ESMILLA, KATRINA SHANE Logical Fallacies

An Encyclopedia of Errors of Reasoning

The ability to identify logical fallacies in the arguments of others, and to avoid them in ones own arguments, is both valuable and increasingly rare. Fallacious reasoning keeps us from knowing the truth, and the inability to think critically makes us vulnerable to manipulation by those skilled in the art of rhetoric.

What is a Logical Fallacy?

A logical fallacy is, roughly speaking, an error of reasoning. When someone adopts a position, or tries to persuade someone else to adopt a position, based on a bad piece of reasoning, they commit a fallacy. I say roughly speaking because this definition has a few problems, the most important of which are outlined below. Some logical fallacies are more common than others, and so have been named and defined. When people speak of logical fallacies they often mean to refer to this collection of well-known errors of reasoning, rather than to fallacies in the broader, more technical sense given above.

Formal and Informal Fallacies

There are several different ways in which fallacies may be categorised. Its possible, for instance, to distinguish between formal fallacies and informal fallacies.

Formal Fallacies (Deductive Fallacies)

Philosophers distinguish between two types of argument: deductive and inductive. For each type of argument, there is a different understanding of what counts as a fallacy. Deductive arguments are supposed to be water-tight. For a deductive argument to be a good one (to be valid) it must be absolutely impossible for both its premises to be true and its conclusion to be false. With a good deductive argument, that simply cannot happen; the truth of the premises entails the truth of the conclusion. The classic example of a deductively valid argument is: (1) All men are mortal. (2) Socrates is a man. Therefore: (3) Socrates is mortal. It is simply not possible that both (1) and (2) are true and (3) is false, so this argument is deductively valid. Any deductive argument that fails to meet this (very high) standard commits a logical error, and so, technically, is fallacious. This includes many arguments that we would usually accept as good arguments, arguments that make their conclusions highly probable, but not certain. Arguments of this kind, arguments that arent deductively valid, are said to commit a formal fallacy.

Informal Fallacies
Inductive arguments neednt be as rigorous as deductive arguments in order to be good arguments. Good inductive arguments lend support to their conclusions, but even if their premises are true then that doesnt establish with 100% certainty that their conclusions are

true. Even a good inductive argument with true premises might have a false conclusion; that the argument is a good one and that its premises are true only establishes that its conclusion is probably true. All inductive arguments, even good ones, are therefore deductively invalid, and so fallacious in the strictest sense. The premises of an inductive argument do not, and are not intended to, entail the truth of the arguments conclusion, and so even the best inductive argument falls short of deductive validity. Because all inductive arguments are technically invalid, different terminology is needed to distinguish good and bad inductive arguments than is used to distinguish good and bad deductive arguments (else every inductive argument would be given the bad label: invalid). The terms most often used to distinguish good and bad inductive arguments are strong and weak. An example of a strong inductive argument would be: (1) Every day to date the law of gravity has held. Therefore: (2) The law of gravity will hold tomorrow. Arguments that fail to meet the standards required of inductive arguments commit fallacies in addition to formal fallacies. It is these informal fallacies that are most often described by guides to good thinking, and that are the primary concern of most critical thinking courses and of this site.

Logical and Factual Errors

Arguments consist of premises, inferences, and conclusions. Arguments containing bad inferences, i.e. inferences where the premises dont give adequate support for the conclusion drawn, can certainly be called fallacious. What is less clear is whether arguments containing false premises but which are otherwise fine should be called fallacious. If a fallacy is an error of reasoning, then strictly speaking such arguments are not fallacious; their reasoning, their logic, is sound. However, many of the traditional fallacies are of just this kind. Its therefore best to define fallacy in a way that includes them; this site will therefore use the word fallacy in a broad sense, including both formal and informal fallacies, and both logical and factual errors.

