General Considerations

Republic vs Sandiganbayan 407 scra 10
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 152154 July 15, 2003
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), FERDINAND E. MARCOS (REPRESENTED BY HIS ESTATE/HEIRS: IMELDA R. MARCOS, MARIA IMELDA [IMEE] MARCOS-MANOTOC, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR. AND IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA) AND IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, respondents. CORONA, J.: This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to (1) set aside the Resolution dated January 31, 2002 issued by the Special First Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No. 0141 entitledRepublic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, et. al., and (2) reinstate its earlier decision dated September 19, 2000 which forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) the amount held in escrow in the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE On December 17, 1991, petitioner Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Civil Case No. 0141 entitled Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos, pursuant to RA 13791 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1,2 2,3 144 and 14-A.5 In said case, petitioner sought the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by the following five account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks: (1) Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts; (2) Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus- Avertina Foundation accounts; (3) Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts; (4) Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts and (5) Maler Foundation accounts. In addition, the petition sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG.

On October 18, 1993, respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed their answer. Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements6 dated December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children filed a motion dated December 7, 1995 for the approval of said agreements and for the enforcement thereof. The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the conditions contained therein. The aforementioned General Agreement specified in one of its premises or "whereas clauses" the fact that petitioner "obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million) belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met x x x." The said decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter Consandey, granting petitioner's request for legal assistance.7 Consandey declared the various deposits in the name of the enumerated foundations to be of illegal provenance and ordered that they be frozen to await the final verdict in favor of the parties entitled to restitution. Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental Agreements. Respondent Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as witness for the purpose of establishing the partial implementation of said agreements. On October 18, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition thereto which was later adopted by respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr. In its resolution dated November 20, 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the motion to approve the compromise agreement "(took) precedence over the motion for summary judgment." Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on May 26, 1998 claiming she was not a party to the motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that she owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate. Meanwhile, on August 10, 1995, petitioner filed with the District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland, an additional request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in the PNB. The request was granted. On appeal by the Marcoses, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in a decision dated December 10, 1997, upheld the ruling of the District Attorney of Zurich granting the request for the transfer of the funds. In 1998, the funds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow. Subsequently, respondent Marcos children moved that the funds be placed in custodia legis because the deposit in escrow in the PNB was allegedly in danger of dissipation by petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, in its resolution dated September 8, 1998, granted the motion. After the pre-trial and the issuance of the pre-trial order and supplemental pre-trial order dated October 28, 1999 and January 21, 2000, respectively, the case was set for trial. After several resettings, petitioner, on March 10, 2000, filed another motion for summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million, based on the following grounds: I

THE ESSENTIAL FACTS WHICH WARRANT THE FORFEITURE OF THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE PETITION UNDER R.A. NO. 1379 ARE ADMITTED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PLEADINGS AND OTHER SUBMISSIONS MADE IN THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING. II RESPONDENTS' ADMISSION MADE DURING THE PRE-TRIAL THAT THEY DO NOT HAVE ANY INTEREST OR OWNERSHIP OVER THE FUNDS SUBJECT OF THE ACTION FOR FORFEITURE TENDERS NO GENUINE ISSUE OR CONTROVERSY AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT IN THE PRESENT ACTION, THUS WARRANTING THE RENDITION OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT.8 Petitioner contended that, after the pre-trial conference, certain facts were established, warranting a summary judgment on the funds sought to be forfeited. Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition to the petitioner's motion for summary judgment, which opposition was later adopted by her co-respondents Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr. On March 24, 2000, a hearing on the motion for summary judgment was conducted. In a decision9 dated September 19, 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment: CONCLUSION There is no issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence. The Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted. The Swiss deposits which were transmitted to and now held in escrow at the PNB are deemed unlawfully acquired as ill-gotten wealth. DISPOSITION WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the Republic of the Philippines and against the respondents, declaring the Swiss deposits which were transferred to and now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the total aggregate value equivalent to US$627,608,544.95 as of August 31, 2000 together with the increments thereof forfeited in favor of the State.10 Respondent Mrs. Marcos filed a motion for reconsideration dated September 26, 2000. Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. filed their own motion for reconsideration dated October 5, 2000. Mrs. Araneta filed a manifestation dated October 4, 2000 adopting the motion for reconsideration of Mrs. Marcos, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. Subsequently, petitioner filed its opposition thereto. In a resolution11 dated January 31, 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its September 19, 2000 decision, thus denying petitioner's motion for summary judgment:

CONCLUSION In sum, the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks. The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have been established and our judgment thereon, perforce, must also have been without basis. WHEREFORE, the decision of this Court dated September 19, 2000 is reconsidered and set aside, and this case is now being set for further proceedings.12 Hence, the instant petition. In filing the same, petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan, in reversing its September 19, 2000 decision, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that -I PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO PROVE ITS CASE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OF SECTIONS 2 AND 3 OF R.A. NO. 1379: A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CATEGORICALLY ADMITTED NOT ONLY THE PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND IMELDA R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS BUT ALSO THE EXTENT OF THEIR SALARIES AS SUCH PUBLIC OFFICIALS, WHO UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, WERE PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING IN THE MANAGEMENT OF FOUNDATIONS. B. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ALSO ADMITTED THE EXISTENCE OF THE SWISS DEPOSITS AND THEIR OWNERSHIP THEREOF: 1. ADMISSIONS IN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' ANSWER; 2. ADMISSION IN THE GENERAL / SUPPLEMENTAL AGREEMENTS THEY SIGNED AND SOUGHT TO IMPLEMENT; 3. ADMISSION IN A MANIFESTATION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT IMELDA R. MARCOS AND IN THE MOTION TO PLACE THE RES IN CUSTODIA LEGIS; AND 4. ADMISSION IN THE UNDERTAKING TO PAY THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS. C. PETITIONER HAS PROVED THE EXTENT OF THE LEGITIMATE INCOME OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS AND IMELDA R. MARCOS AS PUBLIC OFFICIALS. D. PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED WEALTH. II

SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER SINCE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT RAISED ANY GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT CONSIDERING THAT: A. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DEFENSE THAT SWISS DEPOSITS WERE LAWFULLY ACQUIRED DOES NOT ONLY FAIL TO TENDER AN ISSUE BUT IS CLEARLY A SHAM; AND B. IN SUBSEQUENTLY DISCLAIMING OWNERSHIP OF THE SWISS DEPOSITS, PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ABANDONED THEIR SHAM DEFENSE OF LEGITIMATE ACQUISITION, AND THIS FURTHER JUSTIFIED THE RENDITION OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT. III THE FOREIGN FOUNDATIONS NEED NOT BE IMPLEADED. IV THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUSTICE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REVERSING HIMSELF ON THE GROUND THAT ORIGINAL COPIES OF THE AUTHENTICATED SWISS DECISIONS AND THEIR "AUTHENTICATED TRANSLATIONS" HAVE NOT BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE COURT, WHEN EARLIER THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS QUOTED EXTENSIVELY A PORTION OF THE TRANSLATION OF ONE OF THESE SWISS DECISIONS IN HIS "PONENCIA" DATED JULY 29, 1999 WHEN IT DENIED THE MOTION TO RELEASE ONE HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION US DOLLARS ($150,000,000.00) TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS VICTIMS. V PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR OBJECTION TO THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE SWISS FEDERAL SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.13 Petitioner, in the main, asserts that nowhere in the respondents' motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration were the authenticity, accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever challenged. Otherwise stated, it was incorrect for the Sandiganbayan to use the issue of lack of authenticated translations of the decisions of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court as the basis for reversing itself because respondents themselves never raised this issue in their motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration. Furthermore, this particular issue relating to the translation of the Swiss court decisions could not be resurrected anymore because said decisions had been previously utilized by the Sandiganbayan itself in resolving a "decisive issue" before it. Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for questioning the non-production of the authenticated translations of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court decisions as this was a marginal and technical matter that did not diminish by any measure the conclusiveness and strength of what had been proven and admitted before the Sandiganbayan, that is, that the funds deposited by the Marcoses constituted ill-gotten wealth and thus belonged to the Filipino people. In compliance with the order of this Court, Mrs. Marcos filed her comment to the petition on May 22, 2002. After several motions for extension which were all granted, the comment of Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. and the separate comment of Mrs. Araneta were filed on May 27, 2002.

Mrs. Marcos asserts that the petition should be denied on the following grounds: A. PETITIONER HAS A PLAIN, SPEEDY, AND ADEQUATE REMEDY AT THE SANDIGANBAYAN. B. THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN SETTING THE CASE FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.14 Mrs. Marcos contends that petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2000 directing petitioner to submit the authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions. Instead of availing of said remedy, petitioner now elevates the matter to this Court. According to Mrs. Marcos, a petition for certiorari which does not comply with the requirements of the rules may be dismissed. Since petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, that is, to proceed to trial and submit authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions, its petition before this Court must be dismissed. Corollarily, the Sandiganbayan's ruling to set the case for further proceedings cannot and should not be considered a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment. Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., in their comment, prayed for the dismissal of the petition on the grounds that: (A) BY THE TIME PETITIONER FILED ITS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON 10 MARCH 2000, IT WAS ALREADY BARRED FROM DOING SO. (1) The Motion for Summary Judgment was based on private respondents' Answer and other documents that had long been in the records of the case. Thus, by the time the Motion was filed on 10 March 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in against petitioner. (2) By its positive acts and express admissions prior to filing the Motion for Summary Judgment on 10 March 1990, petitioner had legally bound itself to go to trial on the basis of existing issues. Thus, it clearly waived whatever right it had to move for summary judgment. (B) EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT LEGALLY BARRED FROM FILING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE SANDIGANBAYAN IS CORRECT IN RULING THAT PETITIONER HAS NOT YET ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR THE FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS. (1) Republic Act No. 1379, the applicable law, is a penal statute. As such, its provisions, particularly the essential elements stated in section 3 thereof, are mandatory in nature. These should be strictly construed against petitioner and liberally in favor of private respondents.

(2) Petitioner has failed to establish the third and fourth essential elements in Section 3 of R.A. 1379 with respect to the identification, ownership, and approximate amount of the property which the Marcos couple allegedly "acquired during their incumbency". (a) Petitioner has failed to prove that the Marcos couple "acquired" or own the Swiss funds. (b) Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the fact of acquisition has been proven, petitioner has categorically admitted that it has no evidence showing how much of the Swiss funds was acquired "during the incumbency" of the Marcos couple from 31 December 1965 to 25 February 1986. (3) In contravention of the essential element stated in Section 3 (e) of R.A. 1379, petitioner has failed to establish the other proper earnings and income from legitimately acquired property of the Marcos couple over and above their government salaries. (4) Since petitioner failed to prove the three essential elements provided in paragraphs (c)15 (d),16 and (e)17 of Section 3, R.A. 1379, the inescapable conclusion is that the prima facie presumption of unlawful acquisition of the Swiss funds has not yet attached. There can, therefore, be no premature forfeiture of the funds. (C) IT WAS ONLY BY ARBITRARILY ISOLATING AND THEN TAKING CERTAIN STATEMENTS MADE BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OUT OF CONTEXT THAT PETITIONER WAS ABLE TO TREAT THESE AS "JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS" SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE AND THEREAFTER A CONCLUSIVE CASE TO JUSTIFY THE FORFEITURE OF THE SWISS FUNDS. (1) Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the General and Supplemental Agreements, as well as the other written and testimonial statements submitted in relation thereto, are expressly barred from being admissible in evidence against private respondents. (2) Had petitioner bothered to weigh the alleged admissions together with the other statements on record, there would be a demonstrable showing that no such "judicial admissions" were made by private respondents. (D) SINCE PETITIONER HAS NOT (YET) PROVEN ALL THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR FORFEITURE, AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT MADE ANY JUDICIAL ADMISSION THAT WOULD HAVE FREED IT FROM ITS BURDEN OF PROOF, THE SANDIGANBAYAN DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. CERTIORARI, THEREFORE, DOES NOT LIE, ESPECIALLY AS THIS COURT IS NOT A TRIER OF FACTS.18 For her part, Mrs. Araneta, in her comment to the petition, claims that obviously petitioner is unable to comply with a very plain requirement of respondent Sandiganbayan. The instant petition is allegedly an attempt to elevate to this Court matters, issues and incidents which should be properly

threshed out at the Sandiganbayan. To respondent Mrs. Araneta, all other matters, save that pertaining to the authentication of the translated Swiss Court decisions, are irrelevant and impertinent as far as this Court is concerned. Respondent Mrs. Araneta manifests that she is as eager as respondent Sandiganbayan or any interested person to have the Swiss Court decisions officially translated in our known language. She says the authenticated official English version of the Swiss Court decisions should be presented. This should stop all speculations on what indeed is contained therein. Thus, respondent Mrs. Araneta prays that the petition be denied for lack of merit and for raising matters which, in elaborated fashion, are impertinent and improper before this Court. PROPRIETY OF PETITIONER'S ACTION FOR CERTIORARI But before this Court discusses the more relevant issues, the question regarding the propriety of petitioner Republic's action for certiorari under Rule 6519 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Sandiganbayan Resolution dated January 21, 2002 should be threshed out. At the outset, we would like to stress that we are treating this case as an exception to the general rule governing petitions for certiorari. Normally, decisions of the Sandiganbayan are brought before this Court under Rule 45, not Rule 65.20 But where the case is undeniably ingrained with immense public interest, public policy and deep historical repercussions, certiorari is allowed notwithstanding the existence and availability of the remedy of appeal.21 One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government in February 1986 was the recovery of the unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed by former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, their relatives, friends and business associates. Thus, the very first Executive Order (EO) issued by then President Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office after the ouster of the Marcoses was EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and charged it with the task of assisting the President in the "recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship." The urgency of this undertaking was tersely described by this Court inRepublic vs. Lobregat22: surely x x x an enterprise "of great pith and moment"; it was attended by "great expectations"; it was initiated not only out of considerations of simple justice but also out of sheer necessity - the national coffers were empty, or nearly so. In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parties concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two decades have passed since the government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition, accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these funds and other assets be finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks.23 We thus take cognizance of this case and settle with finality all the issues therein. ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT

The crucial issues which this Court must resolve are: (1) whether or not respondents raised any genuine issue of fact which would either justify or negate summary judgment; and (2) whether or not petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379. (1) THE PROPRIETY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT We hold that respondent Marcoses failed to raise any genuine issue of fact in their pleadings. Thus, on motion of petitioner Republic, summary judgment should take place as a matter of right. In the early case of Auman vs. Estenzo24, summary judgment was described as a judgment which a court may render before trial but after both parties have pleaded. It is ordered by the court upon application by one party, supported by affidavits, depositions or other documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may in turn file an opposition supported also by affidavits, depositions or other documents. This is after the court summarily hears both parties with their respective proofs and finds that there is no genuine issue between them. Summary judgment is sanctioned in this jurisdiction by Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure: SECTION 1. Summary judgment for claimant.- A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.25 Summary judgment is proper when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material fact in the action.26 The theory of summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is demonstrated by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but sham or fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment for petitioner Republic. The Solicitor General made a very thorough presentation of its case for forfeiture: xxx 4. Respondent Ferdinand E. Marcos (now deceased and represented by his Estate/Heirs) was a public officer for several decades continuously and without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the Republic of the Philippines from December 31, 1965 up to his ouster by direct action of the people of EDSA on February 22-25, 1986. 5. Respondent Imelda Romualdez Marcos (Imelda, for short) the former First Lady who ruled with FM during the 14-year martial law regime, occupied the position of Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 up to the peaceful revolution in February 22-25, 1986. She likewise served once as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa during the early years of martial law from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor in concurrent capacity as Minister of Human Settlements. x x x xxx xxx xxx
11. At the outset, however, it must be pointed out that based on the Official Report of the Minister of Budget, the total salaries of former President Marcos as President form 1966 to 1976 was P60,000 a year and from 1977 to 1985, P100,000 a year; while that of the former

First Lady, Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister of Human Settlements from June 1976 to February 22-25, 1986 was P75,000 a year xxx. ANALYSIS OF RESPONDENTS LEGITIMATE INCOME xxx 12. Based on available documents, the ITRs of the Marcoses for the years 1965-1975 were filed under Tax Identification No. 1365-055-1. For the years 1976 until 1984, the returns were filed under Tax Identification No. M 6221-J 1117-A-9. 13. The data contained in the ITRs and Balance Sheet filed by the "Marcoses are summarized and attached to the reports in the following schedules: Schedule A: Schedule of Income (Annex "T" hereof); Schedule B: Schedule of Income Tax Paid (Annex "T-1" hereof); Schedule C: Schedule of Net Disposable Income (Annex "T-2" hereof); Schedule D: Schedule of Networth Analysis (Annex "T-3" hereof). 14. As summarized in Schedule A (Annex "T" hereof), the Marcoses reported P16,408,442.00 or US$2,414,484.91 in total income over a period of 20 years from 1965 to 1984. The sources of income are as follows: Official Salaries - P 2,627,581.00 Legal Practice Farm Income Others Total 11,109,836.00 149,700.00 2,521,325.00 16.01% 67.71% .91% 15.37%
P16,408,442.00 - 100.00%
15. FM's official salary pertains to his compensation as Senate President in 1965 in the amount of P15,935.00 and P1,420,000.00 as President of the Philippines during the period 1966 until 1984. On the other hand, Imelda reported salaries and allowances only for the years 1979 to 1984 in the amount of P1,191,646.00. The records indicate that the reported income came from her salary from the Ministry of Human Settlements and allowances from Food Terminal, Inc., National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation, National Food Authority Council, Light Rail Transit Authority and Home Development Mutual Fund.

16. Of the P11,109,836.00 in reported income from legal practice, the amount of P10,649,836.00 or 96% represents "receivables from prior years" during the period 1967 up to 1984. 17. In the guise of reporting income using the cash method under Section 38 of the National Internal Revenue Code, FM made it appear that he had an extremely profitable legal practice before he became a President (FM being barred by law from practicing his law profession during his entire presidency) and that, incredibly, he was still receiving payments almost 20 years after. The only problem is that in his Balance Sheet attached to his 1965 ITR immediately preceeding his ascendancy to the presidency he did not show any Receivables from client at all, much less the P10,65-M that he decided to later recognize as income. There are no documents showing any withholding tax certificates. Likewise, there is nothing on record that will show any known Marcos client as he has no known law office. As previously stated, his networth was a mere P120,000.00 in December, 1965. The joint income tax returns of FM and Imelda cannot, therefore, conceal the skeletons of their kleptocracy. 18. FM reported a total of P2,521,325.00 as Other Income for the years 1972 up to 1976 which he referred to in his return as "Miscellaneous Items" and "Various Corporations." There is no indication of any payor of the dividends or earnings. 19. Spouses Ferdinand and Imelda did not declare any income from any deposits and placements which are subject to a 5% withholding tax. The Bureau of Internal Revenue attested that after a diligent search of pertinent records on file with the Records Division, they did not find any records involving the tax transactions of spouses Ferdinand and Imelda in Revenue Region No. 1, Baguio City, Revenue Region No.4A, Manila, Revenue Region No. 4B1, Quezon City and Revenue No. 8, Tacloban, Leyte. Likewise, the Office of the Revenue Collector of Batac. Further, BIR attested that no records were found on any filing of capital gains tax return involving spouses FM and Imelda covering the years 1960 to 1965. 20. In Schedule B, the taxable reported income over the twenty-year period was P14,463,595.00 which represents 88% of the gross income. The Marcoses paid income taxes totaling P8,233,296.00 or US$1,220,667.59. The business expenses in the amount of P861,748.00 represent expenses incurred for subscription, postage, stationeries and contributions while the other deductions in the amount of P567,097.00 represents interest charges, medicare fees, taxes and licenses. The total deductions in the amount of P1,994,845.00 represents 12% of the total gross income. 21. In Schedule C, the net cumulative disposable income amounts to P6,756,301.00 or US$980,709.77. This is the amount that represents that portion of the Marcoses income that is free for consumption, savings and investments. The amount is arrived at by adding back to the net income after tax the personal and additional exemptions for the years 1965-1984, as well as the tax-exempt salary of the President for the years 1966 until 1972. 22. Finally, the networth analysis in Schedule D, represents the total accumulated networth of spouses, Ferdinand and Imelda. Respondent's Balance Sheet attached to their 1965 ITR, covering the year immediately preceding their ascendancy to the presidency, indicates an ending networth of P120,000.00 which FM declared as Library and Miscellaneous assets. In computing for the networth, the income approach was utilized. Under this approach, the beginning capital is increased or decreased, as the case may be, depending upon the income earned or loss incurred. Computations establish the total networth of spouses

Ferdinand and Imelda, for the years 1965 until 1984 in the total amount of US$957,487.75, assuming the income from legal practice is real and valid x x x. G. THE SECRET MARCOS DEPOSITS IN SWISS BANKS 23. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how both respondents clandestinely stashed away the country's wealth to Switzerland and hid the same under layers upon layers of foundations and other corporate entities to prevent its detection. Through their dummies/nominees, fronts or agents who formed those foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the impossibility of detecting and documenting all those secret accounts as well as the enormity of the deposits therein hidden, the following presentation is confined to five identified accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M with a reservation for the filing of a supplemental or separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise. H. THE AZIO-VERSO-VIBUR FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS 24. On June 11, 1971, Ferdinand Marcos issued a written order to Dr. Theo Bertheau, legal counsel of Schweizeresche Kreditanstalt or SKA, also known as Swiss Credit Bank, for him to establish the AZIO Foundation. On the same date, Marcos executed a power of attorney in favor of Roberto S. Benedicto empowering him to transact business in behalf of the said foundation. Pursuant to the said Marcos mandate, AZIO Foundation was formed on June 21, 1971 in Vaduz. Walter Fessler and Ernst Scheller, also of SKA Legal Service, and Dr. Helmuth Merling from Schaan were designated as members of the Board of Trustees of the said foundation. Ferdinand Marcos was named first beneficiary and the Marcos Foundation, Inc. was second beneficiary. On November 12, 1971, FM again issued another written order naming Austrahil PTY Ltd. In Sydney, Australia, as the foundation's first and sole beneficiary. This was recorded on December 14, 1971. 25. In an undated instrument, Marcos changed the first and sole beneficiary to CHARIS FOUNDATION. This change was recorded on December 4, 1972. 26. On August 29, 1978, the AZIO FOUNDATION was renamed to VERSO FOUNDATION. The Board of Trustees remained the same. On March 11, 1981, Marcos issued a written directive to liquidated VERSO FOUNDATION and to transfer all its assets to account of FIDES TRUST COMPANY at Bank Hofman in Zurich under the account "Reference OSER." The Board of Trustees decided to dissolve the foundation on June 25, 1981. 27. In an apparent maneuver to bury further the secret deposits beneath the thick layers of corporate entities, FM effected the establishment of VIBUR FOUNDATION on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz. Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust, were designated as members of the Board of Trustees. The account was officially opened with SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Company acted as fiduciary. However, comparison of the listing of the securities in the safe deposit register of the VERSO FOUNDATION as of February 27, 1981 with that of VIBUR FOUNDATION as of December 31, 1981 readily reveals that exactly the same securities were listed. 28. Under the foregoing circumstances, it is certain that the VIBUR FOUNDATION is the beneficial successor of VERSO FOUNDATION.

29. On March 18, 1986, the Marcos-designated Board of Trustees decided to liquidate VIBUR FOUNDATION. A notice of such liquidation was sent to the Office of the Public Register on March 21, 1986. However, the bank accounts and respective balances of the said VIBUR FOUNDATION remained with SKA. Apparently, the liquidation was an attempt by the Marcoses to transfer the foundation's funds to another account or bank but this was prevented by the timely freeze order issued by the Swiss authorities. One of the latest documents obtained by the PCGG from the Swiss authorities is a declaration signed by Dr. Ivo Beck (the trustee) stating that the beneficial owner of VIBUR FOUNDATION is Ferdinand E. Marcos. Another document signed by G. Raber of SKA shows that VIBUR FOUNDATION is owned by the "Marcos Familie" 30. As of December 31, 1989, the balance of the bank accounts of VIBUR FOUNDATION with SKA, Zurich, under the General Account No. 469857 totaled $3,597,544.00 I. XANDY-WINTROP: CHARIS-SCOLARIVALAMO-SPINUS-AVERTINA FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS 31. This is the most intricate and complicated account group. As the Flow Chart hereof shows, two (2) groups under the foundation organized by Marcos dummies/nominees for FM's benefit, eventually joined together and became one (1) account group under the AVERTINA FOUNDATION for the benefit of both FM and Imelda. This is the biggest group from where the $50-M investment fund of the Marcoses was drawn when they bought the Central Bank's dollar-denominated treasury notes with high-yielding interests. 32. On March 20, 1968, after his second year in the presidency, Marcos opened bank accounts with SKA using an alias or pseudonym WILLIAM SAUNDERS, apparently to hide his true identity. The next day, March 21, 1968, his First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos also opened her own bank accounts with the same bank using an American-sounding alias, JANE RYAN. Found among the voluminous documents in Malacaang shortly after they fled to Hawaii in haste that fateful night of February 25, 1986, were accomplished forms for "Declaration/Specimen Signatures" submitted by the Marcos couple. Under the caption "signature(s)" Ferdinand and Imelda signed their real names as well as their respective aliases underneath. These accounts were actively operated and maintained by the Marcoses for about two (2) years until their closure sometime in February, 1970 and the balances transferred to XANDY FOUNDATION. 33. The XANDY FOUNDATION was established on March 3, 1970 in Vaduz. C.W. Fessler, C. Souviron and E. Scheller were named as members of the Board of Trustees. 34. FM and Imelda issued the written mandate to establish the foundation to Markus Geel of SKA on March 3, 1970. In the handwritten Regulations signed by the Marcos couple as well as in the type-written Regulations signed by Markus Geel both dated February 13, 1970, the Marcos spouses were named the first beneficiaries, the surviving spouse as the second beneficiary and the Marcos children Imee, Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and Irene as equal third beneficiaries. 35. The XANDY FOUNDATION was renamed WINTROP FOUNDATION on August 29, 1978. The Board of Trustees remained the same at the outset. However, on March 27, 1980, Souviron was replaced by Dr. Peter Ritter. On March 10. 1981, Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos issued a written order to the Board of Wintrop to liquidate the foundation and transfer all its assets to Bank Hofmann in Zurich in favor of FIDES TRUST COMPANY. Later, WINTROP FOUNDATION was dissolved.

36. The AVERTINA FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of FIDES TRUST CO., as members of the Board of Trustees. Two (2) account categories, namely: CAR and NES, were opened on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner of AVERTINA was not made known to the bank since the FIDES TRUST CO. acted as fiduciary. However, the securities listed in the safe deposit register of WINTROP FOUNDATION Category R as of December 31, 1980 were the same as those listed in the register of AVERTINA FOUNDATION Category CAR as of December 31, 1981. Likewise, the securities listed in the safe deposit register of WINTROP FOUNDATION Category S as of December 31, 1980 were the same as those listed in the register of Avertina Category NES as of December 31, 1981.Under the circumstances, it is certain that the beneficial successor of WINTROP FOUNDATION is AVERTINA FOUNDATION. The balance of Category CAR as of December 31, 1989 amounted to US$231,366,894.00 while that of Category NES as of 12-31-83 was US$8,647,190.00. Latest documents received from Swiss authorities included a declaration signed by IVO Beck stating that the beneficial owners of AVERTINA FOUNDATION are FM and Imelda. Another document signed by G. Raber of SKA indicates that Avertina Foundation is owned by the "Marcos Families." 37. The other groups of foundations that eventually joined AVERTINA were also established by FM through his dummies, which started with the CHARIS FOUNDATION. 38. The CHARIS FOUNDATION was established in VADUZ on December 27, 1971. Walter Fessler and Ernst Scheller of SKA and Dr. Peter Ritter were named as directors. Dr. Theo Bertheau, SKA legal counsel, acted as founding director in behalf of FM by virtue of the mandate and agreement dated November 12, 1971. FM himself was named the first beneficiary and Xandy Foundation as second beneficiary in accordance with the handwritten instructions of FM on November 12, 1971 and the Regulations. FM gave a power of attorney to Roberto S. Benedicto on February 15, 1972 to act in his behalf with regard to Charis Foundation. 39. On December 13, 1974, Charis Foundation was renamed Scolari Foundation but the directors remained the same. On March 11, 1981 FM ordered in writing that the Valamo Foundation be liquidated and all its assets be transferred to Bank Hofmann, AG in favor of Fides Trust Company under the account "Reference OMAL". The Board of Directors decided on the immediate dissolution of Valamo Foundation on June 25, 1981. 40 The SPINUS FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Atty. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust Co., as members of the Foundation's Board of Directors. The account was officially opened with SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner of the foundation was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary. However, the list of securities in the safe deposit register of Valamo Foundation as of December 31, 1980 are practically the same with those listed in the safe deposit register of Spinus Foundation as of December 31, 1981. Under the circumstances, it is certain that the Spinus Foundation is the beneficial successor of the Valamo Foundation. 41. On September 6, 1982, there was a written instruction from Spinus Foundation to SKA to close its Swiss Franc account and transfer the balance to Avertina Foundation. In July/August, 1982, several transfers from the foundation's German marks and US dollar accounts were made to Avertina Category CAR totaling DM 29.5-M and $58-M, respectively. Moreover, a comparison of the list of securities of the Spinus Foundation as of February 3,

1982 with the safe deposit slips of the Avertina Foundation Category CAR as of August 19, 1982 shows that all the securities of Spinus were transferred to Avertina. J. TRINIDAD-RAYBY-PALMY FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS 42. The Trinidad Foundation was organized on August 26, 1970 in Vaduz with C.W. Fessler and E. Scheller of SKA and Dr. Otto Tondury as the foundation's directors. Imelda issued a written mandate to establish the foundation to Markus Geel on August 26, 1970. The regulations as well as the agreement, both dated August 28, 1970 were likewise signed by Imelda. Imelda was named the first beneficiary and her children Imelda (Imee), Ferdinand, Jr. (Bongbong) and, Irene were named as equal second beneficiaries. 43. Rayby Foundation was established on June 22, 1973 in Vaduz with Fessler, Scheller and Ritter as members of the board of directors. Imelda issued a written mandate to Dr. Theo Bertheau to establish the foundation with a note that the foundation's capitalization as well as the cost of establishing it be debited against the account of Trinidad Foundation. Imelda was named the first and only beneficiary of Rayby foundation. According to written information from SKA dated November 28, 1988, Imelda apparently had the intention in 1973 to transfer part of the assets of Trinidad Foundation to another foundation, thus the establishment of Rayby Foundation. However, transfer of assets never took place. On March 10, 1981, Imelda issued a written order to transfer all the assets of Rayby Foundation to Trinidad Foundation and to subsequently liquidate Rayby. On the same date, she issued a written order to the board of Trinidad to dissolve the foundation and transfer all its assets to Bank Hofmann in favor of Fides Trust Co. Under the account "Reference Dido," Rayby was dissolved on April 6, 1981 and Trinidad was liquidated on August 3, 1981. 44. The PALMY FOUNDATION was established on May 13, 1981 in Vaduz with Dr. Ivo Beck and Limag Management, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Fides Trust Co, as members of the Foundation's Board of Directors. The account was officially opened with the SKA on September 10, 1981. The beneficial owner was not made known to the bank since Fides Trust Co. acted as fiduciary. However, when one compares the listing of securities in the safe deposit register of Trinidad Foundation as of December 31,1980 with that of the Palmy Foundation as of December 31, 1980, one can clearly see that practically the same securities were listed. Under the circumstances, it is certain that the Palmy Foundation is the beneficial successor of the Trinidad Foundation. 45. As of December 31, 1989, the ending balance of the bank accounts of Palmy Foundation under General Account No. 391528 is $17,214,432.00. 46. Latest documents received from Swiss Authorities included a declaration signed by Dr. Ivo Beck stating that the beneficial owner of Palmy Foundation is Imelda. Another document signed by Raber shows that the said Palmy Foundation is owned by "Marcos Familie". K. ROSALYS-AGUAMINA FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS 47. Rosalys Foundation was established in 1971 with FM as the beneficiary. Its Articles of Incorporation was executed on September 24, 1971 and its By-Laws on October 3, 1971. This foundation maintained several accounts with Swiss Bank Corporation (SBC) under the general account 51960 where most of the bribe monies from Japanese suppliers were hidden.

48. On December 19, 1985, Rosalys Foundation was liquidated and all its assets were transferred to Aguamina Corporation's (Panama) Account No. 53300 with SBC. The ownership by Aguamina Corporation of Account No. 53300 is evidenced by an opening account documents from the bank. J. Christinaz and R.L. Rossier, First Vice-President and Senior Vice President, respectively, of SBC, Geneva issued a declaration dated September 3, 1991 stating that the by-laws dated October 3, 1971 governing Rosalys Foundation was the same by-law applied to Aguamina Corporation Account No. 53300. They further confirmed that no change of beneficial owner was involved while transferring the assets of Rosalys to Aguamina. Hence, FM remains the beneficiary of Aguamina Corporation Account No. 53300. As of August 30, 1991, the ending balance of Account No. 53300 amounted to $80,566,483.00. L. MALER FOUNDATION ACCOUNTS 49. Maler was first created as an establishment. A statement of its rules and regulations was found among Malacaang documents. It stated, among others, that 50% of the Company's assets will be for sole and full right disposal of FM and Imelda during their lifetime, which the remaining 50% will be divided in equal parts among their children. Another Malacaang document dated October 19,1968 and signed by Ferdinand and Imelda pertains to the appointment of Dr. Andre Barbey and Jean Louis Sunier as attorneys of the company and as administrator and manager of all assets held by the company. The Marcos couple, also mentioned in the said document that they bought the Maler Establishment from SBC, Geneva. On the same date, FM and Imelda issued a letter addressed to Maler Establishment, stating that all instructions to be transmitted with regard to Maler will be signed with the word "JOHN LEWIS". This word will have the same value as the couple's own personal signature. The letter was signed by FM and Imelda in their signatures and as John Lewis. 50. Maler Establishment opened and maintained bank accounts with SBC, Geneva. The opening bank documents were signed by Dr. Barbey and Mr. Sunnier as authorized signatories. 51. On November 17, 1981, it became necessary to transform Maler Establishment into a foundation. Likewise, the attorneys were changed to Michael Amaudruz, et. al. However, administration of the assets was left to SBC. The articles of incorporation of Maler Foundation registered on November 17, 1981 appear to be the same articles applied to Maler Establishment. On February 28, 1984, Maler Foundation cancelled the power of attorney for the management of its assets in favor of SBC and transferred such power to Sustrust Investment Co., S.A. 52. As of June 6, 1991, the ending balance of Maler Foundation's Account Nos. 254,508 BT and 98,929 NY amount SF 9,083,567 and SG 16,195,258, respectively, for a total of SF 25,278,825.00. GM only until December 31, 1980. This account was opened by Maler when it was still an establishment which was subsequently transformed into a foundation. 53. All the five (5) group accounts in the over-all flow chart have a total balance of about Three Hundred Fifty Six Million Dollars ($356,000,000.00) as shown by Annex "R-5" hereto attached as integral part hereof. xxx x x x.27

Respondents Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., in their answer, stated the following: xxx xxx xxx
4. Respondents ADMIT paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Petition. 5. Respondents specifically deny paragraph 5 of the Petition in so far as it states that summons and other court processes may be served on Respondent Imelda R. Marcos at the stated address the truth of the matter being that Respondent Imelda R. Marcos may be served with summons and other processes at No. 10-B Bel Air Condominium 5022 P. Burgos Street, Makati, Metro Manila, and ADMIT the rest. xxx xxx xxx
10. Respondents ADMIT paragraph 11 of the Petition. 11. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 12 of the Petition for lack of knowledge sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and that they cannot remember exactly the truth as to the matters alleged. 12. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 13 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs and Balance Sheet. 13. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 14 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs. 14. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 15 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs. 15. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 16 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs. 16. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 17 of the Petition insofar as it attributes willful duplicity on the part of the late President Marcos, for being false, the same being pure conclusions based on pure assumption and not allegations of fact; and specifically DENY the rest for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs or the attachments thereto. 17. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 18 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs. 18. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 19 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents

cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs and that they are not privy to the activities of the BIR. 19. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 20 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs. 20. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 21 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs. 21. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 22 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents cannot remember with exactitude the contents of the alleged ITRs. 22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundation and corporate entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired. 23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since Respondents were not privy to the transactions regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. 24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,37, 38, 39, 40, and 41 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents are not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. 25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46, of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. 26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52, of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since Respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to Respondent Imelda R. Marcos she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. Upon careful perusal of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children indubitably failed to tender genuine issues in their answer to the petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Respondents' defenses of "lack of knowledge for lack of

privity" or "(inability to) recall because it happened a long time ago" or, on the part of Mrs. Marcos, that "the funds were lawfully acquired" are fully insufficient to tender genuine issues. Respondent Marcoses' defenses were a sham and evidently calibrated to compound and confuse the issues. The following pleadings filed by respondent Marcoses are replete with indications of a spurious defense: (a) Respondents' Answer dated October 18, 1993; (b) Pre-trial Brief dated October 4, 1999 of Mrs. Marcos, Supplemental Pre-trial Brief dated October 19, 1999 of Ferdinand, Jr. and Mrs. Imee Marcos-Manotoc adopting the pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, and Manifestation dated October 19, 1999 of Irene Marcos-Araneta adopting the pre-trial briefs of her co- respondents; (c) Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment dated March 21, 2000, filed by Mrs. Marcos which the other respondents (Marcos children) adopted; (d) Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos and adopted by the Marcos children; (e) Motion for Reconsideration dated September 26, 2000 filed by Mrs. Marcos; Motion for Reconsideration dated October 5, 2000 jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr., and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration dated October 9, 2000 likewise jointly filed by Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr.; (f) Memorandum dated December 12, 2000 of Mrs. Marcos and Memorandum dated December 17, 2000 of the Marcos children; (g) Manifestation dated May 26, 1998; and (h) General/Supplemental Agreement dated December 23, 1993. An examination of the foregoing pleadings is in order. Respondents' Answer dated October 18, 1993.
In their answer, respondents failed to specifically deny each and every allegation contained in the petition for forfeiture in the manner required by the rules. All they gave were stock answers like "they have no sufficient knowledge" or "they could not recall because it happened a long time ago," and, as to Mrs. Marcos, "the funds were lawfully acquired," without stating the basis of such assertions. Section 10, Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides: A defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny the remainder. Where a defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of a material averment made in the complaint, he shall so state, and this shall have the effect of a denial.28

The purpose of requiring respondents to make a specific denial is to make them disclose facts which will disprove the allegations of petitioner at the trial, together with the matters they rely upon in support of such denial. Our jurisdiction adheres to this rule to avoid and prevent unnecessary expenses and waste of time by compelling both parties to lay their cards on the table, thus reducing the controversy to its true terms. As explained in Alonso vs. Villamor,29 A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It is rather a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by a rapier's thrust. On the part of Mrs. Marcos, she claimed that the funds were lawfully acquired. However, she failed to particularly state the ultimate facts surrounding the lawful manner or mode of acquisition of the subject funds. Simply put, she merely stated in her answer with the other respondents that the funds were "lawfully acquired" without detailing how exactly these funds were supposedly acquired legally by them. Even in this case before us, her assertion that the funds were lawfully acquired remains bare and unaccompanied by any factual support which can prove, by the presentation of evidence at a hearing, that indeed the funds were acquired legitimately by the Marcos family. Respondents' denials in their answer at the Sandiganbayan were based on their alleged lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations of the petition. It is true that one of the modes of specific denial under the rules is a denial through a statement that the defendant is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the material averment in the complaint. The question, however, is whether the kind of denial in respondents' answer qualifies as the specific denial called for by the rules. We do not think so. In Morales vs. Court of Appeals,30 this Court ruled that if an allegation directly and specifically charges a party with having done, performed or committed a particular act which the latter did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and express denial must be made. Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against them, the Marcoses responded by simply saying that they had no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such allegations. Such a general, self-serving claim of ignorance of the facts alleged in the petition for forfeiture was insufficient to raise an issue. Respondent Marcoses should have positively stated how it was that they were supposedly ignorant of the facts alleged.31 To elucidate, the allegation of petitioner Republic in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture stated: 23. The following presentation very clearly and overwhelmingly show in detail how both respondents clandestinely stashed away the country's wealth to Switzerland and hid the same under layers upon layers of foundations and other corporate entities to prevent its detection. Through their dummies/nominees, fronts or agents who formed those foundations or corporate entities, they opened and maintained numerous bank accounts. But due to the difficulty if not the impossibility of detecting and documenting all those secret accounts as well as the enormity of the deposits therein hidden, the following presentation is confined to five identified accounts groups, with balances amounting to about $356-M with a reservation for the filing of a supplemental or separate forfeiture complaint should the need arise.32 Respondents' lame denial of the aforesaid allegation was:

22. Respondents specifically DENY paragraph 23 insofar as it alleges that Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities for being false, the truth being that Respondents' aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired.33 Evidently, this particular denial had the earmark of what is called in the law on pleadings as a negative pregnant, that is, a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at.34 Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it an affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, has been held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.35 In the instant case, the material allegations in paragraph 23 of the said petition were not specifically denied by respondents in paragraph 22 of their answer. The denial contained in paragraph 22 of the answer was focused on the averment in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture that "Respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities." Paragraph 22 of the respondents' answer was thus a denial pregnant with admissions of the following substantial facts: (1) the Swiss bank deposits existed and (2) that the estimated sum thereof was US$356 million as of December, 1990. Therefore, the allegations in the petition for forfeiture on the existence of the Swiss bank deposits in the sum of about US$356 million, not having been specifically denied by respondents in their answer, were deemed admitted by them pursuant to Section 11, Rule 8 of the 1997 Revised Rules on Civil Procedure: Material averment in the complaint, xxx shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. xxx.36 By the same token, the following unsupported denials of respondents in their answer were pregnant with admissions of the substantial facts alleged in the Republic's petition for forfeiture: 23. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation since respondents were not privy to the transactions regarding the alleged Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts, except that, as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. 24. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 of the Petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such transactions they were privy to, they cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. 25. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 42, 43, 45, and 46 of the petition for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to from a belief as to the truth of the allegations since

respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to, they cannot remember with exactitude, the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. 26. Respondents specifically DENY paragraphs 49, 50, 51 and 52 of the petition for lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions and as to such transaction they were privy to they cannot remember with exactitude the same having occurred a long time ago, except that as to respondent Imelda R. Marcos, she specifically remembers that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. The matters referred to in paragraphs 23 to 26 of the respondents' answer pertained to the creation of five groups of accounts as well as their respective ending balances and attached documents alleged in paragraphs 24 to 52 of the Republic's petition for forfeiture. Respondent Imelda R. Marcos never specifically denied the existence of the Swiss funds. Her claim that "the funds involved were lawfully acquired" was an acknowledgment on her part of the existence of said deposits. This only reinforced her earlier admission of the allegation in paragraph 23 of the petition for forfeiture regarding the existence of the US$356 million Swiss bank deposits. The allegations in paragraphs 4737 and 4838 of the petition for forfeiture referring to the creation and amount of the deposits of the Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation as well as the averment in paragraph 52-a39 of the said petition with respect to the sum of the Swiss bank deposits estimated to be US$356 million were again not specifically denied by respondents in their answer. The respondents did not at all respond to the issues raised in these paragraphs and the existence, nature and amount of the Swiss funds were therefore deemed admitted by them. As held in Galofa vs. Nee Bon Sing,40 if a defendant's denial is a negative pregnant, it is equivalent to an admission. Moreover, respondents' denial of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture "for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since respondents were not privy to the transactions" was just a pretense. Mrs. Marcos' privity to the transactions was in fact evident from her signatures on some of the vital documents41 attached to the petition for forfeiture which Mrs. Marcos failed to specifically deny as required by the rules.42 It is worthy to note that the pertinent documents attached to the petition for forfeiture were even signed personally by respondent Mrs. Marcos and her late husband, Ferdinand E. Marcos, indicating that said documents were within their knowledge. As correctly pointed out by Sandiganbayan Justice Francisco Villaruz, Jr. in his dissenting opinion: The pattern of: 1) creating foundations, 2) use of pseudonyms and dummies, 3) approving regulations of the Foundations for the distribution of capital and income of the Foundations to the First and Second beneficiary (who are no other than FM and his family), 4) opening of bank accounts for the Foundations, 5) changing the names of the Foundations, 6) transferring funds and assets of the Foundations to other Foundations or Fides Trust, 7) liquidation of the Foundations as substantiated by the Annexes U to U-168, Petition [for forfeiture] strongly indicate that FM and/or Imelda were the real owners of the assets deposited in the Swiss banks, using the Foundations as dummies.43 How could respondents therefore claim lack of sufficient knowledge or information regarding the existence of the Swiss bank deposits and the creation of five groups of accounts when Mrs. Marcos and her late husband personally masterminded and participated in the formation and control of said foundations? This is a fact respondent Marcoses were never able to explain.

Not only that. Respondents' answer also technically admitted the genuineness and due execution of the Income Tax Returns (ITRs) and the balance sheets of the late Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos attached to the petition for forfeiture, as well as the veracity of the contents thereof. The answer again premised its denials of said ITRs and balance sheets on the ground of lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the contents thereof. Petitioner correctly points out that respondents' denial was not really grounded on lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief but was based on lack of recollection. By reviewing their own records, respondent Marcoses could have easily determined the genuineness and due execution of the ITRs and the balance sheets. They also had the means and opportunity of verifying the same from the records of the BIR and the Office of the President. They did not. When matters regarding which respondents claim to have no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief are plainly and necessarily within their knowledge, their alleged ignorance or lack of information will not be considered a specific denial.44 An unexplained denial of information within the control of the pleader, or is readily accessible to him, is evasive and is insufficient to constitute an effective denial.45 The form of denial adopted by respondents must be availed of with sincerity and in good faith, and certainly not for the purpose of confusing the adverse party as to what allegations of the petition are really being challenged; nor should it be made for the purpose of delay.46 In the instant case, the Marcoses did not only present unsubstantiated assertions but in truth attempted to mislead and deceive this Court by presenting an obviously contrived defense. Simply put, a profession of ignorance about a fact which is patently and necessarily within the pleader's knowledge or means of knowing is as ineffective as no denial at all.47 Respondents' ineffective denial thus failed to properly tender an issue and the averments contained in the petition for forfeiture were deemed judicially admitted by them. As held in J.P. Juan & Sons, Inc. vs. Lianga Industries, Inc.: Its "specific denial" of the material allegation of the petition without setting forth the substance of the matters relied upon to support its general denial, when such matters were plainly within its knowledge and it could not logically pretend ignorance as to the same, therefore, failed to properly tender on issue.48 Thus, the general denial of the Marcos children of the allegations in the petition for forfeiture "for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the allegations since they were not privy to the transactions" cannot rightfully be accepted as a defense because they are the legal heirs and successors-in-interest of Ferdinand E. Marcos and are therefore bound by the acts of their father vis-a-vis the Swiss funds. PRE-TRIAL BRIEF DATED OCTOBER 18, 1993
The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos was adopted by the three Marcos children. In said brief, Mrs. Marcos stressed that the funds involved were lawfully acquired. But, as in their answer, they failed to state and substantiate how these funds were acquired lawfully. They failed to present and attach even a single document that would show and prove the truth of their allegations. Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, x x x their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others:

xxx (d) the documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof; xxx (f) the number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective testimonies.49 It is unquestionably within the court's power to require the parties to submit their pre-trial briefs and to state the number of witnesses intended to be called to the stand, and a brief summary of the evidence each of them is expected to give as well as to disclose the number of documents to be submitted with a description of the nature of each. The tenor and character of the testimony of the witnesses and of the documents to be deduced at the trial thus made known, in addition to the particular issues of fact and law, it becomes apparent if genuine issues are being put forward necessitating the holding of a trial. Likewise, the parties are obliged not only to make a formal identification and specification of the issues and their proofs, and to put these matters in writing and submit them to the court within the specified period for the prompt disposition of the action.50 The pre-trial brief of Mrs. Marcos, as subsequently adopted by respondent Marcos children, merely stated: xxx WITNESSES 4.1 Respondent Imelda will present herself as a witness and reserves the right to present additional witnesses as may be necessary in the course of the trial. xxx DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE 5.1 Respondent Imelda reserves the right to present and introduce in evidence documents as may be necessary in the course of the trial. Mrs. Marcos did not enumerate and describe the documents constituting her evidence. Neither the names of witnesses nor the nature of their testimony was stated. What alone appeared certain was the testimony of Mrs. Marcos only who in fact had previously claimed ignorance and lack of knowledge. And even then, the substance of her testimony, as required by the rules, was not made known either. Such cunning tactics of respondents are totally unacceptable to this Court. We hold that, since no genuine issue was raised, the case became ripe for summary judgment. OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT DATED MARCH 21, 2000
The opposition filed by Mrs. Marcos to the motion for summary judgment dated March 21, 2000 of petitioner Republic was merely adopted by the Marcos children as their own opposition to the said motion. However, it was again not accompanied by affidavits, depositions or admissions as required by Section 3, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure:

x x x The adverse party may serve opposing affidavits, depositions, or admissions at least three (3) days before hearing. After hearing, the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.51 The absence of opposing affidavits, depositions and admissions to contradict the sworn declarations in the Republic's motion only demonstrated that the averments of such opposition were not genuine and therefore unworthy of belief. Demurrer to Evidence dated May 2, 2000;52 Motions for Reconsideration;53 and Memoranda of Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children54
All these pleadings again contained no allegations of facts showing their lawful acquisition of the funds. Once more, respondents merely made general denials without alleging facts which would have been admissible in evidence at the hearing, thereby failing to raise genuine issues of fact. Mrs. Marcos insists in her memorandum dated October 21, 2002 that, during the pre-trial, her counsel stated that his client was just a beneficiary of the funds, contrary to petitioner Republic's allegation that Mrs. Marcos disclaimed ownership of or interest in the funds. This is yet another indication that respondents presented a fictitious defense because, during the pre-trial, Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children denied ownership of or interest in the Swiss funds: PJ Garchitorena: Make of record that as far as Imelda Marcos is concerned through the statement of Atty. Armando M. Marcelo that the US$360 million more or less subject matter of the instant lawsuit as allegedly obtained from the various Swiss Foundations do not belong to the estate of Marcos or to Imelda Marcos herself. That's your statement of facts? Atty. MARCELO: Yes, Your Honor. PJ Garchitorena: That's it. Okay. Counsel for Manotoc and Manotoc, Jr. What is your point here? Does the estate of Marcos own anything of the $360 million subject of this case. Atty. TECSON: We joined the Manifestation of Counsel. PJ Garchitorena: You do not own anything? Atty. TECSON:

Yes, Your Honor. PJ Garchitorena: Counsel for Irene Araneta? Atty. SISON: I join the position taken by my other compaeros here, Your Honor. xxx Atty. SISON: Irene Araneta as heir do (sic) not own any of the amount, Your Honor.55 We are convinced that the strategy of respondent Marcoses was to confuse petitioner Republic as to what facts they would prove or what issues they intended to pose for the court's resolution. There is no doubt in our mind that they were leading petitioner Republic, and now this Court, to perplexity, if not trying to drag this forfeiture case to eternity. Manifestation dated May 26, 1998 filed by MRS. Marcos; General/Supplemental Compromise Agreement dated December 28, 1993
These pleadings of respondent Marcoses presented nothing but feigned defenses. In their earlier pleadings, respondents alleged either that they had no knowledge of the existence of the Swiss deposits or that they could no longer remember anything as it happened a long time ago. As to Mrs. Marcos, she remembered that it was lawfully acquired. In her Manifestation dated May 26, 1998, Mrs. Marcos stated that: COMES NOW undersigned counsel for respondent Imelda R. Marcos, and before this Honorable Court, most respectfully manifests: That respondent Imelda R, Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the above-entitled case, being the sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the various foundations alleged in the case; That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the estate of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. In the Compromise/Supplemental Agreements, respondent Marcoses sought to implement the agreed distribution of the Marcos assets, including the Swiss deposits. This was, to us, an unequivocal admission of ownership by the Marcoses of the said deposits. But, as already pointed out, during the pre-trial conference, respondent Marcoses denied knowledge as well as ownership of the Swiss funds.

Anyway we look at it, respondent Marcoses have put forth no real defense. The "facts" pleaded by respondents, while ostensibly raising important questions or issues of fact, in reality comprised mere verbiage that was evidently wanting in substance and constituted no genuine issues for trial. We therefore rule that, under the circumstances, summary judgment is proper. In fact, it is the law itself which determines when summary judgment is called for. Under the rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact requiring the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadings appear to raise issue, if the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter of law.56 In sum, mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible in evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will not defeat a motion for summary judgment.57 A summary judgment is one granted upon motion of a party for an expeditious settlement of the case, it appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of fact posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A motion for summary judgment is premised on the assumption that the issues presented need not be tried either because these are patently devoid of substance or that there is no genuine issue as to any pertinent fact. It is a method sanctioned by the Rules of Court for the prompt disposition of a civil action where there exists no serious controversy.58 Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any material fact. The theory of summary judgment is that, although an answer may on its face appear to tender issues requiring trial, if it is established by affidavits, depositions or admissions that those issues are not genuine but fictitious, the Court is justified in dispensing with the trial and rendering summary judgment for petitioner.59 In the various annexes to the petition for forfeiture, petitioner Republic attached sworn statements of witnesses who had personal knowledge of the Marcoses' participation in the illegal acquisition of funds deposited in the Swiss accounts under the names of five groups or foundations. These sworn statements substantiated the ill-gotten nature of the Swiss bank deposits. In their answer and other subsequent pleadings, however, the Marcoses merely made general denials of the allegations against them without stating facts admissible in evidence at the hearing, thereby failing to raise any genuine issues of fact. Under these circumstances, a trial would have served no purpose at all and would have been totally unnecessary, thus justifying a summary judgment on the petition for forfeiture. There were no opposing affidavits to contradict the sworn declarations of the witnesses of petitioner Republic, leading to the inescapable conclusion that the matters raised in the Marcoses' answer were false. Time and again, this Court has encountered cases like this which are either only half-heartedly defended or, if the semblance of a defense is interposed at all, it is only to delay disposition and gain time. It is certainly not in the interest of justice to allow respondent Marcoses to avail of the appellate remedies accorded by the Rules of Court to litigants in good faith, to the prejudice of the Republic and ultimately of the Filipino people. From the beginning, a candid demonstration of respondents' good faith should have been made to the court below. Without the deceptive reasoning and argumentation, this protracted litigation could have ended a long time ago. Since 1991, when the petition for forfeiture was first filed, up to the present, all respondents have offered are foxy responses like "lack of sufficient knowledge or lack of privity" or "they cannot recall because it happened a long time ago" or, as to Mrs. Marcos, "the funds were lawfully acquired." But,

whenever it suits them, they also claim ownership of 90% of the funds and allege that only 10% belongs to the Marcos estate. It has been an incredible charade from beginning to end. In the hope of convincing this Court to rule otherwise, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc and Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr. contend that "by its positive acts and express admissions prior to filing the motion for summary judgment on March 10, 2000, petitioner Republic had bound itself to go to trial on the basis of existing issues. Thus, it had legally waived whatever right it had to move for summary judgment."60 We do not think so. The alleged positive acts and express admissions of the petitioner did not preclude it from filing a motion for summary judgment. Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: Rule 35 Summary Judgment Section 1. Summary judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof. Section 2. Summary judgment for defending party. - A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory relief is sought may, at any time, move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. (Emphasis ours)61 Under the rule, the plaintiff can move for summary judgment "at any time after the pleading in answer thereto (i.e., in answer to the claim, counterclaim or cross-claim) has been served." No fixed reglementary period is provided by the Rules. How else does one construe the phrase "any time after the answer has been served?" This issue is actually one of first impression. No local jurisprudence or authoritative work has touched upon this matter. This being so, an examination of foreign laws and jurisprudence, particularly those of the United States where many of our laws and rules were copied, is in order. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim may move for summary judgment at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, and that a party against whom a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim is asserted may move for summary judgment at any time. However, some rules, particularly Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York, specifically provide that a motion for summary judgment may not be made until issues have been joined, that is, only after an answer has been served.62 Under said rule, after issues have been joined, the motion for summary judgment may be made at any stage of the litigation.63 No fixed prescriptive period is provided. Like Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice of New York, our rules also provide that a motion for summary judgment may not be made until issues have been joined, meaning, the plaintiff has to wait

for the answer before he can move for summary judgment.64 And like the New York rules, ours do not provide for a fixed reglementary period within which to move for summary judgment. This being so, the New York Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice can be applied by analogy to the interpretation of Section 1, Rule 35, of our 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the New York rule, after the issues have been joined, the motion for summary judgment may be made at any stage of the litigation. And what exactly does the phrase "at any stage of the litigation" mean? In Ecker vs. Muzysh,65 the New York Supreme Court ruled: "PER CURIAM. Plaintiff introduced her evidence and the defendants rested on the case made by the plaintiff. The case was submitted. Owing to the serious illness of the trial justice, a decision was not rendered within sixty days after the final adjournment of the term at which the case was tried. With the approval of the trial justice, the plaintiff moved for a new trial under Section 442 of the Civil Practice Act. The plaintiff also moved for summary judgment under Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice. The motion was opposed mainly on the ground that, by proceeding to trial, the plaintiff had waived her right to summary judgment and that the answer and the opposing affidavits raised triable issues. The amount due and unpaid under the contract is not in dispute. The Special Term granted both motions and the defendants have appealed. The Special Term properly held that the answer and the opposing affidavits raised no triable issue. Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice and the Civil Practice Act prescribe no limitation as to the time when a motion for summary judgment must be made. The object of Rule 113 is to empower the court to summarily determine whether or not a bona fide issue exists between the parties, and there is no limitation on the power of the court to make such a determination at any stage of the litigation." (emphasis ours) On the basis of the aforequoted disquisition, "any stage of the litigation" means that "even if the plaintiff has proceeded to trial, this does not preclude him from thereafter moving for summary judgment."66 In the case at bar, petitioner moved for summary judgment after pre-trial and before its scheduled date for presentation of evidence. Respondent Marcoses argue that, by agreeing to proceed to trial during the pre-trial conference, petitioner "waived" its right to summary judgment. This argument must fail in the light of the New York Supreme Court ruling which we apply by analogy to this case. In Ecker,67 the defendant opposed the motion for summary judgment on a ground similar to that raised by the Marcoses, that is, "that plaintiff had waived her right to summary judgment" by her act of proceeding to trial. If, as correctly ruled by the New York court, plaintiff was allowed to move for summary judgment even after trial and submission of the case for resolution, more so should we permit it in the present case where petitioner moved for summary judgment before trial. Therefore, the phrase "anytime after the pleading in answer thereto has been served" in Section 1, Rule 35 of our Rules of Civil Procedure means "at any stage of the litigation." Whenever it becomes evident at any stage of the litigation that no triable issue exists, or that the defenses raised by the defendant(s) are sham or frivolous, plaintiff may move for summary judgment. A contrary interpretation would go against the very objective of the Rule on Summary Judgment which is to

"weed out sham claims or defenses thereby avoiding the expense and loss of time involved in a trial."68 In cases with political undertones like the one at bar, adverse parties will often do almost anything to delay the proceedings in the hope that a future administration sympathetic to them might be able to influence the outcome of the case in their favor. This is rank injustice we cannot tolerate. The law looks with disfavor on long, protracted and expensive litigation and encourages the speedy and prompt disposition of cases. That is why the law and the rules provide for a number of devices to ensure the speedy disposition of cases. Summary judgment is one of them. Faithful therefore to the spirit of the law on summary judgment which seeks to avoid unnecessary expense and loss of time in a trial, we hereby rule that petitioner Republic could validly move for summary judgment any time after the respondents' answer was filed or, for that matter, at any subsequent stage of the litigation. The fact that petitioner agreed to proceed to trial did not in any way prevent it from moving for summary judgment, as indeed no genuine issue of fact was ever validly raised by respondent Marcoses. This interpretation conforms with the guiding principle enshrined in Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that the "[r]ules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."69 Respondents further allege that the motion for summary judgment was based on respondents' answer and other documents that had long been in the records of the case. Thus, by the time the motion was filed on March 10, 2000, estoppel by laches had already set in against petitioner. We disagree. Estoppel by laches is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable or unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the person has abandoned his right or declined to assert it.70 In effect, therefore, the principle of laches is one of estoppel because "it prevents people who have slept on their rights from prejudicing the rights of third parties who have placed reliance on the inaction of the original parties and their successors-in-interest".71 A careful examination of the records, however, reveals that petitioner was in fact never remiss in pursuing its case against respondent Marcoses through every remedy available to it, including the motion for summary judgment. Petitioner Republic initially filed its motion for summary judgment on October 18, 1996. The motion was denied because of the pending compromise agreement between the Marcoses and petitioner. But during the pre-trial conference, the Marcoses denied ownership of the Swiss funds, prompting petitioner to file another motion for summary judgment now under consideration by this Court. It was the subsequent events that transpired after the answer was filed, therefore, which prevented petitioner from filing the questioned motion. It was definitely not because of neglect or inaction that petitioner filed the (second) motion for summary judgment years after respondents' answer to the petition for forfeiture. In invoking the doctrine of estoppel by laches, respondents must show not only unjustified inaction but also that some unfair injury to them might result unless the action is barred.72 This, respondents failed to bear out. In fact, during the pre-trial conference, the Marcoses disclaimed ownership of the Swiss deposits. Not being the owners, as they claimed, respondents did not have any vested right or interest which could be adversely affected by petitioner's alleged inaction.

