NALSAR UNIVERSITY OF LAW, HYDERABAD

SUBJECT: PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW PROJECT WORK ON THE TOPIC: ISSUES & CONTROVERSIES OF RECENT INDO-US NUCLEAR AGREEMENT

SUBMISSION TO: PROFESSOR V. BALAKISTA REDDY (PROFESSOR OF LAW & PROCTOR)

SUBMITTED BY: PARUL PRASAD 1 YEAR LL.M COURSE ROLL NUM: 2012-28 DATE: 9/10/2012
ST

Table of Contents
HYPOTHESIS ..................................................................................................................... 3 A BRIEF OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................... 4 BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................. 6 WHAT IS A 123 AGREEMENT? ........................................................................................... 8 IMPORTANT FEATURES OF THE AGREEMENT .................................................................. 11 WHAT ARE THE ESSENTIAL TERMS OF THE DEAL? ............................................................ 13 TERMS AND CONDITIONS ............................................................................................... 14 WHAT U.S.A. GETS FROM THIS AGREEMENT? ................................................................. 16 WHAT KIND OF TECHNOLOGY WOULD INDIA RECEIVE IN RETURN? ................................. 18 WHY INDIA NEEDS THE DEAL?......................................................................................... 19 WHO APPROVED THE AGREEMENT? ............................................................................... 21 ADVANTAGES OF 123 DEAL TO INDIA.............................................................................. 24 DISADVANTAGES OF DEAL TO INDIA ............................................................................... 26 CHRONOLOGY OF THE INDO-U.S. NUCLEAR DEAL ............................................................ 27 RATIONALE BEHIND THE AGREEMENT............................................................................. 31 CONTROVERSY IN INDIA OVER NUCLEAR DEAL WITH U.S.A. ............................................ 33 POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO THE DEAL IN INDIA................................................................ 39 THE U.S. DOMESTIC DEBATE ON THE INDO-U.S. NUCLEAR DEAL ...................................... 41 MAJOR ISSUES ................................................................................................................ 46 CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 51 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................... 53

HYPOTHESIS

The 123 agreement between India and USA refers to Sec. 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy
Act. There is a ban on transfer of nuclear technology to other countries under this Act. The Hyde Act was passed by U.S.A to make an exception for India, to enable transfer of technology for civil nuclear energy. The 123 Agreement is the terms of engagement which operationalizes the treaty agreement between india and u.s.a for transfer of civil nuclear technology. The next step is to enter into agreement with the IAEA ( international atomic energy agency) for safegaurds of the civil nuclear reactors to be set up under the 123 agreement and to enter into an agreement with the NSG ( nuclear suppliers group) for supply of nuclear fuel i.e uranium for the civil nuclear reactors. Once India completes the agreements with IAEA and NSG, then the U.S. Congress will vote on the 123 agreement. Once it is approved by the U.S. Congress, then the deal is complete and India and U.S.A can enter into nuclear commerce i.e supply of nuclear reactors, transfer of technology, supply of nuclear fuel etc. TYPE OF LEGAL RESEARCH: I have followed the impact method of research.

1
A BRIEF OVERVIEW

On 18th July, 2005, United States of Americas President George W. Bush & Prime Minister
of India Dr. Manmohan Singh had made a public & formal declaration about a negotiated & binding nuclear trade agreement that would help widen bilateral pursuits relating to civil nuclear energy & nuclear-use technology. The Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, also known as the Hyde Act, is the United States municipal law that modifies the requirements of Section 123 of the United Nations Atomic Energy Act (UNAEA) to permit nuclear assistance with IIndia & in specific to negotiate a 123 Agreement. As an internal United States law, the Hyde Act is binding on the United States. The Hyde Act cannot be made binding on India, although it can be interpreted as a prescription for future United States reactions. According to the Vienna convention, an international treaty like the 123 agreement cannot be replaced by a municipal local law such as the Hyde Act. The 123 agreement lays down the terms & specifications for a bilateral civilian nuclear agreement & requires compulsory assent of the United States Congress & of the Indian cabinet ministers. According to the Nuclear Power Corporation of India, the civilian nuclear agreement will assist India in meeting its target of adding 25,000 MW of nuclear power through imports of nuclear reactors & fuel by 2020. After the essential terms & specifications of the bilateral civilian nuclear agreement were concluded on 27th July, 2007, it ran into trouble because of strong political resistance in India. In 2008 The Indian government gathered a confidence vote in the parliament by 275256 votes in the event of desertion by some parties. The deal also faced opposition from non-proliferation activists, anti-nuclear organisations, & some states within the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The agreement was signed on October 8, 2008 between the United States & India. Under the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Agreement, better known as the 123 agreement signed between the Republic of India & the United States of America, India agreed to put all its civil nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards & in exchange the United States agreed to work toward full civil nuclear cooperation with India.[1] This nuclear deal took more than three years to come to realization as it had to go through various complicated stages, including amendment of U.S. domestic law, specially the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, an India-IAEA safeguards (inspections) agreement, a civil-military nuclear Separation Plan in India, & the grant of an exemption for India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an export-control cartel that had been formed mainly in rejoinder to India's first nuclear test in 1974. In its final step, the nuke deal provides permanent safeguards to civil nuclear facilities & permits broad civil nuclear cooperation, while excluding the transfer of sensitive equipments & technologies, including civil enrichment & reprocessing items even under IAEA safeguards. On 2nd February, 2009, India signed an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA. [2] Once India brings this agreement into force, inspections began in a gradual manner on the

Office of the Press Secretary "Joint Statement between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh" (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/07/20050718-6.html) 2 India Safeguards Agreement Signed (http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/News/2009/indiaagreement.html)

35 civilian nuclear plants India has identified. [3] This nuke deal introduces a new aspect in U.S.-India relations to international non-proliferation efforts. On 1st August, 2008, the IAEA approved the safeguards agreement with India, after which the United States of America approached the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to grant a waiver to India to initiate civilian nuclear trade.[4] The 45-nation NSG granted waiver to India on September 6, 2008 permitting it to make use of civilian nuclear technology & fuel from other countries.[5] The execution of this waiver made India the only country in the world with nuclear weapons which is not a party to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but is still allowed to carry out nuclear trade with the rest of the world. The US House of Representatives passed the bill on September 28, 2008.[6] On October 1, 2008 the United States Senate sanctioned the civil nuclear agreement allowing India to purchase nuclear technology & fuel from the United States of America.[7] George W. Bush, United States President, signed the bill on the Indo-US nuke deal, into law, better known as the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval & Non-proliferation Enhancement Act, on October 8, 2008.[8] On 10th October, 2008, the agreement was signed by then Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee & his counterpart then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Ten days later, U.S. President George W. Bush transmitted two certifications in order for the two governments to exchange diplomatic notes required as per by P.L. 110-369. New Delhi & Washington exchanged diplomatic notes & the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement came into force on December 6, 2008. The 123 agreement states that the governments of United States of America and the republic of India must begin consultations, to be concluded within one year, on the relevant arrangements and procedures within six months of a request from India. India had made such a request on February 3, 2009. India and the United States completed negotiations on the agreement March 29, 2010[9] The Indo-US nuke deal lifts a three-decade U.S. moratorium on nuclear trade with India. It provides United States aid to India's civilian nuclear energy program, & widens U.S.-India cooperation in energy & satellite technology.