Taxonomy of Fallacies
Once it has been decided what is to count as a logical fallacy, the question remains as to how the various fallacies are to be categorised. The most common classification of fallacies groups fallacies of relevance, of ambiguity, and ofpresumption. Arguments that commit fallacies of relevance rely on premises that arent relevant to the truth of the conclusion. The various irrelevant appeals are all fallacies of relevance, as are ad hominems. Arguments that commit fallacies of ambiguity, such as equivocation or the straw man fallacy, manipulate language in misleading ways. Arguments that commit fallacies of presumption contain false premises, and so fail to establish their conclusion. For example, arguments based on a false dilemma orcircular arguments both commit fallacies of presumption. These categories have to be treated quite loosely. Some fallacies are difficult to place in any category; others belong in two or three. The No True Scotsmanfallacy, for example, could be classified either as a fallacy of ambiguity (an attempt to switch definitions of Scotsman) or as a fallacy of presumption (it begs the question, reinterpreting the evidence to fit its conclusion rather than forming its conclusion on the basis of the evidence).

Philosophy 103: Introduction to Logic Syllogistic Fallacies: Four Term Fallacy

Abstract: The Four Term Fallacy or Fallacy of Equivocation is explained. Strictly speaking, an argument which commits this fallacy cannot be a syllogism by definition because the argument contains more than three terms.

I.. Consider the following argument: "A poor lesson is better than a good lesson because a poor lesson is better than nothing, and nothing is better than a good lesson." A. Note how in the following argument we have an uncomfortable feeling that the argument seems good with true premisses, but the conclusion is obviously false. Often, we smile at arguments like these because we know something is drastically wrong, but it is not initially intuitively obvious what it is. Knowing that a valid argument cannot have true premisses and a false conclusion, and yet the argument appears to be perfectly valid, is a tip-off for the presence of the fallacy of equivocation. Nothing is better than a good lesson. A poor lesson is better than nothing. A poor lesson is better than a good lesson. B. Obviously, there is something wrong with this syllogism; this is evident from its humorous appearance. When we sketch a diagram, without attending to the meaning of the classes, it is clear that the diagram would appear valid. How is this possible?

C. Although the argument does not translate very well into standard form categorical propositions, if we attempt to do so, we can see that the classes do not match. The word "nothing" is being used in two different senses. One attempt at translation yields: No [lessons] are [things better than good lessons.] All [poor lessons] are [things better than no lessons at all.] All [poor lessons] are [things better than good lessons.]

Notice that we have more than three terms--our middle term does not match. Hence, we cannot get a valid diagram:

D. Fallacy of Four Terms occurs when a categorical syllogism contains more than three terms. More commonly, the fallacy of four terms is called from the point of view of informal logic, the fallacy of equivocation. 1. Rule: A valid standard from categorical syllogism must contain exactly three terms, each of which is used in the same sense throughout the argument.

2. With more than three terms, no connection can be established from which a conclusion can be drawn. Informally, the idea of the syllogism is that two things related to the same thing ought to be related to each other.

3. If, for example, the M term is being used in two different senses, then the M term denotes two different classes and so cannot link together theS and P terms. Note: Not just the middle term is subject to equivocation, as in this example; any of the terms in a syllogism might have be used in two different senses. 4. Before testing any syllogism, be sure to read and understand what is being adduced; otherwise, the four term fallacy could possibly be overlooked.

Philosophy 103: Introduction to Logic Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle Term

Abstract: The Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle Term is discussed and illustrated.

I. We continue our study of the syllogistic fallacies with a second common fallacy. A. Note, how in the following argument, about the only persons likely to be sympathetic are those who dislike Senator Jones. (Notice that singular statements are treated as universal affirmative propositions.) All [Communists] are [believers in heavy taxes]. [Senator Jones] is a [believer in heavy taxes]. [Senator Jones] is a [Communist].

The Venn Diagram would be sketched like this:

B. It is fairly evident that for the conclusion to follow logically, one would have to presuppose instead that "All believers in heavy taxes are Communists," not "All Communists are believers in heavy taxes." Notice that the former statement would distributethe term "believers in heavy taxes." But this distribution is not what is asserted in the original argument. In the original argument, the middle term is undistributed in both premisses.

C. Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle Term occurs when the middle term is undistributed in both premisses. 1. Rule: In a valid standard form categorical syllogism, the middle term must be distributed in at least one premiss. 2. Reason: for the two terms of the conclusion to be connected through the third, as in the mechanism sketched below, at least one of them must be related to the whole of the class designated by the middle term. Otherwise, the connection might be with different parts of the middle term, as illustrated below, and no connection can be made.

3. Note: Remember for the Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle Term to occur, the middle term must be undistributed in both premisses, not just one premiss.

Philosophy 103: Introduction to Logic Syllogistic Fallacies: Fallacy of the Illicit Minor Term and Fallacy of the Illicit Major Term
I. We continue our discussion of the syllogistic fallacies with the third and fourth fallacies on our list. Consider the following argument. All [subversives]D are [radicals]U. No [Republicans]D are [subversives]D. No [Republicans]D are [radicals]D.

A. We can see from the Venn Diagrams corresponding to this argument that this argument is fallacious.

B. When we plug in the distribution statuses for the classes in each argument from the chart learned when we studied categorical propositions, we notice something interesting.

C. Notice how in the argument, the major term "P-radicals" is undistributed in the major premiss, but is distributed in the conclusion. 1. Since a term is said to be "undistributed" when not every member of the class is being referred to, and a term is said to be "distributed" when each

and every member of the class is being referred to, we are reasoning from information about part of a class to information about the whole of the class. 2. When reasoning from a few instances to a conclusion involving all instances, we are, metaphorically speaking, committing the fallacy of converse accident. That is, in the premiss, we are referring to "some radicals" and then reasoning to "all radicals" in the conclusion. Another way of looking at this fallacy is to compare the process with subalternation on the Square of Opposition. We are moving from a subaltern being true (some radicals) to a superaltern being undetermined (all radicals) in truth value . 3. Since this fallacious reasoning involves the major term in the syllogism, the fallacy committed there is termed the Illicit Process of the Major Term or Illicit Major, for short. D. The Fallacy of the Illicit Major occurs when the major term is undistributed in the premiss but is distributed in the conclusion (but not vice versa!). E. The second argument is as follows. All [good citizens]D are [nationalists]U All [good citizens]D are [progressives]U All [progressives]D are [nationalists]U

1. We can see from the Venn Diagram for this argument that it is fallacious.

2. When we plug in the distribution statuses for the classes in each argument from the chart learned when we studied categorical propositions, we notice something interesting.

F. Notice how in the argument, the minor term "S-progressives" is undistributed in the minor premiss, but is distributed in the conclusion. 1. As in the first argument above, we are moving from referring to some of the progressives in the premiss to referring to all of the progressives in the conclusion 3. Since this fallacious reasoning involves the minor term in the syllogism, the fallacy committed there is termed the Illicit Process of the Minor Term or Illicit Minor, for short.

G. The Fallacy of the Illicit Minor occurs when the minor term is undistributed in the premiss but is distributed in the conclusion (but not vice versa). Rule: In a valid standard form categorical syllogism no term can be distributed in the conclusion unless it is also distributed in the premisses... Reason: ...otherwise the conclusion would assert more than what is contained in the premisses.

Philosophy 103: Introduction to Logic Syllogistic Fallacies: Exclusive Premisses

Abstract: The Fallacy of Two Negative Premisses or Exclusive Premisses is illustrated and explained.

I. We continue our study of fallacies with a fifth fallacy. Consider the following argument. "No internal combustion engines are nonpolluting power plants, and no nonpolluting power plants are safe devices. Therefore, no internal combustion engines are safe devices." A. First, let's put the argument in standard form:
M P

No [nonpolluting power plants] are [safe devices].

S M

No [internal combustion engines] are [nonpolluting power plants].

S P

No [internal combustion engines] are [safe devices].

1. The Venn diagram shows this argument to be invalid.

2. Note that both premisses are negative. As most people are intuitively aware, about what a thing is not, do not carry much information about what that thing is. If I say I am thinking of something that is not a tree, you would not know very much about what I am thinking. 3. By referring to the mnemonic of the mechanism of the syllogism sketched here, we can surmise that the basis of the syllogism is captured by noting that two things related to the same thing should be somehow related to each other, if at least one of them is totally related.

