FIRE SAFETY

The Burnley Tunnel Fires of 2007 - a Courts perspective

TUNNEL SAFETY EXPERTS from around the world should welcome a decision of the Australian courts on 30 January 2013 to release the Courts detailed technical findings about the sequence of events, systems performance and human behaviour arising from the 2007 fatal Burnley Tunnel fires. Both the Court's technical documentation and the Court's determination provide important impartial information on how a modern road tunnel performs in severely challenged emergency conditions. Importantly these Court reports explore driver behaviour before the crashes, the degradation of the computer systems controlling the electromechanical systems during the event, the behaviour of survivors as they self rescue, the effectiveness of the smoke management systems, the operation of the deluge systems, the performance of emergency services and the subsequent reopening of the tunnel. Both the report by the Court appointed expert and the findings and recommendations of the Court itself provide useful insights into an actual tunnel incident, a rare window created by a legal investigation providing a useful vision of tunnel safety and a list of recommendations for contemporary tunnel safety. The Court made recommendations touching upon education of drivers into tunnel safety, design imperatives such as reducing the need for lane changes, the importance of consistent vehicle speed within tunnels, emergency stopping lanes, the need for effective emergency egress pathways, ensuring functionality of control computer systems, design aspects of deluge systems, the importance of emergency evacuation messages and the functionality of emergency services communications underground. The Court noted with approval the observations of the Victorian Assistant Chief Fire Officer that: "... if it wasn't for the CityLink operators acting as they did there would have been a far greater catastrophe ... there would have been many more fatalities ... potentially

Professor Arnold Dix, Scientist and Lawyer explains the recent court findings into Melbournes fatal Burnley Tunnel fires in 2007 and what they mean to the tunnelling industry

everyone inside the tunnel that day could have perished ..." While this short summary is no substitute for reading the Court judgements and expert report it provides an insight into the incident and the basis for the recommendations made by the Court. The Tunnel The Burnley tunnel is one of two non identical pair of tunnels, three lanes wide servicing Melbournes busiest toll road networks. Vehicle numbers typically exceed 100,000 vehicles per day per tube, and there is a high proportion of HGVs. The Burnley tunnel is 3.4km long and at its deepest point is 60m under ground level. The grades within the Burnley Tunnel are very high exceeding a 6% down slope after the entrance portal prior to its deepest point and exceeding a 5% up slope for nearly one kilometre prior to the exit portal. The Burnley Tunnel has three, 3.5m lanes, a vertical traffic clearance of 4.9m and two 0.5m shoulders as well as an elevated 0.8m wide walkway. It carries a mixed fleet with a significant proportion of heavy goods vehicles. On the morning of the accident traffic mix was 28% heavy goods vehicles and 72% cars. Traffic flow is unidirectional; there is no prohibition on lane changes or any restriction on vehicle types in lanes at the time of the collisions. Dangerous goods are not permitted through the tunnel.

Both tunnels are longitudinally ventilated, equipped with a deluge system, supplemented by a dedicated overhead smoke extraction system, and monitored continuously by both human operators and artificial intelligence technologies. The deluge systems are part of a sophisticated computer based safety system but are ultimately manually operated. This deluge system is divided into individually operable zones of 30m in length and 11.5m in width. It is a dry system once remotely operated quick action valves are commanded to open and an otherwise dry set of pipes is filled with water. The deluge discharge rate is around 2,850 litres per minute per 30m zone. The tunnels are equipped with large collection sumps.

Pic 1: Spiral deluge nozzle in area of the tunnel fires

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FIRE SAFETY
The Incident At 09:52:30 am on the 23rd of March 2007 in a steep downhill section of the Burnley Tunnel, a truck made an unscheduled stop.

Pic 4: 9:54:27 - Controllers alarms at time of first collision, the fireball is generated by fuel released from the first crushed vehicle. Pic 2: This image shows the stopped truck and the red arrow shows the artificial intelligence detecting the stopped vehicle and raising an alarm for the operator.

Pic 6: 9:55:59 - this photograph shows a truck driver after the crash protecting himself from the radiation coming from the burning vehicles before the deluge system was operated.

By 09:56:00am (two minutes after ignition) emergency ventilation and a fixed fire suppression system had been activated, and an effective emergency evacuation of several hundred tunnel users had commenced.

Over the next two minutes 103 vehicles passed the stopped truck without incident, although traffic become congested around the stopped vehicle. Two minutes later, by 09:54:24 several vehicles, including 4 HGVs and 7 light vehicles had crashed, 3 people were dead and fire and a series of explosions were initiated.

Pic 5: 9:54:42 - 15 seconds after initial impact showing truck driver running from impact scene

Truck 1 (stopped) Pic 7: 9:56:49 - Deluge activating

Fire growth and spread were contained.

