Targeted killing is a morally permissible foreign policy tool.

I affirm. The affirmative confines the topic to targeted killings against terrorists. The VALUE is MORALITY. The STANDARD is MAXIMIZING THE PROTECTION OF LIFE.

Contention 1: Targeted Killings stop terrorism

Uyl and Rasmussen 1981 say Rand has spoken of the ultimate end as the standard by which all other ends are evaluated. When the ends to be evaluated are chosen ones the ultimate end is the standard for moral evaluation. Life as the sort of thing a living entity is, then, is the ultimate standard of value; and since only human beings are capable of choosing their ends, it is the life as a human being-man's life qua man-that is the standard for moral evaluation.
AND, Killing terrorist leaders leaves the terrorists in disarray. Solis in 2007 writes Killing senior terrorists, expert bomb makers, and those who provide philosophical guidance for terrorists may spare countless noncombatant victims while, at the same time, forgoing risk to friendly combatant forces. A successful targeted killing removes a dangerous enemy from the battlefield and deprives the foe of his leadership, guidance, and experience. The targeted killing of terrorist leaders leaves subordinates confused and in disarray, however temporarily. Successors will feel trepidation, knowing they too may be in the enemys sights. Targeted killing unbalances terrorist organizations, making them concerned with protecting their own membership and diverting them from their goals.

Contention 2: Targeted killings lead to less civilian casualties. Ulrich writes:

The foregoing examination of the basic requirements of the law of armed conflict reveals, in the words of one commentator, that "targeted

killing is the most natural application of the principles of jus in bello in wars against terror." n112 The practice of assassination, even when justified by the exigencies and laws of war, is not often viewed as a morally defensible use of force. And yet, the comparatively widespread acceptance of the higher combatant deaths and collateral damage associated with conventional conflict is more at odds with the basic jus in bello precept of limited war: The moral legitimacy of targeted killing becomes even clearer when compared to the alternative means of fighting terror - that is, the massive invasion of the community that shelters and supports the

terrorists in an attempt to catch or kill the terrorists and destroy their [*1054] infrastructure... Hence,
targeted killing is the preferable method not only because, on a utilitarian calculation, it saves lives - a very weighty moral consideration - but also because it is more commensurate with a fundamental condition of justified self-defense, namely, that those killed are responsible for the threat posed. n113 Targeted

killing preserves not only the lives of civilians caught up in the conflict by combatants who often refuse to fight in the open, but also those of the troops who must engage these terrorists. n114 By directing the use of force at only those individuals who threaten U.S. soldiers and civilians, targeted killing more efficiently destroys the terrorists' ability to wage war and inflict terror, while ensuring that collateral damage is kept to a minimum. This is the very essence of limited war as prescribed by jus in bello.

AND, targeted killings are better than the alternatives. Statman in 2003 writes assassination does involve some moral risk, it also has a chance of achieving better results from a moral point of view. Think of a battle in a conventional war against an enemy unit. Assume it can be won either by bombing the unit from the air, killing 200 soldiers, or by having its headquarters targeted by an intelligent missile, killing most of the commanders of the unit say, 25 officers. If both tactics could achieve the same result, then surely the second tactic should be morally preferred. Similarly, if Bin Laden and 30 of his close partners had been targeted, that would have been far better than killing thousands of people and causing enormous damage in Afghanistan, in a war whose contribution to the cessation of world terror is
Third, while far from clear.

Contention 3: Targeted killing uses people as a means to an end. Kamm 2005 writes If we treat people as tools who are available in order to promote our ends, we are treating people in a way that is inconsistent with their dignity as, what Immanuel Kant cal97led, "ends-in-themselves."3 Persons are not to be used as mere means, in a way that is useful to us but sets back their interests to a great degree. However, suppose that we proceed by using means that are morally permissible, just considered in their own right, while knowing that despite all efforts to avoid bad side effects, we foresee that deaths will occur. According to this justification of the DDE, it may be permissible not to constrain our behavior in the light of the interests of others, if we do not treat them as mere tools available for our use.
One approach to justifying the DDE takes into account the dignity of persons in order to distinguish foreseen deaths from intended deaths."

However, sometimes it is not possible to carry out a war harming combatants. In such cases, rather than calling off the war, it only has been thought, it might be morally permissible to harm non combatants. This takes us to the second important principle involved in jus in bello. The doctrine that is typically relied on to explain what one may or may not do to noncombatants, when one has not been able to is known as the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE). This has a long history as a general moral principle, but it has been made use of in just war theory in particular. The DDE claims that there is a significant moral distinction between intending harm as an end or a means, even a means to a greater good, and doing some act that you foresee will, with certainty cause just as much

harm, but merely as a side effect. The latter is sometimes referred to (unfortunately) as "collateral damage,

Thus, I affirm.