's
house was just outside the Saycon compound.
[25]
The premises were
sufficiently illuminated by light coming from the terrace of the house and from
the MERALCO street light which made identification of the accused-appellant
possible.
[26]
Joey could not, therefore, have been mistaken as to the identity of
accused-appellant.
Furthermore, the claim that accused-appellant was in San Miguel, Bulacan
at the time of the crime was contradicted by prosecution witness Joselito
Aborque.
[27]
Aborque was also a "taho" vendor. He was a neighbor of
accused-appellant. Aborque testified that he saw accused-appellant in the
latter's house with three male visitors at around 7:00 p.m. of April 10,
1994
[28]
as he (Aborque) and his wife went out for a stroll. The defense tried
to discredit him by imputing to him a desire to eliminate a competitor since
they were both "taho" vendors and by pointing out that Aborque had given his
statement to the NBI five days after the crime.
[29]
Aborque denied he and
accused-appellant were business rivals.
[30]
Even if they were, this would not
be enough for him to testify falsely against accused-appellant. As for the
contention that it was only on April 16, 1994 that he gave his statement to the
NBI, it is sufficient to say that the reluctance of some people to be involved in
criminal trials is a matter of judicial notice. Failure to volunteer what one
knows to law enforcement officials does not necessarily impair a witness'
credibility.
[31]
In any event the trial court, which had the opportunity to observe
this witness' demeanor, found his testimony to be truthful and we find no
reason to disregard its finding on this matter.
For the defense of alibi to prosper, accused-appellant must establish by
clear and convincing evidence not only that he was not present at the scene
of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been
present there at the time of its commission.
[32]
This accused-appellant failed to
do. According to him, the distance between San Miguel, Bulacan and
Tandang Sora, Quezon City, where the Saycon compound is, can be
negotiated in two and a half hours, and even an hour less if traffic is not
heavy.
[33]
Hence, even assuming that accused-appellant really went to
Bulacan in the morning of April 10, 1994, he could have easily returned to
Tandang Sora later the same day.
It is true that none of the witnesses for the prosecution testified having
seen accused-appellant stab Felipe Climaco, a point on which the defense
harps.
[34]
There was conspiracy in this case, however, as shown by the
concerted manner in which accused-appellant and his companions entered
the Saycon compound and later withdrew from it and the way they attacked
the security guard and the houseboy. Regardless of the part of accused-
appellant in the stabbing of the guard and the wounding of the houseboy, he
is liable because of the rule in conspiracy that the act of one is the act of all.
[35]

Moreover, what the prosecution lacked by way of an eyewitness was
made up by the circumstantial evidence in the record of this case.
[36]
As
provided in Sec. 4 of Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,
circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In this case it is established that (1)
accused-appellant was present at the scene of the crime; (2) he had a bladed
weapon in his possession and displayed a readiness to use the same when
he stabbed Joey Rodriguez; (3) Climaco died due to multiple stab wounds; (4)
bloodstains were found on the wall separating the Saycon compound from the
house of accused-appellant;
[37]
and (5) accused-appellant fled to Bulacan
thereafter. His flight is evidence of his guilt.
[38]
It is logical to infer from all
these circumstances that accused-appellant was among those who inflicted
fatal wounds on Climaco. As noted in People v. Abitona,
[39]
facts or
circumstances which are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but
also inconsistent with his innocence, constitute evidence which, in weight and
probative force, may surpass even direct evidence in its effect upon the court.
3. Upon the facts thus established the Court is convinced that accused-
appellant is guilty of robbery with homicide. While accused-appellant and his
companions failed to rob the Saycons, the fact is that they took the gun of the
security guard for the purpose of gain. Since the group in addition killed the
guard, the crime committed is the complex one of robbery with homicide. It is
not necessary that the person robbed be the same person whom the
malefactors originally intended to rob. In People v. Ga,
[40]
the accused
planned to rob a house at Forbes Park in Makati. They killed the house
owner, Don Julio Gonzaga, and his wife and houseboy and seriously
wounded his daughter and, as help was coming, they fled without being able
to take anything from the house. Instead they took a wristwatch and transistor
radio belonging to a houseboy. It was held that the crime was robbery with
homicide.
In People v. Balanag,
[41]
the accused entered the house of Dr. Guillermo
Lopez, Sr. and then killed him for having filed a case against one of the
accused. They fled after taking with them a shoulder bag of Dr. Lopez's
daughter, Genoveva. This was also held to be robbery with homicide.
Nor is it necessary to show that the sole purpose was robbery and by
reason thereof homicide was committed. Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that there is robbery with homicide not only when "by reason of
the robbery" homicide is committed but also when "on the occasion" thereof
homicide is committed. If robbery and homicide are committed on the same
occasion, the special complex crime is deemed committed.
Thus, in People v. Pamintuan,
[42]
the accused, who were detention
prisoners, escaped from jail, killing jail guards and taking firearms from the
armory. They were found guilty of robbery with homicide.
In People v. Tolentino,
[43]
three individuals were creating trouble in a
store. When a policeman across the street was summoned for help by the
storeowner, the three turned to him and ganged up on him. The accused took
the service revolver of the policeman and shot him and then fled with the
gun. It was contended that the taking of the gun was a mere afterthought and
that to prove robbery with homicide the prosecution must show that the
robbery preceded the killing. In rejecting this contention, we held:
"The contentions of the accused-appellant are untenable. The testimony of Lourdes
Santos clearly shows that there was an intent to rob the victim of his gun. The gun
was first taken from the victim before he was killed. The gun was then taken away
and hidden. Nevertheless, whether or not the taking was before or after the death of
the victim is of no moment in this case. It is immaterial that homicide preceded the
robbery where robbery was the real motive of the culprits. (People v. Gapasin 145
SCRA 178). In the case at bar, the accused intended both to take the gun and kill the
victim."
In another case, People v. Hasiron,
[44]
three individuals, one of whom was
the accused, went to the house of the victim and, when told that he was
asleep, left with the advice that they would return. An hour later they
returned. They talked with the victim outside his house and after awhile one
of the trio shot the victim, another one went inside his house and took his M-
16 Armalite, while the accused took the victim's service pistol which was
tucked in his waist. It was contended that robbery was not the primary motive
because if this had been their intention, they would have robbed the victim of
his guns the first time they came. Indeed, the trial court said that the groups'
purpose in looking for the victim was to "confront [him] about something." But
the contention was dismissed. Finding the accused guilty of robbery with
homicide, this Court said:
"[T]here is no reasonable doubt that a principal (though not necessarily the only)
objective of the malefactors was to take away the firearms in the possession of the
deceased policeman. They evidently knew that Abdulmonim had a firearm in his
house, apart from the handgun tucked in his waist; Jerry Hayudini promptly and
unerringly went inside the Aspi house and secured the M-16 armalite, while appellant
pulled out the handgun from Abdulmonim's waist."
4. Now as to the penalty. Republic Act No. 7659, which took effect
December 31, 1993, amended Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code as
follows:
"Sec. 9. Article 294 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
'Article 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons - Penalties. -
Any person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any
person shall suffer:
'1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall
have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson."'
It provides in Section 23:
"SEC. 23. Article 62 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as
follows:
'Art. 62. Effects of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of
habitual delinquency.- Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual
delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of diminishing or increasing
the penalty in conformity with the following rules:
'1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially
punishable by law or which are included by the law in defining a crime and
prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the purpose of
increasing the penalty.
'1(a). When the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offender of his
public position, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum regardless of
mitigating circumstances.
'The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person
who belongs to an organized/syndicated crime group.
'An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons
collaborating, confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in
the commission of any crime. x x x"'
On the basis of these provisions, the trial court imposed on accused-
appellant the death penalty.
We hold that the trial court erred in finding that accused-appellant and his
companions constituted a syndicated or an organized crime group within the
meaning of Article 62, as amended. While it is true they confederated and
mutually helped one another for the purpose of gain, there is no proof that
they were a group organized for the general purpose of committing crimes for
gain, which is the essence of a syndicated or organized crime group.
The following exchange between Senator Tolentino and Senator
Guingona during the deliberation on what is now Art. 62, paragraph 1(a) of the
Revised Penal Code is enlightening:
[45]

"Senator Guingona. May we know the difference between the offense committed by a
syndicated crime group and one which is committed by conspiracy of two or more
persons.
"Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, the syndicated crime is something like an offense by a
group actually for gain purposes. In case of conspiracy, that is not necessarily so.
"Senator Guingona. So that, that is the only difference.
"Senator Tolentino. The difference, of course, is that in the case of syndicated crime, the
group is an organized group, while such organization is not required in the case of
mere conspiracy. Two or more persons just agree to commit a crime, we have a
conspiracy, while in the case of a syndicate there is a group that is actually organized
for crime purposes.
"Senator Guingona. How about the difference between the syndicated group and a band in
case of specific crimes against persons and property?
"Senator Tolentino. Well, in the case of a band that means all of them participate in the
commission of the offense. All the members, I think, four or more participate in the
commission of the offense. But in the case of a syndicated crime, maybe one member
of the group alone commits a crime, while in the organized group one or two members
may commit the crime.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Senator Guingona. Yes, but as can be gleaned from the answer of the distinguished
Sponsor, only those who actually commit the offense would be the one liable for this
aggravating circumstance. Those who know but do not participate are not principals,
and even if they are members of the syndicate, they will not be held liable.
"My question is: Would the same situation not arise if we say that conspiracy would qualify
the offense instead of having a syndicated crime here where the member of the
syndicated group, who does not participate, is not liable?
"Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, I think the concept of syndicate here is different from
conspiracy. Two or more persons may conspire to commit robbery. All right. That is a
particular offense. But in the case of a syndicate, the concept here is a group that is
organized for commission of crimes, not only a particular crime, but of crimes. So,
there is a big difference between the conspiracy and the syndicate.
"Now, if the idea of the distinguished President Pro Tempore is to make the mere fact of
conspiracy an aggravating circumstance, well, that is another matter. We can have
that as a proposal later on. But mere conspiracy does not constitute a syndicate as
conceived in this provision that we are presenting.
"Senator Guingona. So that if two or more persons get together and decide to commit one
crime only, that is not a syndicate.
"Senator Tolentino. That is not a syndicate. That is a conspiracy.
"xxx xxx xxx
"Senator Guingona. That is why under the circumstances, if there is a conspiracy to sell
prohibited drugs, under the principle of conspiracy, the liability of the seller would be
equally applied to the liability of the financier or to the importer.
"Senator Tolentino. But if they are not syndicate, there is no aggravating
circumstance. They are all liable equally, but there is no aggravating circumstance.
"Senator Guingona. Precisely. Can we not change or instead of amending the conspiracy
concept, apply that and say that conspiracy will now be considered as the qualifying
aggravating circumstance? In that way, all will have the same liability, and it is up to
the individual person to put up the defense and say: 'I did not know. I was a part of the
syndicate, but I was only doing something that I thought was confined to this.'
"Senator Tolentino. Mr. President, if what the distinguished Gentleman means that instead
of 'who belongs to an organized or syndicated crime group, we just have to say 'who is
a part of conspiracy, that will not carry the intent of this provision. Because that
means, whenever there is an agreement between two or more persons to commit a
particular crime at one time, we already increase the penalty. That is not the idea of
this. The idea of this proposal is that this group actually engages in the commission of
crimes, not just a particular crime.
"As in the case already mentioned by the distinguished Gentleman, there is a
syndicate, but one group commits the crime of selling; another group commits the
crime of importing; another group commits the crime of planting drugs. There are
different crimes committed by a single group that is organized for that purpose.
"But when we talk of conspiracy, we mean an agreement between two or more
persons to commit a particular crime. I do not think the Gentleman can raise that to a
level of making it an aggravating circumstance because there is no reason for it. The
reason in the syndicated crime is that it is practically a profession that is being
adopted by a group.
"Senator Guingona. Must there be more than one offense planned?
"Senator Tolentino. Maybe, several in the future, not in a particular instance.
"Here is a syndicate that may commit one crime now; another crime tomorrow;
another crime two days afterwards. It is really a crime group."
What emerges from this discussion is the idea of a group of persons, at
least two in number, which is organized for the purpose of committing crimes
for gain. In the case at bar, while the evidence shows that accused-appellant
and his companions planned to rob the Saycons, there is no evidence that
they were organized for the purpose of committing crimes for gain. There was
a conspiracy to commit robbery but not a syndicated or organized crime
group.
The foregoing is the opinion of nine (9) members of the Court, five (5) of
whom believe that the aggravating circumstance of nighttime should have
been appreciated by the trial court. To them it is clear that accused-appellant
and his companions waited until it was midnight of April 10, 1994 before
carrying out their plan, the better to ensure its success. As earlier noted,
three of accused-appellant's companions (Alcober, Clariza and Demson)
arrived at 7:00 o'clock in the evening of April 10, 1994 in the house of
accused-appellant. But the group did not then go into action. At 10:00 o'clock
the other two (Aruta and Caenghog) arrived to join the group. Still the group
did not strike. They waited until midnight before they did. All the time, the
group was looking over the wall, Evidently accused-appellant and his group
were waiting until the occupants of the house had retired for the night. Even
viewed objectively, it can be said that nighttime greatly facilitated the
commission of the crime because with people asleep, the possibility of
resistance from the occupants of the house and help from the neighbors was
considerably diminished. As held in People v. Alcala:
[46]

"While it does not positively appear that the accused sought the nighttime for the
perpetration of the crime, the fact is that they at least took advantage of it, for they
approached the house at an early time, and yet they did not commit the crime until late
in the night. This is sufficient in order that the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity
may be held to exist. (U.S. vs. Billedo, 32 Phil., 574.)"
Since there is no mitigating circumstance to offset the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime, in the opinion of the five (5) Justices the greater
penalty (i.e., death) must be imposed on accused-appellant, in accordance
with Article 63, paragraph 2, no. 1 which provides that when only an
aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of an offense, the
penalty for which is composed of two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty
should be imposed.
Since the votes of the five (5) Justices fall short of the majority of eight (8)
votes needed to affirm the sentence of death of the trial court, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on accused-appellant in accordance
with Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659.
On the other hand, four (4) of the Justices, while holding that accused-
appellant is guilty of robbery with homicide, do not agree that nighttime was
sought in this case in order to facilitate the commission of the crime and
therefore they vote to impose on accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
The remaining six (6) other Justices believe that accused-appellant is
guilty only of the separate crimes of homicide and physical injuries. Of these
six, four (4) believe that nighttime should be appreciated as an aggravating
circumstance, while two (2) do not think it should. Two (2) of the six (6)
Justices, with whom the other four (4) concurred (so far as the two find the
crimes committed to be homicide and physical injuries), expressed different
reasons for their dissents. One said:
[1] "In People vs. Galit (135 SCRA 465 [1985]), it was held that to satisfy the
constitutional guarantees accorded a person under custodial investigation, 'there
should be several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple
words.' The warning given to the accused-appellant in the form of two paragraphs
falls short of this requirement. He was not informed by the investigator of his right to
acompetent and independent counsel of his choice. Neither was he asked whether
he has a counsel of his choice, nor was he given an opportunity to look for one."
[2] "My reading of the PAGPAUBAYA suggests that he waived not just the right to
remain silent but also the right to counsel. However, as can be gleaned from his
certification, Atty. Abrenica did nothing as aprocured lawyer; he remained as a mere
stolid witness to an act of a lowly taho vendor, which could seal the latter's destiny
with death. [The Constitution] requires of the counsel a meaningful presence
consisting of a sincere effort to explain further to the subject the significance, import,
and consequences of the waiver."
[3] "Even assuming that the extrajudicial confession spoke the truth and was not
extracted by means of violence or intimidation, the denial of the accused-appellant's
right to a competent and independent counsel or the absence of effective legal
assistance when he waived his constitutional rights rendered the confession
inadmissible pursuant to Section 12(3), Article II of the 1987 Constitution."
The other said:
[1] "The NBI ought to have given him reasonable opportunity to get a lawyer of his
confidence thru his family or friends before extracting his confession. The police
practice of calling any lawyer on-sight to assist a suspect under custodial
investigation should be discontinued. x x x For generally, these on-sight lawyers
give their services free and understandably lack the enthusiasm to defend the rights
of an accused. Atty. Abrenica appears to belong to this variety. x x x The records
do not show how well he advised appellant of his rights. Indeed, he did not even
appear during the trial to enlighten the court of the extent of his legal services to the
appellant. When the crime is heinous and punishable by death, it behooves this
Court to be strict in safeguarding the right to counsel of the accused. It can spell the
difference between life and death."
[2] "Even assuming that the appellant was not denied the right to counsel, x x x he
should only be convicted for the separate crimes of homicide and physical
injuries. x x x They failed to consummate their conspiracy because of the
intervention of security guard Felipe "Philip" Climaco and houseboy Joey
Rodriguez. On the occasion of said attempted robbery, accused-appellant and his
companions stabbed Climaco and Rodriguez. Climaco died while Rodriguez
sustained serious physical injuries. x x x
"The taking of Climaco's gun cannot be complexed with the stabbing of Climaco and
Rodriguez to constitute robbery with homicide. Before they entered the premises, the
group had no intention of robbing Climaco of his gun. It was only Darius, one of the
companions of accused-appellant, who seized Climaco's gun after they had killed
him. His act was merely an afterthought. x x x
"The facts in People vs. Tolentino and People vs. Hasiron are different from the case
at bar. In those cases, the intent to rob the victims is clear and the killing was only
incidental to the robbery. x x x
"The taking [by another malefactor] of Climaco's gun constitutes theft. Be that as it
may, accused-appellant cannot be held liable for theft because that is not the object of
the conspiracy. The evidence shows that the group only conspired to rob the Saycon
residence. The rule is that conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the
conspiracy. x x x"
WHEREFORE, the decision of Branch 104 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, so far as it finds the accused-appellant guilty of robbery with
homicide is, AFFIRMED with the modification that the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is imposed on him for lack of necessary votes to affirm the death
sentence.
SO ORDERED.



ABALLE V PEOPLE
G.R. No. L-64086 March 15, 1990
PETER PAUL ABALLE Y MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HONORABLE JUDGE BERNARDO V.
SALUDARES, respondents.
Faustino C. Fanlo counsel de oficio for petitioner.

FERNAN, C.J .:
This is a direct appeal from the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Davao City,
Branch II, finding petitioner Peter Paul Aballe y Mendoza guilty of homicide and sentencing
him to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to
sixteen (16) years of reclusion temporal with all the accessory penalties and ordering him to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Jennie Banguis y Aquino in the amount of P12,000.00
and to pay the amount of P5,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.
1

At around seven o'clock in the evening of November 7, 1980 in Saypon, Toril, Davao City,
Quirino Banguis, a 42-year old driver, attended a birthday party at the residence of his
neighbor Aguilles Mora. He brought along his
wife and other children, leaving his 12-year-old daughter Jennie alone in their house.
2

Upon their return at around 8:30 that same night, Quirino found Jennie in the sala, lying
prostrate, bathed in her own blood with multiple wounds on different parts of her body.
There were no eyewitnesses to the bizarre killing.
The postmortem report disclosed that Jennie sustained a total of thirty-two (32) stab
wounds. Cause of death was attributed to hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds.
3

At daybreak of the following day, November 8, 1980, acting on information furnished by the
victim's father, a police team headed by Sergeant Herminigildo Marante sought the accused
Peter Paul Aballe for questioning. They found him just as he was coming out of the
communal bathroom in Saypon and wearing what appeared to be a bloodstained T-shirt.
Upon seeing Sgt. Marante, the accused without anyone asking him, orally admitted that he
killed Jennie Banguis. Sgt. Marante subsequently brought him to the Toril police station for
interrogation.
While under custodial investigation, Aballe, 17 years old, a school dropout (he finished
second year high school) and next door neighbor of the victim, brought the police to his
house and pointed to them the pot at the "bangera" where he had concealed the death
weapon which was a four-inch kitchen knife.
4
Also taken from Aballe was the bloodstained
red and white striped T-shirt which he claimed he wore during the commission of the
crime.
5
Aballe also made an extrajudicial confession admitting his guilt in killing Jennie
while under the influence of liquor and marijuana.
6
The sworn affidavit in the main reads as
follows:
Preliminary Question: Mr. Aballe, you are under investigation in
connection with an offense. Any statement you may give may
be use (sic) for or against you in court in the future. Under our
New Constitution, you have the right to remain silent and the
right to the presence and assistance of a counsel of your own
choice, do you understand? Do you waive all these rights?
Answer: Yes sir.
Q After apprising you of your rights under our new Constitution,
do you still wish to proceed with this investigation?
A Yes sir.
Q Are you willing to waive all these rights?
A Yes sir. . . .
Q If so will you please state your name and other personal
circumstances.
A Peter Paul Aballe y Mendoza, 17 years old, single, a high
school drop out, jobless and presently residing at Saypon,
Crossing Bayabas, Toril, Davao City.
Q Are you aware on why you are in this Office?
A I am here sir in connection with the death of a minor JENNY
BANGUIS Y AQUINO, our neighbor in the night of November 7,
1980.
Q What do you know about the death of the said JENNY
BANGUIS?
A I was the one who killed her sir while she was sleeping alone
at their residence by stabbing her with the use of a kitchen
knife for several times while I was under the influence of liquor
and marijuana at about 6:30 P.M. November 7, 1980.
Q Where did you get the said marijuana you were referring to?
A From one alias Dodong Flores who sold it to me for Fifteen
pesos (P15.00) per match box.
Q Showing you this kitchen knife and this blooded (sic) T-shirt,
(Investigator showing the subject a kitchen knife measuring
about (4) inches in length with a wooden handle and a striped
T-shirt with blood stains) can you identify this (sic)?
A That is the very same knife sir I used in stabbing JENNY
BANGUlS and that was the T-shirt I wore during the incident.
Q Do you have any standing grudge with the said JENNY?
A No sir, for I only stabbed her when she slapped me after I
woke her up at their residence where she was sleeping alone.
Q You mean to say that you just stabbed her because she
slapped you when you woke her up?
A Yes sir, and I was not at my right sense for I was under
influence of liquor and the marijuana I took.
Q After you have stabbed her, where did you go?
A I went to watch television at the residence of one Alias Ma at
Saypon, Crossing Bayabas, Toril, Davao City and I only knew
that the said JENNY BANGUIS was dead the morning after and
I was apprehended by the Police and was brought to this office.
Q I have no more to ask, do you have something more to say in
investigation?
A No more sir.
Q Are you willing to affix your signature in this statement
signifying veracity to the best of your knowledge and belief ?
A Yes sir, . . . .
7

Whereupon, an information was filed against Aballe, charging him with homicide penalized
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
8
At his arraignment on April 13, 1981, he
pleaded not guilty.
9
He also disavowed his extrajudicial confession on the ground that it
was obtained through coercion and in the absence of counsel.
Aballe's repudiation of his earlier confession notwithstanding, the trial court convicted the
accused of the crime of homicide.
10

In this petition for review on certiorari, Aballe contends that the trial court erred in giving full
weight to his extrajudicial confession taken during custodial investigation and in imposing a
penalty which was not in accordance with law.
The argument that Aballe's extrajudicial admission should have been disregarded by the
lower court for having been obtained in violation of Aballe's constitutional rights is well
taken. Throughout the custodial interrogation, the accused's parents and relatives were
almost always around but at no stage of the entire proceedings was it shown that the
youthful offender was ever represented by counsel. Since the execution of the extrajudicial
statement
11
was admittedly made in the absence of counsel, whether de oficio or de parte,
and the waiver of counsel was not made with the assistance of counsel as mandated by the
provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, said confession should have
been discarded by the lower court.
12

Indeed, equally inadmissible is the kitchen knife
13
recovered from Aballe after his capture
and after the police had started to question him. Together with the extrajudicial confession,
the fatal weapon is but a fruit of a constitutionally infirmed interrogation and must
consequently be disallowed. The bloodstained T-shirt,
14
however, is admissible, being in
the nature of an evidence in plain view
15
which an arresting officer may take and introduce
in evidence. The prevailing rule in this jurisdiction is that "an officer making an arrest may
take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which was
used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the
prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping, or which may be used in
evidence in the trial of the cause . . ."
16

But even with the exclusion of the extrajudicial confession and the fatal weapon we agree
with the trial court that the guilt of the accused has been established beyond reasonable
doubt. It is well to note that even before the taking of the extrajudicial confession, the
accused, upon being picked up in the morning of November 8, 1980 as he was coming out
of the communal bathroom and wearing a T-shirt covered with bloodstains which he tried to
cover with his hands, suddenly broke down and knelt before Sgt. Marante and confessed
that he killed Jennie Banguis. The testimony of Sgt. Marante on Aballe's oral confession is
competent evidence to positively link the accused to the aforesaid killing. His testimony
reads in part:
Q: In the morning of November 8, 1980, where were you at that
time?
A: At the police station.
Q: And could you tell us of any unusual incident?
A: The father of the deceased came to the office and he told us
that he suspected somebody whom he observed to be
suspicious so we responded immediately to the call of
assistance of the father and went back to the scene of the
incident and asked for the whereabouts of the person whom he
confided to us the name.
Q: And what did you find out?
A: Somebody told us that the subject was still in a common
bathroom so I posted myself outside the bathroom.
Q: This subject you are referring to Sgt. Marante, who is he?
A: Peter Paul Aballe.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And after finding out that . . . ah, by the way, where was the
bathroom?
A: It was a common bathroom located just a few meters away
from infront of his house.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And when you found out that the subject was still in the
bathroom what did you do?
A: I waited until he came out.
Q: And did that person come outside?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Is he the accused?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened next?
A: I saw bloodstains in his T-shirt and I pointed to the
bloodstain and he tried to cover it and I notice again that he
had a swollen knuckle and I asked him what is this and then
he broke down, held my hand, knelt down and confessed that
he was the one who killed the victim and I said you stop that
because whatever you will say now might led (sic) you to jail
and he continued and so I asked him where is (sic) his parents
and the mother was nowhere to be found and I asked for his
relatives and they accompanied him to the police station. At the
police station the mother later arrived and I told her that your
son confessed to the commission of the crime.
Q: And in the station what did you do per your procedure?
A: As I was appraising (sic) him or asking him in front of her
(sic) mother I still repeated the same thing. I appraised (sic)
him if he needs a lawyer and he said he does not need a
lawyer because he just wanted to tell the truth. And in the
course, I called the desk officer to record what he mentioned as
to the commission of the crime.
Q: Aside from the admission of the accused in this case what
other physical objects of the crime were you able to recover?
A: I was able to recover the fatal weapon, the knife.
Q: Where?
A: From the house of the accused.
Q: Who gave it to you?
A: The accused himself.
Q: What else?
A: The T-shirt with bloodstain.
Q: Where is the knife now?
A: In the possession of the desk officer in Toril.
Q: And also the T-shirt?
A: Yes sir.
Q: So after interviewing the accused, what other procedure
followed?
A: The accused was indorsed to the office investigator to take
down the statement of said accused.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When did you apprehend the accused, while he was inside
or already outside the bathroom?
A: He was coming out.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What was he wearing?
A: T-shirt with bloodstain on the breast that is why I asked him
immediately what is this and I pointed to the bloodstain.
Q: Mr. Marante you immediately asked or rather you informed
the accused immediately of the death of Jennie Banguis after
getting out of the bathroom?
A: He confessed to me.
Q: You just answer the question, did you inform him?
A: No, I did not.
Q: So without informing him about it as you said he
immediately confessed.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: At that time were you in your police uniform?
A: No, I was in civilian.
Q: Without even introducing yourself at that time is was only
after bringing the accused to the police station did he know that
you were a Deputy District Commander of the police in Toril?
A: Probably yes.
17

"The declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt of the offenses charged
may be given in evidence against him."
18

The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is
competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard and understood all of
it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its
substance. (23 C.J.S. 196)
19

Compliance with the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation is not applicable to
a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning, but given in an ordinary manner,
whereby the accused orally admitted having slain the victim.
20

The penalty decreed by the lower court must however be modified. The killing of Jennie is
mitigated by minority (the accused was born on June 29, 1963), but it is aggravated by
dwelling since Jennie was fatally stabbed while in her parents' house, a fact overlooked by
the trial court. Not having been alleged in the information, dwelling is considered generic
and cannot therefore offset minority which is a privileged mitigating circumstance.
The imposable penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
is reclusion temporal. For being only 17 years, 4 months and 8 days of age at the time of
the commission of the offense, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed on the accused but always in the proper period. With the aggravating circumstance
of dwelling, the penalty is imposable in its maximum period or from ten (10) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years or prision mayor maximum.
21
Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the range of the penalty next lower is from six (6) months and one (1) day to
six (6) years of prision correccional.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is hereby AFFIRMED with the penalty
modified to an indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor as maximum. The civil indemnity is increased to
P30,000.00 in accordance with recent jurisprudence. Costs against the accused Peter Paul
Aballe.
SO ORDERED.


PEOPLE V CAGUIAO
G.R. No. L-38975 January 17, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO P. CAGUIOA Judge, Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch VII,
and PAQUITO YUPO,respondents.
Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente for petitioner.
Edelmiro A. Amante for private respondent.