"Implementation of the India-United States Joint Statement of July 18, 2005: India's Separation Plan" (http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2008/infcirc731.pdf) 4 Outlookindia.com (http://www.outlookindia.com/pti_news.asp?id=321896) 5 "Nuclear Suppliers Group Grants India Historic Waiver MarketWatch" (http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/nuclearsuppliers-group-grants-india/story.aspx?guid={BA6E4022-DBC8-4B43B9DE-62608913CB8A}&dist=hppr) 6 "House of Reps clears N-deal, France set to sign agreement-USA-World-The Times of India" (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/USA/House_of_Reps_clears_Ndeal_France_set_to_sign_agreement/articleshow/3536151.cms) 7 The Times of India (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/US_Senate_approves_IndoUS_nuclear_deal/articleshow/3551691.cms) Senate approves nuclear deal with India (http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/10/01/us.india.nuclear/) 8 "Bush signs bill on N-deal on October 8" (http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/10/20081008-4.html) 9 http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/139194.htm

2
BACKGROUND

Indias known ores are of low grade & the price of uranium produced in India is more than
five times the international price. If we depended only on our own resources of uranium, we will have a slow growth of nuclear power capacity. Given the constraints on empting coal based power (through CO2 burden in the atmosphere), on gas (due to limited availability & imported LNG prices being linked to crude oil price) & on hydro electricity (due to opposition against dams because of rehabilitation & submergence questions), India urgently needs to rely more on nuclear energy to enlarge the electrical generation capacity. Indias interest in fast reactors is because it opens a way of utilizing the energy potential of thorium. However substantial quantities of plutonium are required to start off the fast reactors. This plutonium can come from natural uranium heavy water reactors (such as the ones we have built & are building) or from low enriched uranium light water reactors. The need to import natural uranium arises because the total amount of uranium available in India, as of now, is not large & thus India has entered into a civil nuclear agreement with United States of America. [10] Countries party to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have an established right of admission to peaceful use of nuclear energy & a responsibility to cooperate on civilian nuclear technology. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has also agreed on guidelines for nuclear exports, including reactors & fuel. Those guidelines are designed to certify that nuclear energy is not deflected from peaceful use to military use for weapons programs. In 1968, India refused to sign the NPT, claiming it was biased. In 1974, India tested its first nuclear bomb, showing it could develop nuclear weapons with technology transferred for peaceful purposes. As a result, the United States isolated India for twenty-five years, refusing nuclear cooperation & trying to convince other countries to do the same. But since 2000, the United States has moved to build a "strategic partnership" with India, increasing cooperation in fields including spaceflight, satellite technology, & missile defence. Although India have not signed the NPT, India argues that the NPT creates a club of "nuclear haves" & a larger group of "nuclear have-nots" by confining the legitimate possession of nuclear weapons to those states that tested them before 1967, who alone are free to own & increase their nuclear stockpiles.[11] As a result, India was left outside the international nuclear order, which forced India to evolve its own resources for nuclear fuel & power generation, including fast breeder reactors & a thorium breeder reactor.[12] Nuclear isolation coerced expansion of Indias civil nuclear program, it left India comparatively immune to foreign reactions to a forthcoming nuclear test. India conducted five nuclear tests in May, 1998 at Pokhran, due to continued unchecked nuclear & missile proliferation activities between China, North Korea & Pakistan. India was given international sanctions after its May 1998 nuclear tests. Indian GDP growth increased to 6.6% (during sanctions) in 19981999 from 4.8% in 19971998 (prior to sanctions). However, due to the size of its economy these sanctions had little impact on India. As a result, at the end of 2001, the U.S.
10 11

www.cfr.org/india/us-india-nuclear-deal/p9663 http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/embassy_non_proliferation.htm 12 http://www.ans.org/pubs/journals/nt/va-133-1-1-32 and http://www.rediff.com/news/2005/aug/25nuke.htm

Administration decided to drop all sanctions on India. Although India accomplished its strategic purpose from the Pokhran nuclear tests in 1998, it continued to find its civil nuclear program isolated internationally. India has always insisted on the plan for a nuclear-free world & has adopted a voluntary "no first use policy". The NSG has been set up to control exports of nuclear materials, equipment & technology, in addition to propelling India to accomplish success in developing new nuclear reactor technologies. The NSG official permission provided India with the incentive to continue developing its own nuclear weapons technology with a definite goal of attaining self-sufficiency for weapons design, testing & production. With an estimate that India possess reserves of about 80,000112,369 tons of uranium, India has enough material to supply its nuclear weapons program, even if it restricted Plutonium production to only 8 of the country's 17 current reactors, & then further restricted Plutonium production to only 1/4 of the fuel core of these reactors.[13] It has been valuated that although India's estimated reserve of uranium amounts to only 1% of the world's known uranium reserves, yet India has the capability to produce a enormous nuclear armoury while remaining well within the lowest valuation of its known uranium reserves.[14] The uranium export restrictions of NSG has affected Indian nuclear power generation capacity. It challenges India's long term plan to exp& its civil nuclear power generation capacity from its current output of about 4 Giga Watt electricity to a larger output of 20 Giga Watt electricity by 2020. According to the Joint Statement released on 18th July, 2005, President George W. Bush said he would work to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India & would also seek agreement from Congress to adjust US laws & policies. On Indias part, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh stated that India would take on the same responsibilities & practices & acquire the same benefits & advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. Thus, these responsibilities & practices consist of: Identifying & separating civil & nuclear facilities & programmes in a phased manner & filing a declaration regarding its civilian facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Taking a decision to voluntarily place its civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Continuing Indias unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing, & Working with the United States for the conclusion of a Multilateral Fissile Material Cut off Treaty. [15] The 123 Agreement between India and the U.S. reflects deepening relationship between the two countries. The 123 civil nuclear agreement, the third such pact ever undertaken by the U.S. with another country, grants India advance consent to reprocess spent fuel of U.S. origin and fuel burned in U.S. reactors. This agreement would have broader impact in the India-U.S. ties. [16]