But even assuming for the sake of argument that laches had already set in, the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights.73 Nor can estoppel validate an act that contravenes law or public policy.74 As a final point, it must be emphasized that laches is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.75 Equity demands that petitioner Republic should not be barred from pursuing the people's case against the Marcoses. (2) The Propriety of Forfeiture The matter of summary judgment having been thus settled, the issue of whether or not petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in accordance with the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379 now takes center stage. The law raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who owns it. Hence, Sections 2 and 6 of RA 137976 provide: xxx xxx
Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount or property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Judgment If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property in question, forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become the property of the State.Provided, That no judgment shall be rendered within six months before any general election or within three months before any special election. The Court may, in addition, refer this case to the corresponding Executive Department for administrative or criminal action, or both. From the above-quoted provisions of the law, the following facts must be established in order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may be effected: (1) ownership by the public officer of money or property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in his name or otherwise, and (2) the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., is grossly disproportionate to, the legitimate income of the public officer. That spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officials during the time material to the instant case was never in dispute. Paragraph 4 of respondent Marcoses' answer categorically admitted the allegations in paragraph 4 of the petition for forfeiture as to the personal circumstances of Ferdinand E. Marcos as a public official who served without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the Republic of the Philippines from December 1, 1965

to February 25, 1986.77 Likewise, respondents admitted in their answer the contents of paragraph 5 of the petition as to the personal circumstances of Imelda R. Marcos who once served as a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor, concurrently Minister of Human Settlements, from June 1976 to February 1986.78 Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted in paragraph 10 of her answer the allegations of paragraph 11 of the petition for forfeiture which referred to the accumulated salaries of respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.79 The combined accumulated salaries of the Marcos couple were reflected in the Certification dated May 27, 1986 issued by then Minister of Budget and Management Alberto Romulo.80 The Certification showed that, from 1966 to 1985, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos had accumulated salaries in the amount of P1,570,000 and P718,750, respectively, or a total of P2,288,750: Ferdinand E. Marcos, as President 1966-1976 1977-1984 1985 at P60,000/year at P100,000/year at P110,000/year P660,000 800,000 110,000 P1,570,00 Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister June 1976-1985 at P75,000/year P718,000
In addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos couple's combined salaries from January to February 1986 in the amount of P30,833.33. Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted to P2,319,583.33. Converted to U.S. dollars on the basis of the corresponding peso-dollar exchange rates prevailing during the applicable period when said salaries were received, the total amount had an equivalent value of $304,372.43. The dollar equivalent was arrived at by using the official annual rates of exchange of the Philippine peso and the US dollar from 1965 to 1985 as well as the official monthly rates of exchange in January and February 1986 issued by the Center for Statistical Information of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Prescinding from the aforesaid admissions, Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides that: Section 4. Judicial admissions An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.81 It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in the course of the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of judicial proceedings, as in the pre-trial of the case.82 Thus, facts pleaded in the petition and answer, as in the case at bar, are deemed admissions of petitioner and respondents, respectively, who are not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with such admissions.83

The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive "any other emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities".84 Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could "not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source."85 In fact, his management of businesses, like the administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution: Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure, hold any other office except when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice any profession, participate directly or indirectly in the management of any business, or be financially interested directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government owned or controlled corporation. Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government owned or controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit. Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the provision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or administrative body, or manage any business, or practice any profession, and shall also be subject to such other disqualification as may be provided by law. Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds. Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss funds since it failed to prove the essential elements under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of RA 1379. As the Act is a penal statute, its provisions are mandatory and should thus be construed strictly against the petitioner and liberally in favor of respondent Marcoses. We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses' other lawful income or income from legitimately acquired property for the presumption to apply because, as between petitioner and respondents, the latter were in a better position to know if there were such other sources of lawful income. And if indeed there was such other lawful income, respondents should have specifically stated the same in their answer. Insofar as petitioner Republic was concerned, it was enough to specify the known lawful income of respondents. Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides that, in determining prima facie evidence of ill-gotten wealth, the value of the accumulated assets, properties and other material possessions of those covered by Executive Order Nos. 1 and 2 must be out of proportion to the known lawful income of such persons. The respondent Marcos couple did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL) from which their net worth could be determined. Their failure to file their SAL was in itself a violation of law and to allow them to successfully assail the Republic for not presenting their SAL would reward them for their violation of the law.

Further, contrary to the claim of respondents, the admissions made by them in their various pleadings and documents were valid. It is of record that respondents judicially admitted that the money deposited with the Swiss banks belonged to them. We agree with petitioner that respondent Marcoses made judicial admissions of their ownership of the subject Swiss bank deposits in their answer, the General/Supplemental Agreements, Mrs. Marcos' Manifestation and Constancia dated May 5, 1999, and the Undertaking dated February 10, 1999. We take note of the fact that the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan were unanimous in holding that respondents had made judicial admissions of their ownership of the Swiss funds. In their answer, aside from admitting the existence of the subject funds, respondents likewise admitted ownershipthereof. Paragraph 22 of respondents' answer stated: 22. Respondents specifically DENY PARAGRAPH 23 insofar as it alleges that respondents clandestinely stashed the country's wealth in Switzerland and hid the same under layers and layers of foundations and corporate entities for being false, the truth being that respondents' aforesaid properties were lawfully acquired. (emphasis supplied) By qualifying their acquisition of the Swiss bank deposits as lawful, respondents unwittingly admitted their ownership thereof. Respondent Mrs. Marcos also admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits by failing to deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of certain actionable documents bearing her signature attached to the petition. As discussed earlier, Section 11, Rule 886 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that material averments in the complaint shall be deemed admitted when not specifically denied. The General87 and Supplemental88 Agreements executed by petitioner and respondents on December 28, 1993 further bolstered the claim of petitioner Republic that its case for forfeiture was proven in accordance with the requisites of Sections 2 and 3 of RA 1379. The whereas clause in the General Agreement declared that: WHEREAS, the FIRST PARTY has obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the $356 million belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met, but even after 7 years, the FIRST PARTY has not been able to procure a final judgment of conviction against the PRIVATE PARTY. While the Supplemental Agreement warranted, inter alia, that: In consideration of the foregoing, the parties hereby agree that the PRIVATE PARTY shall be entitled to the equivalent of 25% of the amount that may be eventually withdrawn from said $356 million Swiss deposits. The stipulations set forth in the General and Supplemental Agreements undeniably indicated the manifest intent of respondents to enter into a compromise with petitioner. Corollarily, respondents' willingness to agree to an amicable settlement with the Republic only affirmed their ownership of the Swiss deposits for the simple reason that no person would acquiesce to any concession over such huge dollar deposits if he did not in fact own them.

Respondents make much capital of the pronouncement by this Court that the General and Supplemental Agreements were null and void.89 They insist that nothing in those agreements could thus be admitted in evidence against them because they stood on the same ground as an accepted offer which, under Section 27, Rule 13090of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that "in civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror." We find no merit in this contention. The declaration of nullity of said agreements was premised on the following constitutional and statutory infirmities: (1) the grant of criminal immunity to the Marcos heirs was against the law; (2) the PCGG's commitment to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs was against the Constitution; and (3) the government's undertaking to cause the dismissal of all cases filed against the Marcoses pending before the Sandiganbayan and other courts encroached on the powers of the judiciary. The reasons relied upon by the Court never in the least bit even touched on the veracity and truthfulness of respondents' admission with respect to their ownership of the Swiss funds. Besides, having made certain admissions in those agreements, respondents cannot now deny that they voluntarily admitted owning the subject Swiss funds, notwithstanding the fact that the agreements themselves were later declared null and void. The following observation of Sandiganbayan Justice Catalino Castaeda, Jr. in the decision dated September 19, 2000 could not have been better said: x x x The declaration of nullity of the two agreements rendered the same without legal effects but it did not detract from the admissions of the respondents contained therein. Otherwise stated, the admissions made in said agreements, as quoted above, remain binding on the respondents.91 A written statement is nonetheless competent as an admission even if it is contained in a document which is not itself effective for the purpose for which it is made, either by reason of illegality, or incompetency of a party thereto, or by reason of not being signed, executed or delivered. Accordingly, contracts have been held as competent evidence of admissions, although they may be unenforceable.92 The testimony of respondent Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. during the hearing on the motion for the approval of the Compromise Agreement on April 29, 1998 also lent credence to the allegations of petitioner Republic that respondents admitted ownership of the Swiss bank accounts. We quote the salient portions of Ferdinand Jr.'s formal declarations in open court: ATTY. FERNANDO: Mr. Marcos, did you ever have any meetings with PCGG Chairman Magtanggol C. Gunigundo? F. MARCOS, JR.: Yes. I have had very many meetings in fact with Chairman. ATTY. FERNANDO: Would you recall when the first meeting occurred?

PJ GARCHITORENA: In connection with what? ATTY. FERNANDO: In connection with the ongoing talks to compromise the various cases initiated by PCGG against your family? F. MARCOS, JR.: The nature of our meetings was solely concerned with negotiations towards achieving some kind of agreement between the Philippine government and the Marcos family. The discussions that led up to the compromise agreement were initiated by our then counsel Atty. Simeon Mesina x x x.93 xxx ATTY. FERNANDO: What was your reaction when Atty. Mesina informed you of this possibility? F. MARCOS, JR.: My reaction to all of these approaches is that I am always open, we are always open, we are very much always in search of resolution to the problem of the family and any approach that has been made us, we have entertained. And so my reaction was the same as what I have always why not? Maybe this is the one that will finally put an end to this problem.94 xxx ATTY. FERNANDO: Basically, what were the true amounts of the assets in the bank? PJ GARCHITORENA: So, we are talking about liquid assets here? Just Cash? F. MARCOS, JR.: Well, basically, any assets. Anything that was under the Marcos name in any of the banks in Switzerland which may necessarily be not cash.95 xxx PJ GARCHITORENA: xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

x x x What did you do in other words, after being apprised of this contract in connection herewith? F. MARCOS, JR.: I assumed that we are beginning to implement the agreement because this was forwarded through the Philippine government lawyers through our lawyers and then, subsequently, to me. I was a little surprised because we hadn't really discussed the details of the transfer of the funds, what the bank accounts, what the mechanism would be. But nevertheless, I was happy to see that as far as the PCGG is concerned, that the agreement was perfected and that we were beginning to implement it and that was a source of satisfaction to me because I thought that finally it will be the end.96 Ferdinand Jr.'s pronouncements, taken in context and in their entirety, were a confirmation of respondents' recognition of their ownership of the Swiss bank deposits. Admissions of a party in his testimony are receivable against him. If a party, as a witness, deliberately concedes a fact, such concession has the force of a judicial admission.97 It is apparent from Ferdinand Jr.'s testimony that the Marcos family agreed to negotiate with the Philippine government in the hope of finally putting an end to the problems besetting the Marcos family regarding the Swiss accounts. This was doubtlessly an acknowledgment of ownership on their part. The rule is that the testimony on the witness stand partakes of the nature of a formal judicial admission when a party testifies clearly and unequivocally to a fact which is peculiarly within his own knowledge.98 In her Manifestation99 dated May 26, 1998, respondent Imelda Marcos furthermore revealed the following: That respondent Imelda R. Marcos owns 90% of the subject matter of the above-entitled case, being the sole beneficiary of the dollar deposits in the name of the various foundations alleged in the case; That in fact only 10% of the subject matter in the above-entitled case belongs to the estate of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos; xxx xxx xxx
Respondents' ownership of the Swiss bank accounts as borne out by Mrs. Marcos' manifestation is as bright as sunlight. And her claim that she is merely a beneficiary of the Swiss deposits is belied by her own signatures on the appended copies of the documents substantiating her ownership of the funds in the name of the foundations. As already mentioned, she failed to specifically deny under oath the authenticity of such documents, especially those involving "William Saunders" and "Jane Ryan" which actually referred to Ferdinand Marcos and Imelda Marcos, respectively. That failure of Imelda Marcos to specifically deny the existence, much less the genuineness and due execution, of the instruments bearing her signature, was tantamount to a judicial admission of the genuineness and due execution of said instruments, in accordance with Section 8, Rule 8100 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Likewise, in her Constancia101 dated May 6, 1999, Imelda Marcos prayed for the approval of the Compromise Agreement and the subsequent release and transfer of the $150 million to the rightful owner. She further made the following manifestations: xxx xxx xxx

2. The Republic's cause of action over the full amount is its forfeiture in favor of the government if found to be ill-gotten. On the other hand, the Marcoses defend that it is a legitimate asset. Therefore, both parties have an inchoate right of ownership over the account. If it turns out that the account is of lawful origin, the Republic may yield to the Marcoses. Conversely, the Marcoses must yield to the Republic. (underscoring supplied) xxx xxx xxx
3. Consistent with the foregoing, and the Marcoses having committed themselves to helping the less fortunate, in the interest of peace, reconciliation and unity, defendant MADAM IMELDA ROMUALDEZ MARCOS, in firm abidance thereby, hereby affirms her agreement with the Republic for the release and transfer of the US Dollar 150 million for proper disposition, without prejudice to the final outcome of the litigation respecting the ownership of the remainder. Again, the above statements were indicative of Imelda's admission of the Marcoses' ownership of the Swiss deposits as in fact "the Marcoses defend that it (Swiss deposits) is a legitimate (Marcos) asset." On the other hand, respondents Maria Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. and Maria Irene Marcos-Araneta filed a motion102 on May 4, 1998 asking the Sandiganbayan to place the res (Swiss deposits) in custodia legis: 7. Indeed, the prevailing situation is fraught with danger! Unless the aforesaid Swiss deposits are placed in custodia legis or within the Court's protective mantle, its dissipation or misappropriation by the petitioner looms as a distinct possibility. Such display of deep, personal interest can only come from someone who believes that he has a marked and intimate right over the considerable dollar deposits. Truly, by filing said motion, the Marcos children revealed their ownership of the said deposits. Lastly, the Undertaking103 entered into by the PCGG, the PNB and the Marcos foundations on February 10, 1999, confirmed the Marcoses' ownership of the Swiss bank deposits. The subject Undertaking brought to light their readiness to pay the human rights victims out of the funds held in escrow in the PNB. It stated: WHEREAS, the Republic of the Philippines sympathizes with the plight of the human rights victims-plaintiffs in the aforementioned litigation through the Second Party, desires to assist in the satisfaction of the judgment awards of said human rights victims-plaintiffs, by releasing, assigning and or waiving US$150 million of the funds held in escrow under the Escrow Agreements dated August 14, 1995, although the Republic is not obligated to do so under final judgments of the Swiss courts dated December 10 and 19, 1997, and January 8, 1998; WHEREAS, the Third Party is likewise willing to release, assign and/or waive all its rights and interests over said US$150 million to the aforementioned human rights victims-plaintiffs. All told, the foregoing disquisition negates the claim of respondents that "petitioner failed to prove that they acquired or own the Swiss funds" and that "it was only by arbitrarily isolating and taking certain statements made by private respondents out of context that petitioner was able to treat these as judicial admissions." The Court is fully aware of the relevance, materiality and implications of every pleading and document submitted in this case. This Court carefully scrutinized the proofs

presented by the parties. We analyzed, assessed and weighed them to ascertain if each piece of evidence rightfully qualified as an admission. Owing to the far-reaching historical and political implications of this case, we considered and examined, individually and totally, the evidence of the parties, even if it might have bordered on factual adjudication which, by authority of the rules and jurisprudence, is not usually done by this Court. There is no doubt in our mind that respondent Marcoses admitted ownership of the Swiss bank deposits. We have always adhered to the familiar doctrine that an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and becomes conclusive on him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether an objection is interposed by the adverse party or not.104 This doctrine is embodied in Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.105 In the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, respondents' judicial admission of ownership of the Swiss deposits is definitely binding on them. The individual and separate admissions of each respondent bind all of them pursuant to Sections 29 and 31, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. The act or declaration of a partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence against such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested with the party.106 SEC. 31. Admission by privies. Where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the former.107 The declarations of a person are admissible against a party whenever a "privity of estate" exists between the declarant and the party, the term "privity of estate" generally denoting a succession in rights.108 Consequently, an admission of one in privity with a party to the record is competent.109 Without doubt, privity exists among the respondents in this case. And where several co-parties to the record are jointly interested in the subject matter of the controversy, the admission of one is competent against all.110 Respondents insist that the Sandiganbayan is correct in ruling that petitioner Republic has failed to establish aprima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss deposits. We disagree. The sudden turn-around of the Sandiganbayan was really strange, to say the least, as its findings and conclusions were not borne out by the voluminous records of this case. Section 2 of RA 1379 explicitly states that "whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. x x x"

The elements which must concur for this prima facie presumption to apply are: (1) the offender is a public officer or employee; (2) he must have acquired a considerable amount of money or property during his incumbency; and (3) said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. It is undisputed that spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were former public officers. Hence, the first element is clearly extant. The second element deals with the amount of money or property acquired by the public officer during his incumbency. The Marcos couple indubitably acquired and owned properties during their term of office. In fact, the five groups of Swiss accounts were admittedly owned by them. There is proof of the existence and ownership of these assets and properties and it suffices to comply with the second element. The third requirement is met if it can be shown that such assets, money or property is manifestly out of proportion to the public officer's salary and his other lawful income. It is the proof of this third element that is crucial in determining whether a prima facie presumption has been established in this case. Petitioner Republic presented not only a schedule indicating the lawful income of the Marcos spouses during their incumbency but also evidence that they had huge deposits beyond such lawful income in Swiss banks under the names of five different foundations. We believe petitioner was able to establish the prima facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses were manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials. Otherwise stated, petitioner presented enough evidence to convince us that the Marcoses had dollar deposits amounting to US $356 million representing the balance of the Swiss accounts of the five foundations, an amount way, way beyond their aggregate legitimate income of only US$304,372.43 during their incumbency as government officials. Considering, therefore, that the total amount of the Swiss deposits was considerably out of proportion to the known lawful income of the Marcoses, the presumption that said dollar deposits were unlawfully acquired was duly established. It was sufficient for the petition for forfeiture to state the approximate amount of money and property acquired by the respondents, and their total government salaries. Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations states: Prima Facie Evidence. Any accumulation of assets, properties, and other material possessions of those persons covered by Executive Orders No. 1 and No. 2, whose value is out of proportion to their known lawful income is prima facie deemed ill-gotten wealth. Indeed, the burden of proof was on the respondents to dispute this presumption and show by clear and convincing evidence that the Swiss deposits were lawfully acquired and that they had other legitimate sources of income. A presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed and, unless the fact thus prima facie established by legal presumption is disproved, it must stand as proved.111 Respondent Mrs. Marcos argues that the foreign foundations should have been impleaded as they were indispensable parties without whom no complete determination of the issues could be made.

She asserts that the failure of petitioner Republic to implead the foundations rendered the judgment void as the joinder of indispensable parties was a sine qua non exercise of judicial power. Furthermore, the non-inclusion of the foreign foundations violated the conditions prescribed by the Swiss government regarding the deposit of the funds in escrow, deprived them of their day in court and denied them their rights under the Swiss constitution and international law.112 The Court finds that petitioner Republic did not err in not impleading the foreign foundations. Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,113 taken from Rule 19b of the American Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides for the compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Generally, an indispensable party must be impleaded for the complete determination of the suit. However, failure to join an indispensable party does not divest the court of jurisdiction since the rule regarding indispensable parties is founded on equitable considerations and is not jurisdictional. Thus, the court is not divested of its power to render a decision even in the absence of indispensable parties, though such judgment is not binding on the non-joined party.114 An indispensable party115 has been defined as one: [who] must have a direct interest in the litigation; and if this interest is such that it cannot be separated from that of the parties to the suit, if the court cannot render justice between the parties in his absence, if the decree will have an injurious effect upon his interest, or if the final determination of the controversy in his absence will be inconsistent with equity and good conscience. There are two essential tests of an indispensable party: (1) can relief be afforded the plaintiff without the presence of the other party? and (2) can the case be decided on its merits without prejudicing the rights of the other party?116 There is, however, no fixed formula for determining who is an indispensable party; this can only be determined in the context and by the facts of the particular suit or litigation. In the present case, there was an admission by respondent Imelda Marcos in her May 26, 1998 Manifestation before the Sandiganbayan that she was the sole beneficiary of 90% of the subject matter in controversy with the remaining 10% belonging to the estate of Ferdinand Marcos.117 Viewed against this admission, the foreign foundations were not indispensable parties. Their non-participation in the proceedings did not prevent the court from deciding the case on its merits and according full relief to petitioner Republic. The judgment ordering the return of the $356 million was neither inimical to the foundations' interests nor inconsistent with equity and good conscience. The admission of respondent Imelda Marcos only confirmed what was already generally known: that the foundations were established precisely to hide the money stolen by the Marcos spouses from petitioner Republic. It negated whatever illusion there was, if any, that the foreign foundations owned even a nominal part of the assets in question. The rulings of the Swiss court that the foundations, as formal owners, must be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings hinged on the assumption that they owned a nominal share of the assets.118 But this was already refuted by no less than Mrs. Marcos herself. Thus, she cannot now argue that the ruling of the Sandiganbayan violated the conditions set by the Swiss court. The directive given by the Swiss court for the foundations to participate in the proceedings was for the purpose of protecting whatever nominal interest they might have had in the assets as formal owners. But inasmuch as their ownership was subsequently repudiated by Imelda Marcos, they could no longer be considered as indispensable parties and their participation in the proceedings became unnecessary.

In Republic vs. Sandiganbayan,119 this Court ruled that impleading the firms which are the res of the action was unnecessary: "And as to corporations organized with ill-gotten wealth, but are not themselves guilty of misappropriation, fraud or other illicit conduct in other words, the companies themselves are not the object or thing involved in the action, the res thereof there is no need to implead them either. Indeed, their impleading is not proper on the strength alone of their having been formed with ill-gotten funds, absent any other particular wrongdoing on their part Such showing of having been formed with, or having received ill-gotten funds, however strong or convincing, does not, without more, warrant identifying the corporations in question with the person who formed or made use of them to give the color or appearance of lawful, innocent acquisition to illegally amassed wealth at the least, not so as place on the Government the onus of impleading the former with the latter in actions to recover such wealth. Distinguished in terms of juridical personality and legal culpability from their erring members or stockholders, said corporations are not themselves guilty of the sins of the latter, of the embezzlement, asportation, etc., that gave rise to the Government's cause of action for recovery; their creation or organization was merely the result of their members' (or stockholders') manipulations and maneuvers to conceal the illegal origins of the assets or monies invested therein. In this light, they are simply the res in the actions for the recovery of illegally acquired wealth, and there is, in principle, no cause of action against them and no ground to implead them as defendants in said actions." Just like the corporations in the aforementioned case, the foreign foundations here were set up to conceal the illegally acquired funds of the Marcos spouses. Thus, they were simply the res in the action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth and did not have to be impleaded for lack of cause of action or ground to implead them. Assuming arguendo, however, that the foundations were indispensable parties, the failure of petitioner to implead them was a curable error, as held in the previously cited case of Republic vs. Sandiganbayan:120 "Even in those cases where it might reasonably be argued that the failure of the Government to implead the sequestered corporations as defendants is indeed a procedural abberation, as where said firms were allegedly used, and actively cooperated with the defendants, as instruments or conduits for conversion of public funds and property or illicit or fraudulent obtention of favored government contracts, etc., slight reflection would nevertheless lead to the conclusion that the defect is not fatal, but one correctible under applicable adjective rules e.g., Section 10, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court [specifying the remedy of amendment during trial to authorize or to conform to the evidence]; Section 1, Rule 20 [governing amendments before trial], in relation to the rule respecting omission of so-called necessary or indispensable parties, set out in Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. It is relevant in this context to advert to the old familiar doctrines that the omission to implead such parties "is a mere technical defect which can be cured at any stage of the proceedings even after judgment"; and that, particularly in the case of indispensable parties, since their presence and participation is essential to the very life of the action, for without them no judgment may be rendered, amendments of the complaint in order to implead them should be freely allowed, even on appeal, in fact even after rendition of judgment by this Court, where it appears that the complaint otherwise indicates their identity and character as such indispensable parties."121

Although there are decided cases wherein the non-joinder of indispensable parties in fact led to the dismissal of the suit or the annulment of judgment, such cases do not jibe with the matter at hand. The better view is that non-joinder is not a ground to dismiss the suit or annul the judgment. The rule on joinder of indispensable parties is founded on equity. And the spirit of the law is reflected in Section 11, Rule 3122 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It prohibits the dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, through motion or on order of the court on its own initiative.123 Likewise, jurisprudence on the Federal Rules of Procedure, from which our Section 7, Rule 3124 on indispensable parties was copied, allows the joinder of indispensable parties even after judgment has been entered if such is needed to afford the moving party full relief.125 Mere delay in filing the joinder motion does not necessarily result in the waiver of the right as long as the delay is excusable.126 Thus, respondent Mrs. Marcos cannot correctly argue that the judgment rendered by the Sandiganbayan was void due to the non-joinder of the foreign foundations. The court had jurisdiction to render judgment which, even in the absence of indispensable parties, was binding on all the parties before it though not on the absent party.127 If she really felt that she could not be granted full relief due to the absence of the foreign foundations, she should have moved for their inclusion, which was allowable at any stage of the proceedings. She never did. Instead she assailed the judgment rendered. In the face of undeniable circumstances and the avalanche of documentary evidence against them, respondent Marcoses failed to justify the lawful nature of their acquisition of the said assets. Hence, the Swiss deposits should be considered ill-gotten wealth and forfeited in favor of the State in accordance with Section 6 of RA 1379: SEC. 6. Judgment. If the respondent is unable to show to the satisfaction of the court that he has lawfully acquired the property in question, then the court shall declare such property forfeited in favor of the State, and by virtue of such judgment the property aforesaid shall become property of the State x x x. THE FAILURE TO PRESENT AUTHENTICATED TRANSLATIONS OF THE SWISS DECISIONS Finally, petitioner Republic contends that the Honorable Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing himself on the ground that the original copies of the authenticated Swiss decisions and their authenticated translations were not submitted to the court a quo. Earlier PJ Garchitorena had quoted extensively from the unofficial translation of one of these Swiss decisions in hisponencia dated July 29, 1999 when he denied the motion to release US$150 Million to the human rights victims. While we are in reality perplexed by such an incomprehensible change of heart, there might nevertheless not be any real need to belabor the issue. The presentation of the authenticated translations of the original copies of the Swiss decision was not de rigueur for the public respondent to make findings of fact and reach its conclusions. In short, the Sandiganbayan's decision was not dependent on the determination of the Swiss courts. For that matter, neither is this Court's. The release of the Swiss funds held in escrow in the PNB is dependent solely on the decision of this jurisdiction that said funds belong to the petitioner Republic. What is important is our own assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence to rule in favor of either petitioner Republic or respondent Marcoses. In this instance, despite the absence of the authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions, the evidence on hand tilts convincingly in favor of petitioner Republic.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated January 31, 2002 is SET ASIDE. The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are now deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002, plus interest, are hereby forfeited in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur. Puno, and Vitug, JJ., in the result Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on official leave. Carpio, J., no part.
Magallona vs Ermita
EN BANC
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE ALFERES, CZARINA MAY CASTRO, ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN MARRI CAETE, VANN ALLEN DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN
G.R No. 187167
Present:
CORONA, C.J., CARPIO, VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, and SERENO, JJ.
Magallona vs Ermita
FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO, ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE, MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY, MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI, MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT, MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV, CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO, MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and MARCELINO VELOSO III, Petitioners,
- versus HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO
Magallona vs Ermita
ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL MAPPING & RESOURCE INFORMATION AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, Respondents. July 16, 2011 Promulgated:
x -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
Magallona vs Ermita
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9522 (RA 9522) adjusting the countrys archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
1
The Antecedents
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046) demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State. This law followed the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in 1958 (UNCLOS I), codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties over their territorial sea, the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.
2 3 4
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant
Magallona vs Ermita
with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. Among others, UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the extended continental shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
5 6 7 8
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective capacities as citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators, as the case may be, assail the constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine states sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties, and (2) RA 9522 opens the countrys waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.
9 10 11 12 13
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as regime of islands not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS IIIs framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal.
14
Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues questioning (1) the petitions compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial
Magallona vs Ermita
review grounded on petitioners alleged lack of locus standi and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the countrys compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the countrys security, environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines claim over Sabah.
Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of petitioners assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.
We left unacted petitioners prayer for an injunctive writ.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. Preliminarily
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and 2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.
Magallona vs Ermita
2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
The Ruling of the Court On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.
On the Threshold Issues
Petitioners Possess Locus Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and taxpayers because the petition alleges neither infringement of legislative prerogative nor misuse of public funds, occasioned by the passage and implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners locus standi as citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably difficult to find other litigants possessing a more direct and specific interest to bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship standing.
15 16 17
The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition
Magallona vs Ermita
Are Proper Remedies to Test the Constitutionality of Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners.
18
Respondents submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition, viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test the constitutionality of statutes, and indeed, of acts of other branches of government. Issues of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners, carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought to be reviewed here is one such law.
19 20
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool to Demarcate the Countrys Maritime Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Magallona vs Ermita
Delineate Philippine Territory
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 dismembers a large portion of the national territory because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.
21 22
Petitioners theory fails to persuade us.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits. UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
23
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which
Magallona vs Ermita
baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the outermost islands and drying reefs of the archipelago.
24
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through
Magallona vs Ermita
occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law.
25 26
RA 9522s Use of the Framework of Regime of Islands to Determine the Maritime Zones of the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent with the Philippines Claim of Sovereignty Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522s use of UNCLOS IIIs regime of islands framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, weakens our territorial claim over that area. Petitioners add that the KIGs (and Scarborough Shoals) exclusion from the Philippine archipelagic baselines results in the loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters, prejudicing the livelihood of subsistence fishermen. A comparison of the configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its congressional deliberations, vis--vis the Philippines obligations under UNCLOS III, belie this view.
27 28
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine
Magallona vs Ermita
basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS IIIs limitation on the maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines claim over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.
Petitioners assertion of loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial waters under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines total maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the table below:
29
Extent of maritime area using RA 3046, as amended, taking into account the Treaty of Paris delimitation (in square nautical miles) Internal or archipelagic waters 166,858
Extent of maritime area using RA 9522, taking into account UNCLOS III (in square nautical miles)
171,435
Territorial Sea
274,136
32,106
Magallona vs Ermita
Exclusive Economic Zone TOTAL 440,994 382,669
586,210
Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.
30
Magallona vs Ermita
Further, petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be
Magallona vs Ermita
determined as Regime of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First, Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that [t]he drawing of such baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that the length of the baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.
31
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably depart to an appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.
32 33
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam DefensorSantiago, took pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate deliberations:
Magallona vs Ermita
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the provision of international law which states: The drawing of such baseline shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago. So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are still allowed by international law to claim them as our own. This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our archipelago is defined by the orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline. Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal, itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago. (Emphasis supplied)
34
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS IIIs limits. The need to shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by respondents:
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime zones including the extended continental shelf in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to wit: 1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical miles x x x. This exceeds
Magallona vs Ermita
the maximum length allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length, up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles. 2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped or deleted from the baselines system. This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical miles of water. 3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not established by geodetic survey methods. Accordingly, some of the points, particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to be located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as prescribed by Article 47.
35
Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as Regime[s] of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine States responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of UNCLOS III, any naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide, such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of regime of islands, whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.
36 37
Statutory Claim Over Sabah under RA 5446 Retained
Magallona vs Ermita
Petitioners argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the Philippines claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA 5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not Incompatible with the Constitutions Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the law unconstitutionally converts internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution hazards, in violation of the Constitution.
38
Magallona vs Ermita
Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of the Constitution or as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath. UNCLOS III affirms this:
39
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic waters and of their bed and subsoil. 1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast. 2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well as to their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. xxxx 4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in other respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein. (Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers, may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passage. Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea lanes passage are now pending in Congress.
40 41
Magallona vs Ermita
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations and conditions for their exercise. Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international law, thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law. No modern State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
42 43 44
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser footing vis--vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States archipelago and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III. Separate islands generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States territorial sovereignty, subjecting these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.
45 46 47
Petitioners invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II (Declaration of Principles and State Policies) must also fail. Our present state of jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides, which, absent enabling legislation, do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights x x x. Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran treated the right to a healthful and
48 49 50
Magallona vs Ermita
balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The other provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII, Section 2, paragraph 2 ) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 7 ), are not violated by RA 9522.
51 52
In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.
UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III creates a sui generis maritime space the exclusive economic zone in waters previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical miles. UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS III.
53
RA 9522 and the Philippines Maritime Zones
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III, Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522. We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS III and we find petitioners reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will find itself
54 55
Magallona vs Ermita
devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the countrys case in any international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationallyrecognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 129406 March 6, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) and ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO, Respondents. DECISION GARCIA, J.: Before the Court is this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside the March 28, 19951 and March 13, 19972 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, Second Division, in Civil Case No. 0034, insofar as said resolutions ordered the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to pay private respondent Roberto S. Benedicto or his corporations the value of 227 shares of stock of the Negros Occidental Golf and Country Club, Inc. (NOGCCI) at P150,000.00 per share, registered in the name of said private respondent or his corporations. The facts: Civil Case No. 0034 entitled Republic of the Philippines, plaintiff, v. Roberto S. Benedicto, et al., defendants, is a complaint for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, reconstitution and damages. The case is one of several suits involving ill-gotten or unexplained wealth that petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, filed with the Sandiganbayan against private respondent Roberto S. Benedicto and others pursuant to Executive Order (EO) No. 14,3 series of 1986. Pursuant to its mandate under EO No. 1,4 series of 1986, the PCGG issued writs placing under sequestration all business enterprises, entities and other properties, real and personal, owned or registered in the name of private respondent Benedicto, or of corporations in which he appeared to have controlling or majority interest. Among the properties thus sequestered and taken over by PCGG fiscal agents were the 227 shares in NOGCCI owned by private respondent Benedicto and registered in his name or under the names of corporations he owned or controlled. Following the sequestration process, PCGG representatives sat as members of the Board of Directors of NOGCCI, which passed, sometime in October 1986, a resolution effecting a corporate policy change. The change consisted of assessing a monthly membership due of P150.00 for each NOGCCI share. Prior to this resolution, an investor purchasing more than one NOGCCI share was exempt from paying monthly membership due for the second and subsequent shares that he/she owned. Subsequently, on March 29, 1987, the NOGCCI Board passed another resolution, this time increasing the monthly membership due from P150.00 to P250.00 for each share.

As sequestrator of the 227 shares of stock in question, PCGG did not pay the corresponding monthly membership due thereon totaling P2,959,471.00. On account thereof, the 227 sequestered shares were declared delinquent to be disposed of in an auction sale. Apprised of the above development and evidently to prevent the projected auction sale of the same shares, PCGG filed a complaint for injunction with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 5348. The complaint, however, was dismissed, paving the way for the auction sale for the delinquent 227 shares of stock. On August 5, 1989, an auction sale was conducted. On November 3, 1990, petitioner Republic and private respondent Benedicto entered into a Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. 0034. The agreement contained a general release clause5 whereunder petitioner Republic agreed and bound itself to lift the sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI shares, among other Benedictos properties, petitioner Republic acknowledging that it was within private respondent Benedictos capacity to acquire the same shares out of his income from business and the exercise of his profession.6 Implied in this undertaking is the recognition by petitioner Republic that the subject shares of stock could not have been ill-gotten. In a decision dated October 2, 1992, the Sandiganbayan approved the Compromise Agreement and accordingly rendered judgment in accordance with its terms. In the process of implementing the Compromise Agreement, either of the parties would, from time to time, move for a ruling by the Sandiganbayan on the proper manner of implementing or interpreting a specific provision therein. On February 22, 1994, Benedicto filed in Civil Case No. 0034 a "Motion for Release from Sequestration and Return of Sequestered Shares/Dividends" praying, inter alia, that his NOGCCI shares of stock be specifically released from sequestration and returned, delivered or paid to him as part of the parties Compromise Agreement in that case. In a Resolution7 promulgated on December 6, 1994, the Sandiganbayan granted Benedictos aforementioned motion but placed the subject shares under the custody of its Clerk of Court, thus: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the said "Motion for Release From Sequestration and Return of Sequestered Shares/Dividends" is hereby GRANTED and it is directed that said shares/dividends be delivered/placed under the custody of the Clerk of Court, Sandiganbayan, Manila subject to this Courts disposition. On March 28, 1995, the Sandiganbayan came out with the herein first assailed Resolution,8 which clarified its aforementioned December 6, 1994 Resolution and directed the immediate implementation thereof by requiring PCGG, among other things: (b) To deliver to the Clerk of Court the 227 sequestered shares of [NOGCCI] registered in the name of nominees of ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO free from all liens and encumbrances, or in default thereof, to pay their value at P150,000.00 per share which can be deducted from [the Republics] cash share in the Compromise Agreement. [Words in bracket added] (Emphasis Supplied). Owing to PCGGs failure to comply with the above directive, Benedicto filed in Civil Case No. 0034 a Motion for Compliance dated July 25, 1995, followed by an Ex-Parte Motion for Early Resolution dated February 12, 1996. Acting thereon, the Sandiganbayan promulgated yet another Resolution9 on February 23, 1996, dispositively reading:

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the instant motion for early resolution and considering that, indeed, the PCGG has not shown any justifiable ground as to why it has not complied with its obligation as set forth in the Order of December 6, 1994 up to this date and which Order was issued pursuant to the Compromise Agreement and has already become final and executory, accordingly, the Presidential Commission on Good Government is hereby given a final extension of fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof within which to comply with the Order of December 6, 1994 as stated hereinabove. On April 1, 1996, PCGG filed a Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration,10 praying for the setting aside of the Resolution of February 23, 1996. On April 11, 1996, private respondent Benedicto filed a Motion to Enforce Judgment Levy. Resolving these two motions, the Sandiganbayan, in its second assailed Resolution11 dated March 13, 1997, denied that portion of the PCGGs Manifestation with Motion for Reconsideration concerning the subject 227 NOGCCI shares and granted Benedictos Motion to Enforce Judgment Levy. Hence, the Republics present recourse on the sole issue of whether or not the public respondent Sandiganbayan, Second Division, gravely abused its discretion in holding that the PCGG is at fault for not paying the membership dues on the 227 sequestered NOGCCI shares of stock, a failing which eventually led to the foreclosure sale thereof. The petition lacks merit. To begin with, PCGG itself does not dispute its being considered as a receiver insofar as the sequestered 227 NOGCCI shares of stock are concerned.12 PCGG also acknowledges that as such receiver, one of its functions is to pay outstanding debts pertaining to the sequestered entity or property,13 in this case the 227 NOGCCI shares in question. It contends, however, that membership dues owing to a golf club cannot be considered as an outstanding debt for which PCGG, as receiver, must pay. It also claims to have exercised due diligence to prevent the loss through delinquency sale of the subject NOGCCI shares, specifically inviting attention to the injunctive suit, i.e., Civil Case No. 5348, it filed before the RTC of Bacolod City to enjoin the foreclosure sale of the shares. The filing of the injunction complaint adverted to, without more, cannot plausibly tilt the balance in favor of PCGG. To the mind of the Court, such filing is a case of acting too little and too late. It cannot be over-emphasized that it behooved the PCGGs fiscal agents to preserve, like a responsible father of the family, the value of the shares of stock under their administration. But far from acting as such father, what the fiscal agents did under the premises was to allow the element of delinquency to set in before acting by embarking on a tedious process of going to court after the auction sale had been announced and scheduled. The PCGGs posture that to the owner of the sequestered shares rests the burden of paying the membership dues is untenable. For one, it lost sight of the reality that such dues are basically obligations attached to the shares, which, in the final analysis, shall be made liable, thru delinquency sale in case of default in payment of the dues. For another, the PCGG as sequestrator-receiver of such shares is, as stressed earlier, duty bound to preserve the value of such shares. Needless to state, adopting timely measures to obviate the loss of those shares forms part of such duty and due diligence. The Sandiganbayan, to be sure, cannot plausibly be faulted for finding the PCGG liable for the loss of the 227 NOGCCI shares. There can be no quibbling, as indeed the graft court so declared in its assailed and related resolutions respecting the NOGCCI shares of stock, that PCGGs fiscal agents, while sitting in the NOGCCI Board of Directors agreed to the amendment of the rule pertaining to membership dues. Hence, it is not amiss to state, as did the Sandiganbayan, that the PCGG-

designated fiscal agents, no less, had a direct hand in the loss of the sequestered shares through delinquency and their eventual sale through public auction. While perhaps anti-climactic to so mention it at this stage, the unfortunate loss of the shares ought not to have come to pass had those fiscal agents prudently not agreed to the passage of the NOGCCI board resolutions charging membership dues on shares without playing representatives. Given the circumstances leading to the auction sale of the subject NOGCCI shares, PCGGs lament about public respondent Sandiganbayan having erred or, worse still, having gravely abused its discretion in its determination as to who is at fault for the loss of the shares in question can hardly be given cogency. For sure, even if the Sandiganbayan were wrong in its findings, which does not seem to be in this case, it is a well-settled rule of jurisprudence that certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Corollarily, errors of procedure or mistakes in the courts findings and conclusions are beyond the corrective hand of certiorari.14 The extraordinary writ of certiorari may be availed only upon a showing, in the minimum, that the respondent tribunal or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.15 The term "grave abuse of discretion" connotes capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to excess, or a lack of jurisdiction.16 The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.17 Sadly, this is completely absent in the present case. For, at bottom, the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan did no more than to direct PCGG to comply with its part of the bargain under the compromise agreement it freely entered into with private respondent Benedicto. Simply put, the assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan have firm basis in fact and in law. Lest it be overlooked, the issue of liability for the shares in question had, as both public and private respondents asserted, long become final and executory. Petitioners narration of facts in its present petition is even misleading as it conveniently fails to make reference to two (2) resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan. We refer to that courts resolutions of December 6, 199418 and February 23, 199619 as well as several intervening pleadings which served as basis for the decisions reached therein. As it were, the present petition questions only and focuses on the March 28, 199520 and March 13, 199721 resolutions, which merely reiterated and clarified the graft courts underlying resolution of December 6, 1994. And to place matters in the proper perspective, PCGGs failure to comply with the December 6, 1994 resolution prompted the issuance of the clarificatory and/or reiteratory resolutions aforementioned. In a last-ditch attempt to escape liability, petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit.22 As argued, the order for it to pay the value of the delinquent shares would fix monetary liability on a government agency, thus necessitating the appropriation of public funds to satisfy the judgment claim.23 But, as private respondent Benedicto correctly countered, the PCGG fails to take stock of one of the exceptions to the state immunity principle, i.e., when the government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034. Where, as here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit cannot be effectively invoked.24 For, as jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through its duly authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a private party, it thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatever counterclaims or defenses the latter may have against it.25 Petitioner Republics act of filing its complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from suit. Being itself the

plaintiff in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set up its immunity against private respondent Benedictos prayers in the same case. In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto, petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself in the same level of its adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express consent, precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into such contract,26 breach of which on its part gives the corresponding right to the other party to the agreement. Finally, it is apropos to stress that the Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. 0034 envisaged the immediate recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth without further litigation by the government, and buying peace on the part of the aging Benedicto.27 Sadly, that stated objective has come to naught as not only had the litigation continued to ensue, but, worse, private respondent Benedicto passed away on May 15, 2000,28 with the trial of Civil Case No. 0034 still in swing, so much so that the late Benedicto had to be substituted by the administratrix of his estate.29 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice WE CONCUR: REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice Chairperson ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. REYNATO S .PUNO Associate Justice Chairperson, Second Division CERTIFICATION RENATO C. CORONA Asscociate Justice