FERNANDO, C.J .:
It is not easy to make out a case of improvident exercise of authority on the part of a lower
court when the assailed actuation was clearly inspired by a desire to adhere to the literal
and explicit mandate of the Constitution. That is the difficulty confronting the prosecution
when it filed this certiorari proceeding resulting from respondent Judge Eduardo P. Caguioa
sustaining the objection of the defense to questions asked a witness based on an alleged
extrajudicial admission by an accused private respondent Paquito Yupo, during a police
interrogation conducted on July 18, 1973, without his having been assisted by counsel.
There was, in the opinion of respondent Judge, a clear failure to abide by the express
prohibition in the fundamental law against the possibility of any confession obtained from a
person under investigation without his having been informed of his right to keep silent and
to have the benefit of counsel.
1
Clearly then, the leading case of Magtoto v.
Manguera 2 does not apply. the interrogation having taken place six months after the
effectivity Of the present Constitution. The prosecution would deny its applicability,
contending that there was a waiver. Respondent Judge was of the view that this innovation
in the Constitution, intended to buttress and fortify the right against self-incrimination, was
not susceptible of waiver. When he remained firm in his stand, the petition was filed, a
grave abuse of discretion being imputed to him.
According to the petition, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed on September 14, 1973, in
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, an information for murder against Paquito Yupo y
Gonzales, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 146-V-73, with the case, after the
raffle, being assigned to Branch VIII, presided by respondent Judge.
3
Upon arraignment on
October 5, 1973, the accused pleaded not guilty.
4
The trial of the case then proceeded, the
prosecution having presented six witnesses, including the father of the deceased, Miguel
Tribol, and his common-law wife, Lydia Begnotia who allegedly received the ante
mortem statement of the victim, Rodolfo Tribol.
5
Then, at the hearing on June 3, 1974, the
prosecution presented Corporal Conrado Roca of the Meycauayan Police Department,
before whom a written statement of the accused Paquito Yupo and his alleged waiver of his
right to remain silent and to be assisted by a counsel of his own choice was taken.
6
After
this witness had Identified the statement of the accused and the waiver, he was questioned
on the incriminating answers in such statement to the police, but there was an objection on
the part of the defense counsel based on the ground of such statement being inadmissible
in evidence, as the statement was taken by the police without any counsel assisting the
accused in the investigation.
7
Respondent Judge sustained the objection of the defense on
the view that such judicial confession of the accused is inadmissible in evidence for being
unconstitutional, it appearing that the accused was not assisted by a counsel when it was
given.
8
He likewise stated that such right could not be waived.
9
Upon his refuse to
reconsider such ruling, this petition was filed.
Certiorari does not lie. The petition must be dismissed. It was not shown that the alleged
waiver was given freely and voluntarily. The questioning was rather perfunctory. An even
more telling circumstance against such alleged waiver being given credence was that
private respondent, a native of Samar, then nineteen years old, was interrogated
extensively in Tagalog, no showing having been made that his acquaintance with the
language was such that he could fully understand the import of what was asked him. On the
specific question of whether or not the right to counsel during custodial interrogation
interrogation may be waived, the Court rules that there is no bar to such a waiver if made
intelligently and voluntarily, with full understanding of its consequences.
1. As far back as Abriol v. Homeres,
10
a 1949 decision, decided under the 1935
Constitution, which did not contain a provision similar to Section 20 which adopted the
Miranda doctrine, this Court, through Justice Ozaeta, relying on the leading American case
of Johnson v. Zerbst,
11
made clear that while there could be a waiver of the rights of an
accused, it must be intelligently waived, otherwise a court's jurisdiction starting at the
banning of the trial may be lost in the course of the proceeding.
12
The landmark opinion
of Miranda v. Arizona,
13
decided in 1966, as noted above, the source of this constitutional
provision, emphasized that statements made during the period of custodial interrogation to
be admissible require a clear intelligent waiver of constitutional rights, the suspect being
warned prior to questioning that he has a right to remain silent, that any utterance may be
used against him and that he has the right to the presence of a counsel, either retained or
appointed. In the language of Chief Justice Warren: "Our holding win be spelled out with
some specificity in the pages which follow, but briefly stated, it is this: the prosecution may
not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards
effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation, we
mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the
procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to
inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must
be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does not make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either
retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of those rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any
manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before
speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in
any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The
mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on
his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until
he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned."
14

2. Tested by such a clear and unequivocal standard, the alleged waiver falls far short. It is
clearly inadmissible. There was a perfunctory opening statement asked by a certain
Corporal Conrado B. Roca of the Police Force of Meycauayan, worded thus: "Ipinaaalam ko
sa iyo na ikaw ay sinisiyasat tungkol sa isang paglabag sa batas na iyong ginawa, bago ko
ipagpatuloy ang pagtatanong sa iyo, ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag magsalita kung
ayaw mo at may karapatan ka rin na magkaroon ng abogado na iyong gusto at dapat mo
ring mabatid na anuman ang sabihin mo dito ay maaaring gamitin ng ayon o laban sa iyo,
magsasalaysay ka pa rin ba?"
15
Then came the monosyllabic answer Opo. That was ala
Even the very annex submitted to the petition merely stated that there were signatures of
private respondent Yupo, the aforesaid Roca, and a certain Roberto Sales. The day when it
was subscribed and sworn to, allegedly before Municipal Judge Mariano Mendieta was not
even specified. Again, there was a statement that it was a certified true copy by a certain
Teresita M. Tecson, whose connection with the case or with the court was not even shown.
There was no signature. There were only illegible letters, perhaps indicating that they were
the initials. The doubt that must have occurred to the police officials of Meycauayan is
evident from their submitting a one-page statement, presumably signed by the same people
and certified by the same Tecson, reading in fun as follows: "[Sa sinumang Kinauukulan
lpinabasa, ipinaalam at naintindihan ni Paquito Yupo y Gonzales], 19 na taong gulang,
binata tubo sa San Policarpio, Eastern Samar ang nasa ibaba nito '[Ikaw ay sinisiyasat
ngayon dahilan sa paglabag sa batas. Karapatan mo ang huwag magsalita. Anumang iyong
sasabihin ay maaring gamiting katibayan laban sa iyo. At ikaw ay may karapatan sa tulong
at sa pagharap ng abogado na iyong napipisil sa habila ng kabatiran ni [Paquito Yupo ng
mga nilalaman ng nasa itaas, siya ay nagbigay pa rin ng salaysay.,"
16
Could it be their way
of trying to impress on a court the fact that there was an in waiver? If so, it did not cure the
fatal infirmity. Rather the contrary.
3. People v. Bacong
17
stands as a warning against imputing to an accused an
understanding of the proceeding when the language used is one with which he is not
familiar. The point at issue was whether there was an improvident plea of guilt. It was
stressed in the brief filed on behalf of the accused that he " 'is an ignorant and illiterate
person, a neophyte in the national penitentiary, and one fully conversant [only] with his
native Visayan. This is apparent from his statement thus: "26. T Marunong ka bang bumasa
at sumulat ng wikang tagalog? & Naka uunawa po ako sir, pero hindi po ako masyadong
marunong, ang tangi ko pong naiisulat ay ang aking pangalan " ... An observation and
closer look [at] his signature indeed reveals that the accused is an illiterate and unschooled
person. The strokes of his signature are irregular, halting, and show a difficult and laborious
effort to write the letters of his name. ... In his signature on file with this Honorable Court,
the same observations can be made. ... Admittedly, the accused is a Visayan and still a
neophyte in the national penitentiary who does not understand well Tagalog. ... We cannot
expect the accused to have fully understood the legal signification of these qualifying
circumstances, which allegations had been the subject of various interpretations of our
courts. ...' "
18
As a matter of fact in that case, Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, in lieu
of appellant's brief filed a manifestation admitting that there was an improvident plea of guilt
and that judgment should be set aside. In that case, there was an effort to ascertain
whether the accused could read and write in Tagalog' In this case, the private respondent, a
Visayan, was asked a kilometric question in Tagalog, and the interrogator was satisfied with
the monosyllabic Opo. Also, the failure to submit to this Court the alleged signature of
private respondent may be indicative of the fear on the part of counsel for petitioner that the
absence of education of the nineteen-year old private respondent would be apparent. At
any rate, it cannot be denied that to predicate a waiver under the circumstances disclosed
would be to nullify the plain command of the constitutional provision requiring that a
confession to be admissible must be given only if the accused were informed of his right to
remain silent and to counsel; otherwise, it is "inadmissible in character." The lower court,
therefore, acted in accordance with the plain dictate of the Constitution. To quote from that
eminent civil libertarian Justice Douglas: "Formulas of respect for constitutional safeguards
cannot prevail over the facts of life which contradict them. They may not become a cloak for
inquisitorial practices and make an empty form of [constitutional rights]."
19

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. The trial of the case is ordered to be
resumed forthwith No costs.
Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concur in the result.
Antonio, J., concur in the dissent of Justice Aquino.


PEOPLE V MAILIMIT
[G.R. No. 109775. November 14, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE
ENCARNACION MALIMIT alias MANOLO, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
FRANCISCO, J .:
Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with
[1]
and convicted of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide,
[2]
was meted by the trial
court
[3]
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to indemnify
the heirs of Onofre Malaki the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost.
[4]

In this appeal, appellant asks for his acquittal alleging that the trial court
committed the following errors, to wit:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
UNRELIABLE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES ON
THEIR ALLEGED IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS
THE PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME DESPITE THE FACT (SIC) THEY
REVEALED THEIR ALLEGED KNOWLEDGE OF THE CRIME MORE
THAN FIVE MONTHS AFTER THE INCIDENT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE WALLET
AND ITS CONTENTS ALTHOUGH THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH LEAD
TO ITS PRODUCTION WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
[5]

The following is the recital of facts as summarized by the appellee in its
Brief, and duly supported by the evidence on record:
On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 oclock in the evening, [Onofre] Malaki was
attending to his store. Malakis houseboy Edilberto Batin, on the other hand, was busy
cooking chicken for supper at the kitchen located at the back of the store (TSN, June
19, 199 (sic), p. 14).
Soon thereafter, Florencio Rondon, a farmer, arrived at the store of Malaki. Rondon
was to purchase chemical for his rice farm (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 19). Rondon came
from his house, approximately one hundred and fifty (150) meters distant from
Malakis store (Ibid., p. 24).
Meanwhile, Batin had just finished cooking and from the kitchen, he proceeded
directly to the store to ask his employer (Malaki) if supper is to be prepared. As Batin
stepped inside the store, he was taken aback when he saw appellant coming out of the
store with a bolo (TSN, June 9, 1992, p. 14), while his boss, bathed in his own blood,
was sprawled on the floor struggling for his life (hovering between life and death)
(Ibid.).
Rondon, who was outside and barely five (5) meters away from the store, also saw
appellant Jose Malimit (or Manolo) rushing out through the front door of Malakis
store with a blood-stained bolo (TSN, May 22, 1992, p. 29). Aided by the illumination
coming from a pressure lamp (petromax) inside the store, Rondon clearly recognized
Malimit (Ibid., p. 22).
Batin immediately went out of the store to seek help. Outside the store, he met Rondon (TSN,
June 9, 1992, p. 15). After a brief conversation, both Batin and Rondon rushed to the nearby
house of Malakis brother-in-law Eutiquio Beloy and informed Beloy of the tragic incident
which befell Malaki. Batin, along with Beloy, went back to the store. Inside, they saw the lifeless
body of Malaki in a pool of blood lying prostrate at the floor. Beloy readily noticed that the
stores drawer was opened and ransacked and the wallet of Malaki was missing from his pocket
(Ibid., pp. 16-17).
[6]

In his first assignment of error, appellant questions the credibility of
prosecution witnesses Florencio Rondon and Edilberto Batin by pointing out
their alleged delay in revealing what they knew about the incident. He posits
that while the crime took place on April 15, 1991, it was only on September
17, 1991 when these witnesses tagged him as the culprit.
We find these contentions bereft of merit. Appellant haphazardly
concluded that Rondon and Batin implicated the appellant to this gruesome
crime only on September 17, 1991. The aforementioned date however, was
merely the date
[7]
when Rondon and Batin executed their respective
affidavits,
[8]
narrating that they saw the appellant on the night of April 15,
1991 carrying a bolo stained with blood and rushing out of Malakis store. As
to appellants claim of delay, suffice it to state that extant from the records are
ample testimonial evidence negating appellants protestation, to wit: (1) after
having discovered the commission of the crime, Rondon and Batin
immediately looked for Eutiquio Beloy, Malakis brother-in-law, and informed
him that appellant was the only person they saw running away from the crime
scene;
[9]
(2) Beloy and Batin reported the crime with the CAFGU detachment
in their barangay where Batin declared that it was appellant who robbed
Malaki on that fateful night;
[10]
and (3) Batin again made a similar statement
later at the Silago Police Station.
[11]

Next, appellant derided the non-presentation by the prosecution of the
police blotter which could prove if appellant was indeed implicated right away
by Batin to the crime.
[12]
We do not believe, however, that it was necessary for
the prosecution to present as evidence a copy of the aforementioned police
blotter. Neither was its non-presentation in court fatal to the prosecutions
case. Entries in the police blotter are merely corroborative evidence of the
uncontroverted testimony of Batin that he identified the appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime before the Silago police. As such, its presentation as
evidence is not indispensable.
[13]
Besides, if appellant believed that he was not
identified therein, then he should have secured a copy thereof from the Silago
Police Station and utilized the same as controverting evidence to impeach
Batins credibility as witness.
[14]
Having failed to do so, appellant cannot now
pass the blame on the prosecution for something which appellant himself
should have done.
Even assuming arguendo that Rondon and Batin identified the appellant
only on September 15, 1991, or after the lapse of five months from
commission of the crime, this fact alone does not render their testimony less
credible. The non-disclosure by the witness to the police officers of appellants
identity immediately after the occurrence of the crime is not entirely against
human experience.
[15]
In fact the natural reticence of most people to get
involved in criminal prosecutions against immediate neighbors, as in this
case,
[16]
is of judicial notice.
[17]
At any rate, the consistent teaching of our
jurisprudence is that the findings of the trial court with regard to the credibility
of witnesses are given weight and the highest degree of respect by the
appellate court.
[18]
This is the established rule of evidence, as the matter of
assigning values to the testimony of witnesses is a function best performed by
the trial court which can weigh said testimony in the light of the witness
demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial.
[19]
And although the rule admits of
certain exceptions, namely: (1) when patent inconsistencies in the statements
of witnesses are ignored by the trial court, or (2) when the conclusions arrived
at are clearly unsupported by the evidence,
[20]
we found none in this case.
In his second assignment of error, appellant asseverates that the
admission as evidence of Malakis wallet
[21]
together with its contents, viz., (1)
Malakis residence certificate;
[22]
(2) his identification card;
[23]
and (3) bunch of
keys,
[24]
violates his right against self-incrimination.
[25]
Likewise, appellant
sought for their exclusion because during the custodial investigation, wherein
he pointed to the investigating policemen the place where he hid Malakis
wallet, he was not informed of his constitutional rights.
We are not persuaded. The right against self-incrimination guaranteed
under our fundamental law finds no application in this case. This right, as put
by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States,
[26]
x x x is a prohibition of the
use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him x x
x. It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from
the [accused]s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt.
[27]
It does not
apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incriminating statement but an object evidence. Wigmore, discussing the
question now before us in his treatise on evidence, thus, said:
If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control of his] own
vocal utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever form exercise, then, it would be
possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of his
crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained
by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles
a clear reduction ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel
of the privilege, *** but testimonial compulsion.
[28]

Neither are we prepared to order the exclusion of the questioned pieces of
evidence pursuant to the provision of the Constitution under Article III, Section
12, viz:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
x x x x x x x x x.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Sec. 17
hereof, shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.(Underscoring ours.)
x x x x x x x x x
These are the so-called Miranda rights so oftenly disregarded by our
men in uniform. However, infractions thereof render inadmissible only the
extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial investigation. The
admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is
not otherwise excluded by law or rules,
[29]
is not affected even if obtained or
taken in the course of custodial investigation. Concededly, appellant was not
informed of his right to remain silent and to have his own counsel by the
investigating policemen during the custodial investigation. Neither did he
execute a written waiver of these rights in accordance with the constitutional
prescriptions. Nevertheless, these constitutional short-cuts do not affect the
admissibility of Malakis wallet, identification card, residence certificate and
keys for the purpose of establishing other facts relevant to the crime. Thus,
the wallet is admissible to establish the fact that it was the very wallet taken
from Malaki on the night of the robbery. The identification card, residence
certificate and keys found inside the wallet, on the other hand, are admissible
to prove that the wallet really belongs to Malaki. Furthermore, even
assumingarguendo that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the same
will not detract from appellants culpability considering the existence of other
evidence and circumstances establishing appellants identity and guilt as
perpetrator of the crime charged.
We, now come to appellants third assignment of error where he demurs
on the prosecutions evidence, contending that they are insufficient to sustain
his conviction.
Our close scrutiny of the record reveals otherwise. Time and again, we
ruled that there can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial
evidence when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads
to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion
of all the others, as the perpetrator of the crime.
[30]
In order that circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these
essential requisites, viz., (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts
from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of
all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
[31]
In this case, there were at least five (5) circumstances constituting an
unbroken chain of events which by their concordant combination and
cumulative effect, satisfy the requirements for the conviction of the
appellant,
[32]
specifically: (1) appellant was seen by Rondon and Batin, whose
credibilities were untarnished, holding a bolo in his right hand and rushing out
of Malakis store seconds prior to their discovery of the crime;
[33]
(2) Malaki
sustained multiple stab wounds
[34]
and he died of cardiac arrest, secondary to
severe external hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds;
[35]
(3) witness
Elmer Ladica saw the appellant on August 6, 1991, accompanied by some
policemen, retrieve Malakis wallet underneath a stone at the seashore in
Barangay Hingatungan;
[36]
(4) appellant himself admitted in his testimony that
on August 6, 1991, he accompanied several policemen to the seashore where
he hid Malakis wallet;
[37]
and (5) appellants flight and his subsequent
disappearance from Hingatungan immediately after the incident.
[38]

On the other hand, appellants version of the story does not inspire belief.
He maintains that on that fateful night he was in his house together with his
wife. He claims that they had just arrived from a gambling spree allegedly in
the house of a certain Maui Petalcorin. Surprisingly, however, the defense did
not bother to call appellants wife to the witness stand to corroborate
appellants alibi. Neither did it present as witness Maui Petalcorin, or any other
person who may have seen the appellant in the said place, if only to provide a
semblance of truth to this assertion. As the defense of alibi is weak in view of
the positive identification of the appellant by the prosecution witnesses,
[39]
it
becomes weaker because of the unexplained failure of the defense to present
any corroboration.
[40]
Furthermore, proof that appellant was in his house when
the crime was committed is not enough. Appellant must likewise demonstrate
that he could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or in
its vicinity, at the time of its commission.
[41]
In this case, appellant himself
admitted that his house was just about eighty (80) meters away from the
house of Malaki.
[42]
It was, therefore, not impossible for him to have been
physically present at the place of the commission of the crime, as in fact, no
evidence to negate this possibility was ever adduced by him at the trial.
Appellants insistence that he merely found Malakis wallet by chance
while gathering shells along the seashore, and that he feared being implicated
in the crime for which reason he hid the wallet underneath a stone, hardly
inspires belief. We are at a loss, just as the trial court was, as to why appellant
should fear being implicated in the crime if indeed he merely found Malakis
wallet by chance. No inference can be drawn from appellants purported
apprehension other than the logical conclusion that appellant had knowledge
of the crime. Besides, proof that appellant is in possession of a stolen property
gives rise to a valid presumption that he stole the same.
[43]

In fine, as the killing of Malaki took place on the occasion of robbery,
appellant was correctly convicted by the trial court of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.



MARCELO V SANDIGANBAYAN
[G.R. No. 109242. January 26, 1999]
LITO C. MARCELO, petitioner, vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (First
Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J .:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Lito Marcelo from a decision of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division)
[1]
convicting him and two others of qualified theft. The
information against them alleges
That on or about February 17, 1989, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused,
ARNOLD PASICOLAN, a public officer, being then an Emergency Laborer assigned
as bag opener at the printed matters section of Makati Central Post Office, and taking
advantage of his official position by having access to the mail matters in conspiracy
with accused RONNIE S. ROMERO and LITO MARCELO, both private individuals,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with grave abuse of
confidence, and with intent of gain and without the consent of the owners thereof,
take, steal and carry away from the Central Post office of Makati one bag containing
assorted mail matters some of them containing U.S. Dollar Bills in the aggregate
amount of $500, or its peso equivalent in the amount of P11,000.00, Philippine
Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the different addressee (sic) or the
government in the aforesaid mentioned (sic) amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The facts established during the trial show the following:
On February 10, 1989, Jacinto Merete, a letter carrier in the Makati Central Post Office,
disclosed to his chief, Projecto Tumagan, the existence of a group responsible for the pilferage
of mail matter in the post office.
[2]
Among those mentioned by Merete were Arnold
Pasicolan, an emergency laborer assigned as a bag opener in the Printed Matters Section, and
Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter of the Makati Post Office. Merete likewise described the
modus operandi of the group.
For this reason, Tumagan sought the aid of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in
apprehending the group responsible for mail pilferage in the Makati Post Office.
On February 17, 1989, NBI Director Salvador Ranin dispatched NBI agents to Legaspi
Village following a report that the group would stage a theft of mail matter on that day. Tumagan
accompanied a team of NBI agents composed of Senior Agent Arles Vela and two other agents
in a private car. They arrived at Legaspi Village at about 1:00 p.m. They stayed at the corner of
Adelantado and Gamboa Streets, while two other teams of NBI agents waited at Amorsolo
Street, near the Esguerra Building.
[3]

At 2:00 p.m., a postal delivery jeep, driven by one Henry Orindai, was parked in front of the
Esguerra Building on Adelantado Street.
[4]
Esguerra Building is located between Adelantado and
Amorsolo Streets. Adelantado and Amorsolo Streets are parallel to each other. The passengers
of the postal delivery jeep were Arnold Pasicolan, Jacinto Merete, and the driver, Henry
Orindai.
[5]
Pasicolan alighted from the jeep bringing with him a mail bag. Merete stayed inside
the jeep. Pasicolan then passed through an alley between Esguerra and Montepino Buildings
going towards Amorsolo St.
[6]
Montepino Building is adjacent to Esguerra Building. The two are
separated by the alley. Upon reaching Amorsolo St., Pasicolan gave the mail bag to two persons,
who were later identified as Ronnie Romero and petitioner Lito Marcelo. The latter transferred
the contents of the mail bag (i.e., assorted mail matter) to a travelling bag. The two then secured
the bag to the back of their motorcycle.
[7]

Meanwhile, the NBI team led by agent Vela, upon seeing Pasicolan going towards
Amorsolo St., moved their car and started towards Amorsolo St. They were just in time to see
Pasicolan handing over the mail bag to Marcelo and Romero.
[8]
At that point, Atty. Sacaguing
and Arles Vela arrested the two accused.
Unaware of the arrest of Romero and Marcelo, Pasicolan went back to the postal delivery
jeep and proceeded toward Pasay Road. The NBI agents followed the postal delivery jeep,
overtook it, and arrested Pasicolan.
[9]

The NBI agents brought Pasicolan, Marcelo, and Romero to their headquarters. They also
brought along with them the motorcycle of Romero and Marcelo and the bag of unsorted mail
found in their possession.
[10]
On their way to the NBI headquarters, they passed by the Makati
Central Post Office, intending to arrest another suspect, Redentor Aguinaldo. However, they
were not able to find him there.
[11]

The unsorted mail seized from Marcelo and Romero consisted of 622 letters.
[12]
The names
of the addressees were listed. They were subsequently notified by the Bureau of Posts to claim
their letters. Many of them, after proper identification, were able to claim their letters. Some
letters contained money.
Romero, Marcelo, and Pasicolan were asked to affix their signatures on the envelopes of the
letters. They did so in the presence of the members of the NBI Administrative and Investigative
Staff and the people transacting business with the NBI at that time. According to Director Ranin,
they required the accused to do this in order to identify the letters as the very same letters
confiscated from them.
[13]

NBI Director Ranin allegedly saw US dollar bills in various denominations of 20, 50, and
100 dollars.
[14]
Vela and the other NBI agents stated in their affidavits that there were dollar bills
in the letters which, if converted to Philippine pesos, at the then exchange rate of P22 to US $1,
were worth P11,000.00.
[15]
The addressees agreed to leave the envelopes of the letters with the
NBI. Those letters which were not claimed were opened in court in the presence of the counsel
for the defense. The letters were found to contain three (3) one dollar bills, one (1) five dollar
bill, one (1) twenty dollar bill, a check for twenty-five dollars, and fifty (50) Saudi Arabian
riyals.
[16]

Arnold Pasicolan, Ronnie Romero, and herein petitioner Lito Marcelo were charged with
infidelity in the custody of documents. The case was later withdrawn and another information
for qualified theft was filed before the Sandiganbayan.
On March 8, 1993, the Sandiganbayan found all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as principals of the crime of qualified theft. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the three accused, Arnold Pasicolan y Mabazza,
Ronnie Romero y Santos, and Lito Mercado [should be Marcelo] y Cruz, guilty, as
principals, beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft defined in Article
310, in conjunction with Articles 308 and 309, of the Revised Penal
Code. Accordingly, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and considering the
aggravating circumstances of taking advantage of public position, the Court imposes
upon Arnold Pasicolan y Mabazza the penalty ranging from EIGHT (8) years, EIGHT
(8) months, and ONE (1) day of Prision mayor, as minimum, to THIRTEEN (13)
YEARS, ONE (1) month, and ELEVEN (11) days of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. Applying again the Indeterminate Sentence Law and there being no
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the Court imposes upon Ronnie Romero y
Santos and Lito Marcelo y Cruz, the penalty ranging from SEVEN (7) YEARS, four
(4) months, and ONE (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eleven (11) years,
SIX (6) months, and TWENTY-ONE (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari based on the following assignment of
errors:
(1) Respondent Honorable Court had wrongly made the crucial finding against petitioner that he
has committed the act charged in conspiracy with each other.
(2) Respondent Honorable Court erred in admitting as evidence of petitioners guilt the letters
signed by the accused during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel, in
utter disregard of his constitutional right.
First. Petitioner says that since the subject of the alleged pilferage was mail matter, only a
government employee may be held guilty of qualified theft unless a private individual was
shown to have been in conspiracy with him. He contends that since he is not a government
employee, then he cannot be charged or held guilty of the crime as there is no proof that he
conspired with a postal employee. The petitioner argues that there is no evidence to prove that he
was at any time in conspiracy with the members of the syndicate inside the post office. In fact,
petitioner points out, Jacinto Merete, Projecto Tumagan, and his co-accused Arnold Pasicolan
were one in saying that it was their first time to see him and Romero on February 17, 1989.
Likewise, in the meeting allegedly conducted by the members of the syndicate, he and Romero
were not around nor were their names mentioned. Petitioner says that although he and Romero
knew each other, it was only on February 17, 1989 that they saw each other again in order to see
a movie.
We cannot understand petitioners theory that, as the subject of the pilferage was mail
matter, only a government employee, presumably of the postal service, can be held liable of
qualified theft. What makes the theft of mail matter qualified is the fact that the subject thereof
is mail matter, regardless of whether the offender is a postal employee or a private
individual. This much is clear from Art. 310 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Qualified theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by
two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if
committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property
stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from
the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is
taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance.
Thus, as long as the thing stolen is one of those enumerated in Art. 310, the crime is
qualified theft. In this case, it is mail matter. Hence, it is not necessary that petitioner be shown
to have been in conspiracy with a government employee in order to hold him liable for qualified
theft.
Be that as it may, conspiracy was proven in this case. NBI agent Arles Vela testified that
petitioner was instrumental in transferring the contents of the mail bag which Pasicolan handed
to them to their travelling bag and that afterward petitioner and his co-accused Romero tied the
bag to their motorcycle.
Velas testimony was corroborated by Projecto Tumagan, who likewise testified that
Romero and Marcelo transferred the contents of the mail bag to their bags. Although Tumagan
said petitioner and Romero had two bags, thus contradicting Velas testimony that petitioner and
his co-accused had only one bag, the inconsistency in the testimonies of these two prosecution
witnesses is not really of much importance. What is important is that Tumagan corroborated
Velas testimony that petitioner helped in putting the letters in their bag. The discrepancy could
be due to the fact that these two witnesses were inside a car and were at some distance from the
persons they were observing. At any rate, during the cross-examination, Tumagan said that the
contents of the mail bag were transferred to one other bag implying that there was really
just one bag involved.
[17]
Moreover, the defense should have confronted Tumagan with
this inconsistency and asked him to explain. For its failure to do so, the defense cannot for the
first time raise the point in this appeal.
Petitioner Marcelo showed no sign of surprise or hesitation when Pasicolan handed the mail
bag to him and Romero. It was apparent he was acting pursuant to a prior agreement because
when the mail bag was given to him, he got the bag and he and Romero then transferred its
contents to their travelling bag. Petitioner acted in concert with Pasicolan and Romero, thus
indicating he was in conspiracy with them. As the Sandiganbayan said:
The accused appear to have committed the acts charged in conspiracy with each other
pursuant to a pre-conceived plan known to all of them to attain a common goal. Thus,
when the postal delivery jeep stopped near Esguerra Building along Adelantado
Street, Pasicolan alighted bringing with him a mail bag, passed through an alley
beside Esquerra Building, and upon reaching Amorsolo Street handed over the mail
bag to Romero and Marcelo who were waiting for him. Upon receiving the mail bag
they quickly opened it and transferred its contents to a bag which Aguinaldo provided
for the purpose. No words were exchanged between Pasicolan, on the other hand, and
Romero and Marcelo, on the other, in effecting the delivery. Pasicolan did not ask if
Romero and/or Marcelo were the person or persons sent to receive the mail
bag. These facts indicate that the three accused already knew each other and were
fully aware of what each had to do. And when Romero and Marcelo were arrested for
receiving the mail bag, they said nothing to the NBI. Not even a whimper of protest
was heard from them. They appear resigned to their fate after having been caught red-
handed.
Petitioner Marcelo claimed that he and Romero met on February 17, 1989 in order to see a
movie; that when Pasicolan handed four envelopes to Romero, he was across the street buying
cigarettes; and that when he joined Romero, a person identifying himself as an NBI agent
arrested them. Marcelo testified:
[18]

ATTY. CRUZ
Q So you were asked by Ronnie Romero if you will be reporting for work at that time?
A Yes, sir.
JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA
Q What time was this when you were asked by Ronnie Romero?
A 1:00 oclock in the afternoon.
ATTY. CRUZ
Q What was the reason why you were asked by Ronnie Romero?
A He wanted me to go with him to see a movie.
Q Did he tell you at what place you will see a movie?
A No, sir.
Q What was your reply?
A I told him yes, I will go with you, anyway I have to go to my work at 10:00 oclock in the
evening.
. . . .
Q What happened next Mr. Marcelo?
A Then I rode at the back of his motorcycle and we went straight to Makati. Suddenly we stopped
near a building and I asked him what we will do there and he told me he was going to wait for
somebody there.
. . . .
ATTY. CRUZ
Q What was told to you when you reached there?
WITNESS
A He told me he had to wait for somebody there and I told him to hurry up, I thought you said we
are going to see a movie, and he said, this will not take long.
Q While at Taguig, were you informed by Ronnie Romero that you will be waiting for somebody
when you reached Makati?
A No, sir.
. . . .
Q And what happened next?
A While we were there I told Ronnie Romero I had to buy cigarette from across the street and after
a while, about half an hour, Ronnie called me I saw somebody handing him about four pieces of
envelopes.
Q How would you describe that envelope?
A It was like the Manila envelope that we see being used by the elementary grades.
Q Was there any distinguishing mark in this envelope?
A No, sir.
Q Were you able to see what was the contents of these envelopes?
A No, sir.
Q That person who handed the envelope to Ronnie, do you know him?
A I do not know him.
Q While that envelope was being handed to Ronnie, you mean to say you were across the street?
A Yes, sir.
Q And so you crossed the street to reach Ronnie?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you crossed the street was the envelope still being handed or already handed to Ronnie?
A It was already handed to him.
Q What happened next?
A After I crossed the street somebody shouted at us identifying himself as NBI, WE are from the
NBI, do not move.
The foregoing testimony is contrary to the testimony of Ronnie Romero. Romero said that
Redentor Aguinaldo, a mail sorter, had asked him to meet a person in Makati who would give
him an envelope to be delivered to an unidentified person at the BF Homes Subdivision in
Paraaque. Romeros version is as follows:
[19]

ATTY. I. CRUZ:
Q And do you know a certain person by the name of Redentor Aguinaldo?
JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA:
Q The accusation against you is that you conspired with your co-accused Arnold Pasicolan and Lito
Marcelo in stealing the articles and things stated in the Information. Why do you say that you are
not part of the conspiracy, what do you mean by that statement?
A Because, sir, I do not know what was the contents of the envelope.
You can proceed now.
ATTY. I. CRUZ:
Q You mentioned of an envelope which you claim not to have known the contents of the
same. Who gave you the envelope?
A Arnold Pasicolan.
Q Do you know Arnold Pasicolan prior to and/or before February 17, 1989?
. . . .
A No, sir.
ATTY. I. CRUZ:
Q When for the first time did you come to know Arnold Pasicolan?
A On February 17, sir.
Q When, where specifically did you come to know him?
A At the NBI office, sir.
Q Now...
JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA:
Q February 17, 1989?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Proceed.
. . . .
ATTY. I. CRUZ:
Q Do you know a certain Redentor Aguinaldo?
A Yes, sir.
JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA:
Q Tell us the circumstances under which you received this envelope?
A I received that envelope given to me by Arnold Pasicolan.
Q If you answer in monosyllable we will not understand. Alright, you tell your story?
A Redentor Aguinaldo on February 17 told me that he is going to give me a job. What I will do is
get the envelope and bring it to a certain subdivision in Las Pias and somebody will pick it up
and pay me P100.00 for it.
Proceed.
ATTY. I. CRUZ:
Q Now, do you know the person to whom you are to deliver the envelope?
A No, sir.
Q Now, if you do now know the person to whom you will deliver the envelope. JUSTICE
HERMOSISIMA:
You may not cross-examine, tell him to tell us facts.
ATTY. I. CRUZ:
Q Where specifically in the subdivision in Paraaque where you will deliver the envelope?
A BF Homes.
JUSTICE HERMOSISIMA:
Q To what particular person will you supposed to deliver it?
A I was just asked to go to that place and somebody will approach me.
Q To make your story more believable, BF Homes in Paraaque is a very big subdivision. You
enter that subdivision and there will be several persons whom you can see there. How will the
person know that you are carrying an envelope for him. Where were you supposed to deliver
it. If you cannot explain that, we will not believe you?
A In that subdivision, there is a vacant place where there are no houses. It is where I often go.
Q BF Homes subdivision in Paraaque has several vacant lots, how will you know what vacant lot
to proceed to?
A It was pointed to me by Aguinaldo.
Q So, Aguinaldo went with you in the morning of that same day and pointed to you the place?
A In the morning of that same day and he pointed to me the place.
Second. The petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in admitting in evidence the
letters signed by him because he was asked to sign them during custodial investigation without
the assistance of counsel. The following provisions of the Constitution are invoked by petitioner:
Article III, 12(1). - Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
. . . .
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof
shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
Petitioners counsel says that the signing of petitioners and his co-accuseds names was not
a mere mechanical act but one which required the use of intelligence and therefore
constitutes self-incrimination. Petitioners counsel presumably has in mind the ruling in Beltran
v. Samson
[20]
to the effect that the prohibition against compelling a man to be a witness against
himself extends to any attempt to compel the accused to furnish a specimen of his
handwriting for the purpose of comparing it with the handwriting in a document in a prosecution
for falsification. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers;
writing is not a purely mechanical act because it requires the application of intelligence and
attention,
[21]
so it was held.
To be sure, the use of specimen handwriting in Beltran is different from the use of
petitioners signature in this case. In that case, the purpose was to show that the specimen
handwriting matched the handwriting in the document alleged to have been falsified and thereby
show that the accused was the author of the crime (falsification) while in this case the purpose
for securing the signature of petitioner on the envelopes was merely to authenticate the envelopes
as the ones seized from him and Ronnie Romero. However, this purpose and petitioners
signatures on the envelope, when coupled with the testimony of prosecution witnesses that the
envelopes seized from petitioner were those given to him and Romero, undoubtedly help
establish the guilt of petitioner. Since these signatures are actually evidence of admission
obtained from petitioner and his co-accused under circumstances contemplated in Art. III,
12(1) and 17 of the Constitution, they should be excluded. For indeed, petitioner and his co-
accused signed following their arrest. Hence, they were at the time under custodial investigation,
defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way.
[22]
Under the
Constitution, among the rights of a person under custodial investigation is the right to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice and if the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, that he must be provided with one.
However, the letters are themselves not inadmissible in evidence. The letters were validly
seized from petitioner and Romero as an incident of a valid arrest. A ruling that petitioners
admission that the letters in question were those seized from him and his companion on February
17, 1989 is inadmissible in evidence does not extend to the exclusion from evidence of the letters
themselves. The letters can stand on their own, being the fruits of a crime validly seized during a
lawful arrest. That these letters were the ones found in the possession of petitioner and his
companion and seized from them was shown by the testimonies of Vela and Tumagan.
Indeed, petitioner and his co-accused were not convicted solely on the basis of the signatures
found on the letters but on other evidence, notably the testimonies of NBI agents and other
prosecution witnesses.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.