13 14

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/atomsforwarfinal4.pdf http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-US_civilian_nuclear_agreement 15 www.usindiafriendship.net/viewpoints1/nuclearagreement2007.htm 16 www.thehindu.com/news/international/article321649

3
WHAT IS A 123 AGREEMENT?

In order for the United States to engage in civilian nuclear cooperation with other states, it
must conclude a framework agreement that meets specific requirements under Section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). The AEA also provides for exemptions to these requirements, export control licensing procedures, and criteria for terminating cooperation. Congressional review is required for Section 123 agreements. [17] The 123 agreement between the republic of India and United States of America refers to Sec. 123 of the United States Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 (as amended; P.L. 95-242; 42 U.S.C. 2153 et seq.)[18] Section 123 of the Act establishes the conditions and outlines the process for major nuclear cooperation between the United States and other countries. In order for a country to enter into such an agreement with the United States, that country must commit to a set of nine non-proliferation criteria. The United States has entered into nuclear cooperation agreements with: Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, China, Colombia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Norway, South Africa, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and Ukraine, as well as the 27-member European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[19] Section 123 of the AEA specifies the necessary steps for engaging in nuclear cooperation with another country. [20] Section 123 of the AEA provides: Section 123 a. states that the proposed agreement is to include the terms, conditions, duration, nature and scope of cooperation and lists nine criteria that the agreement must meet. It also contains provisions for the President to exempt an agreement from any of several criteria described in that section and includes details on the kinds of information the executive branch must provide to Congress. Section 123 b. specifies the process for submitting the text of the agreement to Congress. Section 123 c. specifies how Congress approves cooperation agreements that are limited in scope (e.g., do not transfer nuclear material or cover reactors larger than 5 MWe). This report does not discuss such agreements.

17 18

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS22937.pdf The Atomic Energy Act (AEA) was amended by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA) (P.L. 95-242) to include stringent nonproliferation requirements for significant U.S. nuclear exports. For example, the act required nonnuclearweapon states to have full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards as a condition for entering into nuclear cooperation agreements with the United States. For existing and future agreements, the NNPA added a provision for Congress to review export licenses. The act also included a provision for halting exports if a country tested a nuclear device, violated safeguards agreements, or continued nuclear weapons-related activities. 19 http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/AEASection123 20 www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/.../sr0980v1.pdf

Section 123 d. specifies how Congress approves agreements that do cover significant nuclear cooperation (transfer of nuclear material or reactors larger than 5Mwe), including exempted agreements. Section 123a. paragraphs (1) through (9), lists nine non-proliferation criteria that an agreement with a non-nuclear weapon state must meet unless the President determines an exemption is necessary.[21]These include guarantees that:

Nuclear material [22] and equipment transferred to the country must remain under safeguards in perpetuity. Non-nuclear-weapon states partners must have full-scope IAEA safeguards, essentially covering all major nuclear facilities. A guarantee that transferred nuclear material, equipment, and technology will not have any role in nuclear weapons development or any other military purpose, except in the case of cooperation with nuclear-weapon states. In the event that a non-nuclear-weapon state partner detonates a nuclear device using nuclear material produced or violates an IAEA safeguards agreement, the United States has the right to demand the return of any transfers. U.S. consent is required for any re-transfer of material or classified data. Nuclear material transferred or produced as a result of the agreement is subject to adequate physical security. U.S. prior consent rights to the enrichment or reprocessing of nuclear material obtained or produced as a result of the agreement. Prior U.S. approval is required for highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium obtained or produced as a result of the agreement. The above non-proliferation criteria apply to all nuclear material or nuclear facilities produced or constructed as a result of the agreement.

The above nonproliferation criteria apply to all nuclear material or nuclear facilities produced or constructed as a result of the agreement. The President may exempt a proposed agreement from any of the above criteria upon determination maintaining such a criteria would seriously prejudicial to the achievement of U.S. non-proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security of the United States.[23] Exempted 123 agreements would then go through a different process

21 22

http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/AEASection123 Nuclear material means (1) plutonium, uranium enriched in the isotopes 233 or 235, and any other material that is determined to be special nuclear material, but does not include source material, or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing, but does not include source material. 23 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS22937.pdf

than non-exempt agreements, [24] requiring a congressional joint resolution approving the agreement for it to become law. To date, all of the Section 123 agreements in force are nonexempt agreements. Prior to the adoption of P.L. 109-401, the Henry J. Hyde United StatesIndia Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, the President would have needed to exempt the nuclear cooperation agreement with India from some requirements of Section 123 a. P.L. 109-401, however, exempted nuclear cooperation with India from some of the AEAs requirements.[25] In 2006, U.S. Congress passed the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act (also known as the Hyde Act) which amended the AEA permit nuclear cooperation with India, a country which is not a member of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and does not maintain full-scope safeguards. The Hyde Act was passed by U.S.A to enable transfer of technology for civil nuclear energy. The 123 Agreement is the terms of engagement which operationalizes the treaty agreement between India and U.S.A. for transfer of civil nuclear technology. The next step is to enter into agreement with the IAEA ( international atomic energy agency) for safeguards of the civil nuclear reactors to be set up under the 123 agreement and to enter into an agreement with the NSG ( Nuclear Suppliers Group) for supply of nuclear fuel i.e. uranium for the civil nuclear reactors. Once India completes the agreements with IAEA and NSG, then the U.S. Congress will vote on the 123 agreement. Once it is approved by the U.S. Congress, then the deal is complete and India and U.S.A can enter into nuclear commerce i.e. supply of nuclear reactors, transfer of technology, supply of nuclear fuel etc.[26]

24

Nuclear cooperation agreements with nuclear weapon states recognized by the NPT are provided for in the AEA, and are therefore non-exempt agreements. The NPT defines nuclear weapon states as those that exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1, 1967: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 25 CRS Report RL33016, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress, by Paul K. Kerr. The agreement entered into force in December 2008 26 http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/nlbfr/documents/087_090_USAtomicEnergyAct.pdf

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4
IMPORTANT FEATURES OF THE AGREEMENT

Following are the salient features of the 123 Agreement [27] signed between the republic of
India and the United States of America on civil nuclear energy cooperation: Nuclear material, equipment and components transferred pursuant to the Agreement and nuclear material and by-product material used in or produced through the use of any nuclear material, equipment and components so transferred should not be used by the recipient party for any nuclear device, for research on or development of any nuclear device or for any military purpose. The United States is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in the bilateral India-US agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy which would be submitted to the US Congress. The United States will join India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA and Indiaspecific fuel supply agreement. The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply in the lifetime of India's reactors. If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies occurred, the US and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries including Russia, UK and France, to pursue measures to restore fuel supplies to India. An India-specific 'safeguards agreement' would be negotiated between India and the IAEA, providing for safeguards to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time as well as providing for corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies. Taking this into account, India would place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an appropriate safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The nuclear material and equipment transferred to India by the US pursuant to the agreement and any nuclear material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non nuclear material, equipment or components so transferred shall be subject to safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with the India-specific Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA and an additional protocol, when in force. Under the Agreement, India would establish a new national re-processing facility dedicated to re-processing safeguarded nuclear material under IAEA safeguards and the two countries will agree on arrangements and procedures under which such reprocessing will take place in this new facility.