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman's Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice
Republic vs Hidalgo
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
SECOND DIVISION DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DIVISION OF ALBAY represented by its SCHOOLS DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT, Petitioner, G.R. No. 161758 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: CELSO OATE, Respondent. June 8, 2007 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: A little neglect may lead to great prejudice.
- versus -
The Case This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 seeking to reverse and set aside the January 14, 2004 Decision[2]of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60659, which affirmed the November 3, 1997 Decision[3] of the Legaspi City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch I, declaring as null and void the December 21, 1998 Deed of Donation[4] executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in favor of petitioner, and directing the latter to return to
Republic vs Hidalgo
respondent Celso Oate the possession of the portion of land occupied by the school site of the Daraga North Central Elementary School. The Facts Spouses Claro Oate and Gregoria Los Baos owned Lot No. 6849 (disputed lot) with an area of around 27,907 square meters registered under the Torrens System of land registration under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2563. Claro Oate had three children, namely: Antonio, Rafael, and Francisco, all surnamed Oate. Respondent Celso Oate is the grandson of Claro Oate, being the son of Francisco Oate. In 1940, Bagumbayan Elementary School of Daraga was constructed on a portion of the disputed lot. The school was eventually renamed Daraga North Central Elementary School. The Municipality of Daraga leveled the area while petitioner Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS; now Department of Education [DepEd]) developed and built various school buildings and facilities on the disputed lot. Sometime in 1991, respondent filed a reconstitution proceeding of OCT No. 2563 which was granted by the Legaspi City RTC, Branch V after due notice, publication, and hearing. Consequently, OCT No. RO-18971[5] was issued in the name of spouses Claro Oate and Gregoria Los Baos. On August 26, 1991, a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Cession was executed by respondent and his three (3) sisters, namely: Melba O. Napil, Cielo O. Lardizabal, and Maria Visia O. Maldo, who waived their successional rights in favor of respondent Celso Oate. Asserting that the disputed lot was inherited by his father, Francisco Oate, from the latters father, Claro Oate, by virtue of a prior partition among the three (3) sons of Claro Oate and Gregoria Los Baos, respondent in turn claimed ownership of said lot through the deed of extrajudicial settlement. Meanwhile, the issue of whether respondents father, Francisco Oate, truly acquired the disputed lot through a prior partition among Claro Oates three (3) children had been passed upon in another case, Civil Case No. 8724 for Partition,
Republic vs Hidalgo
Reconveyance and Damages filed by the heirs of Rafael Oate before the Legaspi City RTC, Branch IX.[6] In said case, respondent Celso Oate, the defendant, prevailed and the case was dismissed by the trial court. Thereafter, respondent caused Lot No. 6849 to be subdivided into five (5) lots, all under his name, except Lot No. 6849-B which is under the name of Mariano M. Lim. On October 26, 1992, the subdivided lots were issued Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCTs): (1) Lot No. 6849-A (13,072 square meters) under TCT No. T-83946;[7] (2) Lot No. 6849-B (3,100 square meters) under TCT No. T84049;[8] (3) Lot No. 6849-C (10,000 square meters) under TCT No. T83948;[9] (4) Lot No. 6849-D (1,127 square meters) under TCT No. T83949;[10] and (5) Lot No. 6849-E (608 square meters) under TCT No. T-83950.[11] On December 15, 1992, through his counsel, respondent sent a letter to petitioner apprising it about the facts and circumstances affecting the elementary school and its occupancy of Lot No. 6849-A with an area of 13,072 square meters. Respondent proposed to petitioner DECS that it purchase Lot No. 6849-A at the Fair Market Value (FMV) of PhP 400 per square meter and also requested for reasonable rentals from 1960.[12] The records show that then DECS Director IV Jovencio Revil subsequently referred the matter to the DECS Division Superintendent Rizalina D. Saquido for investigation.[13] On February 24, 1993, through his counsel, respondent likewise wrote to Engr. Orlando Roces, District Engineer, Albay Engineering District about the ongoing construction projects in the school.[14] Engr. Roces then informed respondents counsel that petitioner DECS is the owner of the school site having acquired the disputed lot by virtue of a Deed of Donation executed by theMunicipality of Daraga, Albay in favor of petitioner.[15] Consequently, on March 18, 1993, respondent instituted a Complaint[16] for Annulment of Donation and/or Quieting of Title with Recovery of Possession of Lot No. 6849 located at Barrio Bagumbayan, Daraga, Albay before the Legaspi City RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 8715, against petitioner DECS, Division of Albay, represented by the Division Superintendent of Schools, Mrs. Rizalina D. Saquido; and the Municipality of Daraga, Albay, represented by the Municipal Mayor, Honorable Cicero Triunfante.
Republic vs Hidalgo
In its April 28, 1993 Answer,[17] the Municipality of Daraga, Albay, through Mayor Cicero Triunfante, denied respondents ownership of the disputed lot as it alleged that sometime in 1940, the Municipality bought said lot from Claro Oate, respondents grandfather, and since then it had continually occupied said lot openly and publicly in the concept of an owner until 1988 when the Municipality donated the school site to petitioner DECS; thus asserting that it could also claim ownership also through adverse possession. Moreover, it claimed that the disputed lot had been declared in the name of defendant municipality in the Municipal Assessors Office under Tax Declaration No. 31954 from 1940 until 1988 for purposes of exemption from real estate taxes. Further,defendant Municipality contended that respondent was guilty of laches and was estopped from assailing ownership over the disputed lot. Similarly, petitioners April 29, 1993 Answer[18] reiterated in essence the defenses raised by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay and further contended that respondent had no cause of action because it acquired ownership over the disputed lot by virtue of a Deed of Donation executed on December 21, 1988 in its favor; and that respondents claim was vague as it was derived from a void Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Cession disposing of the disputed lot which was already sold to the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in 1940. Petitioner likewise assailed the issuance of a reconstituted OCT over Lot 6849 when the lower court granted respondents petition for reconstitution without notifying petitioner. During the ensuing trial where both parties presented documentary and testimonial evidence, respondent testified that he came to know of the disputed lot in 1973 when he was 23 years old; that he took possession of the said lot in the same year; that he came to know that the elementary school occupied a portion of the said lot only in 1991; and that it was only in 1992 that he came to know of the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay.[19] Also, Felicito Armenta, a tenant cultivating a portion of disputed Lot 6849, testified that respondent indeed owned said lot and the share of the crops cultivated were paid to respondent.[20] However, after respondent testified, defendants in said case filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss[21] on the ground that respondents suit was against the State
Republic vs Hidalgo
which was prohibited without the latters consent. Respondent countered with his Opposition to Joint Motion to Dismiss.[22] Subsequently, the trial court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss, ruling that the State had given implied consent by entering into a contract.[23] Aside from the reconstituted OCT No. RO-18971, respondent presented the TCTs covering the five (5) portions of the partitioned Lot 6849, Tax Declaration No. 04-006-00681[24] issued for said lot, and the April 20, 1992 Certification[25] from the Office of the Treasurer of the Municipality of Daraga, Albay attesting to respondents payment of realty taxes for Lot 6849 from 1980 to 1990. After respondent rested his case, the defense presented and marked their documentary exhibits of Tax Declaration No. 30235 issued in the name of the late Claro Oate, which was cancelled in 1938; Tax Declaration 31954,[26] which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 30235, in the name of Municipality of Daraga with the annotation of Ex-Officio Deputy Assessor Natalio Grageda attesting to the purchase by the Municipality under Municipal Voucher No. 69, August 1940 accounts and the issuance of TCT No. 4812 in favor of the Municipality; Tax Declaration No. 8926[27] in the name of the Municipality which cancelled Tax Declaration No. 31954; and the subsequent Tax Declaration Nos. 22184,[28] 332,[29] and 04-006-00068.[30] The defense presented the testimony of Mr. Jose Adra,[31] the Principal of Daraga North Central Elementary School, who testified on the Municipalitys donation of disputed Lot 6849 to petitioner and the improvements on said lot amounting to more than PhP 11 million; and Mrs. Toribia Milleza,[32] a retired government employee and resident of Bagumbayan, Daraga, Albay since 1955, who testified on the Municipalitys continuous and adverse possession of the disputed lot since 1940. As mentioned earlier, Civil Case No. 8724 for Partition, Reconveyance and Damages was instituted by the heirs of Rafael Oate in Legaspi City RTC, Branch IX against Spouses Celso Oate and Allem Vellez, involving the same disputed lot. Petitioner and co-defendant Municipality of Daraga, Albay were about to file a
Republic vs Hidalgo
complaint for intervention in said case, but it was overtaken by the resolution of the case on August 14, 1995 with the trial court dismissing the complaint. The Ruling of the RTC On November 3, 1997, the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of respondent Celso Oate. The dispositive portion declared, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants: 1. Declaring the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in favor of the defendant Department of Education Culture and Sports through the Albay Schools Division as null and void; 2. Declaring the plaintiff as the owner in fee simple of Lots Nos. 6849-A, 6849-C, 6849-D and 6849-E which are registered in his name;
3. Commanding the defendants to return the possession of the portion of the land occupied by the school site to the herein plaintiff Celso Oate; 4. Ordering the plaintiff for reason of equity, to pay the defendant Municipality of Daraga, Albay the amount of Fifty Thousand (50,000.00) Pesos pursuant to Article 479 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines; 5. The defendant Department of Education Culture and Sports being a builder in good faith, the provisions of Article 448 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines shall be observed by the parties; and 6. Ordering the defendants to pay the costs of the suit. No attorneys fees is hereby adjudged in favor of plaintiffs counsel. SO ORDERED.[33]
Republic vs Hidalgo
The trial court ratiocinated that it was clear that subject Lot 6849 was originally registered under the Torrens System in the name of Spouses Claro Oate and Gregoria Los Baos as evidenced by OCT No. RO-18971. The right of respondent Celso Oate over the disputed lot had not been proven otherwise or overturned in Civil Case No. 8724, and this was bolstered by the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Cession, where respondents sister waived their successional rights in his favor. Thus, the trial court ruled in favor of respondents title. Besides, it further ruled that defendants could not assail the registered title of respondent in a collateral proceeding. While the Municipality of Daraga, Albay anchored its prior ownership over the disputed lot by virtue of a sale in 1940 and mentioned TCT No. 4812 supposedly issued in its name, it however failed to submit any deed of conveyance in its favor, as well as a copy of the alleged TCT No. 4812. Hence, the trial court held that its claim over disputed Lot 6849 was based solely on adverse prescription which could not prevail over respondents registered title. The trial court concluded that given these factual and evidentiary proofs, petitioner had no right to occupy Lot 6849-A, and the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in favor of petitioner must be nullified. Finally, the trial court awarded PhP 50,000 to the Municipality of Daraga, Albay for the cost of landfill and ordered that Article 448[34] of the New Civil Code be followed by the parties as petitioner was a builder in good faith. The Ruling of the Court of Appeals Aggrieved, petitioner DECS and Municipality of Daraga, Albay filed their respective Notices of Appeal[35] assailing the trial courts Decision before the CA. However, on June 17, 1998, the appellate court declared the appeals of both petitioners abandoned and dismissed for their failure to pay the required docket fees within the reglementary period.[36] Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration[37] of the said June 17, 1998 Resolution and its appeal was subsequently reinstated.[38] The Municipality ofDaraga, Albay, however, totally
Republic vs Hidalgo
lost its appeal due to inaction, and the appellate court correspondingly issued a Partial Entry of Judgment on July 9, 1998.[39] Moreover, the appellate court held that there was no jurisdictional defect in the reconstitution proceeding being one in rem, and in the issuance of OCT No. RO-18971 based on the destroyed or lost OCT No. 2563, even if no notice was sent to petitioner. Thus, the CA ruled that respondents claim of ownership over Lot 6849-A occupied by the school is conclusive for being soundly predicated on TCT No. T-83946 which cancelled the reconstituted OCT No. RO18971. Furthermore, it reiterated the trial courts holding that petitioner is precluded from attacking collaterally respondents title over the disputed lot in this proceeding. The CA emphasized that petitioners failure to present TCT No. 4812 allegedly issued in the name of the Municipality of Daraga, Albay in 1940 in lieu of OCT No. 2563 and the Deed of Conveyance executed by the original owner, Claro Oate, in favor of the Municipalitywas fatal to the defense. It reasoned that all the more had their claim of ownership become doubtful when defendantsappellants [sic] failed to explain from their pleadings and the evidence submitted before Us their failure to present the two documents.[40] The appellate court concluded that given these facts, no title in the name of the Municipality ever existed and thus it could not have validly donated the subject property to petitioner. Anent the issue of the applicability of Amigable v. Cuenca,[41] the CA affirmed the doctrine enunciated in said case that to uphold the States immunity from suit would subvert the ends of justice. In fine, the appellate court pointed out the inconvenience and impossibility of restoring possession of Lot 6849-A to respondent considering the substantial improvements built on said lot by the government which amounted to almost PhP 12 million; and that the only relief available was for the government to pay just compensation in favor of respondent computed on the basis of the value of the property at the time of the governments taking of the land. Through its assailed Decision,[42] the CA dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the trial courts decisionin toto. It reasoned that laches
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does not apply, its application rests on the sound discretion of the court, and where the court believes that its application would result in manifest wrong or injustice, it is constrained not to be guided strictly by said doctrine. Besides, it opined that laches could not defeat the rights of a registered owner. The Issues Hence, we have the instant petition where petitioner raises the following assignment of errors:
I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS CAUSE OF ACTION TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS NOT YET BARRED BY LACHES. II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ACCORDING GREAT WEIGHT ON RESPONDENTS RECONSTITUTED ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE (OCT) NO. 2563 COVERING SUBJECT PROPERTY. III THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER MAY BE SUED IN VIOLATION OF THE STATES IMMUNITY FROM SUIT. IV THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER MAY BE SUED INDEPENDENTLY OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.[43]
Petitioner basically raises two issuesthe application of laches and the nonsuability of the State.
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The threshold issue is whether petitioner DECS can be sued in Civil Case No. 8715 without its consent. A supplementary issue is whether petitioner DECS can be sued independently of the Republic of the Philippines. We rule that petitioner DECS can be sued without its permission as a result of its being privy to the Deed of Donation executed by the Municipality of Daraga, Albay over the disputed property. When it voluntarily gave its consent to the donation, any dispute that may arise from it would necessarily bring petitioner DECS down to the level of an ordinary citizen of the State vulnerable to a suit by an interested or affected party. It has shed off its mantle of immunity and relinquished and forfeited its armor of non-suability of the State.[44] The auxiliary issue of non-joinder of the Republic of the Philippines is likewise resolved in the negative. While it is true that petitioner is an unincorporated government agency, and as such technically requires the Republic of the Philippines to be impleaded in any suit against the former, nonetheless, considering our resolution of the main issue below, this issue is deemed mooted. Besides, at this point, we deem it best to lift such procedural technicality in order to finally resolve the long litigation this case has undergone. Moreover, even if we give due course to said issue, we will arrive at the same ruling. The Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party-defendant in Civil Case No. 8715 considering that it impliedly gave its approval to the involvement of petitioner DECS in the Deed of Donation. In a situation involving a contract between a government department and a third party, the Republic of the Philippines need not be impleaded as a party to a suit resulting from said contract as it is assumed that the authority granted to such department to enter into such contract carries with it the full responsibility and authority to sue and be sued in its name.
Main Issue: Equitable Remedy of Laches Petitioner strongly asserts that the Municipality of Daraga, Albay had continuous, open, and adverse possession in the concept of an owner over the
Republic vs Hidalgo
disputed lot since 1940 until December 21, 1988 or for about 48 years. Significantly, it maintains that Tax Declaration No. 31954 covering the disputed lot in the name of the Municipality of Daraga, Albay contains an annotation certifying that said lot was under voucher No. 69, August, 1940 accounts. The corresponding Transfer Title No. 4812 has been issued by the Register of Deeds Office of Albay on August 3, 1940.[45] When petitioner received the lot as donation from the Municipality on December 21, 1988, it possessed the subject lot also in the concept of an owner and continued to introduce improvements on the lot. Consequently, when respondent instituted the instant case in 1993, petitioner and its predecessor-ininterest Municipality of Daraga, Albay had possessed the subject lot for a combined period of about fifty two (52) years. Petitioner strongly avers that Claro Oate, the original owner of subject lot, sold it to the Municipality. At the very least it asserts that said Claro Oate allowed the Municipality to enter, possess, and enjoy the lot without protest. In fact, Claro Oate neither protested nor questioned the cancellation of his Tax Declaration No. 30235 covering the disputed lot and its substitution by Tax Declaration No. 31954 in the name of the Municipality on account of his sale of the lot to the latter. In the same vein, when Claro Oate and his spouse died, their children Antonio, Rafael, and Francisco who succeeded them also did not take any steps to question the ownership and possession by the Municipality of the disputed lot until they died on June 8, 1990, June 12, 1991, andOctober 22, 1957, respectively. Petitioner maintains that significantly, respondent and his siblings succeeding their father Francisco as the alleged owners, from his death on October 22, 1957also did not take any action to recover the questioned lot from 1957 until 1993 when the instant suit was commenced. Petitioner avers that if they were really the owners of said lot, they would not have waited 52 long years to institute the suit assuming they have a cause of action against the Municipality or petitioner. Thus, petitioner submits that the equitable principle of laches has indubitably set in to bar respondents action to recover possession of, and title to, the disputed lot.
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Laches and its elements Indeed, it is settled that rights and actions can be lost by delay and by the effect of delay as the equitable defense of laches does not concern itself with the character of the defendants title, but only with plaintiffs long inaction or inexcusable neglect to bar the latters action as it would be inequitable and unjust to the defendant. Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that whichby the exercise of due diligence could or should have been done earlier.[46] Verily, laches serves to deprive a party guilty of it to any judicial remedies. Its elements are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom the defendant claims, giving rise to the situation which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct as having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right in which the defendant bases the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.[47] In Felix Gochan and Sons Realty Corporation, we held that [t]hough laches applies even to imprescriptible actions, its elements must be proved positively. Laches is evidentiary in nature which could not be established by mere allegations in the pleadings and can not be resolved in a motion to dismiss (emphases supplied).[48] In the same vein, we explained in Santiago v. Court of Appeals that there is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular circumstances.[49] Issue of laches not barred by adverse judgment against Daraga, Albay
It is unfortunate that defendant Municipality of Daraga, Albay lost its appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 60659 before the CA for its failure to pay the required docket fees within the reglementary period. As a result, a Partial Entry of Judgment was
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made on July 9, 1998 and consequently, the dispositions in the November 3, 1997 Decision, rendered by the Legaspi City RTC, Branch I in favor of respondent Celso Oate, became final and executory as against defendant Municipality of Daraga, Albay. As an off-shoot, with respect to the Municipality of Daraga, the Deed of Donation in favor of petitioner DECS was annulledrespondent Oate was declared owner in fee simple of the disputed lots and entitled to possession but was required to pay PhP 50,000 to the Daraga Municipal Government and the costs of suit. By reason of the finality of the Decision against the Municipality of Daraga, Tax Declaration Nos. 04-006-00068, 332, 22184, 31954, and 8926 are all cancelled and annulled (if not yet cancelled). What are the effects of the final judgment against Municipality of Daraga on its co-defendant, petitioner DECS? Generally, it has no impact on the appeal of DECS unless the decision affects its defenses. In this petition, DECS no longer questions the declaration of nullity of the Deed of Donation over the disputed lot and hence can be considered as a final resolution of the issue. Likewise, it does not challenge the ownership of Oate of the disputed lots, but merely relied on the defense of laches. The final directive for Municipality of Daraga to return possession of the land has no significance on DECS appeal since precisely, it is DECS position that it should retain possession of the land. From these considerations, the final RTC November 3, 1997 Decision against the Municipality of Daraga has no substantial and material effect upon the DECS appeal. The only remaining issue left is whether laches can inure to the benefit of petitioner DECS considering the fact that Lot No. 6849-A was devoted to public education when the elementary school was built in 1940 under the supervision and control of DECS up to 1993 when Civil Case No. 8715 was filed by respondent Oate. We rule in the affirmative. Laches has set in
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A brief scrutiny of the records does show tell-tale signs of laches. The first element is undisputed: the then Bagumbayan Elementary School of Daraga was constructed in 1940 on a portion of disputed Lot 6849, specifically Lot No. 6849-A containing13,072 square meters under TCT No. T-83946. Moreover, Mrs. Toribia Milleza,[50] a retired government employee and resident of Bagumbayan, Daraga since 1955 pertinently testified, thus:
Q: How long have you been residing in this Bagumbayan, Daraga, Albay? A: Maybe I stayed there in 1955 until the present.[51] xxxx Q: Now, can you further recall the kind of building that was constructed in this property? A: Seva type, building. Q: At present how many buildings were constructed in this property? A: Plenty of school buildings. Q: Now, how many buildings were first constructed in [sic] this property? A: In 1955 only one, the Seva type, then there was constructed five (5) Marcos Type buildings during the Marcos time.[52] place,
The devotion of Lot No. 6849-A to education started in 1940 and continued up to December 21, 1988 when said lot was donated to the DECS. From then on, DECS built various buildings and introduced improvements on said lot. Lot No. 6849-A was continuously used for public education until March 18, 1993 when respondent Oate filed Civil Case No. 8715 and thereafter up to the present. Thus, for a total period of more than fifty-two (52) years, Lot No. 6849-A was exclusively and completely utilized by DECS for public education. This fact was not successfully challenged nor refuted by respondent.
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The second element of laches was likewise proven. No evidence was presented to show that respondent or his predecessors-in-interest ever took any action, administrative or judicial, nor either party questioned or protested the Municipalitys adverse occupation of a portion of Lot 6849. As petitioner had demonstrated laches by persuasive and credible evidence, it is incumbent upon respondent to show that his predecessors-in-interest indeed protected their rights of ownership over the lot. Thus, as early as 1940, when the first Seva type school building was constructed over a portion of the disputed lot, now Lot 6849-A, respondent must prove that his predecessors-in-interest indeed undertook activities to contest the occupation of the portion of the lot by the Municipality and subsequently by petitioner DECS. Unfortunately, respondent failed to substantiate such defense of ownership and possession of the lot and even skirted this issue. Respondent testified that he came to know of Lot 6849 only in 1973 when he was 23 years old.[53] He asserted that he took possession of said lot in the same year when his two (2) uncles, the brothers of his late father, passed on to him the disputed lot as his fathers share of the inheritance from the late Claro Oate and Gregoria Los Baos (his grandparents). However, it is interesting to note that he testified that he only came to know in 1991 that the elementary school was built on a portion of Lot 6849, now Lot 6849-A. These assertions are irreconcilable. Common experience tells us that one who owns a property and takes possession of it cannot fail to discover and know that an existing elementary school was built and standing on the lot from the time that the owner starts possessing a property. Nonetheless, even granting that respondent indeed only came to know of such encroachment or occupation in 1991, his rights cannot be better than that of his predecessors-in-interest, that is, Claro Oate and his uncles, Antonio and Rafael, who died in 1990 and 1991, respectively. Since respondents right over the lot originated from his predecessors-in-interest, then he cannot have better rights over Lot No. 6849-A than the latter. The spring cannot rise higher than its source. Besides, respondent has not proffered any explanation why his predecessors-in-interest did not protest and challenge the Municipalitys occupancy over a portion of their lot. Verily, with the span of around 52 years afforded respondent and his predecessors-in-interest, their inaction and delay in protecting their rights were certainly excessive and unjustified.
Republic vs Hidalgo
In the third element, the records clearly bear out the fact that petitioner DECS did not know nor anticipate that their possession and occupancy of a portion of Lot 6849 would later be questioned. In fact, petitioner built additional school buildings and facilities on the school site amounting to more than PhP 11 million. Mr. Jose Adra, School Principal of the Daraga North Central Elementary School, testified on the donation of the disputed lot to petitioner and the cost of the improvements on it.[54] After more than forty-eight (48) years of unquestioned, peaceful, and uninterrupted possession by petitioner DECS, it had no knowledge nor reason to believe that respondent would assert any right over the lot after the lapse of such long occupation coupled with a tax declaration in the name of the Daraga Municipality. Finally, the last element is likewise proven by the antecedent facts that clearly show grave prejudice to the government, in general, and to petitioner, in particular, if the instant action is not barred without even considering the cost of the construction of the school buildings and facilities and the deleterious effect on the school children and affected school teachers and personnel if Lot No. 6849A would be returned to respondent. Verily, the application of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the court as its application is controlled by equitable considerations. In the instant case, with the foregoing considerations, we are constrained from giving approbation to the trial and appellate courts ruling that the application of the principle of laches would subvert the ends of justice. Indeed, it is unjust for the State and the affected citizenry to suffer after respondent and his predecessors-ininterest had slept on their rights for 52 years. Also, the inaction of respondent Oate and his predecessors-in-interest for over 50 years has reduced their right to regain possession of Lot 6849-A to a stale demand. Laches holds over the actual area possessed and occupied by petitioner
Republic vs Hidalgo
We, however, make the clear distinction that laches applies in favor of petitioner only as regards Lot 6849-A which is actually possessed and occupied by it. Laches does not apply to Lot Nos. 6849-B, 6849-C, 6849-D, and 6849E. These portions were never occupied by the Municipality and petitioner. Agricultural tenant Felicito Armenta testified that his father, Antonio Armenta, started cultivating portions of Lot 6849 way back in the 1940s and that he took over the tenancy in 1960 when his father stopped tilling the land. Besides, if the Municipality indeed owned Lot 6849 by virtue of a purchase, it is likewise guilty of laches in not protecting or contesting the cultivation by Oates agricultural tenants of said portions of Lot 6849. Transfer Certificates of Title on portions of Lot 6849 valid Petitioner contends that the reconstitution of OCT No. 2563covering subject lot in 1991 or 52 years after the Municipality owned said lotdoes not in any way affect the latters preferential and superior right over the disputed lot. In the same vein, it maintains that it is inconsequential that petitioner and the Municipality failed to present as evidence the deed of conveyance in favor of the Municipality, as well as TCT No. 4812 as a registered land owner may lose the right to recover possession of a registered property by reason of laches. Petitioner concludes that the long delayed reconstitution of OCT No. 2563 by respondent was a mere afterthought and intended to camouflage his and his predecessors unreasonably long inaction which indicates an awareness that they have no valid claim whatsoever over disputed Lot 6849. We disagree. It must be noted that a reconstitution proceeding is one in rem and is thus binding to the whole world. While it is true that laches has set in so far as it pertains to the portion of Lot 6849, specifically Lot 6849-A where the Municipality and petitioner DECS had constructed the existing school, such does not hold true for the totality of Lot 6849 as explained above. Indeed, the reconstitution proceeding being one in rem, the consequent issuance of OCT No. RO-18971 in lieu of the lost or destroyed OCT No. 2563 is valid.
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Anent the issue of non-notification, we agree with the observation of the courts a quo that even granting arguendo that petitioner was not notified about the reconstitution proceeding, such deficiency is not jurisdictional as to nullify and prevail over the final disposition of the trial court in a proceeding in rem. More so, while petitioner strongly asserts that the certification in Tax Declaration No. 31954 attesting to the payment of the disputed lot under Municipal Voucher No. 69 and the issuance of TCT No. 4812, which was never disputed nor controverted by respondent, should have been given evidentiary weight by the trial and appellate courts as the presumptions of regularity and validity of such official act have not been overcome, such documents cannot defeat the registered title of respondent. Between a clear showing of ownership evidenced by a registered title and a certification in a tax declaration, albeit done in an official capacity, the former holds as the latter is only persuasive evidence. Indeed, tax declarations in land cases per se do not constitute ownership without other substantial pieces of evidence. The records do not show and petitioner has not given any cogent explanation why the Deed of Conveyance in favor of theMunicipality of Daraga, Albay and TCT No. 4812 were not presented. With clear and affirmative defenses set up by petitioner andMunicipality of Daraga, Albay, it is incumbent for them to present these documents. Therefore, the unmistakable inference is that there was indeed no sale and conveyance by Claro Oate of Lot 6849 in favor of the Municipality. Consequently, the TCTs cancelling OCT No. RO-18971 covering Lot Nos. 6849-A, 6849-B, 6849-C, 6849-D, and 6849-E were likewise validly issued. Thus, notwithstanding valid titles over the portions of Lot 6849, respondent Oate cannot now take possession over Lot No. 6849-A for reason of laches. In the recent case of De Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, we reiterated the principle we have consistently applied in laches:
The law[55] provides that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner can be acquired by prescription or adverse
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possession. Nonetheless, while it is true that a Torrens Title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of laches.[56] Thus, with our resolution of the principal issue of applicability of the equitable remedy of laches, the issue of suability of the State has been mooted.
A final word. Considering our foregoing disquisition and upon grounds of equity, a modification of the final decision prevailing between respondent Oate and the Municipality of Daraga, Albay is in order. It would be grossly iniquitous for respondent Oate to pay PhP 50,000 to the Municipality of Daraga, Albay considering that he is not entitled to recover the possession and usufruct of Lot No. 6849-A. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the January 14, 2004 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 60659 affirming the November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: 1) Declaring the DepEd (formerly DECS), Division of Albay to have the rights of possession and usufruct over Lot 6849-A with an area of 13,072 square meters under TCT No. T-83946 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay, as a result of laches on the part of respondent Celso Oate and his predecessors-ininterest. Respondent Celso Oate, his heirs, assigns, and successors-in-interest are prohibited from selling, mortgaging, or encumbering Lot 6849-A while the said lot is still being used and occupied by petitioner DECS. However, the rights of possession and usufruct will be restored to respondent the moment petitioner DECS no longer needs the said lot. The Registry of Deeds of Albay is ordered to annotate the aforementioned restrictions and conditions at the back of TCT No. T83946-A in the name of respondent Celso Oate. Item No. 2 of the November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC is modified accordingly; 2) Declaring Celso Oate as the true and legal owner in fee simple of the following lots:
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a. Lot 6849-C with an area of 10,000 square meters under TCT No. T-83948 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay; b. Lot 6849-D with an area of 1,127 square meters under TCT No. T-83949 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay; and c. Lot 6849-E with an area of 608 square meters under TCT No. T-83950 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay. 3) Declaring Mariano M. Lim as true and legal owner of Lot 6849-B with an area of 3,100 square meters under TCT No.T-84049 of the Registry of Deeds of Albay; 4) Ordering petitioner DECS and all other persons claiming under said department to return the possession of Lots 6849-C, 6849-D, and 6849-E to respondent Celso Oate and Lot 6849-B to Mariano M. Lim; and 5) Deleting Item No. 4 of the November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC, which ordered respondent Celso Oate to pay Fifty Thousand Pesos (PhP 50,000) to defendant Municipality of Daraga, Albay. The November 3, 1997 Decision of the Legaspi City RTC is AFFIRMED in all other respects. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic vs Hidalgo
FIRST DIVISION
REPUBLIC OF PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, - versus -
THE G.R. No. 161657 Present: PUNO, C.J.,Chairperson, SANDOVALA. GUTIERREZ, CORONA, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: October 4, 2007
HON. VICENTE HIDALGO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 37, CARMELO V. CACHERO, in his capacity as Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and TARCILA LAPERAL MENDOZA, Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x DECISION GARCIA, J.: Via this verified petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic, for short), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), comes to this Court to nullify and set aside the decision dated August 27, 2003 and other related issuances of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 37, in its Civil Case No. 9994075. In directly invoking the Courts original jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari and prohibition, without challenge from any of the respondents, the Republic gave as justification therefor the fact that
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the case involves an overTWO BILLION PESO judgment against the State, allegedly rendered in blatant violation of the Constitution, law and jurisprudence. By any standard, the case indeed involves a colossal sum of money which, on the face of the assailed decision, shall be the liability of the national government or, in fine, the taxpayers. This consideration, juxtaposed with the constitutional and legal questions surrounding the controversy, presents special and compelling reasons of public interests why direct recourse to the Court should be allowed, as an exception to the policy on hierarchy of courts. At the core of the litigation is a 4,924.60-square meter lot once covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 118527 of the Registry of Deeds of Manila in the name of the herein private respondent Tarcila Laperal Mendoza (Mendoza), married to Perfecto Mendoza. The lot is situated at No. 1440 Arlegui St., San Miguel, Manila, near the Malacaang Palace complex. On this lot, hereinafter referred to as the Arlegui property, now stands the Presidential Guest House which was home to two (2) former Presidents of the Republic and now appears to be used as office building of the Office of the President.[1] The facts: Sometime in June 1999, Mendoza filed a suit with the RTC of Manila for reconveyance and the corresponding declaration of nullity of a deed of sale and title against the Republic, the Register of Deeds of Manila and one Atty. Fidel Vivar. In her complaint, as later amended, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94075and eventually raffled to Branch 35 of the court, Mendoza essentially alleged being the owner of the disputed Arlegui property which the Republic forcibly dispossessed her of and over which the Register of Deeds of Manila issued TCT No. 118911 in the name of the Republic. Answering, the Republic set up, among other affirmative defenses, the States immunity from suit. The intervening legal tussles are not essential to this narration. What is material is that in an Order of March 17, 2000, the RTC of Manila, Branch 35, dismissed Mendozas complaint. The court would also deny, in another order dated May 12, 2000, Mendozas omnibus motion for reconsideration. On a petition for certiorari, however, the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 60749,reversed the trial courts assailed orders and remanded the case to the court a quo for further proceedings.[2] On appeal, this Court, in G.R. No. 155231, sustained the CAs reversal action.[3]
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From Branch 35 of the trial court whose then presiding judge inhibited himself from hearing the remanded Civil Case No. 99-94075, the case was re-raffled to Branch 37 thereof, presided by the respondent judge. On May 5, 2003, Mendoza filed a Motion for Leave of Court to file a Third Amended Complaint with a copy of the intended third amended complaint thereto attached. In the May 16, 2003 setting to hear the motion, the RTC, in open court and in the presence of the Republics counsel, admitted the third amended complaint, ordered the Republic to file its answer thereto within five (5) days from May 16, 2003 and set a date for pre-trial. In her adverted third amended complaint for recovery and reconveyance of the Arlegui property, Mendoza sought the declaration of nullity of a supposed deed of sale dated July 15, 1975 which provided the instrumentation toward the issuance of TCT No. 118911 in the name of the Republic. And aside from the cancellation of TCT No. 118911, Mendoza also asked for the reinstatement of her TCT No. 118527.[4]until the first week of July 1975 when a group of armed men representing themselves to be members of the Presidential Security Group [PSG] of the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had forcibly entered [her] residence and ordered [her] to turn over to them her Copy of TCT No. 118525 and compelled her and the members of her household to vacate the same ; thus, out of fear for their lives, [she] handed her Owners Duplicate Certificate Copy of TCT No. 118527 and had left and/or vacated the subject property.Mendoza further alleged the following: In the same third amended complaint, Mendoza averred that,
since time immemorial, she and her predecessors-in-interest had been in peaceful and adverse possession of the property as well as of the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 118527. Such possession, she added, continued
1. Per verification, TCT No. 118527 had already been cancelled by virtue of a deed of sale in favor of the Republic allegedly executed by her and her deceased husband on July 15, 1975 and acknowledged before Fidel Vivar which deed was annotated at the back of TCT No. 118527 under PE: 2035/T118911 dated July 28, 1975; and 2. That the aforementioned deed of sale is fictitious as she (Mendoza) and her husband have not executed any deed of conveyance covering the disputed property in favor of the Republic, let alone appearing before Fidel Vivar. Inter alia, she prayed for the following: 4. Ordering the Republic to pay plaintiff [Mendoza] a reasonable compensation or rental for the use or occupancy of the subject property in
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the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS a month with a five (5%) per cent yearly increase, plus interest thereon at the legal rate, beginning July 1975 until it finally vacates the same; 5. Ordering the Republic to pay plaintiffs counsel a sum equivalent to TWENTY FIVE (25%) PER CENT of the current value of the subject property and/or whatever amount is recovered under the premises; Further, plaintiff prays for such other relief, just and equitable under the premises. On May 21, 2003, the Republic, represented by the OSG, filed aMotion for Extension (With Motion for Cancellation of scheduled pre-trial). In it, the Republic manifested its inability to simply adopt its previous answer and, accordingly, asked that it be given a period of thirty (30) days from May 21, 2003 or until June 20, 2003 within which to submit an Answer.[5] June 20, 2003 came and went, but no answer was filed. On July 18, 2003 and again on August 19, 2003, the OSG moved for a 30-day extension at each instance. The filing of the last two motions for extension proved to be an idle gesture, however, since the trial court had meanwhile issued an order[6] dated July 7, 2003 declaring the petitioner Republic as in default and allowing the private respondent to present her evidence ex-parte. The evidence for the private respondent, as plaintiff a quo, consisted of her testimony denying having executed the alleged deed of sale dated July 15, 1975 which paved the way for the issuance of TCT No. 118911. According to her, said deed is fictitious or inexistent, as evidenced by separate certifications, the first (Exh. E), issued by the Register of Deeds for Manila and the second (Exh. F), by the Office of Clerk of Court, RTC Manila. Exhibit E[7] states that a copy of the supposed conveying deed cannot, despite diligent efforts of records personnel, be located, while Exhibit F[8] states that Fidel Vivar was not a commissioned notary public for and in the City of Manila for the year 1975. Three other witnesses[9]Arlegui property.testified, albeit their testimonies revolved around the
appraisal and rental values of the
Eventually, the trial court rendered a judgment by default[10] for Mendoza and against the Republic. To the trial court, the Republic had veritably confiscated Mendozas property, and deprived her not only of the use thereof but also denied her of the income she could have had otherwise realized during all the years she was illegally dispossessed of the same. Dated August 27, 2003, the trial courts decision dispositively reads as follows: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
Republic vs Hidalgo
1. Declaring the deed of sale dated July 15, 1975, annotated at the back of [TCT] No. 118527 as PE:2035/T-118911, as non-existent and/or fictitious, and, therefore, null and void from the beginning; 2. Declaring that [TCT] No. 118911 of the defendant Republic of the Philippines has no basis, thereby making it null and void from the beginning; 3. Ordering the defendant Register of Deeds for the City of Manila to reinstate plaintiff [Mendozas TCT] No. 118527; 4. Ordering the defendant Republic to pay just compensation in the sum of ONE HUNDRED FORTY THREE MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND (P143,600,000.00) PESOS, plus interest at the legal rate, until the whole amount is paid in full for the acquisition of the subject property; 5. Ordering the plaintiff, upon payment of the just compensation for the acquisition of her property, to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in favor of the defendant Republic ; and, on the other hand, directing the defendant Register of Deeds, upon presentation of the said deed of conveyance, to cancel plaintiffs TCT No. 118527 and to issue, in lieu thereof, a new Transfer Certificate of Title in favor of the defendant Republic; 6. Ordering the defendant Republic to pay the plaintiff the sum of ONE BILLION FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWENTY SEVEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT (P1,480,627,688.00) PESOS, representing the reasonable rental for the use of the subject property, the interest thereon at the legal rate, and the opportunity cost at the rate of three (3%) per cent per annum, commencing July 1975 continuously up to July 30, 2003, plus an additional interest at the legal rate, commencing from this date until the whole amount is paid in full; 7. Ordering the defendant Republic to pay the plaintiff attorneys fee, in an amount equivalent to FIFTEEN (15%) PER CENT of the amount due to the plaintiff. With pronouncement as to the costs of suit. SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket and emphasis added.) Subsequently, the Republic moved for, but was denied, a new trial per order of the trial court of October 7, 2003.[11] Denied also was its subsequent
Republic vs Hidalgo
plea for reconsideration.[12] These twin denial orders were followed by several orders and processes issued by the trial court on separate dates as hereunder indicated: 1. November 27, 2003 - - Certificate of Finality declaring the August 27, 2003 decision final and executory.[13] 2. December 17, 2003 - - Order denying the Notice of Appeal filed on November 27, 2003, the same having been filed beyond the reglementary period.[14] 3. December 19, 2003 - - Order[15] granting the private respondents motion for execution. 4. December 22, 2003 - - Writ of Execution.[16]
Hence, this petition for certiorari. By Resolution[17] of November 20, 2006, the case was set for oral arguments. On January 22, 2007, when this case was called for the purpose, both parties manifested their willingness to settle the case amicably, for which reason the Court gave them up to February 28, 2007 to submit the compromise agreement for approval. Following several approved extensions of the February 28, 2007 deadline, the OSG, on August 6, 2007, manifested that it is submitting the case for resolution on the merits owing to the inability of the parties to agree on an acceptable compromise. In this recourse, the petitioner urges the Court to strike down as a nullity the trial courts order declaring it in default and the judgment by default that followed. Sought to be nullified, too, also on the ground that they were issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, are the orders and processes enumerated immediately above issued after the rendition of the default judgment. Petitioner lists five (5) overlapping grounds for allowing its petition. It starts off by impugning the order of default and the judgment by default. To the petitioner, the respondent judge committed serious jurisdictional error when he proceeded to hear the case and eventually awarded the private respondent a staggering amount without so much as giving the petitioner the opportunity to present its defense. Petitioners posture is simply without merit.
Republic vs Hidalgo
Deprivation of procedural due process is obviously the petitioners threshold theme. Due process, in its procedural aspect, guarantees in the minimum the opportunity to be heard.[18] Grave abuse of discretion, however, cannot plausibly be laid at the doorstep of the respondent judge on account of his having issued the default order against the petitioner, then proceeding with the hearing and eventually rendering a default judgment. For, what the respondent judge did hew with what Section 3, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court prescribes and allows in the event the defending party fails to seasonably file a responsive pleading. The provision reads: SEC. 3. Default; declaration of.- If the defending party fails to answer within the time allowed therefor, the court shall, upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party, and proof of such failure, declare the defending party in default. Thereupon, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the claimant to submit evidence .[19] While the ideal lies in avoiding orders of default,[20] the policy of the law being to have every litigated case tried on its full merits,[21] the act of the respondent judge in rendering the default judgment after an order of default was properly issued cannot be struck down as a case of grave abuse of discretion. The term grave abuse of discretion, in its juridical sense, connotes capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[22] The abuse must be of such degree as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in a capricious manner. The word capricious, usually used in tandem with arbitrary, conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action.[23] Under the premises, the mere issuance by the trial court of the order of default followed by a judgment by default can easily be sustained as correct and doubtless within its jurisdiction. Surely, a disposition directing the Republic to pay an enormous sum without the trial court hearing its side does not, without more, vitiate, on due procedural ground, the validity of the default judgment. The petitioner may have indeed been deprived of such hearing, but this does not mean that its right to due process had been violated. For, consequent to being declared in default, the defaulting defendant is deemed to have waived his right to be heard or to take part in the trial. The handling solicitors simply squandered the Republics opportunity to be heard. But more importantly, the law itself imposes such deprivation of the right to participate as a form of penalty against one
Republic vs Hidalgo
unwilling without justification to join issue upon the allegations tendered by the plaintiff. And going to another point, the petitioner would ascribe jurisdictional error on the respondent judge for denying its motion for new trial based on any or a mix of the following factors, viz., (1) the failure to file an answer is attributable to the negligence of the former handling solicitor; (2) the meritorious nature of the petitioners defense; and (3) the value of the property involved. The Court is not convinced. Even as the Court particularly notes what the trial court had said on the matter of negligence: that all of the petitioners pleadings below bear at least three signatures, that of the handling solicitor, the assistant solicitor and the Solicitor General himself, and hence accountability should go up all the way to the top of the totem pole of authority, the cited reasons advanced by the petitioner for a new trial are not recognized under Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court for such recourse.[24] Withal, there is no cogent reason to disturb the denial by the trial court of the motion for new trial and the denial of the reiterative motion for reconsideration. Then, too, the issuance by the trial court of the Order dated December 17, 2003[25] denying the petitioners notice of appeal after the court caused the issuance on November 27, 2003 of a certificate of finality of its August 27, 2003 decision can hardly be described as arbitrary, as the petitioner would have this Court believe. In this regard, the Court takes stock of the following key events and material dates set forth in the assailed December 17, 2003 order, supra: (a) The petitioner, thru the OSG, received onAugust 29, 2003 a copy of the RTC decision in this case, hence had up to September 13, 2003, a Saturday, within which to perfect an appeal; (b) On September 15, 2003, a Monday, the OSG filed its motion for new trial, which the RTC denied, the OSG receiving a copy of the order of denial on October 9, 2003; and (c) On October 24, 2003, the OSG sought reconsideration of the order denying the motion for new trial. The motion for reconsideration was denied per Order dated November 25, 2003, a copy of which the OSG received on the same date. Given the foregoing time perspective, what the trial court wrote in its aforementioned impugned order of December 17, 2003 merits approval: In the case at bar, it is clear that the motion for new trial filed on the fifteenth (15th) day after the decision was received on August 29, 2003 was denied and the moving party has only the remaining period from notice of notice of denial within which to file a notice of appeal. xxx
Republic vs Hidalgo
Accordingly, when defendants [Republic et al.] filed their motion for new trial on the last day of the fifteen day (15) prescribed for taking an appeal, which motion was subsequently denied, they had one (1) day from receipt of a copy of the order denying new trial within which to perfect [an] appeal . Since defendants had received a copy of the order denying their motion for new trial on 09 October 2003, reckoned from that date, they only have one (1) day left within which to file the notice of appeal. But instead of doing so, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration which was later declared by the Court as pro forma motion in the Order dated 25 November 2003. The running of the prescriptive period, therefore, can not be interrupted by apro forma motion. Hence the filing of the notice of appeal on 27 November 2007 came much too late for by then the judgment had already become final and executory.[26] (Words in bracket added; Emphasis in the original.) It cannot be over-emphasized at this stage that the special civil action of certiorari is limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction; it is not a remedy to correct errors of judgment. Hence, the petitioners lament, partly covered by and discussed under the first ground for allowing its petition, about the trial court taking cognizance of the case notwithstanding private respondents claim or action being barred by prescription and/or laches cannot be considered favorably. For, let alone the fact that an action for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract, as here, does not prescribe;[27] that a void transfer of property can be recovered by accion reivindicatoria;[28] and that the legal fiction of indefeasibility of a Torrens title cannot be used as a shield to perpetuate fraud,[29] the trial courts disinclination not to appreciate in favor of the Republic the general principles of prescription or laches constitutes, at best, errors of judgment not correctable by certiorari. The evidence adduced below indeed adequately supports a conclusion that the Office of the President, during the administration of then President Marcos, wrested possession of the property in question and somehow secured a certificate of title over it without a conveying deed having been executed to legally justify the cancellation of the old title (TCT No. 118527) in the name of the private respondent and the issuance of a new one (TCT No. 118911) in the name of petitioner Republic. Accordingly, granting private respondents basic plea for recovery of the Arlegui property, which was legally hers all along, and the reinstatement of her cancelled certificate of title are legally correct as they are morally right. While not exactly convenient because the Office of the President presently uses it for mix residence and office purposes, restoring private respondent to her possession of the Arlegui property is still legally and physically feasible. For what is before us, after all, is a registered owner of a piece of land who, during the early days of the martial law regime, lost possession thereof
Republic vs Hidalgo
to the Government which appropriated the same for some public use, but without going through the legal process of expropriation, let alone paying such owner just compensation. The Court cannot, however, stop with just restoring the private respondent to her possession and ownership of her property. The restoration ought to be complemented by some form of monetary compensation for having been unjustly deprived of the beneficial use thereof, but not, however, in the varying amounts and level fixed in the assailed decision of the trial court and set to be executed by the equally assailed writ of execution. The Court finds the monetary award set forth therein to be erroneous. And the error relates to basic fundamentals of law as to constitute grave abuse of discretion. As may be noted, private respondent fixed the assessed value of her Arlegui property at P2,388,990.00. And in the prayer portion of her third amended complaint for recovery, she asked to be restored to the possession of her property and that the petitioner be ordered to pay her, as reasonable compensation or rental use or occupancy thereof, the sum of P500,000.00 a month, or P6 Million a year, with a five percent (5%) yearly increase plus interest at the legal rate beginning July 1975. From July 1975 when the PSG allegedly took over the subject property to July 2003, a month before the trial court rendered judgment, or a period of 28 years, private respondents total rental claim would, per the OSGs computation, only amount to P371,440,426.00. In its assailed decision, however, the trial court ordered the petitioner to pay private respondent the total amount of overP1.48 Billion or the mind-boggling amount of P1,480,627,688.00,to be exact, representing the reasonable rental for the property, the interest rate thereon at the legal rate and the opportunity cost. This figure is on top of the P143,600,000.00 which represents the acquisition cost of the disputed property. All told, the trial court would have the Republic pay the total amount of about P1.624 Billion, exclusive of interest, for the taking of a property with a declared assessed value of P2,388,900.00. This is not to mention the award of attorneys fees in an amount equivalent to 15% of the amount due the private respondent. In doing so, the respondent judge brazenly went around the explicit command of Rule 9, Section 3(d) of the Rules of Court[30] which defines the extent of the relief that may be awarded in a judgment by default, i.e., only so much as has been alleged andproved. The court acts in excess of jurisdiction if it awards an amount beyond the claim made in the complaint or beyond that proved by the evidence.[31][32] In the abstract, this means that the judgment must not be characterized by outrageous one-sidedness, but by what is fair, just and equitable that always underlie the enactment of
Republic vs Hidalgo
a law. While
a defaulted defendant may be said to be at the mercy of the trial court, the Rules of
Court and certainly the imperatives of fair play see to it that any decision against him must be in accordance with law.
Given the above perspective, the obvious question that comes to mind is the level of compensation which for the use and occupancy of the Arlegui property - would be fair to both the petitioner and the private respondent and, at the same time, be within acceptable legal bounds. The process of balancing the interests of both parties is not an easy one. But surely, theArlegui property cannot possibly be assigned, even perhaps at the present real estate business standards, a monthly rental value of at least P500,000.00 or P6,000,000.00 a year, the amount private respondent particularly sought and attempted to prove. This asking figure is clearly unconscionable, if not downright ridiculous, attendant circumstances considered. To the Court, an award of P20,000.00 a month for the use and occupancy of the Arlegui property, while perhaps a little bit arbitrary, is reasonable and may be granted pro hac viceconsidering the following hard realities which the Court takes stock of: 1. The property is relatively small in terms of actual area and had an assessed value of only P2,388,900.00; 2. What the martial law regime took over was not exactly an area with a new and imposing structure, if there was any; and 3. The Arlegui property had minimal rental value during the relatively long martial law years, given the very restrictive entry and egress conditions prevailing at the vicinity at that time and even after. To be sure, the grant of monetary award is not without parallel. In Alfonso v. Pasay City,[33] a case where a registered owner also lost possession of a piece of lot to a municipality which took it for a public purposes without instituting expropriation proceedings or paying any compensation for the lot, the Court, citing Herrera v. Auditor General,[34] ordered payment of just compensation but in the form of interest when a return of the property was no longer feasible. The award of attorneys fees equivalent to 15% of the amount due the private respondent, as reduced herein, is affirmed. The assessment of costs of suit against the petitioner is, however, nullified, costs not being allowed against the Republic, unless otherwise provided by law.[35]
Republic vs Hidalgo
The assailed trial courts issuance of the writ of execution[36] against government funds to satisfy its money judgment is also nullified. It is basic that government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments.[37] Republic v. Palacio[38] teaches that a judgment against the State generally operates merely to liquidate and establish the plaintiffs claim in the absence of express provision; otherwise, they can not be enforced by processes of law. Albeit title to the Arlegui property remains in the name of the petitioner Republic, it is actually the Office of the Presidentwhich has beneficial possession of and use over it since the 1975 takeover. Accordingly, and in accord with the elementary sense of justice, it behooves that office to make the appropriate budgetary arrangements towards paying private respondent what is due her under the premises. This, to us, is the right thing to do. The imperatives of fair dealing demand no less. And the Court would be remiss in the discharge of its duties as dispenser of justice if it does not exhort the Office of the President to comply with what, in law and equity, is its obligation. If the same office will undertake to pay its obligation with reasonable dispatch or in a manner acceptable to the private respondent, then simple justice, while perhaps delayed, will have its day. Private respondent is in the twilight of her life, being now over 90 years of age.[39] Any delay in the implementation of this disposition would be a bitter cut. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila dated August 27, 2003 insofar as it nullified TCT No. 118911 of petitioner Republic of the Philippines and ordered the Register of Deeds of Manila to reinstate private respondent Tarcila L. Mendozas TCT No. 118527, or to issue her a new certificate of title is AFFIRMED. Should it be necessary, the Register of Deeds of Manila shall execute the necessary conveying deed to effect the reinstatement of title or the issuance of a new title to her. It is MODIFIED in the sense that for the use and occupancy of the Arlegui property, petitioner Republic is ordered to pay private respondent the reasonable amount of P20,000.00 a month beginning July 1975 until it vacates the same and the possession thereof restored to the private respondent, plus an additional interest of 6% per annum on the total amount due upon the finality of this Decision until the same is fully paid. Petitioner is further ordered to pay private respondent attorney's fees equivalent to 15% of the amount due her under the premises. Accordingly, a writ of certiorari is hereby ISSUED in the sense that: 1. The respondent courts assailed decision of August 27, 2003 insofar as it ordered the petitioner Republic of the Philippines to pay private respondent
Republic vs Hidalgo
Tarcila L. Mendoza the sum of One Billion Four Hundred Eighty Million Six Hundred Twenty Seven Thousand Six Hundred Eighty Eight Pesos (P1,480,627,688.00) representing the purported rental use of the property in question, the interest thereon and the opportunity cost at the rate of 3% per annum plus the interest at the legal rate added thereon isnullified. The portion assessing the petitioner Republic for costs of suit is also declared null and void. 2. The Order of the respondent court dated December 19, 2003 for the issuance of a writ of execution and the Writ of Execution dated December 22, 2003 against government funds are hereby declared null and void. Accordingly, the presiding judge of the respondent court, the private respondent, their agents and persons acting for and in their behalves are permanently enjoined from enforcing said writ of execution. However, consistent with the basic tenets of justice, fairness and equity, petitioner Republic, thru the Office of the President, is hereby strongly enjoined to take the necessary steps, and, with reasonable dispatch, make the appropriate budgetary arrangements to pay private respondent Tarcila L. Mendoza or her assigns the amount adjudged due her under this disposition. SO ORDERED.
Yujuico vs Atienza
SECOND DIVISION
TERESITA M. YUJUICO, Petitioner, G.R. No. 164282 Present: - versus PUNO, J., Chairman, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., TINGA, and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., Chairman, City School Board of Manila, DR. MA. LUISA S. QUIONES, Co-Chairman, City School Board, and Schools Division Superintendent, ROGER Promulgated: GERNALE, Member, City School Board of Manila, HON. MANUEL M. ZARCAL, October 12, 2005 (in substitution of ARLENE ORTIZ), Member, City School Board of Manila, BENJAMIN VALBUENA (In substitution of MILES ROCES), Member, City School Board of Manila, LIBERTY TOLEDO, Member, City School Board of Manila, HON. FRANCESCA GERNALE (In substitution of PERCIVAL FLORIENDO), Member, City School Board of Manila, ISABELITA SANTOS, Secretary, City School Board of Manila, VICENTE MACARUBBO (In substitution of ISABELITA CHING), Assistant Secretary, City School Board of Manila, CITY SCHOOL BOARD OF MANILA and JUDGE MERCEDES POSADA-LACAP, in her capacity as
Yujuico vs Atienza
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 15, Respondents. x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION TINGA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari instituted by Teresita M. Yujuico, petitioner in the case for mandamus docketed as Civil Case No. 02-103748 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 15. Petitioner is questioning the propriety of the Order[1] dated 25 June 2004, granting respondents Petition for Relief from Judgment under Section 2, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The operative facts are not disputed. On 8 December 1995, the City Council of Manila enacted an Ordinance[2] authorizing the City Mayor to acquire by negotiation or expropriation certain parcels of land for utilization as a site for the Francisco Benitez Elementary School.[3] The property chosen is located along Solis St. near Juan Luna St. in the Second District of Manila and contains an approximate area of 3,979.10 square meters. It is covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 71541, 71548, 24423, 71544 and 71546, all in the name of petitioner. The Ordinance provides that an amount not to exceed the fair market value of the land then prevailing in the area will be allocated out of the Special Education Fund (SEF) of the City of Manila (City) to defray the cost of the propertys acquisition.[4] Failing to acquire the land by negotiation, the City filed a case for eminent domain against petitioner as owner of the property. Filed on 22 August 1996, the case was raffled to Branch 15, RTC of Manila and docketed as Civil Case No. 96-79699.[5]
Yujuico vs Atienza
On 30 June 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision[6] in the expropriation case in favor of the City. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.) The lots including the improvements therein of defendant

Teresita M. Yujuico, as described in the complaint, are declared expropriated for public use;
2.) The fair market value of the lots of defendant is fixed

at P18,164.80 per square meter. The fair market value of the improvements of lots subject of this action is fixed at P 978,000.00;
3.) The plaintiff must pay defendant the sum of P72,279,555.68