GUTANG V PEOPLE
[G.R. No. 135406. July 11, 2000]
DAVID GUTANG Y JUAREZ, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
DE LEON, JR., J .:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
Decision
[1]
dated September 9, 1998 rendered by the former Twelfth
Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19463. The
assailed Decision affirmed the judgment
[2]
dated October 13, 1995 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, finding petitioner
David J. Gutang guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of
Sections 8 and 16 of RA 6425, as amended, (for illegal possession and
use of prohibited drugs) as charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 2696-D
and 2697-D, respectively.
The facts are as follows:
On March 5, 1994, accused-appellant David Gutang, together with
Noel Regala, Alex Jimenez and Oscar de Venecia, Jr., was arrested by
elements of the PNP NARCOM, in connection with the enforcement of
a search warrant
[3]
in his residence at No. 331 Ortigas Avenue,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. When the police operatives of the
PNP-NARCOM served the search warrant, which was issued by Judge
Martin Villarama, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig,
Metro Manila, they found the petitioner and his three (3) companions
inside the comfort room of the masters bedroom, at the second floor of
the house.
[4]
During the search, the following materials were found on
top of a glass table inside the masters bedroom:
a. shabu paraphernalias, such as tooters;
b. aluminum foil;
c. two (2) burners (one small, one big);
d. fourteen (14) disposable lighters;
e. three (3) weighing scales;
f. plastic sealant used in repacking shabu;
g. several transparent plastic bags of different sizes;
h. about 1.4 grams of suspected marijuana fruiting tops contained in a small white
plastic;
i. about 0.7 gram of suspected dried marijuana contained in a small plastic container.
[5]

The PNP-NARCOM team also inspected the cars of accused
Regala, Jimenez and de Venecia, Jr. which were parked inside the
compound of the residence of petitioner Gutang. They found a
Winchester Rayban case (sunglasses) with an undetermined amount
of suspected shabu residues and tooters in a black plastic container
and aluminum foil inside the car of Regala. The cars of Jimenez and
de Venecia, Jr. yielded negative results. The items which were
confiscated were then brought to the crime laboratory of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) at Camp Crame, Quezon City for laboratory
tests. The results of the laboratory examinations showed that the said
items found in the masters bedroom of the residence of petitioner
Gutang were positive for marijuana and methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu). The items found inside the car of Regala were
also positive for shabu.
The findings are as follows:
PHYSICAL SCIENCES REPORT NO. D-168-94
CASE: Alleged Viol. Of RA 6425
SUSPECTS: DAVID GUTANG Y JUAREZ
NOEL REGALA Y YORRO
ALEX JIMENEZ Y ESPINOSA
CAREY DE VENECIA Y LOCSIN
TIME AND DATE RECEIVED: 1430H, 05 MARCH 1994
REQUESTING PARTY/UNIT: C, 2
nd
SOG NARCOM
Camp Crame, Q.C.
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Exh. A One (1) white plastic bag containing the following:
Exh. A-1 One (1) white film case with dried suspected marijuana fruiting
tops weighing 1.56 grams.
Exh. A-2 One (1) small black box with dried suspected marijuana fruiting
tops weighing 0.70 gram.
Exh. A-3 Two (2) pieces of improvised tooter with white crystalline residue.
Exh. A-4 Several foil and small plastic bag with white crystalline residue.
Exh. B One (1) white plastic bag marked ROEL REGALA containing the
following:
Exh. B-1 One (1) Winchester case with white crystalline substance.
Exh. B-2 One (1) black case containing several tooters with white
crystalline residue.
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:
To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drug.
FINDINGS:
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave the
following results:
1. Exhs. A-1 and A-2 POSITIVE to the test for Marijuana, a prohibited drug.
2. Exhs. A-3, A-4, B-1 and B-2 POSITIVE to the test for methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), a regulated drug.
CONCLUSION
Exhs. A-1 and A-2 contain marijuana, a prohibited drug.
Exhs. A-3, A-4, B-1 and B-2 contain Methamphetamine Hydrochloride
(shabu) a regulated drug. xxx
REMARKS:
TIME AND DATE COMPLETED: 1630H, Or
March 1994
(Annex A, pp. 6-8)
On the same day, March 5, 1994, immediately after Gutang,
Regala, Jimenez and de Venecia, Jr. were placed under arrest, they
were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame. According
to PNP Forensic Chemist Julita De Villa, their office received from
PNP-NARCOM which is also based in Camp Crame a letter-request
for drug dependency test on the four (4) men.
[6]
After receiving the said
request, Mrs. Esguerra of the PNP Crime Laboratory asked the four (4)
men including the petitioner to give a sample of their urine. The
petitioner and his co-accused complied and submitted their urine
samples to determine the presence of prohibited drugs. After
examining the said urine samples, PNP Forensic Chemist De Villa
came out with Chemistry Report No. DT-107-94
[7]
and Physical Report
No. DT-107-94
[8]
dated March 9, 1994, showing that the said urine
samples all tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu).
Consequently, the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 2696-D and
2697-D were filed in court against the petitioner and his companions
for violation of Sections 8 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, (otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act) as amended by Republic Act No.
7659. Incidentally, the charge against accused Oscar de Venecia, Jr.
was dismissed by the trial court in an Order
[9]
dated August 3, 1994 on
the ground that he voluntarily submitted himself for treatment,
rehabilitation and confinement at the New Beginnings Foundation, Inc.,
a private rehabilitation center accredited by the Dangerous Drugs
Board.
Upon arraignment, petitioner Gutang entered a plea of not guilty.
His co-accused, Regala and Jimenez, likewise pleaded not
guilty. Thereafter, joint trial of the cases proceeded. However,
petitioner Gutang did not present any evidence.
After trial, the lower court rendered its decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Court finds 1) accused DAVID
GUTANG and ALEXANDER JIMENEZ in Criminal Case No. 2696-D, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 as amended
(Possession and use of prohibited drug); and are hereby sentenced to suffer
a penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to two (2) years, four (4) months
of prision correccionaland to pay the costs; 2) In Criminal Case No. 2697-D
(Possession) accused DAVID GUTANG, NOEL REGALA and ALEXANDER
JIMENEZ, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16 (ibid)
and are hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor to two (2) years, four (4) months of prision correccional and to pay the
costs; 3) accused NOEL REGALA, in Criminal Case No. 2698-D
(Possession of regulated drugs) is hereby sentenced to suffer a penalty of six
(6) months of arresto mayor to two (2) years, four (4) months of prision
correccional and to pay the costs.
The items confiscated are ordered forfeited in favor of the government and to
be disposed of in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
[10]

The judgment of conviction of the lower court was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner raises the following
assignments of error:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
RECEIPT FOR PROPERTY SEIZED; EXHIBIT I AND EXHIBIT R; THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE REPORT NO. D-168-94. EXHIBIT D; THE
CHEMISTRY REPORT NO. DT-107-94, EXHIBIT L; AND THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE REPORT NO. DT-107-94, EXHIBIT M ARE
INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED HAS NOT BEEN
OVERCOME BY PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
We affirm the conviction of the petitioner.
Petitioner insists that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence
Exhibits I and R, which are the Receipts of Property Seized,
considering that it was obtained in violation of his constitutional
rights. The said Receipts for Property Seized, which described the
properties seized from the petitioner by virtue of the search warrant,
contain his signature. According to petitioner, inasmuch as the said
evidence were obtained without the assistance of a lawyer, said
evidence are tantamount to having been derived from an uncounselled
extra-judicial confession and, thus, are inadmissible in evidence for
being fruits of the poisonous tree.
We agree. It has been held in a long line of cases that the
signature of the accused in the Receipt of Property Seized is
inadmissible in evidence if it was obtained without the assistance of
counsel.
[11]
The signature of the accused on such a receipt is a
declaration against his interest and a tacit admission of the crime
charged for the reason that, in the case at bar, mere unexplained
possession of prohibited drugs is punishable by law. Therefore, the
signatures of the petitioner on the two (2) Receipts of Property Seized
(Exhibits I and R) are not admissible in evidence, the same being
tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession which is
prohibited by the Constitution.
Petitioner further contends that since the Receipts for Property
Seized (Exhibits I and R) are inadmissible in evidence, it follows that
the Physical Science Reports Nos. D-168-94 and DT-107-94 (Exhibit D
and M) and Chemistry Report No. DT-107-94 (Exhibit L) finding the
said items seized to be positive for marijuana and shabu, are also
inadmissible inasmuch as they are mere conclusions drawn from the
said Receipts and hence a part thereof.
We disagree. The fact that the Receipts of Property Seized
(Exhibits I and R) are inadmissible in evidence does not render
inadmissable the Physical Science Reports (Exhibit D and M) and the
Chemistry Report (Exhibit L) inasmuch as the examined materials
were legally seized or taken from the petitioners bedroom on the
strength of a valid search warrant duly issued by Judge Villarama, Jr.
of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. Since the said
materials were validly seized or taken from the bedroom of the
petitioner in his presence, the laboratory tests conducted thereon were
legally and validly done. Hence, the said Reports containing the
results of the laboratory examinations, aside from the testimonial and
other real evidence of the prosecution, are admissible in evidence and
sufficiently proved that the petitioner used and had the said prohibited
drugs and paraphernalia in his possession. In other words, even
without the Receipts of Property Seized (Exhibits I and R) the alleged
guilt of the petitioner for the crimes charged were proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
Petitioner also posits the theory that since he had no counsel
during the custodial investigation when his urine sample was taken and
chemically examined, Exhibits L and M, which are the respective
Chemistry and Physical Reports, both dated March 9, 1994, are also
inadmissible in evidence since his urine sample was derived in effect
from an uncounselled extra-judicial confession. Petitioner claims that
the taking of his urine sample allegedly violates Article III, Section 2 of
the Constitution, which provides that:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized.
We are not persuaded. The right to counsel begins from the time a
person is taken into custody and placed under investigation for the
commission of a crime, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to ask
questions to elicit information and/or confession or admissions from the
accused. Such right is guaranteed by the Constitution and cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. However,
what the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral
compulsion to extort communication from the accused, but not an
inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may be material.
[12]
In fact, an
accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or measured, or
his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his body to
enable the foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the
proscription against testimonial compulsion.
[13]
The situation in the case
at bar falls within the exemption under the freedom from testimonial
compulsion since what was sought to be examined came from the
body of the accused. This was a mechanical act the accused was
made to undergo which was not meant to unearth undisclosed facts
but to ascertain physical attributes determinable by simple
observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner and his co-
accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine but they in
fact voluntarily gave the same when they were requested to undergo a
drug test.
[14]

Assuming arguendo that the urine samples taken from the
petitioner are inadmissible in evidence, we agree with the trial court
that the record is replete with other pieces of credible evidence
including the testimonial evidence of the prosecution which point to the
culpability of the petitioner for the crimes charged.
First of all, the petitioner has not satisfactorily explained the
presence in his bedroom of the assorted drug paraphernalia
[15]
and
prohibited drugs found atop a round table therein at the time of the
raid.
[16]
Petitioners feeble excuse that he and his co-accused were not
in the masters bedroom but inside the comfort room deserves scant
consideration since the comfort room is part of the masters
bedroom.
[17]
Prosecution witness Capt. Franklin Moises Mabanag, head
of the said PNP-NARCOM raiding team, testified that when petitioner
was arrested, the latter showed manifestations and signs that he was
under the influence of drugs, to wit:
By Fiscal Villanueva (To the witness)
Q: Mr. Witness, why was a drug defendant (sic) test requested on the persons of David
Gutang, Noel Regala, Alexander Jimenez and Oscar de Venecia?
A: A drug test was made on them because when we held these persons David Gutang,
Noel Regala, Alexander Jimenez and Oscar de Venecia, they showed manifestations
and signs that they are under the influence of drugs.
Atty. Arias:
That is a conjectural answer. The witness is not authorized to testify on that.
Fiscal Villanueva:
We agreed as to the expertise of this witness at the time when I was qualifying him
(interrupted)
By Fiscal Villanueva (To the witness)
Court:
At any rate, that was only his observation it is not necessarily binding to the court, that
is his testimony, let it remain.
Atty. Arias:
But the rule is clear.
Court:
That is what he observed.
Fiscal Villanueva:
And what is this manifestation that you observed?
Atty. Arias:
Precisely, that is already proving something beyond what his eyes can see.
Fiscal Villanueva:
That is part of his testimony.
Court:
Let the witness answer.
Witness:
I observed they are profusely sweating and their lips are dry, I let them show their
tongue and it was whitish and their faces are pale, reason why we made the necessary
request for drug test.
[18]

It is worth noting that the search warrant was served only after
months of surveillance work by the PNP-NARCOM operatives led by
Chief Inspector Franklin Mabanag in the residence of
petitioner. Earlier, a confidential informant had even bought a gram of
shabu from petitioner Gutang. Prosecution witness Mabanag also
found, during the surveillance, persons who frequented the house of
petitioner, and that the confidential informant of the PNP-NARCOM
had in fact gained entry into the house. The police officers are
presumed to have performed the search in the regular performance of
their work. Allegedly improper motive on the part of the PNP-
NARCOM team must be shown by the defense, otherwise, they are
presumed to be in the regular performance of their official duties.
[19]
But
the defense failed to do so.
All told, in the face of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, it is
clear that petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.



PEOPLE V DENIEGA
G.R. No. 103499 December 29, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
REY DENIEGA y MACOY, and HOYLE DIAZ y URNILLO, defendants-appellants.

KAPUNAN, J .:
The naked body of Marlyn Canoy was found on a heap of garbage in an ill-frequented back
corner on the left side of the Mt. Carmel Church in New Manila, Quezon City. Her hands
were tied behind her back by a shoestring and pieces of her own clothing. The body bore
thirty nine (39) stab wounds. There was evidence that she had been brutally assaulted,
physically and sexually, before she was murdered.
Police authorities investigating the gruesome crime on August 31, 1989, arrested Rey
Daniega y Macoy on information that the victim was last seen with Daniega,
1
a waiter at the
Gathering Disco where Canoy used to work. Friends of Canoy volunteered the information
that the former had just broken off from a stormy relationship with Daniega.
2
The latter, it
was bruited,
3
desperately tried to patch up the relationship.
Following the latter's arrest, and on the basis of a confession obtained by police authorities
from him during custodial investigation (where he allegedly admitted raping and killing
Canoy),
4
appellant Hoyle Diaz y Urnillo was invited by the investigators for questioning. A
second sworn statement, substantially similar and corroborating many of the details of
Daniega's sworn affidavit, was later extracted from Diaz. In the said statement, Diaz
admitted his participation in the rape of Canoy, but denied that he had something to do with
the victim's death.
5

Armed with the said extra-judicial confessions, an Information was filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City,
6
charging petitioners with the crime of Rape with Homicide,
committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of August, 1989, in Quezon City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping
each other, with lewd designs, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, by means of force, violence and/or intimidation have sexual
intercourse with MARLYN CANOY BENDO, without her consent and against
her will; and by reason of and on the occasion thereof, said accused,
pursuant to their conspiracy, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent to kill and without any justifiable cause, attack, assault
and employ personal violence upon the person of said victim, by then and
there stabbing her with an icepick several times, thereby inflicting upon her
serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of her
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Marlyn Canoy Bendo,
in such amount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the New
Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
At trial, the confessions obtained by law enforcement authorities during their (separate)
custodial investigations formed the centerpiece of the prosecution's case for Rape with
Homicide against both accused.
7
These confessions allegedly disclosed details of the
killing, summarized by the trial court in its Decision dated August 23, 1991, thus:
Rey Deniega's confession essentially stated:
On August 28, 1989, he and Marlyn were at her house at Onyx Street, Sta.
Ana Manila. There they had an altercation because she wanted to break up
with her already. He accompanied Marlyn afterwards to Rolando's Disco Pub
where Marlyn works. They agreed however, to meet again after she gets (sic)
out of the Disco Pub to have a final talk about their relationship. They agreed
to see each other at 3:00 in the morning of August 29, 1989 at a waiting shed
along Aurora Boulevard near San Juan. He arrived there earlier than Marlyn.
While waiting, Rey saw Hoyle Diaz (a.k.a. Boyet) pass by. Rey told Hoyle that
he is going to take Marlyn to the Mt. Carmel Church compound and if Boyet
wants to take revenge on Marlyn (makaganti) Boyet can hold-up her there.
When Marlyn and Rey were already at the Mt. Carmel Church compound,
Boyet arrived with two companions. Boyet berated Marlyn for choosing Rey
as her boyfriend instead of Boyet despite the fact that he has already spent
large sums for her. Then, suddenly the two companions of Boyet by the name
of Tony and Carlos pulled with a jerk the apparel of Marlyn and undressed
her. The two tied Marlyn's hands and got her necklace and wristwatch. Boyet
then took off his T-shirt and pulled down his pants and raped Marlyn. After the
rape, Tony and Carlos stabbed Marlyn. Then Boyet gave Rey an icepick and
ordered him to stab Marlyn whom he stabbed once in the stomach. Rey left
leaving the three men behind.
Hoyle Diaz confession essentially stated:
He came to know of both Rey Deniega and Marlyn Canoy at Gathering
House where Hoyle used to take drinks. He was courting Marlyn there and
used to take her as a table partner.
He saw Rey Deniega on a bridge near Broadway Avenue and Aurora
Boulevard, Quezon City on August 29, 1989 at around 2:00 in the morning.
There Rey told Hoyle that he will teach Marlyn a lesson and will hold her up.
He asked Hoyle to accompany him. At between 3:00 and 4:00 that morning
Marlyn arrived at the waiting shed where she and Rey were supposed to
meet and Rey took Marlyn to Mt. Carmel Church compound with Hoyle Diaz
following behind.
The two talked for about 20 minutes. Then they had an altercation, hurling
and hollering bad words at each other. Rey tried to undress Marlyn who
resisted. Rey boxed Marlyn and was finally able to take off her clothes. Then
Rey raped Marlyn. After Rey was through, Hoyle raped Marlyn.
Afterwards, Rey told Hoyle that so that there will be no more trouble (aberia)
they better finish off Marlyn. Rey took out an icepick and stabbed Marlyn.
Then he handed the icepick to Hoyle and Hoyle stabbed Marlyn too. Then
Rey faced Hoyle (hinarap) and so Hoyle ran away as Rey chased him. As
Hoyle ran he threw away the icepick. He does not know if Rey returned to get
the necklace, bag and wristwatch of Marlyn. Hoyle also stated that he saw
that Rey was heavily influenced by drugs (sabog sa gamot). Hoyle also
recalled that on the way to Mt. Carmel a man followed them but the man was
no longer in the vicinity when they reached the Mt. Carmel Church
Compound.
When Rey ran after Hoyle, Rey was holding no weapon. Marlyn was raped right where
she was found dead.
8

In their defense, appellants, during the course of the trial, vehemently denied the claim that
they had voluntarily executed the said confessions.
9
Appellants Daniega and Diaz went to
the extent of seeking the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation, and there
executed a sworn statement to the effect that their respective confessions were coerced
and obtained through
torture.
10
Both testified that they were subjected to electrocution and water treatment. They
contended that they were arrested without warrants of arrest and that the confessions
obtained from them immediately thereafter were made without the assistance of counsel.
After the prosecution rested its case on December 14, 1990, the accused-appellants moved
for leave to file Demurrer to Evidence, which the trial court granted.
11
In a demurrer
submitted to the trial court on December 28, 1990, appellants moved for the dismissal of the
information for Rape with Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, stressing
that: 1) the confessions obtained by police authorities were acquired without the assistance
of counsel in violation of their constitutional rights and were hence, inadmissible in
evidence; 2) the same (confessions) "were obtained through torture, force, threat and other
means which vitiat[ed] (their) free will;" and 3) except for the testimonies of the medico-legal
officer and two IBP lawyers who alleged that they assisted the accused during their
custodial investigation, the prosecution presented no other evidence to warrant a
conviction.
12

In an Order dated January 30, 1991, the Regional Trial Court denied the motion for
Demurrer to Evidence.
13
Consequently, after hearing the appellants' testimonies, the lower
court, on August 31, 1991 rendered its Decision convicting the accused-appellants of the
crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing each of them to a penalty ofReclusion
Perpetua.
14
They were likewise ordered to pay the heirs of Marlyn Canoy the amount of
P50,000.00 in solidum.
15

In dismissing appellant's principal defense that their confessions were obtained in violation
of their constitutional rights, the trial court held that:
The court finds it hard to believe that (Atty. Sansano and Atty. Rous), both of
whom are officers of the Legal Aid Committee of the IBP and are prominent
practitioners of great integrity, would act as the accused said they did. Over
and beyond this it appears that the confessions were executed during
daytime and the accused themselves brought to the Quezon City IBP office at
noontime during office hours when several employees of that chapter were
working, there are usually other lawyers there, and therefore, the accused, if
their confession were really prevaricated beforehand, had ample atmosphere
to tell Atty. Sansano and Atty. Rous, respectively, that their confession were
coerced and untrue. The two counsels testified that they precisely segregated
the accused from their police escorts to cull out the truth and the accused
volunteered to confess to the crime at bar;
Rey Deniega was arrested at around 6:30 in the morning and Hoyle Diaz at around 9:30
in the morning. Rey was brought to the IBP at around 11:00 in the morning and Hoyle at
around 2:00 p.m. of the same day of their arrest on August 31, 1990. Their confession
were quite lengthily (4 page each) and filled with details. There is nothing in the record to
show that the apprehending officers are clever and articulate enough to be able to
fabricate in a short a time the kind of confessions submitted here . . . .
16

Considering that no eyewitnesses to the actual commission of the crime were presented
before the court, the issue of the voluntariness and due execution of the extrajudicial
confessions of the appellants upon which their conviction was based, is pivotal in the
resolution of the instant appeal. Analyzing the appropriate provisions of law in relation to the
facts of the case at bench, we find for appellants.
It is a settled rule that this Court will not normally overturn factual conclusions of the trial
court, unless factual evidence has either been deliberately ignored or misapprehended. The
confessions which form part of the record of the case at bench are an eloquent example of
facts deliberately ignored: the legal insufficiencies and inconsistencies in the documents in
question are so glaring, even from a cursory examination of the confessions, that they
should not escape even the untrained eye.
The statements evidencing the interrogation, including those portions in which the
appellants purportedly were informed of their constitutional rights, were in typewritten form.
However, within the body of these documents, blank spaces were conspicuously left at
strategic areas (spaces) where the accused were supposed to sign and acknowledge that
they were appraised of their rights and that they gave their statements voluntarily. These
were spaces obviously provided for the accused to fill in the blank with the word "yes"
("opo") followed by another blank space for their respective signatures. In addition to these,
the header of the disputed documents indicates that the investigations were conducted at
the police headquarters, contradicting the prosecution witnesses' declarations that the
confessions were obtained in the Quezon City IBP office.
Apart from the defects evident on the face of the documents, there exists evidence
indicating that the actual custodial investigation was conducted at the police headquarters in
the absence of counsel, as contended by appellants. While we have no dispute with the trial
court's observation that the appellants were brought to the Quezon City IBP office during
daytime when other individuals were holding office in the IBP floor (who may have
witnessed the presence of the appellants in the area),
17
it is one thing for appellants to be
brought to the IBP office only for the purpose of signing the confessions in plain view of the
other employees of the office, while compliance with the constitutional mandate requiring
the presence of counsel during the actual custodial investigation is quite another.
There is convincing proof
18
that, while Attys. Sansano and Rous may have been present at
the signing of the documents, they were not present at all during the actual custodial
investigation of the accused in the police headquarters.
For instance, Atty. Sansano placed the time of arrival of appellant Deniega at the IBP
Quezon City chapter office at "around 11:30 in the morning" of August 31, 1989.
19
However,
Deniega's extrajudicial confession taken by Pat. Maniquis gives the time of its execution as
11:20 A.M. also on August 31, 1989 or earlier than the time they allegedly arrived at the IBP
office.
Moreover, even assuming the possibility of error in recording the actual time of the
investigation,
20
there is conflict as to the place where the custodial investigation was
actually conducted. Atty. Sansano for instance, testified that Daniega's extrajudicial
confession was taken at the QC-IBP office.
21
An examination of the document's heading
however reveals that the confessions were given to the investigator (Maniquis) at the police
headquarters of the SID, QCPS (sa himpilan ng homicide ng SID, QCPS) not in the IBP
office of Atty. Sansano.
With respect to the extrajudicial confession of appellant Diaz, Atty. Rous' declaration that
"the custodial investigation was conducted by the policeman in the (IBP chapter)
office,"
22
conflicts with the statement in the actual document (sinumpaang salaysay) that he
(appellant) executed his confession at the police headquarters of the SID, QCPS (himpilan
ng homicide, SID, QCPS) and not the IBP office.
Lastly, the probity of Pat. Maniquis, who testified in rebuttal was certainly not enhanced by
the information given the trial court by prosecution witness P/Sgt. Rogelio Barcelona that he
(Maniquis) had been dismissed from the service for unspecified reasons.
23

A thorough reading of the transcripts of the testimonies of the two lawyers, Atty. Sansano
and Atty. Rous, indicates that they appeared less as agents of the accused during the
alleged investigation than they were agents of the police authorities. In the case before us, it
was the police authorities who brought the accused, handcuffed, to the IBP headquarters
where the services of the lawyers were supposedly "engaged." No details of the actual
assistance rendered during the interrogation process were furnished or alleged during the
entire testimony of the lawyers in open court. The bulk of the lawyers' oral testimonies
merely gave the trial court assurance that they supposedly explained to the appellants their
constitutional rights, that the signatures present were their signatures and those of the
accused, and that the accused agreed to having the lawyers assist them during the process
of custodial investigation.
24

Clearly, the standards utilized by police authorities (and the lawyers) to assure the
constitutional rights of the accused in the case at bench fall short of the standards
demanded by our case law and the Constitution itself.
In Morales, Jr. v. Enrile,
25
the Court defined the procedure which law enforcement officers
must observe in custodial investigations as follows:
At the time, a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him
of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall
be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter of messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
26

The rules laid down in Morales were reiterated in 1985 case of People vs. Galit.
27

The 1987 Constitution provided a stricter rule by mandating that waiver of the right to
counsel must be made not only in the presence of counsel but also in writing. Article III,
Section 12 provides:
1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Section 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court requires, moreover, that a confession, to be
admissible, must beexpress.
Finally, Republic Act 7438 mandates that the entire confession must be in writing.
28

In all, under rules laid down by the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a
confession to be admissible must satisfy all of four fundamental requirements: 1) the
confession must be voluntary 2) the confession must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel; 3) the confession must be express and 4) the
confession must be in writing.
It is noteworthy that the modifiers competent and independent were terms absent in all
organic laws previous to the 1987 Constitution. Their addition in the fundamental law of
1987 was meant to stress the primacy accorded to the voluntariness of the choice, under
the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation, by according the accused,
deprived of normal conditions guaranteeing individual autonomy, an informed judgment
based on the choices given to him by a competent and independent lawyer.
Thus, the lawyer called to be present during such investigations should be as far as
reasonably possible, the choice of the individual undergoing questioning. If the lawyer were
one furnished in the accused's behalf, it is important that he should be competent and
independent, i.e., that he is willing to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused,
as distinguished from one who would merely be giving a routine, peremptory and
meaningless recital of the individual's constitutional rights. In People vs. Basay, this Court
stressed that an accused's right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel
"contemplates the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial
and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle."
29

Ideally therefore, a lawyer engaged for an individual facing custodial investigation (if the
latter could not afford one) "should be engaged by the accused (himself), or by the latter's
relative or person authorized by him to engage an attorney or by the court, upon proper
petition of the accused or person authorized by the accused to file such petition."
30
Lawyers
engaged by the police, whatever testimonials are given as proof of their probity and
supposed independence, are generally suspect, as in many areas, the relationship between
lawyers and law enforcement authorities can be symbiotic.
Conditions vary at every stage of the process of custodial investigation. What may satisfy
constitutional requirements of voluntariness at the investigation's onset may not be
sufficient as the investigation goes on. There would be denial of the right to the assistance
of competent and independent counsel if the investigation or, as in the case before us,
during the process of signing. The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be
present from the beginning to end, i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising
caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in
a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to remain
silent or terminate the interview.
The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is rendered
meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as opposed to a meaningful
advocacy of the rights of the person undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so
cursory as to be useless, voluntariness is impaired. If the lawyer's role is reduced to being
that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared document albeit indicating therein
compliance with the accused's constitutional rights, the constitutional standard guaranteed
by Article III, Section 12 (1) is not met. The process above-described fulfills the prophylactic
purpose of the constitutional provision by avoiding "the pernicious practice of extorting false
or coerced admissions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation
for the commission of the offense"
31
and ensuring that the accused's waiver of his right to
self incrimination during the investigation is an informed one in all aspects.
The process of assisting appellants in the case at bench as described by the lawyers in
their testimony therefore hardly meets the standard of effective and meaningful
communication required by the 1987 Constitution, when its framers decided to add the
modifiers competent and independent to the requirement for counsel during the process of
custodial investigations.
The failure to meet the constitutional requirement for competent and independent counsel
and the glaring inconsistencies in documents purportedly executed under the trained and
watchful eyes of the lawyers who allegedly were of assistance to the accused during the
process of custodial investigation - taken together with the manner in which the signatures
of the accused were affixed into the confessions cast a serious doubt on their due
execution, and support the contention that the sworn statements executed by the appellants
were already prepared and signed at the police headquarters before the statements were
brought to the QC-IBP office for signing. During the trial, Daniega testified to the following:
Q Was Atty. Sansano present when this alleged sinumpaang
salaysay was taken from you by questions and answers which
consist of 31 questions and 32 answers?
A No, because this statement was signed by me at the police station and
then we brought it to the IBP office.
32