27

http://news.oneindia.in/2007/08/03/salient-features-of-123-agreement-between-india-and-us-1186146576.html

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The provisions of the agreement will not be used to interfere with the nuclear policy or programmes for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy including research and development. The agreement which remain in force for 40 years, and continues thereafter for an additional period of ten years each. Either country will have the right to terminate the Agreement prior to its expiration on one year written notice to the other country. The Agreement would terminate one year from the date of the written notice. The country seeking termination would cease further cooperation if it determined that a mutually-acceptable solution of outstanding issues had not been possible or could not be achieved through consultations. If a country seeking termination, cited violation of IAEA safeguards agreement as the reason, a crucial factor would be whether the IAEA Board of Governors had found non-compliance. Following the termination, either Party would have the right to require the return of any nuclear or non-nuclear material or component through consultations. However, efforts would have to be made to resolve any dispute through negotiations.

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5
WHAT ARE THE ESSENTIAL TERMS OF THE DEAL?

The essential terms of the U.S.-India civil Nuclear Agreement are: [28]
India agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and place its civil facilities under IAEA safeguards and, in exchange, the United States agreed to work toward full civil nuclear cooperation with India. India must keep its military reactors separate from the Civilian. The use of technology is only for civilian purpose. (To make power) India cannot use the nuclear technology for military purpose (Making Nuclear Bombs) India commits to strengthening the security of its nuclear arsenals. The companies from U.S and NSG countries will be allowed to build nuclear reactors in India and provide nuclear fuel for its civilian energy program. India commits to signing an Additional Protocol-which allows more intrusive IAEA inspections-of its civilian facilities. India works toward negotiating a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) with the United States banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. India agrees to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that don't possess them and to support international non-proliferation efforts. U.S. companies will be allowed to build nuclear reactors in India and provide nuclear fuel for its civilian energy program. (An approval by the Nuclear Suppliers Group lifting the ban on India has also cleared the way for other countries to make nuclear fuel and technology sales to India.)

28

www.cfr.org/india/us-india-nuclear-deal/p9663

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6
TERMS AND CONDITIONS

The 123 civil nuclear agreement between India and U.S.A. has eight important terms and
conditions: [29] It gives the U.S. absolute right to terminate cooperation with India .The termination can come into effect at the end of one-year notice period although the agreement empowers the U.S. to suspend all cooperation without such a notice. The only requirement is that the party sending a notice of termination has to provide the notice for doing so. This accord does not uphold a core principle of international law and is linked with the national lines and regulations like the U.S. Hyde Act because there is no Indian law governing nuclear cooperation with the U.S. or any other specific country. Both the U.S. and Indian sides have publicly acknowledged that the agreement is within the legal framework of the India specific Hyde Act, which reigns, supreme in this arrangement. The provision of the nuclear testing has not been explicitly referred in the agreement although a test prohibition against India is clear through the incorporation of the U.S. right to demand the return of all supplied materials and item. The Hyde Act Section 106 openly bans Indian testing. The U.S. under the 123 agreement has not only the right to terminate cooperation in response to an Indian test but also can terminate that if according to Washington, India did not comply with the given conditions in the Hyde Act with regard to the prescribed non -proliferation condition. The agreement gives the exclusive right to the U.S. to unilaterally terminate, cooperate and demand the return of all equipment and fuel supplied in the past. However, the agreement states that before invoking the right of return, the concerned party would "undertake consultations with the other party" and that the supplier state would "compensate promptly that party for the fair market value" of the items and materials it takes back. While the U.S. has the right to terminate cooperation at will and withdraw from all obligations, India has been denied the right to withdraw from all its obligations, even if the agreement was terminated at America instance. The agreement also includes India`s obligation to accept international inspection on its entire civil nuclear program including the indigenously built facilities it is voluntarily opening to external scrutiny. The U.S. also maintains the right in the 123 agreement to unilaterally suspend the reprocessing-related "arrangements and procedures" which it intends to work out with

29

http://www.indianetzone.com/7/123_agreement.htm

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New Delhi in the years ahead once India has built a new reprocessing facility under IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards. The agreement relating to `consultation` and uninterrupted fuel supply appear more to be accord with the provisions of the national laws. The agreement as mentioned in Art5 (4) does not allow India to build up lifetime reserves but only permits continuous fuel supply for the continuous operations of the reactors for their lifetime. A special provision has been made in the case of India that is worth mentioning. There is a ban on the transfer of nuclear technology under Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act .The Hyde Act was passed by the US to make an exception for India to enable transfer of technology for civil nuclear energy. [30]

30

http://www.indianetzone.com/7/123_agreement.htm

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7
WHAT U.S.A. GETS FROM THIS AGREEMENT?
U.S. expects that such a deal could spur India's economic growth and bring in $150 billion in the next decade for nuclear power plants, of which the US wants a share. U.S. also expects Indias economic growth will make a counterweight to China. All in all the oldest democracy wants a strategic partnership with the largest democracy. In the best interest of U.S to secure its energy needs of coal, crude oil and natural gas. [31][32]

Economic benefits to US: [33] Take for example the recently agreed Indo US nuclear deal. If India sets up 10 large size nuclear power plants, which is the intent in next 15 years, India will import technology and hardware from US for at least half of these projects (technology for the remaining may come from elsewhere). Each of these plants at a green field site will cost about $4 billion. In short, orders worth $15-20 billion will be placed with the US companies in next 6 to 8 years. Remaining orders may go to France, Germany, Canada and UK. Monies for these installations will come to India either in form of FDI or soft & commercial loans. Banks and equipment manufacturers abroad will be delighted to make this money available to India. In return India will pay it back with goods and services export. Same way as China does it for the past 25 years. It is a win-win situation for the US lenders and US suppliers. Further expansion of business dealings on both sides will follow. Another example of emerging Indo-US co-operation is in the area of aerospace industry. Order for $8 Billion worth of commercial airplanes has been placed with Boeing of Seattle. Another big order for 125 military planes is on the way. US parliamentarians have to work these big business deals in their thinking prior their vote. The high tech manufacturing industry is at a take off stage in India. In last 3 months, announcements by big US companies totaling $7 billion dollars investment have been made. This has gone far beyond Indias expectations. This sector together with IT services and BPO will power the US industry and businesses into higher profitability and help India accelerate its growth. Co-operation in auto parts, pharmaceuticals, R & D and defense industry cannot be ruled out. For each of these US is looking for a low cost supplier. China does not fit