(3,979.10 sq. m. x P18,164.80) representing the value of the subject lots plus P978,000.00 representing the value of the improvements or the total amount ofP73,257,555.00 as just compensation for the whole property (including the improvements) minus the sum ofP5,363,289.00 that plaintiff deposited in Court per Order dated April 30, 1997, hence the balance ofP67,894,266.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from July 15, 1997 (date of possession of subject property for the purpose of this proceedings) until the day full payment is made to defendant or deposited in Court.[7]
The judgment became final and executory, no appeal having been interposed by either party.[8] On 6 April 2001, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution of Judgment[9] which the trial court granted. Pursuant to a Writ of Execution[10] dated 28 June 2001, the branch sheriff served a Notice ofGarnishment on the funds of the City deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines, YMCA Branch, Manila (Land Bank) to satisfy the judgment amount of P67,894,226.00, with interest at 6% per annum.[11]
Yujuico vs Atienza
Invoking jurisprudence holding that public funds cannot be made subject to garnishment, the City filed a motion to quash the Notice of Garnishment.[12] Acting on the motion, the trial court issued anOrder dated 2 August 2001. In the Order, the lower court recalled that during the hearing on the motion, the counsel for the City manifested that the amount of P36,403,170.00 had been appropriated by the City School Board (CSB) under CSB Resolutions Nos. 613 and 623, of which P31,039,881.00 was available for release. The amount of P5,363,269.00, representing fifteen percent (15%) of the assessed value of the property, had been deposited in court at the start of the expropriation proceedings and subsequently received by petitioner. In line with the manifestation made by the counsel for the City, the trial court ordered the release to petitioner of the amount of P31,039,881.00 deposited with the Land Bank, in partial payment of the just compensation adjudged in favor of petitioner.[13] The trial court further stated in the Order:
Considering that this case is on all fours with the case of the Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals (190 SCRA 206), wherein it was ruled that x x x Public funds are not subject to levy and execution, the Court therefore grants plaintiffs Motion to Quash the Notice of Garnishment and the Notice of Garnishment to the Landbank of the Philippines issued by the Branch Sheriff of this Court is hereby ordered lifted. There being no opposition for the release of the Thirty One Million Thirty Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty One Pesos (P31,039,881.00) deposited with the Land Bank, YMCA Branch as Special Education Fund, the Manager of the Landbank of the Philippines, YMCA, Manila is hereby directed to release the said amount to defendant Teresita M. Yujuico in partial payment of the just compensation adjudged by this Court in its Decision dated June 30, 2000.
Yujuico vs Atienza
Upon manifestation of the counsel for the plaintiff that it is the City School Board which has the authority to pass a resolution allocating funds for the full satisfaction of the just compensation fixed, the said body is hereby given thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order to pass the necessary resolution for the payments of the remaining balance due to defendant Teresita M. Yujuico.[14]
A copy of the Order dated 2 August 2001 was served on the CSB on 3 August 2001.[15] On 30 August 2001, petitioner submitted a manifestation before the trial court requesting that she be informed by both the City and the CSB if a resolution had already been passed by the latter in compliance with the Order.[16] Earlier, petitioner sent a letter to the Superintendent of City Schools of Manila to verify the CSBs compliance with the Order.[17] Not having been favored with a reply to her queries even after the lapse of the thirty (30)-day compliance period, petitioner sent a letter to the CSB dated 10 September 2001, demanding compliance with the Order.[18] As there was no action from the CSB, on 1 February 2002, petitioner filed a petition for contempt of court against respondents Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., Dr. Ma. Luisa S. Quioes, Roger Gernale, Arlene Ortiz, Miles Roces, Percival Floriendo, Liberty Toledo, Isabelita Santos and Isabelita Ching in their capacities as officers and members of the CSB.[19] The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-102837 of the Manila RTC.[20] Countering the petition for contempt, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss,[21] wherein they alleged inter alia that they never disregarded the Order as the matter had in fact been calendared and deliberated upon during the meetings of the CSB.[22] In their subsequent Omnibus Reply,[23]respondents argued
Yujuico vs Atienza
that petitioners failure to avail of the proper recourse to enforce the final and executory judgment[24] should not be a ground to hold them in contempt of court. Citing the case ofMunicipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals,[25] respondents asserted that petitioner should have filed a petition for mandamus to force the CSB to pass the necessary resolution for immediate payment of the balance of the just compensation awarded in her favor.[26] According to respondents, petitioner took the Order as a writ of mandamus when in fact it was a mere order in furtherance of the Writ of Execution.[27] This interpretation, respondents insisted, should never be allowed since petitioner merely wanted to escape the payment of docket fees in the filing of the petition for mandamus.[28] In an Order[29] dated 17 May 2002, the trial court denied the petition for contempt of court.
On 6 June 2002, petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus[30] against the members of the CSB, the same respondents in the petition for contempt of court, seeking to compel them to pass a resolution appropriating the amount necessary to pay the balance of the just compensation awarded to petitioner in the expropriation case, Civil Case No. 96-79699. The petition was docketed as Spl. Civil Action No. 02-103748 and raffled to Branch 51 of the RTC of Manila. [31] Upon petitioners motion,[32] Branch 51 of the Manila RTC before which the mandamus case was pending, in an Order[33] dated
Yujuico vs Atienza
23 August 2002, directed its consolidation with the expropriation case before Branch 15.[34] In a Decision[35] dated 9 October 2002, the lower court (Branch 15) granted the petition for mandamus. Specifically, it ordered respondents to immediately pass a resolution appropriating the necessary amount and the corresponding disbursement thereof for the full and complete payment of the balance of the court-adjudged compensation still due petitioner, ratiocinating as follows:[36]
This case is on all fours with the case of Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals (190 SCRA 206). .... The States power of eminent domain should be exercised within the bounds of fair play and justice. In the case at bar, considering that valuable property has been taken, the compensation to be paid fixed and the municipality is in full possession and utilizing the property for the public purpose, for three (3) years, the Court finds that the municipality has had more than reasonable time to pay full compensation. The arguments of the herein respondents that passing the ordinance or the act of appropriating special educational fund is a discretionary act that could not be compelled by mandamus should be thrown overboard. It must be stressed that what we have here is a final and executory judgment, establishing a legal right for the petitioner to demand fulfillment which on the other hand became an imperative duty on the part of the respondent to perform the act required. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are hereby ordered to immediately pass a resolution appropriating the necessary amount; and the corresponding disbursement thereof, for the full and complete payment of the remaining balance of the court-adjudged compensation due and owing to petitioner Teresita M. Yujuico. SO ORDERED.[37]
Yujuico vs Atienza
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court denied in an Order[38] dated 13 December 2002. With respondents not interposing an appeal, the Decision became final and executory on 2 January 2003[39] and eventually, the corresponding Entry of Judgment was issued on 15 January 2003.[40] The court granted petitioners Motion for Execution[41] in an Order[42] dated 12 March 2003. However, on 14 March 2003, respondents filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment,[43] wherein they also prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents invoked excusable negligence as a ground for their failure to seasonably file an appeal.[44] While it denied the application for TRO in view of its prior order granting petitioners Motion for Execution, the court granted the Petition for Relief from Judgment in an Order[45] dated 25 June 2004. This had the effect of giving due course to respondents appeal despite the fact that the decision of the trial court had already attained finality. Finding the Order unacceptable, petitioner elevated it to this Court by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 45. In her petition, petitioner asks that the order of the lower court giving due course to respondents appeal be reversed and set aside on a pure question of law.[46] Before resolving the substantive issues raised by the parties, the Court will first address the procedural infirmities ascribed by respondents to the petition at bar. Respondents assail the correctness and propriety of the mode of appeal resorted to by petitioner.[47]According to them, the order granting the petition for relief from judgment is an interlocutory order which cannot be made the subject of an appeal.[48] Respondents likewise argue that petitioner failed to
Yujuico vs Atienza
respect the rule on hierarchy of courts. This Court, they aver, had consistently held that its original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is not exclusive but is concurrent with that of the RTC and the Court of Appeals in certain cases.[49] Respondents have correctly pointed out that an interlocutory order cannot be made subject to an appeal. However, when viewed in context, the recitals of the petition clearly disclose and the Court is convinced that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it granted respondents petition for relief from judgment. While this case should have been elevated to this Court not by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 but through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, in the exercise of our sound discretion and in order to write finis to this case which has needlessly dragged on for so long, we shall treat the petition as a special civil action for certiorari. After all, it was filed within the reglementary period for the filing of a Rule 65 petition. As we held in Salinas v. NLRC,[50] in the interest of justice, this Court has often judiciously treated petitions erroneously captioned as petitions for review on certiorari as special civil actions for certiorari. This is in line with the principle that the strict application of procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of the case on the merits.[51] Accordingly, facial allegations of reversible error in the petition will be treated, as they should be, as contextual averments of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court a quo. Appropriately, petitioner impleaded the RTC Presiding Judge as party-respondent in the instant petition. Anent the alleged breach of the rule on hierarchy of courts, the doctrine is not an iron-clad dictum.[52] The rule may be relaxed when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant the
Yujuico vs Atienza
exercise of this Courts primary jurisdiction.[53] In this case, the judgment sought to be satisfied has long attained finality and the expropriated property has been utilized as a school site for five (5) years now; yet, the awarded just compensation has not been fully paid. These circumstances, in the Courts estimation, merit the relaxation of the technical rules of procedure to ensure that substantial justice will be served. Concerning petitioners alleged failure to implead the CSB or its new members before the trial court,[54] respondents argue that since there are five (5) new members in the CSB any decision in the case requiring the CSB to act as a body would prove to be legally impossible. The former members of the CSB could no longer be compelled to act according to the orders of the Court since they no longer have the capacity to do so. On the other hand, respondents continue, the new members cannot be directed to comply with the Courts judgment either; they have never been impleaded in the case; thus, the Court never acquired jurisdiction over their persons.[55] The arguments were effectively neutered our Resolution dated 8 August 2005. There, we declared:
Considering the arguments posited by both parties, this Court is of the view that a substitution of the original respondents by the members of the CSB who replaced them is warranted. The phrase or such time as may be granted by the Court in Sec. 17, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure denotes that the Court before whom the motion for substitution is filed may grant a period longer than thirty (30) days for the purpose. In any event, technical rules on substitution of a party should not be so narrowly construed as to prevent this Court from taking cognizance of a case and deciding it on the merits. Moreover, petitioner did make an attempt to implead the new members of the CSB by making the CSB itself a respondent before this Court. There is also no showing that the new members of the CSB have deviated from the stand of their predecessors-in-interest; hence,
in
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there is a substantial need for continuing or maintaining petitioners action against them.[56]
In the same Resolution, the Court ordered the impleading of the new CSB members Roger Gernale,Manuel M. Zarcal, Benjamin Valbuena and Francesca Gernale as party respondentsthe last three in substitution of Arlene Ortiz, Percival Floriendo, Miles Rocesand the new CSB Assistant Secretary Vicente Macarubbo in substitution of Isabelita Ching.[57] Only Manuel Zarcal filed a Comment[58] dated 30 August 2005 through a new counsel, adopting in toto the comment of his co-respondents. Hence, the other four newly impleaded party respondents are deemed to have retained the Office of the City Legal Officer (OCLO) as their counsel and to have adopted the Comment already filed by the OCLO in behalf of their co-respondents. Thus, the proper substitutions of some party respondents have already taken place in this case. The last procedural hurdle thrown petitioners way by respondents refers to the supposed failure of the petition to comply with the requirements of Section 4, Rule 7 and Section 4, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure[59] as amended by Supreme Court Circular A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC.[60]Respondents claim that there was failure to include a verified statement indicating the material dates relative to the receipt of the judgments and the filing of the pleadings. The verification, moreover, allegedly failed to state that petitioner has read the petition[61] and that the copies attached thereto are based on authentic records.[62] The defects of the verification allegedly render the petition without legal effect and constitute grounds for its dismissal. The purpose of requiring a verification is to secure an assurance that the allegations of the petition have been made in
Yujuico vs Atienza
good faith; or are true and correct, not merely speculative.[63] This requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of pleadings and non-compliance therewith does not necessarily render it fatally defective.[64] Perusal of the verification in question shows that there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of the Rules and the alleged defects are not so material as to justify the dismissal of the petition. Now, the substantial issues. Up for determination is the tenability of the RTCs favorable action on respondents petition for relief from judgment. This engenders a look at the grounds and defenses relied upon by respondents in support of their petition. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a petition for relief may be granted upon a showing that (1) through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, a party has been prevented from taking an appeal, and (2) the party has a good and substantial cause of action or defense. The above requisites notwithstanding, it bears stressing that relief from judgment is premised on equity. It is an act of grace which is allowed only in exceptional cases.[65] In this case, according to respondents they were unable to seasonably file a notice of appeal due to excusable negligence.[66] One Ronald Silva (Silva), an employee of the OCLO, allegedly failed to forward the Order denying respondents motion for reconsideration in Civil Case No. 02-103748 to the handling lawyers. When the order was delivered to the OCLO on 17 December 2002,[67] Silva was the one who received it because the employee designated to do so was out on official business.[68] Since the employees were busy preparing for the office Christmas party that day,[69] Silva forgot all about the order. He only remembered it when the order for entry of judgment in the case was received on 29
Yujuico vs Atienza
January 2003. By that time, however, the order dated 17 December 2002 had already been misplaced.[70] Clearly, the situation does not present a case of excusable negligence which would warrant relief under Rule 38. Time and again, this Court has ruled that the inability to perfect an appeal in due time by reason of failure of a counsels clerk to notify the handling lawyer is not a pardonable oversight.[71] As held in one case:
. . . The excuse offered by respondent . . . as reason for his failure to perfect in due time his appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court, that counsels clerk forgot to hand him the court notice, is the most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe the procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules of Court. The uncritical acceptance of this kind of common-place excuses, in the face of the Supreme Courts repeated rulings that they are neither credible nor constitutive of excusable negligence (Gaerlan v. Bernal, L-4039, 29 January 1952; Mercado v. Judge Domingo, L-19457, 17 December 1966) is certainly such whimsical exercise of judgment as to be a grave abuse of discretion. .... In the face of all these facts and circumstances, . . . the respondent judge revealed a simple-minded willingness to swallow a story patently concocted to delay as much as possible the satisfaction of a judgment against respondent . . . .This indiscriminating credulity does not conform to what is to be expected of a judicial mind.[72]
Reiterated in numerous cases is the rule that the clerks faults are attributable to the handling lawyers.[73] Thus, excuses offered based on the formers negligence are not deemed excusable. That the admonitions issued out by this Court were mostly directed against lawyers in law firms does not exempt respondents herein from the same treatment. For all intents and purposes, the set-up at the OCLO is akin to that of a law firm, the only difference being
Yujuico vs Atienza
that the former serves a public entity while the latter caters to private clients. The following pronouncement in Negros Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals[74] is apropos:
The negligence committed in the case at bar cannot be considered excusable, nor is it unavoidable. Time and again, the Court has admonished law firms to adopt a system of distributing pleadings and notices, whereby lawyers working therein receive promptly notices and pleadings intended for them, so that they will always be informed of the status of their cases. The Court has also often repeated that the negligence of clerks which adversely affect the cases handled by lawyers is binding upon the latter.[75]
Without doubt, it was grave abuse of discretion for the lower court to have given due course to respondents appeal through the grant of their petition for relief from judgment based on the flimsy ground they proferred. Even assuming that the negligence invoked by respondents could be considered excusable, still the petition should not have been granted. It must be borne in mind that two requisites must be satisfied before a petition under Rule 38 may be granted, the other being the existence of a good and substantial cause of action or defense. Respondents defense consisted of their claim that the CSB has a personality separate and distinct from the City such that it should not be made to pay for the Citys obligations.[76] However, the argument is undercut by the particular circumstances of this case. It is worthy of note that the records of this case clearly show that the same counsel, the OCLO, represented the City in the expropriation case and now, all except one of the individual respondents in the case at bar. Worthy of note are the following manifestations relied upon by the lower court in issuing the order
Yujuico vs Atienza
on the motion to quash the Notice of Garnishment over the funds of the City, to wit:
The Motion to Quash Notice of Garnishment was heard by this court this morning and Atty. Joseph Aquino appeared for the plaintiff (City of Manila) and Atty. Federico Alday, for the defendant. Atty. Aquino manifested that the amount of Thirty Six Million Four Hundred Three Thousand One Hundred Seventy Pesos (P36,403,170.00) had been appropriated by the City School Board (CSB) under CSB Resolution Nos. 613 and 623 for this purpose. .... Upon manifestation of the counsel for the plaintiff that it is the City School Board which has the authority to pass a resolution allocating funds for the full satisfaction of the just compensation fixed, the said body is hereby given thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order to pass the necessary resolution for the payments of the remaining balance due to defendant Teresita M. Yujuico. (Emphasis supplied.)[77]
The manifestation was made by the same counsel now claiming that it is actually the City which should be made liable for the payment of its own obligations. This, after it trotted out the CSB as the entity with authority to pass a resolution that would satisfy the obligation it had vigorously pursued. The above circumstances, coupled with the rule that an act performed by counsel within the scope of a general or implied authority is regarded as an act of the client,[78] render the City and, through it, respondents in estoppel. By estoppel is meant that an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.[79] Petitioner and the courts acted in accordance with the Citys own manifestations by running after the CSB. At this point, respondents and the OCLO can no longer turn around and toss the obligation back to the City. After all, it was the legal
Yujuico vs Atienza
counsel of both the City and respondents who made a big production out of showing that the liability incurred by the City will be borne by the CSB. Contrary to respondents claim, the law does not make the CSB an entity independent from the City of Manila. This is evident from the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991, the law providing for the creation of school boards. It states:
TITLE IV.- LOCAL SCHOOL BOARDS Section 98. Creation, Composition and Compensation.(a) There shall be established in every province, city or municipality a provincial, city, or municipal school board, respectively. (b) as follows: The composition of local school boards shall be
... (2) The city school board shall be composed of the city mayor and the city superintendent of schools as co-chairmen; the chairman of the education committee of the sangguniang panlungsod, the city treasurer, the representative of the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan in the sangguniang panlungsod, the duly elected president of the city federation of parents-teachers associations, the duly elected representative of the non-academic personnel of public schools in the city, as members; ... Section 101. Compensation and Remuneration.The co-chairmen and members of the provincial, city or municipal school board shall perform their duties as such without compensation or remuneration. Members thereof who are not government officials or employees shall be entitled to traveling expenses and allowances chargeable against the funds of the local school board concerned, subject to existing accounting and auditing rules and regulations.[80]
Yujuico vs Atienza
The fact that the highest ranking official of a local government unit (LGU) is designated as co-chairman of the school board negates the claim in this case that the CSB has a personality separate and distinct from the City. The other fact that government officials in the school board do not receive any compensation or remuneration while NGO representatives merely receive allowances underscores the absurdity of respondents argument all the more. Indeed, such would not be the situation if the school board has a personality separate and distinct from the LGU.
Respondents also argue that the members of the CSB cannot be directed to decide a discretionary function in the specific manner the court desires.[81] The question of whether the enactment of an ordinance to satisfy the appropriation of a final money judgment rendered against an LGU may be compelled by mandamus has already been settled in Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals.[82]
Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left with no legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds therefore [SeeViuda De Tan Toco v. The Municipal Council of Iloilo, supra, Baldivia v. Lota, 107 Phil 1099 (1960); Yuviengco v. Gonzales, 108 Phil 247 (1960)].[83]
Clearly, mandamus is a remedy available to a property owner when a money judgment is rendered in its favor and against a municipality or city, as in this case.
Yujuico vs Atienza
Moreover, the very ordinance authorizing the expropriation of petitioners property categorically states that the payment of the expropriated property will be defrayed from the SEF. To quote:
An amount not to exceed the current fair market value, prevailing in the area appraised in accordance with the requirements of existing laws, rules and regulations, of the property to be acquired or so much thereof as may be necessary for the purpose shall be allocated out of the Special Education Fund of the City to defray the cost of acquisition of the above-mentioned parcels of land.[84]
The legality of the above-quoted provision is presumed. The source of the amount necessary to acquire petitioners property having in fact been specified by the City Council of Manila, the passage of the resolution for the allocation and disbursement thereof is indeed a ministerial duty of the CSB. Furthermore, respondents had argued in the petition for contempt filed against them by petitioner that the latters failure to invoke the proper remedy of mandamus should not be a ground to penalize them with contempt. In their haste to have the contempt petition dismissed, respondents consistently contended that what petitioner should have filed was a case for mandamus to compel passage of the corresponding resolution of the CSB if she wanted immediate payment.[85] Having relied on these representations of respondents and having filed the action they adverted to, petitioner cannot now be sent by respondents on another wild goose chase to obtain ultimate recovery of what she is legally entitled to. While this Court recognizes the power of LGU to expropriate private property for public use, it will not stand idly by while the
Yujuico vs Atienza
expropriating authority maneuvers to evade the payment of just compensation of property already in its possession. The notion of expropriation is hard enough to take for a private owner. He is compelled to give up his property for the common weal. But to give it up and wait in vain for the just compensation decreed by the courts is too much to bear. In cases like these, courts will not hesitate to step in to ensure that justice and fair play are served. As we have already ruled:
. . . This Court will not condone petitioners blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation proceedings it had in fact initiated. It cannot be over-emphasized that within the context of the States inherent power of eminent domain, . . . (j)ust compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just for the property owner is made to suffer the consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss (Consculluela v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77765, August 15, 1988, 164 SCRA 393, 400. See also Provincial Government of Sorsogon v. Vda. De Villaroya, G.R. No. 64037, August 27, 1987, 153 SCRA 291).[86]
The decision rendering just compensation in petitioners favor was promulgated way back in the year 2000.[87] Five years have passed, yet the award still has not been fully satisfied. Recently, inRepublic v. Lim,[88] this Court made the following pronouncement:
. . . while the prevailing doctrine is that the non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover
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possession of their property. This is in consonance with the principle that the government cannot keep the property and dishonor the judgment. To be sure, the five-year period limitation will encourage the government to pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the government, whenever it takes property from private persons against their will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation.[89] (Citations omitted)
Given the above ruling, the reversion of the expropriated property to the petitioner would prove not to be a remote prospect should respondents and the City they represent insist on trudging on their intransigent course. One final note. Respondents appeal from the Decision dated 9 October 2002 of the lower court, made possible by its grant of their petition for relief, is before the Court of Appeals where it is docketed as CA-G.R. No. 86692.[90] The courts Decision in this case would have obvious consequences on said appeal; hence, referral of this Decision to the Court of Appeals is in order. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Order of the trial court dated 25 June 2004, granting respondents Petition for Relief from Judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and its Decision dated 9 October 2002, ordering respondents to immediately pass a resolution for the payment of the balance of the court-adjudged compensation due petitioner, is REINSTATED.
Yujuico vs Atienza
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Court of Appeals for its information and guidance in relation to CA-G.R. No. 86692 entitled Teresita M. Yujuico v. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., et al. SO ORDERED.
DANTE TINGA WE CONCUR: Associate Justice
O.
REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice Chairman
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice
(On Leave) ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
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I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice Chairman, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
Deutsche gesellschaft fur technische Zusammenarbeit vs ca
SECOND DIVISION DEUTSCHE GESELLSCHAFT FR G.R. No. 152318 TECHNISCHE ZUSAMMENARBEIT, also known as GERMAN AGENCY Present: FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION, (GTZ) HANS PETER PAULENZ and QUISUMBING, J., ANNE NICOLAY, Chairperson, Petitioners, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, VELASCO, and - versus BRION, JJ.
Promulgated: HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARIEL CADIENTE SANTOS, Labor Arbiter of the Arbitration Branch, National Labor Relations Commission, and BERNADETTE CARMELLA MAGTAAS, CAROLINA DIONCO, CHRISTOPHER RAMOS, MELVIN DELA PAZ, RANDY TAMAYO and EDGARDO RAMILLO, Respondents. April 16, 2009
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
On 7 September 1971, the governments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of the Philippines ratified an Agreement concerning Technical
Co-operation (Agreement) in Bonn, capital of what was then West Germany. The Agreement affirmed the countries common interest in promoting the technical and economic development of their States, and recogni[zed] the benefits to be derived by both States from closer technical co-operation, and allowed for the conclusion of arrangements concerning individual projects of technical cooperation.[1] While the Agreement provided for a limited term of effectivity of five (5) years, it nonetheless was stated that [t]he Agreement shall be tacitly extended for successive periods of one year unless either of the two Contracting Parties denounces it in writing three months prior to its expiry, and that even upon the Agreements expiry, its provisions would continue to apply to any projects agreed upon x x x until their completion.[2] On 10 December 1999, the Philippine government, through then Foreign Affairs Secretary Domingo Siazon, and the German government, agreed to an Arrangement in furtherance of the 1971 Agreement. This Arrangement affirmed the common commitment of both governments to promote jointly a project called, Social Health InsuranceNetworking and Empowerment (SHINE), which was designed to enable Philippine familiesespecially poor onesto maintain their health and secure health care of sustainable quality.[3] It appears that SHINE had already been in existence even prior to the effectivity of the Arrangement, though the record does not indicate when exactly SHINE was constituted. Nonetheless, the Arrangement stated the various obligations of the Filipino and German governments. The relevant provisions of the Arrangement are reproduced as follows:
3. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany shall make the following contributions to the project. It shall (a) second
one expert in health economy, insurance and health systems for up to 48 expert/months, one expert in system development for up to 10 expert/months short-term experts to deal with special tasks for a total of up to 18 expert/months, project assistants/guest students as required, who shall work on the project as part of their basic and further training and assume specific project tasks under the separately financed junior staff promotion programme of the Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ); (b) provide in situ
short-term experts to deal with diverse special tasks for a total of up to 27 expert/months, five local experts in health economy, health insurance, community health systems, information technology, information systems, training and community mobilization for a total of up to 240 expert/months, local and auxiliary personnel for a total of up to 120 months;
(c) supply inputs, in particular two cross-country vehicles, ten computers with accessories, office furnishings and equipment
up to a total value of DM 310,000 (three hundred and ten thousand Deutsche Mark); (c) meet
the cost of accommodation for the seconded experts and their families in so far as this cost is not met by the seconded experts themselves, the cost of official travel by the experts referred to in sub-paragraph (a) above within and outside the Republic of the Philippines, the cost of seminars and courses,
the cost of transport and insurance to the project site of inputs to be supplied pursuant to sub-paragraph (c) above, excluding the charges and storage fees referred to in paragraph 4(d) below, a proportion of the operating and administrative costs;
xxx 4. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall make the following contributions to the project: It shall (a) provide the necessary Philippine experts for the project, in particular one project coordinator in the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth), at least three further experts and a sufficient number of administrative and auxiliary personnel, as well as health personnel in the pilot provinces and in the other project partners, in particular one responsible expert for each pilot province and for each association representing the various target groups, release suitably qualified experts from their duties for attendance at the envisaged basic and further training activities; it shall only nominate such candidates as have given an undertaking to work on the project for at least five years after completing their training and shall ensure that these Philippine experts receive appropriate remuneration, ensure that the project field offices have sufficient expendables, make available the land and buildings required for the project; (b) assume an increasing proportion of the running and operating costs of the project; (c) afford the seconded experts any assistance they may require in carrying out the tasks assigned to them and place at their disposal all necessary records and documents; (d) guarantee that the project is provided with an itemized budget of its own in order to ensure smooth continuation of the project. the necessary legal and administrative framework is created for the project,
the project is coordinated in close cooperation with other national and international agencies relevant to implementation, the inputs supplied for the project on behalf of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany are exempted from the cost of licenses, harbour dues, import and export duties and other public charges and fees, as well as storage
fees, or that any costs thereof are met, and that they are cleared by customs without delay. The aforementioned exemptions shall, at the request of the implementing agencies also apply to inputs procured in the Republic of the Philippines, the tasks of the seconded experts are taken over as soon as possible by Philippine experts, examinations passed by Philippine nationals pursuant to this Arrangement are recognized in accordance with their respective standards and that the persons concerned are afforded such opportunities with regard to careers, appointments and advancement as are commensurate with their training.[4]
In the arraignment, both governments likewise named their respective implementing organizations for SHINE. The Philippinesdesignated the Department of Health (DOH) and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth) with the implementation of SHINE. For their part, the German government charge[d] the Deustche Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit[[5]] (GTZ[[6]]) GmbH, Eschborn, with the implementation of its contributions.[7] Private respondents were engaged as contract employees hired by GTZ to work for SHINE on various dates between December of 1998 to September of 1999. Bernadette Carmela Magtaas was hired as an information systems manager and project officer of SHINE;[8] Carolina Dionco as a Project Assistant of SHINE;[9] Christopher Ramos as a project assistant and liason personnel of NHI related SHINE activities by GTZ;[10] Melvin Dela Paz and Randy Tamayo as programmers;[11] and Edgardo Ramilo as driver, messenger and multipurpose service man.[12] The employment contracts of all six private respondents all specified Dr. Rainer Tollkotter, identified as an adviser of GTZ, as the employer. At the same time, all the contracts commonly provided that [i]t is mutually agreed and understood that [Dr. Tollkotter, as employer] is a seconded GTZ expert who is hiring the Employee on behalf of GTZ and for a Philippine-German bilateral project named Social Health InsuranceNetworking and Empowerment (SHINE) which will end at a given time.[13]
In September of 1999, Anne Nicolay (Nicolay), a Belgian national, assumed the post of SHINE Project Manager. Disagreements eventually arose between Nicolay and private respondents in matters such as proposed salary adjustments, and the course Nicolay was taking in the implementation of SHINE different from her predecessors. The dispute culminated in a letter[14]dated 8 June 2000, signed by the private respondents, addressed to Nicolay, and copies furnished officials of the DOH, Philheath, and the director of the Manila office of GTZ. The letter raised several issues which private respondents claim had been brought up several times in the past, but have not been given appropriate response. It was claimed that SHINE under Nicolay had veered away from its original purpose to facilitate the development of social health insurance by shoring up the national health insurance program and strengthening local initiatives, as Nicolay had refused to support local partners and new initiatives on the premise that community and local government unit schemes were not sustainablea philosophy that supposedly betrayed Nicolays lack of understanding of the purpose of the project. Private respondents further alleged that as a result of Nicolays new thrust, resources have been used inappropriately; that the new management style was not congruent with the original goals of the project; that Nicolay herself suffered from cultural insensitivity that consequently failed to sustain healthy relations with SHINEs partners and staff. The letter ended with these ominous words:
The issues that we [the private respondents] have stated here are very crucial to us in working for the project. We could no longer find any reason to stay with the project unless ALL of these issues be addressed immediately and appropriately.[15]
In response, Nicolay wrote each of the private respondents a letter dated 21 June 2000, all similarly worded except for their respective addressees. She
informed private respondents that the projects orientations and evolution were decided in consensus with partner institutions, Philhealth and the DOH, and thus no longer subject to modifications. More pertinently, she stated:
You have firmly and unequivocally stated in the last paragraph of your 8 June 2000 letter that you and the five other staff could no longer find any reason to stay with the project unless ALL of these issues be addressed immediately and appropriately. Under the foregoing premises and circumstances, it is now imperative that I am to accept your resignation, which I expect to receive as soon as possible.[16]
th
Taken aback, private respondents replied with a common letter, clarifying that their earlier letter was not intended as a resignation letter, but one that merely intended to raise attention to what they perceived as vital issues.[17] Negotiations ensued between private respondents and Nicolay, but for naught. Each of the private respondents received a letter from Nicolay dated 11 July 2000, informing them of the pre-termination of their contracts of employment on the grounds of serious and gross insubordination, among others, resulting to loss of confidence and trust.[18] On 21 August 2000, the private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC. Named as respondents therein where GTZ, the Director of its Manila office Hans Peter Paulenz, its Assistant Project Manager Christian Jahn, and Nicolay. On 25 October 2005, GTZ, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the case, as its acts were undertaken in the discharge of the governmental functions and sovereign acts of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. This was opposed by private respondents with the arguments that GTZ had failed to secure a certification that it was immune from suit from the Department of Foreign Affairs, and that it
was GTZ and not the German government which had implemented the SHINE Project and entered into the contracts of employment. On 27 November 2000, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order[19] denying the Motion to Dismiss. The Order cited, among others, that GTZ was a private corporation which entered into an employment contract; and that GTZ had failed to secure from the DFA a certification as to its diplomatic status.
On 7 February 2001, GTZ filed with the Labor Arbiter a Reiterating Motion to Dismiss, again praying that the Motion to Dismiss be granted on the jurisdictional ground, and reprising the arguments for dismissal it had earlier raised.[20] No action was taken by the Labor Arbiter on this new motion. Instead, on 15 October 2001, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision[21] granting the complaint for illegal dismissal. The Decision concluded that respondents were dismissed without lawful cause, there being a total lack of due process both substantive and procedural [sic].[22] GTZ was faulted for failing to observe the notice requirements in the labor law. The Decision likewise proceeded from the premise that GTZ had treated the letter dated 8 June 2000 as a resignation letter, and devoted some focus in debunking this theory. The Decision initially offered that it need not discuss the jurisdictional aspect considering that the same had already been lengthily discussed in the Order de[n]ying respondents Motion to Dismiss.[23] Nonetheless, it proceeded to discuss the jurisdictional aspect, in this wise:
Under pain of being repetitious, the undersigned Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint on the following grounds: Firstly, under the employment contract entered into between complainants and respondents, specifically Section 10 thereof, it provides that contract partners agree that his contract shall be subject to the LAWS of the jurisdiction of the locality in which the service is performed. Secondly, respondent having entered into contract, they can no longer invoke the sovereignty of the Federal Republic of Germany. Lastly, it is imperative to be immune from suit, respondents should have secured from the Department of Foreign Affairs a certification of respondents diplomatic status and entitlement to diplomatic privileges including immunity from suits. Having failed in this regard, respondents cannot escape liability from the shelter of sovereign immunity.[sic][24]
Notably, GTZ did not file a motion for reconsideration to the Labor Arbiters Decision or elevate said decision for appeal to the NLRC. Instead, GTZ opted to assail the decision by way of a special civil action for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals.[25] On 10 December 2001, the Court of Appeals promulgated a Resolution[26] dismissing GTZs petition, finding that judicial recourse at this stage of the case is uncalled for[,] [t]he appropriate remedy of the petitioners [being] an appeal to the NLRC x x x.[27] A motion for reconsideration to this Resolution proved fruitless for GTZ.[28] Thus, the present petition for review under Rule 45, assailing the decision and resolutions of the Court of Appeals and of the Labor Arbiter. GTZs arguments center on whether the Court of Appeals could have entertained its petition for certiorari despite its not having undertaken an appeal before the NLRC; and whether the complaint for illegal dismissal should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on account of GTZs insistence that it enjoys immunity from suit. No special arguments are directed with respect to petitioners Hans Peter Paulenz and Anne Nicolay, respectively the then Director and the then Project Manager of GTZ
in the Philippines; so we have to presume that the arguments raised in behalf of GTZs alleged immunity from suit extend to them as well. The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file a Comment on the petition. In its Comment dated 7 November 2005, the OSG took the side of GTZ, with the prayer that the petition be granted on the ground that GTZ was immune from suit, citing in particular its assigned functions in implementing the SHINE programa joint undertaking of the Philippine and German governments which was neither proprietary nor commercial in nature. The Court of Appeals had premised the dismissal of GTZs petition on its procedural misstep in bypassing an appeal to NLRC and challenging the Labor Arbiters Decision directly with the appellate court by way of a Rule 65 petition. In dismissing the petition, the
Court of Appeals relied on our ruling in Air Service Cooperative v. Court of Appeals.[29] The central issue in that case was whether a decision of a Labor Arbiter rendered without jurisdiction over the subject matter may be annulled in a petition before a Regional Trial Court. That case may be differentiated from the present case, since the Regional Trial Court does not have original or appellate jurisdiction to review a decision rendered by a Labor Arbiter. In contrast, there is no doubt, as affirmed by jurisprudence, that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, by way of its original certiorari jurisdiction, decisions ruling on complaints for illegal dismissal. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals is correct in pronouncing the general rule that the proper recourse from the decision of the Labor Arbiter is to first appeal the same to the NLRC. Air Services is in fact clearly detrimental to petitioners position in one regard. The Court therein noted that on account of the failure to correctly appeal the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, such judgment consequently became final and executory.[30] GTZ goes as far as to request that the Court re-examine Air Services, a suggestion that is needlessly improvident under the circumstances. Air Services affirms doctrines grounded in sound procedural rules that have allowed for the considered and orderly disposition of labor cases.
The OSG points out, citing Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez v. Court of Appeals,[31] that even when appeal is available, the Court has nonetheless allowed a writ of certiorari when the orders of the lower court were issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction. Indeed, the Court has ruled before that the failure to employ
available intermediate recourses, such as a motion for reconsideration, is not a fatal infirmity if the ruling assailed is a patent nullity. This approach suggested by the OSG allows the Court to inquire directly into what is the main issuewhether GTZ enjoys immunity from suit. The arguments raised by GTZ and the OSG are rooted in several indisputable facts. The SHINE project was implemented pursuant to the bilateral agreements between the Philippine and German governments. GTZ was tasked, under the 1991 agreement, with the implementation of the contributions of the German government. The activities performed by GTZ pertaining to the SHINE project are governmental in nature, related as they are to the promotion of health insurance in the Philippines. The fact that GTZ entered into employment contracts with the private respondents did not disqualify it from invoking immunity from suit, as held in cases such as Holy See v. Rosario, Jr.,[32] which set forth what remains valid doctrine:
Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.[33]
Beyond dispute is the tenability of the comment points raised by GTZ and the OSG that GTZ was not performing proprietary functions notwithstanding its entry into the particular employment contracts. Yet there is an equally fundamental
premise which GTZ and the OSG fail to address, namely: Is GTZ, by conception, able to enjoy the Federal Republics immunity from suit? The principle of state immunity from suit, whether a local state or a foreign state, is reflected in Section 9, Article XVI of the Constitution, which states that the State may not be sued without its consent. Who or what consists of the State? For one, the doctrine is available to foreign States insofar as they are sought to be sued in the courts of the local State,[34] necessary as it is to avoid unduly vexing the peace of nations.
If the instant suit had been brought directly against the Federal Republic of Germany, there would be no doubt that it is a suit brought against a State, and the only necessary inquiry is whether said State had consented to be sued. However, the present suit was brought against GTZ. It is necessary for us to understand what precisely are the parameters of the legal personality of GTZ. Counsel for GTZ characterizes GTZ as the implementing agency of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, a depiction similarly adopted by the OSG. Assuming that characterization is correct, it does not automatically invest GTZ with the ability to invoke State immunity from suit. The distinction lies in whether the agency is incorporated or unincorporated. The following lucid discussion from Justice Isagani Cruz is pertinent:
Where suit is filed not against the government itself or its officials but against one of its entities, it must be ascertained whether or not the State, as the principal that may ultimately be held liable, has given its consent to be sued. This ascertainment will depend in the first instance on whether the government agency impleaded is incorporated or unincorporated. An incorporated agency has a charter of its own that invests it with a separate juridical personality, like the Social Security System, the University of the Philippines, and the City of Manila. By contrast, the unincorporated agency is so called because it has no separate juridical personality but is merged in the general machinery of the government, like the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Mines and the Government Printing Office. If the agency is incorporated, the test of its suability is found in its charter. The simple rule is that it is suable if its charter says so, and this is true regardless of the functions it is performing. Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provides that they can sue and be sued.[35]
State immunity from suit may be waived by general or special law. [36] The special law can take the form of the original charter of the incorporated government agency. Jurisprudence is replete with examples of incorporated government agencies which were ruled not entitled to invoke immunity from suit, owing to provisions in their charters manifesting their consent to be sued. These include the National Irrigation Administration,[37] the former Central Bank,[38]and the National Power Corporation.[39] In SSS v. Court of Appeals,[40] the Court through Justice MelencioHerrera explained that by virtue of an express provision in its charter allowing it to sue and be sued, the Social Security System did not enjoy immunity from suit:
We come now to the amendability of the SSS to judicial action and legal responsibility for its acts. To our minds, there should be no question on this score considering that the SSS is a juridical entity with a personality of its own. It has corporate powers separate and distinct from the Government. SSS' own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in Court. These words "sue and be sued" embrace all civil process incident to a legal action. So that, even assuming that the SSS, as it claims, enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental functions, by virtue of the explicit provision of the aforecited enabling law, the Government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability. That statutory law has given to the private citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required to submit to the jurisdiction of the Courts, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense. Whether the SSS performs governmental or proprietary functions thus becomes unnecessary to belabor. For by that waiver, a private citizen may bring a suit against it for varied objectives, such as, in this case, to obtain compensation in damages arising from contract, and even for tort. A recent case squarely in point anent the principle, involving the National Power Corporation, is that of Rayo v. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, 110 SCRA 457 (1981), wherein this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Vicente Abad Santos, ruled: "It is not necessary to write an extended dissertation on whether or not the NPC performs a governmental function with respect to the management and operation of the Angat Dam. It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court under its charter. (R.A. No. 6395, Sec. 3[d]). As a government, owned and controlled corporation, it has a personality
of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government. Moreover, the charter provision that the NPC can 'sue and be sued in any court' is without qualification on the cause of action and accordingly it can include a tort claim such as the one instituted by the petitioners."[41]
It is useful to note that on the part of the Philippine government, it had designated two entities, the Department of Health and the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PHIC), as the implementing agencies in behalf of the Philippines. The PHIC was established under Republic Act No. 7875, Section 16(g) of which grants the corporation the power to sue and be sued in court. Applying the previously cited jurisprudence, PHIC would not enjoy immunity from suit even in the performance of its functions connected with SHINE, however, governmental in nature as they may be. Is GTZ an incorporated agency of the German government? There is some mystery surrounding that question. Neither GTZ nor the OSG go beyond the claim that petitioner is the implementing agency of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. On the other hand, private respondents asserted before the Labor Arbiter that GTZ was a private corporation engaged in the implementation of development projects.[42] The Labor Arbiter accepted that claim in his Order denying the Motion to Dismiss,[43] though he was silent on that point in his Decision. Nevertheless, private respondents argue in their Comment that the finding that GTZ was a private corporation was never controverted, and is therefore deemed admitted.[44] In its Reply, GTZ controverts that finding, saying that it is a matter of public knowledge that the status of petitioner GTZ is that of the implementing agency, and not that of a private corporation.[45] In truth, private respondents were unable to adduce any evidence to substantiate their claim that GTZ was a private corporation, and the Labor Arbiter acted rashly in accepting such claim without explanation. But neither has GTZ supplied any evidence defining its legal nature beyond that of the bare
descriptive implementing agency. There is no doubt that the 1991 Agreement designated GTZ as the implementing agency in behalf of the German government. Yet the catch is that such term has no precise definition that is responsive to our concerns. Inherently, an agent acts in behalf of a principal, and the GTZ can be said to act in behalf of the German state. But that is as far as implementing agency could take us. The term by itself does not supply whether GTZ is incorporated or unincorporated, whether it is owned by the German state or by private interests, whether it has juridical personality independent of the German government or none at all. GTZ itself provides a more helpful clue, inadvertently, through its own official Internet website.[46] In the Corporate Profile section of the English language version of its site, GTZ describes itself as follows:
As an international cooperation enterprise for sustainable development with worldwide operations, the federally owned Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH supports the German Government in achieving its development-policy objectives. It provides viable, forward-looking solutions for political, economic, ecological and social development in a globalised world. Working under difficult conditions, GTZ promotes complex reforms and change processes. Its corporate objective is to improve peoples living conditions on a sustainable basis. GTZ is a federal enterprise based in Eschborn near Frankfurt am Main. It was founded in 1975 as a company under private law. The German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) is its major client. The company also operates on behalf of other German ministries, the governments of other countries and international clients, such as the European Commission, the United Nations and the World Bank, as well as on behalf of private enterprises. GTZ works on a public-benefit basis. All surpluses generated are channeled [sic] back into its own international cooperation projects for sustainable development.[47]
GTZs own website elicits that petitioner is federally owned, a federal enterprise, and founded in 1975 as a company under private law. GTZ clearly has a very meaningful relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany, which
apparently owns it. At the same time, it appears that GTZ was actually organized not through a legislative public charter, but under private law, in the same way that Philippine corporations can be organized under the Corporation Code even if fully owned by the Philippine government. This self-description of GTZ in its own official website gives further cause for pause in adopting petitioners argument that GTZ is entitled to immunity from suit because it is an implementing agency. The above-quoted statement does not dispute the characterization of GTZ as an implementing agency of the Federal Republic of Germany, yet it bolsters the notion that as a company organized under private law, it has a legal personality independent of that of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany, in its own official website,[48] also makes reference to GTZ and describes it in this manner:
x x x Going by the principle of sustainable development, the German Technical Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft fr Technische Zusammenarbeit GmbH, GTZ) takes on non-profit projects in international technical cooperation. The GTZ is a private company owned by the Federal Republic of Germany.[49]
Again, we are uncertain of the corresponding legal implications under German law surrounding a private company owned by the Federal Republic of Germany. Yet taking the description on face value, the apparent equivalent under Philippine law is that of a corporation organized under the Corporation Code but owned by the Philippine government, or a government-owned or controlled corporation without original charter. And it bears notice that Section 36 of the
Corporate Code states that [e]very corporation incorporated under this Code has the power and capacity x x x to sue and be sued in its corporate name.[50] It is entirely possible that under German law, an entity such as GTZ or particularly GTZ itself has not been vested or has been specifically deprived the power and capacity to sue and/or be sued. Yet in the proceedings below and before this Court, GTZ has failed to establish that under German law, it has not consented to be sued despite it being owned by the Federal Republic of Germany. We adhere to the rule that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines,[51] and following the most intelligent assumption we can gather, GTZ is akin to a governmental owned or controlled corporation without original charter which, by virtue of the Corporation Code, has expressly consented to be sued. At the very least, like the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals, this Court has no basis in fact to conclude or presume that GTZ enjoys immunity from suit. This absence of basis in fact leads to another important point, alluded to by the Labor Arbiter in his rulings. Our ruling in Holy See v. Del Rosario[52] provided a template on how a foreign entity desiring to invoke State immunity from suit could duly prove such immunity before our local courts. The principles enunciated in that case were derived from public international law. We stated then:
In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity. In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of "suggestion," where the foreign state or the international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a "suggestion" that the defendant is entitled to immunity. InEngland, a similar procedure is followed, only the Foreign Office issues a certification to that effect instead of submitting a "suggestion" (O'Connell, I International Law 130 [1965]; Note: Immunity from
Suit of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obligations, 50 Yale Law Journal 1088 [1941]). In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic Migration Commission v. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to that effect. In Baer v. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a "suggestion" to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General embodied the "suggestion" in a Manifestation and Memorandum as amicus curiae.[53]
It is to be recalled that the Labor Arbiter, in both of his rulings, noted that it was imperative for petitioners to secure from the Department of Foreign Affairs a certification of respondents diplomatic status and entitlement to diplomatic privileges including immunity from suits.[54] The requirement might not necessarily be imperative. However, had GTZ obtained such certification from the DFA, it would have provided factual basis for its claim of immunity that would, at the very least, establish a disputable evidentiary presumption that the foreign party is indeed immune which the opposing party will have to overcome with its own factual evidence. We do not see why GTZ could not have secured such certification or endorsement from the DFA for purposes of this case. Certainly, it would have been highly prudential for GTZ to obtain the same after the Labor Arbiter had denied the motion to dismiss. Still, even at this juncture, we do not see any evidence that the DFA, the office of the executive branch in charge of our diplomatic relations, has indeed endorsed GTZs claim of immunity. It may be possible that GTZ tried, but failed to secure such certification, due to the same concerns that we have discussed herein.
Would the fact that the Solicitor General has endorsed GTZs claim of States immunity from suit before this Court sufficiently substitute for the DFA certification? Note that the rule in public international law quoted in Holy See referred to endorsement by the Foreign Office of the State where the suit is filed, such foreign office in the Philippines being the Department of Foreign Affairs. Nowhere in the Comment of the OSG is it manifested that the DFA has endorsed GTZs claim, or that the OSG had solicited the DFAs views on the issue. The arguments raised by the OSG are virtually the same as the arguments raised by GTZ without any indication of any special and distinct perspective maintained by the Philippine government on the issue. The Comment filed by the OSG does not inspire the same degree of confidence as a certification from the DFA would have elicited. Holy See made reference to Baer v. Tizon,[55] and that in the said case, the United States Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make a suggestion to the trial court, accomplished by way of a Manifestation and Memorandum, that the petitioner therein enjoyed immunity as the Commander of the Subic Bay Naval Base. Such circumstance is actually not narrated in the text of Baer itself and was likely supplied in Holy See because its author, Justice Camilio Quiason, had appeared as the Solicitor in behalf of the OSG in Baer. Nonetheless, as narrated in Holy See, it was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs which directed the OSG to intervene in behalf of the United States government in the Baer case, and such fact is manifest enough of the endorsement by the Foreign Office. We do not find a similar circumstance that bears here. The Court is thus holds and so rules that GTZ consistently has been unable to establish with satisfaction that it enjoys the immunity from suit generally enjoyed by its parent country, the Federal Republic of Germany. Consequently, both the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals acted within proper bounds when they
refused to acknowledge that GTZ is so immune by dismissing the complaint against it. Our finding has additional ramifications on the failure of GTZ to properly appeal the Labor Arbiters decision to the NLRC. As pointed out by the OSG, the direct recourse to the Court of Appeals while bypassing the NLRC could have been sanctioned had the Labor Arbiters decision been a patent nullity. Since the Labor Arbiter acted properly in deciding the complaint, notwithstanding GTZs claim of immunity, we cannot see how the decision could have translated into a patent nullity. As a result, there was no basis for petitioners in foregoing the appeal to the NLRC by filing directly with the Court of Appeals the petition for certiorari. It then follows that the Court of Appeals acted correctly in dismissing the petition on that ground. As a further consequence, since petitioners failed to perfect an appeal from the Labor Arbiters Decision, the same has long become final and executory. All other questions related to this case, such as whether or not private respondents were illegally dismissed, are no longer susceptible to review, respecting as we do the finality of the Labor Arbiters Decision. A final note. This decision should not be seen as deviation from the more common methodology employed in ascertaining whether a party enjoys State immunity from suit, one which focuses on the particular functions exercised by the party and determines whether these are proprietary or sovereign in nature. The nature of the acts performed by the entity invoking immunity remains the most important barometer for testing whether the privilege of State immunity from suit should apply. At the same time, our Constitution stipulates that a State immunity from suit is conditional on its withholding of consent; hence, the laws and circumstances pertaining to the creation and legal personality of an instrumentality or agency invoking immunity remain relevant. Consent to be sued, as exhibited in this decision, is often conferred by the very same statute or general law creating the instrumentality or agency.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Senate of the Philippines vs Ermita

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 169777* April 20, 2006
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS,Petitioners, vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines,Respondents. x-------------------------x G.R. No. 169659 April 20, 2006
BAYAN MUNA represented by DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, Rep. RAFAEL MARIANO, Rep. LIZA MAZA, Rep. TEODORO CASINO, Rep. JOEL VIRADOR, COURAGE represented by FERDINAND GAITE, and COUNSELS FOR THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTIES (CODAL) represented by ATTY. REMEDIOS BALBIN, Petitioners, vs. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Respondent. x-------------------------x G.R. No. 169660 April 20, 2006
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of Defense, and GENEROSO S. SENGA, in his capacity as AFP Chief of Staff, Respondents. x-------------------------x G.R. No. 169667 April 20, 2006
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner, vs. HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Respondent. x-------------------------x

G.R. No. 169834 April 20, 2006
PDP- LABAN, Petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent. x-------------------------x G.R. No. 171246 April 20, 2006
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR AMORANDO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FILEMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J. B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA, and the INTEGRATED BAR FOR THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the early history of republican thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of government may keep certain information confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason for vesting executive power in only one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the U.S. Constitutional Convention said: "Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished."1 History has been witness, however, to the fact that the power to withhold information lends itself to abuse, hence, the necessity to guard it zealously. The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. In resolving the controversy, this Court shall proceed with the recognition that the issuance under review has come from a co-equal branch of government, which thus entitles it to a strong presumption of constitutionality. Once the challenged order is found to be indeed violative of the Constitution, it is duty-bound to declare it so. For the Constitution, being the highest expression of the sovereign will of the Filipino people, must prevail over any issuance of the government that contravenes its mandates. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP). On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource

speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project. The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations2 dated September 22, 2005 to the following officials of the AFP: the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon; Inspector General of the AFP Vice Admiral Mateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R. Danga; Chief of the Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo; Assistant Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and Assistant Commandant, Corps of Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for them to attend as resource persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005 on the following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005 entitled "Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005"; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator Jinggoy E. Estrada delivered on July 26, 2005 entitled "The Philippines as the Wire-Tapping Capital of the World"; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator Rodolfo Biazon delivered on August 1, 2005 entitled "Clear and Present Danger"; (4) Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo Madrigal Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in the National Interest, on the Role of the Military in the So-called "Gloriagate Scandal"; and (5) Senate Resolution No. 295 filed by Senator Biazon Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the Wire-Tapping of the President of the Philippines. Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga who, by letter3 dated September 27, 2005, requested for its postponement "due to a pressing operational situation that demands [his utmost personal attention" while "some of the invited AFP officers are currently attending to other urgent operational matters." On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita a letter4 dated September 27, 2005 "respectfully request[ing] for the postponement of the hearing [regarding the NorthRail project] to which various officials of the Executive Department have been invited" in order to "afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation." Senate President Drilon, however, wrote5 Executive Secretary Ermita that the Senators "are unable to accede to [his request]" as it "was sent belatedly" and "[a]ll preparations and arrangements as well as notices to all resource persons were completed [the previous] week." Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005 a letter6 from the President of the North Luzon Railways Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the NorthRail project be postponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on the contract agreements relative to the project had been secured. On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes,"7 which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:

SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In accordance with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session. SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege. (a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest. Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order, including: Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002); Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998). Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998); Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998); Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002). (b) Who are covered. The following are covered by this executive order: Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege; Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;

Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined by the President. SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. All public officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of E.O. 464, and another letter8 informing him "that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have not secured the required consent from the President." On even date which was also the scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter9 to Senator Biazon, Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense and Security, informing him "that per instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is authorized to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a written approval from the President" and "that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear before the public hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28 September 2005." Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the investigation scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made to face court martial proceedings. As to the NorthRail project hearing scheduled on September 29, 2005, Executive Secretary Ermita, citing E.O. 464, sent letter of regrets, in response to the invitations sent to the following government officials: Light Railway Transit Authority Administrator Melquiades Robles, Metro Rail Transit Authority Administrator Roberto Lastimoso, Department of Justice (DOJ) Chief State Counsel Ricardo V. Perez, then Presidential Legal Counsel Merceditas Gutierrez, Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Undersecretary Guiling Mamonding, DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza, Philippine National Railways General Manager Jose Serase II, Monetary Board Member Juanita Amatong, Bases Conversion Development Authority Chairperson Gen. Narciso Abaya and Secretary Romulo L. Neri.10 NorthRail President Cortes sent personal regrets likewise citing E.O. 464.11 On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, for certiorari and prohibition, were filed before this Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464. In G.R. No. 169659, petitioners party-list Bayan Muna, House of Representatives Members Satur Ocampo, Crispin Beltran, Rafael Mariano, Liza Maza, Joel Virador and Teodoro Casino, Courage, an organization of government employees, and Counsels for the Defense of Liberties (CODAL), a group of lawyers dedicated to the promotion of justice, democracy and peace, all claiming to have standing to file the suit because of the transcendental importance of the issues they posed, pray, in their petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional; that respondent

Executive Secretary Ermita, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Arroyo, be prohibited from imposing, and threatening to impose sanctions on officials who appear before Congress due to congressional summons. Additionally, petitioners claim that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and impedes them from fulfilling their respective obligations. Thus, Bayan Muna alleges that E.O. 464 infringes on its right as a political party entitled to participate in governance; Satur Ocampo, et al. allege that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws; Courage alleges that the tenure of its members in public office is predicated on, and threatened by, their submission to the requirements of E.O. 464 should they be summoned by Congress; and CODAL alleges that its members have a sworn duty to uphold the rule of law, and their rights to information and to transparent governance are threatened by the imposition of E.O. 464. In G.R. No. 169660, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, claiming that his constitutional rights as a citizen, taxpayer and law practitioner, are affected by the enforcement of E.O. 464, prays in his petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional. In G.R. No. 169667, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc.12 (ALG), alleging that as a coalition of 17 legal resource non-governmental organizations engaged in developmental lawyering and work with the poor and marginalized sectors in different parts of the country, and as an organization of citizens of the Philippines and a part of the general public, it has legal standing to institute the petition to enforce its constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, a right which was denied to the public by E.O. 464,13 prays, that said order be declared null and void for being unconstitutional and that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita be ordered to cease from implementing it. On October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in the resolution of the issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material injury, as it has already sustained the same with its continued enforcement since it directly interferes with and impedes the valid exercise of the Senates powers and functions and conceals information of great public interest and concern, filed its petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169777 and prays that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional. On October 14, 2005, PDP-Laban, a registered political party with members duly elected into the Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, filed a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169834, alleging that it is affected by the challenged E.O. 464 because it hampers its legislative agenda to be implemented through its members in Congress, particularly in the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation and transcendental issues need to be resolved to avert a constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative branches of the government. Meanwhile, by letter14 dated February 6, 2006, Senator Biazon reiterated his invitation to Gen. Senga for him and other military officers to attend the hearing on the alleged wiretapping scheduled on February 10, 2005. Gen. Senga replied, however, by letter15 dated February 8, 2006, that "[p]ursuant to Executive Order No. 464, th[e] Headquarters requested for a clearance from the President to allow [them] to appear before the public hearing" and that "they will attend once [their] request is approved by the President." As none of those invited appeared, the hearing on February 10, 2006 was cancelled.16 In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food and the Blue Ribbon Committee on the alleged mismanagement and use of the fertilizer fund under the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani program of the Department of Agriculture (DA), several Cabinet officials were invited to the hearings scheduled on October 5 and 26, November 24 and December 12, 2005 but most of them failed to attend, DA Undersecretary Belinda Gonzales, DA Assistant Secretary

Felix Jose Montes, Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority Executive Director Norlito R. Gicana,17 and those from the Department of Budget and Management18 having invoked E.O. 464. In the budget hearings set by the Senate on February 8 and 13, 2006, Press Secretary and Presidential Spokesperson Ignacio R. Bunye,19 DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez20 and Department of Interior and Local Government Undersecretary Marius P. Corpus21 communicated their inability to attend due to lack of appropriate clearance from the President pursuant to E.O. 464. During the February 13, 2005 budget hearing, however, Secretary Bunye was allowed to attend by Executive Secretary Ermita. On February 13, 2006, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz and the incumbent members of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as taxpayers, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as the official organization of all Philippine lawyers, all invoking their constitutional right to be informed on matters of public interest, filed their petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 171246, and pray that E.O. 464 be declared null and void. All the petitions pray for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents from implementing, enforcing, and observing E.O. 464. In the oral arguments on the petitions conducted on February 21, 2006, the following substantive issues were ventilated: (1) whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing E.O. 464 prior to its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation; and (2) whether E.O. 464 violates the following provisions of the Constitution: Art. II, Sec. 28, Art. III, Sec. 4, Art. III, Sec. 7, Art. IV. Sec. 1, Art. VI, Sec. 21, Art. VI, Sec. 22, Art. XI, Sec. 1, and Art. XIII, Sec. 16. The procedural issue of whether there is an actual case or controversy that calls for judicial review was not taken up; instead, the parties were instructed to discuss it in their respective memoranda. After the conclusion of the oral arguments, the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda, paying particular attention to the following propositions: (1) that E.O. 464 is, on its face, unconstitutional; and (2) assuming that it is not, it is unconstitutional as applied in four instances, namely: (a) the so called Fertilizer scam; (b) the NorthRail investigation (c) the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP; and (d) the investigation on the Venable contract.22 Petitioners in G.R. No. 16966023 and G.R. No. 16977724 filed their memoranda on March 7, 2006, while those in G.R. No. 16966725 and G.R. No. 16983426 filed theirs the next day or on March 8, 2006. Petitioners in G.R. No. 171246 did not file any memorandum. Petitioners Bayan Muna et al. in G.R. No. 169659, after their motion for extension to file memorandum27 was granted, subsequently filed a manifestation28 dated March 14, 2006 that it would no longer file its memorandum in the interest of having the issues resolved soonest, prompting this Court to issue a Resolution reprimanding them.29 Petitioners submit that E.O. 464 violates the following constitutional provisions: Art. VI, Sec. 2130 Art. VI, Sec. 2231 Art. VI, Sec. 132

Art. XI, Sec. 133 Art. III, Sec. 734 Art. III, Sec. 435 Art. XIII, Sec. 16 36 Art. II, Sec. 2837 Respondents Executive Secretary Ermita et al., on the other hand, pray in their consolidated memorandum38 on March 13, 2006 for the dismissal of the petitions for lack of merit. The Court synthesizes the issues to be resolved as follows: 1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress; 2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and 3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Essential requisites for judicial review Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of E.O. 464, ascertainment of whether the requisites for a valid exercise of the Courts power of judicial review are present is in order. Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.39 Except with respect to the requisites of standing and existence of an actual case or controversy where the disagreement between the parties lies, discussion of the rest of the requisites shall be omitted. Standing Respondents, through the Solicitor General, assert that the allegations in G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660 and 169667 make it clear that they, adverting to the non-appearance of several officials of the executive department in the investigations called by the different committees of the Senate, were brought to vindicate the constitutional duty of the Senate or its different committees to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation or in the exercise of its oversight functions. They maintain that Representatives Ocampo et al. have not shown any specific prerogative, power, and privilege of the House of Representatives which had been effectively impaired by E.O. 464, there being no mention of any investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees which was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464.

As for Bayan Munas alleged interest as a party-list representing the marginalized and underrepresented, and that of the other petitioner groups and individuals who profess to have standing as advocates and defenders of the Constitution, respondents contend that such interest falls short of that required to confer standing on them as parties "injured-in-fact."40 Respecting petitioner Chavez, respondents contend that Chavez may not claim an interest as a taxpayer for the implementation of E.O. 464 does not involve the exercise of taxing or spending power.41 With regard to the petition filed by the Senate, respondents argue that in the absence of a personal or direct injury by reason of the issuance of E.O. 464, the Senate and its individual members are not the proper parties to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Invoking this Courts ruling in National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin42 and Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,43 respondents assert that to be considered a proper party, one must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury due to the enforcement of E.O. 464.44 That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public decision-making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation45 is not disputed. E.O. 464, however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information that is crucial to law-making.46 Verily, the Senate, including its individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.47 In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur Ocampo (Bayan Muna), Teodoro Casino (Bayan Muna), Joel Virador (Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis), Rafael Mariano (Anakpawis), and Liza Maza (Gabriela) are allowed to sue to question the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the absence of any claim that an investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464 notwithstanding, it being sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws. The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise meets the standing requirement as it obtained three seats in the House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and is, therefore, entitled to participate in the legislative process consonant with the declared policy underlying the party list system of affording citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties who lack well-defined political constituencies to contribute to the formulation and enactment of legislation that will benefit the nation.48 As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo et al. have the standing to file their petitions, passing on the standing of their co-petitioners Courage and Codal is rendered unnecessary.49 In filing their respective petitions, Chavez, the ALG which claims to be an organization of citizens, and the incumbent members of the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP in behalf of its lawyer members,50 invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, asserting that the right to information, curtailed and violated by E.O. 464, is essential to the effective exercise of other constitutional rights51 and to the maintenance of the balance of power among the three branches of the government through the principle of checks and balances.52

It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and personal. In Franciso v. House of Representatives,53 this Court held that when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest. As for petitioner PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is clothed with legal standing in view of the transcendental issues raised in its petition which this Court needs to resolve in order to avert a constitutional crisis. For it to be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance, however, it must establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is public) or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.54 The first and last determinants not being present as no public funds or assets are involved and petitioners in G.R. Nos. 169777 and 169659 have direct and specific interests in the resolution of the controversy, petitioner PDP-Laban is bereft of standing to file its petition. Its allegation that E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda is vague and uncertain, and at best is only a "generalized interest" which it shares with the rest of the political parties. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution.55 In fine, PDP-Labans alleged interest as a political party does not suffice to clothe it with legal standing. Actual Case or Controversy Petitioners assert that an actual case exists, they citing the absence of the executive officials invited by the Senate to its hearings after the issuance of E.O. 464, particularly those on the NorthRail project and the wiretapping controversy. Respondents counter that there is no case or controversy, there being no showing that President Arroyo has actually withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the invited officials.56 These officials, they claim, merely communicated to the Senate that they have not yet secured the consent of the President, not that the President prohibited their attendance.57 Specifically with regard to the AFP officers who did not attend the hearing on September 28, 2005, respondents claim that the instruction not to attend without the Presidents consent was based on its role as Commander-inChief of the Armed Forces, not on E.O. 464. Respondents thus conclude that the petitions merely rest on an unfounded apprehension that the President will abuse its power of preventing the appearance of officials before Congress, and that such apprehension is not sufficient for challenging the validity of E.O. 464. The Court finds respondents assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of an actual case or controversy insofar as E.O. 464 is concerned. For E.O. 464 does not require either a deliberate withholding of consent or an express prohibition issuing from the President in order to bar officials from appearing before Congress. As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of officials invited to the hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to wait for any further event before considering the present case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be sheer abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain from passing on the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

Constitutionality of E.O. 464 E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before Congress, deprives Congress of the information in the possession of these officials. To resolve the question of whether such withholding of information violates the Constitution, consideration of the general power of Congress to obtain information, otherwise known as the power of inquiry, is in order. The power of inquiry The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which reads: SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Underscoring supplied) This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that, in the latter, it vests the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature established therein the Batasang Pambansa and its committees. The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v. Nazareno,58 a case decided in 1950 under that Constitution, the Court already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate. Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who was considered a leading witness in the controversy, was called to testify thereon by the Senate. On account of his refusal to answer the questions of the senators on an important point, he was, by resolution of the Senate, detained for contempt. Upholding the Senates power to punish Arnault for contempt, this Court held: Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.59 . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to legislate.60 The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation. Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of the government transaction involved in Arnault was a proper exercise of the power of inquiry. Besides being related to the expenditure of public funds of which Congress is the guardian, the transaction, the Court held, "also involved government

agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions it is within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish." Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations. As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof. As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called "McCarthy era," however, the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Courts certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,61 the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation. Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or Houses duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the persons affected, even if they belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances, none appearing to obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might be established, resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending on the particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction. Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege." Since this term figures prominently in the challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular clauses,62 and in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Executive privilege

The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the promulgation of the 1986 Constitution.63 Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined and used in the legal literature of the United States. Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress."64 Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public."65 Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. 66 It has encompassed claims of varying kinds.67 Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase "executive privilege," it may be more accurate to speak of executive privileges "since presidential refusals to furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of considerations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either judicial or legislative investigations." One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning with Washington, on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informers privilege, or the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. 68 Tribes comment is supported by the ruling in In re Sealed Case, thus: Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials have claimed a variety of privileges to resist disclosure of information the confidentiality of which they felt was crucial to fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch of our government. Courts ruled early that the executive had a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state secrets. The courts have also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of government informers in some circumstances and a qualified right to withhold information related to pending investigations. x x x"69 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The entry in Blacks Law Dictionary on "executive privilege" is similarly instructive regarding the scope of the doctrine. This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the executive from disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations, and extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in intragovernmental advisory and deliberative communications.70 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.71

The leading case on executive privilege in the United States is U.S. v. Nixon, 72 decided in 1974. In issue in that case was the validity of President Nixons claim of executive privilege against a subpoena issued by a district court requiring the production of certain tapes and documents relating to the Watergate investigations. The claim of privilege was based on the Presidents general interest in the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence. The U.S. Court held that while there is no explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality in the U.S. Constitution, it is constitutionally based to the extent that it relates to the effective discharge of a Presidents powers. The Court, nonetheless, rejected the Presidents claim of privilege, ruling that the privilege must be balanced against the public interest in the fair administration of criminal justice. Notably, the Court was careful to clarify that it was not there addressing the issue of claims of privilege in a civil litigation or against congressional demands for information. Cases in the U.S. which involve claims of executive privilege against Congress are rare.73 Despite frequent assertion of the privilege to deny information to Congress, beginning with President Washingtons refusal to turn over treaty negotiation records to the House of Representatives, the U.S. Supreme Court has never adjudicated the issue.74 However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a case decided earlier in the same year as Nixon, recognized the Presidents privilege over his conversations against a congressional subpoena.75 Anticipating the balancing approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nixon, the Court of Appeals weighed the public interest protected by the claim of privilege against the interest that would be served by disclosure to the Committee. Ruling that the balance favored the President, the Court declined to enforce the subpoena. 76 In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez.77Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis for the privilege: "The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Ombudsman against the therein petitioners. It did not involve, as expressly stated in the decision, the right of the people to information.78 Nonetheless, the Court recognized that there are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public, thus acknowledging, in substance if not in name, that executive privilege may be claimed against citizens demands for information. In Chavez v. PCGG,79 the Court held that this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters."80 The same case held that closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a recognized limitation on the right to information. Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,81 the Court ruled that the right to information does not extend to matters recognized as "privileged information under the separation of powers,"82 by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door

Cabinet meetings. It also held that information on military and diplomatic secrets and those affecting national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused were exempted from the right to information. From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in this jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. Validity of Section 1 Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. There are significant differences between the two provisions, however, which constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these provisions separately. Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads possession of any information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis--vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour. SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session. Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22 of Article VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis--vis Section 21 which provides for the power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation." As the following excerpt of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission shows, the framers were aware that these two provisions involved distinct functions of Congress. MR. MAAMBONG. x x x When we amended Section 20 [now Section 22 on the Question Hour] yesterday, I noticed that members of the Cabinet cannot be compelled anymore to appear before the House of Representatives or before the Senate. I have a particular problem in this regard, Madam President, because in our experience in the Regular Batasang Pambansa as the Gentleman himself has experienced in the interim Batasang Pambansa one of the most competent inputs that we can put in our committee deliberations, either in aid of legislation or in congressional

investigations, is the testimonies of Cabinet ministers. We usually invite them, but if they do not come and it is a congressional investigation, we usually issue subpoenas. I want to be clarified on a statement made by Commissioner Suarez when he said that the fact that the Cabinet ministers may refuse to come to the House of Representatives or the Senate [when requested under Section 22] does not mean that they need not come when they are invited or subpoenaed by the committee of either House when it comes to inquiries in aid of legislation or congressional investigation. According to Commissioner Suarez, that is allowed and their presence can be had under Section 21. Does the gentleman confirm this, Madam President? MR. DAVIDE. We confirm that, Madam President, because Section 20 refers only to what was originally the Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House.83 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. The reference to Commissioner Suarez bears noting, he being one of the proponents of the amendment to make the appearance of department heads discretionary in the question hour. So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members of the Commission that the Committee on Style, precisely in recognition of this distinction, later moved the provision on question hour from its original position as Section 20 in the original draft down to Section 31, far from the provision on inquiries in aid of legislation. This gave rise to the following exchange during the deliberations: MR. GUINGONA. [speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Style] We now go, Mr. Presiding Officer, to the Article on Legislative and may I request the chairperson of the Legislative Department, Commissioner Davide, to give his reaction. THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide is recognized.
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MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I have only one reaction to the Question Hour. I propose that instead of putting it as Section 31, it should follow Legislative Inquiries. THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What does the committee say? MR. GUINGONA. I ask Commissioner Maambong to reply, Mr. Presiding Officer. MR. MAAMBONG. Actually, we considered that previously when we sequenced this but we reasoned that in Section 21, which is Legislative Inquiry, it is actually a power of Congress in terms of its own lawmaking; whereas, a Question Hour is not actually a power in terms of its own lawmaking power because in Legislative Inquiry, it is in aid of legislation. And so we put Question Hour as Section 31. I hope Commissioner Davide will consider this. MR. DAVIDE. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation.

MR. MAAMBONG. After conferring with the committee, we find merit in the suggestion of Commissioner Davide. In other words, we are accepting that and so this Section 31 would now become Section 22. Would it be, Commissioner Davide? MR. DAVIDE. Yes.84 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Consistent with their statements earlier in the deliberations, Commissioners Davide and Maambong proceeded from the same assumption that these provisions pertained to two different functions of the legislature. Both Commissioners understood that the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is different from the power to conduct inquiries during the question hour. Commissioner Davides only concern was that the two provisions on these distinct powers be placed closely together, they being complementary to each other. Neither Commissioner considered them as identical functions of Congress. The foregoing opinion was not the two Commissioners alone. From the above-quoted exchange, Commissioner Maambongs committee the Committee on Style shared the view that the two provisions reflected distinct functions of Congress. Commissioner Davide, on the other hand, was speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative Department. His views may thus be presumed as representing that of his Committee. In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question hour" has a definite meaning. It is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable for their acts and the operation of the government,85 corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question period. There was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution86 which made the appearance of ministers mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system established by that Constitution, where the ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly accountable to it. An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate accountability of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National Assembly for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in the presidential system where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot be terminated before their term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only as long as they enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this confidence is lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.87 The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers.88 To that extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from the question period of the parliamentary system. That department heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress right to executive information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative. As Schwartz observes: Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the subject under discussion, it is that the Congress has the right to obtain information from any source even from officials of departments and agencies in the executive branch. In the United States there is, unlike the situation which prevails in a parliamentary system such as that in Britain, a clear separation between the legislative and executive branches. It is this very separation that makes the congressional right to obtain information from the executive so essential, if the functions of the Congress as the elected representatives of the people are adequately to be carried out. The absence of close rapport

between the legislative and executive branches in this country, comparable to those which exist under a parliamentary system, and the nonexistence in the Congress of an institution such as the British question period have perforce made reliance by the Congress upon its right to obtain information from the executive essential, if it is intelligently to perform its legislative tasks. Unless the Congress possesses the right to obtain executive information, its power of oversight of administration in a system such as ours becomes a power devoid of most of its practical content, since it depends for its effectiveness solely upon information parceled out ex gratia by the executive.89 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.90 In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a longstanding custom. By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief Justice. Having established the proper interpretation of Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the Court now proceeds to pass on the constitutionality of Section 1 of E.O. 464. Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its

application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it constitutional. The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part. Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary. Validity of Sections 2 and 3 Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are "covered by the executive privilege." The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the President. Given the title of Section 2 "Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege" , it is evident that under the rule of ejusdem generis, the determination by the President under this provision is intended to be based on a similar finding of coverage under executive privilege. En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that executive privilege actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed above, is properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to categories of persons. In light, however, of Sec 2(a) of E.O. 464 which deals with the nature, scope and coverage of executive privilege, the reference to persons being "covered by the executive privilege" may be read as an abbreviated way of saying that the person is in possession of information which is, in the judgment of the head of office concerned, privileged as defined in Section 2(a). The Court shall thus proceed on the assumption that this is the intention of the challenged order. Upon a determination by the designated head of office or by the President that an official is "covered by the executive privilege," such official is subjected to the requirement that he first secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. This requirement effectively bars the appearance of the official concerned unless the same is permitted by the President. The proviso allowing the President to give its consent means nothing more than that the President may reverse a prohibition which already exists by virtue of E.O. 464. Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is the determination by a head of office, authorized by the President under E.O. 464, or by the President herself, that such official is in possession of information that is covered by executive privilege. This determination then becomes the basis for the officials not showing up in the legislative investigation. In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged, and that

the President has not reversed such determination. Such declaration, however, even without mentioning the term "executive privilege," amounts to an implied claim that the information is being withheld by the executive branch, by authority of the President, on the basis of executive privilege. Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege. The letter dated September 28, 2005 of respondent Executive Secretary Ermita to Senate President Drilon illustrates the implied nature of the claim of privilege authorized by E.O. 464. It reads: In connection with the inquiry to be conducted by the Committee of the Whole regarding the Northrail Project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation on 29 September 2005 at 10:00 a.m., please be informed that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to Executive Order No. 464 (s. 2005), entitled "Ensuring Observance Of The Principle Of Separation Of Powers, Adherence To The Rule On Executive Privilege And Respect For The Rights Of Public Officials Appearing In Legislative Inquiries In Aid Of Legislation Under The Constitution, And For Other Purposes". Said officials have not secured the required consent from the President. (Underscoring supplied) The letter does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. Significant premises in this letter, however, are left unstated, deliberately or not. The letter assumes that the invited officials are covered by E.O. 464. As explained earlier, however, to be covered by the order means that a determination has been made, by the designated head of office or the President, that the invited official possesses information that is covered by executive privilege. Thus, although it is not stated in the letter that such determination has been made, the same must be deemed implied. Respecting the statement that the invited officials have not secured the consent of the President, it only means that the President has not reversed the standing prohibition against their appearance before Congress. Inevitably, Executive Secretary Ermitas letter leads to the conclusion that the executive branch, either through the President or the heads of offices authorized under E.O. 464, has made a determination that the information required by the Senate is privileged, and that, at the time of writing, there has been no contrary pronouncement from the President. In fine, an implied claim of privilege has been made by the executive. While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive privilege may be invoked against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in the possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress. Thus, the case holds: There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internaldeliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a coequal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the situation in the instant case.91 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions claims of executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of privilege authorized by the Order to determine whether it is valid. While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a case to case basis, examining the ground invoked therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied claim of privilege, a defect that renders it invalid per se. By its very nature, and as demonstrated by the letter of respondent Executive Secretary quoted above, the implied claim authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof (e.g., whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.). While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by the privilege under the challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is being referred to by the executive. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is included in the phrase "confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered by this executive order." Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested. A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be clearly asserted. As U.S. v. Reynolds teaches: The privilege belongs to the government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private party. It is not to be lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer. The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.92 (Underscoring supplied) Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected.93 These, in substance, were the same criteria in assessing the claim of privilege asserted against the Ombudsman in Almonte v. Vasquez94 and, more in point, against a committee of the Senate in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon.95 A.O. Smith v. Federal Trade Commission is enlightening: [T]he lack of specificity renders an assessment of the potential harm resulting from disclosure impossible, thereby preventing the Court from balancing such harm against plaintiffs needs to determine whether to override any claims of privilege.96 (Underscoring supplied) And so is U.S. v. Article of Drug:97 On the present state of the record, this Court is not called upon to perform this balancing operation. In stating its objection to claimants interrogatories, government asserts, and nothing more, that the disclosures sought by claimant would inhibit the free expression of opinion that non-disclosure is

designed to protect. The government has not shown nor even alleged that those who evaluated claimants product were involved in internal policymaking, generally, or in this particular instance. Privilege cannot be set up by an unsupported claim. The facts upon which the privilege is based must be established. To find these interrogatories objectionable, this Court would have to assume that the evaluation and classification of claimants products was a matter of internal policy formulation, an assumption in which this Court is unwilling to indulge sua sponte.98 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy99 similarly emphasizes that "an agency must provide precise and certain reasons for preserving the confidentiality of requested information." Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America100 amplifies, thus: A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a specific designation and description of the documents within its scope as well as precise and certain reasons for preserving their confidentiality. Without this specificity, it is impossible for a court to analyze the claim short of disclosure of the very thing sought to be protected. As the affidavit now stands, the Court has little more than its sua sponte speculation with which to weigh the applicability of the claim. An improperly asserted claim of privilege is no claim of privilege. Therefore, despite the fact that a claim was made by the proper executive as Reynolds requires, the Court can not recognize the claim in the instant case because it is legally insufficient to allow the Court to make a just and reasonable determination as to its applicability. To recognize such a broad claim in which the Defendant has given no precise or compelling reasons to shield these documents from outside scrutiny, would make a farce of the whole procedure.101 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Due respect for a co-equal branch of government, moreover, demands no less than a claim of privilege clearly stating the grounds therefor. Apropos is the following ruling in McPhaul v. U.S:102 We think the Courts decision in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 70 S. Ct. 724, is highly relevant to these questions. For it is as true here as it was there, that if (petitioner) had legitimate reasons for failing to produce the records of the association, a decent respect for the House of Representatives, by whose authority the subpoenas issued, would have required that (he) state (his) reasons for noncompliance upon the return of the writ. Such a statement would have given the Subcommittee an opportunity to avoid the blocking of its inquiry by taking other appropriate steps to obtain the records. To deny the Committee the opportunity to consider the objection or remedy is in itself a contempt of its authority and an obstruction of its processes. His failure to make any such statement was "a patent evasion of the duty of one summoned to produce papers before a congressional committee[, and] cannot be condoned." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted) Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect.103 A useful analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege against self-incrimination. Thus, Hoffman v. U.S.104 declares: The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, and to require him to answer if it clearly appears to the court that he is mistaken. However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in

which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result." x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress. In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines, binding only on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege. It does not purport to be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may thus be construed as a mere expression of opinion by the President regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege. Petitioners, however, assert as another ground for invalidating the challenged order the alleged unlawful delegation of authority to the heads of offices in Section 2(b). Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, in particular, cites the case of the United States where, so it claims, only the President can assert executive privilege to withhold information from Congress. Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the Presidents authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence. Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch,105 or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities.106 The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain informations must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the President," which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score. It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to

consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance. The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for requiring officials to secure the consent of the President under Section 3 of E.O. 464 is to ensure "respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation." That such rights must indeed be respected by Congress is an echo from Article VI Section 21 of the Constitution mandating that "[t]he rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is clear that it is essentially an authorization for implied claims of executive privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated. That such authorization is partly motivated by the need to ensure respect for such officials does not change the infirm nature of the authorization itself. Right to Information E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of executive officials in the hearings conducted by it, and not with the demands of citizens for information pursuant to their right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioners are not amiss in claiming, however, that what is involved in the present controversy is not merely the legislative power of inquiry, but the right of the people to information. There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen. Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information. To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte: It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.107(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of inquiry.