In his cross-examination, the other accused, Diaz likewise testified as follows:
Q Who told you to sign this document?
A That paper, we made that at the headquarters.
Q Do you know who prepared this at the headquarters?
A It was Pat. Maniquis.
Q And Pat. Maniquis was typing this while he was asking you
this question?
A. I did not see that paper while he was investigating me, it was
later, he showed that to me, maam.
Q For how long a time more or less (did) Pat. Maniquis
investigate(d) you?
A About one hour maam.
Q And after that one hour, how long a time elapse(d) before
you were brought to the IBP Bldg.
A Two or three in the afternoon.
Q And when you were told to sign this document, at the IBP
Bldg., Pat. Maniquis, who were the person(s) present aside
from you and Pat. Maniquis?
Atty. Gojar:
He did not sign that in the IBP, your Honor. It was at the
headquarters.
A I signed that document(s) at the police headquarters.
Q What time more or less was that, when you signed that
document?
A About lunch time.
Q Was that after Pat. Maniquis investigated you?
A Yes maam.
Q Who were present at the time Pat. Maniquis told you to sign
this?
A I don't know them, I only remember Pat. Maniquis.
Q Did you have any occasion to read this before you sign(ed)
this?
A No maam, he just asked me to sign it.
Q But can you read tagalog?
A Yes maam.
Q And you did not take any opportunity to read this before you
sign(ed) it?
A Everything went fast, sir.
Q After you signed this how long a time elapse(d) before you
went to Quezon City IBP?
Atty. Gojar:
It was already answered, your honor.
Q What time did you sign this?
A I signed it about ten to eleven in the morning ad we went to IBP about
two or three in the afternoon.
33
(Emphasis supplied.)
Together with all the legal deficiencies pointed out so far, it would not be difficult for us to
give credence to appellants' testimonies to the effect that the investigation was actually
conducted in the absence of counsel in one place (the QC SID headquarters) and signed in
the presence of counsel in another (the QC IBP office). Appellants, who were not trained in
the law, would not have understood the constitutional nuances of the fact that the
confessions and the signing of the documents evidencing the confessions were obtained in
different places. Assuming they were couched, appellants were quite vehement as they
were consistent in their separate oral testimonies, and one or both of them would have
withered, in any case, on intense cross examination.
These facts lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the confessions of both defendants
were obtained in the absence of independent and competent counsel as mandated by the
1987 Constitution and that the same may have been acquired under conditions negating
voluntariness, as alleged by the accused.
34

In fine, the likelihood for compulsion is forcefully apparent in every custodial investigation. A
person compelled under the circumstances obtaining in every custodial investigation is
surrounded by psychologically hostile forces and the threat of physical violence so that the
information extracted is hardly voluntary. In the oftentimes highly intimidating setting of a
police investigation, the potential for suggestion is strong.
Every so often, courts are confronted with the difficult task of taking a hard look into the
sufficiency of extra-judicial confessions extracted by law enforcement authorities as the sole
basis for convicting accused individuals. In cases of crimes notable for their brutality and
ruthlessness, the impulse to find the culprits at any cost occasionally tempts these agencies
to take shortcuts and disregard constitutional and legal safeguards intended to bring about
a reasonable assurance that only the guilty are punished. Our courts, in the process of
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, play a central role in bringing about this
assurance by determining whether or not the evidence gathered by law enforcement
agencies scrupulously meets exacting standards fixed by the Constitution. If the standards
are not met, the Constitution provides the corresponding remedy by providing a strict
exclusionary rule,i.e., that "[a]ny confession or admission obtained in violation of (Article III,
Section 12[1]) . . . hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence."
35

There is a distinct possibility that the confessions given by the appellants in the case at
bench might speak the truth. Judges face unimaginable pressures from all areas, including
the pressure of their heavy dockets. They are on the forefront of the government's battle
against crime. Were it not for the defects inherent in the confessions, and the contradictions
and inconsistencies here noted, the trial court's well-written opinion in the case at bench
an eloquent example of the earnest attempts judges make to battle crime, would have been
readily sustained by this Court. Yet again, there remains the possibility that the real
assailants lurk free somewhere, thanking their luck. What can only be said, in relation to the
unfortunate circumstances of the case at bench has already been said,ad nauseam, in a
number of cases before this. In People v. Javar,
36
for instance, we emphasized,
conformably with Art. III, Sec. 12 of the Constitution that:
Any statement obtained in violation of the constitutional provision, or in part,
shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession speaks the truth, if it
was made without the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in
evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been
voluntarily given.
We stress, once again, that the exclusionary rules adopted by the framers of the 1987
Constitution were designed, not to vindicate the constitutional rights of lawbreakers but to
protect the rights of all citizens, especially the innocent, in the only conceivable way those
rights could be effectively protected, by removing the incentive of law enforcement and
other officials to obtain confessions by the easy route, either by psychological and physical
torture, or by methods which fall short of the standard provided by the fundamental law.
Allowing any profit gained through such methods furnishes an incentive for law enforcement
officials to engage in constitutionally proscribed methods of law enforcement, and renders
nugatory the only effective constitutional protections available to citizens.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, appellants Rey Daniega y Macoy and Hoyle
Diaz y Urnillo are herebyACQUITTED of the crime of Rape with Homicide. Their immediate
release from custody is hereby ordered unless they are being held on other legal grounds.
SO ORDERED.


PEOPLE V CALVO
[G.R. No. 91694. March 14, 1997]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SABAS
CALVO, JR., and RODOLFO LONGCOP, accused-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
FRANCISCO, J .:
Charged with and prosecuted for robbery with homicide were herein
appellant Sabas Calvo, Jr. and co-accused Rodolfo Longcop under an
information reading:
"That on or about September 26, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused, conspiring and confederating together with JOSE BALSOLASO Y TUBINO
who has already been charged for the same crime before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila under Criminal Case No. 87-58217, and one whose true name, identity and
whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with intent to gain and by
means of force and violence, that is, by strangling with a piece of cloth IGNACIA
MAULEON Y JOPIA and stabbing her several times with bladed instruments, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away one bag
containing P1,150.00 in cash, among other things, owned by said Ignacia J. Mauleon
against the latter's will, to the damage and prejudice of said Ignacio J. Mauleon in the
same sum of P1,150.00, Philippine Currency; that by reason or on the occasion of the
said robbery, herein accused, with intent to kill, inflicted fatal stab wounds upon the
said Ignacia J. Mauleon which were the direct cause of her death immediately
thereafter."
The antecedents have been narrated in detail by the trial court, to wit:
"FACTS DEDUCED FROM THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE:
"Spouses Felipe and Ignacia Maullon, are engaged in a bakery business with every
sign of prosperity; in fact, they have stores scattered all over the City and employ a
host of bakery workers.
"One of their bakeries, the Philip's Bakery is at Espaa, Sarnpaloc, Manila where
Beatriz Bido is a stay-in sales girl. On September 26, 1987 at about 9:00 in the
evening after her washing chores, she went upstairs, knocked at the room of her boss,
Mrs. Ignacia Maullon. Nobody answered. About five minutes later, two men barged
out from the room rushing downstairs. One of them held a gun whom Bido identified
as one, Sabas Calvo. He pushed her into the bath room repeatedly but she resisted. He
threatened Bido not to shout else (sic) he will shoot her. Bido also identified the
companion as one Bobby Gaspar, who closely followed Calvo, who was carrying a
leather bag. When Bido succeeded in entering Mrs. Maullon's room she was
speechless and surprised to see Mrs. Maullon's body sprawled on the floor in a pool of
blood. She also saw the room in disarray - clothes and other articles were scattered all
over the place. The cabinets and drawers were forced open and ransacked. Bdio (sic)
rushed down shouting hysterically. She saw Cora, Rosemarie, Leny, Romy, Rodolfo,
Tony, Nonong, and others. She narrated to them as she gasped for breath the horrible
sight she saw upstairs. Some of her companions then rushed upstairs to see for
themselves what happened while the others sought immediate help. Cora, another
sales girl, went to a neighbor and phone Yollie Maullon who was at another store of
the Maullon's.
"Nearby the Philip's Bakery is another store owned and operated by one Lucila
Gorospe, a businesswoman. Gorospe was just in front of her store facing the Philip's
Bakery when this incident happened. Her store was still opened at the time and was
well lighted. By the side of the street near the store is an electric post with electric
light. All these lights: the one at her store, the electric post and that of Philip's Bakery
illuminated the place well. It was while facing the Philip's Bakery, a distance of about
seven (7) meters away when she saw two men running as fast as their legs could carry
them. The men came from the stairs of Philip's Bakery. Beatriz identified one of them
as Sabas Calvo, Jr., who was running towards P. Campano Street, carrying a bag.
Sabas' companion did not carry anything. One, Henry Jordan - driver of Marietta
rushed out and gave the duo a chase. Calvo however, pointed his gun at Henry Jordan.
He scampered for safety and gave up the chase. Bobby and Calvo made good their
escape.
"In the meantime, the Homicide Section of the Western Police District received a
telephone call from Tessie Evangelista informing them that a female unidentified
body was found inside Philip's Bakery located at the corner of Morayta and Espaa
Streets. The police immediately dispatched a team of operatives composed of Pfc.
Norberto Obrero, Cpl. Pedro Campano and Pat. Renato Marquez. The team
immediately proceeded to the place of the incident. When they arrived, they saw a
mobile patrol car of police Station No. 4 already in the premises. The patrol car with
some four policemen were searching and investigating the place. The team proceeded
upstairs. They found the room with the dead Ignacia Maullon. The room was in
topsyturvy condition; the contents of the cabinet and drawers were scattered all over
the place. The victim Ignacia Maullon lie sprawled on her back in the middle of the
room. Pfc. Obrero took pictures of the scene. Ignacia Maullon sustained multiple
stabbed wounds on different parts of her body. After several inquiries Pat. Obrero
succeeded in getting two witnesses: Beatriz Bido and Rosemarie Libreilla.
Investigation went underway and series of documents were prepared such as the
Progress Report, Advanced Report (Exh. B), Progress Report (Exh. C), Booking sheet
and Arrest Report, Exh. E statement of Beatriz Bido (Exh. F) Statement of Rosemarie
Libreilla (Exh. G).
"Afterwards, an identified informant tipped the police on the whereabouts of the
suspects. Immediately the operatives were dispatched and the proceeded to 4959
Herran, Makati, Metro Manila. They threw a cordon around the place. During the
operation two persons were seen scampering for cover. The duo were followed
closely and were found trying to hide in the roof. One of them made a dash for liberty
but eventually fell into the clutches of the lawmen. He was brought to the
headquarters. The arrested man turned out later to be Jose Balsolaso. Again the police
followed the trail of the other culprits. Tips came in, that the wanted culprits could be
at Barrio Obrero then at Balic-Balic. However, inspite of the concerted efforts, the
hunt proved futile. The remaining suspects were not bagged. Then more information
was received that suspects may have gone to their hometown at Northern Samar. On
instructions from their headquarters, the operatives led by Pat. Tan, Pat Libol and
relatives of the victim went to Palapag, Northern Samar. Withe (sic) assistance from
the Local Police authorities they found their quarry. Sabas Calvo, Jr., was placed
under their custody, brought to Manila Headquarters. On November 5, 1985, accused
Rodolfo Longcop was also arrested at Philip's Bakery, Manila. Upon investigation,
Rodolfo Longcop chose to remain silent and did not issue any written statement.
Accused Sabas Calvo, Jr., indicated his willingness to give his statement. The police
advised accused Sabas Calvo, Jr., of his constitutional rights and gve (sic) him Atty.
Alfredo Feraren, Jr. of the Citizen Legal Assistance Office of Quezon City, as counsel
to assist him during the custodial investigation/interrogation. The accused was
adviced on his Constitutional right by both the police and his counsel Atty. Feraren,
Jr., during the custodial investigation. Accused Sabas Calvo Jr. gave his statement
marked as Exh. K, duly counter signed by his appointed counsel Atty. Feraren Jr. In
the statement (Exh. K) he admitted having committed the crime and implicated one
Bobby Gaspar and Rodolfo Longcop. Whereupon, the police closed the case with the
filing of the complaint before the Fiscal's Office. In turn, the Fiscal Office filed the
case against Sabas Calvo Jr. and Rodolfo Longcop for robbery with homicide under
Crim. Case No. 87-58217.
"After the government witness Beatriz Bido finished testifying, where she failed to
identify accused Jose Balsolaso, the Prosecution moved for the dismissal of the case
as to Jose Balsolaso. the Court in its order dated March 13, 1988 under Crim. Case
No. 87-58217 dismissed the case of accused Jose Balsolaso.
"On the other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of accused Sabas Calvo,
Jr.
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE:
"1. Sabas Calvo, Jr., 26, single, Silk screen printer and a resident of Pilarmino
St., Proj. 4, Quezon City.
"The accused testified and claimed that on February 26, 1987, he was at home at
Palapag, Northern Samar. On November 1, 1987 while in his hometwon (sic) he was
arrested by three men Pat. Abil Orio, policeman from Palapag and two other
policemen from Laoang Northern Samar and he was brought to the Municipal Hall of
Palapag and later to Laoang. Then he was turned over to Manila Police authorities
who in turn brought him to Manila. On November 3, 1987 (sic). On November 5
1987, he was investigated. He does not know he was represented by a counsel and
does not know Atty. Feraren Jr., of the CLAO. According to him he was placed in a
police line-up, made to go outside where a woman looked at him and identified him
while inside the jail. He claimed to have asked protection from the police and to wait
for his mother to get a lawyer for him. He disclaimed participation in the robbery at
Philip's Bakery and the killing of Ignacia Maullon. Unlike the other accused, Rodolfo
Longcop, an employee of Philip's Bakery and employed by victim Ignacia Maullon
did not go into hiding after the killing and when the authorities were hot on the trial of
the suspects he chose to stay put and continue his work at Philip's Bakery. When
accused Sabas Calvo, Jr. was arrested at his hometown at Northern Samar and during
the investigation pointed at Rodolfo Longcop as one of their companions in the
dastardly crime that he had committed, accused Rodolfo Longcop was immediately
arrested and placed on detention. During the trial while accused Rodolfo Longcop was
in detention, he died of sickness."
[1]

With the death of accused Longcop during the pendency of the trial and
the dismissal of the case as against Jose Balsolaso, only appellant Calvo was
found guilty of the crime charged, sentenced toreclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment and ordered to indemnify deceased Ignacia Mauleon's heirs in
the amount of P50,000.00. The bases for conviction were (1) appellant's
extrajudicial confession dated November 5, 1987 (Exhibit "K") wherein he
recounted how the plan to rob the bakery was hatched and his participation as
look-out while his companions Longcop and one Bobby Gaspar did the actual
heist and killing of Ignacia Mauleon, and (2) the identification of appellant by
prosecution witnesses Beatriz Bido and Lucila Gorospe.
Now before us pleading for his acquittal, appellant assails the admissibility
of his alleged extrajudicial confession, as well as the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses.
Anent extrajudicial confessions, this Court reiterates its pronouncement in
"People vs. Deniega"
[2]
that "under rules laid down by the Constitution and
existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy all
of four fundamental requirements: 1) the confession must be voluntary; 2) the
confession must be made with the assistance of competent and independent
counsel; 3) the confession must be express; and 4) the confession must be in
writing." The "irregularities" which appellant claims to have attended his
extrajudicial confession principally relate to the second requirement.
The first "irregularity" concerns the competence of Atty. Alfredo Ferraren,
the CLAO lawyer who assisted appellant in the preparation of his extrajudicial
confession. Appellant claims that Atty. Ferraren utterly failed to protect his
rights during the custodial investigation as shown by the following advice
given by said lawyer which, to borrow appellant's counsel's words, "threatened
the accused and further pushed him deep to the mud."
[3]

"FISCAL PATAG (to witness):
Q: Now, you said you have assisted him in the preparation of this Extra Judicial
Confession, will you kindly tell this Court as to how you assisted him there?
A: (Atty. Ferraren) I talked with him, asked him his involvement in this case. I advice
(sic) him if he really committed this offense. It is better that he execute an Extra
Judicial Confession. I told that if he does not, then he maybe suspected of having
fabricated facts after a long time.
COURT (to witness):
Q: You advice (sic) him that?
A: I advice (sic) him that if he really committed the offense, it would be better for him
to execute an Extra Judicial Confession, otherwise if he will not execute an Extra
Judicial Confession, Your Honor, he maybe placed in a situation were they maybe
thinking that he fabricated facts."
[4]

We cannot see how this kind of advice rendered Atty. Ferraren
incompetent, or could ever be considered as telltale sign of the
involuntariness of the confession. It was nothing more than a straight-forward
exhortation for appellant to tell the truth as to his participation in the crime, if
he indeed had something to do with it. A confession is not rendered
involuntary merely because defendant was told that he should tell the truth or
that it would be better for him to tell the truth.
[5]
Stated elsewise, telling the
accused that it would be better for him to speak or tell the truth does not
furnish any Inducement, or a sufficient inducement, to render objectionable a
confession thereby obtained, unless threats or promises are applied.
[6]
These
threats or promises which the accused must successfully prove in order to
make his confession inadmissible, must take the form of violence, intimidation,
a promise of reward or leniency.
[7]
Atty. Ferraren's proposition that appellant
may be suspected of merely fabricating facts if he does not execute a
confession hardly qualifies as a "threat" or "promise" as herein contemplated.
Surely then, no temptation to appellant to falsely accuse himself can be found
in the tenor and language of Atty. Ferraren's advice.
The other "irregularity" apparently relates to a denial of the right to have an
independent counsel of one's own choice, inasmuch as appellant claims that
the police authorities ignored his initial request to wait for his mother who was
scouting for a lawyer. Appellant thus testified:
"Q: When you were brought by the policemen to the General Headquarters, did you
ask some favors for your protection?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What protection did you ask from the policemen?
A: While I was investigated I was telling them to wait for my mother who was then
looking for a lawyer for me.
Q: To whom did you ask this request?
A: To Corporal Bagallon, sir.
Q: What was the response of Corporal Bagallon?
A: Never mind."
[8]

Appellant is nonetheless deemed to have waived this defect when, as shown
by the following excerpts from his extrajudicial confession (Exh. "K") he
agreed to be represented by Atty. Ferraren in lieu of a counsel of his own
choice.
Thus:
"PAALAA(sic).: Ikaw SABAS CALVO Jr., ay nasa ilalim ngayon ng isang
pagsisiyasat hinggil sa isang krimen na naganap noong petsa 26 ng Setyembre,
1987, sa loob ng isang bakery shop sa kalye Espaa, Sampaloc, Manila, na kung
saan ay may nasawina nagngangalang IGNACIA MAULEON. Bago ka namin
isailalim sa pagsisiyasat, ikaw ay aming pinaaalahanan na may mga karapatan ka
sa ilalim ng ating bagong Saligang Batas, bilang isang taong nasasailalim ng isang
pagsisiyasat o imbestigasyon, tulad ng mga sumusunod:
01. T: Ikaw ay may karapatang manatiling tahimik, huwag magbigay ng isang
salaysay o tumangging sumagot sa anumang katanungan, ano ngayon ang iyong
masasabi?
S: Magbibigay po ako ng salaysay. Isasalaysay mga pangyayari.
02. T: Ikaw ay may karapatan pa ring kumuha ng serbisyo ng isang abogado para
makatulong mo sa imbestigasyong ito at dahil din sa nasabi mo sa amin kanina na
pansamantala ay wala kang makukuhang abogado ikaw ngayon ay aming
bibigyan ng libreng abogado sa pamamagitan ng pamahalaan o gobierno natin at
ito ay nasa katauhan ni ATTY. ALFREDO FERRAREN, tinatanggap mo ba na
maging abogado mo ngayon si Atty. Ferraren?
S: Opo.
03. T: Naiintindihan mo ba ang lahat ng mga karapatan mo na ipinaliwanag namin
sa iyo?
S: Opo.
04. T: Sa kabila ng mga karapatan mo na aming ipinaliwanag sa iyo. ikaw pa rin
ba ay nakahandang magbigay sa amin ng isang malaya at kusang loob na
salaysay sa harap ni ATTY. FERRAREN?
S: Opo. (Underscoring supplied).
(At this juncture, ATTY. ALFREDO FERRAREN, JR., conceded to push thru with
the taking down of declarant's statement after the latter signified his willingness and
voluntariness to give a free and voluntary statement)
SGD. ______________________ SGD.
_________________
ATTY. ALFREDO FERRAREN, JR. SABAS
CALVO, JR.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office (Declarant)
QUEZON CITY DISTRICT OFFICE
646 Perlas Building
Quezon Avenue, Q. C. "
Having been cleared of any irregularity, we therefore uphold the
admissibility of appellant's extrajudicial confession which, by itself, is sufficient
basis for his conviction. A confession, to recall, constitutes evidence of high
order since it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal
mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by
truth and his conscience. This presumption of spontaneity and voluntariness
stands unless the defense proves otherwise.
[9]

Even if the extrajudicial confession be ignored by assuming, for
argument's sake, that the alleged "irregularities" indeed marred its execution,
there is nonetheless other evidence particularly the identification made by
prosecution witnesses Beatriz Bido and Lucila Gorospe upon which
appellant's guilt was duly established. Witness Bido identified appellant as one
of the two (2) men (the other was Bobby Gaspar) who went out of deceased
Ignacia Mauleon's room and who angrily told her not to shout otherwise she
will be shot. She further testified that after appellant and Bobby Gaspar left the
room and went downstairs already carrying a bag, she went inside the room
which was already in disarray and saw the bloodied, lifeless body of Ignacia
Mauleon sprawled on the floor.
[10]
Witness Gorospe corroborated Bido's
identification of appellant when she testified that from her vantage point (in
front of her own store which is just seven (7) meters away from deceased
Ignacia Mauleon's bakery), she identified appellant who was carrying a
shoulder bag, as one of the two (2) men coming down from the stairs of
deceased Mauleon's bakery and who thereafter ran away at a very fast pace,
with one Henry Jordas giving chase. Henry Jordas, according to Gorospe,
nonetheless gave up his pursuit when appellant pointed a gun at him. Witness
Gorospe also stated that she was familiar with appellant, having seen the
latter in front of deceased Mauleon's bakery on three (3) previous occasions.
[11]

Contrary to appellant's claim, the credibility of witness Bido is not at all
shattered by the fact that during the police line-up held on September 30,
1987, she pointed to Jose Balsolaso as Bobby Gaspar's companion in the
crime committed at the Mauleon bakery. She has offered a satisfactory
explanation by saying that she has honestly mistaken said Balsolaso for
appellant, as both have similar facial features.
[12]
Besides, what is more
determinative is her identification, in open court, of appellant as the one
present at the scene of the crime with Bobby Gaspar. Thus,
"Q: Now, before this Court, will you kindly point to the person whom you saw the
presence at the scene on September 26, 1987 whom you saw at that time held a
gun whom you said pointing at you saying that you should not shout?
A: It was Sabas Calvo.
Q: For purposes of identification . . .
ATTY. POTOT:
It was already answered, Your Honor, Sabas Calvo.
FISCAL PATAG:
For purposes of identification, Your Honor.
COURT:
Let the witness answer.
WITNESS:
Witness pointing to a person who identify himself as Sabas Calvo."
[13]
(undersoring
supplied)
With the identification of appellant made by witnesses Bido and Gorospe
whose testimonies appear credible and who have not been shown to have
been driven by any ill-motives in implicating him in the crime, appellant's claim
of non-involvement must therefore fail. Alibi and denial, to repeat, cannot
prevail over positive identification.
[14]

In fine, appellant's conviction for robbery with homicide as charged, is in
order. We nonetheless have to correct that portion of the appealed decision
(specifically in the dispositive portion) where the trial court, while correctly
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to the first paragraph of
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, apparently equated such penalty with
life imprisonment. Both are different and distinct penalties.
[15]
As explained in
"People vs. Baguio."
[16]

"The Code does not prescribe the penalty of 'life imprisonment' for any of the felonies
therein defined, that penalty being invariably imposed for serious offense penalized
not by the Revised Penal Code but by special laws. Reclusion perpetua entails
imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which the convict becomes eligible for
pardon, it also carries with it accessory penalties, namely: perpetual special
disqualification, etc. It is not the same as 'life imprisonment' which, for one thing,
does not carry with it any accessory penalty, and for another, does not appear to have
any definite extent or duration."
WHEREFORE, save for the slight modification removing from its
dispositive portion the alternative reference to "life imprisonment", the assailed
decision dated March 31, 1989 convicting appellant Sabas Calvo, Jr. of the
crime of robbery with homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.


PEOPLE V LISING
[G.R. No. 106210-11. January 30, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO
RAMBO LISING, RODOLFO MANALILI, FELIMON GARCIA,
ENRICO DIZON and ROBIN MANGA, accused-appellants.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J .:
The parents of Cochise and Beebom must have lifted their sorrowful faces
heavenward and blurted out an anguished cry: Oh God! Why must it be they, so
young, so loving, so beautiful and so promising, to be brutally snatched from our
embrace and never to be seen again?
Conchise, whose full name was Ernesto Bernabe II, was 26 years old on the fateful
day of April 26, 1990 and Ana Lourdes Castaos, or Beebom to her family and friends,
was 22. Cochise had just graduated from the University of the Philippines with a degree
of Bachelor of Laws and was reviewing for the bar examinations, while Beebom was a
graduating student at the College of Mass Communications from the same
university. Both excelled in academic and extra-curricular activities.
The senseless and gruesome killing of the young man and woman, both full of
promise, horrifies us. But what makes this crime more despicable in our eyes is the
involvement of people sworn to uphold the law.
For the crimes for which they were charged and sentenced, appellants now come to
this Court asking us to give their case a second look, insisting on their innocence.
Sometime in March, 1990, Rodolfo Manalili, a businessman asked Felimon Garcia,
his townmate, if he knew somebody who could allegedly effect the arrest of one Robert
Herrera, the suspect in the killing of his brother, Delfin Manalili.
Felimon Garcia said he knew one and arranged a meeting with him.
On April 21, 1990, Felimon Garcia called up Manalili and informed him that he
already contacted a policeman to help him and said that the policeman wanted to talk to
him. So an appointment was set at 12:00 p.m. of April 22, 1990 at Dau Exit, North
Expressway, Mabalacat, Pampanga.
On said date Manalili, together with his son Richard, arrived at the Dau Exit at about
12:30 p.m. of April 22, 1990. Felimon Garcia was already there waiting for Manalili.
They proceeded to the Golden Palace Chinese Restaurant where they would meet
Roberto Lising. They, however, had to change venue because Roberto Lisings live-in
partner, Ligaya Faustino and other companions were in the restaurant. So they went
instead to a nearby carinderia and instructed Felimon Garcia to follow them there.
Shortly, Felimon Garcia arrived and introduced Roberto Lising, Enrico Dizon and
another man armed with a service pistol to Manalili. During the meeting, Manalili gave
them P2,000.00 and instructed them to go and see Vic Nabua,
*
his employee who will
point to them the person to be arrested.
On April 23-24, Lisings group went to Quezon City and met Vic Lisboa. They
conducted a surveillance on the Castaos residence in the hope of seeing
Herrera. Failing to do so, the group was asked to come back the next day.
On April 25, the same group arrived at the vicinity of the Castaos residence at
around 5:00 p.m. to resume their surveillance. Two hours later, Lisboa alerted the
group after allegedly spotting Herrera entering the Castaos residence.
Later, the group saw a man and a woman who happened to be Cochise and
Beebom leave the Castaos residence in a green box type Lancer car. The group
followed the Lancer car with Lising, Dizon and Manga riding in a black car and Lisboa
and Garcia in a motorcycle.
The Lancer car went to Dayrits Ham and Burger House on Timog Circle, Quezon
City where the couple intended to have dinner. Alighting from the car, they were
accosted by Dizon and Manga who were both carrying firearms. Amidst protestations,
Dizon poked his gun at Cochise, handcuffed him, and shoved him into the car. Beebom
protested loudly at the arrest and was also shoved into the back of the car.
The young couples failure to go home that night and the next day alarmed their
parents, so a search was then initiated by close friends and relatives - inquiring from
hospitals, restaurants, friends houses and possible places where the couple would go.
One group chanced upon Dayrits Ham and Burger House where they were told that
a couple who fitted their descriptions were taken by three (3) men believed to be from
the military in the evening of April 25, 1990.
The abduction of Cochise and Beebom hit the front pages. Appeals by the parents
to locate them reached the authorities where all possible angles of their disappearance
were explored but there were no significant leads. After about two (2) months of futile
search for their whereabouts, a break came on June 21, 1990 when two (2) security
guards working in a Shellane Warehouse in San Fernando, Pampanga went to see Ms.
Rosie Bernabe at her Pasay City Hall office and had information concerning her son,
Cochise. Mrs. Bernabe referred the two guards to the CAPCOM who interviewed them.
The two guards told the CAPCOM that their friends Raul Morales and Jun Medrano,
both employees of Roberto Lising, informed them that Lising killed a mestisuhin man
and a woman in their warehouse.
On June 23, 1990, Raul Morales was picked up and told his story. In a sworn
statement executed on even date, he stated that he was a pahinante residing in the
warehouse where LPG cylinders are stored, located near Valle Verde Drive-In Lodge in
San Fernando, Pampanga, owned by Ligaya Fausto, common-law wife of Roberto
Lising alias Rambo. In the main, he said:
21. T: Sa ikaliliwanag ng pagsisiyasat na ito, maaari bang isalaysay mo ang sinasabi
mong hindi pangkaraniwang pangyayari?
S: Nangyari yan alas 2:00 ng madaling araw ng 26 April 1990 natutulog ako, nang mayron
kumatok sa pinto ng bodega at nagising ako. Tinawag ko si Aida Morales para buksan
ang gate tapos sabi ni Aida Ikaw na lang ang magbukas pagkatapos kinuha ko yung
susi sa kanya para buksan ang yong gate. Noong binubuksan ko yong gate sabi sa akin
ni Roberto Llising Bakit ang tagal mo tapos pakabukas ko ng gate pumasok yong
dalawang kotse una yung itim pagkatapos yung green na kotse na Lancer, tapos unang
bumaba sa kotse na itim si Rambo, pangalawa si Felimon bumaba sa kotse na Lancer
may dala na pala. Pagkatapos lumabas ng gate si Felimon may dala na pala. Si Rambo
naman binuksan yong dalawang pinto ng kotseng itim bumaba yung babae at saka yung
lalaki hinila palabas ni Rambo. Pagkatapos tinalian niya ng alambre bukod pa sa pagtali
ng alambre pati pa yong mukha tinalian ng damit. Pagkatapos pagtali ni Rambo, biglang
dumating si Felimon dala pa yong pala pagkatapos sininyasahan si Rambo na ilabas na
iyong lalaki. Dinala ulit ni Rambo yung pala noong palabas na sila nung
lalaki. Pagkatapos ayaw nga lumabas ng lalaki, itinulak ni Rambo papunta sa labas,
sabi naman ng babae maawa naman po kayo sa amin dahil wala kaming kasalanan
pagkatapos tinutukan ni Rambo yong babae at sabi Putang ina mo, wag kang maingay,
papatayin rin kita. Noong dinala na ni Rambo, umiiyak na lang yong babae. Mga
kalahating oras bago bumalik si Rambo sa bodega na hindi na kasama yong
lalaki. Nakahubad siya at pinapawisan, bukod pa yan, naghugas pa ng kamay
siya. Pagkatapos nag-usap-usap silang tatlo, si Rambo, si Felimon at yong kasama ni
Rambo. Pagkatapos nagsabi si Rambo sa akin na buksan na ang gate at aalis na
sila. Binuksan ko ang gate at nagsakayan sila sa kotse, si Rambo sa itim at saka yong
babae, sa Lancer naman ang nakasakay yong kasama niya at si Felimon, at pagkatapos
lumabas na sila, tuloy-tuloy na umalis.
[1]