Cars that become crushed

Skidding truck - tyre smoke

Pic 3: The incident unfolding

Pic 8: 9:57:28 Deluge suppressing fires

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FIRE SAFETY

Pic 9 - 10:05:00 Fireman without breathing apparatus observed to enter fire zone and fight fire undercover of deluge operation

Emergency services were able to approach the incident and extinguish the fires. Tunnel damage was minimal and tolled operations could have rerecommenced within hours. The Court summarised the sequence of events as follows: "Sixty seven seconds after that fire commenced, the Tunnel operator enabled emergency mode in preparation for the smoke extraction, deluge operation and evacuation. Twenty seven seconds later the emergency response plan was activated by the Tunnel operator and this activated the emergency smoke extraction and the deluge system." Commentary Despite the severity of these initiating events the fires were contained, with no flash over or other significant fire growth occurring once the deluge fixed fire fighting system was initiated. However, it was not merely the presence of the fixed fire fighting system which was critical it was that the ventilation system was effective in that it stopped backlayering (up a steep tunnel grade of 6%) and reduced the longitudinal airflow rapidly (to approximately 2m/sec) in order to optimize smoke extraction and minimize ventilation induced fire growth. It was the fire brigade that put the fires out the deluge system merely kept the fires small enough to allow

Pic 11: Burnley Tunnel after fire - road surface and tunnel walls and services still intact.

effective emergency services intervention. The incident resulted in several hundred people being evacuated from the tunnel and their vehicles. None of the evacuees or their vehicles was injured or damaged. The tunnel only suffered minor damage, and could have been re-opened 10s of hours later if the extent of the damage could have been more rapidly determined. Picture 10 depicts the minimal damage to the tunnel. Spalling of the non structural road barrier was confined to an area of approximately 100mm by 150mm. Discussion In the Burnley incident the ventilation system rapidly reduced the longitudinal velocity to approximately 2m/sec. This low ventilation rate was sufficient to stop backlayering despite the buoyancy effect caused by the tunnels steep grade of in excess of 6.2% at the incident location. Downwind of the incident conditions rapidly deteriorated. Video images suggest complete destratification occurred during the post fire turbulent flow period. Smoke extraction systems coupled with induced low longitudinal air flows rapidly controlled these degraded conditions. The rapid activation of the FFFS and quick control of longitudinal velocities contributed to minimal fire growth following the crash, explosions and subsequent fire. The fire inside the structure of the prime mover was not extinguished by the FFFS but was extinguished by the intervention of fire fighters. This is entirely consistent with the expectations derived from experiments involving shielded fires. The absence of flashover and lack of accelerated fire growth is consistent with the experimental data on the effects of a

FFFS with water application rates roughly in the order of 10mm/min. Human Behaviour The majority of people did not use the emergency cross passages or the elevated emergency pathways to evacuate. Instead, most people used the roadway. Many evacuees chose not to use evacuation passages - indeed several people actively rejected using cross passages after briefly inspecting them. However those tunnel users that did use the cross passages to access the adjoining safe tunnel chose to use the elevated walkways to self rescue.

Pic 12: 10:05:31 - Domain Tunnel (safe tunnel) evacuees that used the cross passages to escape the fire chose to use the elevated walkways within the safe tunnel.

Pic 10: Minimal damage to the tunnel

Despite the presence of emergency telephones no evacuees used them. Evacuees were observed actively helping the less able to escape, while disabled people were observed to be amongst the fastest to make and commence evacuation following the incident.

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Conclusion The rapid and accurate use of Burnleys FFFS coupled with effective longitudinal air velocity control coincided with minimal tunnel damage, no non crash human victim fire related injuries and rapid reopening of the infrastructure. The use of FFFS coupled with advanced tunnel ventilation control, rapid incident detection and accurate response positively contribute to tunnel fire safety and asset protection.
Pic 13 - 9:59:37 - (5 minutes after the incident) self evacuation is well underway with disabled, adults with pushers, and able bodied adults mostly evacuating on foot using the roadway (some evacuees were observed returning to their vehicles to gather belongings or trying to approach the incident to take photographs).

A significant number of people chose to stay and observe the incident, many taking photographs and putting themselves at risk doing so. These observations (amongst others) led both the Court and the Court's special expert to recommend that higher priority be placed upon the effectiveness of measures designed to protect tunnel users during the self rescue phase.

The Court's Recommendations The Burnley incident was the subject of both a Supreme Court criminal trial and a full coronial investigation. The Court ultimately recommended a range of measures including: Drivers be educated about safety in tunnels, especially with respect to safe distances, the dangers of lane changing, driver distraction, emergency behaviour, self rescue and emergency response Implementation of a ban on lane changing in tunnels be considered Tunnel designs that encourage consistency of vehicle speed as an objective during detailed proposed new tunnel design assessments be favoured Consideration of an emergency lane requirement for new tunnels be implemented Minimisation of tunnel intersections be pursued

Recognition of the importance of sight lines in designs be acknowledged An emphasis on improved performance of emergency egress pathways for evacuees be embraced A focus on assessing the operational effectiveness of emergency control computer systems be developed A functional review of the performance of deluge systems during multiple events be undertaken A review on the content of emergency messages for evacuating pedestrians be undertaken A focus on the operability of emergency services communications equipment in subsurface environments become an operational focus These recommendations provide a pertinent reminder to us all on the importance of the systems we create to work during emergencies from a practical perspective. These observations support the efforts of organisations such as ITA COSUF, PIARC and NFPA 130 and 502 to refine and further improve the requirements found in regulatory and quasi-regulatory publications internationally. This event reminds us of the importance of ensuring the tunnels we create are functionally responsive to the practical needs generated by people whom seek to enjoy safe journeys underground.

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