Implementation of E.O. 464 prior to its publication While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication. On the need for publishing even those statutes that do not directly apply to people in general, Taada v. Tuvera states: The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in courts of justice.108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the challenged order must be covered by the publication requirement. As explained above, E.O. 464 has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. It is, therefore, a matter of public interest which members of the body politic may question before this Court. Due process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented. Conclusion Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. For [w]hat republican theory did accomplishwas to reverse the old presumption in favor of secrecy, based on the divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it with a presumption in favor of publicity, based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty. (Underscoring supplied)109 Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but we shall have given up something of much greater value our right as a people to take part in government. WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID. SO ORDERED.
Kilusang Mayo Uno vs Director General, National Economic Development Authority

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 167798 April 19, 2006
KILUSANG MAYO UNO, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), JOSELITO V. USTAREZ, EMILIA P. DAPULANG, SALVADOR T. CARRANZA, MARTIN T. CUSTODIO, JR. and ROQUE M. TAN, Petitioners, vs. THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, and THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET and MANAGEMENT, Respondents. x-----------------------------------x G.R. No. 167930 April 19, 2006
BAYAN MUNA Representatives SATUR C. OCAMPO, TEODORO A. CASIO, and JOEL G. VIRADOR, GABRIELA WOMENS PARTY Representative LIZA L. MAZA, ANAKPAWIS Representatives RAFAEL V. MARIANO and CRISPIN B. BELTRAN, Rep. FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, Rep. EDUARDO C. ZIALCITA, Rep. LORENZO R. TAADA III, DR. CAROL PAGADUAN-ARAULLO and RENATO M. REYES, JR. of BAYAN, MARIE HILAO-ENRIQUEZ of KARAPATAN, ANTONIO L. TINIO of ACT, FERDINAND GAITE of COURAGE, GIOVANNI A. TAPANG of AGHAM, WILFREDO MARBELLA GARCIA, of KMP, LANA LINABAN of GABRIELA, AMADO GAT INCIONG, RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR., DEAN PACIFICO H. AGABIN, SHARON R. DUREMDES of the NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES IN THE PHILIPPINES, and BRO. EDMUNDO L. FERNANDEZ (FSC) of the ASSOCIATION OF MAJOR RELIGIOUS SUPERIORS OF THE PHILIPPINES (AMRSP), Petitioners, vs. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, ROMULO NERI, in his capacity as Director-General of the NATIONAL ECONOMIC and DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NEDA) and the Administrator of the NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE (NSO), Respondents. DECISION CARPIO, J.: This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420) on the ground that it is unconstitutional. EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005, reads: REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE AND HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES WHEREAS, good governance is a major thrust of this Administration;

WHEREAS, the existing multiple identification systems in government have created unnecessary and costly redundancies and higher costs to government, while making it inconvenient for individuals to be holding several identification cards; WHEREAS, there is urgent need to streamline and integrate the processes and issuance of identification cards in government to reduce costs and to provide greater convenience for those transacting business with government; WHEREAS, a unified identification system will facilitate private businesses, enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued identification cards in private transactions, and prevent violations of laws involving false names and identities. NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Republic of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, do hereby direct the following: Section 1. Adoption of a unified multi-purpose identification (ID) system for government. All government agencies, including government-owned and controlled corporations, are hereby directed to adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system to ensure the attainment of the following objectives:
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a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden on both the government and the public brought about by the use of multiple ID cards and the maintenance of redundant database containing the same or related information; b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with the government and those availing of government services; c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider use of the unified ID card as provided under this executive order; d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID cards; and e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective government service. Section 2. Coverage All government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations issuing ID cards to their members or constituents shall be covered by this executive order. Section 3. Data requirement for the unified ID system The data to be collected and recorded by the participating agencies shall be limited to the following: Name Home Address Sex Picture Signature

Date of Birth Place of Birth Marital Status Names of Parents Height Weight Two index fingers and two thumbmarks Any prominent distinguishing features like moles and others Tax Identification Number (TIN) Provided that a corresponding ID number issued by the participating agency and a common reference number shall form part of the stored ID data and, together with at least the first five items listed above, including the print of the right thumbmark, or any of the fingerprints as collected and stored, shall appear on the face or back of the ID card for visual verification purposes. Section 4. Authorizing the Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, to Harmonize All Government Identification Systems. The Director-General, National Economic Development Authority, is hereby authorized to streamline and harmonize all government ID systems. Section 5. Functions and responsibilities of the Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority. In addition to his organic functions and responsibilities, the DirectorGeneral, National Economic and Development Authority, shall have the following functions and responsibilities: a. Adopt within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this executive order a unified government ID system containing only such data and features, as indicated in Section 3 above, to validly establish the identity of the card holder: b. Enter into agreements with local governments, through their respective leagues of governors or mayors, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and with other branches or instrumentalities of the government, for the purpose of ensuring government-wide adoption of and support to this effort to streamline the ID systems in government; b. Call on any other government agency or institution, or create subcommittees or technical working groups, to provide such assistance as may be necessary or required for the effective performance of its functions; and d. Promulgate such rules or regulations as may be necessary in pursuance of the objectives of this executive order. Section 6. Safeguards. The Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, and the pertinent agencies shall adopt such safeguard as may be necessary and adequate to

ensure that the right to privacy of an individual takes precedence over efficient public service delivery. Such safeguards shall, as a minimum, include the following: a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for purposes of establishing the identity of a person, shall be limited to those specified in Section 3 of this executive order; b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in violation of a persons right to privacy shall be allowed or tolerated under this order; c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the identification system shall be instituted; d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and treated as strictly confidential and a personal or written authorization of the Owner shall be required for access and disclosure of data; e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by advanced security features and cryptographic technology; and f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall be required for any correction or revision of relevant data, or under such conditions as the participating agency issuing the identification card shall prescribe. Section 7. Funding. Such funds as may be recommended by the Department of Budget and Management shall be provided to carry out the objectives of this executive order. Section 8. Repealing clause. All executive orders or issuances, or portions thereof, which are inconsistent with this executive order, are hereby revoked, amended or modified accordingly. Section 9. Effectivity. This executive order shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. DONE in the City of Manila, this 13th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, Two Thousand and Five. Thus, under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing identification (ID) systems. Petitioners in G.R. No. 167798 allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they allege that EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy.1 Petitioners in G.R. No. 167930 allege that EO 420 is void based on the following grounds: 1. EO 420 is contrary to law. It completely disregards and violates the decision of this Honorable Court inOple v. Torres et al., G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998. It also violates RA 8282 otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1997. 2. The Executive has usurped the legislative power of Congress as she has no power to issue EO 420. Furthermore, the implementation of the EO will use public funds not appropriated by Congress for that purpose.

3. EO 420 violates the constitutional provisions on the right to privacy (i) It allows access to personal confidential data without the owners consent. (ii) EO 420 is vague and without adequate safeguards or penalties for any violation of its provisions. (iii) There are no compelling reasons that will legitimize the necessity of EO 420. 4. Granting without conceding that the President may issue EO 420, the Executive Order was issued without public hearing. 5. EO 420 violates the Constitutional provision on equal protection of laws and results in the discriminatory treatment of and penalizes those without ID.2 Issues Essentially, the petitions raise two issues. First, petitioners claim that EO 420 is a usurpation of legislative power by the President. Second, petitioners claim that EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy. Respondents question the legal standing of petitioners and the ripeness of the petitions. Even assuming that petitioners are bereft of legal standing, the Court considers the issues raised under the circumstances of paramount public concern or of transcendental significance to the people. The petitions also present a justiciable controversy ripe for judicial determination because all government entities currently issuing identification cards are mandated to implement EO 420, which petitioners claim is patently unconstitutional. Hence, the Court takes cognizance of the petitions. The Courts Ruling The petitions are without merit. On the Alleged Usurpation of Legislative Power Section 2 of EO 420 provides, "Coverage. All government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations issuing ID cards to their members or constituents shall be covered by this executive order." EO 420 applies only to government entities that issue ID cards as part of their functions under existing laws. These government entities have already been issuing ID cards even prior to EO 420. Examples of these government entities are the GSIS,3 SSS,4 Philhealth,5 Mayors Office,6 LTO,7 PRC,8 and similar government entities. Section 1 of EO 420 directs these government entities to "adopt a unified multi-purpose ID system." Thus, all government entities that issue IDs as part of their functions under existing laws are required to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their IDs. Section 1 of EO 420 enumerates the purposes of the uniform data collection and format, namely: a. To reduce costs and thereby lessen the financial burden on both the government and the public brought about by the use of multiple ID cards and the maintenance of redundant database containing the same or related information;

b. To ensure greater convenience for those transacting business with the government and those availing of government services; c. To facilitate private businesses and promote the wider use of the unified ID card as provided under this executive order; d. To enhance the integrity and reliability of government-issued ID cards; and e. To facilitate access to and delivery of quality and effective government service. In short, the purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability, insure compatibility, and provide convenience to the people served by government entities. Section 3 of EO 420 limits the data to be collected and recorded under the uniform ID system to only 14 specific items, namely: (1) Name; (2) Home Address; (3) Sex; (4) Picture; (5) Signature; (6) Date of Birth; (7) Place of Birth; (8) Marital Status; (9) Name of Parents; (10) Height; (11) Weight; (12) Two index fingers and two thumbmarks; (13) Any prominent distinguishing features like moles or others; and (14) Tax Identification Number. These limited and specific data are the usual data required for personal identification by government entities, and even by the private sector. Any one who applies for or renews a drivers license provides to the LTO all these 14 specific data. At present, government entities like LTO require considerably more data from applicants for identification purposes. EO 420 will reduce the data required to be collected and recorded in the ID databases of the government entities. Government entities cannot collect or record data, for identification purposes, other than the 14 specific data. Various laws allow several government entities to collect and record data for their ID systems, either expressly or impliedly by the nature of the functions of these government entities. Under their existing ID systems, some government entities collect and record more data than what EO 420 allows. At present, the data collected and recorded by government entities are disparate, and the IDs they issue are dissimilar. In the case of the Supreme Court,9 the IDs that the Court issues to all its employees, including the Justices, contain 15 specific data, namely: (1) Name; (2) Picture; (3) Position; (4) Office Code Number; (5) ID Number; (6) Height; (7) Weight; (8) Complexion; (9) Color of Hair; (10) Blood Type; (11) Right Thumbmark; (12) Tax Identification Number; (13) GSIS Policy Number; (14) Name and Address of Person to be Notified in Case of Emergency; and (15) Signature. If we consider that the picture in the ID can generally also show the sex of the employee, the Courts ID actually contains 16 data. In contrast, the uniform ID format under Section 3 of EO 420 requires only "the first five items listed" in Section 3, plus the fingerprint, agency number and the common reference number, or only eight specific data. Thus, at present, the Supreme Courts ID contains far more data than the proposed uniform ID for government entities under EO 420. The nature of the data contained in the Supreme Court ID is also far more financially sensitive, specifically the Tax Identification Number. Making the data collection and recording of government entities unified, and making their ID formats uniform, will admittedly achieve substantial benefits. These benefits are savings in terms of

procurement of equipment and supplies, compatibility in systems as to hardware and software, ease of verification and thus increased reliability of data, and the user-friendliness of a single ID format for all government entities. There is no dispute that government entities can individually limit the collection and recording of their data to the 14 specific items in Section 3 of EO 420. There is also no dispute that these government entities can individually adopt the ID format as specified in Section 3 of EO 420. Such an act is certainly within the authority of the heads or governing boards of the government entities that are already authorized under existing laws to issue IDs. A unified ID system for all these government entities can be achieved in either of two ways. First, the heads of these existing government entities can enter into a memorandum of agreement making their systems uniform. If the government entities can individually adopt a format for their own ID pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws, they can also adopt by mutual agreement a uniform ID format, especially if the uniform format will result in substantial savings, greater efficiency, and optimum compatibility. This is purely an administrative matter, and does not involve the exercise of legislative power. Second, the President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the "President shall have control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices." The same Section also mandates the President to "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." Certainly, under this constitutional power of control the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. The Presidents constitutional power of control is self-executing and does not need any implementing legislation. Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voters ID cards.10 This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government. The Constitution also mandates the President to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. There are several laws mandating government entities to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services.11 The adoption of a uniform ID data collection and format under EO 420 is designed to reduce costs, increase efficiency, and in general, improve public services. Thus, in issuing EO 420, the President is simply performing the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Clearly, EO 420 is well within the constitutional power of the President to promulgate. The President has not usurped legislative power in issuing EO 420. EO 420 is an exercise of Executive power the Presidents constitutional power of control over the Executive department. EO 420 is also compliance by the President of the constitutional duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them. In issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness in

the implementation of current ID systems of government entities under existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act of legislation. The act of issuing ID cards and collecting the necessary personal data for imprinting on the ID card does not require legislation. Private employers routinely issue ID cards to their employees. Private and public schools also routinely issue ID cards to their students. Even private clubs and associations issue ID cards to their members. The purpose of all these ID cards is simply to insure the proper identification of a person as an employee, student, or member of a club. These ID cards, although imposed as a condition for exercising a privilege, are voluntary because a person is not compelled to be an employee, student or member of a club. What require legislation are three aspects of a government maintained ID card system. First, when the implementation of an ID card system requires a special appropriation because there is no existing appropriation for such purpose. Second, when the ID card system is compulsory on all branches of government, including the independent constitutional commissions, as well as compulsory on all citizens whether they have a use for the ID card or not. Third, when the ID card system requires the collection and recording of personal data beyond what is routinely or usually required for such purpose, such that the citizens right to privacy is infringed. In the present case, EO 420 does not require any special appropriation because the existing ID card systems of government entities covered by EO 420 have the proper appropriation or funding. EO 420 is not compulsory on all branches of government and is not compulsory on all citizens. EO 420 requires a very narrow and focused collection and recording of personal data while safeguarding the confidentiality of such data. In fact, the data collected and recorded under EO 420 are far less than the data collected and recorded under the ID systems existing prior to EO 420. EO 420 does not establish a national ID card system. EO 420 does not compel all citizens to have an ID card. EO 420 applies only to government entities that under existing laws are already collecting data and issuing ID cards as part of their governmental functions. Every government entity that presently issues an ID card will still issue its own ID card under its own name. The only difference is that the ID card will contain only the five data specified in Section 3 of EO 420, plus the fingerprint, the agency ID number, and the common reference number which is needed for crossverification to ensure integrity and reliability of identification. This Court should not interfere how government entities under the Executive department should undertake cost savings, achieve efficiency in operations, insure compatibility of equipment and systems, and provide user-friendly service to the public. The collection of ID data and issuance of ID cards are day-to-day functions of many government entities under existing laws. Even the Supreme Court has its own ID system for employees of the Court and all first and second level courts. The Court is even trying to unify its ID system with those of the appellate courts, namely the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan and Court of Tax Appeals. There is nothing legislative about unifying existing ID systems of all courts within the Judiciary. The same is true for government entities under the Executive department. If government entities under the Executive department decide to unify their existing ID data collection and ID card issuance systems to achieve savings, efficiency, compatibility and convenience, such act does not involve the exercise of any legislative power. Thus, the issuance of EO 420 does not constitute usurpation of legislative power. On the Alleged Infringement of the Right to Privacy

All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government entities have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of these government entities violate their right to privacy. There have also been no complaints of abuse by these government entities in the collection and recording of personal identification data. In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems of government entities prior to EO 420 violate their right to privacy. Since petitioners do not make such claim, they even have less basis to complain against the unified ID system under EO 420. The data collected and stored for the unified ID system under EO 420 will be limited to only 14 specific data, and the ID card itself will show only eight specific data. The data collection, recording and ID card system under EO 420 will even require less data collected, stored and revealed than under the disparate systems prior to EO 420. Prior to EO 420, government entities had a free hand in determining the kind, nature and extent of data to be collected and stored for their ID systems. Under EO 420, government entities can collect and record only the 14 specific data mentioned in Section 3 of EO 420. In addition, government entities can show in their ID cards only eight of these specific data, seven less data than what the Supreme Courts ID shows. Also, prior to EO 420, there was no executive issuance to government entities prescribing safeguards on the collection, recording, and disclosure of personal identification data to protect the right to privacy. Now, under Section 5 of EO 420, the following safeguards are instituted: a. The data to be recorded and stored, which shall be used only for purposes of establishing the identity of a person, shall be limited to those specified in Section 3 of this executive order; b. In no case shall the collection or compilation of other data in violation of a persons right to privacy be allowed or tolerated under this order; c. Stringent systems of access control to data in the identification system shall be instituted; d. Data collected and stored for this purpose shall be kept and treated as strictly confidential and a personal or written authorization of the Owner shall be required for access and disclosure of data; e. The identification card to be issued shall be protected by advanced security features and cryptographic technology; f. A written request by the Owner of the identification card shall be required for any correction or revision of relevant data, or under such conditions as the participating agency issuing the identification card shall prescribe. On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even narrowly limits the data that can be collected, recorded and shown compared to the existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further provides strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards. The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities. Some one hundred countries have compulsory national ID systems, including democracies such as

Spain, France, Germany, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal. Other countries which do not have national ID systems, like the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, the Nordic Countries and Sweden, have sectoral cards for health, social or other public services.12 Even with EO 420, the Philippines will still fall under the countries that do not have compulsory national ID systems but allow only sectoral cards for social security, health services, and other specific purposes. Without a reliable ID system, government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, and LTO cannot perform effectively and efficiently their mandated functions under existing laws. Without a reliable ID system, GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and similar government entities stand to suffer substantial losses arising from false names and identities. The integrity of the LTOs licensing system will suffer in the absence of a reliable ID system. The dissenting opinion cites three American decisions on the right to privacy, namely, Griswold v. Connecticut,13U.S. Justice Department v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,14 and Whalen v. Roe.15 The last two decisions actually support the validity of EO 420, while the first is inapplicable to the present case. In Griswold, the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a state law that prohibited the use and distribution of contraceptives because enforcement of the law would allow the police entry into the bedrooms of married couples. Declared the U.S. Supreme Court: "Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of the marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship." Because the facts and the issue involved in Griswold are materially different from the present case, Griswold has no persuasive bearing on the present case. In U.S. Justice Department, the issue was not whether the State could collect and store information on individuals from public records nationwide but whether the State could withhold such information from the press. The premise of the issue in U.S. Justice Department is that the State can collect and store in a central database information on citizens gathered from public records across the country. In fact, the law authorized the Department of Justice to collect and preserve fingerprints and other criminal identification records nationwide. The law also authorized the Department of Justice to exchange such information with "officials of States, cities and other institutions." The Department of Justice treated such information as confidential. A CBS news correspondent and the Reporters Committee demanded the criminal records of four members of a family pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Freedom of Information Act expressly exempts release of information that would "constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy," and the information demanded falls under that category of exempt information. With the exception of the 8 specific data shown on the ID card, the personal data collected and recorded under EO 420 are treated as "strictly confidential" under Section 6(d) of EO 420. These data are not only strictly confidential but also personal matters. Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution grants the "right of the people to information on matters of public concern." Personal matters are exempt or outside the coverage of the peoples right to information on matters of public concern. The data treated as "strictly confidential" under EO 420 being private matters and not matters of public concern, these data cannot be released to the public or the press. Thus, the ruling in U.S. Justice Department does not collide with EO 420 but actually supports the validity EO 420. Whalen v. Roe is the leading American case on the constitutional protection for control over information. In Whalen, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a New York law that required doctors to furnish the government reports identifying patients who received prescription drugs that have a potential for abuse. The government maintained a central computerized database containing

the names and addresses of the patients, as well as the identity of the prescribing doctors. The law was assailed because the database allegedly infringed the right to privacy of individuals who want to keep their personal matters confidential. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the privacy claim, and declared: Disclosures of private medical information to doctors, to hospital personnel, to insurance companies, and to public health agencies are often an essential part of modern medical practice even when the disclosure may reflect unfavorably on the character of the patient. Requiring such disclosures to representatives of the State having responsibility for the health of the community does not automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy. (Emphasis supplied) Compared to the personal medical data required for disclosure to the New York State in Whalen, the 14 specific data required for disclosure to the Philippine government under EO 420 are far less sensitive and far less personal. In fact, the 14 specific data required under EO 420 are routine data for ID systems, unlike the sensitive and potentially embarrassing medical records of patients taking prescription drugs. Whalen, therefore, carries persuasive force for upholding the constitutionality of EO 420 as non-violative of the right to privacy. Subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have reiterated Whalen. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,16 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of a law that required doctors performing abortions to fill up forms, maintain records for seven years, and allow the inspection of such records by public health officials. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "recordkeeping and reporting requirements that are reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health and that properly respect a patients confidentiality and privacy are permissible." Again, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,17 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a law that required doctors performing an abortion to file a report to the government that included the doctors name, the womans age, the number of prior pregnancies and abortions that the woman had, the medical complications from the abortion, the weight of the fetus, and the marital status of the woman. In case of state-funded institutions, the law made such information publicly available. In Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: "The collection of information with respect to actual patients is a vital element of medical research, and so it cannot be said that the requirements serve no purpose other than to make abortion more difficult." Compared to the disclosure requirements of personal data that the U.S. Supreme Court have upheld in Whalen, Danforth and Casey as not violative of the right to privacy, the disclosure requirements under EO 420 are far benign and cannot therefore constitute violation of the right to privacy. EO 420 requires disclosure of 14 personal data that are routine for ID purposes, data that cannot possibly embarrass or humiliate anyone. Petitioners have not shown how EO 420 will violate their right to privacy. Petitioners cannot show such violation by a mere facial examination of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws the data collection, recording and exhibition while prescribing comprehensive safeguards. Ople v. Torres18 is not authority to hold that EO 420 violates the right to privacy because in that case the assailed executive issuance, broadly drawn and devoid of safeguards, was annulled solely on the ground that the subject matter required legislation. As then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban noted in his concurring opinion in Ople v. Torres, "The voting is decisive only on the need for appropriate legislation, and it is only on this ground that the petition is granted by this Court." EO 420 applies only to government entities that already maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant such government

entities any power that they do not already possess under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed executive issuance in Ople v. Torres sought to establish a "National Computerized Identification Reference System,"19 a national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system where none existed before. In the present case, EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the existing sectoral card systems of government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient, reliable and user-friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the Presidents constitutional power of control over government entities in the Executive department, as well as under the Presidents constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed. WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Executive Order No. 420 is declared VALID. SO ORDERED.
Republic vs Gingoyon
EN BANC
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 166429 Represented by Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita, the DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND Present: COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), and the MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT DAVIDE, JR., C.J., AUTHORITY (MIAA), PUNO, Petitioners, PANGANIBAN, ' QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, ' -versus- AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO-MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, HON. HENRICK F. GINGOYON, TINGA, In his capacity as Presiding CHICO-NAZARIO, and Judge of the Regional Trial Court, GARCIA, JJ. Branch 117, Pasay City and PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC., Respondents. Promulgated:
December 19, 2005
x---------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION TINGA, J.:

The Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III (NAIA 3) was conceived, designed and constructed to serve as the country's show window to the world. Regrettably, it has spawned controversies. Regrettably too, despite the apparent completion of the terminal complex way back it has not yet been operated. This has caused immeasurable economic damage to the country, not to mention its deplorable discredit in the international community.
In the first case that reached this Court, Agan v. PIATCO, [1] the contracts' which the Government had with the contractor were voided for being contrary to law and public policy. The second case now before the Court involves the matter of just compensation due the contractor for the terminal complex it built. We decide the case on the basis of fairness, the same norm that pervades both the Court's 2004 Resolution in the first case and the latest expropriation law.
The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the Court's decision in Agan v. PIATCO, [2]promulgated in 2003 (2003 Decision). This decision nullified the 'Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III entered into between the Philippine Government (Government) and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as the amendments and supplements thereto. The agreement had authorized PIATCO to build a new international airport terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal during the concession period of 25 years. The contracts were nullified, among others, that Paircargo Consortium, predecessor of PIATCO, did not possess the requisite financial capacity when it was awarded the NAIA 3 contract and that the agreement was' contrary to public policy. [3]
At the time of the promulgation of the 2003 Decision, the NAIA 3 facilities had already been built by PIATCO and were nearing completion. [4] However, the ponencia was silent as to the legal status of the NAIA 3 facilities following the nullification of the contracts, as well as whatever rights of PIATCO for reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the facilities. Still, in his Separate Opinion, Justice Panganiban, joined by Justice Callejo, declared as follows:
Should government pay at all for reasonable expenses incurred in the construction of the Terminal? Indeed it should, otherwise it will be unjustly enriching itself at the expense of Piatco and, in particular, its funders, contractors and investors ' both local and foreign . After all, there is no question that the State needs and will make use of Terminal III, it being part and parcel of the critical infrastructure and transportation-related programs of government. [5]
PIATCO and several respondents-intervenors filed their respective motions for the reconsideration of the 2003 Decision. These motions were denied by the Court in its Resolution dated 21 January 2004 (2004 Resolution). [6]However, the Court this time squarely addressed the issue of the rights of PIATCO to refund, compensation or reimbursement for its expenses in the construction of the NAIA 3 facilities. The holding of the Court on this crucial point follows:
This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction.For the government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The compensation must be just and in accordance with law and equity for the government can not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its investors.[7]
After the promulgation of the rulings' in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate operation. The Government and PIATCO conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the NAIA 3 facilities. [8] It also appears that arbitral proceedings were commenced before the International Chamber of Commerce International Court of Arbitration and the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, [9] although the Government has raised jurisdictional questions before those two bodies. [10]
Then, on 21 December 2004, the Government [11] filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay City Regional Trial Court (RTC), together with an Application for Special Raffle seeking the immediate holding of a special raffle. The Government sought upon the filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities.
The Government also declared that it had deposited the amount of P 3,002,125,000.00 [12] (3 Billion) [13] in Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3 terminal's assessed value for taxation purposes. [14]
The case [15] was raffled to Branch 117 of the Pasay City RTC, presided by respondent judge Hon. Henrick F. Gingoyon (Hon. Gingoyon). On the same day that the Complaint was filed, the RTC issued an Order [16] directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it to 'take or enter upon the possession of the NAIA 3 facilities. Citing the case of City of v. Serrano, [17] the RTC noted that it had the ministerial duty to issue the writ of possession upon the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation. The RTC found these requisites present, particularly noting that '[t]he case record shows that [the Government has] deposited the assessed value of the [NAIA 3 facilities] in the Land Bank of the Philippines, an authorized depositary, as shown by the certification attached to their complaint. Also on the same day, the RTC issued a Writ of Possession. According to PIATCO, the Government was able to take possession over the NAIA 3 facilities immediately after the Writ of Possession was issued. [18]
However, on 4 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order designed to supplement its 21 December 2004 Order and the Writ of Possession. In the 4 January 2005 Order, now assailed in the present petition, the RTC noted that its earlier issuance of its writ of possession was pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, it was observed that Republic Act No. 8974 (Rep. Act No. 8974), otherwise known as 'An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purposes' and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (Implementing Rules) had amended Rule 67 in many respects.
There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under Rep. Act No. 8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the Government is required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas' in Rule 67, the Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No. 8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the replacement cost method.
Accordingly, on the basis of Sections 4 and 7 of Rep. Act No. 8974 and Section 10 of the Implementing Rules, the RTC made key qualifications to its earlier issuances. First, it directed the Land Bank of the Philippines, Baclaran Branch (LBP-Baclaran), to immediately release the amount of US$62,343,175.77 to PIATCO, an amount which the RTC characterized as that which the Government 'specifically made available for the purpose of this expropriation; and such amount to be deducted from the amount of just compensation due PIATCO as eventually determined by the RTC. Second, the Government was directed to submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds signed by authorized officials to cover the payment of just compensation. Third, the Government was directed 'to maintain, preserve and safeguard the NAIA 3 facilities or 'perform such as acts or activities in preparation for their direct operation of the airport terminal, pending expropriation proceedings and full payment of just compensation. However, the Government was prohibited 'from performing acts of ownership like awarding concessions or leasing any part of [NAIA 3] to other parties. [19]
The very next day after the issuance of the assailed 4 January 2005 Order, the Government filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, which was set for hearing on 10 January 2005. On 7 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order, the second now assailed before this Court, which appointed three (3) Commissioners to ascertain the amount of just compensation for the NAIA 3 Complex. That same day, the Government filed a Motion for Inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon.
The RTC heard the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Inhibition on 10 January 2005. On the same day, it denied these motions in an Omnibus Order dated 10 January 2005. This is the third Order now assailed before this Court. Nonetheless, while the Omnibus Orderaffirmed the earlier dispositions in the 4 January 2005 Order, it excepted from affirmance 'the superfluous part of the Order prohibiting the plaintiffs from awarding concessions or leasing any part of [NAIA 3] to other parties. [20]
Thus, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 was filed on 13 January 2005. The petition prayed for the nullification of the RTC orders dated 4 January 2005, 7 January 2005, and 10 January 2005, and for the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from taking further action on the expropriation case. A concurrent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction was granted by this Court in a Resolution dated 14 January 2005. [21]
The Government, in imputing grave abuse of discretion to the acts of Hon. Gingoyon, raises five general arguments, to wit:
(i) that Rule 67, not Rep. Act No. 8974, governs the present expropriation proceedings;
(ii) that Hon. Gingoyon erred when he ordered the immediate release of the amount of US$62.3 Million to PIATCO considering that the assessed value as alleged in the complaint was only P 3 Billion;
(iii) that the RTC could not have prohibited the Government from enjoining the performance of acts of ownership;
(iv) that the appointment of the three commissioners was erroneous; and
(v) that Hon. Gingoyon should be compelled to inhibit himself from the expropriation case. [22]
Before we delve into the merits of the issues raised by the Government, it is essential to consider the crucial holding of the Court in its 2004 Resolution in Agan, which we repeat below:
This Court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the NAIA IPT III facility are almost complete and that funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction. For the government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The compensation must be just and in accordance with law and equity for the government can not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO and its investors. [23]
This pronouncement contains the fundamental premises which permeate this decision of the Court. Indeed, Agan , final and executory as it is, stands as governing law in this case, and any disposition of the present petition must conform to the conditions laid down by the Court in its 2004Resolution .
The 2004 Resolution Which Is Law of This Case Generally Permits Expropriation
The pronouncement in the 2004 Resolution is especially significant to this case in two aspects, namely: (i) that PIATCO must receive payment of just compensation determined in accordance with law and equity; and (ii) that the government is barred from taking over NAIA 3 until such just compensation is paid . The parties cannot be allowed to evade the directives laid down by this Court through any mode of judicial action, such as the complaint for eminent domain.
It cannot be denied though that the Court in the 2004 Resolution prescribed mandatory guidelines which the Government must observe before it could acquire the NAIA 3 facilities. Thus, the actions of respondent judge under review, as well as the arguments of the parties must, to merit affirmation, pass the threshold test of whether such propositions are in accord with the 2004 Resolution.
The Government does not contest 2004 Resolution , [24]thus its application
the
efficacy
of
this
pronouncement
in
the
to the case at bar is not a matter of controversy. Of course, questions such as what is the standard of 'just compensation and which particular laws and equitable principles are applicable, remain in dispute and shall be resolved forthwith.
The Government has chosen to resort to expropriation, a remedy available under the law, which has the added benefit of an integrated process for the determination of just compensation and the payment thereof to PIATCO. We appreciate that the case at bar is a highly unusual case, whereby the Government seeks to expropriate a building complex constructed on land which the State already owns. [25] There is an inherent illogic in the resort to eminent domain on property already owned by the State. At first blush, since the State already owns the property on which NAIA 3 stands, the proper remedy should be akin to an action for ejectment.
However, the reason for the resort by the Government to expropriation proceedings is understandable in this case. The 2004 Resolution, in requiring the payment of just compensation prior to the takeover by the Government of
NAIA 3, effectively precluded it from acquiring possession or ownership of the NAIA 3 through the unilateral exercise of its rights as the owner of the ground on which the facilities stood. Thus, as things stood after the 2004 Resolution, the right of the Government to take over the NAIA 3 terminal was preconditioned by lawful order on the payment of just compensation to PIATCO as builder of the structures.
The determination of just compensation could very well be agreed upon by the parties without judicial intervention, and it appears that steps towards that direction had been engaged in. Still, ultimately, the Government resorted to its inherent power of eminent domain through expropriation proceedings. Is eminent domain appropriate in the first place, with due regard not only to the law on expropriation but also to the Court's 2004 Resolution in Agan ?
The right of eminent domain extends to personal and real property, and the NAIA 3 structures, adhered as they are to the soil, are considered as real property. [26] The public purpose for the expropriation is also beyond dispute. It should also be noted that Section 1 of Rule 67 (on Expropriation) recognizes the possibility that the property sought to be expropriated may be titled in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, and in such case an averment to that effect should be made in the complaint. The instant expropriation complaint did aver that the NAIA 3 complex 'stands on a parcel of land owned by the Bases Conversion Development Authority, another agency of [the Republic of the Philippines]. [27]
Admittedly, eminent domain is not the sole judicial recourse by which the Government may have acquired the NAIA 3 facilities while satisfying the requisites in the 2004 Resolution. Eminent domain though may be the most effective, as well as the speediest means by which such goals may be accomplished. Not only does it enable immediate possession after satisfaction of the requisites under the law, it also has a built-in procedure through which just compensation may be ascertained. Thus, there should be no question as to the propriety of eminent domain proceedings in this case.
Still, in applying the laws and rules on expropriation in the case at bar, we are impelled to apply or construe these rules in accordance with the Court's prescriptions in the 2004 Resolution to achieve the end effect that the Government may validly take over the NAIA 3 facilities. Insofar as this case is concerned, the 2004 Resolution is effective not only as a legal precedent, but as the source of rights and prescriptions that must be guaranteed, if not enforced, in the resolution of this petition. Otherwise, the integrity and efficacy of the rulings of this Court will be severely diminished.
It is from these premises that we resolve the first question, whether Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation proceedings in this case.
Application of Rule 67 Violates the 2004 Agan Resolution
The Government insists that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governs the expropriation proceedings in this case to the exclusion of all other laws. On the other hand, PIATCO claims that it is Rep. Act No. 8974 which does apply. Earlier, we had adverted to the basic differences between the statute and the procedural rule. Further elaboration is in order.
Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private property. For example, Section 19 of the Local Government Code governs as to the exercise by local government units of the power of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects.
Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property 'for national government infrastructure projects. [28] Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply.
Under both Rule 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government commences expropriation proceedings through the filing of a complaint. Unlike in the case of local governments which necessitate an authorizing ordinance before expropriation may be accomplished, there is no need under Rule 67 or Rep. Act No. 8974 for legislative authorization before the Government may proceed with a particular exercise of eminent domain. The most crucial difference between Rule 67 and Rep. Act No. 8974 concerns the particular essential step the Government has to undertake to be entitled to a writ of possession.
The first paragraph of Section 2 of Rule 67 provides:
'SEC. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized government depository. ' Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government depositary.
In contrast, Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8974 relevantly states:
SEC. 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings . Whenever it is necessary to acquire real property for the right-of-way, site or location for any national government infrastructure project through expropriation, the appropriate proceedings before the proper court under the following guidelines: a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7 hereof; ... c) In case the completion of a government infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the
property its proffered value taking into consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 hereof.
Upon completion with the guidelines abovementioned, the court shall immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of the property and start the implementation of the project. Before the court can issue a Writ of Possession, the implementing agency shall present to the court a certificate of availability of funds from the proper official concerned. ...
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted texts, Rule 67 merely requires the Government to deposit with an authorized government depositary the assessed value of the property for expropriation for it to be entitled to a writ of possession. On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 8974 requires that the Government make a direct payment to the property owner before the writ may issue. Moreover, such payment is based on the zonal valuation of the BIR in the case of land, the value of the improvements or structures under the replacement cost method, [29] or if no such valuation is available and in cases of utmost urgency, the proffered value of the property to be seized.
It is quite apparent why the Government would prefer to apply Rule 67 in lieu of Rep. Act No. 8974. Under Rule 67, it would not be obliged to immediately pay any amount to PIATCO before it can obtain the writ of possession since all it need do is deposit the amount equivalent to the assessed value with an authorized government depositary. Hence, it devotes considerable effort to point out that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not apply in this case, notwithstanding the undeniable reality that NAIA 3 is a national government project. Yet, these efforts fail, especially considering the controlling effect of the 2004 Resolution in Agan on the adjudication of this case.
It is the finding of this Court that the staging of expropriation proceedings in this case with the exclusive use of Rule 67 would allow for the Government to take over the NAIA 3 facilities in a fashion that directly rebukes our 2004 Resolution in Agan . This Court cannot sanction deviation from its own final and executory orders.
Section 2 of Rule 67 provides that the State 'shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if [the plaintiff] deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court. [30] It is thus apparent that under the provision, all the Government need do to obtain a writ of possession is to deposit the amount equivalent to the assessed value with an authorized government depositary.
Would the deposit under Section 2 of Rule 67 satisfy the requirement laid down in the 2004 Resolution that '[f]or the government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures' ? Evidently not.
If Section 2 of Rule 67 were to apply, PIATCO would be enjoined from receiving a single centavo as just compensation before the Government takes over the NAIA 3 facility by virtue of a writ of possession. Such an injunction squarely contradicts the letter and intent of the 2004 Resolution. Hence, the position of the Government sanctions its own disregard or violation the prescription laid down by this Court that there must first be just compensation paid to PIATCO before the Government may take over the NAIA 3 facilities.
Thus, at the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without violating the 2004 Resolution. Even assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in this case, it does not necessarily follow that Rule 67 should then apply. After all, adherence to the letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn violate the Court's requirement in the 2004 Resolution that there must first be payment of just compensation to PIATCO before the Government may take over the property.
It is the plain intent of Rep. Act No. 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme of 'immediate payment in cases involving national government infrastructure projects. The following portion of the Senate deliberations, cited by PIATCO in its Memorandum, is worth quoting to cogitate on the purpose behind the plain meaning of the law:
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). 'x x x Because the Senate believes that, you know, we have to pay the landowners immediately not by treasury bills but by cash. Since we are depriving them, you know, upon payment, 'no, of possession, we might as well pay them as much, 'no, hindi lang 50 percent . xxx THE CHAIRMAN (REP. VERGARA). Accepted. xxx THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). Oo. Because this is really in favor of the landowners, e. THE CHAIRMAN (REP. VERGARA). That's why we need to really secure the availability of funds. xxx THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). No, no. It's the same. It says here: iyong first paragraph, diba? Iyong zonal ' talagang magbabayad muna. In other words, you know, there must be a payment kaagad. (TSN, Bicameral Conference on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill 1422 and Senate Bill 2117, August 29, 2000, pp. 14-20) xxx THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO). Okay, okay, 'no. Unang-una, it is not deposit, 'no. It's payment.
REP. BATERINA. It's payment, ho, payment. (Id., p. 63) [31]
It likewise bears noting that the appropriate standard of just compensation is a substantive matter. It is well within the province of the legislature to fix the standard, which it did through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 8974. Specifically, this prescribes the new standards in determining the amount of just compensation in expropriation cases relating to national government infrastructure projects, as well as the manner of payment thereof. At the same time, Section 14 of the Implementing Rules recognizes the continued applicability of Rule 67 on procedural aspects when it provides 'all matters regarding defenses and objections to the complaint, issues on uncertain ownership and conflicting claims, effects of appeal on the rights of the parties, and such other incidents affecting the complaint shall be resolved under the provisions on expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. [32]
'Given that the 2004 Resolution militates against the continued use of the norm under Section 2, Rule 67, is it then possible to apply Rep. Act No. 8974? We find that it is, and moreover, its application in this case complements rather than contravenes the prescriptions laid down in the 2004 Resolution.
Rep. Act No. 8974 Fits to the Situation at Bar and Complements the
2004 Agan Resolution
Rep. Act No. 8974 is entitled 'An Act To Facilitate The Acquisition Of Right-Of-Way, Site Or Location For National Government Infrastructure Projects And For Other Purposes. Obviously, the law is intended to cover expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure projects. Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 8974 explains what are considered as 'national government projects.
Sec. 2. National Government Projects . ' The term 'national government projects' shall refer to all national government infrastructure, engineering works and service contracts, including projects undertaken by government-owned and controlled corporations, all projects covered by Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No. 7718, otherwise known as the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Law, and other related and necessary activities, such as site acquisition, supply and/or installation of equipment and materials, implementation, construction, completion, operation, maintenance, improvement, repair and rehabilitation, regardless of the source of funding.
As acknowledged in the 2003 Decision, the development of NAIA 3 was made pursuant to a build-operate-and-transfer arrangement pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957, as amended, [33] which pertains to infrastructure or development projects normally financed by the public sector but which are now wholly or partly implemented by the private sector. [34] Under the build-operate-and-transfer scheme, it is the project proponent which undertakes the construction, including the financing, of a given infrastructure facility. [35] In Tatad v. Garcia, [36] the Court acknowledged that the operator of the EDSA Light Rail Transit project under a BOT scheme was the owner of the facilities such as 'the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches, rail stations, terminals and the power plant. [37]
There can be no doubt that PIATCO has ownership rights over the facilities which it had financed and constructed. The 2004 Resolution squarely recognized that right when it mandated the payment of just compensation to PIATCO prior to the takeover by the Government of NAIA 3.
The fact that the Government resorted to eminent domain proceedings in the first place is a concession on its part of PIATCO's ownership. Indeed, if no such right is recognized, then there should be no impediment for the Government to seize control of NAIA 3 through ordinary ejectment proceedings.
Since the rights of PIATCO over the NAIA 3 facilities are established, the nature of these facilities should now be determined. Under Section 415(1) of the Civil Code, these facilities are ineluctably immovable or real property, as they constitute buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil. [38] Certainly, the NAIA 3 facilities are of such nature that they cannot just be packed up and transported by PIATCO like a traveling circus caravan.
Thus, the property subject of expropriation, the NAIA 3 facilities, are real property owned by PIATCO. This point is critical, considering the Government's insistence that the NAIA 3 facilities cannot be deemed as the 'right-of-way', 'site or 'location of a national government infrastructure project, within the coverage of Rep. Act No. 8974.
There is no doubt that the NAIA 3 is not, under any sensible contemplation, a 'right-of-way. Yet we cannot agree with the Government's insistence that neither could NAIA 3 be a 'site or 'location. The petition quotes the definitions provided in Black's Law Dictionary of 'location as the specific place or position of a person or thing and 'site as pertaining to a place or location or a piece of property set aside for specific use. [39] Yet even Black's Law Dictionary provides that '[t]he term [site] does not of itself necessarily mean a place or tract of land fixed by definite boundaries. [40] One would assume that the Government, to back up its contention, would be able to point to a clear-cut rule that a 'site or 'location exclusively refers to soil, grass, pebbles and weeds. There is none.
Indeed, we cannot accept the Government's proposition that the only properties that may be expropriated under Rep. Act No. 8974 are parcels of land. Rep. Act No. 8974 contemplates within its coverage such real property constituting land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil. Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 8974, which sets the declaration of the law's policy, refers to 'real property acquired for national government infrastructure projects are promptly paid just compensation. [41] Section 4 is quite explicit in stating that the scope of the law relates to the acquisition of 'real property, which under civil law includes buildings, roads and constructions adhered to the soil.
It is moreover apparent that the law and its implementing rules commonly provide for a rule for the valuation of improvements and/or structures thereupon separate from that of the land on which such are constructed. Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 8974 itself recognizes that the improvements or structures on the land may very well be the subject of expropriation proceedings. Section 4(a), in relation to Section 7 of the law provides for the guidelines for the valuation of the improvements or structures to be expropriated. Indeed, nothing in the law would prohibit the application of Section 7, which provides for the valuation method of the improvements and or structures in the instances wherein it is necessary for the Government to expropriate only the improvements or structures, as in this case.
The law classifies the NAIA 3 facilities as real properties just like the soil to which they are adhered. Any sub-classifications of real property and divergent treatment based thereupon for purposes of expropriation must be based on substantial distinctions, otherwise the equal protection clause of the Constitution is violated. There may be perhaps a molecular distinction between soil and the inorganic improvements adhered thereto, yet there are no purposive distinctions that would justify a variant treatment for purposes of expropriation. Both the land itself and the improvements thereupon are susceptible to private ownership independent of each other, capable of pecuniary estimation, and if taken from the owner, considered as a deprivation of property. The owner of improvements seized through expropriation suffers the same degree of loss as the owner of land seized through similar means. Equal protection demands that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. For purposes of expropriation, parcels of land are similarly situated as the buildings or improvements constructed thereon, and a disparate treatment between those two classes of real property infringes the equal protection clause.
Even as the provisions of Rep. Act No. 8974 call for that law's application in this case, the threshold test must still be met whether its implementation would conform to the dictates of the Court in the 2004 Resolution. Unlike in the case of Rule 67, the application of Rep. Act No. 8974 will not contravene the 2004 Resolution, which requires the payment of just compensation before any takeover of the NAIA 3 facilities by the Government. The 2004 Resolution does not particularize the extent such payment must be effected before the takeover, but it unquestionably requires at least some degree of payment to the private property owner before a writ of possession may issue. The utilization of Rep. Act No. 8974 guarantees compliance with this bare minimum requirement, as it assures the private property owner the payment of, at the very least, the proffered value of the property to be seized. Such payment of the proffered value to the owner, followed by the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the Government, is precisely the schematic under Rep. Act No. 8974, one which facially complies with the prescription laid down in the 2004 Resolution.
Clearly then, we see no error on the part of the RTC when it ruled that Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the instant expropriation proceedings. The Proper Amount to be Paid under Rep. Act No. 8974
Then, there is the matter of the proper amount which should be paid to PIATCO by the Government before the writ of possession may issue, consonant to Rep. Act No. 8974.
At this juncture, we must address the observation made by the Office of the Solicitor General in behalf of the Government that there could be no 'BIR zonal valuations' on the NAIA 3 facility, as provided in Rep. Act No. 8974, since zonal valuations are only for parcels of land, not for airport terminals. The Court agrees with this point, yet does not see it as an impediment for the application of Rep. Act No. 8974.
It must be clarified that PIATCO cannot be reimbursed or justly compensated for the value of the parcel of land on which NAIA 3 stands. PIATCO is not the owner of the land on which the NAIA 3 facility is constructed, and it should not be entitled to just compensation that is inclusive of the value of the land itself. It would be highly disingenuous to compensate PIATCO for the value of land it does not own. Its entitlement to just compensation should be limited to the value of the improvements and/or structures themselves. Thus, the determination of just compensation cannot include the BIR zonal valuation under Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8974.
Under Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government is required to 'immediately pay the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the [BIR]; and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7. As stated above, the BIR zonal valuation cannot apply in this case, thus the amount subject to immediate payment should be limited to 'the value of the improvements and/or structures as determined under Section 7, with Section 7 referring to the 'implementing rules and regulations for the equitable valuation of the improvements and/or structures on the land. Under the present implementing rules in place, the valuation of the improvements/structures are to be based using 'the replacement cost method.[42] However, the replacement cost is only one of the factors to be considered in determining the just compensation.
In addition to Rep. Act No. 8974, the 2004 Resolution in Agan also mandated that the payment of just compensation should be in accordance with equity as well. Thus, in ascertaining the ultimate amount of just compensation, the duty of the trial court is to ensure that such amount conforms not only to the law, such as Rep. Act No. 8974, but to principles of equity as well.
Admittedly, there is no way, at least for the present, to immediately ascertain the value of the improvements and structures since such valuation is a matter for factual determination. [43] Yet Rep. Act No. 8974 permits an expedited means by which the Government can immediately take possession of the property without having to await precise determination of the valuation. Section 4(c) of Rep. Act No. 8974 states that 'in case the completion of a government infrastructure
project is of utmost urgency and importance, and there is no existing valuation of the area concerned, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property itsproferred value, taking into consideration the standards prescribed in Section 5 [of the law]. [44]The 'proffered value may strike as a highly subjective standard based solely on the intuition of the government, but Rep. Act No. 8974 does provide relevant standards by which 'proffered value should be based, [45] as well as the certainty
of judicial determination of the propriety of the proffered value. [46]
In filing the complaint for expropriation, the Government alleged to have deposited the amount ofP3 Billion earmarked for expropriation, representing the assessed value of the property. The making of the deposit, including the determination of the amount of the deposit, was undertaken under the erroneous notion that Rule 67, and not Rep. Act No. 8974, is the applicable law. Still, as regards the amount, the Court sees no impediment to recognize this sum of P3 Billion as the proffered value under Section 4(b) of Rep. Act No. 8974. After all, in the initial determination of the proffered value, the Government is not strictly required to adhere to any predetermined standards, although its proffered value may later be subjected to judicial review using the standards enumerated under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 8974.
How should we appreciate the questioned order of Hon. Gingoyon, which pegged the amount to be immediately paid to PIATCO at around $62.3 Million? The Order dated 4 January 2005, which mandated such amount, proves problematic in that regard. While the initial sum of P3 Billion may have been based on the assessed value, a standard which should not however apply in this case, the RTC cites without qualification Section 4(a) of Rep. Act No. 8974 as the basis for the amount of $62.3 Million, thus leaving the impression that the BIR zonal valuation may form part of the basis for just compensation, which should not be the case. Moreover, respondent judge made no attempt to apply the enumerated guidelines for determination of just compensation under Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 8974, as required for judicial review of the proffered value.
The Court notes that in the 10 January 2005 Omnibus Order , the RTC noted that the concessions agreement entered into between the Government and PIATCO stated that the actual cost of building NAIA 3 was 'not less than US$350 Million. [47] The RTC then proceeded to observe that while Rep. Act No. 8974 required the immediate payment to PIATCO the amount equivalent to 100% of the value of NAIA 3, the amount deposited by the Government constituted only 18% of this value. At this point, no binding import should be given to this observation that the actual cost of building NAIA 3 was 'not less than US$350 Million, as the final conclusions on the amount of just compensation can come only after due ascertainment in accordance with the standards set under Rep. Act No. 8974, not the declarations of the parties. At the same time, the
expressed linkage between the BIR zonal valuation and the amount of just compensation in this case, is revelatory of erroneous thought on the part of the RTC.
We have already pointed out the irrelevance of the BIR zonal valuation as an appropriate basis for valuation in this case, PIATCO not being the owner of the land on which the NAIA 3 facilities stand. The subject order is flawed insofar as it fails to qualify that such standard is inappropriate.
It does appear that the amount of US$62.3 Million was based on the certification issued by the LBP-Baclaran that the Republic of the Philippines maintained a total balance in that branch amounting to such amount. Yet the actual representation of the $62.3 Million is not clear. The Land Bank Certification expressing such amount does state that it was issued upon request of the International Airport Authority 'purportedly as guaranty deposit for the expropriation complaint. [48]The Government claims in its Memorandum that the entire amount was made available as a guaranty fund for the final and executory judgment of the trial court, and not merely for the issuance of the writ of possession. [49] One could readily conclude that the entire amount of US$62.3 Million was intended by the Government to answer for whatever guaranties may be required for the purpose of the expropriation complaint.
Still, such intention the Government may have had as to the entire US$62.3 Million is only inferentially established. In ascertaining the proffered value adduced by the Government, the amount of P3 Billion as the amount deposited characterized in the complaint as 'to be held by [Land Bank] subject to the [RTC's ] orders, [50] should be deemed as controlling. There is no clear evidence that the Government intended to offer US$62.3 Million as the initial payment of just compensation, the wording of the Land Bank Certification notwithstanding, and credence should be given to the consistent position of the Government on that aspect.
In any event, for the RTC to be able to justify the payment of US$62.3 Million to PIATCO and notP3 Billion Pesos, he would have to establish that the higher amount represents the valuation of the structures/improvements, and not the BIR zonal valuation on the land wherein NAIA 3 is built. TheOrder dated 5 January 2005 fails to establish such integral fact, and in the absence of
contravening proof, the proffered value of P3 Billion, as presented by the Government, should prevail.
Strikingly, the Government submits that assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 is applicable, the deposited amount of P3 Billion should be considered as the proffered value, since the amount was based on comparative values made by the City Assessor. [51] Accordingly, it should be deemed as having faithfully complied with the requirements of the statute. [52] While the Court agrees that P3 Billion should be considered as the correct proffered value, still we cannot deem the Government as having faithfully complied with Rep. Act No. 8974. For the law plainly requires direct payment to the property owner, and not a mere deposit with the authorized government depositary. Without such direct payment, no writ of possession may be obtained.
Writ of Possession May Not Be Implemented Until Actual Receipt by PIATCO of Proferred Value
The Court thus finds another error on the part of the RTC. The RTC authorized the issuance of the writ of possession to the Government notwithstanding the fact that no payment of any amount had yet been made to PIATCO, despite the clear command of Rep. Act No. 8974 that there must first be payment before the writ of possession can issue. While the RTC did direct the LBPBaclaran to immediately release the amount of US$62 Million to PIATCO, it should have likewise suspended the writ of possession, nay, withdrawn it altogether, until the Government shall have actually paid PIATCO. This is the inevitable consequence of the clear command of Rep. Act No. 8974 that requires immediate payment of the initially determined amount of just compensation should be effected. Otherwise, the overpowering intention of Rep. Act No. 8974 of ensuring payment first before transfer of repossession would be eviscerated.
Rep. Act No. 8974 represents a significant change from previous expropriation laws such as Rule 67, or even Section 19 of the Local Government Code. Rule 67 and the Local Government Code merely provided that the Government deposit the initial amounts [53] antecedent to acquiring possession of the property with, respectively, an authorized Government depositary [54] or the proper court. [55] In both cases, the private owner does not receive compensation prior to the deprivation of property. On the other hand, Rep. Act No. 8974 mandates immediate payment of the initial just compensation prior to the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the Government.
Rep. Act No. 8974 is plainly clear in imposing the requirement of immediate prepayment, and no amount of statutory deconstruction can evade such requisite. It enshrines a new approach towards eminent domain that reconciles the inherent unease attending expropriation proceedings with a position of fundamental equity. While expropriation proceedings have always demanded just compensation in exchange for private property, the previous deposit requirement impeded immediate compensation to the private owner, especially in cases wherein the determination of the final amount of compensation would prove highly disputed. Under the new modality prescribed by Rep. Act No. 8974, the private owner sees immediate monetary recompense with the same degree of speed as the taking of his/her property.
While eminent domain lies as one of the inherent powers of the State, there is no requirement that it undertake a prolonged procedure, or that the payment of the private owner be protracted as far as practicable. In fact, the expedited procedure of payment, as highlighted under Rep. Act No. 8974, is inherently more fair, especially to the layperson who would be hard-pressed to fully comprehend the social value of expropriation in the first place. Immediate payment placates to some degree whatever ill-will that arises from expropriation, as well as satisfies the demand of basic fairness.
The Court has the duty to implement Rep. Act No. 8974 and to direct compliance with the requirement of immediate payment in this case. Accordingly, the Writ of Possession dated 21
December 2004 should be held in abeyance, pending proof of actual payment by the Government to PIATCO of the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities, which totals P3,002,125,000.00.
Rights of the Government upon Issuance of the Writ of Possession
Once the Government pays PIATCO the amount of the proffered value of P3 Billion, it will be entitled to the Writ of Possession. However, the Government questions the qualification imposed by the RTC in its 4 January 2005 Order consisting of the prohibition on the Government from performing acts of ownership such as awarding concessions or leasing any part of NAIA 3 to other parties. To be certain, the RTC, in its 10 January 2005 Omnibus Order , expressly stated that it was not affirming 'the superfluous part of the Order [of 4 January 2005] prohibiting the plaintiffs from awarding concessions or leasing any part of NAIA [3] to other parties. [56] Still, such statement was predicated on the notion that since the Government was not yet the owner of NAIA 3 until final payment of just compensation, it was obviously incapacitated to perform such acts of ownership.
In deciding this question, the 2004 Resolution in Agan cannot be ignored, particularly the declaration that '[f]or the government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The obvious import of this holding is that unless PIATCO is paid just compensation, the Government is barred from 'taking over, a phrase which in the strictest sense could encompass even a bar of physical possession of NAIA 3, much less operation of the facilities.
There are critical reasons for the Court to view the 2004 Resolution less stringently, and thus allow the operation by the Government of NAIA 3 upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession.
For one, the national prestige is diminished every day that passes with the NAIA 3 remaining mothballed. For another, the continued non-use of the facilities contributes to its physical deterioration, if it has not already. And still for another, the economic benefits to the Government and the country at large are beyond dispute once the NAIA 3 is put in operation.
Rep. Act No. 8974 provides the appropriate answer for the standard that governs the extent of the acts the Government may be authorized to perform upon the issuance of the writ of possession. Section 4 states that 'the court shall immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of the property and start the implementation of the project. We hold that accordingly, once the Writ of Possession is effective, the Government itself is authorized to perform the acts that are essential to the operation of the NAIA 3 as an international airport terminal upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession. These would include the repair, reconditioning and improvement of the complex, maintenance of the existing facilities and equipment, installation of new facilities and equipment, provision of services and facilities pertaining to the facilitation of air traffic and transport, and other services that are integral to a modern-day international airport. The Government's position is more expansive than that adopted by the Court. It argues that with the writ of possession, it is enabled to perform acts de jure on the expropriated property. It citesRepublic v. Tagle , [57] as well as the statement therein that 'the expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or occupation of land, and from them concludes that 'its mere physical entry and occupation of the property fall short of the taking of title, which includes all the rights that may be exercised by an owner over the subject property.
This conclusion is indeed lifted directly from statements in Tagle , [58] but not from the ratio decidendi of that case. Tagle concerned whether a writ of possession in favor of the Government was still necessary in light of the fact that it was already in actual possession of the property. In ruling that the Government was entitled to the writ of possession, the Court in Tagle explains that such writ vested not only physical possession, but also the legal right to possess the property. Continues the Court, such legal right to possess was particularly important in the case, as there was a pending suit against the Republic for unlawful detainer, and the writ of possession would serve to safeguard the Government from eviction. [59]
At the same time, Tagle conforms to the obvious, that there is no transfer of ownership as of yet by virtue of the writ of possession. Tagle may concede that the Government is entitled to exercise more than just the right of possession by virtue of the writ of possession, yet it cannot be construed to grant the Government the entire panoply of rights that are available to the owner. Certainly, neither Tagle nor any other case or law, lends support to the Government's proposition that it acquires beneficial or equitable ownership of the expropriated property merely through the writ of possession.
Indeed, this Court has been vigilant in defense of the rights of the property owner who has been validly deprived of possession, yet retains legal title over the expropriated property pending payment of just compensation. We reiterated the various doctrines of such import in our recent holding in Republic v. Lim: [60]
The recognized rule is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions. In Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. et al., vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform [ [61] ] , thus:
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnor's title relates back
to the date on which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner's report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed.
x x x Although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to the property taken remains in the owner until payment is actually made. (Emphasis supplied.) In Kennedy v. Indianapolis , the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to property does not pass to the condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be uniform to this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure , it was held that 'actual payment to the owner of the condemned property was a condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the State albeit 'not to the appropriation of it to public use. In Rexford v.
Republic vs Gingoyon Knight , the Court of Appeals of New Yorksaid that the construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the compensation although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further said that 'both on principle and authority the rule is . . . that the right to enter on and use the property is complete, as soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not pass from the owner without his consent, until just compensation has been made to him. Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes , that:
If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be apparent that the method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid.... (Emphasis
supplied.)
Clearly, without full payment of just compensation, there can be no transfer of title from the landowner to the expropriator. Otherwise stated, the Republic's acquisition of ownership is conditioned upon the full payment of just compensation within a reasonable time. Significantly, in Municipality of Bian v. Garcia [ [62]] this Court ruled that the expropriation of lands consists of two stages, to wit: x x x The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, 'of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint x x x. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the court of 'the just compensation for the property sought to
Republic vs Gingoyon be taken. This is done by the court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. x x x.
It is only upon the completion of these two stages that expropriation is said to have been completed. In Republic v. Salem Investment Corporation [ [63]] , we ruled that, 'the process is not completed until payment of just compensation. Thus, here, the failure of the Republic to pay respondent and his predecessors-in-interest for a period of 57 years rendered the expropriation process incomplete.
Lim serves fair warning to the Government and its agencies who consistently refuse to pay just compensation due to the private property owner whose property had been expropriated. At the same time, Lim emphasizes the fragility of the rights of the Government as possessor pending the final payment of just compensation, without diminishing the potency of such rights. Indeed, the public policy, enshrined foremost in the Constitution, mandates that the Government must pay for the private property it expropriates. Consequently, the proper judicial attitude is to guarantee compliance with this primordial right to just compensation. Final Determination of Just Compensation Within 60 Days
The issuance of the writ of possession does not write finis to the expropriation proceedings. As earlier pointed out, expropriation is not completed until payment to the property owner of just compensation. The proffered value stands as' merely a provisional determination of the amount of just compensation, the payment of which is sufficient to transfer possession of the property to the Government. However, to effectuate the transfer of ownership, it is necessary for the Government to pay the property owner the final just compensation.
In Lim, the Court went as far as to countenance, given the exceptional circumstances of that case, the reversion of the validly expropriated property to private ownership due to the failure of the Government to pay just compensation in that case. [64] It was noted in that case that the Government deliberately refused to pay just compensation. The Court went on to rule that 'in cases where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their property. [65]
Rep. Act No. 8974 mandates a speedy method by which the final determination of just compensation may be had. Section 4 provides:
In the event that the owner of the property contests the implementing agency's proffered value, the court shall determine the just compensation to be paid the owner within sixty (60) days from the date of filing of the expropriation case. When the decision of the court becomes final and executory, the implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the just compensation as determined by the court.
We hold that this provision should apply in this case. The sixty (60)-day period prescribed in Rep. Act No. 8974 gives teeth to the law's avowed policy 'to ensure that owners of real property acquired for national government infrastructure projects are promptly paid just compensation.[66] In this case, there already has been irreversible delay in the prompt payment of PIATCO of just compensation, and it is no longer possible for the RTC to determine the just compensation due PIATCO within sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint last 21 December 2004, as contemplated by the law. Still, it is feasible to effectuate the spirit of the law by requiring the trial court to make such determination within sixty (60) days from finality of this decision, in accordance with the guidelines laid down in Rep. Act No. 8974 and its Implementing Rules.
Of course, once the amount of just compensation has been finally determined, the Government is obliged to pay PIATCO the said amount. As shown in Lim and other like-minded cases, the Government's refusal to make such payment is indubitably actionable in court.
Appointment of Commissioners
The next argument for consideration is the claim of the Government that the RTC erred in appointing the three commissioners in its 7 January 2005 Order without prior consultation with either the Government or PIATCO, or without affording the Government the opportunity to object to the appointment of these commissioners. We can dispose of this argument without complication.
It must be noted that Rep. Act No. 8974 is silent on the appointment of commissioners tasked with the ascertainment of just compensation. [67] This protocol though is sanctioned under Rule 67. We rule that the appointment of commissioners under Rule 67 may be resorted to, even in expropriation proceedings under Rep. Act No. 8974, since the application of the provisions of Rule 67 in that regard do not conflict with the statute. As earlier stated, Section 14 of the Implementing Rules does allow such other incidents affecting the complaint to be resolved under the provisions on expropriation of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Even without Rule 67, reference during trial to a commissioner of the examination of an issue of fact is sanctioned under Rule 32 of the Rules of Court.
But while the appointment of commissioners under the aegis of Rule 67 may be sanctioned in expropriation proceedings under Rep. Act No. 8974, the standards to be observed for the determination of just compensation are provided not in Rule 67 but in the statute. In particular,
the governing standards for the determination of just compensation for the NAIA 3 facilities are found in Section 10 of the Implementing Rules for Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for the replacement cost method in the valuation of improvements and structures. [68]
Nothing in Rule 67 or Rep. Act No. 8974 requires that the RTC consult with the parties in the expropriation case on who should be appointed as commissioners. Neither does the Court feel that such a requirement should be imposed in this case. We did rule in Municipality of Talisay v. Ramirez[69] that 'there is nothing to prevent [the trial court] from seeking the recommendations of the parties on [the] matter [of appointment of commissioners], the better to ensure their fair representation. [70] At the same time, such solicitation of recommendations is not obligatory on the part of the court, hence we cannot impute error on the part of the RTC in its exercise of solitary discretion in the appointment of the commissioners.
What Rule 67 does allow though is for the parties to protest the appointment of any of these commissioners, as provided under Section 5 of the Rule. These objections though must be made filed within ten (10) days from service of the order of appointment of the commissioners. [71] In this case, the proper recourse of the Government to challenge the choice of the commissioners is to file an objection with the trial court, conformably with Section 5, Rule 67, and not as it has done, assail the same through a special civil action for certiorari. Considering that the expropriation proceedings in this case were effectively halted seven (7) days after the Order appointing the commissioners, [72] it is permissible to allow the parties to file their objections with the RTC within five (5) days from finality of this decision.
Insufficient Ground for Inhibition of Respondent Judge
The final argument for disposition is the claim of the Government is that Hon. Gingoyon has prejudged the expropriation case against the Government's cause and, thus, should be required to inhibit himself. This grave charge is predicated on facts which the Government characterizes as 'undeniable. In particular, the Government notes that the 4 January 2005 Order was issued motu proprio , without any preceding motion, notice or hearing. Further, such order, which directed the payment of US$62 Million to PIATCO, was attended with error in the computation of just compensation. The Government also notes that the said Order was issued even before summons had been served on PIATCO.
The disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his/her judicial power [73] and should not be allowed on the basis of mere speculations and surmises. It certainly cannot be predicated on the adverse nature of the judge's rulings towards the movant for inhibition, especially if these rulings are in accord with law. Neither could inhibition be justified merely on the erroneous nature of the rulings of the judge. We emphasized in Webb v. People : [74]
To prove bias and prejudice on the part of respondent judge, petitioners harp on the alleged adverse and erroneous rulings of respondent judge on their various motions. By themselves, however, they do not sufficiently prove bias and prejudice to disqualify respondent judge. To be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. Opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on the evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge. As a general rule, repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter how erroneous and vigorously and consistently expressed, are not a basis for disqualification of a judge on grounds of bias and prejudice. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. Although the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be insufficient to establish a case against the judge. The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or malice. [75]
The Government's contentions against Hon. Gingoyon are severely undercut by the fact that the 21 December 2004 Order , which the 4 January 2005 Order sought to rectify, was indeed severely flawed as it erroneously applied the provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, instead of Rep. Act No. 8974, in ascertaining compliance with the requisites for the issuance of the writ of possession. The 4 January
2005 Order , which according to the Government establishes Hon. Gingoyon's bias, was promulgated precisely to correct the previous error by applying the correct provisions of law. It would not speak well of the Court if it sanctions a judge for wanting or even attempting to correct a previous erroneous' order which precisely is the right move to take.
Neither are we convinced that the motu proprio issuance of the 4 January 2005 Order , without the benefit of notice or hearing, sufficiently evinces bias on the part of Hon. Gingoyon. The motu proprio amendment by a court of an erroneous order previously issued may be sanctioned depending on the circumstances, in line with the long-recognized principle that every court has inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction. [76] Section 5(g), Rule 135 of the Rules of Court further recognizes the inherent power of courts 'to amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice, [77] a power which Hon. Gingoyon noted in his 10 January 2005Omnibus Order. [78] This inherent power includes the right of the court to reverse itself, especially when in its honest opinion it has committed an error or mistake in judgment, and that to adhere to its decision will cause injustice to a party litigant. [79]
Certainly, the 4 January 2005 Order was designed to make the RTC's previous order conformable to law and justice, particularly to apply the correct law of the case. Of course, as earlier established, this effort proved incomplete, as the 4 January 2005 Order did not correctly apply Rep. Act No. 8974 in several respects. Still, at least, the 4 January 2005 Order correctly reformed the most basic premise of the case that Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation proceedings. Nonetheless, the Government belittles Hon. Gingoyon's invocation of Section 5(g), Rule 135 as 'patently without merit. Certainly merit can be seen by the fact that the 4 January 2005 Orderreoriented the expropriation proceedings towards the correct governing law. Still, the Government claims that the unilateral act of the RTC did not conform to law or justice, as it was not afforded the right to be heard.
The Court would be more charitably disposed towards this argument if not for the fact that the earlier order with the 4 January 2005 Order sought to correct was itself issued without the benefit of any hearing. In fact, nothing either in Rule 67 or Rep. Act No. 8975 requires the conduct of a
hearing prior to the issuance of the writ of possession, which by design is available immediately upon the filing of the complaint provided that the requisites attaching thereto are present. Indeed, this expedited process for the obtention of a writ of possession in expropriation cases comes at the expense of the rights of the property owner to be heard or to be deprived of possession. Considering these predicates, it would be highly awry to demand that an order modifying the earlier issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case be barred until the staging of a hearing, when the issuance of the writ of possession itself is not subject to hearing. Perhaps the conduct of a hearing under these circumstances would be prudent. However, hearing is not mandatory, and the failure to conduct one does not establish the manifest bias required for the inhibition of the judge.
The Government likewise faults Hon. Gingoyon for using the amount of US$350 Million as the basis for the 100% deposit under Rep. Act No. 8974. The Court has noted that this statement was predicated on the erroneous belief that the BIR zonal valuation applies as a standard for determination of just compensation in this case. Yet this is manifest not of bias, but merely of error on the part of the judge. Indeed, the Government was not the only victim of the errors of the RTC in the assailed orders. PIATCO itself was injured by the issuance by the RTC of the writ of possession, even though the former had yet to be paid any amount of just compensation. At the same time, the Government was also prejudiced by the erroneous ruling of the RTC that the amount of US$62.3 Million, and not P3 Billion, should be released to PIATCO.
The Court has not been remiss in pointing out the multiple errors committed by the RTC in its assailed orders, to the prejudice of both parties. This attitude of error towards all does not ipso facto negate the charge of bias. Still, great care should be had in requiring the inhibition of judges simply because the magistrate did err. Incompetence may be a ground for administrative sanction, but not for inhibition, which requires lack of objectivity or impartiality to sit on a case.
The Court should necessarily guard against adopting a standard that a judge should be inhibited from hearing the case if one litigant loses trust in the judge. Such loss of trust on the part of the Government may be palpable, yet inhibition cannot be grounded merely on the feelings of the party-litigants. Indeed, every losing litigant in any case can resort to claiming that the judge was biased, and he/she will gain a sympathetic ear from friends, family, and people who do not understand the judicial process. The test in believing such a proposition should not be the vehemence of the litigant's claim of bias, but the Court's judicious estimation, as people who
know better than to believe any old cry of 'wolf!', whether such bias has been irrefutably exhibited.
The Court acknowledges that it had been previously held that 'at the very first sign of lack of faith and trust in his actions, whether well-grounded or not, the judge has no other alternative but to inhibit himself from the case. [80] But this doctrine is qualified by the entrenched rule that 'a judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce doubt to his honest actuations and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful selfexamination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people's faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired. [81] And a self-assessment by the judge that he/she is not impaired to hear the case will be respected by the Court absent any evidence to the contrary. As held in Chin v. Court of Appeals :
An allegation of prejudgment, without more, constitutes mere conjecture and is not one of the "just and valid reasons" contemplated in the second paragraph of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court for which a judge may inhibit himself from hearing the case. We have repeatedly held that mere suspicion that a judge is partial to a party is not enough. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and evidence and without fear or favor. There should be adequate evidence to prove the allegations, and there must be showing that the judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case. To be a disqualifying circumstance, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. [82]
The mere vehemence of the Government's claim of bias does not translate to clear and convincing evidence of impairing bias. There is no sufficient ground to direct the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from hearing the expropriation case.
In conclusion, the Court summarizes its rulings as follows:
(1) The 2004 Resolution in Agan sets the base requirement that has to be observed before the Government may take over the NAIA 3, that there must be payment to PIATCO of just compensation in accordance with law and equity. Any ruling in the present expropriation case must be conformable to the dictates of the Court as pronounced in the Agan cases.
(2) Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires the immediate payment by the Government of at least the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO and provides certain valuation standards or methods for the determination of just compensation.
(3) Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the implementation of Writ of Possession in favor of the Government over NAIA 3 is held in abeyance until PIATCO is directly paid the amount of P3 Billion, representing the proffered value of NAIA 3 under Section 4(c) of the law.
(4) Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the Government is authorized to start the implementation of the NAIA 3 Airport terminal project by performing the acts that are essential to the operation of the NAIA 3 as an international airport terminal upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession, subject to the conditions above-stated. As prescribed by the Court, such authority encompasses 'the repair, reconditioning and improvement of the complex, maintenance of the existing facilities and equipment, installation of new facilities and equipment, provision of services and facilities pertaining to the facilitation of air traffic and transport, and other services that are integral to a modern-day international airport. [83]
(5) The RTC is mandated to complete its determination of the just compensation within sixty (60) days from finality of this Decision. In doing so, the RTC is obliged to comply with 'law and equity as ordained in Again and the standard set under Implementing Rules of Rep. Act No. 8974 which is the 'replacement cost method as the standard of valuation of structures and improvements.
(6) There was no grave abuse of discretion attending the RTC Order appointing the commissioners for the purpose of determining just compensation. The provisions on commissioners under Rule 67 shall apply insofar as they are not inconsistent with Rep. Act No. 8974, its Implementing Rules, or the rulings of the Court in Agan .
(7) The Government shall pay the just compensation fixed in the decision of the trial court to PIATCO immediately upon the finality of the said decision.
(8) There is no basis for the Court to direct the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon.
All told, the Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC to warrant the nullification of the questioned orders. Nonetheless, portions of these orders should be modified to conform with law and the pronouncements made by the Court herein.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED in PART with respect to the orders dated 4 January 2005and 10 January 2005 of the lower court. Said orders are AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1)
The implementation of the Writ of Possession dated 21 December 2005 is HELD IN ABEYANCE, pending payment by petitioners to PIATCO of the amount of Three Billion Two Million One Hundred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P3,002,125,000.00), representing the proffered value of the NAIA 3 facilities;
2)
Petitioners, upon the effectivity of the Writ of Possession, are authorized start the implementation of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Pasenger Terminal III project by performing the acts that are essential to the operation of the said International Airport Passenger Terminal project;
3)
RTC Branch 117 is hereby directed, within sixty (60) days from finality of this Decision, to determine the just compensation to be paid to PIATCO by the Government.
The Order dated 7 January 2005 is AFFIRMED in all respects subject to the qualification that the parties are given ten (10) days from finality of this Decision to file, if they so choose, objections to the appointment of the commissioners decreed therein.
The Temporary Restraining Order dated 14 January 2005 is hereby LIFTED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Silverio vs Republic
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. DECISION CORONA, J.: When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2) Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda) When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a persons sex? May a person successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery? On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male." He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a mans body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female." An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila. On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was made. During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fianc, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses. On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read: Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for. The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative. Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman, now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him. Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner and her [fianc] and the realization of their dreams. Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioners first name from "Rommel Jacinto" to MELY and petitioners gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5 On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court
of Appeals granted the Republics petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.9 Hence, this petition. Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10 The petition lacks merit. A Persons First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by the trial court: Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied) Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides: SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial. RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed: SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or (3) The change will avoid confusion. Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners first name was not within that courts primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned. No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order. Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.23 Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is: SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean: xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied) Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:24 ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment. To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary. Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly. "Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.27 The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The comprehensive term status include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in
general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation, marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied) A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws. But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioners cause. Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides: SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child. In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued. xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth.29 Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31 When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words "sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and function that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between male and female."33 Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term "sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-operative male-tofemale transsexual to be included in the category "female." For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the
civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate. Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong. The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioners first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if petitioners petition were to be granted. It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it. In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based. To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege. It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress. Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Office of the Court Administrator vs Reyes