4. However, when both premisses are negative, our mnemonic shows the classes are not related in some way to each other, and this information is of no use to see how the terms in the conclusion are related. This state of affairs can be illustrated as follows. B. This Rule of Quality states that no standard form syllogism with two negative premisses is valid. 1. The fallacy is called either the Fallacy of Exclusive Premisses or the Fallacy of Two Negative Premisses. 2. Reason: When a syllogism has exclusive premisses, all that is being asserted is that S is wholly or partially excluded from part or all of the M class, likewise for the P class; but since this statement is true for every possible syllogism, the premisses entail no information. 3. Note that you can detect the fallacy of Exclusive Premisses merely by inspecting the mood of the syllogism. Test yourself on the following examples. Philosophy 103: Introduction to Logic Syllogistic Fallacies: Affirmative Conclusions from a Negative Premiss
Abstract: The Fallacy of the Affirmative Conclusion From a Negative Premiss is explained and illustrated.

I. The following argument illustrates another one of our syllogistic fallacies. "Some laborites are democrats, because All blue collar workers are laborites, and some blue collar workers are not democrats. A. When we set up this argument in a standard form and order syllogism, we obtain ... Some [blue-collar workers] are not [democrats]. All [blue-collar workers] are [laborites]. Some [laborites] are [democrats].

1. The Venn diagram shows this argument to be invalid.

2. The mnemonic mechanism of the syllogism suggests why this argument is invalid. We can't make the affirmative link between S and P.

B. Intuitively, most of us think that if a conclusion is negative, then one premiss must be negative as well, and if the conclusion is affirmative, neither premiss could be negative in a valid argument. This intuition is correct.

II. The second quality rule is if either of the premisses of a valid standard form syllogism is negative, then the conclusion must also be negative. A. Reason: If an affirmative conclusion is entailed, then both premisses must be statements of class inclusion. Since class inclusion is only obtained by affirmative statements, if the conclusion has one class is partly or wholly contained in the other, then the premisses must assert that the middle class is contained by the minor class and contained in the major class. B. The Fallacy of Drawing an Affirmative Conclusion from a Negative Premiss is the resultant fallacy, if the rule does not hold. C. Note: the syllogism does not have to be in standard form for use to be able to spot this fallacy. All that we need to see is the mood. Test your understanding by trying the following problems. AEA-2 IOI-3 EEA-4 EAE-1

IAO-1

OIO-3

Philosophy 103: Introduction to Logic Syllogistic Fallacies: Existential Fallacy

Abstract: The Existential Fallacy is illustrated and explained.

I. The final fallacy of the syllogistic fallacies is illustrated in the following argument: "Since no rigid levers are flexible things, Some rigid levers are not elastic bars because all elastic bars are flexible things." A. When set up in standard form and order the syllogism looks like this: All [elastic bars] are [flexible things]. No [rigid levers] are [flexible things]. Some [rigid levers] are not [elastic bars].

1. The Venn Diagram for this argument raises some interesting issues. How would you evaluate the following argument? Is it valid?

2. According to our interpretation of the symbols used in Venn diagrams, we would have to have an "X" in the SMP area, but there is no "X" there. The blank space indicates no information is known about that area. 3. If we had independent information concerning the existence of rigid levers, we would know that at least one rigid lever existed, and this one would have to be in the SMP area of the diagram.

4. However, if we are evaluating the argument as given and we do not assume anything else, we cannot validly get to the conclusion from these premisses. B. On the Boolean interpretation of categorical syllogisms, we cannot assume the existence of individuals mentioned in universal statements. If our language, if we want to assert that individuals exist, we must say so by adding a particular statement. 1. On this convention, the word "some" when used in a particular statement is taken to imply at least one of the individuals exists. 2. In sum, then, universal statements do not imply that the classes exist, whereas particular statements do imply that the classes exist. 3. We take this interpretation in our logic here so that arguments can be presented concerning subjects about ideal or nonexistent objects such as frictionless planes, ideal gasses, and black bodies. II. Rule (Boolean Interpretation): No valid standard form categorical syllogism with a particular premiss can have both premisses universal. A. Reason: If the rule were not followed, then we would go from premisses which have no existential import to a conclusion that does have existential import. The problem of existential importcan be illustrated by Venn Diagrams. B. The Existential Fallacy occurs whenever a standard form syllogism has two universal premisses and a particular conclusion.