31 32

www.dpcc.co.in/pdf/nuclearenergyprogramme.pdf http://www.slideshare.net/ashishnangla/indo-us-nuclear-deal-presentation 33 www.ivarta.com/columns/OL_060324.htm 3/

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the bill as too many eggs go into one basket, hence another supplier has to be located and developed. India fits the bill. Political Benefits to US: [34] With a few strokes of pen, President Bush eliminated a major Cold War irritant from the scene. India is not politically and diplomatically aligned with US as the Europe is, but India as a strategic partner in ensuring safety of sea-lanes of the Indian Ocean is very valuable. At the moment and as long as US stays in Iraq and Afghanistan, the world will perceive US as big bully. A major regional power, with a different outlook than the European and the US is needed to cool the tempers off. India has to step in to prevent further sliding of the Middle East into anarchy. Hot heads in Washington are looking at each development in the region as a threat. This mindset has earned US demerit points on the international diplomatic chessboard. Muslim sympathy for US after 9/11 has evaporated. That is why Osma Bin Laden is still free and Mullah Omar is beginning to make inroads into Afghanistan. Further escalation in Iran will worsen the situation. Hence, India has to do what it has done best for the last 50 years i.e. advise a respite and cool thinking. Any development, which will extricate US out of Iraq and now Iran, will be welcomed by US.

Military Benefits to the US: [35] US will benefits immensely with India as a major military power. Forty percent of worlds oil and commerce passes through the Indian Ocean sea-lanes. These today are unprotected. Pirates in the Red Sea and at the Malacca Straits prey on commerce. Moreover, angry Iran could block Straits of Hormuz and prevent oil shipments. US alone cannot police all the sea-lanes of the world. They need India to be there in the Indian Ocean to ensure free flow of commerce. Rising China as a military power is a menace. There defense expenditure of $85 billion a year and rising is nothing short of a desire to dominate East Asia. In-spite of US having its 6th Fleet in the area, they will be powerless to prevent capture of Taiwan by China if they so wished. Only Chinas commercial and export interests are holding them back. Hence containing China should be the major goal of USs China policy. India is the lynch pin of this policy. Suitably armed and ready to defend, India will easily neutralize China together USs 6th Fleet and Japan. Chinas political influence in Indian Ocean Littoral States, bar Pakistan is minor. Pakistan has no scruples. Thanks to President Bush, he has sent the first message to the Pakistani leaders in 55 years that Indo-US - Pakistani relations have permanently been dehyphenated. Future military expansion in India to take up its role as a regional player bids well for the US military hardware suppliers. They will gain immensely over next 20 years.

34 35

www.ivarta.com/columns/OL_060324.htm 3/ Ibid.

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8
WHAT KIND OF TECHNOLOGY WOULD INDIA RECEIVE IN RETURN?
India would be eligible to buy nuclear technology from NSG countries which includes the USA. (There are 45 countries in nuclear suppliers group) India will get Nuclear reactors and Fuel for making power for energy hungry India. India will become the only one country that gets nuclear technology without signing NPT. [36][37]

36 37

http://www.slideshare.net/santoshjnu/india-us-nuclear-deal-8343901 http://www.slideshare.net/ashishnangla/indo-us-nuclear-deal-presentation

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9
WHY INDIA NEEDS THE DEAL?

The Indo-US nuclear deal, apart from ending Indias three-decade-old

nuclear apartheid, opens the door to high-end technology that will help propel industries ranging from pharma to bio-tech and from avionics to manufacturing. Specifically, it would pave the way to energy security for India. [38] [39] 17 existing reactors, which at 54 percent in 2007-08 had the lowest plant load factor in a very long time, will get access to imported uranium. This will help in overcoming the paucity of fuel. Access to imported fuel will fire three new reactors in Rawatbhata in Rajasthan. The deal will help in the expansion of the Kundankulam Atomic Power Project in Tamil Nadu. India will be able to access Canadas CANDU reactors that allow direct breeding of thorium, a mineral that is available in abundance in India.

Apart from the above mentioned benefits the deal also gives access to dual use technology that can be used in various industrial and scientific sectors. Some of the dual-use technology and trigger list items that will now be available to India are: [40] Sonar, used for undersea warfare can now be used for finding minute abnormalities in mammograms. India can now have advanced computers having weather forecasting applications such as CRAYXPM 14. The countrys oil refineries can now access digital phosphorous oscilloscopes. We can get biotechnology that can improve public health, agriculture growth and fasten economic development. Hydrocarbon prices are rising by the day. A diversification of our energy basket will help in controlling inflation.

Benefits to India could be broadly categorized as economical, political and military. [41] Economic benefits to India:

38 39

http://www.visionofdate.com/2008_10_05_archive.html http://zeenews.india.com/news/archives/123-of-indo-us-nuclear-deal_467563.html 40 Ibid. 41 www.ivarta.com/columns/OL_060324.htm

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There is an urgent need in India for capital to build its infrastructure and manufacturing base. And there is only one source to get it i.e. US & Europe. US and Europe at this moment are content with sending capital to China to supply them with consumer goods. The former very cleverly have avoided exporting manufacturing technology to supply high priced, high technology capital goods to China. This component together with auto-parts, pharmaceuticals and computer hardware could herald India into big leagues in ten years and beyond. Commercial Aircraft manufacture, ship building, factories to make giant power plants, steel making plants, mining & drilling hardware, petroleum & petrochemical plant building facilities could be ultimately shared with India. The latter within ten years will have a workforce sufficiently skilled to undertake all the foregoing. It will be beneficial to US. Labor costs in India, will always stay a third of US, and European costs. That will make India an ideal candidate for this technology transfer. Opportunity of the KPO (Knowledge Process Off-shoring) is knocking at Indias door. Indian graduates of Science and Engineering will play a major role in this expansion. In about 5 years KPO Off-shoring will grow immensely. India stands to benefit most from it. Thanks to the edge, Indian science & technology graduates have established. Political Benefits to India: [42] After 50 years of isolation, India will have the opportunity to say something, in world forums like UN, WTO and World monetary lending institutions, and be heard. This was not the case previously. Reasons India had no clout. With western economies in the future, tied more and more with India, the latters clout will improve. There will be frequent inter-government exchanges on matters of mutual interest. India could become a full member of the select group of G-8 members. Gone will be the days that US politicians will heap scorn on India, the way they are doing it today. The Indo US Nuclear deal is in fact dumping the past and unlocking the hidden potential of the future. In addition Pakistan may get the cue and begin a rethink of its policies towards India. Military Benefits to India: [43] Indian military is in dire need to diversify its sourcing of military hardware. Russia has been a very reliable source for the past 40 years. This source has to be diversified. Ultimately all military hardware will have to be produced in India. But development time in India is too long and success factor is low. This has to be speeded up. The only way at Indias disposal is buy its immediate needs and import technology to develop its own weapon system. It is a bit expensive up front but pays dividend later as India joins the select group of countries as a source of military hardware. Additionally a well-equipped Indian military will preclude any repeat of 1962 Chinese invasion or future conflicts with Pakistan.