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. P-08-2535 June 23, 2010 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 04- 2022-P and A.M. No. 04-434-RTC) OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs. FLORENCIO M. REYES,1 Officer-in-Charge, and RENE DE GUZMAN, Clerk, Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Respondents. DECISION Per curiam:* This complaint for gross misconduct against Rene de Guzman (De Guzman), Clerk, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 31, is an offshoot of the complaint filed by Atty. Hugo B. Sansano, Jr. (Atty. Sansano) relative to the alleged incompetence/inefficiency of the RTC of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 31, in the transmittal of the records of Criminal Case No. 1144-G2 to the Court of Appeals. In our Resolution dated September 17, 2007, we adopted the findings and recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) declaring as closed and terminated the administrative matter relative to the delay in the transmittal of the records of Criminal Case No. 1144-G, and exonerating De Guzman and Florencio M. Reyes (Reyes), the Officer-in-Charge of the RTC of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 31. However, in the same Resolution, we also required De Guzman to comment on the allegation that he is using illegal drugs and had been manifesting irrational and queer behavior while at work. According to Reyes, De Guzmans manifestations of absurd behavior prompted Judge Napoleon R. Sta. Romana (Judge Sta. Romana) to request the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory to perform a drug test on De Guzman. As alleged by Reyes: x x x Mr. Rene de Guzman, the Docket Clerk, was [in] charge of the preparation and transmission of the records on appeal x x x. Nonetheless, x x x Judge Sta. Romana would x x x often x x x [remind him] about the transmittal of records of the appealed cases [for more than] a dozen times, even personally confronting Mr. Rene de Guzman about the matter, x x x though unsuccessfully x x x. Mr. De Guzman would just x x x dismiss the subject in ridicule and with the empty assurance that the task is as good as finished and what x x x need[s] to be done [is] simply retyping of the corrected indices or the like and that he would submit the same in [no] time at all. This was after a number of weeks from March 26, 2003 after Mr. De Guzman made the undersigned sign the transmittal of PP v. Manangan which he allegedly did not transmit before owing to some minor corrections in the indexing. All too often, (it seems to have been customary on his part, for this he would do to other pressing assignment) he would come to the office the next day, jubilant that the problem has been solved at last! But to no avail. This attitude seemingly bordering on the irrational if not to say that a sense of responsibility is utterly lacking may have given cue for Judge Sta. Romana to have Mr. De Guzman undergo a drug test x x x.3

That Mr. De Guzman could brush aside even the personal importuning by the judge is a fete no other of our co-employees dare emulate. On the contrary, everybody is apprehensive for his well being and in his behalf. x x x On May 24, 2004, Judge Sta. Romana requested the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office to conduct a drug test on De Guzman. On May 26, 2004, De Guzman underwent a qualitative examination the results of which yielded positive for Tetrahydrocannabinol metabolites (marijuana) and Methamphetamine (shabu), both dangerous drugs. In our Resolution of September 17, 2007, we required De Guzman to submit his comment on the charge of misconduct relative to the alleged use of prohibited drugs within 10 days from notice. Notwithstanding the Courts directive, De Guzman failed to file his Comment. Thus, on January 23, 2008, we directed De Guzman to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for failure to comply with the September 17, 2007 Resolution. At the same time, we resolved to require him to submit his comment within 10 days from notice. De Guzman complied with our directive only on March 12, 2008. In his letter, De Guzman claimed that he failed to comply with the Courts directive because he lost his copy of the September 17, 2007 Resolution. Treating De Guzmans letter as his Comment, we referred the same to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation. The OCA submitted its Report and Recommendation on July 23, 2008 which reads in part: xxxx Noticeably, respondent de Guzman did not challenge the authenticity and validity of the chemistry report of the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office which found him positive for "marijuana" and "shabu". He did not also promptly submit another test report or other document to controvert the drug test report. His plain refutation of the charge and his willingness to submit himself now to a drug test are token attempts at candor and assertion of innocence. These perfunctory attempts cannot prevail over the solitary yet compelling evidence of misconduct for use of prohibited drugs. Relative to respondents delay in filing his comment to the charge of misconduct, his claim that he "lost and misplaced (his) copy of said resolution, and for that (he) almost forgot about it" is neither a valid reason nor an excuse for the delay in complying with the order of the Court. His flippant attitude towards the repeated orders of the Court to explain his conduct does not merit consideration and justification for delay. It is settled that respondents "indifference to [the resolutions] requiring him to comment on the accusation(s) in the complaint thoroughly and substantially is gross misconduct, and may even be considered as outright disrespect to the Court." After all, a resolution of the Supreme Court is not a mere request and should be complied with promptly and completely. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but has likewise been considered as an utter lack of interest to remain with, if not contempt of the judicial system. It should be mentioned that this is not the first instance that respondent is ordered to account for his failure to comply with a court order. Earlier, he was required to explain to the Court his failure to promptly submit a copy of the affidavit of retired court stenographer Jorge Caoile and to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for his failure to comply with a show cause order.

For failure to overcome the charge of use of prohibited drugs and to satisfactorily explain his failure to submit promptly his compliance to the Courts show cause order, respondent may be held guilty of two counts of gross misconduct. The OCA thus submitted the following recommendations for consideration of the Court viz: 1. The instant matter be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative case; and 2. Respondent Rene de Guzman be found guilty of gross misconduct and accordingly be DISMISSED from the service effective immediately with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to his re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled agencies, corporations and financial institutions.4 On August 27, 2008, we required De Guzman to manifest within 10 days from receipt whether he is willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed and submitted. As before, De Guzman simply ignored our directive. Consequently, on September 28, 2009, we deemed waived the filing of De Guzmans manifestation. Our Ruling We adopt the findings and recommendation of the OCA. We note that De Guzman is adept at ignoring the Courts directives. In his letter-explanation in the administrative matter relative to the delay in the transmittal of the records of Criminal Case No. 1144-G, he requested for a period of 10 days or until November 15, 2004 within which to submit the Affidavit of George Caoile (Caoile), the retired Stenographer, as part of his comment. However, despite the lapse of five months, De Guzman still failed to submit Caoiles affidavit. Subsequently, we furnished him with a copy of the April 18, 2005 Resolution wherein we mentioned that we are awaiting his submission of the affidavit of Caoile which shall be considered as part of his (De Guzmans) comment. Nine months from the time he undertook to submit the affidavit of Caoile, De Guzman has yet to comply with his undertaking. Thus, on August 10, 2005, we required De Guzman to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure. Unfortunately, De Guzman merely ignored our show cause order. Consequently, on November 20, 2006, we imposed upon him a fine of P1,000.00. Finally, on January 24, 2007, or after the lapse of one year and two months, De Guzman submitted the affidavit of Caoile. Similarly, we also required De Guzman to file his comment within 10 days from notice as regards the allegation that he was using prohibited drugs. However, he again ignored our directive as contained in the Resolution of September 17, 2007. Thus, on January 23, 2008, we required him to show cause why he should not be held in contempt for such failure. By way of explanation, De Guzman submitted a letter dated March 12, 2008 wherein he claimed that he failed to file his comment on the charge of miscondouct because he allegedly lost his copy of the said September 17, 2007 Resolution. Finally, on August 27, 2008, we required De Guzman to manifest whether he is willing to submit the case for resolution based on the pleadings submitted. As before, he failed to comply with the same.

As correctly observed by the OCA, De Guzman has shown his propensity to defy the directives of this Court.5However, at this juncture, we are no longer wont to countenance such disrespectful behavior. As we have categorically declared in Office of the Court Administrator v. Clerk of Court Fe P. Ganzan, MCTC, Jasaan, Claveria, Misamis Oriental:6 x x x A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request, and should be complied with promptly and completely. Such failure to comply betrays, not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but also disrespect for the lawful order and directive of the Court. Furthermore, this contumacious conduct of refusing to abide by the lawful directives issued by the Court has likewise been considered as an utter lack of interest to remain with, if not contempt of, the system. Ganzans transgression is highlighted even more by the fact that she is an employee of the Judiciary, who, more than an ordinary citizen, should be aware of her duty to obey the orders and processes of the Supreme Court without delay. x x x Anent the use of illegal drugs, we have upheld in Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board7 the validity and constitutionality of the mandatory but random drug testing of officers and employees of both publicand private offices. As regards public officers and employees, we specifically held that: Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional demand, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.8 Parenthetically, in A.M. No. 06-1-01-SC9 dated January 17, 2006, the Court has adopted guidelines for a program to deter the use of dangerous drugs and institute preventive measures against drug abuse for the purpose of eliminating the hazards of drug abuse in the Judiciary, particularly in the first and second level courts. The objectives of the said program are as follows: 1. To detect the use of dangerous drugs among lower court employees, impose disciplinary sanctions, and provide administrative remedies in cases where an employee is found positive for dangerous drug use. 2. To discourage the use and abuse of dangerous drugs among first and second level court employees and enhance awareness of their adverse effects by information dissemination and periodic random drug testing. 3. To institute other measures that address the menace of drug abuse within the personnel of the Judiciary. In the instant administrative matter, De Guzman never challenged the authenticity of the Chemistry Report of the Nueva Ecija Provincial Crime Laboratory Office. Likewise, the finding that De Guzman was found positive for use ofmarijuana and shabu remains unrebutted. De Guzmans general denial that he is not a drug user cannot prevail over this compelling evidence. The foregoing constitutes more than substantial evidence that De Guzman was indeed found positive for use of dangerous drugs. In Dadulo v. Court of Appeals,10 we held that "(a)dministrative proceedings are governed by the substantial evidence rule. Otherwise stated, a finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence

that the respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise."11 This Court is a temple of justice. Its basic duty and responsibility is the dispensation of justice. As dispensers of justice, all members and employees of the Judiciary are expected to adhere strictly to the laws of the land, one of which is Republic Act No. 916512 which prohibits the use of dangerous drugs.13 The Court has adhered to the policy of safeguarding the welfare, efficiency, and well-being not only of all the court personnel, but also that of the general public whom it serves. The Court will not allow its front-line representatives, like De Guzman, to put at risk the integrity of the whole judiciary. As we held in Baron v. Anacan,14 "(t)he image of a court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the personnel who work thereat. Thus, the conduct of a person serving the judiciary must, at all times, be characterized by propriety and decorum and above all else, be above suspicion so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary. The Court would never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those in the administration of justice, which will violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary." Article XI of the Constitution mandates that: SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people and serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. De Guzmans use of prohibited drugs has greatly affected his efficiency in the performance of his functions. De Guzman did not refute the observation of his superior, Judge Sta. Romana, that as a criminal docket court clerk, he (De Guzman) was totally inept and incompetent. Hence, to get across his displeasure and dissatisfaction with his job performance, Judge Sta. Romana gave De Guzman an unsatisfactory rating. Moreover, De Guzmans efficiency as a custodian of court records is also totally wanting. As early as May 12, 2004, Judge Sta. Romana issued a Memorandum addressed to De Guzman relative to the "sleeping cases" inside the latters drawer. It would appear that several cases have not been proceeded upon because De Guzman hid the records of the same inside his drawer. The text of the said Memorandum reads: An examination of the records found in your drawer reveal that the following cases have not moved because you have not brought the same to the attention of the Presiding Judge, to wit: 1. Crim. Case No. 1849-C, PP v. Ruben Villanueva Order of transmittal to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija dated August 6, 2003 to resolve the Motion for Reconsideration. Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor dated September 23, 2003 denying the Motion for Reconsideration and transmitting the records to the RTC, Br. 31, Guimba, Nueva Ecija received by this court on September 24, 2003; 2. Crim. Case No. 1993-G, PP vs. JOJO SUPNET Information dated October 14, 2002 received by this Court on November 18, 2002;

3. Crim. Case No. 2013-G, PP vs. Brgy. Capt. BAYANI CAMIS Information dated September 23, 2002 received by this court on January 24, 2003; 4. Crim. Case No. 2007-G, PP vs. Armando Marcos Information dated June 23, 2002; Records received on January 2, 2003. The Presiding Judge caused the issuance of finding of probable causes and the corresponding Warrants of Arrest. You are hereby ordered to assist the OIC/Clerk of Court in sending forthwith the Warrants of Arrest to the proper agencies for implementation. In the same vein, Reyes also put forth the absurd behavioral manifestations of De Guzman. According to Reyes, Judge Sta. Romana would always remind De Guzman to prepare and transmit the complete records of the appealed cases. However, De Guzman would only make empty assurances to perform his task. Notwithstanding the reminders of his superiors, De Guzman would still fail to transmit the records. Instead, he would report the next day and jubilantly declare that the problem has been solved at last. In fine, we agree with the OCA that by his repeated and contumacious conduct of disrespecting the Courts directives, De Guzman is guilty of gross misconduct and has already forfeited his privilege of being an employee of the Court. Likewise, we can no longer countenance his manifestations of queer behavior, bordering on absurd, irrational and irresponsible, because it has greatly affected his job performance and efficiency. By using prohibited drugs, and being a front-line representative of the Judiciary, De Guzman has exposed to risk the very institution which he serves. It is only by weeding out the likes of De Guzman from the ranks that we would be able to preserve the integrity of this institution. Two justices disagree with the majority opinion. They opine that the Courts action in this case contravenes an express public policy, i.e., "imprisonment for drug dealers and pushers, rehabilitation for their victims." They also posit that De Guzmans failure to properly perform his duties and promptly respond to Court orders precisely springs from his drug addiction that requires rehabilitation. Finally, they state that the Courts real strength is not in its righteousness but in its willingness to understand that men are not perfect and that there is a time to punish and a time to give a chance for contrition and change. However, the legislative policy as embodied in Republic Act No. 9165 in deterring dangerous drug use by resort to sustainable programs of rehabilitation and treatment must be considered in light of this Courts constitutional power of administrative supervision over courts and court personnel. The legislative power imposing policies through laws is not unlimited and is subject to the substantive and constitutional limitations that set parameters both in the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.15 As such, it cannot limit the Courts power to impose disciplinary actions against erring justices, judges and court personnel. Neither should such policy be used to restrict the Courts power to preserve and maintain the Judiciarys honor, dignity and integrity and public confidence that can only be achieved by imposing strict and rigid standards of decency and propriety governing the conduct of justices, judges and court employees. Likewise, we cannot subscribe to the idea that De Guzmans irrational behavior stems solely from his being a drug user. Such queer behavior can be attributed to several factors. However, it cannot by any measure be categorically stated at this point that it can be attributed solely to his being a drug user. Finally, it must be emphasized at this juncture that De Guzmans dismissal is not grounded only on his being a drug user. His outright dismissal from the service is likewise anchored on his

contumacious and repeated acts of not heeding the directives of this Court. As we have already stated, such attitude betrays not only a recalcitrant streak of character, but also disrespect for the lawful orders and directives of the Court. ACCORDINGLY, Rene de Guzman, Clerk, Regional Trial Court of Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 31, is herebyDISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations. SO ORDERED.
Southern Cross Cement vs Cement Manufacturers Association of the Philippines

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT EN BANC G.R. No. 158540. August 3, 2005 SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners, vs. CEMENT MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, Respondent. RESOLUTION TINGA, J.: Cement is hardly an exciting subject for litigation. Still, the parties in this case have done their best to put up a spirited advocacy of their respective positions, throwing in everything including the proverbial kitchen sink. At present, the burden of passion, if not proof, has shifted to public respondents Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and private respondent Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corporation (Philcemcor),1 who now seek reconsideration of our Decision dated 8 July 2004 (Decision), which granted the petition of petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation (Southern Cross). This case, of course, is ultimately not just about cement. For respondents, it is about love of country and the future of the domestic industry in the face of foreign competition. For this Court, it is about elementary statutory construction, constitutional limitations on the executive power to impose tariffs and similar measures, and obedience to the law. Just as much was asserted in the Decision, and the same holds true with this presentResolution. An extensive narration of facts can be found in the Decision.2 As can well be recalled, the case centers on the interpretation of provisions of Republic Act No. 8800, the Safeguard Measures Act ("SMA"), which was one of the laws enacted by Congress soon after the Philippines ratified the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.3 The SMA provides the structure and mechanics for the imposition of emergency measures, including tariffs, to protect domestic industries and producers from increased imports which inflict or could inflict serious injury on them.4 A brief summary as to how the present petition came to be filed by Southern Cross. Philcemcor, an association of at least eighteen (18) domestic cement manufacturers filed with the DTI a petition seeking the imposition of safeguard measures on gray Portland cement,5 in accordance with the SMA. After the DTI issued a provisional safeguard measure,6 the application was referred to the Tariff Commission for a formal investigation pursuant to Section 9 of the SMA and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, in order to determine whether or not to impose a definitive safeguard measure on imports of gray Portland cement. The Tariff Commission held public hearings and conducted its own investigation, then on 13 March 2002, issued its Formal Investigation Report ("Report"). The Report determined as follows: The elements of serious injury and imminent threat of serious injury not having been established, it is hereby recommended that no definitive general safeguard measure be imposed on the importation of gray Portland cement.7

The DTI sought the opinion of the Secretary of Justice whether it could still impose a definitive safeguard measure notwithstanding the negative finding of the Tariff Commission. After the Secretary of Justice opined that the DTI could not do so under the SMA,8 the DTI Secretary then promulgated a Decision9 wherein he expressed the DTIs disagreement with the conclusions of the Tariff Commission, but at the same time, ultimately denying Philcemcors application for safeguard measures on the ground that the he was bound to do so in light of the Tariff Commissions negative findings.10 Philcemcor challenged this Decision of the DTI Secretary by filing with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus11 seeking to set aside the DTI Decision, as well as the Tariff Commissions Report. It prayed that the Court of Appeals direct the DTI Secretary to disregard the Report and to render judgment independently of the Report. Philcemcor argued that the DTI Secretary, vested as he is under the law with the power of review, is not bound to adopt the recommendations of the Tariff Commission; and, that the Report is void, as it is predicated on a flawed framework, inconsistent inferences and erroneous methodology.12 The Court of Appeals Twelfth Division, in a Decision13 penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice Elvi John Asuncion,14 partially granted Philcemcors petition. The appellate court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari since it alleged grave abuse of discretion. While it refused to annul the findings of the Tariff Commission,15 it also held that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the factual findings of the Tariff Commission since such findings are merely recommendatory and they fall within the ambit of the Secretarys discretionary review. It determined that the legislative intent is to grant the DTI Secretary the power to make a final decision on the Tariff Commissions recommendation.16 On 23 June 2003, Southern Cross filed the present petition, arguing that the Court of Appeals has no jurisdiction over Philcemcors petition, as the proper remedy is a petition for review with the CTA conformably with the SMA, and; that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission on the existence or non-existence of conditions warranting the imposition of general safeguard measures are binding upon the DTI Secretary. Despite the fact that the Court of Appeals Decision had not yet become final, its binding force was cited by the DTI Secretary when he issued a new Decision on 25 June 2003, wherein he ruled that that in light of the appellate courts Decision, there was no longer any legal impediment to his deciding Philcemcors application for definitive safeguard measures.17 He made a determination that, contrary to the findings of the Tariff Commission, the local cement industry had suffered serious injury as a result of the import surges.18 Accordingly, he imposed a definitive safeguard measure on the importation of gray Portland cement, in the form of a definitive safeguard duty in the amount of P20.60/40 kg. bag for three years on imported gray Portland Cement.19 On 7 July 2003, Southern Cross filed with the Court a "Very Urgent Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or A Writ of Preliminary Injunction" ("TRO Application"), seeking to enjoin the DTI Secretary from enforcing hisDecision of 25 June 2003 in view of the pending petition before this Court. Philcemcor filed an opposition, claiming, among others, that it is not this Court but the CTA that has jurisdiction over the application under the law. On 1 August 2003, Southern Cross filed with the CTA a Petition for Review, assailing the DTI Secretarys 25 June 2003 Decision which imposed the definite safeguard measure. Yet Southern Cross did not promptly inform this Court about this filing. The first time the Court would learn about this Petition with the CTA was when Southern Cross mentioned such fact in a pleading dated 11 August 2003 and filed the next day with this Court.20

Philcemcor argued before this Court that Southern Cross had deliberately and willfully resorted to forum-shopping; that the CTA, being a special court of limited jurisdiction, could only review the ruling of the DTI Secretary when a safeguard measure is imposed; and that the factual findings of the Tariff Commission are not binding on the DTI Secretary.21 After giving due course to Southern Crosss Petition, the Court called the case for oral argument on 18 February 2004.22 At the oral argument, attended by the counsel for Philcemcor and Southern Cross and the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court simplified the issues in this wise: (i) whether the Decision of the DTI Secretary is appealable to the CTA or the Court of Appeals; (ii) assuming that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, whether itsDecision is in accordance with law; and, whether a Temporary Restraining Order is warranted.23 After the parties had filed their respective memoranda, the Courts Second Division, to which the case had been assigned, promulgated its Decision granting Southern Crosss Petition.24The Decision was unanimous, without any separate or concurring opinion. The Court ruled that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction over Philcemcors Petition, the proper remedy under Section 29 of the SMA being a petition for review with the CTA; and that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the negative determination of the Tariff Commission and could therefore impose the general safeguard measures, since Section 5 of the SMA precisely required that the Tariff Commission make a positive final determination before the DTI Secretary could impose these measures. Anent the argument that Southern Cross had committed forum-shopping, the Court concluded that there was no evident malicious intent to subvert procedural rules so as to match the standard under Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court of willful and deliberate forum shopping. Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 5 June 2003 was declared null and void. The Court likewise found it necessary to nullify the Decision of the DTI Secretary dated 25 June 2003, rendered after the filing of this present Petition. This Decision by the DTI Secretary had cited the obligatory force of the null and void Court of Appeals Decision, notwithstanding the fact that the decision of the appellate court was not yet final and executory. Considering that the decision of the Court of Appeals was a nullity to begin with, the inescapable conclusion was that the new decision of the DTI Secretary, prescinding as it did from the imprimatur of the decision of the Court of Appeals, was a nullity as well. After the Decision was reported in the media, there was a flurry of newspaper articles citing alleged negative reactions to the ruling by the counsel for Philcemcor, the DTI Secretary, and others.25 Both respondents promptly filed their respective motions for reconsideration. On 21 September 2004, the Court En Banc resolved, upon motion of respondents, to accept the petition and resolve the Motions for Reconsideration.26 The case was then reheard27 on oral argument on 1 March 2005. During the hearing, the Court elicited from the parties their arguments on the two central issues as discussed in the assailed Decision, pertaining to the jurisdictional aspect and to the substantive aspect of whether the DTI Secretary may impose a general safeguard measure despite a negative determination by the Tariff Commission. The Court chose not to hear argumentation on the peripheral issue of forum-shopping,28 although this question shall be tackled herein shortly. Another point of concern emerged during oral arguments on the exercise of quasijudicial powers by the Tariff Commission, and the parties were required by the Court to discuss in their respective memoranda whether the Tariff Commission could validly exercise quasi-judicial powers in the exercise of its mandate under the SMA.

The Court has likewise been notified that subsequent to the rendition of the Courts Decision, Philcemcor filed aPetition for Extension of the Safeguard Measure with the DTI, which has been referred to the Tariff Commission.29In an Urgent Motion dated 21 December 2004, Southern Cross prayed that Philcemcor, the DTI, the Bureau of Customs, and the Tariff Commission be directed to "cease and desist from taking any and all actions pursuant to or under the null and void CA Decision and DTI Decision, including proceedings to extend the safeguard measure.30 In a Manifestation and Motion dated 23 June 2004, the Tariff Commission informed the Court that since no prohibitory injunction or order of such nature had been issued by any court against the Tariff Commission, the Commission proceeded to complete its investigation on the petition for extension, pursuant to Section 9 of the SMA, but opted to defer transmittal of its report to the DTI Secretary pending "guidance" from this Court on the propriety of such a step considering this pending Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution dated 5 July 2005, the Court directed the parties to maintain the status quo effective of even date, and until further orders from this Court. The denial of the pending motions for reconsideration will obviously render the pending petition for extension academic. I. Jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals Under Section 29 of the SMA The first core issue resolved in the assailed Decision was whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the special civil action for certiorari filed by Philcemcor assailing the 5 April 2002 Decision of the DTI Secretary. The general jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over special civil actions for certiorari is beyond doubt. The Constitution itself assures that judicial review avails to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. At the same time, the special civil action of certiorari is available only when there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.31 Philcemcors recourse of special civil action before the Court of Appeals to challenge the Decision of the DTI Secretary not to impose the general safeguard measures is not based on the SMA, but on the general rule on certiorari. Thus, the Court proceeded to inquire whether indeed there was no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that would warrant the allowance of Philcemcors special civil action. The answer hinged on the proper interpretation of Section 29 of the SMA, which reads: Section 29. Judicial Review. Any interested party who is adversely affected by the ruling of the Secretary in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure may file with the CTA, a petition for review of such ruling within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. Provided, however, that the filing of such petition for review shall not in any way stop, suspend or otherwise toll the imposition or collection of the appropriate tariff duties or the adoption of other appropriate safeguard measures, as the case may be. The petition for review shall comply with the same requirements and shall follow the same rules of procedure and shall be subject to the same disposition as in appeals in connection with adverse rulings on tax matters to the Court of Appeals.32 (Emphasis supplied) The matter is crucial for if the CTA properly had jurisdiction over the petition challenging the DTI Secretarys ruling not to impose a safeguard measure, then the special civil action of certiorari resorted to instead by Philcemcor would not avail, owing to the existence of a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.33The Court of Appeals, in asserting that it had jurisdiction, merely cited the general rule on certiorari jurisdiction without bothering to refer to, or possibly even study, the import of Section 29. In contrast, this Court duly considered the meaning and ramifications of Section 29, concluding that it provided for a plain, speedy and adequate remedy

that Philcemcor could have resorted to instead of filing the special civil action before the Court of Appeals. Philcemcor still holds on to its hypothesis that the petition for review allowed under Section 29 lies only if the DTI Secretarys ruling imposes a safeguard measure. If, on the other hand, the DTI Secretarys ruling is not to impose a safeguard measure, judicial review under Section 29 could not be resorted to since the provision refers to rulings "in connection with the imposition" of the safeguard measure, as opposed to the non-imposition. Since the Decision dated 5 April 2002 resolved against imposing a safeguard measure, Philcemcor claims that the proper remedial recourse is a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. Interestingly, Republic Act No. 9282, promulgated on 30 March 2004, expressly vests unto the CTA jurisdiction over "[d]ecisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in case of nonagricultural product, commodity or article . . . involving . . . safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said duties."34 It is clear that any future attempts to advance the literalist position of the respondents would consequently fail. However, since Republic Act No. 9282 has no retroactive effect, this Court had to decide whether Section 29 vests jurisdiction on the CTA over rulings of the DTI Secretary not to impose a safeguard measure. And the Court, in its assailed Decision, ruled that the CTA is endowed with such jurisdiction. Both respondents reiterate their fundamentalist reading that Section 29 authorizes the petition for review before the CTA only when the DTI Secretary decides to impose a safeguard measure, but not when he decides not to. In doing so, they fail to address what the Court earlier pointed out would be the absurd consequences if their interpretation is followed to its logical end. But in affirming, as the Court now does, its previous holding that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for review questioning the non-imposition of safeguard measures by the DTI Secretary, the Court relies on the plain reading that Section 29 explicitly vests jurisdiction over such petitions on the CTA. Under Section 29, there are three requisites to enable the CTA to acquire jurisdiction over the petition for review contemplated therein: (i) there must be a ruling by the DTI Secretary; (ii) the petition must be filed by an interested party adversely affected by the ruling; and (iii) such ruling must be "in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure." Obviously, there are differences between "a ruling for the imposition of a safeguard measure," and one issued "in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure." The first adverts to a singular type of ruling, namely one that imposes a safeguard measure. The second does not contemplate only one kind of ruling, but a myriad of rulings issued "in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure." Respondents argue that the Court has given an expansive interpretation to Section 29, contrary to the established rule requiring strict construction against the existence of jurisdiction in specialized courts.35 But it is the express provision of Section 29, and not this Court, that mandates CTA jurisdiction to be broad enough to encompass more than just a ruling imposing the safeguard measure. The key phrase remains "in connection with." It has connotations that are obvious even to the layman. A ruling issued "in connection with" the imposition of a safeguard measure would be one that bears some relation to the imposition of a safeguard measure. Obviously, a ruling imposing a safeguard measure is covered by the phrase "in connection with," but such ruling is by no means exclusive. Rulings which modify, suspend or terminate a safeguard measure are necessarily in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure. So does a ruling allowing for a provisional safeguard measure. So too, a ruling by the DTI Secretary refusing to refer the application for a safeguard measure to the Tariff Commission. It is clear that there is an entire subset of rulings that

the DTI Secretary may issue in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure, including those that are provisional, interlocutory, or dispositive in character.36 By the same token, a ruling not to impose a safeguard measure is also issued in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure. In arriving at the proper interpretation of "in connection with," the Court referred to the U.S. Supreme Court cases of Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.37 and New York State Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Ins.38 Both cases considered the interpretation of the phrase "relates to" as used in a federal statute, the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974. Respondents criticize the citations on the premise that the cases are not binding in our jurisdiction and do not involve safeguard measures. The criticisms are off-tangent considering that our ruling did not call for the application of the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974 in the Philippine milieu. The American cases are not relied upon as precedents, but as guides of interpretation. Certainly, if there are applicable local precedents pertaining to the interpretation of the phrase "in connection with," then these certainly would have some binding force. But none avail, and neither do the respondents demonstrate a countervailing holding in Philippine jurisprudence. Yet we should consider the claim that an "expansive interpretation" was favored in Shaw because the law in question was an employees benefit law that had to be given an interpretation favorable to its intended beneficiaries.39 In the next breath, Philcemcor notes that the U.S. Supreme Court itself was alarmed by the expansive interpretation in Shaw and thus in Blue Cross, the Shaw ruling was reversed and a more restrictive interpretation was applied based on congressional intent.40 Respondents would like to make it appear that the Court acted rashly in applying a discarded precedent in Shaw, a non-binding foreign precedent nonetheless. But the Court did make the following observation in its Decisionpertaining to Blue Cross: Now, let us determine the maximum scope and reach of the phrase "in connection with" as used in Section 29 of the SMA. A literalist reading or linguistic survey may not satisfy. Even the U.S. Supreme Court in New York State Blue Cross Plans v. Travelers Ins.41 conceded that the phrases "relate to" or "in connection with" may be extended to the farthest stretch of indeterminacy for, universally, relations or connections are infinite and stop nowhere.42Thus, in the case the U.S. High Court, examining the same phrase of the same provision of law involved in Shaw, resorted to looking at the statute and its objectives as the alternative to an "uncritical literalism." A similar inquiry into the other provisions of the SMA is in order to determine the scope of review accorded therein to the CTA.43 In the next four paragraphs of the Decision, encompassing four pages, the Court proceeded to inquire into the SMA and its objectives as a means to determine the scope of rulings to be deemed as "in connection with the imposition of a safeguard measure." Certainly, this Court did not resort to the broadest interpretation possible of the phrase "in connection with," but instead sought to bring it into the context of the scope and objectives of the SMA. The ultimate conclusion of the Court was that the phrase includes all rulings of the DTI Secretary which arise from the time an application or motu proprio initiation for the imposition of a safeguard measure is taken.44 This conclusion was derived from the observation that the imposition of a general safeguard measure is a process, initiated motu proprio or through application, which undergoes several stages upon which the DTI Secretary is obliged or may be called upon to issue a ruling. It should be emphasized again that by utilizing the phrase "in connection with," it is the SMA that expressly vests jurisdiction on the CTA over petitions questioning the non-imposition by the DTI Secretary of safeguard measures. The Court is simply asserting, as it should, the clear intent of the legislature in enacting the SMA. Without "in connection with" or a synonymous phrase, the Court

would be compelled to favor the respondents position that only rulings imposing safeguard measures may be elevated on appeal to the CTA. But considering that the statute does make use of the phrase, there is little sense in delving into alternate scenarios. Respondents fail to convincingly address the absurd consequences pointed out by the Decision had their proposed interpretation been adopted. Indeed, suffocated beneath the respondents legalistic tinsel is the elemental questionwhat sense is there in vesting jurisdiction on the CTA over a decision to impose a safeguard measure, but not on one choosing not to impose. Of course, it is not for the Court to inquire into the wisdom of legislative acts, hence the rule that jurisdiction must be expressly vested and not presumed. Yet ultimately, respondents muddle the issue by making it appear that the Decision has uniquely expanded the jurisdictional rules. For the respondents, the proper statutory interpretation of the crucial phrase "in connection with" is to pretend that the phrase did not exist at all in the statute. The Court, in taking the effort to examine the meaning and extent of the phrase, is merely giving breath to the legislative will. The Court likewise stated that the respondents position calls for split jurisdiction, which is judicially abhorred. In rebuttal, the public respondents cite Sections 2313 and 2402 of the Tariff and Customs Code (TCC), which allegedly provide for a splitting of jurisdiction of the CTA. According to public respondents, under Section 2313 of the TCC, a decision of the Commissioner of Customs affirming a decision of the Collector of Customs adverse to the government is elevated for review to the Secretary of Finance. However, under Section 2402 of the TCC, a ruling of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs against a taxpayer must be appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals, and not to the Secretary of Finance. Strictly speaking, the review by the Secretary of Finance of the decision of the Commissioner of Customs is not judicial review, since the Secretary of Finance holds an executive and not a judicial office. The contrast is apparent with the situation in this case, wherein the interpretation favored by the respondents calls for the exercise of judicial review by two different courts over essentially the same questionwhether the DTI Secretary should impose general safeguard measures. Moreover, as petitioner points out, the executive department cannot appeal against itself. The Collector of Customs, the Commissioner of Customs and the Secretary of Finance are all part of the executive branch. If the Collector of Customs rules against the government, the executive cannot very well bring suit in courts against itself. On the other hand, if a private person is aggrieved by the decision of the Collector of Customs, he can have proper recourse before the courts, which now would be called upon to exercise judicial review over the action of the executive branch. More fundamentally, the situation involving split review of the decision of the Collector of Customs under the TCC is not apropos to the case at bar. The TCC in that instance is quite explicit on the divergent reviewing body or official depending on which party prevailed at the Collector of Customs level. On the other hand, there is no such explicit expression of bifurcated appeals in Section 29 of the SMA. Public respondents likewise cite Fabian v. Ombudsman45 as another instance wherein the Court purportedly allowed split jurisdiction. It is argued that the Court, in ruling that it was the Court of Appeals which possessed appellate authority to review decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative cases while the Court retaining appellate jurisdiction of decisions of the Ombudsman in non-administrative cases, effectively sanctioned split jurisdiction between the Court and the Court of Appeals.46 Nonetheless, this argument is successfully undercut by Southern Cross, which points out the essential differences in the power exercised by the Ombudsman in administrative cases and nonadministrative cases relating to criminal complaints. In the former, the Ombudsman may impose an

administrative penalty, while in acting upon a criminal complaint what the Ombudsman undertakes is a preliminary investigation. Clearly, the capacity in which the Ombudsman takes on in deciding an administrative complaint is wholly different from that in conducting a preliminary investigation. In contrast, in ruling upon a safeguard measure, the DTI Secretary acts in one and the same role. The variance between an order granting or denying an application for a safeguard measure is polar though emanating from the same equator, and does not arise from the distinct character of the putative actions involved. Philcemcor imputes intelligent design behind the alleged intent of Congress to limit CTA review only to impositions of the general safeguard measures. It claims that there is a necessary tax implication in case of an imposition of a tariff where the CTAs expertise is necessary, but there is no such tax implication, hence no need for the assumption of jurisdiction by a specialized agency, when the ruling rejects the imposition of a safeguard measure. But of course, whether the ruling under review calls for the imposition or non-imposition of the safeguard measure, the common question for resolution still is whether or not the tariff should be imposed an issue definitely fraught with a tax dimension. The determination of the question will call upon the same kind of expertise that a specialized body as the CTA presumably possesses. In response to the Courts observation that the setup proposed by respondents was novel, unusual, cumbersome and unwise, public respondents invoke the maxim that courts should not be concerned with the wisdom and efficacy of legislation.47 But this prescinds from the bogus claim that the CTA may not exercise judicial review over a decision not to impose a safeguard measure, a prohibition that finds no statutory support. It is likewise settled in statutory construction that an interpretation that would cause inconvenience and absurdity is not favored. Respondents do not address the particular illogic that the Court pointed out would ensue if their position on judicial review were adopted. According to the respondents, while a ruling by the DTI Secretary imposing a safeguard measure may be elevated on review to the CTA and assailed on the ground of errors in fact and in law, a ruling denying the imposition of safeguard measures may be assailed only on the ground that the DTI Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion. As stressed in the Decision, "[c]ertiorari is a remedy narrow in its scope and inflexible in its character. It is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop."48 It is incorrect to say that the Decision bars any effective remedy should the Tariff Commission act or conclude erroneously in making its determination whether the factual conditions exist which necessitate the imposition of the general safeguard measure. If the Tariff Commission makes a negative final determination, the DTI Secretary, bound as he is by this negative determination, has to render a decision denying the application for safeguard measures citing the Tariff Commissions findings as basis. Necessarily then, such negative determination of the Tariff Commission being an integral part of the DTI Secretarys ruling would be open for review before the CTA, which again is especially qualified by reason of its expertise to examine the findings of the Tariff Commission. Moreover, considering that the Tariff Commission is an instrumentality of the government, its actions (as opposed to those undertaken by the DTI Secretary under the SMA) are not beyond the pale of certiorari jurisdiction. Unfortunately for Philcemcor, it hinged its cause on the claim that the DTI Secretarys actions may be annulled on certiorari, notwithstanding the explicit grant of judicial review over that cabinet members actions under the SMA to the CTA. Finally on this point, Philcemcor argues that assuming this Courts interpretation of Section 29 is correct, such ruling should not be given retroactive effect, otherwise, a gross violation of the right to due process would be had. This erroneously presumes that it was this Court, and not Congress, which vested jurisdiction on the CTA over rulings of non-imposition rendered by the DTI Secretary. We have repeatedly stressed that Section 29 expressly confers CTA jurisdiction over rulings in connection with the imposition of the safeguard measure, and the reassertion of this point in the Decision was a matter of emphasis, not of contrivance. The due process protection does not

shield those who remain purposely blind to the express rules that ensure the sporting play of procedural law. Besides, respondents claim would also apply every time this Court is compelled to settle a novel question of law, or to reverse precedent. In such cases, there would always be litigants whose causes of action might be vitiated by the application of newly formulated judicial doctrines. Adopting their claim would unwisely force this Court to treat its dispositions in unprecedented, sometimes landmark decisions not as resolutions to the live cases or controversies, but as legal doctrine applicable only to future litigations. II. Positive Final Determination By the Tariff Commission an Indispensable Requisite to the Imposition of General Safeguard Measures The second core ruling in the Decision was that contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals, the DTI Secretary was barred from imposing a general safeguard measure absent a positive final determination rendered by the Tariff Commission. The fundamental premise rooted in this ruling is based on the acknowledgment that the required positive final determination of the Tariff Commission exists as a properly enacted constitutional limitation imposed on the delegation of the legislative power to impose tariffs and imposts to the President under Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Congressional Limitations Pursuant To Constitutional Authority on the Delegated Power to Impose Safeguard Measures The safeguard measures imposable under the SMA generally involve duties on imported products, tariff rate quotas, or quantitative restrictions on the importation of a product into the country. Concerning as they do the foreign importation of products into the Philippines, these safeguard measures fall within the ambit of Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which states: The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.49 The Court acknowledges the basic postulates ingrained in the provision, and, hence, governing in this case. They are: (1) It is Congress which authorizes the President to impose tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts. Thus, the authority cannot come from the Finance Department, the National Economic Development Authority, or the World Trade Organization, no matter how insistent or persistent these bodies may be.

(2) The authorization granted to the President must be embodied in a law. Hence, the justification cannot be supplied simply by inherent executive powers. It cannot arise from administrative or executive orders promulgated by the executive branch or from the wisdom or whim of the President. (3) The authorization to the President can be exercised only within the specified limits set in the law and is further subject to limitations and restrictions which Congress may impose. Consequently, if Congress specifies that the tariff rates should not exceed a given amount, the President cannot impose a tariff rate that exceeds such amount. If Congress stipulates that no duties may be imposed on the importation of corn, the President cannot impose duties on corn, no matter how actively the local corn producers lobby the President. Even the most picayune of limits or restrictions imposed by Congress must be observed by the President. There is one fundamental principle that animates these constitutional postulates. These impositions under Section 28(2), Article VI fall within the realm of the power of taxation, a power which is within the sole province of the legislature under the Constitution. Without Section 28(2), Article VI, the executive branch has no authority to impose tariffs and other similar tax levies involving the importation of foreign goods. Assuming that Section 28(2) Article VI did not exist, the enactment of the SMA by Congress would be voided on the ground that it would constitute an undue delegation of the legislative power to tax. The constitutional provision shields such delegation from constitutional infirmity, and should be recognized as an exceptional grant of legislative power to the President, rather than the affirmation of an inherent executive power. This being the case, the qualifiers mandated by the Constitution on this presidential authority attain primordial consideration. First, there must be a law, such as the SMA. Second, there must be specified limits, a detail which would be filled in by the law. And further, Congress is further empowered to impose limitations and restrictions on this presidential authority. On this last power, the provision does not provide for specified conditions, such as that the limitations and restrictions must conform to prior statutes, internationally accepted practices, accepted jurisprudence, or the considered opinion of members of the executive branch. The Court recognizes that the authority delegated to the President under Section 28(2), Article VI may be exercised, in accordance with legislative sanction, by the alter egos of the President, such as department secretaries. Indeed, for purposes of the Presidents exercise of power to impose tariffs under Article VI, Section 28(2), it is generally the Secretary of Finance who acts as alter ego of the President. The SMA provides an exceptional instance wherein it is the DTI or Agriculture Secretary who is tasked by Congress, in their capacities asalter egos of the President, to impose such measures. Certainly, the DTI Secretary has no inherent power, even as alter ego of the President, to levy tariffs and imports. Concurrently, the tasking of the Tariff Commission under the SMA should be likewise construed within the same context as part and parcel of the legislative delegation of its inherent power to impose tariffs and imposts to the executive branch, subject to limitations and restrictions. In that regard, both the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary may be regarded as agents of Congress within their limited respective spheres, as ordained in the SMA, in the implementation of the said law which significantly draws its strength from the plenary legislative power of taxation. Indeed, even the President may be considered as an agent of Congress for the purpose of imposing safeguard measures. It is Congress, not the President, which possesses inherent powers to impose tariffs and imposts. Without legislative authorization through statute, the President has no power, authority or right to impose such safeguard measures because taxation is inherently legislative, not executive.

When Congress tasks the President or his/her alter egos to impose safeguard measures under the delineated conditions, the President or the alter egos may be properly deemed as agents of Congress to perform an act that inherently belongs as a matter of right to the legislature. It is basic agency law that the agent may not act beyond the specifically delegated powers or disregard the restrictions imposed by the principal. In short, Congress may establish the procedural framework under which such safeguard measures may be imposed, and assign the various offices in the government bureaucracy respective tasks pursuant to the imposition of such measures, the task assignment including the factual determination of whether the necessary conditions exists to warrant such impositions. Under the SMA, Congress assigned the DTI Secretary and the Tariff Commission their respective functions50 in the legislatures scheme of things. There is only one viable ground for challenging the legality of the limitations and restrictions imposed by Congress under Section 28(2) Article VI, and that is such limitations and restrictions are themselves violative of the Constitution. Thus, no matter how distasteful or noxious these limitations and restrictions may seem, the Court has no choice but to uphold their validity unless their constitutional infirmity can be demonstrated. What are these limitations and restrictions that are material to the present case? The entire SMA provides for a limited framework under which the President, through the DTI and Agriculture Secretaries, may impose safeguard measures in the form of tariffs and similar imposts. The limitation most relevant to this case is contained in Section 5 of the SMA, captioned "Conditions for the Application of General Safeguard Measures," and stating: The Secretary shall apply a general safeguard measure upon a positive final determination of the [Tariff] Commission that a product is being imported into the country in increased quantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic production, as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry; however, in the case of non-agricultural products, the Secretary shall first establish that the application of such safeguard measures will be in the public interest.51 Positive Final Determination By Tariff Commission Plainly Required by Section 5 of SMA There is no question that Section 5 of the SMA operates as a limitation validly imposed by Congress on the presidential52 authority under the SMA to impose tariffs and imposts. That the positive final determination operates as an indispensable requisite to the imposition of the safeguard measure, and that it is the Tariff Commission which makes such determination, are legal propositions plainly expressed in Section 5 for the easy comprehension for everyone but respondents. Philcemcor attributes this Courts conclusion on the indispensability of the positive final determination to flawed syllogism in that we read the proposition "if A then B" as if it stated "if A, and only A, then B."53 Translated in practical terms, our conclusion, according to Philcemcor, would have only been justified had Section 5 read "shall apply a general safeguard measure upon, and only upon, a positive final determination of the Tariff Commission." Statutes are not designed for the easy comprehension of the five-year old child. Certainly, general propositions laid down in statutes need not be expressly qualified by clauses denoting exclusivity in order that they gain efficacy. Indeed, applying this argument, the President would, under the Constitution, be authorized to declare martial law despite the absence of the invasion, rebellion or

public safety requirement just because the first paragraph of Section 18, Article VII fails to state the magic word "only."54 But let us for the nonce pursue Philcemcors logic further. It claims that since Section 5 does not allegedly limit the circumstances upon which the DTI Secretary may impose general safeguard measures, it is a worthy pursuit to determine whether the entire context of the SMA, as discerned by all the other familiar indicators of legislative intent supplied by norms of statutory interpretation, would justify safeguard measures absent a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission. The first line of attack employed is on Section 5 itself, it allegedly not being as clear as it sounds. It is advanced that Section 5 does not relate to the legal ability of either the Tariff Commission or the DTI Secretary to bind or foreclose review and reversal by one or the other. Such relationship should instead be governed by domestic administrative law and remedial law. Philcemcor thus would like to cast the proposition in this manner: Does it run contrary to our legal order to assert, as the Court did in its Decision, that a body of relative junior competence as the Tariff Commission can bind an administrative superior and cabinet officer, the DTI Secretary? It is easy to see why Philcemcor would like to divorce this DTI Secretary-Tariff Commission interaction from the confines of the SMA. Shorn of context, the notion would seem radical and unjustifiable that the lowly Tariff Commission can bind the hands and feet of the DTI Secretary. It can be surmised at once that respondents preferred interpretation is based not on the express language of the SMA, but from implications derived in a roundabout manner. Certainly, no provision in the SMA expressly authorizes the DTI Secretary to impose a general safeguard measure despite the absence of a positive final recommendation of the Tariff Commission. On the other hand, Section 5 expressly states that the DTI Secretary "shall apply a general safeguard measure upon a positive final determination of the [Tariff] Commission." The causal connection in Section 5 between the imposition by the DTI Secretary of the general safeguard measure and the positive final determination of the Tariff Commission is patent, and even respondents do not dispute such connection. As stated earlier, the Court in its Decision found Section 5 to be clear, plain and free from ambiguity so as to render unnecessary resort to the congressional records to ascertain legislative intent. Yet respondents, on the dubitable premise that Section 5 is not as express as it seems, again latch on to the record of legislative deliberations in asserting that there was no legislative intent to bar the DTI Secretary from imposing the general safeguard measure anyway despite the absence of a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission. Let us take the bait for a moment, and examine respondents commonly cited portion of the legislative record. One would presume, given the intense advocacy for the efficacy of these citations, that they contain a "smoking gun" express declarations from the legislators that the DTI Secretary may impose a general safeguard measure even if the Tariff Commission refuses to render a positive final determination. Such "smoking gun," if it exists, would characterize our Decision as disingenuous for ignoring such contrary expression of intent from the legislators who enacted the SMA. But as with many things, the anticipation is more dramatic than the truth. The excerpts cited by respondents are derived from the interpellation of the late Congressman Marcial Punzalan Jr., by then (and still is) Congressman Simeon Datumanong.55 Nowhere in these records is the view expressed that the DTI Secretary may impose the general safeguard measures if the Tariff Commission issues a negative final determination or otherwise is unable to make a positive final determination. Instead, respondents hitch on the observations of Congressman Punzalan Jr., that "the results of the [Tariff] Commissions findings . . . is subsequently submitted to [the DTI Secretary] for the [DTI Secretary] to impose or not to impose;" and that "the [DTI Secretary] here

iswho would make the final decision on the recommendation that is made by a more technical body [such as the Tariff Commission]."56 There is nothing in the remarks of Congressman Punzalan which contradict our Decision. His observations fall in accord with the respective roles of the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary under the SMA. Under the SMA, it is the Tariff Commission that conducts an investigation as to whether the conditions exist to warrant the imposition of the safeguard measures. These conditions are enumerated in Section 5, namely; that a product is being imported into the country in increased quantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic production, as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof to the domestic industry. After the investigation of the Tariff Commission, it submits a report to the DTI Secretary which states, among others, whether the above-stated conditions for the imposition of the general safeguard measures exist. Upon a positive final determination that these conditions are present, the Tariff Commission then is mandated to recommend what appropriate safeguard measures should be undertaken by the DTI Secretary. Section 13 of the SMA gives five (5) specific options on the type of safeguard measures the Tariff Commission recommends to the DTI Secretary. At the same time, nothing in the SMA obliges the DTI Secretary to adopt the recommendations made by the Tariff Commission. In fact, the SMA requires that the DTI Secretary establish that the application of such safeguard measures is in the public interest, notwithstanding the Tariff Commissions recommendation on the appropriate safeguard measure upon its positive final determination. Thus, even if the Tariff Commission makes a positive final determination, the DTI Secretary may opt not to impose a general safeguard measure, or choose a different type of safeguard measure other than that recommended by the Tariff Commission. Congressman Punzalan was cited as saying that the DTI Secretary makes the decision "to impose or not to impose," which is correct since the DTI Secretary may choose not to impose a safeguard measure in spite of a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission. Congressman Punzalan also correctly stated that it is the DTI Secretary who makes the final decision "on the recommendation that is made [by the Tariff Commission]," since the DTI Secretary may choose to impose a general safeguard measure different from that recommended by the Tariff Commission or not to impose a safeguard measure at all. Nowhere in these cited deliberations was Congressman Punzalan, or any other member of Congress for that matter, quoted as saying that the DTI Secretary may ignore a negative determination by the Tariff Commission as to the existence of the conditions warranting the imposition of general safeguard measures, and thereafter proceed to impose these measures nonetheless. It is too late in the day to ascertain from the late Congressman Punzalan himself whether he had made these remarks in order to assure the other legislators that the DTI Secretary may impose the general safeguard measures notwithstanding a negative determination by the Tariff Commission. But certainly, the language of Section 5 is more resolutory to that question than the recorded remarks of Congressman Punzalan. Respondents employed considerable effort to becloud Section 5 with undeserved ambiguity in order that a proper resort to the legislative deliberations may be had. Yet assuming that Section 5 deserves to be clarified through an inquiry into the legislative record, the excerpts cited by the respondents are far more ambiguous than the language of the assailed provision regarding the key question of whether the DTI Secretary may impose safeguard measures in the face of a negative determination by the Tariff Commission. Moreover, even Southern Cross counters with its own excerpts of the legislative record in support of their own view.57 It will not be difficult, especially as to heavily-debated legislation, for two sides with contrapuntal interpretations of a statute to highlight their respective citations from the legislative debate in support of their particular views.58 A futile exercise of second-guessing is happily avoided if the meaning of

the statute is clear on its face. It is evident from the text of Section 5 that there must be a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission that a product is being imported into the country in increased quantities (whether absolute or relative to domestic production), as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat to the domestic industry. Any disputation to the contrary is, at best, the product of wishful thinking. For the same reason that Section 5 is explicit as regards the essentiality of a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission, there is no need to refer to the Implementing Rules of the SMA to ascertain a contrary intent. If there is indeed a provision in the Implementing Rules that allows the DTI Secretary to impose a general safeguard measure even without the positive final determination by the Tariff Commission, said rule is void as it cannot supplant the express language of the legislature. Respondents essentially rehash their previous arguments on this point, and there is no reason to consider them anew. The Decision made it clear that nothing in Rule 13.2 of the Implementing Rules, even though captioned "Final Determination by the Secretary," authorizes the DTI Secretary to impose a general safeguard measure in the absence of a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission.59 Similarly, the "Rules and Regulations to Govern the Conduct of Investigation by the Tariff Commission Pursuant to Republic Act No. 8800" now cited by the respondent does not contain any provision that the DTI Secretary may impose the general safeguard measures in the absence of a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission. Section 13 of the SMA further bolsters the interpretation as argued by Southern Cross and upheld by theDecision. The first paragraph thereof states that "[u]pon its positive determination, the [Tariff] Commission shall recommend to the Secretary an appropriate definitive measure", clearly referring to the Tariff Commission as the entity that makes the positive determination. On the other hand, the penultimate paragraph of the same provision states that "[i]n the event of a negative final determination", the DTI Secretary is to immediately issue through the Secretary of Finance, a written instruction to the Commissioner of Customs authorizing the return of the cash bonds previously collected as a provisional safeguard measure. Since the first paragraph of the same provision states that it is the Tariff Commission which makes the positive determination, it necessarily follows that it, and not the DTI Secretary, makes the negative final determination as referred to in the penultimate paragraph of Section 13.60 The Separate Opinion considers as highly persuasive of former Tariff Commission Chairman Abon, who stated that the Commissions findings are merely recommendatory.61 Again, the considered opinion of Chairman Abon is of no operative effect if the statute plainly states otherwise, and Section 5 bluntly does require a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission before the DTI Secretary may impose a general safeguard measure.62Certainly, the Court cannot give controlling effect to the statements of any public officer in serious denial of his duties if the law otherwise imposes the duty on the public office or officer. Nonetheless, if we are to render persuasive effect on the considered opinion of the members of the Executive Branch, it bears noting that the Secretary of the Department of Justice rendered an Opinion wherein he concluded that the DTI Secretary could not impose a general safeguard measure if the Tariff Commission made a negative final determination.63 Unlike Chairman Abons impromptu remarks made during a hearing, the DOJ Opinion was rendered only after a thorough study of the question after referral to it by the DTI. The DOJ Secretary is the alter ego of the President with a stated mandate as the head of the principal law agency of the government.64 As the DOJ Secretary has no denominated role in the SMA, he was able to render his Opinion from the vantage of judicious distance. Should not his Opinion, studied and direct to the point as it is, carry greater weight than the spontaneous remarks of the Tariff Commissions Chairman which do not even expressly disavow the binding power of the Commissions positive final determination?