On June 25, 1990, the body of Cochise was exhumed. An autopsy was conducted
where the finding was: Cause of Death: Multiple Stab Wounds
The next day, Beeboms body, which was in an advanced decomposing stage was
exhumed from a shallow grave, two (2) kilometers from where Cochises body was
found.
After evading arrest the previous days, Roberto Lising was finally apprehended on
June 30, 1990. In a Sworn Statement on the same day at Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan,
he implicated Felimon Garcia and Roberto Manalili. According to him, this is what
happened:
x x x at about 11:00 oclock in the evening of April 25, 1990, he
received a telephone call from FELIMON GARCIA informing that he
and his companions were at Valle Verde Lodge at San Fernando,
Pampanga and that they have a problem. He immediately went to that
place and saw FELIMON GARCIA who introduced to him RUDY
MANALILI who was then accompanied by six (6) other men; that he
saw a yellow Mercedes Benz, a black Torana and a green Lancer; that
on board the Lancer were a man and a woman who were blindfolded
and were introduced to him by RUDY MANALILI as ROBERTO
HERRERA and JOY MANALILI; that they proceeded to one of the
rooms of the motel where MANALILI told him that the two persons
should die because they killed his brother DELFIN MANALILI; that
afterwards RUDY MANALILI paid the chit and they proceeded to the
warehouse at Villa Victoria, San Fernando, Pampanga, owned by
LIGAYA FAUSTO where he bound COCHISE and led him back of the
warehouse; that MANALILI stabbed COCHISE and he acted only as a
look-out; that FELIMON GARCIA and another person brought the
blindfolded woman to Brgy. San Agustin where she was killed that
before he, FILIMON GARCIA and RUDY MANALILI parted ways,
MANALILI told him to take care of the Lancer, change its color and
later he will get it and after that he was given P40,000.00 in check
which he encashed at the UCPB Diliman Branch, Quezon City on April
26, 1990; that he gave P15,000.00 to FELIMON GARCIA and kept the
rest; that he had the Lancer repainted and used it.
[2]

Thereafter, the manhunt for Felimon Garcia and Rodolfo Manalili began. One by
one, the men responsible for the killing of Cochise and Beebom fell into the hands of the
authorities.
On January 4, 1991, Garcia surrendered and was brought to the NBI. He named
Pat. Enrico Dizon as the companion of Lising when Cochise and Beebom were
kidnapped and brought to Valle Verde Lodge. He refused to make a statement or give
further information until Rodolfo Manalili was arrested.
On January 16, 1991, Enrico Dizon was turned over by his superiors to the NBI. He
named a certain CIC Robin Manga as one of their companions and owner of the car
they used when Cochise and Beebom were kidnapped. Thus, Manga was also picked
up.
Meanwhile, Rodolfo Manalili, who was in Australia at that time was fetched by then
NBI Director Alfredo Lim and Atty. Diego Gutierrez after proper representations were
made with the Australian police.
On January 17, 1991 Felimon Garcia, with the assistance of his counsel, Atty.
Redemberto Villanueva, executed a statement revealing that:
x x x he met RODOLFO MANALILI sometime in April 1987 in his office
at No. 71 Mapang-akit Street corner V. Luna, Quezon City while
soliciting contribution for Barangay fiesta of San Isidro, Minalin. The
relationship continued until he was requested by MANALILI to look for
persons who could help in arresting ROBERTO HERRERA, the
suspect in the killing of his brother DELFIN MANALILI. He contacted
ROBERTO LISING alias RAMBO, a policemen assigned with
Pampanga PC Intelligence Unit, thru LIGAYA FAUSTO, his relative
and live-in partner of LISING, to help in the arrest of HERRERA, and
on April 21, 1990, while in the residence of LISING, he placed a long-
distance call to MANALILI to inform him that LISING is willing to
help. They talked over the phone and agreed to meet the following day
in Dao.
He met MANALILI at the Dao-Mabalacat exit and accompanied the
latter to LISING, ENRICO DIZON AND ANOTHER MAN ARMED WITH
SERVICE PISTOL (.45 CALIBER AND Armalite. MANALILI, during the
meeting, said that VIC NABUA, his employee, will act as pointer of the
persons to be arrested and LISING agreed and asked from
MANALILI P50,000.00 for the job to which MANALILI agreed. Initially
MANALILI gave P2,000.00 to LISING as expenses.
He together with LISING, ENRICO DIZON and the driver of a Tamaraw
went to Quezon City on April 23 and 24, 1990, but VIC NABUA failed to
spot HERRERA. On April 25, 1990, LISING and DIZON returned on
board a black car, Colt Galant (sic) driven by ROBIN MANGA and
NABUA finally told then that HERRERA was at a house near the
Camelot. After a few minutes of surveillance NABUA approached them
and told them to follow the car driven by a man with a woman
companion. Said car proceeded to Timog Circle and parked in front of
Dayrit Hamburger House, followed by the Colt Galant which they
likewise followed on board a motor and handcuffed the man and the
woman. Then LISING instructed him to contact MANALILI and VIC
NABUA proceeded to Pampanga PC where they were instructed by the
military on duty to proceed to Valle Verde Lodge, San Fernando,
Pampanga. There they saw LISING and ERNESTO COCHISE
BERNABE and BEEBOM CASTAOS. MANALILI identified them and
instructed him and LISING to release COCHISE and BEEBOM and
assured that whatever MANALILI promised to LISING WILL BE
PAID. Lising AGREED. However, after MANALILI left, LISING told
him to bring COCHISE and BEEBOM to a warehouse owned by
LIGAYA FAUSTO where COCHISE was killed by LISING. Thereafter
BEEBOM was forced by ENRICO DIZON and ROBIN MANGA top
board the Galant car which left the warehouse towards Barangay San
Agustin.
He and LISING were left in the warehouse and proceeded to the house
of LIGAYA FAUSTO at MALIGAYA Village in San Fernando. At about
9:00 a.m. he and LISING went to the warehouse of MANALILI at
Xavierville Subdivision, Quezon City and there a check for P40,000.00
was given to LISING who encashed it with Fareast Bank and went to
Pampanga. He alighted at Sto. Domingo, Minalin, Pampanga after
LISING gave him P500.00.
[3]

Rodolfo Manalili, on the other hand, with the assistance of Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez
manifested on January 18, 1991:
That he met LISING through FELIMON GARCIA whom he requested to
look for some police officers who could help in the arrest of ROBERTO
HERRERA, the accused in the killing of his brother DELFIN MANALILI.
He met LISING together with a certain Pat ENRICO DIZON of the
Guagua police and another police officer in Dau, Pampanga on April
22, 1990, and gave them a sketch of HERRERA. On April 24, 1990, he
told GARCIA to postpone their plan against HERRERA due to his
forthcoming travel to Germany on April 25. However, at about 10:00
p.m. of April 25, GARCIA came to his office at No. 71 Mapangakit,
Diliman, Quezon City and informed that they have already arrested
HERRERA with a lady companion and that he was instructed to go to
Pampanga, which he did. He was accompanied in his car by GARCIA
and VICTOR LISBOA.
They proceeded to Valle Verde Hotel in San Fernando, Pampanga,
and brought him to Room 213 where he saw a man slumped on the
floor with his eyes and mouth covered with tape. The lady companion
sitting on the bed had her eyes also taped. He told LISING that the
man is not HERRERA. He was forced to peek (sic) inside the room
anew, and this time recognized the woman to be BEEBOM
CASTAOS. He pleaded to LISING and companions to release them
and would give them whatever amount he promised them.
After he was told that BEEBOM and COCHISE would be released he
instructed GARCIA to stay behind and see to it that his instructions
were complied with. Then, he returned with VICTOR LISBOA. The
following day, at about 8:00 a.m., LISING and GARCIA came to his
house and told him that the man and BEEBOM were already released
and in turn gave them a Far East Bank check in the amount
of P40,000.00.
On April 26, he left for Germany and returned on May 28, 1990. While
still in Germany his wife and househelps have been receiving
threatening telephone calls and on the first week of June he received a
call from GARCIA who gave the telephone to LISING who asked
for P60,000.00, otherwise he will kill him or implicate him in the crime.
On June 21, 1990 he left for Hong Kong then to Melbourne for fear of
his life and that of his family.
He claimed that the police officers he saw in Valle Verde Hotel were
Pampanga policeman and not Quezon City policeman.
[4]

Consequently, two (2) Amended Informations were filed in court against Roberto
Rambo Lising, Rodolfo Manalili, Felimon Garcia, Enrico Dizon, Robin Manga, and
Ligaya Fausto.
Criminal Case No. Q-90-15239
For Carnapping (Violation of Republic Act No. 6539)
[5]

That on or about the 25
th
day of April 1990, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, P/Pfc. Roberto Lising y
Canlas, Enrico Dizon, Robin Manga y Quimzon, being then members of the Integrated
National Police with Presidential waiver, and Rodolfo Manalili, Felimon Garcia and
Ligaya Fausto, private individuals and several Does, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, and without the knowledge
and consent of the owner thereof, by means of violence and intimidation against
persons, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry
away one G.T. Lancer, with plate No. PER 942 in an undetermined value and belonging
to Ernesto Bernabe II, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in such
amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.
[6]

Criminal Case No. Q-90-15240
For: Kidnapping with Double Murder
[7]

That on or about the 25
th
day of April, 1990, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, P/Pfc. Roberto Rambo
Lising y Canlas, Enrico Dizon, Roberto (sic) Manga y Quimzon, being then members of
the Integrated National Police with Presidential waiver,and Rodolfo Manalili, Felimon
Garcia, both private individuals, and several Does, conspiring together, confederating
with and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, wil lfully, unlawfully and
feloniously and for the purpose of detaining Ernesto Bernabe II y Blanco @ Cochise
and Ana Lourdes Castaos y Jis de Ortega @ Beebom, kidnap or in any manner
deprive them of their liberty and thereafter, pursuant to their conspiracy, took them to
San Fernando, Pampanga, and with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation
and cruelty, did, then and there stab them several times in the chest and slit open their
necks, augmenting their sufferings which were the direct and immediate cause of their
deaths and thereafter burying them to prevent discovery, and Ligaya Fausto, also a
private individual, knowing the criminal intent of the above-named principal accused
cooperated in the execution of the crime by supplying material and/or moral aid, to the
damage and prejudice of the Heirs of said victims in such amounts as may be awarded
to them under the provisions of the New Civil Code.
[8]

Upon arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty.
In building up their case, the prosecution presented two vital witnesses: Froilan
Olimpia, who witnesses the abduction of the young couple at Dayrits Ham and Burger
House; and Raul Morales, thepahinante who testified on the killing of Cochise.
On May 27, 1991, Froilan Olimpia testified in court and stated that he was 31 years
old and was formerly a security guard of Nationwide Security and Investigation
Agency. He was assigned at the Rotonda Wine Station, the establishment beside
Dayrits Ham and Burger House along Timog Circle, Quezon City. His tour of duty on
April 25, 1990 was from 12:00 noon to 12:00 midnight.
At about 7:00 to 7:30 in the evening, Olimpia was at his post in front of the Wine
Station. There was a green box type Lancer car which parked in front of the Dayrits
Ham and Burger House carrying a man and a woman. Then a black car with no license
plate parked behind the green car and two men alighted from it carrying guns. They
announced that they were policemen, one was carrying a .45 caliber firearm in his
holster and other was carrying a long firearm. These men went towards the green box
type Lancer and handcuffed its driver. He only heard the man being handcuffed retort
Bakit? When asked about the female companion, he said that his attention was more
focused on the handcuffing incident and just later noticed that the woman was already
seated at the back of the car. He did not even see the other man driving the black car.
Olimpia further explained that the security guard of Dayrits Ham and Burger House,
Anastacio dela Cruz, was not really able to witness the whole incident since he was
busy buying a cigarette stick from a nearby vendor. Just when the latter was returning
to his post, the cars were already backing up ready to leave.
He did not tell anyone about the incident nor bothered to report to the authorities
since he was aware that the perpetrators were policemen. He came to know about the
identities of the man and woman and their disappearance when two persons were
making inquiries about them on April 27, 1990. The next time, another group of people
asked him about what he witnessed until he was picked up by the NBI for further
questioning about the whole incident.
Raul Morales was presented in court on April 17, 1991. He stated that since March
1988, he had been working for Ligaya Fausto and Roberto Lising as a pahinante or
truck helper of Crown Gas Commercial, a dealer of LPG, located in Valle Victoria
Village, San Fernando, Pampanga. He knew Roberto Lising to be a policeman and is
known by the name Rambo Lising. He works as a policeman in the morning and when
he returns home after work, helps in delivering gas. During his testimony, Morales was
given a clean sheet of paper and pen where he was asked to make a sketch of his
place of work.
At about 2:00 in the morning of April 26, 1990, he was awakened by a knock at the
gate of the warehouse. When he opened the gate, two cars came in: a green box-
type Lancer car driven by Lising, with Felimon Garcia seated in front, a man and a
woman at the back seat of the car; and a black car with Dizon and Manga. After the two
cars entered the premises, he saw Lising go behind their sleeping quarters and get a
wire. Lising and Dizon then brought Cochise to an area in the middle of the warehouse
while Manga led Beebom to another end. After alighting from the car, Felimon Garcia
got a spade from the back compartment of the car and went out of the
warehouse. Lising and Dizon then removed the handcuffs of Cochise, tied his hands
with the wire and blindfolded him with a tape and torn cloth.
Morales further testified that it was Lising who closed the gate but left it ajar. In a
little while, he noticed another man enter the gate and walked towards Beebom. He
heard the woman plead: Uncle,maawa po kayo sa amin, while Manga was tying
Beeboms hands with the wire. Garcia, after going inside the warehouse, was handed a
knife by Lising which he used to stab Cochise on the chest. Lising then retrieved his
knife from Garcia and continued to stab Cochise. When Cochise was already dead, the
four men, namely, Lising, Garcia, Dizon and Manga carried Cochise out of the
warehouse. They were away for about half an hour and when they came back, the four
men directly went to the well and washed their hands. The four walked towards Manalili
and talked with each other. He could not hear the conversation but saw that they
grouped themselves together.
Before leaving, Lising called on Morales and told him to close the gate and keep the
shoes of Cochise. Lising boarded the green box-type Lancer car with Garcia and the
woman. He noticed Rudy Manalili walk out of the gate.
On April 26, 1991, the court conducted an ocular inspection of the scene of the
crime. Witness Morales pointed to the court how events transpired from where he was
seated.
On the basis of the testimonies of the above witnesses, plus the confessions made
in the extrajudicial statements executed by Roberto Lising, Felimon Garcia, and Rodolfo
Manalili, the prosecution presented their version of the incident as quoted from the trial
courts decision, to wit:
1. The conspiracy to abduct and subsequently kill Ernesto
Cochise Bernabe II and Ana Lourdes Beebom Castaos was
hatched sometime in March 1990 when accused Rodolfo Manalili
secured the services of accused Felimon Garcia to look for men who
would be willing to commit the dastardly deed for a fee. (Exhibits HH
and MM).
2. Accused Garcia then set about on his task and contacted
accused Roberto Lising and Enrico Dizon for the job. (Ibid.)
3. At a meeting arranged by Garcia on 22 April 1990, accused
Manalili talked with Lising and Dizon at Mabalacat, Pampanga about
the details of the conspiracy. (Ibid.)
4. Accused Manalili promised Lising, Dizon and their companions
the amount of P50,000.00 for the job. (Ibid.)
5. Lising and Dizon readily accepted Manalilis using a total
of P10,000.00 as downpayment, the balance of P40,000.00 payable
after the victims have been kidnapped and killed. (Ibid.)
6. Accused Lising and Dizon then recruited accused Robin Manga
to help implement the orders of Manalili. (Ibid.)
7. On 25 April 1990, at around 5:00 oclock in the afternoon,
accused Lising, Dizon, Garcia and Manga, on board Mangas black car,
went to the vicinity of the Camelot Hotel at Quezon City. They
positioned themselves about 60 meters away from the Castaos
residence and waited for the victims. (Exhibit MM)
8. At around 6:30 oclock in the evening of the same day, Cochise
and Beebom went out of the Castaos residence, boarded Cochises
green colored 1985 Lancer car with plate No. PER 942. (Ibid.) This
Lancer car is owned by, and registered under the name of Cochises
father, Fiscal Ernesto Bernabe. (Exhibit DD)
9. Cochise and Beebom then proceeded toward Dayrits Ham and
Burger House at Timog Avenue, Quezon City. (Ibid.)
10. Accused Lising, Dizon, Garcia and Manga immediately boarded
Mangas black car and tailed the green Lancer. (Ibid.)
11. Upon reaching Dayrits hamburger House, Cochise parked the
green Lancer in front of the restaurant. (TSN, 7 May 1991, p.6)
12. Immediately thereafter, Mangas black car was parked
immediately behind. (Ibid.)
13. Accused Dizon, armed with a .45 caliber pistol, and accused
Manga, carrying a long firearm, alighted from the black car, proceeded
towards the green Lancer and announced that they are policemen. (Id.
At 7)
14. While Cochise and Beebom were alighting from the green
Lancer, Dizon approached, pointed the .45 caliber pistol at Cochise
and handcuffed Cochises hands behind his back. (Id., at 8)
15. Cochise, visibly surprised and confused, asked Dizon, Bakit?
(Id. at 14)
16. Accused Dizon ignored the question and rudely pushed Cochise
into the back seat of the green Lancer. (Id., at 7-9)
17. Similarly, accused Manga approached Beebom at the other side
of the green Lancer, and pushed her into the other back seat of the
green Lancer. (Ibid.)
18. Accused Dizon and Manga then boarded the front of the green
Lancer, backed the car out of the parking area of Dayrits Ham &
Burger House and drove away towards EDSA. (Id.at 11)
19. Accused Lising and Garcia, on board Mangas black car,
immediately followed. (Ibid.)
20. After the forcible abduction of Cochise and Beebom, Garcia
informed Manalili of the success of the operation. Garcia further told
Manalili to go to a designated place in San Fernando, Pampanga,
where Cochise and Beebom will be taken. (Exhibit MM)
21. Manalili then proceeded to San Fernando, Pampanga on board
his gray Mercedes Benz. (Ibid.)
22. At around 2:00 oclock in the morning of 26 April 1990, accused
Lising, Dizon, Garcia and Manga brought Cochise and Beebom to a
bodega in San Fernando, Pampanga owned by accused Ligaya
Fausto. (TSN, 18 April 1991, p.6)
23. At this time, Lising was driving the green Lancer with Garcia at
the front seat. At the rear of the car were Cochise and Beebom. (Id. at
8)
24. Manga, on the other hand, was driving the black car, with Dizon
beside him. (Id., at 8)
25. After the green Lancer and the black car were parked inside the
bodega, Cochise, blind-folded, handcuffed and gagged with several
strips of masking tape, was dragged out of the green Lancer by Lising
and Dizon towards an area near the toilet. (Id., at 9-10; TSN, 26 April
1991, p.3)
26. Beebom, on the other hand, was taken by Manga to another
area of the Bodega where she could not see Cochise or hear what was
being done to him. (Ibid.)
27. At this point in time, Manalili arrived, parked the car on the road
outside the bodega and walked inside towards Beebom. (TSN, 18, April
1991, p.11)
28. Beebom, seeing Manalili, pleaded, Uncle, parang awa mo
na. Wala kaming kasalanan. (Ibid.)
29. Manalili simply ignored Beeboms plea for mercy. (Ibid.)
30. Meanwhile, Garcia went to the back of the green Lancer, got a
spade from the truck compartment, and went out of the bodega.
(Ibid). Garcia walked towards the back of the bodega and there, dug a
shallow grave. (Exhibit HH)
31. Lising went to the clothesline area of the bodega, got a length of
a laundry wire and some clothes which he tore apart and made into
makeshift ropes. (TSN, 18 April 1991, p. 12)
33. Garcia then returned to the bodega with the spade still in his
hands and approached Cochise. (Id., at 14)
34. Lising handed a knife to Garcia, who then stabbed Cochise in the
chest. (Ibid.)
35. Lising, appearing, dissatisfied, grabbed the knife from Garcia and
stabbed Cochise several times in the chest and stomach area, as if
telling Garcia how to do it. All this time, Dizon was holding
Cochise. (Id., at 14-15)
36. Cochise then fell to the ground, mortally wounded. (Ibid.)
37. Thereupon, Dizon motioned to Manga to help carry the body of
Cochise. Manalili then was left to keep watch over Beebom. (Id., at
16)
38. Lising, Dizon, Garcia and Manga brought Cochise to the back of
the bodega, into the shallow grave dug by Garcia. The four then
covered cochise with soil. (TSN, 26 April 1991, p. 6; Exhibit MM)
39. They then reported to Manalili for final instructions. The order
was for all of them to leave. (TSN, 26 April 1991, p. 18)
40. Beebom inquired about Cochise, Lising and Dizon answered that
they had released Cochise, and that they would likewise release
her. (TSN, 18 April 1991, p. 18; Exhibit MM)
41. Thus, the five accused left the bodega, Dizon and Manga on
board the black car, Manalili in his own car, and Lising, Garcia and
Beebom in the green Lancer. (TSN, 18 April 1991, p. 18)
42. Later, upon the instructions of Lising, Dizon and Manga took
Beebom with them on the black car. (Exhibit MM). This was the last
time that Beebom was seen alive.
43. At around 5:00 oclock in the morning of the same day, Fausto
arrived at her bodega and waited for Lising to arrive. (TSN, 18 April
1991, p. 20)
44. About an hour later, Lising arrived on board the Lancer car taken
from Cochise. Lising alighted from the Lancer car, proceeded to one of
the huts in the bodega where Fausto was staying, and informed Fausto
about the taking of the Lancer car. (Id., at 21)
45. After a few minutes, Fausto emerged from the hut and instructed
a certain Jun Medrano, one of Faustos helpers in the bodega, to drive
the Lancer car to her house in Maligaya Village, San Fernando,
Pampanga, and hide it there. (Id., at 22)
46. Pursuant to Faustos instruction, Jun Medrano, together with two
other helpers of Fausto, Raul Morales, and a certain Nonoy, drove the
Lancer car to Faustos house and hid it in the barbelan area of the
house. (Id., at 23-24; Exhibit Y)
47. Meanwhile, satisfied that his orders had been fully implemented,
Manalili paid Lising the P40,000.00 balance of the contract, by issuing
a Far East Bank check for the said amount to Lising at around 8:00
oclock in the morning of 26 April 1990. (Exhibits K and HH)
48. Lising immediately encashed the check and distributed the
proceeds among himself and the other accused, Exhibits K-2 and
MM)
49. The Lancer car taken from Cochise, on the other hand, remained
hidden for sometime at the residence of Fausto in Maligaya Village
where it was repainted to a light gray color upon the instruction of
Fausto. (TSN, 18 April 1991, pp. 26-27; Exhibits CC, CC-1 to CC-
6)
50. After the Lancer car was repainted to light gray, Faustos helpers
in the bodega, namely, Jun Medrano, Raul Morales, Rudy, Bebot and
Arnold, upon Faustos instructions, pushed the Lancer car for about
fifteen minutes to have its engine started. Thereafter, the Lancer car
was driven to Faustos bodega. (TSN, 18 April 1991, pp. 28-29)
51. Lising and Fausto thereafter started using the Lancer car in
going to the bank and other places in San Fernando, Pampanga. (Ibid.)
52. The Lancer car was subsequently recovered by the
PC/CAPCOM and turned over to the custody of Fiscal Ernesto
Bernabe. (Exhibits CC, CC-1 to CC-6 and EE)
53. On 25 June 1990, after two months of frantic and exhaustive
search made by the Bernabe family, the body of Cochise was found
and exhumed from the grave where Cochise was buried by Lising,
Garcia Dizon and Manga at the back of Faustos bodega in San
Fernando, Pampanga. It was determined during an autopsy that
Cochise died to multiple stab wounds in his chest and upper
stomach. (TSN, 10 April 1991, p. 33; Exhibits D, D-1 E and E-1
54. The next day, also after two months of frantic and exhaustive
search made by the Castaos family, the body of Beebom was found
and exhumed from a shallow grave about two kilometers from the
bodega of Fausto. It was determined during the autopsy that Beebom
died of severe hemorrhage, secondary to two stab wounds in the chest.
(TSN, 10 April 1991, p. 40; Exhibits 1 and J)
55. Cochise was 26 years old and Beebom was 22 years old when
their lives were untimely ended by the accused. Cochise had just
finished his Bachelor of Laws degree from the University of the
Philippines and was then reviewing for his bar examinations when he
was abducted on 25 April 1990. Beebom, on the other hand, was a
graduating Mass Communication student of the University of the
Philippines when she was abducted on 25 April 1990. Both Cochise
and Beebom excelled in academic and extra-curricular activities, their
written works having been published in periodicals and other
publications. Cochise and Beebom were in the best of their youth and
health at the time of their untimely death. (TSN, 9 August 1991, pp. 4-
7; TSN, 23 July 1991, pp. 24-26; Exhibit II)
56. The Bernabe family, in their attempt to locate Cochise spent a
total of P380,000.00. in laying Cochise to his final rest, the Bernabe
family spent a total of P632,222.00 for funeral and other
expenses. (TSN, 9 August 1991, p. 12; Exhibits LL, LL-1 to LL-3)
57. The Castaos family, on the other hand, spent a total
of P350,000.00 for the funeral services for Beebom. (TSN, 23 July
1991, p. 39)
[9]

In their defense, the accused policemen claimed that there was insufficient
evidence to sustain their conviction. At the same time, each one had an alibi.
Roberto Lising asserted that on April 25, 1990, he took a leave of absence from
office to be able to celebrate his fathers birthday in Arayat, Pampanga and stayed there
for the night. His father was presented to corroborate his assertion.
Enrico Dizon testified that April 25, 1990 was an ordinary working day for him. He
left the office at 5:00 p.m. and headed for home at NO. 107 Kamia St., Bgy. Sindalen,
San Fernando, Pampanga. In fact, two of his neighbors recounted in court the verbal
exchange they had when they saw each other in their neighborhood.
Roberto Manga, meanwhile averred that it was impossible for him to participate in
the commission of the crime since he was still nursing his gunshot wounds sustained in
an encounter with lawless elements for about a year already.
Garcia and Manalili did not take the witness stand. They opted to rely on their
extrajudicial statements executed the previous days manifesting the absence if criminal
intent.
On July 1, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision with the following dispositive
portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused
RODOLFO MANALILI, ROBERTO LISING y CANLAS, FELIMON
GARCIA, ROBIN MANGA y QUIMZON and ENRICO DIZON y
ESCARIO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double
Murder qualified with treachery and aggravated by evidence
premeditation and abused of public position by Lising, Manga and
Dizon, and hereby sentences each one of them to suffer a penalty of
double Reclusion Perpetua with all its accessory penalties provided by
law (the death penalty having been abolished by the 1987
Constitution); to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Ernesto Bernabe
II;
(a) P1,000,000.00 as funeral and other expenses;
(b) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(c) P500,000.00 as moral damages;
(d) P2,000,000.00 for Cochises loss of earning capacity;
The heirs of Ana Lourdes Castaos:
(a) P350,000.00 for funeral and other expenses;
(b) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(c) P500,000.00 as moral damages;
The Court also finds accused Roberto Lising, Enrico Dizon and Robin Manga
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Slight Illegal Detention aggravated by
use of a motor vehicle and hereby sentences each one of them to suffer the maximum
penalty of Reclusion Temporal with imprisonment from Seventeen (17) years, Four (4)
months and one (1) day to Twenty years, and to pay the cost.
Accused LIGAYA FAUSTO who is charged as an accessory after the fact (not
accomplice as alleged by the Prosecution), is hereby acquitted for insufficiency of
evidence.
Accused RODOLFO MANALILI, ROBERTO LISING, ENRICO DIZON, ROBIN
MANGA and FELIMON GARCIA are given full credit of their respective sentences in
this case.
With respect to Criminal Case No. Q-15239 for carnapping, all the accused are
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, it appearing that the use of the car was
done only to facilitate the commission of the crime of Slight Illegal Detention.
[10]

In this appeal, the following assignment of errors were made:
Roberto Lising contends that:
I. THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ADMITTING AND CONSIDERING THE STATEMENTS OF
RODOLFO MANALILI (EXHS. HH:, HH-1 TO HH-25) AND
THAT OF FELIMON GARCIA (MM, MM-1 TO MM-14)
ADMISSIBLE AS AGAINST ROBERTO RAMBO LISING;
II. THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DECLARING RAUL MORALES AS A CREDIBLE WITNESS,
ALSO AS AGAINST ROBERTO RAMBO LISING;
III. THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED,
LIKEWISE, IN STATING THAT HEREIN APPELLANT
IMMEDIATELY ENCASHED THE CHECK AND DISTRIBUTED
THE PROCEEDS AMONG HIMSELF AND THE OTHERS
(EXHS. K-2 AND MM);
IV. THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DECLARING THE STATEMENT OF THE HEREIN
APPELLANT AS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AS AGAINST
HIM;
V. THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DECLARING THAT HEREIN APPELLANT (LISING IS
EQUALLY LIABLE FOR KIDNAPPING THUS, JIVING (SIC)
THE PLACE FOR PURPOSES OF JURISDICTION; AND
VI. THAT THE HON. COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING TE
HEREIN APPELLANT (ROBERTO LISING) AS ONE OF ALL
THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIMES OF DOUBLE MURDER
AND WITH ENRICO DIZON AND ROBIN MANGA FOR
SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
[11]

Enrico Dizon argues that:
1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO
DROP THE NAMES OF ROLANDO KHO, ROLANDO FERNANDEZ,
NOEMI PANGAN AND JESUS REMOLACIO FROM THE
INFORMATION AND ADMIT AMENDED INFORMATION
IMPLICATING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ENRICO DIZON DESPITE
CLEAR EVIDENCE OF THE PARTICIPATION OF KHO,
FERNANDEZ, PANGAN AND REMOLACIO;
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADOPTING THE
PROSECUTIONS VERSION OF STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
ALTHOUGH THERE WERE MISLEADING STATEMENTS AS
PROVED BY THEIR CONTRADICTIONS TO THE TRANSCRIPTS OF
STENOGRAPHIC NOTES, AND AFFIDAVITS PRESENTED;
3. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE FOR IT
RELIED IN THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI,
WITHOUT REGARDING THE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE
TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS RAUL MORALES AND
FROILAN OLIMPIA;
4. THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT GAVE
CREDENCE TO THE AFFIDAVITS EXECUTED BY LISING, MANALILI
AND GARCIA DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY WERE NOT
PRESENTED AS WITNESSES BEFORE THE LOWER COURT;
5. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADJUDGING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIMINAL ACTS BASED
ON THE DECLARATION OF FELIMON GARCIAS EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION WITHOUT ESTABLISHING FIRST THE CONSPIRACY
TO WHICH ACCUSED-APPELLANT DIZON WAS A PART.
[12]