42
43

Ibid. www.ivarta.com/columns/OL_060324.htm

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10
WHO APPROVED THE AGREEMENT?

The final terms of the nuclear deal were approved by the following bodies before they could
be implemented: [44] IAEA: India signed a safeguards agreement with the IAEA under which all nuclear material and equipment transferred to it by the United States as a part of this deal shall be subject to safeguards.[45] In August 2008, the IAEA's Board of Governors approved an India-specific 7/7/12 The U.S.-India Nuclear Deal - Council on Foreign Relations safeguards agreement (PDF).[46] The IAEA said it will begin to implement the new agreement in 2009, with the aim of bringing fourteen Indian reactors under agency safeguards by 2014. The IAEA currently applies safeguards to six of these fourteen nuclear reactors under previous agreements. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei says the IAEA and India are in dialogue concerning an additional protocol to the draft safeguards agreement. INDIAN PARLIAMENT: While the deal does not require a formal vote by the parliament, the coalition government has faced a confidence vote over it. Many parliamentarians oppose the deal, arguing it will limit India's sovereignty and hurt its security. Some Indian nuclear experts are protesting what they see as excessive U.S. participation in deciding which of India's nuclear facilities to define as civilian, and open to international inspections under the plan. [47] THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP: On September 6, 2008 India was granted the waiver at the NSG meeting held in Vienna, Austria. The consensus was arrived at after overcoming misgivings expressed by Austria, Ireland and New Zealand and is an unprecedented step in giving exemption to a country which has not signed the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). [48] Reaction outside NSG over grant of waiver to India: More than 150 nonproliferation activists and anti-nuclear organisations across the world had called for tightening the initial NSG agreement to prevent harming the current global nonproliferation regime. The call said that the initial version of the "deal would be a nonproliferation disaster and a serious setback to the prospects of global nuclear disarmament" and also pushed for all world leaders who are serious about ending the arms race to "to stand up and be counted." [49] Critics have complained the agreement may undermine the credibility, integrity and universality of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Pakistan argues the safeguards agreement "threatens to increase the chances of a nuclear arms race in the subcontinent and Pakistan has also said the same process "should be available as a model for other non-NPT states". Israel is
44 45

http://www.docstoc.com/docs/48018827/The-Indo-US-civilian-nuclear-agreement http://delhipolicygroup.com/pdf/Charting_an_India-US_Relationship.pdf 46 www.cfr.org/india/us-india-nuclear-deal/p9663 6/8 47 http://www.pptsearch365.com/coalition-government-in-india.html 48 en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S.India_Civil_Nuclear_Agreement 49 Ibid.

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citing the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal as a precedent to alter NSG rules to construct its first nuclear power plant in the Negev desert, and is also pushing for its own trade exemptions. Brahma Chellaney, a Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhibased Centre for Policy Research, argued that the wording of the U.S. exemption sought to irrevocably tether New Delhi to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. He argued India would be brought under a wider non-proliferation net, with India being tied to compliance with the entire set of NSG rules. India would acquiesce to its unilateral test moratorium being turned into a multilateral legality. He concluded that instead of the "full" civil nuclear cooperation that the original July 18, 2005, deal promised, India's access to civil nuclear enrichment and reprocessing technologies would be restricted through the initial NSG waiver. Reaction inside the NSG over grant of waiver to India: The deal had initial support from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Russia, and Germany. After some initial opposition, there were reports of Australia, Switzerland, and Canada expressing their support for the deal. However, former U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph says the U.S. State Department made it "very clear that we will not recognize India as a nuclear-weapon state". After the first NSG meeting in August 2008, diplomats noted that up to 20 of the 45 NSG states tabled conditions similar to the Hyde Act for India's waiver to do business with the NSG, there were proposals on practically every paragraph of NSG. A group of seven NSG members suggested including some of the provisions of the U.S. Hyde Act in the final waiver. Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon said in April 2008 that India would be willing to accept some conditions on the waiver and that the NSG would likely punish India if it tested nuclear weapons. [50] Indian reactions over NSG waiver: Indian PM Manmohan Singh visited Washington D.C. on September 26, 2008 to celebrate the conclusion of the agreement with U.S. President George W. Bush. He also visited France to convey his appreciation for the country's stance. [51] India's External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee expressed his deep appreciation for India's allies in the NSG, especially the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, Germany, South Africa and Brazil for helping India achieve NSG's consensus on the nuclear deal. Bhartiya Janata Party's Yashwant Sinha, who also formerly held the post of India's External Affairs Minister, criticized the Indian government's decision to seek NSG's consensus and remarked that "India has walked into the non-proliferation trap set by the U.S., we have given up our right to test nuclear weapons forever, it has been surrendered by the government". However, another prominent member of the same party and India's former National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra supported the development at the NSG and said that the waiver granted made "no prohibition" on India to conduct nuclear tests in the future. [52] A leading advocate of the agreement was India's most eminent strategic affairs analyst K. Subrahmanyam, he argued that the convergence of strategic interests between the two nations forced such a remarkable gesture from the US, overturning its decades-long stand on non-proliferation, and that it would be unwise on India's part to spurn such an overture. [53] He also argued that not recognizing new geo-political realities would be even more foolhardy on the part of
50 51

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S.India_Civil_Nuclear_Agreement Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 www.endusmilitarism.org/indo-us_nuclear_agreement_wikipedia_090608.html