Three Types of Syllogisms: 1. Categorical: This is that 2. Hypothetical: If this, then that 3. Disjunctive: Either this or that

Hypothetical Syllogisms 1. Modus Ponens = Affirming the Antecedent 2. Modus Tollens = Denying the Consequent Example: If Jesus is God, then we should worship Him. Jesus is God. Therefore, we should worship Him. Example: If Jesus is God, then we should worship Him. Jesus is God. Therefore, we should worship Him.

Symbolic Language: 1. 2. 3. G G W

Modus Tollens = Denying the Consequent If humans are perfect, then they do not need a Savior. They do not (not) need a Savior. Therefore, humans are not perfect.

Modus Tollens = Denying the Consequent If humans are perfect, then they do not need a Savior. They do not (not) need a Savior. Therefore, humans are not perfect. 1. 2. 3. P --S -P -S

Hypothetical Syllogism Fallacies Denying the Antecedent If.

Affirming the Consequent then.

Example: Denying the Antecedent 1. If Jesus is not human, then He is God. 2. Jesus is not (not) human. 3. Therefore, Jesus is not God.

Example: Affirming the Consequent 1. If reincarnation is true, then past- life regression therapy will work. 2. Past-life regression therapy works. 3. Therefore, reincarnation is true.

1. If God exists, then mankind has meaning in life. 2. Mankind has meaning in life. 3. Therefore, God exists. 4. If the Bible is the Word of God, then it is inerrant. 5. The Bible is the Word of God. 6. It is inerrant. 7. If Jesus did not rise from the dead, then we are lost in our sin. 8. It is not the case that Christ did not rise from the dead. 9. We are not lost in our sins. 10. If evolution is true, then the second law of thermodynamics is wrong. 11. But the second law of thermodynamics is not wrong. 12. Evolution is not true.

Affirming a Disjunct Alias:

Affirming One Disjunct The Fallacy of the Alternative Syllogism Asserting an Alternative Improper Disjunctive Syllogism

Type: Fallacy of Propositional Logic Forms p or q. p. Therefore, not-q. p or q. q. Therefore, not-p.

Similar Validating Forms (Disjunctive Syllogism) p or q. Not-p. Therefore, q. p or q Not-q. Therefore, p.

Examples Today is Saturday or Sunday. Today is Saturday or Sunday. Today is Saturday. Today is Sunday. Therefore, today is not Sunday. Therefore, today is not Saturday.
Exposition:

Affirming a Disjunct is a non-validating form of argument when "or" is inclusive (see below), as it is standardly interpreted in propositional logic. As with other propositional fallacies, an argument which affirms a disjunct is most likely to seemvalid when we take into consideration some further information not explicitly mentioned in the argument. In the case of Affirming a Disjunct, this is: Suppressed Premiss: Not both p and q. If we have some reason to believe that the two disjuncts are contraries, then the argument may be a valid enthymeme. In contrast, if we cannot rule out the truth of both disjuncts, then the argument is fallacious.
Exposure:

Most logic texts claim that "or" has two meanings: 1. Inclusive (or "weak") disjunction: One or both of the disjuncts is true, which is what is meant by the "and/or" of legalese. 2. Exclusive (or "strong") disjunction: Exactly one of the disjuncts is true. As a form of argument, Affirming One Disjunct is perfectly valid for the exclusive sense of "or". It is only for the inclusive sense that it is a nonvalidating form. For this reason, if the textbook account is correct, there is a problem of ambiguity in the above two argument forms, which faces the application of Affirming One Disjunct as a fallacy. In order to accuse an argument of committing this fallacy, we must determine in which sense the "or" in the first premiss is used. Linguistic Fallacies Linguistic fallacies, or fallacies in the language, are due to the ambiguity of or lack of preciseness in the words or phrases used to express ideas. It is this ambiguity that leads one into making wrong conclusions or inferences. There are six linguistic fallacies: equivocation, amphiboly or amphibology, accent, composition, division, and figure of speech or parallel-word construction. Composition and division are sometimes treated as one fallacy; we have found a very good discussion on the difference of the two.