Robin Manga asserts that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT
AND CREDIT ON THE EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENT OF
CO-ACCUSED RODOLFO MANALILI AND FELIMON
GARCIA DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE TWO DID NOT
TAKE THE WITNESS STAND NOR THEIR STATEMENTS
OFFERED IN EVIDENCE;
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS OF RODOLFO MANALILI
AND FELIMON GARCIA AFFIRMED CONSPIRACY AMONG
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE ITS UTTER LACK
OF EVIDENTIARY VALUE;
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT
AND CREDIT ON THE TESTIMONIES OF RAUL MORALES
AND FROILAN OLIMPIA DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
STATEMENTS OF THE TWO ARE REPLETE WITH
INCONSISTENCIES, SELF-CONTRADICTIONS AND ARE
HIGHLY IMPROBABLE;
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT FELIMON
GARCIAS NARRATION OF THE ABDUCTION WAS
CONSISTENT WITH THE TESTIMONY OF FROILAN
OLIMPIA WITH RESPECT TO THE PARTICIPATION OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ROBIN MANGA DESPITE
STATEMENTS BY OLIMPIA THAT HE SAW QUEZON CITY
POLICEMEN ROLANDO KHO AND ROLANDO FERNANDEZ
AS THE PERSONS WHO ABDUCTED COCHISE AND
BEEBOM IN THE EARLY EVENING OF APRIL 25, 1990
AND DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
STATEMENT FELIMON GARCIA WAS NOT EVEN
IDENTIFIED BY THE LATTER DURING THE TRIAL OF
THESE CASES;
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS
EVIDENCE MATTERS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
MANGA;
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO OBSERVE
THE PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT
MANGA BEING INVOLVED IN THE OFFENSES CHARGED;
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
ACCUSED-APPELLANT MANGA.
[13]

Rodolfo Manalili avers that:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
GIVING TOTAL CREDIBILITY TO RAUL MORALES AND IN
NOT FINDING THAT RAUL MORALES WAS A REHEARSED
AND PERJURED WITNESS INSOFAR AS IMPLICATING
ACCUSED RODOLFO MANALILI IN THE COMMISSION OF
THE CRIME OF DOUBLE MURDER IS CONCERNED;
II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT ACCUSED RODOLFO MANALILI DID NOT HAVE ANY
CRIMINAL INTENT OF DOING AWAY WITH THE LIVES OF
ERNESTO BERNABE II AND ANA LOURDES CASTAOS
AND THAT HE LIKEWISE DID NOT HAVE ANY MOTIVE
WHATSOEVER IN CONSPIRING TO DO SO;
III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
CONCLUDING THAT ACCUSED RODOLFO MANALILI
NEVER ENTERED INTO A CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT THE
CRIME OF DOUBLE MURDER NOR DID HE COMMIT ANY
ACT/S ON THE BASIS OF WHICH IT CAN BE INFERRED
THAT HE ENTERED INTO SUCH A CONSPIRACY TO
COMMIT THE CRIME IMPUTED TO HIM;
IV. SINCE THERE WAS IN EFFECT SEPARATE TRIAL OF
THE SEVERAL ACCUSED WHO WERE EACH
REPRESENTED BY SEPARATE LAWYERS AND
CONSIDERING THAT CONSPIRACY BETWEEN MANALILI
AND HIS CO-ACCUSED HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN BY ANY
ACT OR DECLARATION DURING ITS EXISTENCE, THE
TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN TAKING INTO
ACCOUNT THE SWORN STATEMENT OF ROBERTO
LISING AS EVIDENCE AGAINST RODOLFO MANALILI TO
THE EXTENT THAT IT PURPORTS TO ATTEST TO
MANALILIS INVOLVEMENT IN THE CRIME;
V. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
ON THE BASIS OF WHICH IT CAN BE INFERRED THAT
ANOTHER PARTY WHO WOULD BE MOST BENEFITED BY
DOING AWAY WITH THE LIVES OF THE VICTIMS, WAS
BEHIND THE COMMISSION OF DOUBLE MURDER;
VI. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING
THE WELL-ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE IN CRIMINAL LAW
THAT WHEN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE
CASE ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO TWO REASONABLE
INTERPRETATIONS: ONE REASONABLE
INTERPRETATION LEADING TO A DECISION OF
CONVICTION, AND THE OTHER REASONABLE
INTERPRETATION LEADING TO A FINDING OF
ACQUITTAL, THEN THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION HAS NOT FULFILLED THE STRINGENT
REQUIREMENT OF THE LAW OF PROVING THE GUILT OF
ACCUSED RODOLFO MANALILI BEYOND DOUBT AND
THEREFROM SAID ACCUSED MANALILI IS ENTITLED TO
AN ACQUITTAL; AND
VII. THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING
INFLATED, UNSUBSTANTIATED, AND SPECULATIVE
DAMAGES WHICH ARE NOT RECOVERABLE UNDER
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
[14]

Felimon Garcia contends that:
I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT RAUL MORALES WAS A REHEARSED AND
PERJURED WITNESS TO MAKE FALSE ASSERTIONS
IMPLICATING APPELLANT FELIMON GARCIA IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF DOUBLE MURDER;
II. SINCE THERE WAS IN EFFECT SEPARATE TRIALS OF
THE SEVERAL ACCUSED WHO WERE EACH
REPRESENTED BY SEPARATE LAWYERS AND
CONSIDERING THAT CONSPIRACY BETWEEN
APPELLANT FELIMON GARCIA AND HIS CO-ACCUSED
HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN BY ANY ACT OR DECLARATION
DURING ITS EXISTENCE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY
ERRED IN TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SWORN
STATEMENT OF ROBERTO LISING AS EVIDENCE
AGAINST APPELLANT FELIMON GARCIA;
III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT APPELLANT FELIMON GARCIA DID NOT HAVE ANY
CRIMINAL INTENT NOR MOTIVE WHATSOEVER TO
CONSPIRE WITH APPELLANT LISING ET AL TO KILL
ERNESTO BERNABE II AND ANA LOURDES CASTAOS
BOTH OF WHOM APPELLANT GARCIA HAS NEVER
KNOWN OR MET BEFORE APRIL 25, 1990;
IV. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANT FELIMON GARCIA
PERFORMED THE ACTS ADMITTED BY HIM UNDER THE
COMPULSION OF AN IRRESISTIBLE FORCE AND/OR
UNDER THE IMPULSE OF AN UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR
OF AN EQUAL OR GREATER INJURY AND THEREFORE
EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY; AND
V. EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT APPELLANT
FELIMON GARCIA IS NOT EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL
LIABILITY, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT
FINDING HIM GUILTY MERELY AS AN ACCOMPLICE OF
THE CRIME OF DOUBLE MURDER AND THEREFORE
ENTITLED TO A LOWER PENALTY IN VIEW OF THE
PRESENCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER,
OBFUSCATION, AND LACK OF INTENTION TO COMMIT SO
GRAVE A WRONG, AS MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
[15]

Basically the present appeal is anchored on three issues: (a) the admissibility of the
extrajudicial statements of appellants Manalili, Garcia and Lising; (b) the credibility of
prosecution witnesses Froilan Olimpia and Raul Morales and the (c) finding of
conspiracy among the appellants.
Extrajudicial statements are as a rule, admissible as against their respective
declarants, pursuant to the rule that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. This is based upon the
presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless such
declarations were true. A mans act, conduct and declarations wherever made,
provided they be voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason that it is fair to
presume that they correspond with the truth and it is his fault if they are not.
[16]

There is no question that their respective extrajudicial statement of Manalili and
Garcia were executed voluntarily. They were assisted by their counsel and properly
sworn to before a duly authorized officer. They merely relied on their extra-judicial
statements and did not take the witness stand during the trial.
Lising, on the other hand, claims that he was coerced and tortured into executing
the extrajudicial statement but nothing appears on record that such extrajudicial
statement was made under compulsion, duress or violence on his person. Lising did
not present himself for physical examination, nor did he file administrative charges
against his alleged tormentors which would necessarily buttress the claim of torture in
the absence of such evidence. There are in fact indicia of voluntariness in the
execution of his extra-judicial statements, to wit: (a) it contains many details and facts
which the investigating officer could not have known and could have supplied, without
the knowledge and information given by Lising himself; (b) it bears corrections duly
initialed by him; (c) it tends to explain or justify his conduct and shift the blame to his co-
accused Manalili. Moreover, the claim that Lising was not assisted by counsel is belied
by the fact that the signature of his counsel Atty. Yabut appears in all the pages of his
extrajudicial statements.
The rule that an extrajudicial statement is evidence only against the person making
it, also recognizes various exceptions. One such exception worth noting is the rule that
where several extrajudicial statements had been made by several persons charged with
an offense and there could have been no collusion with reference to said several
confessions, the facts that the statements are in all material respects identical, is
confirmatory of the confession of the co-defendants and is admissible against other
persons implicated therein.
[17]
They are also admissible as circumstantial evidence
against the person implicated therein to show the probability of the latters actual
participation in the commission of the crime and may likewise serve as corroborative
evidence if it is clear from other facts and circumstances that other persons had
participated in the perpetration of the crime charged and proved.
[18]
These are known as
interlocking confessions.
No doubt that the statements were independently executed and rather identical with
each other in their material details. There are also distinct similarities in the narration of
events leading to the killings of Cochise and Beebom.
Manalili and Garcias statements reveal that Manalili wanted to effect the arrest of
Robert Herrera; that he asked help from Garcia if the latter knew of policemen who
could do the job for the promised consideration of P50,000.00; that a downpayment
of P2,000.00 was made; that Manalili was informed that Robert Herrera and Joy Ortega
were arrested; that Manalili together with Garcia and Nabua proceeded to Valle Verde
Motel; that they were met by Dizon and Manga at the motel and were told that Herrera
was inside the room; that upon discovery that Lisings group had taken the wrong
person and recognized Beeboms voice, Manalili pleaded to the group that the victim be
released, assuring Lising that the balance P40,000.00 would still be paid; that Lising
and his group refused but relented upon Manalilis persistence; that Manalili left for
Manila but instructed Garcia to stay behind and ensure the release of the victims; and
that the next day Lising went to his office and claimed the balance to which Manalili
issued the corresponding check.
Garcia added that after Manalili had left, Lising told him to bring Cochise and
Beebom to the warehouse owned by Ligaya where Cochise was killed. Thereafter, they
forcibly took Beebom into the car and proceeded to Brgy. San Agustin.
Likewise, we find Lisings statement as corroborative evidence against the others.
Except as to that portion where he exculpates himself from any liability stating that it
was Manalili and Garcia who actually stabbed Cochise in the warehouse and that he
was merely a lookout, Lisings statement is identical as to the other material facts,
namely, that Cochise and Beebom were brought to the Valle Verde Motel, blindfolded
where he met Manalili and Garcia; that they were brought to the warehouse on board a
green box type Lancer car, where Cochise was killed; that Beebom was brought to
Brgy. San Agustin where she was eventually killed; that he should take care of the
green box type Lancer car and was given P40,000.00 in check.
Nonetheless, the trial courts decision, in convicting all the accused was based not
on the aforesaid extrajudicial statements of the accused alone but mainly on the
eyewitness account of the two witnesses, Froilan Olimpia and Raul Morales, which the
trial court gave weight and credence as bearing the chime of truth and honesty. Well -
established is the rule that the trial courts evaluation of the credit-worthiness of the
testimony given before it by witnesses should be accorded great respect.
[19]
Froilan
Olimpia, a security guard of the Rotonda Wine Station, an establishment adjacent to the
Dayrits Ham and Burger House who witnessed the abduction of Cochise and Beebom
in front of the said restaurant.
He testified that he saw three men in a black car without a license plate drive to
Dayrits Ham and Burger House and park behind the green Lancer car. When the two
men alighted from the car, they introduced themselves as policemen to the by-standers,
one carrying a .45 caliber firearm in his holster and the other carrying a long firearm.
The two men approached the green Lancer car and handcuffed its driver. Olimpia only
heard the man say: Bakit? He later noticed that the woman was already seated at the
back of the car. These two men drove the green Lancer car which was followed by the
black car. When asked to identify the three men, Olimpia unhesitatingly identified Dizon
and Manga.
Q. Mr. Witness, on April 25, 1990, where were you employed?
A. Security Guard of Nationwide Security & Investigation Agency.
Q. You said you were employed with Nationwide Security & Investigation Agency, as
Security Guard on said date, where were you assigned as security guard?
A. At Rotonda Wine Station, sir.
Q. Where is this Rotonda Wine Station located?
A. At Timog Ave., sir.
Q. What city?
A. Quezon City, sir.
Q. You said you were employed as security guard of Rotonda Wine Station, Timog Ave.,
Quezon City, do you have proof to show that you were a security guard of said Rotonda
Wine Station on April 25, 1990?
A. I have, sir, but it is filed with the agency.
Q. This Rotonda Wine Station, what establishments are beside this establishment, and let
us talk first on the left and then right?
A. The left side of Rotonda Wine Station is the Dayrit Hamburger House and the right is a
drugstore.
Q. What was your tour of duty on April 25, 1990?
A. 12:00 noon to 12:00 midnight, sir.
Q. And did you report for duty on said date?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. On or about 7:00 to 7:30 oclock in the evening of April 25, 1990, what particular portion
of Rotonda Wine Station were you posted?
A. I was at the door, sir.
Q. Door of what, front or back?
A. Front door of the Rotonda Wine Station, sir.
Q. When you said you were at the front door, inside the building or outside?
A. Outside of the door, sir.
Q. You mentioned a while ago that on the left side of the Rotonda Wine Station where were
posted is the Dayrit Hamburger House, was there a security guard there?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And do you know him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What is his name?
A. Anastacio de la Cruz, sir.
Q. You stated that at 7:00 to 7:30 in the evening of April 25, 1990, you positioned yourself
in front or outside the door of Rotonda Wine Station, did you notice anything unusual
while you were posting there?
A. Yes, sir, there was.
Q. What was that unusual incident that took place, if any?
A. There was a vehicle parking in front of Dayrit Hamburger house.
Q. What kind of a vehicle parked there?
A. Green Lancer, car, box type.
Q. Where was it parked particularly?
A. In front of Dayrit Hamburger house, at the side of the street.
Q. Did you notice the passenger of that green Lancer car?
A. No, I did not know them, sir.
Q. But did you have the occasion to look and see them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many were they?
A. Two, sir.
Q. Were they male and female?
A. Yes, sir, one man a and one woman.
Q. You said you noticed the car with two persons boarding it, what happened after the
vehicle parked on the side of the street in front of the Dayrit Hamburger house?
A. After they had parked their vehicle, I noticed that another car parked behind that green
Lancer car without any plate number.
Q. Did you notice what kind of a car was that which parked behind the green Lancer car?
A. I noticed it was a black car without plate number but I did not notice the make.
Q. What happened after the black car parked behind the green Lancer car?
A. Two men from the black car alighted.
Q. What did the two men do after they alighted?
A. After they alighted they announced and introduced themselves that they were policemen
and they went towards the green Lancer car.
Q. You said they introduced themselves as policemen, to whom?
A. To the people around the vicinity, to the by-standers.
Q. When the two men who introduced themselves as policemen, did you notice if they
were armed?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Please inform us what arm or weapon did they carry?
A. The other one was carrying a .45 firearm on his holster and the other one was carrying a
long firearm, I do not know what kind of firearm that long firearm was.
Q. This person carrying 45 firearm, could you still recall him or his figure or feature?
A. If I see him again, I could recognize him.
Q. But can you describe him before this Court?
A. Yes, sir, he is tall, a little bit dark complexion and with a little mustache.
Q. You said that if you see that person again, you can recognize him. Will you please look
around the courtroom and point to him if he is now inside?
A. Yes, he is here, sir.
Q. If he is here, will you please point to him?
A. Yes, I can point to him.
Q. Will you please go down from the witness stand, go to him and tap him on his shoulder?
A. (Witness went down from the witness stand, went to the person and tap the shoulder,
who when asked of his name answered as ENRICO DIZON).
Q. Go back to the witness stand.
ATTY. CRESCINI:
May we make it of record, Your Honor, that at the time the witness was asked to identify
Enrico Dizon, there are many people, at least one hundred in number, standing inside
the courtroom closely to each other.
FISCAL:
I would like to adopt the same manifestation, Your Honor.
Q. You have identified the person with 45 caliber firearm, the person who was carrying a
long firearm, can you still recognize him or can you remember his feature?
A. If I could see him again, I can recognize him.
Q. You said that you can see that person with long firearm again, you can recognize him,
will you look around the courtroom and tell us if that person you are referring to is here?
A. Yes, he is here.
Q. Will you please point to him?
A. (Witness pointing to a person inside the courtroom who when asked of his name
answered as ROBIN MANGA).
Q. Now, that you identified the two armed men who alighted from the black car and
introduced themselves as policemen, what did these two men do after that?
A. They went towards the parked green Lancer car.
Q. And what did they do when they went towards the green Lancer car?
A. They immediately handcuffed the man driving the green Lancer car.
Q. This person who was handcuffed, were you able to look and see him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Can you still recognize him if you see him again?
A. Yes, sir, I can recognize him if I see him again.
Q. What about a picture, if you are shown a picture of that man who was handcuffed, could
you still be able to identify him?
A. Yes, sir, I can.
Q. I am showing to you a picture marked as Exh. X-4 please look at this picture and tell
us if you could recognize this picture?
A. Yes, sir, I know this person.
Q. Who is this person?
A. He is Ernesto Bernabe II, sir.
Q. What relation has this person in this picture and the person who was handcuffed in the
evening of April 25, 1990 at the time you saw him?
A. I know, sir, this person in the picture and the one who was handcuffed refer to one and
the same person.
Q. You said that Ernesto Bernabe was handcuffed, you know where was his companion at
the time, who was a woman?
A. I noticed she was already inside the car.
Q. What car are you referring, the green Lancer car or the black car without plate number?
A. The green Lancer car, sir.
Q. You said you saw the woman, were you able to look and see her that evening?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Would you still be able to identify her if you see her again?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. I am showing to Exh. X-4 will you look at this picture, and tell us what relation has this
person in this picture to the one who was together with the man who was handcuffed?
A. She is the woman I am referring to, sir, whom I saw inside the green Lancer, they are
one and the same.
Q. You said you saw the man whom you identified as Ernesto Bernabe being handcuffed
by the two policeman, how far were you from them?
A. Five armslength (sic), sir.
Q. By the way, this front of Dayrit Hamburger house and this Rotonda Wine Store, are they
lighted at night?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What kind of light illuminates the area?
A. Mercury lamp, sir.
Q. How many lights are there?
A. Many, sir.
Q. You said there were lights, in the area during nighttime, can you describe to us from
your point of comparison in daytime whether it is bright or not more particularly at the
time of the incident in question?
A. It was bright just like daytime, sir.
[20]

As to the killing of the two victims, Raul Morales testimony about what transpired in
the warehouse in the morning of April 26, 1990 satisfied the trial court beyond
reasonable doubt, as being consistent and credible, sufficient to convict all the accused
for the crime of murder. He testified positively, that on that fateful morning, two cars
entered the warehouse after he opened the gate. Lising and Garcia alighted from the
green Lancer car and brought out from the backseat Cochise and Beebom. The other
black car carried Dizon and Manga. Soon after, Manalili entered the gate which was left
open by Lising, and stood beside Beebom. Cochise, whose hands were tied with a wire
was brought to an area far from Beeboms view. He was stabbed by Garcia, and then
by Lising. After killing Cochise, the four men carried him out of the warehouse while
Manalili stayed with Beebom.
The trial court was even more convinced about the witnesses credibility after
conducting an ocular inspection of the scene of the crime.
ATTY. LLORENTE:
Q. Now, Mr. Morales, from yesterdays hearing, you mentioned that at about 2:090, April
26, you were awakened by a sound of a motor vehicle and somebody was knocking. Do
you recall having stated that yesterday?
A. Yes, I remember that, sir.
Q. Now, apart from the sound of the motor vehicle and the knock at the door, what else do
you recall?
A. Somebody called for Aida, sir.
Q. What else?
A. I heard somebody said Aida, you open the door and she told me just open the door,
Sir.
Q. And what did you do?
A. I opened the door, Sir.
xxx.
Q. After the gate was opened, what happened?
A. Two (2) cars got inside, Sir.
Q. Can you describe the first car that entered he gate.
A. The first one that got inside was colored green, Sir.
Q. Do you know the make model or kind of vehicle that is colored green?
A. It was a Lancer car, Sir.
Q. Did you notice also who was driving?
A. Yes, I saw, Sir.
Q. Who?
A. It was Roberto Lising, Sir.
Q. Was there anybody else inside the car?
A. There was, Sir.
Q. Who were inside that car?
A. One was in front and two were at the back seat, Sir.
Q. The one in front, do you know who was that?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Who?
A. Felimon Garcia, Sir.
Q. Was that the first time that you met this person?
A. Felimon Garcia?
ATTY. LLORENTE:
Yes.
A. That was the third time, Sir.
Q. Why do you know Felimon Garcia?
A. Because he is a cousin of Ligaya Fausto, Sir.
Q. Can you please look around the Courtroom and tell us if you can point to this Felimon
Garcia and if you can, please do.
That man, Sir.
(Witness pointing to a man in white t-shirt who when asked answered by the name of
Felimon Garcia).
Q. What about the two (2) passengers at the back of the Lancer car, who were they?
A. There was one woman and one man but I dont know their names, Sir.
Q. Lets go to the man. Did you see his condition? Physical condition, his appearance?
A. Tall, medium built, good-looking and hairy on the arms. He was wearing white t-shirt and
was in shorts, Sir.
Q. What about the condition under which this person was seated at the back of the car, can
you describe that?
A. I was not able to observe how he was seated, all I know is that I saw him when he went
out of the car, Sir.
Q. What about the other passengers, the woman passenger. Can you describe her.
A. She was medium built, she was beautiful and fair complexioned puti.
Q. Now, lets go to the second car. Did you notice the driver of the second car?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you recognize this person?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Would you be able to identify him?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Can you please look around if this person driving the second car is in this Courtroom
and if so, please point to him.
(witness pointing to a man in white shirt who when asked answered by the name of ROBIN
MANGA).
Q. Was there anybody else inside the second car aside from the driver?
A. There was, Sir.
Q. Would you be able to identify that person?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Can you again look around the Courtroom and tell us if that person is present and if so,
please point to him?
A. (Witness pointing a man in stripe shirt who when asked answered by the name of Enrico
Dizon).
Q. Now, the two (2) cars having entered the premises, could you please tell us what
happened with these two (2) cars after entering the premises?
A. I saw Roberto Lising went behind the place of our sleeping quarters and got a wire, Sir.
xxx
Q. How did that woman reach that portion of the Lancer car? Can you describe that?
A. She was brought to that portion by he companion of Rambo, Sir
Q. Who in particular?
A. That man, Sir, (witness pointing to accused Robin Manga).
Q. What about the man, how was he brought to that portion which you have identified from
the Lancer car?
A. It was Roberto Lising who brought him there, Sir.
Q. All by himself?
A. They were two (2), Sir.
Q. Whos the second aside from Mr. Lising?
A. (witness pointing to accused Enrico Dizon).
Q. After the man and the woman were placed in that position as you described, what
happened?
A. Felimon Garcia came out and he was bringing with him a spade (pala), Sir.
Q. Did you notice where Felimon Garcia got that spade or pala?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Where?
A. They got it from the Lancer car, Sir.
Q. In what particular portion of the Lancer car?
A. At the back compartment of the car, Sir.
Q. Incidentally, Mr. Morales, what happened to the gate? Who closed the gate?
A. It was they who closed the gate, Sir.
Q. Did anybody else arrive?
A. Yes, there were, Sir.
Q. Who?
(witness pointing to accused Rodolfo Manalili) witness pointed to a man in eyeglasses
who when asked answered by the name of Rodolfo Manalili.
Q. Now, this person that you said arrived, how did he arrive?
A. When he arrive, he went direct to the woman and talked with the woman, Sir.
Q. Did you hear any conversation between that man as you identified as accused Manalili
to the woman that you pointed to here in the sketch?
A. I only heard Dont harm us. We have done no wrong.
p. 46 missing
person that you have described in that area present at that time?
A. They were sweethearts, Sir.
Q. Let me just refer you to the woman that was brought out of the green car, Lancer car.
Did you ever come to know his name later on?
A. When I read it from the newspaper, Sir.
Q. And what was the name that you were able to read from the paper that made you
identified that woman from the Lancer car?
A. Beebom, Sir.
Q. What is the complete name?
A. Beebom Castaos, Sir.
Q. What about the man. Did you also get his complete name.
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. What is his complete name?
A. Cochise Bernabe, Sir.
Q. Now, after this man that you have just identified as Cochise Bernabe, after his hands
were tied at the back, what else did Mr. Lising and Mr. Dizon do with this man?
A. Felimon went inside the bodega, Sir.
Q. And what did Felimon do?
A. After that, he went towards Lising, Sir.
Q. And when Felimon approached Lising, what happened?
A. Felimon was given a knife, Sir. (Witness in the vernacular said kutsilyo)
Q. What did Felimon do with the knife?
A. They went towards the man, Sir.
Q. And what happened?
A. Then he stabbed the man once, Sir.
Q. How? Can you demonstrate?
A. Yes, Sir.
ATTY. LLORENTE:
Please do.
(witness demonstrating by placing his left hand on the height of his shoulder and making a
thrust by his left hand forward).
Q. What else happened after what you had demonstrated happened?
A. Rambo grabbed and took the knife from Felimon, Sir.
Q. And what did Rambo do with the knife?
A. He also stabbed the man, Sir.
ATTY. LLORENTE:
Can you demonstrate to us how did he do this?
A. Yes, sir. (witness demonstrating by putting his left hand forward at the height of his
shoulder and making a forward thrust by his right hand several times).
Q. Did you notice what portion of Cochise was stabbed when Lising was doing this?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. Where?
A. Inside the bodega, Sir. Sa may bodega.
xxx.
[21]

The defense, however, would discredit the of Raul Morales al leging that he was not
a credible witness considering that there were inconsistencies and improbabilities in his
testimony. To them, he was a rehearsed witness, since he was taken from the NBI to
the residence of Governor Remullas son, a good friend of Cochise, as sanctuary during
the trial of this case.
Some of the inconsistencies pointed out are as follows: (1) in the sworn statement,
Morales claimed that the black car driven by Lising entered the compound ahead
followed by the green car driven by Garcia while he stated in his testimony in court that
the green Lancer car was first to enter, driven by Lising with Garcia in the passenger
seat followed by the black car with Manga and Dizon on board; (2) in his statement,
Morales indicated that he did not see the actual killing of Cochise since the victim was
brought out, while he testified in court that Garcia and Lising stabbed the victim inside
the compound; (3) Morales made mention of a total of five persons, including the two
victims, in the early morning of April 26, while in court, he identified the five accused
seen with the two victims.
In has been held that inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony
referring to minor details and not upon the basic aspect of the crime do not impair the
witness credibility.
[22]
These inconsistencies even tend to strengthen, rather than
weaken, the credibility of witnesses as they negate any suspicion of a rehearsed
testimony.
[23]

The defense finds it also improbable for Morales to have witnessed the events at
such a vantage point from the steps of the hut, since the perpetrators of a crime would
not unnecessarily expose themselves in the committing the act to prevent possible
identification.
Obviously, it never occurred to Lising at the time that Morale, who was under his
control and who was afraid of him, would ever testify against him.
Manalili makes capital of the fact that Morales did not mention him at all in his prior
sworn statement as being present at the scene of the crime. For Manalili, the omission
of his name was a significant development as it appeared improbable that a vital
witness will miss out an alleged perpetrator if indeed he was present at the scene of the
crime.
Raul Morales himself admitted later on that there were omissions in his sworn
statement made before the CAPCOM because he was afraid of his employer Lising and
his companions. Understandably, he was reluctant to volunteer all the information about
the killing for fear that he would suffer the same fate of Cochise and Beebom. The initial
reluctance of witness to volunteer information about a criminal case and their
unwillingness to be involved in the criminal investigation is of common knowledge and
has been judicially declared as insufficient to affect credibility.
[24]
Besides, at that time,
Raul Morales was merely concerned with bringing out his story without really paying
particular attention to the details. He related that his employer Lising and companions
brought a man and a woman to their warehouse and killed them both. He saw Cochises
face on the papers and recognized him to be the man whom Lising s group killed.
Morales only mentioned Lising and Garcias names in his sworn statement because
they were the only ones known to him. Such omission and discrepancies should not be
taken against him. It bears emphasis that a sworn statement or an affidavit does not
purport to be a complete compendium of the details of the event narrated by the
affiant.
[25]
It is a matter of judicial experience that a sworn statement being taken ex
parte is almost always incomplete and often and often inaccurate. Thus, discrepancies
between the statements of the affiant in his sworn statement and those made on the
witness stand do not necessarily discredit him.
[26]
There is no rule of evidence to the
effect that omission of certain particulars in an affidavit or sworn statement would estop
an affiant in making an elaboration thereof during the trial.
[27]
Whenever there is an
inconsistency between the affidavit and testimony of the witness, the latter commands
greater weight.
[28]

Roberto Lising discredits Raul Morales as having a motive in implicating him to the
crime since he quelled a rally staged by Morales who was the most arrogant and
stubborn of Faustos employees, seeking an increase in pay. As pahinante in their LPG
business, Morales, according to Lising, was oftentimes reprimanded for not doing his
job well and held responsible for lost gas tanks.
The motive imputed to Morales, a mere pahinante, if he were arrogant and
stubborn, would be tolerated by Lising, the live-in partner of Fausto.
By and large, the defenses raised by the accused do not persuade us. When it
comes to the issue of credibility of the witness, appellate courts give much weight and
respect to the findings of the trial court since the trial court is in the better position to
examine real evidence as well as observe the demeanor of the witness.
[29]
With the
eyewitnesses account of Froilan Olimpia and Raul Morales, the culpability of the
accused for the crimes charged have been established.
This brings us to the third issue of whether or not there was conspiracy.
Conspiracy is a unity of purpose and intention in the commission of a
crime.
[30]
Where two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it then conspiracy exists. While direct evidence is not
necessary, conspiracy may be inferred from and proven by acts of the accused
themselves when during and after said acts point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interest.
[31]

Undoubtedly, the trial court did not err in finding the existence of conspiracy in this
case. With the interlocking confessions of Manalili, Garcia and Lising, the group came to
an agreement to effect the arrest of Robert Herrera for a considerable sum
of P50,000.00. The stake-out at the Castaos residence, the tailing of the car, the
abduction at Dayrits Ham and Burger Restaurant and the detention in the Valle Verde
Motel and the subsequent killing of the two victims all show that all the accused acted in
unison and cooperated with each other towards the accomplishment of a common
criminal design. Where conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all.
Garcia, for his part, prays that his liability be mitigated on grounds of lack of intent or
motive, acts made under the compulsion of an irresistible force, and voluntary
surrender, which if considered would make him merely an accomplice to the crime.
Unfortunately, these defenses and unavailing.
To be exempt from criminal liability, a person invoking irresistible force or
uncontrollable fear must show that the force exerted was such that it reduced him to a
mere instrument who acted not only without will but against his will.
[32]
That compulsion
must be of some character as to leave the accused no opportunity for self-defense in
equal combat of for escape.
[33]