22

the Indian elite. Former President of India and noted Indian scientist, APJ Abdul Kalam, also supported the agreement and remarked that India may break its "voluntary moratorium" on further nuclear tests in "supreme national interest". However, analyst M K Bhadrakumar demurred. He said that the consensus at NSG was achieved on the "basis" of Pranab Mukherjee's commitment to India's voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing and by doing so, India has entered into a "multilateral commitment" bringing it within "the ambit of the CTBT and NPT". The NSG consensus was welcomed by several major Indian companies. Major Indian corporations like Videocon Group, Tata Power and Jindal Power saw a $40 billion (U.S.) nuclear energy market in India in the next 1015 years. On a more optimistic note, some of India's largest and most well-respected corporations like Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, National Thermal Power Corporation and Larsen & Toubro were eyeing a $100 billion (U.S.) business in this sector over the same time period. [54][55] U.S. CONGRESS: In October 2008, the U.S. Congress gave final approval to the bill. Under the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which regulates the trade of nuclear material, congressional approval was needed to pass the exemptions to U.S. laws required for the nuclear deal to be implemented.[56] Some members of Congress were resistant, and called for India to commit to strict limits on its nuclear weapons program before the deal went through. There is a potential area of dispute with India over the terms for suspending the agreement. Before clearing the bill, the U.S. Senate rejected an amendment that would require U.S. nuclear supplies to be cut off if India tests nuclear weapons. The deal does not explicitly impose that condition, though it is part of a 2006 law known as the Hyde Act, which gave the deal preliminary approval.[57]

54

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S.India_Civil_Nuclear_Agreement www.endusmilitarism.org/indo-us_nuclear_agreement_wikipedia_090608.html 56 http://www.cfr.org/india/us-india-nuclear-deal/p9663 57 http://www.docstoc.com/docs/48018827/The-Indo-US-civilian-nuclear-agreement

55

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11
ADVANTAGES OF 123 DEAL TO INDIA

Advantages of Indo-U.S. civil nuclear cooperation agreement to India are:

Indias economical growth is 8- 10% a year and in 10 years we wont be able to keep up without clean nuclear energy. In order for India to become a developed nation, we must have nuclear energy. [58] Reliable power brings more foreign investments to India just like our reliable IT firms bringing Billions of rupees. No power means no factories, no manufacturing plants, no growth and no job. Thus it will bring more and more job opportunities to India. Energy produced from 1kg of Uranium = 1500 tons of coal Enables India to access nuclear technology and fuel from NSG Less pollution Strong business tie-ups with the US. Global recognition. The Indian government has planned to go ahead with this nuclear deal .We want to be the worlds manufacturer like China. This agreement makes the world to accept India as a Nuclear power. After 50 years of isolation, India will have the opportunity to say something, in world forums like UN, WTO and World monetary lending institutions, and be heard. There will be frequent inter-government exchanges on matters of mutual interest. India could become a full member of the select group of G-8 members. [59] Indian military is in need to diversify its sourcing of military hardware. Russia has been a very reliable source for the past 40 years, but it needs to be diversified for Indias upcoming future.

58 59

http://www.slideshare.net/ashishnangla/indo-us-nuclear-deal-presentation http://www.slideshare.net/akshat018/india-us-nuclear-deal

24

Much of our nuclear facilities are working below their capacity due to the ban on India imposed by the nuclear countries, after it test bomb. You will have more uranium, materials, and other equipments for making more nuclear power. Our energy requirements are going up with increase in population and economic advancement. We need to find more and more and cheaper energy sources. Nuclear energy is clean and free from environmental issues. It is necessary for us to come out of the isolation imposed by the world communities. Any recognition to our needs in nuclear field by them without going through the NPT route is welcome and our nuclear scientists are going to be benefited. And our scientist will no longer be treated as pariah and there could be more exchange programmes between Indian scientists and US and other countries. This will be a stepping stone for being recognised as nuclear weapon state. This is a unique arrangement where India, due to its strategic importance for India and in recognition of its record as a responsible nation in not disseminating the nuclear technology to other forces, is being offered this arrangement outside the NPT regime.[60][61][62]

60 61

http://www.slideshare.net/ashishnangla/indo-us-nuclear-deal-presentation http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers18%5Cpaper1740.html 62 http://www.ukessays.com/essays/sciences/indo-us-civilian-nuclear-deal.php

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12
DISADVANTAGES OF DEAL TO INDIA

Disadvantages of Indo-U.S. civil nuclear cooperation agreement to India are:

India has to disclose its all nuclear power plant secrets and also agree to 14 of our nuclear power plants to be under the scanner of International Atomic Energy Agency. Those 14 power plants will continue to be under the scanner of IAEA irrespective of the status of the agreement. [63] On the other hand, if any of the commitments given by USA is breached by them, then there is no clause for cancelling this agreement. The agreement is apparently like this... USA can either hug India or slap India. India will not ask why are we hugged or why are we slapped. [64] On the other hand, India cannot hug or slap USA for breach of agreement.[65] Estimated expenditure: For 20,000 MW production 4 lac crores. Per unit cost: Rs 5.50 Insecure transportation. Logistics management implementation problem If India does nuclear test, then this agreement gets cancelled. And USA will take back all the machinery/ equipment/ technology supplied to India thus far. On the other hand, if any of the commitments given by USA is breached by them, there is no clause for cancelling this agreement. Thus US have an upper hand. [66] After this Agreement USA will supply all fuel, machinery, equipment & technology to India for producing Nuclear Power.[67] But upon signing this Agreement 14 of our Nuclear Power Plants to be under the scanner of International Atomic Power Organisation(IAPO). The fuel utilised to produce Atomic Power can be recycled for reuse and this plant will be under direct supervision of IAPO. [68] [69]

63 64

http://in.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20080723222236AAtMvxL http://in.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20080723222236AAtMvxL 65 http://rparmanik.wordpress.com/2008/08/04/indo-us-civilian-nuclear-agreement/ 66 http://21cvision.blogspot.com/2008/07/n-deal-prize-for-us-firms-over-100.html 67 http://freddiemaize.wordpress.com/a-page-hodler/me-myself-mysociety/the-first-nuclear-bomb-attack-on-india/ 68 http://rivr.sulekha.com/nuclear-energy-is-bad-we-should-not-have-accepted-it-we-are-killing-ourselves_356928_blog 69 http://sagribow.sulekha.com/blog/post/2008/08/what-is-123agreement.htm

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13
CHRONOLOGY OF THE INDO-U.S. NUCLEAR DEAL