III. DTI Secretary has No Power of Review Over Final Determination of the Tariff Commission We should reemphasize that it is only because of the SMA, a legislative enactment, that the executive branch has the power to impose safeguard measures. At the same time, by constitutional fiat, the exercise of such power is subjected to the limitations and restrictions similarly enforced by the SMA. In examining the relationship of the DTI and the Tariff Commission as established in the SMA, it is essential to acknowledge and consider these predicates. It is necessary to clarify the paradigm established by the SMA and affirmed by the Constitution under which the Tariff Commission and the DTI operate, especially in light of the suggestions that the Courts rulings on the functions of quasi-judicial power find application in this case. Perhaps the reflexive application of the quasi-judicial doctrine in this case, rooted as it is in jurisprudence, might allow for some convenience in ruling, yet doing so ultimately betrays ignorance of the fundamental power of Congress to reorganize the administrative structure of governance in ways it sees fit. The Separate Opinion operates from wholly different premises which are incomplete. Its main stance, similar to that of respondents, is that the DTI Secretary, acting as alter ego of the President, may modify and alter the findings of the Tariff Commission, including the latters negative final determination by substituting it with his own negative final determination to pave the way for his imposition of a safeguard measure.65 Fatally, this conclusion is arrived at without considering the fundamental constitutional precept under Section 28(2), Article VI, on the ability of Congress to impose restrictions and limitations in its delegation to the President to impose tariffs and imposts, as well as the express condition of Section 5 of the SMA requiring a positive final determination of the Tariff Commission. Absent Section 5 of the SMA, the President has no inherent, constitutional, or statutory power to impose a general safeguard measure. Tellingly, the Separate Opinion does not directly confront the inevitable question as to how the DTI Secretary may get away with imposing a general safeguard measure absent a positive final determination from the Tariff Commission without violating Section 5 of the SMA, which along with Section 13 of the same law, stands as the only direct legal authority for the DTI Secretary to impose such measures. This is a constitutionally guaranteed limitation of the highest order, considering that the presidential authority exercised under the SMA is inherently legislative. Nonetheless, the Separate Opinion brings to fore the issue of whether the DTI Secretary, acting either as alter egoof the President or in his capacity as head of an executive department, may review, modify or otherwise alter the final determination of the Tariff Commission under the SMA. The succeeding discussion shall focus on that question. Preliminarily, we should note that none of the parties question the designation of the DTI or Agriculture secretaries under the SMA as the imposing authorities of the safeguard measures, even though Section 28(2) Article VI states that it is the President to whom the power to impose tariffs and imposts may be delegated by Congress. The validity of such designation under the SMA should not be in doubt. We recognize that the authorization made by Congress in the SMA to the DTI and Agriculture Secretaries was made in contemplation of their capacities as alter egos of the President. Indeed, in Marc Donnelly & Associates v. Agregado66 the Court upheld the validity of a Cabinet resolution fixing the schedule of royalty rates on metal exports and providing for their collection even though Congress, under Commonwealth Act No. 728, had specifically empowered the President and not any other official of the executive branch, to regulate and curtail the export of metals. In so ruling,

the Court held that the members of the Cabinet were acting as alter egos of the President.67 In this case, Congress itself authorized the DTI Secretary as alter ego of the President to impose the safeguard measures. If the Court was previously willing to uphold the alter egos tariff authority despite the absence of explicit legislative grant of such authority on the alter ego, all the more reason now when Congress itself expressly authorized the alter ego to exercise these powers to impose safeguard measures. Notwithstanding, Congress in enacting the SMA and prescribing the roles to be played therein by the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary did not envision that the President, or his/her alter ego, could exercise supervisory powers over the Tariff Commission. If truly Congress intended to allow the traditional "alter ego" principle to come to fore in the peculiar setup established by the SMA, it would have assigned the role now played by the DTI Secretary under the law instead to the NEDA. The Tariff Commission is an attached agency of the National Economic Development Authority,68 which in turn is the independent planning agency of the government.69 The Tariff Commission does not fall under the administrative supervision of the DTI.70 On the other hand, the administrative relationship between the NEDA and the Tariff Commission is established not only by the Administrative Code, but similarly affirmed by the Tariff and Customs Code. Justice Florentino Feliciano, in his ponencia in Garcia v. Executive Secretary71, acknowledged the interplay between the NEDA and the Tariff Commission under the Tariff and Customs Code when he cited the relevant provisions of that law evidencing such setup. Indeed, under Section 104 of the Tariff and Customs Code, the rates of duty fixed therein are subject to periodic investigation by the Tariff Commission and may be revised by the President upon recommendation of the NEDA.72 Moreover, under Section 401 of the same law, it is upon periodic investigations by the Tariff Commission and recommendation of the NEDA that the President may cause a gradual reduction of protection levels granted under the law.73 At the same time, under the Tariff and Customs Code, no similar role or influence is allocated to the DTI in the matter of imposing tariff duties. In fact, the long-standing tradition has been for the Tariff Commission and the DTI to proceed independently in the exercise of their respective functions. Only very recently have our statutes directed any significant interplay between the Tariff Commission and the DTI, with the enactment in 1999 of Republic Act No. 8751 on the imposition of countervailing duties and Republic Act No. 8752 on the imposition of anti-dumping duties, and of course the promulgation a year later of the SMA. In all these three laws, the Tariff Commission is tasked, upon referral of the matter by the DTI, to determine whether the factual conditions exist to warrant the imposition by the DTI of a countervailing duty, an anti-dumping duty, or a general safeguard measure, respectively. In all three laws, the determination by the Tariff Commission that these required factual conditions exist is necessary before the DTI Secretary may impose the corresponding duty or safeguard measure. And in all three laws, there is no express provision authorizing the DTI Secretary to reverse the factual determination of the Tariff Commission.74 In fact, the SMA indubitably establishes that the Tariff Commission is no mere flunky of the DTI Secretary when it mandates that the positive final recommendation of the former be indispensable to the latters imposition of a general safeguard measure. What the law indicates instead is a relationship of interdependence between two bodies independent of each other under the Administrative Code and the SMA alike. Indeed, even the ability of the DTI Secretary to disregard the Tariff Commissions recommendations as to the particular safeguard measures to be imposed evinces the independence from each other of these two bodies. This is properly so for two reasons the DTI and the Tariff Commission are independent of each other under the Administrative Code; and impropriety is avoided in cases wherein the DTI itself is the one seeking the imposition of the general safeguard measures, pursuant to Section 6 of the SMA.

Thus, in ascertaining the appropriate legal milieu governing the relationship between the DTI and the Tariff Commission, it is imperative to apply foremost, if not exclusively, the provisions of the SMA. The argument that the usual rules on administrative control and supervision apply between the Tariff Commission and the DTI as regards safeguard measures is severely undercut by the plain fact that there is no long-standing tradition of administrative interplay between these two entities. Within the administrative apparatus, the Tariff Commission appears to be a lower rank relative to the DTI. But does this necessarily mean that the DTI has the intrinsic right, absent statutory authority, to reverse the findings of the Tariff Commission? To insist that it does, one would have to concede for instance that, applying the same doctrinal guide, the Secretary of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) has the right to reverse the rulings of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) or the issuances of the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA). As with the Tariff Commission-DTI, there is no statutory authority granting the DOST Secretary the right to overrule the CAB or the PCA, such right presumably arising only from the position of subordinacy of these bodies to the DOST. To insist on such a right would be to invite department secretaries to interfere in the exercise of functions by administrative agencies, even in areas wherein such secretaries are bereft of specialized competencies. The Separate Opinion notes that notwithstanding above, the Secretary of Department of Transportation and Communication may review the findings of the CAB, the Agriculture Secretary may review those of the PCA, and that the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources may pass upon decisions of the Mines and Geosciences Board.75 These three officers may be alter egos of the President, yet their authority to review is limited to those agencies or bureaus which are, pursuant to statutes such as the Administrative Code of 1987, under the administrative control and supervision of their respective departments. Thus, under the express provision of the Administrative Code expressly provides that the CAB is an attached agency of the DOTC76, and that the PCA is an attached agency of the Department of Agriculture.77 The same law establishes the Mines and Geo-Sciences Bureau as one of the Sectoral Staff Bureaus78 that forms part of the organizational structure of the DENR.79 As repeatedly stated, the Tariff Commission does not fall under the administrative control of the DTI, but under the NEDA, pursuant to the Administrative Code. The reliance made by the Separate Opinion to those three examples are thus misplaced. Nonetheless, the Separate Opinion asserts that the SMA created a functional relationship between the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary, sufficient to allow the DTI Secretary to exercise alter ego powers to reverse the determination of the Tariff Commission. Again, considering that the power to impose tariffs in the first place is not inherent in the President but arises only from congressional grant, we should affirm the congressional prerogative to impose limitations and restrictions on such powers which do not normally belong to the executive in the first place. Nowhere in the SMA does it state that the DTI Secretary may impose general safeguard measures without a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission, or that the DTI Secretary may reverse or even review the factual determination made by the Tariff Commission. Congress in enacting the SMA and prescribing the roles to be played therein by the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary did not envision that the President, or his/her alter ego could exercise supervisory powers over the Tariff Commission. If truly Congress intended to allow the traditional alter ego principle to come to fore in the peculiar setup established by the SMA, it would have assigned the role now played by the DTI Secretary under the law instead to the NEDA, the body to which the Tariff Commission is attached under the Administrative Code.

The Court has no issue with upholding administrative control and supervision exercised by the head of an executive department, but only over those subordinate offices that are attached to the department, or which are, under statute, relegated under its supervision and control. To declare that a department secretary, even if acting as alter ego of the President, may exercise such control or supervision over all executive offices below cabinet rank would lead to absurd results such as those adverted to above. As applied to this case, there is no legal justification for the DTI Secretary to exercise control, supervision, review or amendatory powers over the Tariff Commission and its positive final determination. In passing, we note that there is, admittedly, a feasible mode by which administrative review of the Tariff Commissions final determination could be had, but it is not the procedure adopted by respondents and now suggested for affirmation. This mode shall be discussed in a forthcoming section. The Separate Opinion asserts that the President, or his/her alter ego cannot be made a mere rubber stamp of the Tariff Commission since Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution denominates the Chief Executive exercises control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices.80 But let us be clear that such "executive control" is not absolute. The definition of the structure of the executive branch of government, and the corresponding degrees of administrative control and supervision, is not the exclusive preserve of the executive. It may be effectively be limited by the Constitution, by law, or by judicial decisions. The Separate Opinion cites the respected constitutional law authority Fr. Joaquin Bernas, in support of the proposition that such plenary power of executive control of the President cannot be restricted by a mere statute passed by Congress. However, the cited passage from Fr. Bernas actually states, "Since the Constitution has given the President the power of control, with all its awesome implications, it is the Constitution alone which can curtail such power."81 Does the President have such tariff powers under the Constitution in the first place which may be curtailed by the executive power of control? At the risk of redundancy, we quote Section 28(2), Article VI: "The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government." Clearly the power to impose tariffs belongs to Congress and not to the President. It is within reason to assume the framers of the Constitution deemed it too onerous to spell out all the possible limitations and restrictions on this presidential authority to impose tariffs. Hence, the Constitution especially allowed Congress itself to prescribe such limitations and restrictions itself, a prudent move considering that such authority inherently belongs to Congress and not the President. Since Congress has no power to amend the Constitution, it should be taken to mean that such limitations and restrictions should be provided "by mere statute". Then again, even the presidential authority to impose tariffs arises only "by mere statute." Indeed, this presidential privilege is both contingent in nature and legislative in origin. These characteristics, when weighed against the aspect of executive control and supervision, cannot militate against Congresss exercise of its inherent power to tax. The bare fact is that the administrative superstructure, for all its unwieldiness, is mere putty in the hands of Congress. The functions and mandates of the particular executive departments and bureaus are not created by the President, but by the legislative branch through the Administrative Code. 82 The President is the administrative head of the executive department, as such obliged to see that every government office is managed and maintained properly by the persons in charge of it in accordance with pertinent laws and regulations, and empowered to promulgate rules and issuances that would ensure a more efficient management of the executive branch, for so long as such issuances are not contrary to law.83 Yet the legislature has the concurrent power to reclassify or redefine the executive bureaucracy, including the relationship between various administrative agencies, bureaus and departments, and ultimately, even the power to abolish executive

departments and their components, hamstrung only by constitutional limitations. The DTI itself can be abolished with ease by Congress through deleting Title X, Book IV of the Administrative Code. The Tariff Commission can similarly be abolished through legislative enactment. 84 At the same time, Congress can enact additional tasks or responsibilities on either the Tariff Commission or the DTI Secretary, such as their respective roles on the imposition of general safeguard measures under the SMA. In doing so, the same Congress, which has the putative authority to abolish the Tariff Commission or the DTI, is similarly empowered to alter or expand its functions through modalities which do not align with established norms in the bureaucratic structure. The Court is bound to recognize the legislative prerogative to prescribe such modalities, no matter how atypical they may be, in affirmation of the legislative power to restructure the executive branch of government. There are further limitations on the "executive control" adverted to by the Separate Opinion. The President, in the exercise of executive control, cannot order a subordinate to disobey a final decision of this Court or any courts. If the subordinate chooses to disobey, invoking sole allegiance to the President, the judicial processes can be utilized to compel obeisance. Indeed, when public officers of the executive department take their oath of office, they swear allegiance and obedience not to the President, but to the Constitution and the laws of the land. The invocation of executive control must yield when under its subsumption includes an act that violates the law. The Separate Opinion concedes that the exercise of executive control and supervision by the President is bound by the Constitution and law.85 Still, just three sentences after asserting that the exercise of executive control must be within the bounds of the Constitution and law, the Separate Opinion asserts, "the control power of the Chief Executive emanates from the Constitution; no act of Congress may validly curtail it."86 Laws are acts of Congress, hence valid confusion arises whether the Separate Opinion truly believes the first proposition that executive control is bound by law. This is a quagmire for the Separate Opinion to resolve for itself The Separate Opinion unduly considers executive control as the ne plus ultra constitutional standard which must govern in this case. But while the President may generally have the power to control, modify or set aside the actions of a subordinate, such powers may be constricted by the Constitution, the legislature, and the judiciary. This is one of the essences of the check-and-balance system in our tri-partite constitutional democracy. Not one head of a branch of government may operate as a Caesar within his/her particular fiefdom. Assuming there is a conflict between the specific limitation in Section 28 (2), Article VI of the Constitution and the general executive power of control and supervision, the former prevails in the specific instance of safeguard measures such as tariffs and imposts, and would thus serve to qualify the general grant to the President of the power to exercise control and supervision over his/her subalterns. Thus, if the Congress enacted the law so that the DTI Secretary is "bound" by the Tariff Commission in the sense the former cannot impose general safeguard measures absent a final positive determination from the latter the Court is obliged to respect such legislative prerogative, no matter how such arrangement deviates from traditional norms as may have been enshrined in jurisprudence. The only ground under which such legislative determination as expressed in statute may be successfully challenged is if such legislation contravenes the Constitution. No such argument is posed by the respondents, who do not challenge the validity or constitutionality of the SMA.

Given these premises, it is utterly reckless to examine the interrelationship between the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary beyond the context of the SMA, applying instead traditional precepts on administrative control, review and supervision. For that reason, the Decision deemed inapplicable respondents previous citations ofCario v. Commissioner on Human Rights and Lamb v. Phipps, since the executive power adverted to in those cases had not been limited by constitutional restrictions such as those imposed under Section 28(2), Article VI.87 A similar observation can be made on the case of Sharp International Marketing v. Court of Appeals,88 now cited by Philcemcor, wherein the Court asserted that the Land Bank of the Philippines was required to exercise independent judgment and not merely rubber-stamp deeds of sale entered into by the Department of Agrarian Reform in connection with the agrarian reform program. Philcemcor attempts to demonstrate that the DTI Secretary, as with the Land Bank of the Philippines, is required to exercise independent discretion and is not expected to just merely accede to DAR-approved compensation packages. Yet again, such grant of independent discretion is expressly called for by statute, particularly Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 6657 which specifically requires the joint concurrence of "the landowner and the DAR and the [Land Bank of the Philippines]" on the amount of compensation. Such power of review by the Land Bank is a consequence of clear statutory language, as is our holding in the Decision that Section 5 explicitly requires a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission before a general safeguard measure may be imposed. Moreover, such limitations under the SMA are coated by the constitutional authority of Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Nonetheless, is this administrative setup, as envisioned by Congress and enshrined into the SMA, truly noxious to existing legal standards? The Decision acknowledged the internal logic of the statutory framework, considering that the DTI cannot exercise review powers over an agency such as the Tariff Commission which is not within its administrative jurisdiction; that the mechanism employed establishes a measure of check and balance involving two government offices with different specializations; and that safeguard measures are the exception rather than the rule, pursuant to our treaty obligations.89 We see no reason to deviate from these observations, and indeed can add similarly oriented comments. Corollary to the legislative power to decree policies through legislation is the ability of the legislature to provide for means in the statute itself to ensure that the said policy is strictly implemented by the body or office tasked so tasked with the duty. As earlier stated, our treaty obligations dissuade the State for now from implementing default protectionist trade measures such as tariffs, and allow the same only under specified conditions.90The conditions enumerated under the GATT Agreement on Safeguards for the application of safeguard measures by a member country are the same as the requisites laid down in Section 5 of the SMA.91 To insulate the factual determination from political pressure, and to assure that it be conducted by an entity especially qualified by reason of its general functions to undertake such investigation, Congress deemed it necessary to delegate to the Tariff Commission the function of ascertaining whether or not the those factual conditions exist to warrant the atypical imposition of safeguard measures. After all, the Tariff Commission retains a degree of relative independence by virtue of its attachment to the National Economic Development Authority, "an independent planning agency of the government,"92 and also owing to its vaunted expertise and specialization. The matter of imposing a safeguard measure almost always involves not just one industry, but the national interest as it encompasses other industries as well. Yet in all candor, any decision to impose a safeguard measure is susceptible to all sorts of external pressures, especially if the domestic industry concerned is well-organized. Unwarranted impositions of safeguard measures may similarly be detrimental to the national interest. Congress could not be blamed if it desired to insulate the investigatory process by assigning it to a body with a putative degree of independence and traditional expertise in ascertaining factual conditions. Affected industries would have cause to lobby

for or against the safeguard measures. The decision-maker is in the unenviable position of having to bend an ear to listen to all concerned voices, including those which may speak softly but carry a big stick. Had the law mandated that the decision be made on the sole discretion of an executive officer, such as the DTI Secretary, it would be markedly easier for safeguard measures to be imposed or withheld based solely on political considerations and not on the factual conditions that are supposed to predicate the decision. Reference of the binding positive final determination to the Tariff Commission is of course, not a failsafe means to ensure a bias-free determination. But at least the legislated involvement of the Commission in the process assures some measure of measure of check and balance involving two different governmental agencies with disparate specializations. There is no legal or constitutional demand for such a setup, but its wisdom as policy should be acknowledged. As prescribed by Congress, both the Tariff Commission and the DTI Secretary operate within limited frameworks, under which nobody acquires an undue advantage over the other. We recognize that Congress deemed it necessary to insulate the process in requiring that the factual determination to be made by an ostensibly independent body of specialized competence, the Tariff Commission. This prescribed framework, constitutionally sanctioned, is intended to prevent the baseless, whimsical, or consideration-induced imposition of safeguard measures. It removes from the DTI Secretary jurisdiction over a matter beyond his putative specialized aptitude, the compilation and analysis of picayune facts and determination of their limited causal relations, and instead vests in the Secretary the broad choice on a matter within his unquestionable competence, the selection of what particular safeguard measure would assist the duly beleaguered local industry yet at the same time conform to national trade policy. Indeed, the SMA recognizes, and places primary importance on the DTI Secretarys mandate to formulate trade policy, in his capacity as the Presidents alter ego on trade, industry and investment-related matters. At the same time, the statutory limitations on this authorized power of the DTI Secretary must prevail since the Constitution itself demands the enforceability of those limitations and restrictions as imposed by Congress. Policy wisdom will not save a law from infirmity if the statutory provisions violate the Constitution. But since the Constitution itself provides that the President shall be constrained by the limits and restrictions imposed by Congress and since these limits and restrictions are so clear and categorical, then the Court has no choice but to uphold the reins. Even assuming that this prescribed setup made little sense, or seemed "uncommonly silly,"93 the Court is bound by propriety not to dispute the wisdom of the legislature as long as its acts do not violate the Constitution. Since there is no convincing demonstration that the SMA contravenes the Constitution, the Court is wont to respect the administrative regimen propounded by the law, even if it allots the Tariff Commission a higher degree of puissance than normally expected. It is for this reason that the traditional conceptions of administrative review or quasi-judicial power cannot control in this case. Indeed, to apply the latter concept would cause the Court to fall into a linguistic trap owing to the multi-faceted denotations the term "quasi-judicial" has come to acquire. Under the SMA, the Tariff Commission undertakes formal hearings,94 receives and evaluates testimony and evidence by interested parties,95 and renders a decision is rendered on the basis of the evidence presented, in the form of the final determination. The final determination requires a conclusion whether the importation of the product under consideration is causing serious injury or threat to a domestic industry producing like products or directly competitive products, while evaluating all relevant factors having a bearing on the situation of the domestic industry.96 This process aligns conformably with definition provided by Blacks Law Dictionary of "quasi-judicial" as

the "action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."97 However, the Tariff Commission is not empowered to hear actual cases or controversies lodged directly before it by private parties. It does not have the power to issue writs of injunction or enforcement of its determination. These considerations militate against a finding of quasi-judicial powers attributable to the Tariff Commission, considering the pronouncement that "quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a determination of rights privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation."98 Indeed, a declaration that the Tariff Commission possesses quasi-judicial powers, even if ascertained for the limited purpose of exercising its functions under the SMA, may have the unfortunate effect of expanding the Commissions powers beyond that contemplated by law. After all, the Tariff Commission is by convention, a fact-finding body, and its role under the SMA, burdened as it is with factual determination, is but a mere continuance of this tradition. However, Congress through the SMA offers a significant deviation from this traditional role by tying the decision by the DTI Secretary to impose a safeguard measure to the required positive factual determination by the Tariff Commission. Congress is not bound by past traditions, or even by the jurisprudence of this Court, in enacting legislation it may deem as suited for the times. The sole benchmark for judicial substitution of congressional wisdom is constitutional transgression, a standard which the respondents do not even attempt to match. Respondents Suggested Interpretation Of the SMA Transgresses Fair Play Respondents have belabored the argument that the Decisions interpretation of the SMA, particularly of the role of the Tariff Commission vis--vis the DTI Secretary, is noxious to traditional notions of administrative control and supervision. But in doing so, they have failed to acknowledge the congressional prerogative to redefine administrative relationships, a license which falls within the plenary province of Congress under our representative system of democracy. Moreover, respondents own suggested interpretation falls wayward of expectations of practical fair play. Adopting respondents suggestion that the DTI Secretary may disregard the factual findings of the Tariff Commission and investigatory process that preceded it, it would seem that the elaborate procedure undertaken by the Commission under the SMA, with all the attendant guarantees of due process, is but an inutile spectacle. As Justice Garcia noted during the oral arguments, why would the DTI Secretary bother with the Tariff Commission and instead conduct the investigation himself.99 Certainly, nothing in the SMA authorizes the DTI Secretary, after making the preliminary determination, to personally oversee the investigation, hear out the interested parties, or receive evidence.100 In fact, the SMA does not even require the Tariff Commission, which is tasked with the custody of the submitted evidence,101 to turn over to the DTI Secretary such evidence it had evaluated in order to make its factual determination.102Clearly, as Congress tasked it to be, it is the Tariff Commission and not the DTI Secretary which acquires the necessary intimate acquaintance with the factual conditions and evidence necessary for the imposition of the general safeguard measure. Why then favor an interpretation of the SMA that leaves the findings of the Tariff Commission bereft of operative effect and makes them subservient to the wishes of the DTI Secretary, a personage with lesser working familiarity with the relevant factual milieu? In fact, the bare theory of the respondents would effectively allow the DTI Secretary to adopt, under the subterfuge of his "discretion", the factual determination of a private investigative group hired by the

industry concerned, and reject the investigative findings of the Tariff Commission as mandated by the SMA. It would be highly irregular to substitute what the law clearly provides for a dubious setup of no statutory basis that would be readily susceptible to rank chicanery. Moreover, the SMA guarantees the right of all concerned parties to be heard, an elemental requirement of due process, by the Tariff Commission in the context of its investigation. The DTI Secretary is not similarly empowered or tasked to hear out the concerns of other interested parties, and if he/she does so, it arises purely out of volition and not compulsion under law. Indeed, in this case, it is essential that the position of other than that of the local cement industry should be given due consideration, cement being an indispensable need for the operation of other industries such as housing and construction. While the general safeguard measures may operate to the better interests of the domestic cement industries, its deprivation of cheaper cement imports may similarly work to the detriment of these other domestic industries and correspondingly, the national interest. Notably, the Tariff Commission in this case heard the views on the application of representatives of other allied industries such as the housing, construction, and cement-bag industries, and other interested parties such as consumer groups and foreign governments.103 It is only before the Tariff Commission that their views had been heard, and this is because it is only the Tariff Commission which is empowered to hear their positions. Since due process requires a judicious consideration of all relevant factors, the Tariff Commission, which is in a better position to hear these parties than the DTI Secretary, is similarly more capable to render a determination conformably with the due process requirements than the DTI Secretary. In a similar vein, Southern Cross aptly notes that in instances when it is the DTI Secretary who initiates motu proprio the application for the safeguard measure pursuant to Section 6 of the SMA, respondents suggested interpretation would result in the awkward situation wherein the DTI Secretary would rule upon his own application after it had been evaluated by the Tariff Commission. Pertinently cited is our ruling in Corona v. Court of Appeals104 that "no man can be at once a litigant and judge."105 Certainly, this anomalous situation is avoided if it is the Tariff Commission which is tasked with arriving at the final determination whether the conditions exist to warrant the general safeguard measures. This is the setup provided for by the express provisions of the SMA, and the problem would arise only if we adopt the interpretation urged upon by respondents. The Possibility for Administrative Review Of the Tariff Commissions Determination The Court has been emphatic that a positive final determination from the Tariff Commission is required in order that the DTI Secretary may impose a general safeguard measure, and that the DTI Secretary has no power to exercise control and supervision over the Tariff Commission and its final determination. These conclusions are the necessary consequences of the applicable provisions of the Constitution, the SMA, and laws such as the Administrative Code. However, the law is silent though on whether this positive final determination may otherwise be subjected to administrative review. There is no evident legislative intent by the authors of the SMA to provide for a procedure of administrative review. If ever there is a procedure for administrative review over the final determination of the Tariff Commission, such procedure must be done in a manner that does not contravene or disregard legislative prerogatives as expressed in the SMA or the Administrative Code, or fundamental constitutional limitations.

In order that such procedure of administrative review would not contravene the law and the constitutional scheme provided by Section 28(2), Article VI, it is essential to assert that the positive final determination by the Tariff Commission is indispensable as a requisite for the imposition of a general safeguard measure. The submissions of private respondents and the Separate Opinion cannot be sustained insofar as they hold that the DTI Secretary can peremptorily ignore or disregard the determinations made by the Tariff Commission. However, if the mode of administrative review were in such a manner that the administrative superior of the Tariff Commission were to modify or alter its determination, then such "reversal" may still be valid within the confines of Section 5 of the SMA, for technically it is still the Tariff Commissions determination, administratively revised as it may be, that would serve as the basis for the DTI Secretarys action. However, and fatally for the present petitions, such administrative review cannot be conducted by the DTI Secretary. Even if conceding that the Tariff Commissions findings may be administratively reviewed, the DTI Secretary has no authority to review or modify the same. We have been emphatic on the reasons such as that there is no traditional or statutory basis placing the Commission under the control and supervision of the DTI; that to allow such would contravene due process, especially if the DTI itself were to apply for the safeguard measuresmotu proprio. To hold otherwise would destroy the administrative hierarchy, contravene constitutional due process, and disregard the limitations or restrictions provided in the SMA. Instead, assuming administrative review were available, it is the NEDA that may conduct such review following the principles of administrative law, and the NEDAs decision in turn is reviewable by the Office of the President. The decision of the Office of the President then effectively substitutes as the determination of the Tariff Commission, which now forms the basis of the DTI Secretarys decision, which now would be ripe for judicial review by the CTA under Section 29 of the SMA. This is the only way that administrative review of the Tariff Commissions determination may be sustained without violating the SMA and its constitutional restrictions and limitations, as well as administrative law. In bare theory, the NEDA may review, alter or modify the Tariff Commissions final determination, the Commission being an attached agency of the NEDA. Admittedly, there is nothing in the SMA or any other statute that would prevent the NEDA to exercise such administrative review, and successively, for the President to exercise in turn review over the NEDAs decision. Nonetheless, in acknowledging this possibility, the Court, without denigrating the bare principle that administrative officers may exercise control and supervision over the acts of the bodies under its jurisdiction, realizes that this comes at the expense of a speedy resolution to an application for a safeguard measure, an application dependent on fluctuating factual conditions. The further delay would foster uncertainty and insecurity within the industry concerned, as well as with all other allied industries, which in turn may lead to some measure of economic damage. Delay is certain, since judicial review authorized by law and not administrative review would have the final say. The fact that the SMA did not expressly prohibit administrative review of the final determination of the Tariff Commission does not negate the supreme advantages of engendering exclusive judicial review over questions arising from the imposition of a general safeguard measure. In any event, even if we conceded the possibility of administrative review of the Tariff Commissions final determination by the NEDA, such would not deny merit to the present petition. It does not change the fact that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the DTI Secretary was not bound by the negative final determination of the Tariff Commission, or that the DTI Secretary acted without jurisdiction when he imposed general safeguard measures despite the absence of the statutory positive final determination of the Commission.

IV. Courts Interpretation of SMA In Harmony with Other Constitutional Provisions In response to our citation of Section 28(2), Article VI, respondents elevate two arguments grounded in constitutional law. One is based on another constitutional provision, Section 12, Article XIII, which mandates that "[t]he State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods and adopt measures that help make them competitive." By no means does this provision dictate that the Court favor the domestic industry in all competing claims that it may bring before this Court. If it were so, judicial proceedings in this country would be rendered a mockery, resolved as they would be, on the basis of the personalities of the litigants and not their legal positions. Moreover, the duty imposed on by Section 12, Article XIII falls primarily with Congress, which in that regard enacted the SMA, a law designed to protect domestic industries from the possible ill-effects of our accession to the global trade order. Inconveniently perhaps for respondents, the SMA also happens to provide for a procedure under which such protective measures may be enacted. The Court cannot just impose what it deems as the spirit of the law without giving due regard to its letter. In like-minded manner, the Separate Opinion loosely states that the purpose of the SMA is to protect or safeguard local industries from increased importation of foreign products.106 This inaccurately leaves the impression that the SMA ipso facto unravels a protective cloak that shelters all local industries and producers, no matter the conditions. Indeed, our country has knowingly chosen to accede to the world trade regime, as expressed in the GATT and WTO Agreements, despite the understanding that local industries might suffer ill-effects, especially with the easier entry of competing foreign products. At the same time, these international agreements were designed to constrict protectionist trade policies by its member-countries. Hence, the median, as expressed by the SMA, does allow for the application of protectionist measures such as tariffs, but only after an elaborate process of investigation that ensures factual basis and indispensable need for such measures. More accurately, the purpose of the SMA is to provide a process for the protection or safeguarding of domestic industries that have duly established that there is substantial injury or threat thereof directly caused by the increased imports. In short, domestic industries are not entitled to safeguard measures as a matter of right or influence. Respondents also make the astounding argument that the imposition of general safeguard measures should not be seen as a taxation measure, but instead as an exercise of police power. The vain hope of respondents in divorcing the safeguard measures from the concept of taxation is to exclude from consideration Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution. This argument can be debunked at length, but it deserves little attention. The motivation behind many taxation measures is the implementation of police power goals. Progressive income taxes alleviate the margin between rich and poor; the so-called "sin taxes" on alcohol and tobacco manufacturers help dissuade the consumers from excessive intake of these potentially harmful products. Taxation is distinguishable from police power as to the means employed to implement these public good goals. Those doctrines that are unique to taxation arose from peculiar considerations such as those especially punitive effects of taxation,107 and the belief that taxes are the lifeblood of the state.108 These considerations necessitated the evolution of taxation as a distinct legal concept from police power. Yet at the same time, it has been recognized that taxation may be made the implement of the states police power.109

Even assuming that the SMA should be construed exclusively as a police power measure, the Court recognizes that police power is lodged primarily in the national legislature, though it may also be exercised by the executive branch by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power.110 Considering these premises, it is clear that police power, however "illimitable" in theory, is still exercised within the confines of implementing legislation. To declare otherwise is to sanction rule by whim instead of rule of law. The Congress, in enacting the SMA, has delegated the power to impose general safeguard measures to the executive branch, but at the same time subjected such imposition to limitations, such as the requirement of a positive final determination by the Tariff Commission under Section 5. For the executive branch to ignore these boundaries imposed by Congress is to set up an ignoble clash between the two co-equal branches of government. Considering that the exercise of police power emanates from legislative authority, there is little question that the prerogative of the legislative branch shall prevail in such a clash. V. Assailed Decision Consistent With Ruling in Taada v. Angara Public respondents allege that the Decision is contrary to our holding in Taada v. Angara,111 since the Court noted therein that the GATT itself provides built-in protection from unfair foreign competition and trade practices, which according to the public respondents, was a reason "why the Honorable [Court] ruled the way it did." On the other hand, the Decision "eliminates safeguard measures as a mode of defense." This is balderdash, as with any and all claims that the Decision allows foreign industries to ride roughshod over our domestic enterprises. The Decision does not prohibit the imposition of general safeguard measures to protect domestic industries in need of protection. All it affirms is that the positive final determination of the Tariff Commission is first required before the general safeguard measures are imposed and implemented, a neutral proposition that gives no regard to the nationalities of the parties involved. A positive determination by the Tariff Commission is hardly the elusive Shangri-la of administrative law. If a particular industry finds it difficult to obtain a positive final determination from the Tariff Commission, it may be simply because the industry is still sufficiently competitive even in the face of foreign competition. These safeguard measures are designed to ensure salvation, not avarice. Respondents well have the right to drape themselves in the colors of the flag. Yet these postures hardly advance legal claims, or nationalism for that matter. The fineries of the costume pageant are no better measure of patriotism than simple obedience to the laws of the Fatherland. And even assuming that respondents are motivated by genuine patriotic impulses, it must be remembered that under the setup provided by the SMA, it is the facts, and not impulse, that determine whether the protective safeguard measures should be imposed. As once orated, facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passions, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence.112 It is our goal as judges to enforce the law, and not what we might deem as correct economic policy. Towards this end, we should not construe the SMA to unduly favor or disfavor domestic industries, simply because the law itself provides for a mechanism by virtue of which the claims of these industries are thoroughly evaluated before they are favored or disfavored. What we must do is to simply uphold what the law says. Section 5 says that the DTI Secretary shall impose the general safeguard measures upon the positive final determination of the Tariff Commission. Nothing in the whereas clauses or the invisible ink provisions of the SMA can magically delete the words "positive final determination" and "Tariff Commission" from Section 5.

VI. On Forum-Shopping We remain convinced that there was no willful and deliberate forum-shopping in this case by Southern Cross. The causes of action that animate this present petition for review and the petition for review with the CTA are distinct from each other, even though they relate to similar factual antecedents. Yet it also appears that contrary to the undertaking signed by the President of Southern Cross, Hironobu Ryu, to inform this Court of any similar action or proceeding pending before any court, tribunal or agency within five (5) days from knowledge thereof, Southern Cross informed this Court only on 12 August 2003 of the petition it had filed with the CTA eleven days earlier. An appropriate sanction is warranted for such failure, but not the dismissal of the petition. VII. Effects of Courts Resolution Philcemcor argues that the granting of Southern Crosss Petition should not necessarily lead to the voiding of theDecision of the DTI Secretary dated 5 August 2003 imposing the general safeguard measures. For Philcemcor, the availability of appeal to the CTA as an available and adequate remedy would have made the Court of AppealsDecision merely erroneous or irregular, but not void. Moreover, the said Decision merely required the DTI Secretary to render a decision, which could have very well been a decision not to impose a safeguard measure; thus, it could not be said that the annulled decision resulted from the judgment of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals Decision was annulled precisely because the appellate court did not have the power to rule on the petition in the first place. Jurisdiction is necessarily the power to decide a case, and a court which does not have the power to adjudicate a case is one that is bereft of jurisdiction. We find no reason to disturb our earlier finding that the Court of Appeals Decision is null and void. At the same time, the Court in its Decision paid particular heed to the peculiarities attaching to the 5 August 2003Decision of the DTI Secretary. In the DTI Secretarys Decision, he expressly stated that as a result of the Court of Appeals Decision, "there is no legal impediment for the Secretary to decide on the application." Yet the truth remained that there was a legal impediment, namely, that the decision of the appellate court was not yet final and executory. Moreover, it was declared null and void, and since the DTI Secretary expressly denominated the Court of Appeals Decision as his basis for deciding to impose the safeguard measures, the latter decision must be voided as well. Otherwise put, without the Court of Appeals Decision, the DTI Secretarys Decision of 5 August 2003 would not have been rendered as well. Accordingly, the Court reaffirms as a nullity the DTI Secretarys Decision dated 5 August 2003. As a necessary consequence, no further action can be taken on Philcemcors Petition for Extension of the Safeguard Measure. Obviously, if the imposition of the general safeguard measure is void as we declared it to be, any extension thereof should likewise be fruitless. The proper remedy instead is to file a new application for the imposition of safeguard measures, subject to the conditions prescribed by the SMA. Should this step be eventually availed of, it is only hoped that the parties involved would content themselves in observing the proper procedure, instead of making a mockery of the rule of law. WHEREFORE, respondents Motions for Reconsideration are DENIED WITH FINALITY. Respondent DTI Secretary is hereby ENJOINED from taking any further action on the pending Petition for Extension of the Safeguard Measure. Hironobu Ryu, President of petitioner Southern Cross Cement Corporation, and Angara Abello Concepcion Regala & Cruz, counsel petitioner, are hereby given FIVE (5) days from receipt of

this Resolution to EXPLAIN why they should not be meted disciplinary sanction for failing to timely inform the Court of the filing of Southern CrosssPetition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals, as adverted to earlier in this Resolution. SO ORDERED.
Camid vs Office of the President

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. 161414 January 17, 2005
SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID, petitioner, vs. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO, DEPARTMENT of FINANCE, DEPARTMENT of BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and the CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES (HOUSE of REPRESENTATIVES AND SENATE), respondents. DECISION TINGA, J.: This Petition for Certiorari presents this Court with the prospect of our own Brigadoon1 the municipality of Andong, Lanao del Surwhich like its counterpart in filmdom, is a town that is not supposed to exist yet is anyway insisted by some as actually alive and thriving. Yet unlike in the movies, there is nothing mystical, ghostly or anything even remotely charming about the purported existence of Andong. The creation of the putative municipality was declared void ab initio by this Court four decades ago, but the present petition insists that in spite of this insurmountable obstacle Andong thrives on, and hence, its legal personality should be given judicial affirmation. We disagree. The factual antecedents derive from the promulgation of our ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General2 in 1965. As discussed therein, then President Diosdado Macapagal issued several Executive Orders3 creating thirty-three (33) municipalities in Mindanao. Among them was Andong in Lanao del Sur which was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 107.4 These executive orders were issued after legislative bills for the creation of municipalities involved in that case had failed to pass Congress.5 President Diosdado Macapagal justified the creation of these municipalities citing his powers under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Then VicePresident Emmanuel Pelaez filed a special civil action for a writ of prohibition, alleging in main that the Executive Orders were null and void, Section 68 having been repealed by Republic Act No. 2370,6 and said orders constituting an undue delegation of legislative power.7 After due deliberation, the Court unanimously held that the challenged Executive Orders were null and void. A majority of five justices, led by the ponente, Justice (later Chief Justice) Roberto Concepcion, ruled that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the executive branch,8 while three justices opined that the nullity of the issuances was the consequence of the enactment of the 1935 Constitution, which reduced the power of the Chief Executive over local governments.9 Pelaez was disposed in this wise: WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to. It is so ordered.10

Among the Executive Orders annulled was Executive Order No. 107 which created the Municipality of Andong. Nevertheless, the core issue presented in the present petition is the continued efficacy of the judicial annulment of the Municipality of Andong. Petitioner Sultan Osop B. Camid (Camid) represents himself as a current resident of Andong,11 suing as a private citizen and taxpayer whose locus standi "is of public and paramount interest especially to the people of the Municipality of Andong, Province of Lanao del Sur."12 He alleges that Andong "has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and its constituents,"13 even though he concedes that since 1968, no person has been appointed, elected or qualified to serve any of the elective local government positions of Andong.14 Nonetheless, the municipality of Andong has its own high school, Bureau of Posts, a Department of Education, Culture and Sports office, and at least seventeen (17) "barangay units" with their own respective chairmen.15 From 1964 until 1972, according to Camid, the public officials of Andong "have been serving their constituents through the minimal means and resources with least (sic) honorarium and recognition from the Office of the then former President Diosdado Macapagal." Since the time of Martial Law in 1972, Andong has allegedly been getting by despite the absence of public funds, with the "Interim Officials" serving their constituents "in their own little ways and means."16 In support of his claim that Andong remains in existence, Camid presents to this Court a Certification issued by the Office of the Community Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) certifying the total land area of the Municipality of Andong, "created under Executive Order No. 107 issued [last] October 1, 1964."17 He also submits a Certification issued by the Provincial Statistics Office of Marawi City concerning the population of Andong, which is pegged at fourteen thousand fifty nine (14,059) strong. Camid also enumerates a list of governmental agencies and private groups that allegedly recognize Andong, and notes that other municipalities have recommended to the Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly for the immediate implementation of the revival or re-establishment of Andong.18 The petition assails a Certification dated 21 November 2003, issued by the Bureau of Local Government Supervision of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG).19 The Certification enumerates eighteen (18) municipalities certified as "existing," per DILG records. Notably, these eighteen (18) municipalities are among the thirty-three (33), along with Andong, whose creations were voided by this Court in Pelaez. These municipalities are Midaslip, Pitogo, Naga, and Bayog in Zamboanga del Sur; Siayan and Pres. Manuel A. Roxas in Zamboanga del Norte; Magsaysay, Sta. Maria and New Corella in Davao; Badiangan and Mina in Iloilo; Maguing in Lanao del Sur; Gloria in Oriental Mindoro; Maasim in Sarangani; Kalilangan and Lantapan in Bukidnon; and Maco in Compostela Valley.20 Camid imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DILG "in not classifying [Andong] as a regular existing municipality and in not including said municipality in its records and official database as [an] existing regular municipality."21 He characterizes such non-classification as unequal treatment to the detriment of Andong, especially in light of the current recognition given to the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly annulled by reason ofPelaez. As appropriate relief, Camid prays that the Court annul the DILG Certification dated 21 November 2003; direct the DILG to classify Andong as a "regular existing municipality;" all public respondents, to extend full recognition and support to Andong; the Department of Finance and the Department of Budget and Management, to immediately release the internal revenue allotments of Andong; and the public respondents, particularly the DILG, to recognize the "Interim Local Officials" of Andong.22

Moreover, Camid insists on the continuing validity of Executive Order No. 107. He argues that Pelaez has already been modified by supervening events consisting of subsequent laws and jurisprudence. Particularly cited is ourDecision in Municipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez,23 wherein the Court affirmed the unique status of the municipality of San Andres in Quezon as a "de facto municipal corporation."24 Similar to Andong, the municipality of San Andres was created by way of executive order, precisely the manner which the Court in Pelaez had declared as unconstitutional. Moreover, San Narciso cited, as Camid does, Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 as basis for the current recognition of the impugned municipality. The provision reads: Section 442. Requisites for Creation. - xxx (d) Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.25 There are several reasons why the petition must be dismissed. These can be better discerned upon examination of the proper scope and application of Section 442(d), which does not sanction the recognition of just any municipality. This point shall be further explained further on. Notably, as pointed out by the public respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), the case is not a fit subject for the special civil actions of certiorari and mandamus, as it pertains to the de novo appreciation of factual questions. There is indeed no way to confirm several of Camids astonishing factual allegations pertaining to the purported continuing operation of Andong in the decades since it was annulled by this Court. No trial court has had the opportunity to ascertain the validity of these factual claims, the appreciation of which is beyond the function of this Court since it is not a trier of facts. The importance of proper factual ascertainment cannot be gainsaid, especially in light of the legal principles governing the recognition of de facto municipal corporations. It has been opined that municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the community has claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title by prescription.26 These municipal corporations have exercised their powers for a long period without objection on the part of the government that although no charter is in existence, it is presumed that they were duly incorporated in the first place and that their charters had been lost.27 They are especially common in England, which, as well-worth noting, has existed as a state for over a thousand years. The reason for the development of that rule in England is understandable, since that country was settled long before the Roman conquest by nomadic Celtic tribes, which could have hardly been expected to obtain a municipal charter in the absence of a national legal authority. In the United States, municipal corporations by prescription are less common, but it has been held that when no charter or act of incorporation of a town can be found, it may be shown to have claimed and exercised the powers of a town with the knowledge and assent of the legislature, and without objection or interruption for so long a period as to furnish evidence of a prescriptive right.28 What is clearly essential is a factual demonstration of the continuous exercise by the municipal corporation of its corporate powers, as well as the acquiescence thereto by the other instrumentalities of the state. Camid does not have the opportunity to make an initial factual demonstration of those circumstances before this Court. Indeed, the factual deficiencies aside, Camids plaint should have undergone the usual administrative gauntlet and, once that was done,

should have been filed first with the Court of Appeals, which at least would have had the power to make the necessary factual determinations. Camids seeming ignorance of the principles of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, as well as the concomitant prematurity of the present petition, cannot be countenanced. It is also difficult to capture the sense and viability of Camids present action. The assailed issuance is theCertification issued by the DILG. But such Certification does not pretend to bear the authority to create or revalidate a municipality. Certainly, the annulment of the Certification will really do nothing to serve Camids ultimate cause- the recognition of Andong. Neither does the Certification even expressly refute the claim that Andong still exists, as there is nothing in the document that comments on the present status of Andong. Perhaps the Certification is assailed before this Court if only to present an actual issuance, rather than a long-standing habit or pattern of action that can be annulled through the special civil action of certiorari. Still, the relation of theCertification to Camids central argument is forlornly strained. These disquisitions aside, the central issue remains whether a municipality whose creation by executive fiat was previously voided by this Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or reimplementing statute. Apparently, the question has never been decided before, San Narciso and its kindred cases pertaining as they did to municipalities whose bases of creation were dubious yet were never judicially nullified. The effect of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code on municipalities such as Andong warrants explanation. Besides, the residents of Andong who belabor under the impression that their town still exists, much less those who may comport themselves as the municipalitys "Interim Government," would be well served by a rude awakening. The Court can employ a simplistic approach in resolving the substantive aspect of the petition, merely by pointing out that the Municipality of Andong never existed.29 Executive Order No. 107, which established Andong, was declared "null and void ab initio" in 1965 by this Court in Pelaez, along with thirty-three (33) other executive orders. The phrase "ab initio" means "from the beginning,"30 "at first,"31 "from the inception."32 Pelaez was never reversed by this Court but rather it was expressly affirmed in the cases of Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva,33Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,34 and Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya.35 No subsequent ruling by this Court declared Pelaez as overturned or inoperative. No subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965 creating a Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not exist as a duly constituted municipality. This ratiocination does not admit to patent legal errors and has the additional virtue of blessed austerity. Still, its sweeping adoption may not be advisedly appropriate in light of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code and our ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, both of which admit to the possibility of de facto municipal corporations. To understand the applicability of Municipality of San Narciso and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code to the situation of Andong, it is necessary again to consider the ramifications of our decision in Pelaez. The eminent legal doctrine enunciated in Pelaez was that the President was then, and still is, not empowered to create municipalities through executive issuances. The Court therein recognized "that the President has, for many years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations, and that the same have been organized and in actual operation . . . ."36 However, the Court ultimately nullified only those thirty-three (33) municipalities, including Andong, created during the period from 4 September to 29 October 1964 whose existence petitioner Vice-President Pelaez had specifically assailed before this Court. No pronouncement was made as to the other municipalities which had been previously created by the President in the exercise of power the Court deemed unlawful.

Two years after Pelaez was decided, the issue again came to fore in Municipality of San Joaquin v. Siva.37 The Municipality of Lawigan was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 436 in 1961. Lawigan was not one of the municipalities ordered annulled in Pelaez. A petition for prohibition was filed contesting the legality of the executive order, again on the ground that Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code was unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the petition, but the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and entered a new decision declaring Executive Order No. 436 void ab initio. The Court reasoned without elaboration that the issue had already been squarely taken up and settled in Pelaez which agreed with the argument posed by the challengers to Lawigans validity.38 In the 1969 case of Municipality of Malabang v. Benito,39 what was challenged is the validity of the constitution of the Municipality of Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, also created by an executive order,40 and which, similar to Lawigan, was not one of the municipalities annulled in Pelaez. This time, the officials of Balabagan invoked de facto status as a municipal corporation in order to dissuade the Court from nullifying action. They alleged that its status as a de facto corporation cannot be collaterally attacked but should be inquired into directly in an action forquo warranto at the instance of the State, and not by a private individual as it was in that case. In response, the Court conceded that an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto, but only if the municipal corporation is a de facto corporation.41 Ultimately, the Court refused to acknowledge Balabagan as a de facto corporation, even though it had been organized prior to the Courts decision in Pelaez. The Court declared void the executive order creating Balabagan and restrained its municipal officials from performing their official duties and functions.42 It cited conflicting American authorities on whether a de facto corporation can exist where the statute or charter creating it is unconstitutional.43 But the Courts final conclusion was unequivocal that Balabagan was not a de factocorporation.
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In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation.44 The Court did clarify in Malabang that the previous acts done by the municipality in the exercise of its corporate powers were not necessarily a nullity.45 Camid devotes several pages of his petition in citing this point,46 yet the relevance of the citation is unclear considering that Camid does not assert the validity of any corporate act of Andong prior to its judicial dissolution. Notwithstanding, the Court in Malabang retained an emphatic attitude as to the unconstitutionality of the power of the President to create municipal corporations by way of presidential promulgations, as authorized under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. This principle was most recently affirmed in 1988, in Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya.47 The municipality of Santo Tomas, created by President Carlos P. Garcia, filed a complaint against another municipality, who challenged Santo Tomass legal personality to institute suit. Again, Santo Tomas had not been expressly nullified by prior judicial action, yet the Court refused to recognize its legal existence. The blunt but simple ruling: "Now then, as ruled in the Pelaez case supra, the President has no power to create a municipality. Since [Santo Tomas] has no legal personality, it can not be a party to any civil action."48

Nevertheless, when the Court decided Municipality of San Narciso49 in 1995, it indicated a shift in the jurisprudential treatment of municipalities created through presidential issuances. The questioned municipality of San Andres, Quezon was created on 20 August 1959 by Executive Order No. 353 issued by President Carlos P. Garcia. Executive Order No. 353 was not one of the thirty-three issuances annulled by Pelaez in 1965. The legal status of the Municipality of San Andres was first challenged only in 1989, through a petition for quo warranto filed with the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, which did cite Pelaez as authority.50 The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of cause of action, and the petitioners therein elevated the matter to this Court. In dismissing the petition, the Court delved in the merits of the petition, if only to resolve further doubt on the legal status of San Andres. It noted a circumstance which is not present in the case at barthat San Andres was in existence for nearly thirty (30) years before its legality was challenged. The Court did not declare the executive order creating San Andres null and void. Still, acting on the premise that the said executive order was a complete nullity, the Court noted "peculiar circumstances" that led to the conclusion that San Andres had attained the unique status of a "de facto municipal corporation."51 It noted that Pelaez limited its nullificatory effect only to those executive orders specifically challenged therein, despite the fact that the Court then could have very well extended the decision to invalidate San Andres as well.52 This statement squarely contradicts Camids reading ofSan Narciso that the creation of San Andres, just like Andong, had been declared a complete nullity on the same ground of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power found in Pelaez.53 The Court also considered the applicability of Section 442(d)54 of the Local Government Code of 1991. It clarified the implication of the provision as follows: Equally significant is Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code to the effect that municipal districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code is preferred. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even if made, would succeed. The power to create political subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that when it has incorporated Section 442(d) in the Code. Curative laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving "validity to acts done that would have been invalid under existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. (Emphasis supplied)55 The holding in San Narciso was subsequently affirmed in Municipality of Candijay v. Court of Appeals56 and Municipality of Jimenez v. Baz57 In Candijay, the juridical personality of the Municipality of Alicia, created in a 1949 executive order, was attacked only beginning in 1984. Pelaez was again invoked in support of the challenge, but the Court refused to invalidate the municipality, citing San Narciso at length. The Court noted that the situation of the Municipality of Alicia was strikingly similar to that in San Narciso; hence, the town should likewise "benefit from the effects of Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code, and should [be] considered as a regular, de juremunicipality." 58 The valid existence of Municipality of Sinacaban, created in a 1949 executive order, was among the issues raised in Jimenez. The Court, through Justice Mendoza, provided an expert summation of the evolution of the rule. The principal basis for the view that Sinacaban was not validly created as a municipal corporation is the ruling inPelaez v. Auditor General that the creation of municipal corporations is essentially a

legislative matter and therefore the President was without power to create by executive order the Municipality of Sinacaban. The ruling in this case has been reiterated in a number of cases later decided. However, we have since held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., this Court considered the following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160), 442(d) of which provides that "municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities." Here, the same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially. Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O. No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that apparently is desired for its revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66, 16 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within five (5) years from the time the act complained of was done or committed. On the contrary, the State and even the Municipality of Jimenez itself have recognized Sinacaban's corporate existence. Under Administrative Order No. 33 dated June 13, 1978 of this Court, as reiterated by 31 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B. P. Blg. 129), Sinacaban is constituted part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950 by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common boundary. The agreement was embodied in Resolution No. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental. Indeed Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which considered Sinacaban part of the Second District of Misamis Occidental. Moreover, following the ruling in Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., 442(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991 must be deemed to have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban.59
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From this survey of relevant jurisprudence, we can gather the applicable rules. Pelaez and its offspring cases ruled that the President has no power to create municipalities, yet limited its nullificatory effects to the particular municipalities challenged in actual cases before this Court. However, with the promulgation of the Local Government Code in 1991, the legal cloud was lifted over the municipalities similarly created by executive order but not judicially annulled. The de facto status of such municipalities as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban was recognized by this Court, and Section 442(b) of the Local Government Code deemed curative whatever legal defects to title these municipalities had labored under. Is Andong similarly entitled to recognition as a de facto municipal corporation? It is not. There are eminent differences between Andong and municipalities such as San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban.