Garcias participation and presence from the time the abduction was hatched, up to
the killing of the victims is undisputed. He was very well aware of Manalilis plans. He
was instrumental in introducing Lising to Manalili. Likewise, Lisings intentions to silence
both Cochise and Beebom at the end upon realizing an alleged mistake was known to
him. He did not do anything to deter the commission or to report the crimes immediately
thereafter. In fact, he stated that he and Lising saw each other after the incident but
never mentioned anything about it, which only goes to show their intention of concealing
the crime. Only after several months of being hunted, did he send feelers for this
surrender.
Where conspiracy is established, the precise modality or extent of participation of
each individual conspirator becomes secondary since the act of one is the act of
all.
[34]
The degree of actual participation in the commission of crime is immaterial. In
People v. Degoma, the Court explained:
x x x. One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own
the criminal designs of his co-conspirators; he merges his will into the
common felonious intent. A person who embraces a criminal
conspiracy is properly held to have casts his lot with his fellow
conspirators and to have taken his chances that things may go awry
and that the offended party may resists or third persons may get killed
in the course of implementing the basic criminal design. To free himself
from such criminal liability, the law requires some overt act on the part
of the conspirator, to seek to prevent commission of the second or
related felony or to abandon or dissociate himself from the conspiracy
to commit the initial felony. (People v. Salvador, 163 SCRA 574, 580-
582 [1988]; People v. Bazar, 162 SCRA 609, 617 [1988]; People v.
Escober, 157 SCRA 541 567 [1988]; People v. Pelagio, 20 SCRA 153,
159-160 [1967] (Italics supplied).
[35]

For the same reasons. Manalili can not likewise be exonerated from the crime. We
have examined carefully the arguments of the Solicitor General in urging Manalilis
acquittal, but the facts and circumstances surrounding the case do not support his
stand.
We find it difficult to accept Manalilis contention that he had contracted the services
of policemen to effect the legal arrest of Robert Herrera, the main suspect in the killing
of his brother, Delfin Manalili. Equally preposterous is his assertion that upon arriving at
the Valle Verde Hotel in San Fernando, Pampanga, he realized there was a mistake in
the identities of the persons arrested, so he insisted that they be released. Neither is
there factual basis to his claim that he had every reason to protect the life of Beebom, in
particular, since the latter is a principal witness against Robert Herrera, the suspect in
the shooting of his brother.
In the first place, why did he take it upon himself to employ persons unknown to him
to effect the arrest of Herrera? The warrant of arrest of Herrera, if one was really
issued, was never presented in evidence. In the second place, the surreptitious meeting
of Manalili with Lising arranged by Garcia, the surveillance or stake out of the Castaos
residence, the manner of abduction where the victims were blindfolded, handcuffed and
gagged at Valle Verde Motel, cannot certainly be considered as acts in the regular
performance of their duties as policemen. Thirdly, if it was true that Manalili just wanted
the arrest of Robert Herrera, why did he have to seek the assistance of Pampanga
policemen? It would have been more logical and expedient to have utilized the NBI or
Quezon City Police especially when the alleged warrant of arrest was issued by a
Quezon City court. After all, is was not difficult to locate Robert Herrera as he was
reportedly frequenting the Castaos residence in Quezon City. Fourthly, it does not
stand to reason why the victims were taken to Pampanga after allegedly being arrested
in Quezon City. It would have been more cogent for the appellants to have delivered the
victims to the nearest station of the Quezon City Police Department considering that the
warrant of arrest was allegedly issued by a Quezon city court. If arrest was really in the
minds of the accused, why did they hole-up with the victims in a motel when they
arrived in Pampanga? Finally, if they were bent on legally arresting one Roberto
Herrera, it was not necessary for them to also take the woman companion of the person
they mistook as Herrera.
All these only shows that Manalili had premeditated in his mind a more sinister plot
than merely effecting a legal arrest.
It is an unmitigated absurdity for Manalili to pretend that upon his realization of the
mistake in their arrest, he insisted upon the release of the victims since he had every
reason to keep Beebom alive. If he had just a bit of concern for Beeboms safety, why
did Manalili leave for Manila without bringing her and Cochise with him to make sure
that no harm would befall them, knowingly full well of Lisings resolve just revealed to
him to silence both victims? What should be nearer the truth in that Beebom and
Cochise became aware of Manalilis presence at the motel together with the other
accused and this was the added reason why the two had to be eliminated, to do away
with having to explain why he was at the scene. His pretension that he wanted to keep
Beebom from harms way because she was to have testified in the prosecution of his
brother brings hollow. It cannot be assumed that had she lived she would have testified
in court and pointed to Robert Herrera as the killer of Manalilis brother.
In any case, assuming the remote possibility, the mistake in the identity of the
victims does not exonerate Manalili pursuant to the rule that one who performs a
criminal act should be held liable for the act and for all its consequences although the
victim was not the person whom the fellow intended to injure.
[36]

We are reminded of the rule that the conviction must not rest on the weakness of
the defense but on the strength of the prosecutions evidence. In the instant case, apart
from its interlocking sworn statements of appellants, Raul Morales positive testimony
that he saw Manalili enter the bodega, and stand beside Beebom, while Cochise was
being killed, convinces us with moral certainty that Manalili is equally guilty of the crime
charged. His presence in the warehouse clearly belies his claim that from the motel, he
left for Manila already. As against the positive testimony and identification, mere denials
of the accused cannot prevail to overcome conviction by the court.
[37]
The inaction of
Manalili where he could have prevented the killings only reveal his complicity to the
crime. Manalili is certainly part of a complete whole without whom there would be no
Cochise-Beebom double murder case.
Furthermore, the decision of the trial court exonerating Manalili and Garcia for the
crime of Kidnapping and finding the rest of the accused guilty for the crime of Slight
Illegal Detention only does not escape us. There being conspiracy, all the accused
should be equally guilty for the crimes as charged. Unfortunately, we can no longer
convict Manalili and Garcia for Kidnapping in consonance with the constitutional right
against double jeopardy. Nonetheless, they stand to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua for the double murder. The crime of Slight Illegal Detention should be qualified
to Serious Illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code considering
that a female victim was involved.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
1. The decision of the lower court finding accused Rodolfo Manalili,
Roberto Rambo Lising, Felimon Garcia, Robin Q. Manga and Enrico
Dizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of double murder,
including their civil liability is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, and
2. The decision of the lower court finding accused Roberto Rambo
Lising, Enrico Dizon, and Robin Manga guilty of the crime of slight
illegal detention aggravated by the use of motor vehicle is hereby
MODIFIED, in that the said accused are hereby declared guilty of the
crime of Kidnapping under Article 267 (4) of the Revised Penal Code,
and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty ofreclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED.


PEOPLE V ENCIPIDO
G.R. No. 70091 December 29, 1986
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BRIGIDO ENCIPIDO, CHARLITO MANATAD, JESUS RUBIO, RUDY LUMARDA, JOSE
CABAGERAN, EDDIE DE LA PE;A, CRIS RAMIREZ, and JESUS or JOHN
DOE, accused, BRIGIDO ENCIPIDO, CHARLITO MANATAD, and EDDIE DE LA
PE;A accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ignacio P. Moleta for accused-appellants.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J .:
On March 30, 1982, Jose Lacumbes (hereinafter referred to as the DECEASED), a resident
of Barangay Mabini in the Municipality of Tubajon, Surigao del Norte, was found killed by
his wife and children near the hut in their farm in Sitio Capacohan in the same barangay.
Post Mortem findings performed the following morning were:
l) Incised wound of the neck.
2) Eight [8] multiple stab wounds at the back; one [1] inch in length and two and a
half [2] inches in depth.
3) Removed right external ear.
4) Contusions left lumbar region.
5) Both hands tied at the back with rattan.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, severe, secondary to incised wounds of the neck and
multiple stab wounds at the back.
On February 2, 1983, in Criminal Case No. 14 of the Regional Trial Court, 10th Judicial
Region, Branch 32 (the CASE BELOW), the following eight (8) persons: (1) Brigido
ENCIPIDO (2) Charlito MANATAD, (3) Eddie DE LA PENA (hereinafter referred to as
APPELLANTS), (4) Jesus Rubio, (5) Rudy Lumarda, (6) Jose CABAGERAN (7) Cris
Ramirez, and (8) Jesus or John Doe were charged with Murder for the death of the
DECEASED. Only fly APPELLANTS were tried, the other five accused having remained at
large.
A review of the prosecution evidence presented in the CASE BELOW can begin with the
testimony of Felicisimo Alciso. This witness narrated that he went to the hut of the
DECEASED in the afternoon of March 30, 1982, in order to get some chickens which the
latter had promised him but that, before reaching the hut, he heard a gunshot. He stopped
and saw that the DECEASED was being tied and subjected to fist blows. There were three
persons who mauled the DECEASED, while others stayed at a distance. Then, somebody
struck the DECEASED with the butt of a gun causing the latter to fall to the ground. He
described that the hands of the DECEASED were tied at the back, ENCIPIDO was behind
the DECEASED, while MANATAD and DE LA PE;A were on the sides.
1
On orders of
ENCIPIDO also known as "Commander Tanga," DE LA PE;A, also called "Agosto de la
Pena struck the Deceased's neck with a bolo which almost I severed the latter's head.
Frightened, witness Alciso fled from the scene.
After learning from friends and neighbors that those who had killed the DECEASED were
detained, Alciso went to the jail to find out for himself if they were among the group
responsible for the death of the DECEASED, and because "I was afraid that I will be the
next one to be killed by them." He recognized APPELLANTS as among the suspects. When
he asked DE LA PENA why he was in jail, the latter answered that it was because they
were the ones who had beheaded the DECEASED. Alciso was unable to talk to ENCIPIDO
and MANATAD.
Before Alciso there was another prosecution witness presented, Armando Bagacay whose
testimony turned out to be hearsay but which nevertheless is reproduced here to complete
the evidence for the prosecution. He testified that while he was massaging one of the
accused, Rudy Lainarda on March 10, 1982, the latter told him that his ailment was caused
by witchcraft of the victim, Jose Lacumbes, and that he would seek the aid of the rebels to
cut Lacumbes' head. Four days later, Bagacay met one of those originally indicted, Jesus
Rubio, who confided to him that they would cut Lacumbes' neck for making Lumarda sick
and for being responsible for all i the witchcraft in the community. Subsequently, witness
Bagacay heard of the death of Lacumbes at the hands of the rebels.
Two other prosecution witnesses supported testimony Alciso Jorge Ortega, INP Station
Commander of Loreto, Agusan del Norte, testified that when he had just arrived from
Surigao City at about 2:30 o'clock P.M. of May 1, 1982, and while still at the wharf, he was
met by ENCIPIDO who introduced himself as "Commander Tanga," invited him (Ortega) for
a drink so he could talk to the latter personally. Having ac cepted the invitation, the two
proceeded to a store where ENCIPIDOs fourteen companions were already waiting. They
introduced themselves as rebels and offered to help the municipal government. In the
course of the conversation, ENCIPIDO and DE LA PE;A disclosed to the Station
Commander that they were the ones who had beheaded the DECEASED, killed a certain
Benny and one Balaba, and who were responsible for all the killings in Dinagat Island.
The other prosecution witness, Mariano Espina, the Municipal Mayor of Loreto, testified that
in the evening of that same day of May 1, 1982, Station Commander Jorge Ortega informed
him that Commander Tanga" and his men wanted to pay him a courtesy call. They arrived
at about 8:00 in the evening at his house. They introduced themselves and placed their
sidearms on a table as a sign of goodwill. At the time, there were about 2 policemen and 3
CHDF men outside the house but no arrests were made, nor were firearms confiscated, as
a sign of reciprocal goodwill "Commander Tanga" then confided to the Mayor his mission to
cooperate with his administration as they had heard that he was a good Mayor. He also
informed the Mayor that he had been a member of the NPA since he was 13 years old; that
he had already killed many people, including the DECEASED, so that the latter could no
longer harm other people with his witchcraft. For his part, DE LA PE;A brought out a
sharp-pointed knife and tried to test its sharpness, admitted having cut the neck of the
DECEASED, and even showed the latter's ear, dried by that time.
The foregoing testimonies were buttressed from a most unexpected source. DE LA PE;A,
to the surprise of APPELLANT APPELLANTS' common counsel testified in open Court that,
although he belonged to the group of "Commander Tanga," the latter, MANATAD and a
third individual merely forced him to join, threatening to kill him if he refused; that he was
with the group from March 28, 1982; that he was present on March 30, 1982 when
"Commander Tanga" and MANATAD killed the DECEASED but that he was merely
standing by; that the duo were the first ones apprehended, and after them he was also
arrested by the CHDF.
In their defense, ENCIPIDO and MANATAD denied having I killed the victim and interposed
the defense of alibi. ENCIPIDO claimed that on March 30, 1982, he was sawing lumber
from morning till 3:00 P.M. at Barangay Boa for a certain Norberto Bukid. After working he
rested in Bukid's house and did not leave the place. He further testified that he did not know
the DECEASED nor the Station Commander, nor the Municipal Mayor except when he
surrendered his .45 caliber pistol to the latter on May 2, 1982 after which he was arrested.
He decided to surrender his pistol because he was afraid he might be apprehended for
having an unlicensed firearm. MANATAD and DE LA PENA were also placed in jail with
him. Thereafter, with seven others, he was taken to PC head- quarters at Surigao City
where they were severely maltreated and he was forced to sign an affidavit admitting that
he is "Commander Tanga" responsible for the killing of the DECEASED and other persons.
He denied having admitted to the Station Commander and to the Municipal Mayor his Identi
ty as "Commander Tanga" or that he had killed the DECEASED and other persons besides.
MANATAD, for his part, also denied all imputations against him, stating that he only came to
know ENCIPIDO in jail; that he did not know the DECEASED nor who killed him that during
the whole day of March 30, 1982, he was plowing the field tenanted by his mother-in-law at
Barangay Malinao; that he started plowing early in the morning and stopped at about 5:00
o'clock P.M. after which he stayed home. Barangay Captain Sergio Peniones partially
corroborated MANATAD's testimony by stating that he saw MANATAD plowing the i field in
the morning of March 30, 1982. MANATAD's wife, Bienvenida Edusma also testified that
her husband stayed home after 5:00 o'clock P.M. of that day as he was tired after the day's
work; that, in fact, she quarreled with her husband because he refused to accompany her in
bringing their sick child to Tubajon on so that she went alone carrying the child even though
she was then seven months pregnant.
In a Decision promulgated by the Trial Court on December 5, 1984, APPELLANTS were
found guilty of Murder and sen tenced to reclusion perpetua to pay damages to the heirs of
the DECEASED in the amount of P12,000.00 and to pay 3/8 of the costs.
On behalf of APPELLANTS, counsel de officio filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the
Trial Court on December 26, 1984, which the latter denied for having been filed more than
fifteen (5) days after the promulgation date of December 5, 1984. A Notice of Appeal filed
before the then Intermediate Appellate Court was allowed as an appeal not from the
judgment but from the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The penalty imposed
by the Trial Court being reclusion perpetual the appeal was indorsed to this instance, which
we accepted in the interest of substantial justice.
APPELLANTS raise the following Assignments of Error:
A
The lower Court erred in giving credence to the hearsay testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Mariano Espina and George Ortega basing therefrom its findings of
conviction;
B
The lower Court erred in giving credence to the incredible and hearsay testimony of
Felicisimo Alciso the alleged eyewitness;
C
The lower Court erred in appreciating the so-called judicial admission of accused
Eddie de la Pena as against his co-accused Brigido ENCIPIDO and Charlito
Manatad;
D
The lower Court erred in convicting appellants Brigido ENCIPIDO and Charlito
Manatad;
E
The lower Court erred in refusing to give due course to appellants' motion for
reconsideration holding that it was filed out of time when its judgment accordingly
has become final;
F
The lower Court erred in convicting appellant Eddie de la Pe;a.
The evidence against APPELLANTS, taken en conjunto" justifies the finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
1. Eyewitness Felicisimo Alciso positively Identified APPELLANT as among the group who
led the DECEASED out of his hut, with his hands tied behind his back, and thereafter
mauled him and hacked his neck in the afternoon of March 30, 1982. The autopsy findings,
particularly, the "incised wound of the neck," "contusions left lumbar region" and "both
hands tied at the back with rattan" confirm his description of what he had witnessed.
The defense contents, however, that said witness could not have recognized
APPELLANTS.
It is true that at the start of his testimony, he had stated that he did not recognize the
assailants. Thus:
Q. Who were the persons who mauled Jose Lacumbes during that time?
A. I saw that there were three of them but I could not recognize them; and there were some other persons who were
staying from a distance.
2

That testimony, however, referred to the early stage of the incident when the victim was
being mauled. Subsequently, in respect of the killing itself, the witness declared:
Fiscal Sandangal
Could you not recognize the three persons who killed Jose Lacumbes?
Witness:
I could recognize the three persons who killed Jose Lacumbes.
3

Then he described specifically:
Q. What else did you see, if any?
A. I saw that somebody was beating Jose Lacumbes with the use of a gun, and when Jose Lacumbes fell down,
Commander Tanga commanded Eddie de la Pena to cut the head of the victim but the head was not severed from the
body.
4

After pointing to the APPELLANTS in the Courtroom and replying to a question by the
Court, Alciso further explained:
Court (addressing to the witness) When did you know the accused by their
names?
WITNESS: In the jail your Honor. Before I met them in the jail I already recognized their faces but I just do not know
their names. Later on, I already know their names.
5

The defense further claims that Alciso could not have recognized the assailants because he
was at a distance of 80 to 90 meters away from the scene of, the crime. In another instance,
however, he said that the place of the killing was about "20 arms length" from the hut of the
DECEASED, while he was also about the same distance from the hut at that time. The
distances stated were merely his estimates and can be moderately exact or moderately
inexact specially with provincial folk. The important fact is that even from where he was, he
witnessed the incident and his description of it was corroborated by the admission of
APPELLANTS, themselves and supported by the autopsy findings on the cadaver. As this
Court ruled in People vs. Hamtig et al.,
6
the credibility of the testimony of a witness is not
affected by some flaws and inconsistencies in minor details, if as regards the main incident,
the Identities of the malefactors, the testimonies appear to be consistent with each other."
And although it was admittedly the first time that Alciso saw the malefactors, it does not
necessarily follow that he could not have recognized their faces. Persons observing a
startling occurrence would strive to know the ones involved specially where as in this case
the DECEASED was not unknown to Alciso.
Next, it is argued that Alcisos testimony that he went to i the jail to verify the Identity of the
malefactors is not worthy of credence. Concededly, that actuation was unusual However, as
the witness explained he did so because he feared that he may be the next one to be Killed
And the fact that he asked DE LA PE;A why the latter was in jail does not necessarily lead
to the conclusion, as alleged, that he had not witnessed the occurrence. A friendly question
was more likely to evoke candid answer.
There is nothing strange either in Alcisos not having mentioned the culprits by name in his
sworn statement taken more than three months after the incident, having referred to them
merely as "five persons." As is wen known "an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself
Omissions and misunderstanding . are not infrequent, particularly under circumstances of
hurry and impatience."
7

ENCIPIDO and DE LA PE;A verbally acknowledged their guilt before Station Commander
Ortega and Municipal Mayor Espina when they individually boasted that they had killed the
DECEASED so that the latter could no longer harm other people with his witchcraft. They
admitted that they had beheaded the DECEASED. DE LA PE;A even showed the Mayor
the DECEASED's dried ear which he had severed, Further, while I i in jail, DE LA PE;A
also admitted to Alciso when the latter I asked him the reason for their confinement, that it
was because they were the ones who had beheaded the DE CEASED. These oral
confessions indicating complicity in the commission of the crime with which they are
charged are admissible in evidence against the declarants ENCIPIDO and DE LA PE;A
pursuant to Sections 22
8
and 29
9
of the Rules of Court. It is the fact that admissions were
made by APPELLANTS and against their own interest which gives them their evidentiary
value.
10

It is also to be noted that APPELLANTS' extra-judicial confessions were independently
made without collusion, are Identical with each other in their material respects and
confirmatory of the other. They are, therefore, also admissible as circumstantial evidence
against their co-accused implicated therein to show the probability of the latter's actual
participation in the commission of the crime.
11
They are also admissible as corroborative
evidence against the others, it being clear from other facts and circumstances presented
that persons other than the declarants themselves participated in the commission of the
crime charged and proved.
12
They are what is commonly known as interlocking confession
and constitute an exception to the general rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are
admissible in evidence only against the declarants thereof.
And while it may be that ENCIPIDOS written statement before the PC on May 6, 1982
confessing to the killing of the DECEASED was not presented at the trial no presumption of
wilful suppression of evidence may be levelled against the prosecution on account of its
non-production. Apparently, for the prosecution, it was not important or necessary to bolster
up its case.
The argument that the testimonies of Station Commander Ortega, Mayor Espina, and Alciso
as to the extrajudicial admissions made to them respectively by ENCIPIDO and/or DE LA
PE;A constitute hearsay, and thus inadmissible, is not well taken. Oral confessions may
be proved by any competent witness by whom they were heard, the same as any other fact:
The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the
confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard if he heard
and understood an of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in
such case it must be given in its substance. (23 C.J.S. 196).
Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession may be made by the
testimony of a person who testifies that he was present, heard, understood, and
remembers the substance of the conversation or statement made by the accused.
(Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed., Niblack, sec. 278, p. 551).
13

ENCIPIDOS and DE LA PE;A's extrajudicial acknowledgments of guilt to the Municipal
Mayor and the INP Station Commander are not necessarily incredible for, in their minds,
they were not "confessing" but bragging of their exploits" in the belief that they were saving
the community from the witchcraft of the DECEASED and the evil doings of some people.
There is no proof whatsoever that the extrajudicial admissions in question were coerced or
concocted by those officials, who are responsible public officers and presumed to have
regularly performed their functions and against whose impartiality nothing has been proven.
The fact that no arrest were made by them immediately after the disclosures do not
necessarily belie their testimonies since the spirit of "reciprocal goodwill" pervaded the
encounters. Arrests were made, however, the day after, or on May 2, 1982.
APPELLANTS had the opportunity during the trial to refute their verbal admissions as in
fact, they denied having made them, but their denials do not ring with truth in the face of
other inculpating evidence.
3. The additional incriminating evidence was furnished by DE LA PE;A who, in open
Court, under oath, testified that he belonged to "Commander Tanga's" group, was with them
since two days before the incident, and that he was with ENCIPIDO and MANATAD when
they killed the DECEASED. DE LA PE;AS declaration confirms the existence of the group,
their responsibility for the killing and, at the very least, his presence during the commission
of the crime.
True, DE LA PE;A exculpated himself by stating that he was only forced to join the group
and was merely standing by when the killing occurred. A statement involving guilt does not,
however, lose its character as a confession from the fact that it was accompanied by
statements of an exculpatory nature,
14
it being "the natural tendency of every transgressor,
with perhaps very rare exceptions, to acquit himself while he can do so from all liability that
might arise from his act, or at least mitigate it in the eyes of the law and those of his
fellowmen".
15
Like other evidence, it must be weighed, believed, or disbelieved in whole or
in part, as reason may decide. Herein, the exculpatory statement has been proven false by
Alcisos credible account that upon ENCIPIDOS orders, DE LA PE;A hacked the
DECEASED's neck with a bolo which almost severed the latter's head, which testimony is
confirmed by the autopsy finding of "incised wound on the neck." It was likewise proven
false by DE LA PE;As own extrajudicial admission to the Municipal Mayor that he had
hacked the DECEASED's neck and severed his ear, which is buttressed by the post
mortem finding of "removed right external ear."
DE LA PE;AS judicial admission is admissible not only against him but against his co-
accused ENCIPIDO and MANATAD as well. The general rule that the confession of an
accused may be given in evidence against him but that it is not competent evidence against
his co-accused, admits of exceptions. Thus, this Court has held that where several accused
are tried together for the same complaint, the testimony lawfully given by one during the trial
implicating the others is competent evidence against the latter.
16
"The extrajudicial
admission or confession of a co-conspirator out of court is different from the testimony given
by a co-accused during trial. The first is admissible against the declarant alone, but the
second is perfectly admissible against his co-accused,"
17
who had the right and opportunity
to cross-examine the declarant. In this case, counsel de officio had such opportunity to
cross-examine DE LA PE;A but did not avail of it because in his own words:
Atty Moleta: I would like to inform the Honorable Court that I am in quandary It is my duty as counsel-de-oficio to be
candid to this Honorable Court. The witness has not actually followed what I intimated to him to be the nature of his
testimony.
18

In other words, the reason counsel refrained from cross examination was not because he
was not given the opportunity to do so but because DE LA PE;A did not follow counsel's
bidding as to the nature of his testimony. The coached testimony failed but the truth
prevailed. Besides, defense counsel could have presented rebuttal evidence to overcome
DE LA PE;A's testimony if he had chosen to do so but did not.
Thus, MANATAD's direct participation in the commission of the crime with which he is
charged has been established by DE LA PE;A's declaration in open Court that
"Commander Tanga and Charlito Manatad killed a certain person," and the corroborative
testimony of Alciso who categorically testified that MANATAD was on one side of the
DECEASED, DE LA PE;A on the other and ENCIPIDO at the back when they perpetrated
the offense with which they are changed. In MANATAD's respect, therefore, it is not
necessary to invoke conspiracy" to support his conviction.
The defense of alibi separately interposed by ENCIPIDO and MANATAD cannot prevail
over their positive Identification by eyewitness Also by ENCIPIDOS verbal
acknowledgments of guilt, and by DE LA PE;A's judicial and extra- i judicial
admission/confession, which are interlocking and ad-missible as against themselves and as
against the others whom they also implicated. Neither were ENCIPIDO and MANATAD able
to prove that they were at some place for such a period of time that it was impossible for
them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Barangay Boa
where ENCIPIDO was allegedly sawing lumber was approximately 60 kilometers
away,
19
and Barangay Malinao where MANATAD was supposedly plowing the field, about
12 kilometers,
20
from Barangay Mabini, Tubajon, Surigao where the incident occurred.
In the last analysis, the core issue addresses itself to the credibility of witnesses, a matter
that the Trial Court had unequalled competence to consider and decide since it was in a
vantage position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses of both sides while
testifying, an opportunity not afforded to Appellate Courts. Its findings as to credibility should
not be disturbed and are entitled to great weight unless there is some fact of record that has
been overlooked or the significance of which has been misconstrued,
21
which exceptions
we find absent herein.
The last assigned error delving on the refusal of the Trial Court to give due course to
appellants' Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the judgment had become final is
no longer of any consequence since all the grounds therefor have been elevated to and
considered by this Court on appeal.
In fine, the threads of evidence woven together establish APPELLANTS' guilt to a moral
certainty.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed except as to the civil
indemnity, which is hereby increased to P30,000.00 in accordance with recent
jurisprudence. With proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED.


PEOPLE V PAMON
G.R. No. 102005 January 25, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FORTUNATO PAMON, GERSON DULANG alias "Toto", AND JOHN DOE alias
"Dodo", accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Rizalino C. Vineza collaborating counsel for accused-appellant Gerson Dulang.
Moncupa, Toria and Malaya for accused-appellant G. Dulang.
Feliciano M. Maraon for accused-appellant F. Pamon.

CAMPOS, JR. J .:
This is an appeal from the judgment ** of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Dipolog City,
convicting accused-appellants Fortunato Pamon and Gerson Dulang of murder and
sentencing them to reclusion perpetua.
From the records, the following facts are evident:
In the morning of July 26, 1985, Robert Te drove his 3/4-ton cargo truck from his residence
in Sta. Filomena to Sindutan, Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte to buy copra. With him were
Hipolito Andig, Victorino Jauculan, Orlando Tapia, and two other laborers. While they were
negotiating a road in Lipakan, the truck got stuck in the mud. As a result, the trucks of Lily
Wong and Gerson Dulang which were following his truck were blocked and could not
proceed. In order to pull the truck from the mud, Robert Te ordered his companions to tie
the wrench of the truck to a coconut tree with a cable. Robert Te remained behind the wheel
to maneuver the truck. While in that position, a man approached Robert Te and shot him on
the bridge of his nose. The latter died instantly. Another shot was fired and Cesar Siga was
hit. Thereafter, the truck was burned by another man. The gunman escaped and boarded
the last truck which was the one owned by Gerson Dulang.
Initial investigations by the police and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) pointed to
the New People's Army (NPA) as the killers. However, subsequent investigations by the
Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) yielded Fortunato Pamon as the one responsible for
Robert Te's death.
On March 14, 1987, Fortunato Pamon was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest for a
murder charge against him in the RTC of Tangub City. He was detained at the PC stockade
at Camp Hamac, Sicayab, Zamboanga del Norte.
On March 18 or 19, 1987, Fortunato Pamon, in the presence of Atty. Rubencio Ligorio of
the Citizens Legal Assistance Office (CLAO), executed before Pfc. Roland Salatandre of the
CIS a Confession marked as Exhibit "A". He admitted that he shot and killed Robert Te.
Furthermore, he implicated John Doe, alias "Dodo", Gerson Dulang, and Inocencio Feras.
The following are excerpts from the affidavit:
Q If you can still remember, where were you in the morning of
July 26, 1985, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, more or
less?
A I was in Brgy. Lipakan, Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte
together with alias Dodo.
Q What were you two (2) doing there?
A We were on mission to kill Dodong Te, a copra buyer from
Dipolog City.
Q Were you able to kill Dodong Te?
A Yes, sir. I shot him with a 45 Caliber Pistol on his head and
when I shot him again, I do not knew (sic) if he was hit.
Q Why did you kill Dodong Te?
A I killed Dodong Te with the assistance of my companion alias Dodo per
instruction of Mayor Inocencio Feras (sic). Alias Dodo was hired by one
Toto Dulang, a copra buyer from Dipolog City according to alias Dodo.
1

He also narrated the circumstances leading to his being hired as a gunman, his meeting
with "Dodo" for the first time in the house of Inocencio Feras, and how they got to Lipakan in
the morning of July 26, 1985. Furthermore, he said that he was promised P15,000.00 by
Inocencio Feras as payment for the job and that alias "Dodo" would receive the same
amount from Gerson Dulang.
This extrajudicial confession was subscribed and sworn to before Judge Vicente Aseniero
on March 20, 1987. Fortunato Pamon reaffirmed his Confession during the preliminary
investigation of the case on March 23, 1987. During the said investigation, he was asked:
Q When you were told by Dodo that one [sic] the Chinese who
is the one driving the truck is Robert Te @ Dodong what did
you do?
A We were yet on our way to the truck which was driven by Robert Te @
Dodong and upon reaching the rear part of the cargo truck which was
driven by Robert Te I handed the gasoline which was placed in the
plastic gallon wrapped with a dirty cloth which Dodo received then I told
Dodo do not burn the truck because we will kill him and burn the truck.
Then I proceeded to the place where the driver was, to the left side of the
carao truck and when I was already near the driver I pulled out the 45
caliber which I placed on my right armpit wrapped in a jacket and aimed
it to the driver and at that moment looked and faced me and that was the
time I pulled the trigger of the 45 caliber and hit the forehead of the
driver. After Robert Te was hit on his forehead he dropped himself to the
right side of the placed (sic) where he was sitting whereupon I shot him
again because I thought that he could not be killed by the first shot and
that that shot I could not tell whether he was hit or not.
2

On September 17, 1987, an information for murder was filed against Fortunato Pamon, as
principal by direct participation, Inocencio Feras and Gerson Dulang as principals by
inducemet, and John Doe, alias "Dodo" as accomplice. The original information stated:
The undersigned, Provincial Fiscal, accuses FORTUNATO PAMON alias
"Bebie", as principal by direct participation, Ex-Mayor INOCENCIO FERAS as
principal by induction, GERSON DULANG alias "Toto" as principal by
induction and JOHN DOE (at large) as accomplice of the crime of MURDER,
committed as follows:
That, in the morning, on or about the 26th day of July, 1985, in the
municipality of Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte, within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Ex-Mayor Inocencio Feras being then the
mastermind in the bizarre plot to liquidate one ROBERT TE alias "Dodong",
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously induce, offer a price and
reward to his co-accused conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping with one JOHN DOE alias "Dodo" who is still at large, accused
Fortunato Pamon who acted as the triggerman, armed with a 45 caliber pistol
and with intent to kill by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot
said ROBERT TE alias "Dodong" while the latter was operating his 3/4 ton
cargo truck bound for Sindutan of said municipality, thereby inflicting upon
him gunshot wound on the bridge of his nose which caused his instantaneous
death; that as a result of the commission of the said crime the heirs of the
herein victim suffered the following damages, viz:
a) Indemnity for victim's death P30,000.00
b) Loss of earning capacity 10,000.00
c) Moral and exemplary damages 20,000.00