1. Equivocation Definition: [a fallacy that] results from using a word or phrase in more than one sense, playing with a double meaning, or changing the connotation or meaning of a word in the course of the argument, all the while implying the a [sic] the word means exactly the same thing all the way through the argument. [1] Examples:

Only a man can reason. Since Mary is not a man, she cannot reason. [1] A plane is a carpenter's tool, and the Boeing 737 is a plane, hence the Boeing 737 is a carpenter's tool. [2]

2. Amphibology / Amphiboly Definition: [a fallacy which] is committed by using a statement which allows two interpretations either because of the physical grammatical structure (syntax) of the sentence, or because a word or phrase can have two possible meanings, causing the entire statement to be understood in two different ways. [1] Examples:

That book cannot be understood by a single person. [1] Save soap and waste paper. [3]

3. Accent Definition: [a fallacy that occurs when] emphasis is used to suggest a meaning different from the actual content of the proposition. [4] Examples:

My spouse must be cheating on me -- he told me "I don't really love you now." [5] "They think it will work." vs. "They think it will work." [1]

4. Composition Definition: [a fallacy characterized by] arguing (a) that what is true of each part of a whole is also (necessarily) true of the whole itself, or (b) what is true of some parts is also (necessary) true of the whole itself. [6] Examples:

The human body is made up of atoms, which are invisible. Therefore, the human body is invisible. [9] A car made from the highest quality part from every other car in the world would be a really great automobile. [1]

5. Division
Definition: [a fallacy characterized by] arguing that what is true of a whole is (a) also (necessarily) true of its parts and/or (b) also true of some of its parts. [6] Examples:

The community of Pacific Palisades is extremely wealthy. Therefore, every person living there is (must be) extremely wealthy. [6] People are made out of atoms. People are visible. Therefore, atoms are visible. [10]

6. Figure of Speech or Parallel-Word Construction Definition: [a fallacy characterized by] ambiguities due to the fact that different words in Greek (and in Latin) may have different cases or genders even though the case endings or gender endings are the same. Since this is not widespread in other languages or since it coincides with other fallacies (e.g. equivocation, see above) writers tend to interpret it very broadly. [11] Examples:

"Activists have been labeled as idealists, sadists, anarchists, communists, and just about any name that can come to mind ending in -ist, likesamok-ist, sabaist, bad-ist, and of course, who could forget devil-ist?" [12] (The writer has the unsaid argument that any name ending in -ist is viewed as "trouble-makers" by our society.) An introductory book on philosophy has an appendix entitle "List of Isms" the proceeds to list the schools of thought in philosophy. [13] (Not all words that end in -ism is a school of thought: take for example, syllogism.)

Composition vs. Division These two fallacies could be sometimes difficult to differentiate from each other. We have found a very good discussion on how to separate one from the other. The form of the fallacy of composition is the following: All of the parts of the object O have the property P. Therefore, O has the property P. (Where the property P is one which does not distribute from parts to a whole.) [9] While the form of the fallacy of division is the following: The object O has the property P. Therefore, all of the parts of O have the property P. (Where the property P is one which does not distribute from a whole to its parts.) [10] Therefore, to distinguish composition from division, you need only note the direction of the conclusion. If the arguments proceed from the members of a whole, concluding that the whole is such-and-such because the parts it is made up is such-and-such, the fallacy is of composition.

On the other hand, when we conclude that a thing is such-and-such because it is a member of a group which is such-and-such, we are committing a fallacy of division. Always take note however that the property must not be expansive (parts --> whole) for composition or dissective (whole --> parts) for division. If these are not satisfied then we do not have a fallacy.