Most prominent is the fact that the executive order creating Andong was expressly annulled by order of this Court in 1965. If we were to affirm Andongs de facto status by reason of its alleged continued existence despite its nullification, we would in effect be condoning defiance of a valid order of this Court. Court decisions cannot obviously lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the parties aggrieved.
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It bears noting that based on Camids own admissions, Andong does not meet the requisites set forth by Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d) requires that in order that the municipality created by executive order may receive recognition, they must "have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code." Camid admits that Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all.60 This incapacity ties in with the fact that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. Out of obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez, the national government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of its share of the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void municipality. The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in the municipality in the last four decades are eloquent indicia of the non-recognition by the State of the existence of the town. The certifications relied upon by Camid, issued by the DENR-CENRO and the National Statistics Office, can hardly serve the purpose of attesting to Andongs legal efficacy. In fact, both these certifications qualify that they were issued upon the request of Camid, "to support the restoration or re-operation of the Municipality of Andong, Lanao del Sur,"61thus obviously conceding that the municipality is at present inoperative.
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We may likewise pay attention to the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, which had also been relied upon in Jimenez and San Narciso. This Ordinance, which apportioned the seats of the House of Representatives to the different legislative districts in the Philippines, enumerates the various municipalities that are encompassed by the various legislative districts. Andong is not listed therein as among the municipalities of Lanao del Sur, or of any other province for that matter.62 On the other hand, the municipalities of San Andres, Alicia and Sinacaban are mentioned in the Ordinance as part of Quezon,63 Bohol,64 and Misamis Occidental65 respectively. How about the eighteen (18) municipalities similarly nullified in Pelaez but certified as existing in the DILGCertification presented by Camid? The petition fails to mention that subsequent to the ruling in Pelaez, legislation was enacted to reconstitute these municipalities.66 It is thus not surprising that the DILG certified the existence of these eighteen (18) municipalities, or that these towns are among the municipalities enumerated in the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Andong has not been similarly reestablished through statute. Clearly then, the fact that there are valid organic statutes passed by legislation recreating these eighteen (18) municipalities is sufficient legal basis to accord a different legal treatment to Andong as against these eighteen (18) other municipalities. We thus assert the proper purview to Section 442(d) of the Local Government Codethat it does not serve to affirm or reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities such as Andong, which had been previously created by presidential issuances or executive orders. The provision affirms the legal personalities only of those municipalities such as San Narciso, Alicia, and Sinacaban, which may have been created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand, the municipalities judicially dissolved in cases such as Pelaez, San Joaquin, and Malabang, remain inexistent, unless recreated through specific legislative enactments, as done with the eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the DILG. Those municipalities derive their legal personality not from the presidential issuances or executive orders which originally created them or from Section 442(d), but from the respective legislative statutes which were enacted to revive them.
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And what now of Andong and its residents? Certainly, neither Pelaez or this decision has obliterated Andong into a hole on the ground. The legal effect of the nullification of Andong in Pelaez was to revert the constituent barrios of the voided town back into their original municipalities, namely the municipalities of Lumbatan, Butig and Tubaran.67 These three municipalities subsist to this day as part of Lanao del Sur,68 and presumably continue to exercise corporate powers over the barrios which once belonged to Andong. If there is truly a strong impulse calling for the reconstitution of Andong, the solution is through the legislature and not judicial confirmation of void title. If indeed the residents of Andong have, all these years, been governed not by their proper municipal governments but by a ragtag "Interim Government," then an expedient political and legislative solution is perhaps necessary. Yet we can hardly sanction the retention of Andongs legal personality solely on the basis of collective amnesia that may have allowed Andong to somehow pretend itself into existence despite its judicial dissolution. Maybe those who insist Andong still exists prefer to remain unperturbed in their blissful ignorance, like the inhabitants of the cave in Platos famed allegory. But the time has come for the light to seep in, and for the petitioner and like-minded persons to awaken to legal reality. WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Sema vs Comelec
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case These consolidated petitions[1] seek to annul Resolution No. 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) treating Cotabato City as part of the legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.[2] The Facts
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.[3] Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054).[4] Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989. On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,[5] enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province ofShariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides:
Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are hereby separated from the Province of Maguindanao and
Sema vs Comelec
constituted into a distinct and independent province, which is hereby created, to be known as the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
xxxx Sec. 5. The corporate existence of this province shall commence upon the appointment by the Regional Governor or election of the governor and majority of the regular members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The incumbent elective provincial officials of the Province of Maguindanao shall continue to serve their unexpired terms in the province that they will choose or where they are residents: Provided, that where an elective position in both provinces becomes vacant as a consequence of the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, all incumbent elective provincial officials shall have preference for appointment to a higher elective vacant position and for the time being be appointed by the Regional Governor, and shall hold office until their successors shall have been elected and qualified in the next local elections; Provided, further, that they shall continue to receive the salaries they are receiving at the time of the approval of this Act until the new readjustment of salaries in accordance with law. Provided, furthermore, that there shall be no diminution in the number of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the mother province. Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato as a part thereof, shall remain.
Later, three new municipalities[6] were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second legislative district.Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanaos first legislative district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao. The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.
Sema vs Comelec
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a regular province under MMA Act 201. In answer to Cotabato Citys query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELECs Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007,[7]provides in pertinent parts:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt the recommendation of the Law Department thatpending the enactment of the appropriate law by Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao. (Emphasis supplied)
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.[8] On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).[9] In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan withCotabato City, prayed for the nullification of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution[10] and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.[11] Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC acted without or in
Sema vs Comelec
excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in Maguindanaos first legislative district despite the COMELECs earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as the lone component of Maguindanaos reapportioned first legislative district.[12] Sema further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts. In its Comment, the COMELEC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), chose not to reach the merits of the case and merely contended that (1) Sema wrongly availed of the writ of certiorari to nullify COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because the COMELEC issued the same in the exercise of its administrative, not quasi-judicial, power and (2) Semas prayer for the writ of prohibition in G.R. No. 177597 became moot with the proclamation of respondent Didagen P. Dilangalen (respondent Dilangalen) on 1 June 2007 as representative of the legislative district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City. In his Comment, respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from questioning COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 because in her certificate of candidacy filed on 29 March 2007, Sema indicated that she was seeking election as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato City. Respondent Dilangalen added that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is constitutional because it did not apportion a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan or reapportion the legislative districts in Maguindanao but merely renamed Maguindanaos first legislative district. Respondent Dilangalen further claimed that the COMELEC could not reapportion Maguindanaos first legislative district to make Cotabato City its sole component unit as the power to reapportion legislative districts lies exclusively with Congress, not to mention that Cotabato City does not meet the minimum population requirement under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for the creation of a legislative district within a city.[13] Sema filed a Consolidated Reply controverting the matters raised in respondents Comments and reiterating her claim that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902. In the Resolution of 4 September 2007, the Court required the parties in G.R. No. 177597 to comment on the issue of whether a province created by the
Sema vs Comelec
ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province. The parties submitted their compliance as follows: (1) Sema answered the issue in the affirmative on the following grounds: (a) the Court in Felwa v. Salas[14] stated that when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment; (b) Section 462 of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160) affirms the apportionment of a legislative district incident to the creation of a province; and (c) Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution mandate the apportionment of a legislative district in newly created provinces. (2) The COMELEC, again represented by the OSG, apparently abandoned its earlier stance on the propriety of issuing Resolution Nos. 07-0407 and 7902 and joined causes with Sema, contending that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is self-executing. Thus, every new province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly is ipso facto entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives even in the absence of a national law; and (3) Respondent Dilangalen answered the issue in the negative on the following grounds: (a) the province contemplated in Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution is one that is created by an act of Congress taking into account the provisions in RA 7160 on the creation of provinces; (b) Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 withheld from the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to enact measures relating to national elections, which encompasses the apportionment of legislative districts for members of the House of Representatives; (c) recognizing a legislative district in every province the ARMM Regional Assembly creates will lead to the disproportionate representation of the ARMM in the House of Representatives as the Regional Assembly can create provinces without regard to the requirements in Section 461 of RA 7160; and (d) Cotabato City, which has a population of less than 250,000, is not entitled to a representative in the House of Representatives.
Sema vs Comelec
On 27 November 2007, the Court heard the parties in G.R. No. 177597 in oral arguments on the following issues: (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, is constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province.[15] In compliance with the Resolution dated 27 November 2007, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 filed their respective Memoranda on the issues raised in the oral arguments.[16] On the question of the constitutionality of Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, the parties in G.R. No. 177597 adopted the following positions: (1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional (a) as a valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces under Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous regions, through their organic acts, legislative powers over other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of RA 7160.[17] However, Sema concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated in RA 7160 in the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.[18] Thus, Sema proposed that Section 19 should be construed as prohibiting the Regional Assembly from prescribing standards x x x that do not comply with the minimum criteria under RA 7160.[19] (2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional on the following grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was not among those granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated in Section 461 of RA 7160 on the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause; and
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(3) The COMELEC, through the OSG, joined causes with respondent Dilangalen (thus effectively abandoning the position the COMELEC adopted in its Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007) and contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional because (a) it contravenes Section 10 and Section 6,[20] Article X of the Constitution and (b) the power to create provinces was withheld from the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. On the question of whether a province created under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such new province, Sema and respondent Dilangalen reiterated in their Memoranda the positions they adopted in their Compliance with the Resolution of 4 September 2007. The COMELEC deemed it unnecessary to submit its position on this issue considering its stance that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The pendency of the petition in G.R. No. 178628 was disclosed during the oral arguments on 27 November 2007. Thus, in the Resolution of 19 February 2008, the Court ordered G.R. No. 178628 consolidated with G.R. No. 177597. The petition in G.R. No.178628 echoed Sema's contention that the COMELEC acted ultra vires in issuing Resolution No. 7902 depriving the voters ofCotabato City of a representative in the House of Representatives. In its Comment to the petition in G.R. No. 178628, the COMELEC, through the OSG, maintained the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 as a temporary measure pending the enactment by Congress of the appropriate law.
The Issues
The petitions raise the following issues: I. In G.R. No. 177597: (A) Preliminarily (1) whether the writs of Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus are proper to test the constitutionality of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902; and
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(2) whether the proclamation of respondent Dilangalen as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato Citymooted the petition in G.R. No. 177597.
(B) On the merits (1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and (2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province. II. In G.R No. 177597 and G.R No. 178628, whether COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid for maintaining the status quo in the first legislative district of Maguindanao (as Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City [formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City]), despite the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan out of such district (excluding Cotabato City).
The Ruling of the Court The petitions have no merit. We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities; (2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuanis void; and (3) COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.
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On the Preliminary Matters
The Writ of Prohibition is Appropriate to Test the Constitutionality of Election Laws, Rules and Regulations
The purpose of the writ of Certiorari is to correct grave abuse of discretion by any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[21] On the other hand, the writ of Mandamus will issue to compel a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person to perform an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty.[22] True, the COMELEC did not issue Resolution No. 7902 in the exercise of its judicial or quasi-judicial functions.[23] Nor is there a law which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to exclude from canvassing the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City. These, however, do not justify the outright dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 because Sema also prayed for the issuance of the writ of Prohibition and we have long recognized this writ as proper for testing the constitutionality of election laws, rules, and regulations.[24]
Respondent Dilangalens Proclamation Does Not Moot the Petition
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There is also no merit in the claim that respondent Dilangalens proclamation as winner in the 14 May 2007 elections for representative of Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City mooted this petition. This case does not concern respondent Dilangalens election. Rather, it involves an inquiry into the validity of COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, as well as the constitutionality of MMA Act 201 and Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054. Admittedly, the outcome of this petition, one way or another, determines whether the votes cast in Cotabato City for representative of the district of Shariff Kabunsuan Province withCotabato City will be included in the canvassing of ballots. However, this incidental consequence is no reason for us not to proceed with the resolution of the novel issues raised here. The Courts ruling in these petitions affects not only the recently concluded elections but also all the other succeeding elections for the office in question, as well as the power of the ARMM Regional Assembly to create in the future additional provinces.
On the Main Issues
Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly Can Create the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sema vs Comelec
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction,[25] subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, only x x x an Act of Congress can create provinces, cities or municipalities.[26]
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies.[27] In the present case, the question arises whether the
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delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the citys population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district. The threshold issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM
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Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts for the House of Representatives? The answer is in the negative.
Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned Only by an Act of Congress Under the present Constitution, as well as in past[28] Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
xxxx
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. (Emphasis supplied)
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Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC,[29] we held that the power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws, and thus is vested exclusively in Congress. This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body. The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution provides:
Sema vs Comelec
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) Administrative organization; Creation of sources of revenues; Ancestral domain and natural resources; Personal, family, and property relations; Regional urban and rural planning development; Economic, social, and tourism development; Educational policies; Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion
of the general welfare of the people of the region.
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress. On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, The Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x. Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a legislative district whose representative is elected in national elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first representative is always elected in the next national elections from the effectivity of the law.[30] Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national official.[31] It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative
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powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it can never create a national office. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the coverage of the Regional Assemblys legislative powers [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x. The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the exclusive nature of Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts by abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA Act 201 provides that:
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato City as a part thereof, shall remain. (Emphasis supplied)
However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that each province shall have at least one representative. Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is unconstitutional. Sema, petitioner in G.R. No. 177597, contends that Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution, which provides:
Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two
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hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative. (Emphasis supplied)
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution, which states:

Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of Members as it may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was created or where the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically located shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphasis supplied)
serve as bases for the conclusion that the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, created on 29 October 2006, is automatically entitled to one member in the House of Representatives in the 14 May 2007 elections. As further support for her stance, petitioner invokes the statement in Felwa that when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment. The contention has no merit. First. The issue in Felwa, among others, was whether Republic Act No. 4695 (RA 4695), creating the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao and providing for congressional representation in the old and
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new provinces, was unconstitutional for creati[ng] congressional districts without the apportionment provided in the Constitution. The Court answered in the negative, thus:
The Constitution ordains:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than one hundred and twenty Members who shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, but each province shall have at least one Member. The Congress shall by law make an apportionment within three years after the return of every enumeration, and not otherwise. Until such apportionment shall have been made, the House of Representatives shall have the same number of Members as that fixed by law for the National Assembly, who shall be elected by the qualified electors from the present Assembly districts. Each representative district shall comprise as far as practicable, contiguous and compact territory. Pursuant to this Section, a representative district may come into existence: (a) indirectly, through the creation of a province for each province shall have at least one member in the House of Representatives; or (b) by direct creation of several representative districts within a province. The requirements concerning the apportionment of representative districts and the territory thereof refer only to the second method of creation of representative districts, and do not apply to those incidental to the creation of provinces, under the first method. This is deducible, not only from the general tenor of the provision above quoted, but, also, from the fact that the apportionment therein alluded to refers to that which is made by an Act of Congress. Indeed, when a province is created by statute, the corresponding representative district, comes into existence neither by authority of that statute which cannot provide otherwise nor by apportionment, but by operation of the Constitution, without a reapportionment.
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There is no constitutional limitation as to the time when, territory of, or other conditions under which a province may be created, except, perhaps, if the consequence thereof were to exceed the maximum of 120 representative districts prescribed in the Constitution, which is not the effect of the legislation under consideration. As a matter of fact, provinces have been created or subdivided into other provinces, with the consequent creation of additional representative districts, without complying with the aforementioned requirements.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Court sustained the constitutionality of RA 4695 because (1) it validly created legislative districts indirectlythrough a special law enacted by Congress creating a province and (2) the creation of the legislative districts will not result in breaching the maximum number of legislative districts provided under the 1935 Constitution. Felwa does not apply to the present case because in Felwa the new provinces were created by a national law enacted by Congress itself. Here, the new province was created merely by a regional law enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly. What Felwa teaches is that the creation of a legislative district by Congress does not emanate alone from Congress power to reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress power to create provinces which cannot be created without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created by operation of the Constitution because the Constitution provides that each province shall have at least one representative in the House of Representatives. This does not detract from the constitutional principle that the power to create legislative districts belongs exclusively to Congress. It merely prevents any other legislative body, except Congress, from creating provinces because for a legislative body to create a province such legislative body must have the power to create legislative districts. In short, only an act of Congress can
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trigger the creation of a legislative district by operation of the Constitution. Thus, only Congress has the power to create, or trigger the creation of, a legislative district. Moreover, if as Sema claims MMA Act 201 apportioned a legislative district to Shariff Kabunsuan upon its creation, this will leave Cotabato City as the lone component of the first legislative district of Maguindanao. However, Cotabato City cannot constitute a legislative district by itself because as of the census taken in 2000, it had a population of only 163,849. To constitute Cotabato City alone as the surviving first legislative district of Maguindanao will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which requires that [E]ach city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand x x x, shall have at least one representative. Second. Semas theory also undermines the composition and independence of the House of Representatives. Under Section 19,[33] Article VI of RA 9054, the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces and cities within the ARMM with or withoutregard to the criteria fixed in Section 461 of RA 7160, namely: minimum annual income of P20,000,000, and minimum contiguous territory of 2,000 square kilometers or minimum population of 250,000. [34] The following scenarios thus become distinct possibilities: (1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can create 100 or more provinces and thus increase the membership of a superior legislative body, the House of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of 250 fixed in the Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise); (2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives based on one representative for at least every 250,000 residents will be negated because the ARMM Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement in Section 461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every province created must have a population of at least 250,000; and
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(3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in the House of Representatives through the ARMM Regional Assemblys continuous creation of provinces or cities within the ARMM.
The following exchange during the oral arguments of the petition in G.R. No. 177597 highlights the absurdity of Semas position that the ARMM Regional Assembly can create provinces:
Justice Carpio: So, you mean to say [a] Local Government can create legislative district[s] and pack Congress with their own representatives [?] Atty. Vistan II:[35] Yes, Your Honor, because the Constitution allows that. Justice Carpio: So, [the] Regional Assembly of [the] ARMM can create and create x x x provinces x x x and, therefore, they can have thirty-five (35) new representatives in the House of Representatives without Congress agreeing to it, is that what you are saying? That can be done, under your theory[?]
Atty. Vistan II:
Yes, Your Honor, under the correct factual circumstances.
Justice Carpio: Under your theory, the ARMM legislature can create thirty-five (35) new provinces, there may be x x x [only] one hundred thousand (100,000)
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[population], x x x, and they will each have one representative x x x to Congress without any national law, is that what you are saying?
Atty. Vistan II:
Without law passed by Congress, yes, Your Honor, that is what we are saying.
xxxx Justice Carpio: So, they can also create one thousand (1000) new provinces, sen[d] one thousand (1000) representatives to the House of Representatives without a national law[,] that is legally possible, correct?
Atty. Vistan II: Yes, Your Honor.[36]
(Emphasis supplied)
Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on regional autonomy,[37] nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tribranch system of government under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM Regional Assembly recognizes this. The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not the regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states, [A]ny province that may hereafter be created x x x
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shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member, refers to a province created by Congress itself through a national law. The reason is that the creation of a province increases the actual membership of the House of Representatives, an increase that only Congress can decide. Incidentally, in the present 14th Congress, there are 219[38] district representatives out of the maximum 250 seats in the House of Representatives. Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of total membership of the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200 seats for district representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus, there is a need now for Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the House, even before Congress can create new provinces.
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are limited [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws, x x x. The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is established within the framework of the Constitution. This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates that the ARMM shall be created x x x within the framework of this Constitutionand the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily involves also the creation of a legislative district. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of the creation of municipalities and barangays that does not comply with the criteria established in Section 461 of RA 7160, as
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mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, because the creation of such municipalities and barangays does not involve the creation of legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this issue to an appropriate case. In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void. Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic and legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
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WHEREFORE, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. SO ORDERED.
NPC DAMA vs NAPOCOR

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 156208 September 26, 2006
NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS ASSOCIATION, (NPC DAMA), represented by Its President ROGER S. SAN JUAN, SR., NPC EMPLOYEES & WORKERS UNION (NEWU) NORTHERN LUZON REGIONAL CENTER, represented by its Regional President JIMMY D. SALMAN, in their own individual capacities and in behalf of the members of the associations and all affected officers and employees of National Power Corporation (NPC), ZOL D. MEDINA, NARCISO M. MAGANTE, VICENTE B. CIRIO, JR., NECITAS B. CAMAMA, in their individual capacities as employees of National Power Corporation, petitioners, vs. THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC), NATIONAL POWER BOARD OF DIRECTORS (NPB), JOSE ISIDRO N. CAMACHO as Chairman of the National Power Board of Directors (NPB), ROLANDO S. QUILALA, as President Officer-in-charge/CEO of National Power Corporation and Member of National Power Board, and VINCENT S. PEREZ, JR., EMILIA T. BONCODIN, MARIUS P. CORPUS, RUBEN S. REINOSO, JR., GREGORY L. DOMINGO and NIEVES L. OSORIO, respondents. DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: Before Us is a special civil action for Injunction to enjoin public respondents from implementing the National Power Board (NPB) Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, both dated 18 November 2002, directing, among other things, the termination of all employees of the National Power Corporation (NPC) on 31 January 2003 in line with the restructuring of the NPC. On 8 June 2001, Republic Act No. 9136, otherwise known as the "Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001" (EPIRA Law), was approved and signed into law by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo, and took effect on 26 June 2001. Section 2(i) and Section 3 of the EPIRA Law states: Section 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State: xxxx (i) To provide for an orderly and transparent privatization of the assets and liabilities of the National Power Corporation (NPC); xxxx Section 3. Scope. This Act shall provide a framework for the restructuring of the electric power industry, including the privatization of the assets of NPC, the transition to the desired competitive structure, and the definition of the responsibilities of the various government agencies and private entities.1
NPC DAMA vs NAPOCOR

Under the EPIRA Law,2 a new National Power Board of Directors was constituted composed of the Secretary of Finance as Chairman, with the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Budget and Management, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority, the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, the Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry, and the President of the National Power Corporation as members. On 27 February 2002, the Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE) promulgated the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of the EPIRA Law, pursuant to Section 773 thereof. Said IRR were approved by the Joint Congressional Power Commission on even date. Meanwhile, also in pursuant to the provisions of the EPIRA Law, the DOE created the Energy Restructuring Steering Committee (Restructuring Committee) to manage the privatization and restructuring of the NPC, the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO), and the Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Corporation (PSALM). To serve as the overall organizational framework for the realigned functions of the NPC mandated under the EPIRA Law, the Restructuring Committee proposed a new NPC Table of Organization which was approved by the NPB through NPB Resolution No. 2002-53 dated 11 April 2002. Likewise, the Restructuring Committee reviewed the proposed 2002 NPC Restructuring Plan and assisted in the implementation of Phase I (Realignment) of said Plan, and thereafter recommended to the NPB for approval the adoption of measures pertaining to the separation and hiring of NPC personnel. The NPB, taking into consideration the recommendation of the Restructuring Committee, thus amended the Restructuring Plan approved under NPB Resolution No. 2002-53. On 18 November 2002, pursuant to Section 634 of the EPIRA Law and Rule 335 of the IRR, the NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124 which provided for the Guidelines on the Separation Program of the NPC and the Selection and Placement of Personnel in the NPC Table of Organization. Under said Resolution, all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated on 31 January 2003, and shall be entitled to separation benefits. On the same day, the NPB approved NPB Resolution No. 2002-125, whereby a Transition Team was constituted to manage and implement the NPC's Separation Program. In a Memorandum dated 21 November 2002, the NPC OIC-President and CEO Rolando S. Quilala circulated the assailed Resolutions and directed the concerned NPC officials to disseminate and comply with said Resolutions and implement the same within the period provided for in the timetable set in NPB Resolution No. 2002-125. As a result thereof, Mr. Paquito F. Garcia, Manager HRSD and Resources and Administration Coordinator of NPC, circulated a Memorandum dated 22 November 2002 to all NPC officials and employees providing for a checklist of the documents required for securing clearances for the processing of separation benefits of all employees who shall be terminated under the Restructuring Plan. Contending that the assailed NPB Resolutions are void and without force and effect, herein petitioners, in their individual and representative capacities, filed the present Petition for Injunction to restrain respondents from implementing NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125. In support thereof, petitioners invoke Section 78 of the EPIRA Law, to wit: Section 78. Injunction and Restraining Order. The implementation of the provisions of this Act shall not be restrained or enjoined except by an order issued by the Supreme Court of the Philippines. In assailing the validity of NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, petitioners maintain that said Resolutions were not passed and issued by a majority of the members of the duly
NPC DAMA vs NAPOCOR

constituted Board of Directors since only three of its members, as provided under Section 486 of the EPIRA Law, were present, namely: DOE Secretary Vincent S. Perez, Jr.; Department of Budget and Management Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin; and NPC OIC-President Rolando S. Quilala. According to petitioners, the other four members who were present at the meeting and signed the Resolutions were not the secretaries of their respective departments but were merely representatives or designated alternates of the officials who were named under the EPIRA Law to sit as members of the NPB. Petitioners claim that the acts of these representatives are violative of the well-settled principle that "delegated power cannot be further delegated." Thus, petitioners conclude that the questioned Resolutions have been illegally issued as it were not issued by a duly constituted board since no quorum existed because only three of the nine members, as provided under Section 48 of the EPIRA Law, were present and qualified to sit and vote. It is petitioners' submission that even assuming arguendo that there was no undue delegation of power to the four representatives who signed the assailed Resolutions, said Resolutions cannot still be given legal effect because the same did not comply with the mandatory requirement of endorsement by the Joint Congressional Power Commission and approval of the President of the Philippines, as provided under Section 47 of the EPIRA Law which states that: Section 47. NPC Privatization. Except for the assets of SPUG, the generation assets, real estate, and other disposable assets as well as IPP contracts of NPC shall be privatized in accordance with this Act. Within six (6) months from effectivity of this Act, the PSALM Corp. shall submit a plan for the endorsement by the Joint Congressional Power Commission and the approval of the President of the Philippines, on the total privatization of the generation assets, real estate, other disposable assets as well as existing IPP contracts of NPC and thereafter, implement the same, in accordance with the following guidelines, except as provided for in paragraph (f) herein: x x x. Petitioners insist that if ever there exists a valid wholesale abolition of their positions and their concomitant separation form the service, such a process is an integral part of "privatization" and "restructuring" as defined under the EPIRA Law and, therefore, must comply with the above-quoted provision requiring the endorsement of the Joint Congressional Power Commission and the approval of the President of the Philippines. Furthermore, petitioner highlight the fact that said Resolutions will have an adverse effect on about 5,648 employees of the NPC and will result in the displacement of some 2,370 employees, which, petitioners argue, is contrary to the mandate of the Constitution to promote full employment and security of tenure. Respondents, on the other hand, uphold the validity of the assailed Resolutions by arguing that while it is true that four members of the National Power Board of Directors, particularly the respective Secretaries of the Department of Interior and Local Government, the Department of Trade and Industry, and the Department of Finance, as well as the Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority, were not the actual signatories in NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, they were, however, ably represented by their respective alternates. Respondents claim that the validity of such administrative practice whereby an authority is exercised by persons or subordinates appointed by the responsible official has long been settled. Respondents further contend that Section 48 of the EPIRA Law does not in any way prohibit any member of the NPB from authorizing his representative to sign resolutions adopted by the Board. From the arguments put forward by herein parties, it is evident that the pivotal issue to be resolved in this Petition for Injunction is whether or not NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 were properly enacted. It is petitioners' contention that the failure of the four specifically identified department heads7 under Section 48 of the EPIRA Law to personally approve and sign the assailed Resolutions invalidates the adoption of said Resolutions. Petitioners maintain that there was undue
NPC DAMA vs NAPOCOR

delegation of delegated power when only the representatives of certain members of the NPB attended the board meetings and passed and signed the questioned Resolutions. We agree with petitioners. In enumerating under Section 48 those who shall compose the National Power Board of Directors, the legislature has vested upon these persons the power to exercise their judgment and discretion in running the affairs of the NPC. Discretion may be defined as "the act or the liberty to decide according to the principles of justice and one's ideas of what is right and proper under the circumstances, without willfulness or favor.8 Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them by law of acting officially in certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others.9 It is to be presumed that in naming the respective department heads as members of the board of directors, the legislature chose these secretaries of the various executive departments on the basis of their personal qualifications and acumen which made them eligible to occupy their present positions as department heads. Thus, the department secretaries cannot delegate their duties as members of the NPB, much less their power to vote and approve board resolutions, because it is their personal judgment that must be exercised in the fulfillment of such responsibility. There is no question that the enactment of the assailed Resolutions involves the exercise of discretion and not merely a ministerial act that could be validly performed by a delegate, thus, the rule enunciated in the case ofBinamira v. Garrucho10 is relevant in the present controversy, to wit: An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another. In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires, on the part of the officer, the exercise of judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and, unless power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another. Respondents' assertion to the contrary is not tenable. The ruling in the case cited by respondents to support their contention is not applicable in the case at bar. While it is true that the Court has determined in the case ofAmerican Tobacco Company v. Director of Patents11 that a delegate may exercise his authority through persons he appoints to assist him in his functions, it must be stressed that the Court explicitly stated in the same case that said practice is permissible only when the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. According to the Court, the rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates, so long as it is the legally authorized official who makes the final decisionthrough the use of his own personal judgment. In the case at bar, it is not difficult to comprehend that in approving NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125, it is the representatives of the secretaries of the different executive departments and not the secretaries themselves who exercised judgment in passing the assailed Resolution, as shown by the fact that it is the signatures of the respective representatives that are affixed to the questioned Resolutions. This, to our mind, violates the duty imposed upon the specifically enumerated department heads to employ their own sound discretion in exercising the corporate powers of the NPC. Evidently, the votes cast by these mere representatives in favor of the adoption of the said Resolutions must not be considered in determining whether or not the necessary number
NPC DAMA vs NAPOCOR

of votes was garnered in order that the assailed Resolutions may be validly enacted. Hence, there being only three valid votes cast out of the nine board members, namely those of DOE Secretary Vincent S. Perez, Jr.; Department of Budget and Management Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin; and NPC OIC-President Rolando S. Quilala, NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are void and are of no legal effect. Having determined that the assailed Resolutions are void as they lack the necessary number of votes for their adoption, We no longer deem it necessary to pass upon the other issues raised in the instant petition WHEREFORE, premises considered, National Power Board Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are hereby declared VOID and WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT. The Petition for Injunction is hereby GRANTED and respondents are hereby ENJOINED from implementing said NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 and No. 2002-125. SO ORDERED.
Mago vs Penalosa-Fermo
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION A.M. No. MTJ-08-1715 March 19, 2009 [Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2037-MTJ] RODOLFO R. MAGO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE AUREA G. PEALOSA-FERMO, MTC, LABO, CAMARINES NORTE, Respondent. DECISION CARPIO MORALES, J.: Rodolfo R. Mago (complainant) filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Labo, Camarines Norte a complaint for grave coercion against Sheriff Alex Rodolfo Angeles (of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board [DARAB]), et al. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 04-7800. Sheriff Angeles filed a counter-charge for grave threats against complainant and his sons, docketed as Criminal Case No. 04-7811. Alleging that Presiding Judge of the MTC Labo, Camarines Sur Judge Aurea G. Pealosa-Fermo (respondent) committed gross ignorance of the law and bias in the disposition of his complaint and of the counter-charge against him, complainant filed the present administrative complaint, the details of which were summarized by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) as follows:1 Mr. Mago claims that on April 21, 2004 he filed a complaint for Grave Coercion against Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB for brevity) Sheriff Alex Roberto Angeles which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 04-7800. However, instead of summoning the accused for a "Preliminary Investigation", he received a complaint charging him and his two (2) sons with Grave Threats [which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 04-7811]. He stresses the complaint against him as purely fabricated. He states that the complainant in the said case was not DARAB Sheriff Angeles. He avers that the affidavits of the witnesses in the said case could not be found in the records of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Complainant further declares that on July 20, 2004, he received a subpoena to attend the preliminary investigation of Criminal Case No. 04-7811. In compliance, he and his witnesses attended, and even without the assistance of counsel, they were examined through a prepared set of questions handed to them by the stenographer. The respondent judge was not present then. The complainant also states that right after the preliminary investigation, he was immediately arrested and was imprisoned for three (3) days. Thereafter, he was released after he posted bail in the amount of Php12,000 pesos. Complainant also alleges that he filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohibition with Application for Preliminary Injunction and Ex-Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order questioning the order of respondent judge in denying his omnibus motion to quash the information, suppress evidence and produce, inspect and copy documentary evidence. He adds that despite the filing of this petition, the respondent judge continued to direct him to appear at the pretrial/preliminary conference. He likewise avers that his arraignment was set beyond the period allowed by the Rules of Court. He also laments that he could not locate his lawyer, Atty. Lamberto
Bonifacio, Jr. Finally, he alleges that the respondent judge had been biased when hearing his case.2 (Italics in the original; emphasis an underscoring supplied) By 2nd Indorsement dated July 31, 2007,3 respondent gave her side of the case as follows: Contrary to complainants allegation, the complaint in Criminal Case No. 04-7811 (for grave threats), and the affidavits of the therein complainant-sheriffs witnesses were attached to the record.4 Admitting complainants allegation that the court stenographer examined complainant and his witnesses during the preliminary investigation of the grave threats complaint against him with the use of prepared written set of questions, respondent explains as follows: What [complainant] claimed in his Letter-Complaint that the Court Stenographer has a prepared sheet of questions during the preliminary examination is true because after a complaint is filed, the undersigned prepares her questions for preliminary examination based on the affidavits of the complaining witnesses and the counter affidavits of the accused. This is done to make it easy for the Stenographers to take/print the transcript of the proceedings. Some witnesses even ask to read/study the question and request that they write down their answers to the questions for the Stenographers to finalize. Also, this is convenient when more than one preliminary examination is scheduled for the day. This procedure makes it easier for the Stenographers and the witnesses, too, considering the cramped office space. After the witnesses are briefed, the [s]tenographers take over since the prepared sheets are given to them so they could propound the questions and the answers are typed directly. x x x5 (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) Denying complainants allegation that he was arrested within the court premises on July 20, 2004 or right after the conduct of the preliminary examination conducted in the grave threats complaint against him, respondent alleges that the preliminary examination was conducted at 9:00 oclock in the morning of July 19, 2004; that she issued an Order6 the following day, July 20, 2004, finding probable cause and directing the issuance of a warrant of arrest7against complainant which the warrant officer received at 4:40 p.m. on even date; and that complainant was arrested on July 21, 2004 at the Poblacion, Labo, Camarines Norte, as shown by the Warrant Officers Return of Service.8 Admitting that there was delay in scheduling the arraignment of complainant after his arrest, respondent surmises that the Clerk of Court or the clerk-in-charge might have overlooked the Return of Service of the warrant officer. Respondent states, however, that when the arraignment was scheduled, complainants counsel opposed the same and filed an Omnibus Motion which resulted in the repeated resetting of the arraignment. Respondent adds that after complainant was arraigned on June 6, 2006, the preliminary conference/pre-trial was set but was not terminated due to the absence of complainant or his counsel.9 In fact, respondent goes on to allege that in complainants attempt to block his arraignment and to quash the Information against him, he filed a Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohibition with Application for Mandatory Injunction and Ex-Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order with the Regional Trial Court of Labo which was denied for lack of merit. 10 On the allegation of bias on her part, respondent claims that until the criminal complaints were filed, she did not know any of the parties. By June 18, 2008 Report,11 the OCA came up with the following Evaluation:
xxxx . . . [W]e hold [respondent] administratively liable for her unfamiliarity with the basic rules on preliminary investigation. There was irregularity during the preliminary investigation when the respondent judge allowed the stenographers to handle the latter part of the proceedings. xxxx . . . [R]espondent admitted that after the complaint was filed, she prepared a set of questions based on the affidavits of the complaining witnesses and counter affidavits of the accused. She further added that during the preliminary investigation and after briefing the accused and his witnesses, the stenographers took charge of the proceedings. Hence, the respondent judge violated the rules on preliminary investigation. Respondent should not have allowed her stenographer to handle the latter part of the proceedings even if she only wanted to expedite the proceedings and it was more convenient. Respondent judge should have personally taken charge of the entire proceedings since the power to conduct preliminary investigations vests only on her and not on the stenographer. x x x x12 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Finding respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure, the OCA recommended that respondent be FINED in the amount of P20,000 in this wise: [W]e deem it proper to recommend the imposition upon the respondent judge of a penalty of fine in the amount of P20,000[,] this being her first offense. As regards the issue of continuous hearing of the case by the respondent judge, we opine that the respondent judge only acted in good faith and in accordance with law when she continued to direct the herein complainant to attend the pre-trial. Based on the records, the Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohibition with Application for Mandatory Injunction and Ex-Parte Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and the Motion for Reconsideration thereto filed by complainant with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, Labo, Camarines Norte were already denied; thus the respondent judge had the authority to proceed with the case. The postponements in the pre-trial were not attributable to the respondent judge but to the accused and his counsel.
1avv phi1
Finally, on the issue of bias, complainant failed to submit any evidence showing the respondent biased or partial in hearing the case. Bias and partiality of a judge must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Mere suspicion that a judge is bias or partial would not be enough.13 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied) By Resolution of August 20, 2008,14 the Court, on the recommendation of the OCA, re-docketed the case and required the parties to manifest within ten days from notice whether they were willing to submit the matter for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed and submitted. Both parties have manifested in the affirmative. The Court finds the evaluation well-taken. Prior to the amendment on October 3, 2005 of Rules 112 and 114 of the Rules of Court via A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC,Re: Amendment of Rules 112 and 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure by Removing the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation from Judges of the First Level Courts, judges of municipal trial courts were empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in which they
exercised discretion in determining whether there was probable cause to hale the respondent into court. Such being the case, they could not delegate the discretion to another. An officer to whom a discretion is entrusted cannot delegate it to another, the presumption being that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and unless the power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another. In those cases in which the proper execution of the office requires on the part of the officer, the exercise of judgment or discretion, the presumption is that he was chosen because he was deemed fit and competent to exercise that judgment and discretion, and, unless power to substitute another in his place has been given to him, he cannot delegate his duties to another.15 (Underscoring supplied) Then, as now, a personal examination of the complainant in a criminal case and his witness/es was required. Thus, under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court before its amendment, the "investigating fiscal" was required to "certify under oath that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses . . . " By respondents delegation of the examination of the sheriff-complainant in the grave threats case to the stenographer, and worse, by allowing the witnesses to "read/study the [written] question[s]" to be propounded to them and to "write their answers [thereto]" upon respondents justification that the scheme was for the convenience of the stenographers, respondent betrayed her lack of knowledge of procedure, thereby contributing to the erosion of public confidence in the judicial system. Respondent is thus guilty of gross ignorance of the law or procedure which, under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, is a serious charge,16 for which Section 11 (A) of the same Rule prescribes the following penalty: SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed: 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned and controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; 2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or 3. A fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.00. The Court thus finds in order the Recommendation of the OCA to impose a fine of P20,000 on respondent. The OCAs recommendation to warn respondent that a "repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely" does not lie, however, A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC, which took effect on October 3, 2005, having removed the power of judges of the first level courts17 to conduct preliminary investigation. A warning that a commission of another infraction tantamount to gross ignorance of law or procedures shall be dealt with more severely lies, however. WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent, Judge Aurea G. Pealosa-Fermo of the Municipal Trial Court of Labo, Camarines Norte, guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure. She is FINED in
the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000) Pesos and warned that a commission of another infraction which is tantamount to the same charge shall be dealt with more severely. SO ORDERED.
MMDA vs Concerned Residents of Manila Bay
Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
EN BANC METROPOLITAN MANILA G.R. Nos. 171947-48 DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Present: DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS,[1] PUNO, C.J., DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, QUISUMBING, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, YNARES-SANTIAGO, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC CARPIO, WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND CORONA, MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE CARPIO MORALES, COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE AZCUNA, NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME TINGA, GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF CHICO-NAZARIO, THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL VELASCO, JR., GOVERNMENT, NACHURA, Petitioners, REYES, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and - versus BRION, JJ.
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, represented and joined by DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA,
SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and Promulgated: JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, Respondents. December 18, 2008 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DECISION VELASCO, JR., J.: The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained the attention of the international community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental destruction is now on a scale few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself.[2] But amidst hard evidence and clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard. This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their respective offices or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies and their official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry the high national priority it deserves, if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment. At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject official indifference of people and institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.
This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. This environmental aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed from:
x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which reason] ALL defendants must be held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.[3]
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in abating the pollution of theManila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:
Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology; (2) The Environment Code (PD 1152); (3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984); (4) The Water Code (PD 1067); (5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856); (6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825); (7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979); (8) Executive Order No. 192; (9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969); (10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations; (11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and (12) International Law (1)
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose. The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management Section, Environmental Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that water samples collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational activities, or the SB level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.[4] Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf of other petitioners, testified about the MWSS efforts to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay through the Manila Second Sewerage Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as part of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being conducted on shipgenerated waste treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the cleaning of wastes accumulated or washed to shore. The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision[5] in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.
In particular: Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities. Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste. Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances. Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes but also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution of the bay. Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes. Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the marine life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals. Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay. Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay. Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge companies and require them to have proper facilities
for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the importance of preserving and protecting the environment. Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing. No pronouncement as to damages and costs. SO ORDERED. The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were eventually consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.
On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent the said petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944. Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can be compelled by mandamus.
The CA Sustained the RTC By a Decision[6] of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto,stressing that the trial courts
decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under existing laws.[7] Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45 petition on the following ground and supporting arguments: THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL COLIFORMS.
ARGUMENTS I [SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL II THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.
The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings, Upgrading of Water Qualityand Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents? Andsecond, can petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay? On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral arguments. Our Ruling
We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the premises.
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay Can be Compelled by Mandamus Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty. A ministerial duty is one that requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.[9] It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law. [10] Mandamus is available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.
[8]
Petitioners maintain that the MMDAs duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid waste and liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part of the agency concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located by undertaking feasibility studies and cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion. Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that petitioners duty to comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not require the exercise of discretion. According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for example, to choose which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to contain. By the same token, respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether or not to alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDAs ministerial duty to attend to such services. We agree with respondents. First off, we wish to state that petitioners obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the
other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society v. Atienza[11] in which the Court directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil players to cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called Pandacan Terminals within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect to the instant case, the MMDAs duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. The MMDAs duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the scope of the MMDAs waste disposal services to include:
Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis added.)
The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003,[12] enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the effectivity of the law on February 15, 2001, from using and operating open dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the use of controlled dumps. The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the
power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience.[13] A discretionary duty is one that allows a person to exercise judgment and choose to perform or not to perform. [14] Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposalrelated duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis. A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties. Consider: (1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192,[15] is the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the countrys environment and natural resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand, designates the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, more particularly over all aspects of water quality management. On water pollution, the DENR, under the Acts Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction over all aspects of water pollution, determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects and other pertinent information on pollution, and [takes] measures, using available methods and technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution. The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report, an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan which is nationwide in scope covering theManila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides:
Sec. 19 Lead Agency.The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency responsible for the implementation and enforcement of this Act x x x unless otherwise provided herein. As such, it shall have the following functions, powers and responsibilities: a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the
Department shall thereafter review or revise and publish annually, or as the need arises, said report; b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve (12) months following the completion of the status report; c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within 12 months following the completion of the framework for each designated water management area. Such action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality management area governing board every five (5) years or as need arises.
The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality Management Framework.[16] Within twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action Plan.[17] Again, like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to it under RA 9275. Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR, with the assistance of and in partnership with various government agencies and non-government organizations, has completed, as of December 2005, the final draft of a comprehensive action plan with estimated budget and time frame, denominated as Operation Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay. The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases should more than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them under existing laws. (2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,[18] is vested with jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all waterworks and sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now the cities of Metro Manila and several towns of the provinces of Rizal andCavite, and charged with the duty: (g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be necessary for the proper sanitation and other uses of the cities and towns comprising the System; x x x
(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local water districts. It can prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the operations of these districts and shall monitor and evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct, operate, and furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewerage, waste, and storm water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached agency of the DPWH, is tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection, treatment, and sewage disposal system in the different parts of the country.[19] In relation to the instant petition, the LWUA is mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay. (4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292),[20] is designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances respecting the conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with local government units (LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable basis.[21] Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with the PCG and DENR for the enforcement of water quality standards in marine waters.[22] More specifically, its Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall primarily be responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for the development, management, and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources. (5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national government, is tasked under EO 292[23] to provide integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among others, flood control and water resource development systems in accordance with national development objectives and approved government plans and specifications. In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-wide services relating to flood control and sewerage
management which include the formulation and implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for an integrated flood control, drainage and sewerage system. On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the DPWH and MMDA, whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro Manila. For the rest of the country, DPWH shall remain as the implementing agency for flood control services. The mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage services shall include the removal of structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers, waterways, and esteros (drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent laws. (6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979,[24]or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in accordance with the national rules and policies set by the National Pollution Control Commission upon consultation with the latter for the effective implementation and enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend violators who:
a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or any other floating craft, or other man-made structures at sea, by any method, means or manner, into or upon the territorial and inland navigable waters of the Philippines; b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed into such navigable water; and c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water,
where the same shall be liable to be washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed or increase the level of pollution of such water.
(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990 was signed into law onDecember 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to perform all police functions over the Philippine territorial waters and rivers. Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police functions of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the capability to perform such functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the capability to assume and perform the police functions of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate with regard to the enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. This was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were authorized to enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations.[25] (8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated to establish, develop, regulate, manage and operate a rationalized national port system in support of trade and national development.[26] Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the PPA has police authority within the
ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain its purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the following: xxxx b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles, as well as movement within the port of watercraft.[27]
Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from
Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78,[28] the Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators. When the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it is the PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels. (9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems. It is primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which would necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction.[29] Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently violated are dumping of waste matters in public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or non- biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open dumps as enjoined in RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an environmental compliance certificate. Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition may be allowed when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and playgrounds. The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to rivers, waterways, andesteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that discharge wastewater directly or eventually into the Manila Bay, the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to implement the demolition and removal of such structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in
violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in coordination with the DPWH and concerned agencies. (10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water Code), is tasked to promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that affect the source of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH, in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies, shall formulate guidelines and standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and the establishment and operation of a centralized sewage treatment system. In areas not considered as highly urbanized cities, septage or a mix sewerage-septage management system shall be employed. In accordance with Sec. 72[30] of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.1[31] of Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure the regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by private sludge companies through the strict enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation clearance of sludge collection treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their environmental sanitation permit. (11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), is mandated to integrate subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at all levels.[32] Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, Commission on Higher Education, and Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a nationwide educational campaign to promote the development, management, conservation, and proper use of the environment. Under the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the other hand, it is directed to strengthen the integration of environmental concerns in school curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste management principles.[33] (12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of the Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government funds and revenues so as to effectively achieve the countrys development objectives.[34]
One of the countrys development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among others, to streamline processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to promote environmental strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments and of control mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national program of water quality management that recognizes that issues related to this management cannot be separated from concerns about water sources and ecological protection, water supply, public health, and quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive management program for water pollution focusing on pollution prevention. Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the noble objectives of RA 9275 in line with the countrys development objectives. All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay. Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code encompass the cleanup of water pollution in general, not just specific pollution incidents? Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code Include Cleaning in General The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.

Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain, remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for such pollution.
When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, Cleanup Operations, amended the counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues, however, to be operational.
The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:

SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26 hereof, any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the applicable and prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and clean up any pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that the same water bodies have been rendered unfit for utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event emergency cleanup operations are necessary and the polluter fails to immediately undertake the same, the [DENR] in coordination with other government agencies concerned, shall undertake containment, removal and cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed by the persons found to have caused such pollution under proper administrative determination x x x. Reimbursements of the cost incurred shall be made to the Water Quality Management Fund or to such other funds where said disbursements were sourced.
As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than real since the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the designation of the DENR as lead agency in the cleanup operations. Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern themselves only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general. They aver that the twin provisions
would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines the terms cleanup operations and accidental spills, as follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the discharged or spilled in water to restore it to pre-spillcondition. h. pollutants
Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that result from accidents such as collisions and groundings.
Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the government agencies concerned to undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations of a specific polluted portion or portions of the body of water concerned. They maintain that the application of said Sec. 20 is limited only to water pollution incidents, which are situations that presuppose the occurrence of specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corresponding containment, removal, and cleaning operations. Pushing the point further, they argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires cleanup operations to restore the body of water to pre-spill condition, which means that there must have been a specific incident of either intentional or accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as mentioned in Sec. 62(h). As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting the application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for accidental spills only. Contrary to petitioners posture, respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD 1152 may have indeed covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations of businesses around the Manila Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as among the water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152. To respondents, petitioners parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their narrow reading of their respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup coverage
of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase cleanup operations embodied in Sec. 62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition. As pointed out, the phrases cleanup operations and accidental spills do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the chapter where said section is found. Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage. This section, to stress, commands concerned government agencies, when appropriate, to take such measures as may be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards. In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident. For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is properly applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters account. Petitioners assertion, that they have to perform cleanup operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment Code comes into play and the specific duties of the agencies to clean up come in even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident. In this regard, what the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive program of environmental protection and management. This is better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents.[35]
Granting arguendo that petitioners position thus described vis--vis the implementation of Sec. 20 is correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable certainty who the polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions water pollution incidents which may be caused by polluters in the waters of the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in water bodies or waterways that empty into the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies, which may refer to an individual or an establishment that pollutes the land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that the contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this situation, the water pollution incidents are so numerous and involve nameless and faceless polluters that they can validly be categorized as beyond the specific pollution incident level. Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are so undermanned that it would be almost impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters has been few and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been required to contain, remove, or clean up a given water pollution incident. In this kind of setting, it behooves the Government to step in and undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and purposes a general cleanup situation. The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-term solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching the ManilaBay. Otherwise, any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform, their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the
quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as continuing mandamus,[36] the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the doctrine of continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution.[37] The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures which do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-MarikinaSan Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (NCR) (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the MeycuayanMarilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros which discharge their waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures would be on top of the list. And if the issue of illegal or unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with sustained resolve, then practically all efforts to cleanse these important bodies of water would be for naught. The DENR Secretary said as much.[38] Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or the Water Code,[39]which prohibits the building of structures within a given length along banks of rivers and other waterways. Art. 51 reads:
The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind. (Emphasis added.)
Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing along or near the banks of thePasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they may not be treated as unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments undoubtedly contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the concerned LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial establishments set up, within a reasonable period, the necessary waste water treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their industrial discharge, including their sewage waters, from flowing into the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. After such period, non-complying establishments shall be shut down or asked to transfer their operations. At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to comply with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study on the garbage problem in Metro Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is shocking. Some highlights of the report:
1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila the Payatas, Catmon and Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the earth and poison the surface and groundwater that are used for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment. 2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of human waste in the dump sites and surrounding areas, which is presumably generated by households that lack alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an understatement. 3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and possibly strains of pathogens seeps untreated into ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River systems and Manila Bay.[40]
Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever be established as prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below: Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.No open dumps shall be established and operated, nor any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person, including LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste, be allowed after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years following the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)
RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years which ended on February 21, 2006has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which strictly complies with the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up. In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering, dumping of waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of open dumps, open burning of solid waste, and the like. Some sludge companies which do not have proper disposal facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that ends up in the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which enjoins the pollution of water bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from vessels, and unauthorized transport or dumping into sea waters of sewage or solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the introduction by human or machine of substances to the aquatic environment including dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters, discharge of petroleum or residual products of petroleum of carbonaceous materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid, gaseous or solid substances, from any water, land or air transport or other human-made structure. In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set timetables
for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates. The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila Bay. The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at hand becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different government agencies and instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in cleaning up and rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners hiding behind two untenable claims: (1) that there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty. RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.[41] Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as
humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in them. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but withMODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
In particular: (1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the countrys environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement itsOperational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules. (2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991,[42] the DILG, in exercising the Presidents power of general supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river
systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-MarilaoObando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions. (3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,[43] the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time. (4) Pursuant to RA 9275,[44] the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time. (5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,[45] the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore the marine life of theManila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay. (6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513[46] and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators. (8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay. In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003,[47] Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution. (9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed
septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance. (10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,[48] Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003,[49] the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago. (11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the countrys development objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of our marine waters. (12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of continuing mandamus, shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision. No costs. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC [G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011] METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS,[1] DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME GROUP, AND

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, PETITIONERS, VS. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY, REPRESENTED AND JOINED BY DIVINA V. ILAS, SABINIANO ALBARRACIN, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH DELA PEA, PAUL DENNIS QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA, FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA, SARAH JOELLE LINTAG, HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS, FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, AND JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA, RESPONDENTS. RESOLUTION
VELASCO JR., J.: On December 18, 2008, this Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 171947-48 ordering petitioners to clean up, rehabilitate and preserve Manila Bay in their different capacities. The falloreads: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation. In particular: (1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules. (2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the DILG, in exercising the President's power of general supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-MalabonTullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines and other sanctions. (3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275, the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time. (5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay. (6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay. (7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators. (8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay. In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003, Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution. (9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set up the necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance. (10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003, the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago. (11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of 2010

and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the country's development objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of our marine waters. (12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing mandamus," shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision. SO ORDERED. The government agencies did not file any motion for reconsideration and the Decision became final in January 2009. The case is now in the execution phase of the final and executory December 18, 2008 Decision. The Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive and evaluate the quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies in accordance with said decision and to monitor the execution phase. In the absence of specific completion periods, the Committee recommended that time frames be set for the agencies to perform their assigned tasks. This may be viewed as an encroachment over the powers and functions of the Executive Branch headed by the President of the Philippines. This view is misplaced. The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court. None of the agencies ever questioned the power of the Court to implement the December 18, 2008 Decision nor has any of them raised the alleged encroachment by the Court over executive functions. While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of plans of action, data or status reports, these directives are but part and parcel of the execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Section 47 of Rule 39 reads: Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.--The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows: xxxx (c) In any other litigation between the same parties of their successors in interest,that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto. (Emphasis supplied.) It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what appears upon its face to have been so adjudged but also those matters "actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto." Certainly, any activity that is needed to fully implement a final judgment is necessarily encompassed by said judgment. Moreover, the submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases: Sec. 7. Judgment.--If warranted, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ of continuing mandamus requiring respondent to perform an act or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied and to grant such other reliefs as may be warranted resulting from the wrongful or illegal acts of the respondent. The court shall require the respondent to submit periodic reports detailing the progress and

execution of the judgment, and the court may, by itself or through a commissioner or the appropriate government agency, evaluate and monitor compliance. The petitioner may submit its comments or observations on the execution of the judgment. Sec. 8. Return of the writ.--The periodic reports submitted by the respondent detailing compliance with the judgment shall be contained in partial returns of the writ. Upon full satisfaction of the judgment, a final return of the writ shall be made to the court by the respondent. If the court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. (Emphasis supplied.) With the final and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus issued in MMDAmeans that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the Court's orders, the Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment. There being no encroachment over executive functions to speak of, We shall now proceed to the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee. Several problems were encountered by the Manila Bay Advisory Committee.[2] An evaluation of the quarterly progressive reports has shown that (1) there are voluminous quarterly progressive reports that are being submitted; (2) petitioner-agencies do not have a uniform manner of reporting their cleanup, rehabilitation and preservation activities; (3) as yet no definite deadlines have been set by petitioner DENR as to petitioner-agencies' timeframe for their respective duties; (4) as of June 2010 there has been a change in leadership in both the national and local levels; and (5) some agencies have encountered difficulties in complying with the Court's directives. In order to implement the afore-quoted Decision, certain directives have to be issued by the Court to address the said concerns. Acting on the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee, the Court hereby resolves to ORDER the following: (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), as lead agency in thePhilippine Clean Water Act of 2004, shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the updated Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy. The DENR is ordered to submit summarized data on the overall quality of Manila Bay waters for all four quarters of 2010 on or before June 30, 2011. The DENR is further ordered to submit the names and addresses of persons and companies in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan that generate toxic and hazardous waste on or before September 30, 2011. (2) On or before June 30, 2011, the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) shall order the Mayors of all cities in Metro Manila; the Governors of Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan; and the Mayors of all the cities and towns in said provinces to inspect all factories, commercial establishments and private homes along the banks of the major river systems--such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (Paranaque-Zapote, Las Pinas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, and the Laguna De Bay--and other minor rivers and waterways within their jurisdiction that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay and the lands abutting it, to determine if they have wastewater treatment facilities and/or hygienic septic tanks, as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, rules and regulations. Said local government unit (LGU) officials are given up to September 30, 2011 to finish the inspection of said establishments and houses.

In case of non-compliance, the LGU officials shall take appropriate action to ensure compliance by noncomplying factories, commercial establishments and private homes with said law, rules and regulations requiring the construction or installment of wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks. The aforementioned governors and mayors shall submit to the DILG on or before December 31, 2011 their respective compliance reports which will contain the names and addresses or offices of the owners of all the non-complying factories, commercial establishments and private homes, copy furnished the concerned environmental agency, be it the local DENR office or the Laguna Lake Development Authority. The DILG is required to submit a five-year plan of action that will contain measures intended to ensure compliance of all non-complying factories, commercial establishments, and private homes. On or before June 30, 2011, the DILG and the mayors of all cities in Metro Manila shall consider providing land for the wastewater facilities of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) or its concessionaires (Maynilad and Manila Water, Inc.) within their respective jurisdictions. (3) The MWSS shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the list of areas in Metro Manila, Rizal and Cavite that do not have the necessary wastewater treatment facilities. Within the same period, the concessionaires of the MWSS shall submit their plans and projects for the construction of wastewater treatment facilities in all the aforesaid areas and the completion period for said facilities, which shall not go beyond 2037. On or before June 30, 2011, the MWSS is further required to have its two concessionaires submit a report on the amount collected as sewerage fees in their respective areas of operation as of December 31, 2010. (4) The Local Water Utilities Administration is ordered to submit on or before September 30, 2011 its plan to provide, install, operate and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities in said cities and towns and the completion period for said works, which shall be fully implemented by December 31, 2020. (5) The Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 a report on areas in Manila Bay where marine life has to be restored or improved and the assistance it has extended to the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan in developing the fisheries and aquatic resources in Manila Bay. The report shall contain monitoring data on the marine life in said areas. Within the same period, it shall submit its five-year plan to restore and improve the marine life in Manila Bay, its future activities to assist the aforementioned LGUs for that purpose, and the completion period for said undertakings. The DA shall submit to the Court on or before September 30, 2011 the baseline data as of September 30, 2010 on the pollution loading into the Manila Bay system from agricultural and livestock sources. (6) The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) shall incorporate in its quarterly reports the list of violators it has apprehended and the status of their cases. The PPA is further ordered to include in its report the names, make and capacity of the ships that dock in PPA ports. The PPA shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the measures it intends to undertake to implement its compliance with paragraph 7 of the dispositive portion of the MMDA Decision and the completion dates of such measures. The PPA should include in its report the activities of its concessionaire that collects and disposes of the solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes, which shall state the names, make and capacity of the ships serviced by it since August 2003 up to the present date, the dates the ships docked at PPA ports, the number of days the ship was at sea with the corresponding number of passengers and crew per trip, the volume of solid, liquid and other wastes collected from said ships, the treatment undertaken and the disposal site for said wastes. (7) The Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group shall submit on or before June 30, 2011 its five-year

plan of action on the measures and activities it intends to undertake to apprehend the violators of Republic Act No. (RA) 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 and other pertinent laws, ordinances and regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the successful prosecution of violators. The Philippine Coast Guard shall likewise submit on or before June 30, 2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and activities they intend to undertake to apprehend the violators of Presidential Decree No. 979 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976 and RA 9993 or the Philippine Coast Guard Law of 2009 and other pertinent laws and regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the successful prosecution of violators. (8) The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the informal settlers in Metro Manila who, as of December 31, 2010, own and occupy houses, structures, constructions and other encroachments established or built along the PasigMarikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-MalabonTullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways andesteros, in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws. On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit its plan for the removal of said informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid houses, structures, constructions and encroachments, as well as the completion dates for said activities, which shall be fully implemented not later than December 31, 2015. The MMDA is ordered to submit a status report, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Resolution, on the establishment of a sanitary landfill facility for Metro Manila in compliance with the standards under RA 9003 or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act. On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit a report of the location of open and controlled dumps in Metro Manila whose operations are illegal after February 21, 2006,[3] pursuant to Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003, and its plan for the closure of these open and controlled dumps to be accomplished not later than December 31, 2012. Also, on or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, as Chairperson of the National Solid Waste Management Commission (NSWMC), shall submit a report on the location of all open and controlled dumps in Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan. On or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as NSWMC Chairperson, shall submit a report on whether or not the following landfills strictly comply with Secs. 41 and 42 of RA 9003 on the establishment and operation of sanitary landfills, to wit: National Capital Region 1. Navotas SLF (PhilEco), Brgy. Tanza (New Site), Navotas City 2. Payatas Controlled Dumpsite, Barangay Payatas, Quezon City Region III 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. Sitio Coral, Brgy. Matictic, Norzagaray, Bulacan Sitio Tiakad, Brgy. San Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan Brgy. Minuyan, San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan Brgy. Mapalad, Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija Sub-zone Kalangitan, Clark Capas, Tarlac Special Economic Zone
Region IV-A 8. Kalayaan (Longos), Laguna 9. Brgy. Sto. Nino, San Pablo City, Laguna 10. Brgy. San Antonio (Pilotage SLF), San Pedro, Laguna 11. Morong, Rizal

12. Sitio Lukutan, Brgy. San Isidro, Rodriguez (Montalban), Rizal (ISWIMS) 13. Brgy. Pintong Bukawe, San Mateo, Rizal (SMSLFDC) On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA and the seventeen (17) LGUs in Metro Manila are ordered to jointly submit a report on the average amount of garbage collected monthly per district in all the cities in Metro Manila from January 2009 up to December 31, 2010 vis- -vis the average amount of garbage disposed monthly in landfills and dumpsites. In its quarterly report for the last quarter of 2010 and thereafter, MMDA shall report on the apprehensions for violations of the penal provisions of RA 9003, RA 9275 and other laws on pollution for the said period. On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the LGUs in Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan shall submit the names and addresses of the informal settlers in their respective areas who, as of September 30, 2010, own or occupy houses, structures, constructions, and other encroachments built along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna de Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay, in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws. On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the aforesaid LGUs shall jointly submit their plan for the removal of said informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid structures, constructions and encroachments, as well as the completion dates for such activities which shall be implemented not later than December 31, 2012. (9) The Department of Health (DOH) shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the owners of septic and sludge companies including those that do not have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall implement rules and regulations on Environmental Sanitation Clearances and shall require companies to procure a license to operate from the DOH. The DOH and DENR-Environmental Management Bureau shall develop a toxic and hazardous waste management system by June 30, 2011 which will implement segregation of hospital/toxic/hazardous wastes and prevent mixing with municipal solid waste. On or before June 30, 2011, the DOH shall submit a plan of action to ensure that the said companies have proper disposal facilities and the completion dates of compliance. (10) The Department of Education (DepEd) shall submit to the Court on or before May 31, 2011 a report on the specific subjects on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection, environmental laws and the like that it has integrated into the school curricula in all levels for the school year 2011-2012. On or before June 30, 2011, the DepEd shall also submit its plan of action to ensure compliance of all the schools under its supervision with respect to the integration of the aforementioned subjects in the school curricula which shall be fully implemented by June 30, 2012. (11) All the agencies are required to submit their quarterly reports electronically using the forms below. The agencies may add other key performance indicators that they have identified. SO ORDERED.

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Republic vs Sandiganbayan 407 scra 10

Republic vs Sandiganbayan 407 scra 10

Republic vs Sandiganbayan 407 scra 10

Republic vs Sandiganbayan 407 scra 10

Republic vs Sandiganbayan 407 scra 10

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G.R No. 187167

We left unacted petitioners prayer for an injunctive writ.

The petition raises the following issues:

2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

On the Threshold Issues

Petitioners Possess Locus Standi as Citizens

The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition

Are Proper Remedies to Test the Constitutionality of Statutes

RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional

Delineate Philippine Territory

Petitioners theory fails to persuade us.

Exclusive Economic Zone TOTAL 440,994 382,669

Statutory Claim Over Sabah under RA 5446 Retained

RA 9522 and the Philippines Maritime Zones

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

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