P60,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW, (Viol. of Art. 248, Revised Penal Code), with the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism with respect to accused Fortunato Pamon alias "Bebie" having
been convicted in Criminal Case No. 4615 for Murder in Tangub City, and in
consideration of price and reward, and the qualifying circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation.
3

When Inocencio Feras died during the course of the trial, the information was amended by
dropping Feras' name and substituting the name of Gerson Dulang, in the abovequoted
paragraph.
During the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Evangeline Te, the widow of
Robert Te, Rolando Salatandre, Judge Vicente Aseniero, Victoriano Jauculan and Hipolito
Andig.
Evangeline Te testified that at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning of July 25, 1985, she
received a call from Gerson Dulang. The latter invited Robert Te to a birthday party in
Gerson Dulang's house. Robert Te accepted the invitation, left at half past nine, and
returned at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, already drunk. While in that state, he revealed to
Evangeline, his wife, that Gerson Dulang told him; "We will meet in the mountain to find out
who is the better man among us". She also said that before her husband left at 4:30 in the
morning on July 26, 1985, he again told her those words.
Rolando Salatandre testified that the extrajudicial Confession of Fortunato Pamon was
voluntary and that it was in accordance with the constitutional mandate. This was reaffirmed
by Judge Vicente Aseniero in his testimony.
Victoriano Jauculan, an employee of Robert Te, pointed to Fortunato Pamon as the
gunman. Hipolito Andig likewise identified Fortunato Pamon as the killer. They both stated
that Fortunato Pamon boarded Gerson Dulang's truck after the incident.
Prosecution also presented as evidence the medical certificate issued by Dr. Venusto
Bengua on March 20, 1992 which stated that no marks, bruises or signs of torture were
found in Fortunato Pamon's body.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Gerson Dulang who professed
ignorance of the crime; of Raul Curativo, a neighbor of Fortunato Pamon, who described the
killer as "short, dark in complexion, with curly hair and was bearded",
4
and who said that
Fortunato Pamon was not the killer; of Jaime Gilbero, who said that at the time of the killing,
Fortunato Pamon was plowing his field; and of Fortunato Pamon himself who denied the
killing and retracted his extrajudicial confession. His affidavit of retraction, dated April 23,
1987, is attached as Annex "B"
5
of Appellant's Brief. He alleged therein that the confession
was involuntary on his part as it resulted from torture and coercion. This affidavit was,
however, not offered in the trial court as an exhibit.
After trial, the trial court convicted Fortunato Pamon, Gerson Dulang and John Doe alias
"Dodo". It held:
The prosecution's thesis that accused Pamon was the author of the death of
Robert Te finds support in the Confession (Exhibit "A") of said accused
admitting his role as particeps criminis or criminal partner of his co-accused,
Inocencio Feras, Gerson Dulang and John Doe alias "Dodo" admitting having
killed the victim on that ill-fated morning of July 26, 1985 at Linapakan,
Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte. Of course, said accused repudiated his
Confession during trial claiming, among others, that he was not assisted by
counsel during his investigation by CIS Pfc. Ronald Salatandre on March 18-
19, 1987 at the CIS Office, Dipolog City, considering, according to him, that
his supposed counsel, Atty. Rubencio Legorio, arrived in said office when his
Confession was already prepared (TSN, Hamoy, Oct. 10, 1990, p. 71) by
which he meant that Atty. Legorio was not present when his Confession was
taken; but this is belied by Exhibit H-3 showing Atty. Legorio while Pfc.
Salatandre was typing (Exhibit H-1) his investigation of said accused, as well
as latter's claim under discussion is toppled by his "unexplained failure"
(People vs. Sosing, 111 SCRA 368, 374, Par. 3) to present Atty. Legorio to
bolster his claim that latter lawyer was not present when his Confession was
taken. Such unexplained failure of accused Pamon constituted
a conduct (Emphasis supplied) on his part granting truth or verity to the
prosecution's assertion that, indeed, by the latter's (prosecution's) Exh. 3-
A, supra, Atty. Legorio was actually present during, and not after his (accused
Pamon's) investigation, for Atty. Legorio, as a PAO attorney, would not have
affixed his signature (Exhibit A-15) if Pfc. Ronald Salatandre had threatened
and coerced accused Pamon into giving his sworn statement/Confession. On
this point, the Supreme Court said
Surely, the CLAO attorney would not have affixed his signature
had Pat. Muy, as alleged, threatened and coerced Appellant
MENDOZA into giving his sworn statement. (People vs. Yap,
185 SCRA 227, Par. 5.)
In fact, accused Pamon declared that he, together with his counsel Atty.
Legorio, signed his Confession (Tsn, Hamoy, Oct. 10, 1990, p. 72). A
confession constitutes evidence of high order because it is supported by the
strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and
knowingly confess to a crime unless he is prompted by truth and his
conscience. . . .
There was, therefore, compliance by the custodial investigator with the jural mandate
in PEOPLE VS. GALIT,135 SCRA 465 prescribing the assistance of counsel for the
validity/admissibility of a Confession, in which case, accused Pamon's Confession (Exh.
A, supra) is valid and admissible, not only against him, but also against his co-accused
Dulang and John Doe alias "Dodo". (People vs. Ramirez, 169 SCRA 711 A SENSU
CONTRARIO, because the latter authority says, "Confessions obtained in violation of Art.
III, Sec. 12(1) of the Constitution are not admissible against the declarants and much less
against third persons).
6

The trial court also considered the argument of the defense that Atty. Rubencio Ligorio was
not Fortunato Pamon's choice as his counsel during the custodial investigation because
Fortunato Pamon was only forced to sign a paper which turned out be a letter to Atty.
Rubencio Ligorio. Anent this allegation, the court said that there was no violation of the
constitutional right of the accused to have competent and independent counsel of his own
choice "because Pamon did not also refuse Atty. Legorio to assist him during his
investigation, for he did not even declare during the trial that he, in fact, refused Atty.
Legorio to assist him during the investigation, thus, indicating after all, his choice of Atty.
Legorio as his counsel during his custodial investigation".
7

In upholding the voluntariness of the extrajudicial Confession, the trial court also observed
that only Fortunato Pamon could have known the identities of his co-conspirators and that
he did not present evidence that the CIS knew them beforehand. Furthermore, the court
also said that assuming that the Confession was inadmissible, there were other evidences
which proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused Fortunato Pamon, among
which was the positive identification by witnesses pointing to him as the killer. This,
according to the trial court, shattered the defense of alibi of the accused. It also considered
Gerson Dulang's demeanor as a basis for convicting the latter for his lack of seriousness in
testifying which rendered him incapable of telling the truth. Besides, he had already been
implicated by Fortunato Pamon in his Confession. He was held to be principal by induction
because according to accused Fortunato Pamon's Confession, he induced co-accused
John Doe alias "Dodo" to kill victim Robert Te.
8
The participation of co-accused Fortunato
Pamon was held to be principal by direct participation because according to his Confession,
he was the one who actually shot Robert Te to death; John Doe was also held liable
because the three were conspirators their common purpose being to liquidate Robert Te.
After finding the defendants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, the
Court sentenced them as follows:
. . . judgment is hereby rendered declaring accused, Fortunato Pamon and
Gerson Dulang, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
charged in the Information and are hereby correspondingly sentenced each to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessories of the law, and
to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of deceased victim, Robert Te, in
the total sum of ninety thousand pesos (not sixty thousand as mistakenly
alleged in the original and amended information) (P90,000.00), inclusive of
indemnity for victim's death P60,000.00; loss of earning capacity
P10,000.00; and moral and exemplary damages P20,000.00.
Accused, Fortunato Pamon, is not entitled to the full credit of his preventive
imprisonment in view of his being a recidivist (Article 29, No. 1, Revised
Penal Code) by reason of his previous conviction for Murder in Criminal Case
No. 4615 by the Regional Trial Court of Tangub City.
Upon application filed with the Court and after due notice to the prosecution,
the bailbond of accused Gerson Dulang shall be cancelled upon his surrender
for the execution of this judgment.
Costs against both convicted accused.
9

From this judgment of conviction, the defendants appealed.
Fortunato Pamon and Gerson Dulang made separate assignments of errors. Fortunato
Pamon avers that the trial court erred in upholding the validity of his arrest and the
voluntariness and admissibility of his extrajudicial Confession, and in not considering the
testimony of a witness, Raul Curativo, that Fortunato Pamon was not the killer.
Gerson Dulang, on the other hand, claims that the court erred in trying him under both the
original and amended informations since they both did not charge an offense against him; in
admitting the amended information after his arraignment on the original information because
the amendment was not merely a formal but a substantial amendment, in trying him under
the amended information when he was not arraigned under it; and in depriving him of the
right to be tried by an impartial judge.
Both allege that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. They also assail the
admission of the extrajudicial Confession which was involuntarily given and the conviction of
Gerson Dulang under the said Confession since apart from it, there was no other evidence
to prove the conspiracy and Gerson Dulang's guilt.
This appeal hinges on the admissibility or inadmissibility of the extrajudicial Confession of
accused-appellant Fortunato Pamon as evidence against him and his co-accused Gerson
Dulang. Both appellants allege that the trial court erred in admitting the Confession as it was
violative of Article III, Section 12(1) of the Constitution which guarantees a person under
investigation the right to be assisted by an independent counsel of his own choice and the
right against torture and violence. Any violation of said guarantees renders an extrajudicial
confession inadmissible.
Contrary to the allegations of Fortunato Pamon, We are constrained to uphold the
admissibility of his extrajudicial Confession.
A confession constitutes an evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong
presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a
crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience.
10
This presumption of spontaneity and
voluntariness stands unless the defense proves otherwise.
11
A confession is admissible
until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation,
threat, or promise of reward of leniency.
12
In People vs. Quijano,
13
this Court, in dismissing
the plea that the trial court erred in admitting the accused's allegedly involuntary
extrajudicial confession, held:
Finally, the alleged use of force and intimidation has not been substantiated
by evidence other than the statements of the appellants. As has been pointed
out, such allegation is another naive attempt of appellants to backtrack from
their prior voluntary admission of guilt. . . . .
We believe that Fortunato Pamon has not presented enough proof to overcome this
presumption. Apart from his testimony that he was maltreated, Fortunato Pamon presented
no other substantial proof to buttress his claim. He did not submit any medical certificate
which would attest to his allegation that he was mauled and was hit on the head. On the
other hand, the prosecution's witness testified that the examining physician, Dr. Venusto
Bengua, found no sign of physical maltreatment in Fortunato Pamon's body.
14
Neither did
he file any complaint against his manhandlers with the proper authorities. In People vs.
Solis,
15
We held:
A careful scrutiny of the records belie the assertions of maltreatment. We find
that the appellants were afforded the services of counsel during the time they
executed their statements. There was also an instance when the Presiding
Judge visited Joveniano's detention cell and inquired about his condition and
complaints . . . . Cabug was, likewise, brought before the Fiscal before whom
the former subscribed to the veracity of his statement . . . . With all these
chances to report the alleged maltreatment, appellants kept silent. They did
not even file a complaint against their alleged tormentors or ask their counsel
or relatives to do
so. . . . We have already ruled that a confession is deemed to have been
made voluntarily if the accused did not complain to the proper authorities
regarding the alleged maltreatment despite the opportunity to do so . . .
. Appellants neither asked for medical attention nor presented any medical
certificate to attest to the bruises or injuries on their persons. (Emphasis
Ours).
The more recent case of People vs. Damaso,
16
quoting earlier cases, reiterated the
aforementioned ruling. We quote:
In addition, bare assertions of maltreatment by the police authorities in
extracting confessions from the accused are not sufficient in view of the
standing rule . . . "that where the defendants did not present evidence of
compulsion, or duress nor violence on their person; where they failed to
complain to the officer who administered their oaths; where they did not
institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators
for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their
bodies; and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable
physician to buttress their claim, all these were considered by this Court as
factors indicating voluntariness.
In the case at bar, Fortunato Pamon had several chances to deny the voluntariness of his
Confession. First, when he and Atty. Rubencio Ligorio conferred; second, when he
subscribed the Confession before Judge Vicente Aseniero on March 20, 1987; and third,
when he was before the investigating officer on March 23, 1987. In the last instance,
instead of repudiating his Confession, he reaffirmed it.
The other earmarks of voluntariness which are appreciated by this Court are the following:
the signature of Atty. Rubencio Ligorio; the signature of Judge Vicente Aseniero; the
presence of details in his Confession.
17

Aside from holding that the extrajudicial Confession of Fortunato Pamon had been
voluntarily given, We also hold that it was given in the presence and with the assistance of
counsel.
The evidence presented by the prosecution has adequately established that Atty. Rubencio
Ligorio was present when the confession was made and subscribed to. But Fortunato
Pamon claimed that Atty. Rubencio Ligorio was not a counsel of his choice.
We are well aware of the constitutional mandate that the counsel present must not be just
any counsel, but one who has been chosen by the accused. In a recent case, We affirmed
the rule that ". . . no in-custody investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence
of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person in his behalf or appointed by the
court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by someone in his behalf".
18
Thus, We
already had occasion to rule that where counsel is provided for by investigators, the
confession taken in the presence of such counsel is inadmissible as evidence because it
fails to satisfy the constitutional guarantee.
19
But this doctrine recognizes certain exceptions.
Where the counsel has been appointed by the investigators with the conformity of the
confessant, the latter's confession is considered as valid and binding upon him.
20
The
decision in People vs.
Alvarez
21
is also relevant to the case at bar. We said therein that "while it may be that a
lawyer was provided by the police, Alvarez never signified to have a lawyer of his choice."
Thus, the trial court's findings that Fortunato Pamon was assisted by a counsel of his choice
is hereby sustained.
Having ruled on the constitutionality and admissibility of the Confession, We hereby find that
the lower court did not err in convicting accused Fortunato Pamon of murder. Likewise, the
trial court committed no error in holding that Fortunato Pamon was validly arrested since he
himself admitted that he was taken into custody by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by a
judge who convicted him in an earlier murder case.
However, although We sustain the trial court's conviction of Fortunato Pamon, We are
constrained to disagree with the trial court's conviction of Gerson Dulang. Well settled is the
rule that the guilt of an accused must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution failed to meet this quantum of proof with respect to Gerson Dulang. Apart
from the extrajudicial Confession of Fortunato Pamon, there is no other evidence linking
Gerson Dulang to the crime except the testimonies of the widow of Robert Te and of the
latter's employees which We have summarized earlier. The conviction of Gerson Dulang
can hardly rest on such very tenuous grounds.
We are, therefore, left with the extrajudicial Confession of Fortunato Pamon. The trial court,
in admitting the Confession as evidence against Gerson Dulang said:
There was, therefore, compliance by the custodial investigator with the jural mandate . . .
in which case, accused Pamon's Confession, "A", supra) is valid and admissible, not only
against him, but also against his
co-accused Dulang . . . (People vs. Ramirez, 169 SCRA 711-A SENSU CONTRARIO,
because the latter authority says, "Confessions obtained in violation of Article III, Sec.
12(1) of the Constitution are not admissible against the declarants and much less against
third
persons".).
22
(Emphasis Ours).
We cannot sustain the trial court's reasoning that if the confession is not admissible against
the accused, it will not also be admissible against those who had been implicated therein.
But, if it is admissible against the former, then it will also be admissible against the latter.
This simply ignores the doctrine: RES INTER ALIOS ACTA ALTERI NOCERI NON DEBET.
The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another.
23
An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not
admissible against his co-accused.
24
This is so because the co-accused has no opportunity
to cross-examine the confessant and thus, as against him, the confession is hearsay.
25

The case of People vs. Plaza
26
is instructive. The ruling of the Court is quoted, thus:
In short, the extra-judicial confessions/statements of the Napal brothers are
inadmissible against Plaza first, because as earlier stated they lack the
indispensable requisite of corroboration by other evidence and, second,
because during the trial the Napal brothers not only denied that their co-
accused Plaza participated in the killing of Luna but went on to repudiate their
statements as having been extracted from them through the use of force,
violation [sic] and intimidation.
The same situation obtains in this case. The Confession was repudiated by Fortunato
Pamon during the trial. Consequently, it did not become a judicial admission which would
have been admissible against all those implicated.
27
Moreover, We also want to point out
that Fortunato Pamon had no personal knowledge of Gerson Dulang's participation. He only
heard from alias "Dodo" that Gerson Dulang hired him to kill Robert Te.
28
Thus, the
confession of Fortunato Pamon vis-a-vis Gerson Dulang was, as the appellant called it,
double hearsay.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED,
We hereby AFFIRM the conviction of accused Fortunato Pamon and REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the conviction of Gerson Dulang on reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.


PEOPLE V NICANDRO
G.R. No. L-59378 February 11, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
NELIA NICANDRO y VELARMA, accused-appellant.

PLANA, J .:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VIII, convicting the
accused Nelia Nicandro y Velarma of violation of Section 4, Article II, in relation to Section 2(e), (f), (1), (m),
and (o) Article I, of Republic Act 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act), upon an information which reads:
That on or about November 6, 1981, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not
having been authorized by law to sell deliver, give away to another or distribute any prohibited
drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly sell or offer for sale four (4) sticks
of marijuana cigarettes, marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a piece of newspaper, one (1)
roach marijuana cigarette and marijuana seeds and ashes contained in a white plastic bag,
which are prohibited drugs.
The People's version of the facts is as follows:
Not long before November 6,1981, the Drug Enforcement Unit of Police Station No. 5,
Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force, Manila, received complaints from
concerned citizens regarding the illegal sale of prohibited drugs by one alias 'Nel' in the
Commodore Pension House at Arquiza Street, Ermita, Manila (p. 4, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981). lt was
also informed that the use of prohibited drugs in said place was rampant (pp. 3, 18-19,
tsn, Ibid).
Responding to said complaints and reports, Cpl. Salvador Guitan and Pfc. Romeo Joves of
the Drug Enforcement Unit of said Police Station No. 5 placed the Commodore Pension
House and its surroundings under surveillance for about a week (pp. 4-5, tsn, Ibid.). After the
complaints and reports were verified to be true, an entrapment with the confidential informant
acting as the buyer of marijuana was organized. (pp. 5-6, 29-30, tsn, Ibid.).
At about 9:00 p.m. on November 6, 1981, the police team formed to carry out the entrapment
plan was alerted of the presence of the drug pusher, alias 'Nel', at room 301 of the
Commodore Pension House, selling marijuana to drug users (pp. 6, 32-33, tsn, Ibid.).
Immediately Cpl. Salvador Guitan, Pat. Proceso Federes, Pat. Aurora Gomez and Pfc.
Romeo Joves proceeded to the said Commodore Pension House and met the female
confidential informant at the corner of Arquiza Street and M.H. del Pilar Street, Ermita, Manila
(pp. 6, 23, 33, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981; pp. 15-16, tsn. Dec. 9, 1981). Pfc. Joves gave the informant
two (2) P5.00 bills, marked Exhibits "D" and "E", with his initial thereon, marked Exhibits "D-1",
and "E-1" (Exhs. "D", "D-1" "E" and "E-1", pp. 3-4, Folio of Exhs.; pp. 6, 8, 35, tsn, Dec. 8,
1981; p. 16, tsn, Dec. 9, 1981). They instructed her to follow them to the Commodore Pension
House (p. 33, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981).
Following later, the informant went to room 301 of the Commodore Pension House (p. 6, tsn,
Dec. 8, 1981; p. 17, tsn, Dec. 9, 1981). Upon a given signal she knocked on the door of the
room. Appellant Nelia Nicandro y Velarma, alias 'Nel', opened the door (p. 6, tsn, Dec. 8.
1981). The informant asked to buy some marijuana cigarette and gave appellant the two (2)
marked P 5.00 bills (p. 6, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981; p. 17, tsn, Dec. 9, 1981). Thereupon, the
appellant delivered to informant four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarette (pp. 7, 25, tsn; Dec.
8,1981; p. 8, tsn, Dec. 9, 1981).
Immediately the police team closed in and nabbed appellant (p. 7, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981; p. 17,
tsn, Dec. 9, 1981). Pat. Gomez frisked appellant and got from the right front pocket of her
pants the two (2), marked P5.00 bills (Exhs. "D" & " E ") and from the left pocket of her pants
marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a piece of newspaper (pp. 8-9, 12, 34, tsn, Dec. 8, 1981;
pp. 9-10, 17-19, tsn. Dec. 9, 1981). Appellant tried to escape by entering her rented room 301
but was immediately (pp. 8-9, tsn, Dec. 9, 1981).
xxx xxx xxx
Upon being investigated and after having been duly apprised of her constitutional rights,
appellant orally admitted having sold the four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarettes and the
ownership of the marijuana flowering tops taken from her pocket, but refused to reduce her
confession to writing (pp. 12-13, tan; Dec. 8, 1981. ... (People's Brief, pp. 3-6, 8.)
To support the charges, the prosecution relied principally on Pat. Joves, who testified that he saw the accused
sell marijuana cigarettes to the unnamed police informant, which allegedly the accused verbally admitted when
she was under custodial investigation. Pat. Joves declared:
Q Where were you when the informant handed the two P5.00 bills to the
accused?
A We were hidden within the vicinity of Room 301 sir.
Q After your confidential informant have handed the two P5.00 bills to the
accused, what happened next?
A The accused in turn handed one small plastic bag containing suspected
marijuana leaves. I beg to correct sir. I think it was four sticks of marijuana
cigarettes sir. It is not a plastic bag sir.
Q What did you do when you saw the accused hand over to the confidential
informant the four sticks of cigarettes containing marijuana?
A When we saw the accused handed the four sticks of suspected marijuana
cigarettes to our confidential informant, and after a pre-a rranged signal was
given by the confidential informant that the accused had already sold her the
marijuana cigarettes, we immediately nabbed said suspect and at the same
time we Identified ourselves as police officers. (TSN, Dec. 8, 1981, p. 7.)
xxx xxx xxx
Q You also conducted the investigation of this accused and confiscation of
the articles of the crime?
A Yes, sir.
Q How did you conduct the investigation?
A The first thing I did was I informed the accused of her constitutional rights.
Q What next?
A Then I questioned her about the marijuana cigarettes and leaves that were
confiscated and also the marked money and she verbally admitted that she
sold the four sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes and possession and
ownership of the other marijuana leaves which was confiscated from her
possession.
Q Did you place that in writing?
A The accused refused to place her statement in writing, sir. (Ibid., pp. 12-
13.)
xxx xxx xxx
CROSS EXAMINATION
Q And who were your companions in apprehending the accused?
A I was with Police Cpl. Salvador Guitan, Pat. Federis and Policewoman
Aurora Gomez, sir.
Q When you posted yourselves and other companions at the third floor of
Commodore Pensione House, were there any other persons present in the
premises, Pat. Joves?
A There were other persons passing by or walking in the place from where
we were posted sir.
Q In fact, there were several or many persons in that place because there is
a lodging house Pat. Joves when you posted yourselves there? There were
several persons present there?
A There are several persons present but they are just passing by or walking
towards their rooms, sir.
Q And you want this Court to believe that in spite of the presence of these
people walking and passing to the place where you made the apprehension,
you want this Court to believe that the accuse was then selling the alleged
marijuana sticks?
WITNESS:
Please repeat the questions?
ATTY. CARINGAL:
Q You want the Court to believe that the accused was selling the prohibited
drug in public because according to you there were several persons present
then?
A There were several persons passing by sir at that place.
Q You testified a while ago Pat. Joves that you have seen the accused
handing a plastic bag to your confidential informant. How big is that plastic
bag.?
A It was not a plastic bag, sir but four sticks of marijuana cigarettes, sir.
Q Do you want to impress this Honorable Court that the accused was selling
this marijuana cigarette in the open?
A The accused sold marijuana cigarettes also in a way that she will not be
noticed by other persons sir.
Q How were you able to say that the things handed by the accused to your
confidential informant were four sticks of marijuana cigarettes when you
have just said that the transactions was done secretly?
A She was handing the marijuana cigarette secretly, sir.
Q How were you able to say and how were you able to determine that the
things handed to your confidential informant were four sticks of marijuana
cigarettes?
A We saw and observed that the accused handed sticks of suspected
marijuana cigarettes and we also have a prearranged signal from the
confidential informant that the marijuana was already sold by the accused,
sir. (Ibid., pp. 23-25.)
Policewoman Aurora Gomez also testified but her testimony was limited to events subsequent to the alleged
sale of marijuana cigarettes. She did not witness the sale. (TSN, Dec. 9, 1981, pp. 17-18, 21.) Neither did Cpl.
Guitan or Pat. Federis.
After trial, the trial court convicted the accused as aforesaid and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
a fine of P20,000.00.
In the instant appeal, defendant-appellant has assigned the following errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR VIOLATION
OF SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE II IN RELATION TO SECTION 2(e), (1), (f) and (o), ARTICLE 1,
R.A. 6425, AS AMENDED BY P.D. NO. 44 AND FURTHER AMENDED BY P.D. NO. 1675.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF ALL POLICE OF OFFICERS WHICH ARE HEARSAY.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING PROSECUTION EVIDENCE
WHICH WERE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION PETITION OF ACCUSED CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS.
IV
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED MORE PARTICULARLY THE RIGHT
TO CONFRONTATION AND TO CROSS-EXAMINE WITNESS AGAINST HER HAS BEEN
VIOLATED.
Numerous factors combine to make the appeal meritorious.
The prosecution evidence leaves much to be desired. It is at best uncertain whether any prosecution witness
really saw the alleged sale of marijuana cigarettes. Patrolman Joves allegedly was an eyewitness. He testified
that he saw the appellant sell marijuana cigarettes to the police informant, as the transaction took place openly
just outside room 301, in the presence of several persons "passing by or walking in the place". But when his
attention was called to the improbability that an illegal merchandise would openly be sold, he qualified his story
by saying that appellant handed the marijuana cigarettes to appellant "secretly".
Pat. Joves was not certain as to what he saw. At first, he said that after the police informant had paid appellant,
the latter handed to the former "one small plastic bag containing suspected marijuana leaves." Then he
corrected himself by saying: "I think it was four sticks of marijuana cigarettes sir. It is not a plastic bag sir."
It is probable that Pat. Joves really did not see either the alleged delivery of the marijuana cigarettes or the
supposed payment therefor. After all, according to him, the transaction was effected "secretly". On the other
hand, if the sale was made within the view of Pat. Joves and his companions, there would have been no need
for them to wait for a signal from the police informant to indicate that the transaction had been completed,
before closing in and arresting appellant.
With the testimony of Pat. Joves seriously placed in doubt, there is not much left of the prosecution evidence.
Note that the police informant was not presented as a witness, prompting the accused to invoke with reason
the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. [Rules of Court, Rule 131,
Sec. 5(e).]
In convicting the appellant, the trial court relied partly on her alleged oral admission declaraciones custodial
investigation, as testified to by Pat. Joves. This reliance is assailed as violative of Section 20 of Article IV of the
Constitution which reads:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be
informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The above provision is an expanded version of the guarantee against self-incrimination, formally incorporating
the doctrine in the landmark American case of Miranda vs. Arizona
... Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages which follow, but briefly
stated, it is this: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self- incrimination. By custodial
interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are
devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous
opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the
person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of those rights, provided
the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any
manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before
speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any
manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere
fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own
does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has
consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. [384 U.S. 436, 444-445.
Incidentally, the Miranda doctrine rests on just one broad guarantee in the U.S. Constitution,
i.e., that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
(Fifth Amendment.)]
When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to remain silent and to
counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefor, it would not be
sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article
IV of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he
must also explain their effects in practical terms, e.g., what the person under interrogation may or may not do,
and in a language the subject fairly understands. (See People vs. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312: People VS.
Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2.) In other words, the right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a
correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective
communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it
cannot truly be said that the person has been "informed" of his rights. Now, since the right "to be informed"
implies comprehension, the degree of explanation required will necessary vary, depending upon the education,
intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation. Suffice it to say that a
simpler and more lucid explanation is needed where the subject is unlettered.
Thus, in the cited case of People vs. Ramos, this Court said:
In the case at bar, appellant has only finished Grade VI, which means that he is not
adequately educated to understand fairly and fully the significance of his constitutional rights
to silence and to counsel. As mandated, it is not enough that the police investigator merely
informs him of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel, and then taking his
statements down, the interrogating officer must have patience in explaining these rights to him
The records do not reveal that these requirements have been fully complied with, nor was
there any showing that appellant has been represented by counsel during custodial
investigation. In consonance with Section 20 of the Bill of Rights which states that 'any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence,' We hold that
the verbal admissions of appellant during custodial investigation may not be taken in evidence
against him. (pp. 321-322.)
Like other constitutional rights, the right against self-incrimination, including the right of a person under
investigation to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right, may be waived. To be valid,
however, a waiver of the right must not only be voluntary; it must be made knowingly and intelligently (People
vs. Caguioa, supra), which presupposes an awareness or understanding of what is being waived. It stands to
reason that where the right has not been adequately explained and there are serious doubts as to whether the
person interrogated knew and understood his relevant constitutional rights when he answered the questions, it
is Idle to talk of waiver of rights.
Going to the instant case, Pat. Joves testified that he conducted the custodial investigation of appellant. As to
the manner of investigation, he tersely testified:
Q How did you conduct the investigation?
A The first thing I did was I informed the accused of her constitutional rights.
Q What next?
A Then I questioned her about the marijuana cigarettes and leaves that were
confiscated and also the marked money and she verbally admitted that she
sold the four sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes and possession and
ownership of the other marijuana leaves which was confiscated from her
possession. (TSN, December 8, 1981, pp. 12-13.)
According to Pat. Joves, he informed appellant of her constitutional rights when she was under custodial
investigation. What specific rights he mentioned to appellant, he did not say. Neither did he state the manner in
which the appellant was advised of her constitutional rights so as to make her understand them. This is
particularly significant in the instant case because appellant is illiterate and cannot be expected to be able to
grasp the significance of her right to silence and to counsel upon merely hearing an abstract statement thereof.
As it is the obligation of the investigating officer to inform a person under investigation of his right to remain
silent and to counsel, so it is the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance by the
investigating officer with his said obligation. Absent such affirmative showing, the admission or confession
made by a person under investigation cannot be admitted in evidence. As broadly stated in the Miranda case
and quoted with approval by the then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in People vs. Caguioa, supra,
... the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming
from custodial investigation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination (95 SCRA 2,9.
Emphasis supplied.)
The reason is not difficult to see. A constitutional guarantee should be liberally construed with a view to
promoting its object.
... Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or
legislation which would abrogate them.
xxx xxx xxx
In dealing with custodial interrogation, we will not presume that a defendant has been
effectively apprised of his rights and that his privilege against self-incrimination has been
adequately safeguarded on a record that does not show that any warnings have been given or
that any effective alternative has been employed. Nor can a knowing and intelligent waiver of
these rights be assumed on a silent record. ... (Miranda case, 384 U.S. 436, 491, 498-499.)
Thus, in People vs. Ramos, supra, the Court ruled that the verbal admission of the accused during custodial
investigation was inadmissible, although he had been apprised of his constitutional rights to silence and to
counsel, for the reason that the prosecution failed to show that those rights were explained to him, such that it
could not be said that "the apprisal was sufficiently manifested and intelligently understood" by the accuse.
Similarly, in People vs. Caguioa, the Court sustained the rejection by the trial court of the extrajudicial
admission made by the accused during custodial investigation, there being no showing by the prosecution that
there was sufficient compliance with the constitutional duty to inform the accused of his rights to silence and to
counsel, without which there could be no intelligent waiver of said rights. In said case, the accused a native
of Samar was interrogated in Tagalog. The prosecution did not show that the accused's acquaintance with
Tagalog was such that he could fully understand the questions posed to him.
All considered, we hold that the guilt of appellant has not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside, and the appellant is hereby acquitted on the
basis of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.