Following is the chronology of events in the landmark Indo-US nuclear agreement [70] [71]
since US President George W Bush and Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh conceived the deal in July, 2005: July 18, 2005: President Bush and Prime Minister Singh first announce their intention to enter into a nuclear agreement in Washington. March 1, 2006: Bush visits India for the first time. March 3, 2006: Bush and Singh issue a joint statement on their growing strategic partnership, emphasising their agreement on civil nuclear cooperation. July 26, 2006: The US House of Representatives passes the 'Henry J Hyde United StatesIndia Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006,' which stipulates that Washington will cooperate with New Delhi on nuclear issues and exempt it from signing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. July 28, 2006: The Left parties demand threadbare discussion on the issue in Parliament. November 16, 2006: The US Senate passes the 'United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation and US Additional Protocol Implementation Act' to "exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 United States exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology to India." December 18, 2006: President Bush signs into law congressional legislation on Indian atomic energy. July 27, 2007: Negotiations on a bilateral agreement between the United States and India conclude. August 3, 2007: The text of the 'Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy' (123 Agreement) is released by both governments. August 13, 2007: Prime Minister Singh makes a suo motu statement on the deal in Parliament. August 17, 2007: CPI (M) General Secretary Prakash Karat says the 'honeymoon (with government) may be over but the marriage can go on'. September 4, 2007: UPA-Left committee to discuss nuclear deal set up.
70

http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2008-10-09/news/27714736_1_civil-nuclear-cooperation-exports-ofnuclear-materials-bush-visits-india 71 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S.%E2%80%93India_Civil_Nuclear_Agreement

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February 25, 2008: Left parties say the UPA would have to choose between the deal and its government's stability. March 3, 2008: Left parties warn of 'serious consequences' if the nuclear deal is operationalised. March 6, 2008: Left parties set a deadline asking the government to make it clear by March 15 whether it intended to proceed with the nuclear deal or drop it. March 7, 2008: CPI writes to the Prime Minister, warns of withdrawal of support if government goes ahead with the deal. March 14, 2008: CPI (M) says the Left parties will not be responsible if the government falls over the nuclear deal. April 23, 2008: Government says it will seek the sense of the House on the 123 Agreement before it is taken up for ratification by the American Congress. June 17, 2008: External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee meets Prakash Karat, asks the Left to allow the government to go ahead with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement. June 30, 2008: Prime Minister says his government prepared to face Parliament before operationalising the deal. July 8, 2008: Left parties withdraw support to government. July 9, 2008: The draft India-specific safeguards accord with the IAEA circulated to IAEA's Board of Governors for approval. July 10, 2008: Prime Minister calls for a vote of confidence in Parliament. July 14, 2008: The IAEA says it will meet on August 1 to consider the India-specific safeguards agreement. July 18, 2008: Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon briefs the IAEA Board of Governors and some NSG countries in Vienna on the safeguards agreement. July 22, 2008: Government is willing to look at "possible amendments" to the Atomic Energy Act to ensure that the country's strategic autonomy will never be compromised, says Prime Minister Singh. July 22, 2008: UPA government wins trust vote in the Lok Sabha (India). July 24, 2008: India dismisses warning by Pakistan that the deal will accelerate an atomic arms race in the sub-continent. July 24, 2008: India launches full blast lobbying among the 45-nation NSG for an exemption for nuclear commerce. July 25, 2008: IAEA secretariat briefs member states on India-specific safeguards agreement.
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August 1, 2008: IAEA Board of Governors adopts India- specific safeguards agreement unanimously. August 21-22, 2008: The NSG meet to consider an India waiver ends inconclusively amid reservations by some countries. September 4-6, 2008: The NSG meets for the second time on the issue after the US comes up with a revised draft and grants waiver to India after marathon parleys. September 11, 2008: President Bush sends the text of the 123 Agreement to the US Congress for final approval. September 12, 2008: US remains silent over the controversy in India triggered by President Bush's assertions that nuclear fuel supply assurances to New Delhi under the deal were only political commitments and not legally binding. September 13, 2008: The State Department issues a fact sheet on the nuclear deal saying the initiative will help meet India's growing energy requirements and strengthen the nonproliferation regime by welcoming New Delhi into globally accepted non-proliferation standards and practices. September 18, 2008: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee kicks off a crucial hearing on the Indo-US nuclear deal. September 19, 2008: America's nuclear fuel supply assurances to India are a "political commitment" and the government cannot "legally compel" US firms to sell a "given product" to New Delhi, top officials tells Congressional panel. September 21, 2008: US financial crisis diverts attention from N-deal as both the Bush Administration and the Congress are bogged down over efforts to rescue bankrupt American banks financial crisis in the country. September 26, 2008: PM Singh meets President Bush at the White House, but was not able to sign the nuclear deal as the Congress did not approve it. September 27, 2008: House of Representatives approves the Indo-US nuclear deal. 298 members voted for the Bill while 117 voted against. October 1, 2008: Senate approves the Indo-US civil nuclear deal with 86 votes for and 13 against. October 4, 2008: Secretary of State Rice visits Delhi. India and the US unable to ink the nuclear agreement with New Delhi insisting that it would do so only after President Bush signs it into a law, an occasion when it expects certain misgivings to be cleared. October 4, 2008: White House announces that President Bush will sign the legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal into a law on October 8. October 8, 2008: President Bush signs legislation to enact the landmark US-India civilian nuclear agreement.
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October 10, 2008: The signing of the US-India Civil Nulcear Cooperation Agreement popularly known as 123 Agreement by US Secretary of State Dr. Condoleezza Rice and Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee. 123 Agreement is now operatinalized and legally binding on both the countries.

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14
RATIONALE BEHIND THE AGREEMENT
Competition for conventional energy: The growing energy demands of the Indian and Chinese economies have raised questions on the impact of global availability to conventional energy. The Bush Administration has concluded that an Indian shift toward nuclear energy is in the best interest for America to secure its energy needs of coal, crude oil, and natural gas. Nuclear non proliferation: While India still harbours aspirations of being recognised as a nuclear power before considering signing the NPT as a nuclear weapons state (which would be possible if the current 1967 cut-off in the definition of a "nuclear weapon state" were pushed to 1975), other parties to the NPT are not likely to support such an amendment. [72] As a compromise, the proposed civil nuclear agreement implicitly recognises India's "de facto" status even without signing the NPT. The Bush administration justifies a nuclear pact with India because it is important in helping to advance the non-proliferation framework [73] by formally recognising India's strong non-proliferation record even though it has not signed the NPT. The former Under Secretary of State of Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, one of the architects of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal said Indias trust, its credibility, the fact that it has promised to create a state-of-the-art facility, monitored by the IAEA,[74] to begin a new export control regime in place, because it has not proliferated the nuclear technology, we cant say that about Pakistan. when asked whether the U.S. would offer a nuclear deal with Pakistan on the lines of the Indo-U.S. deal. [75] [76] [77] [78] Mohammed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which would be in charge of inspecting India's civilian reactors has praised the deal as "it would also bring India closer as an important partner in the nonproliferation regime". [79] However, members of the IAEA safeguards staff have made it clear that Indian demands that New Delhi be allowed to determine when Indian reactors might be inspected could undermine the IAEA safeguards system. Economic considerations: Financially, the U.S. also expects that such a deal could spur India's economic growth and bring in $150 billion in the next decade for nuclear power plants, of which the US wants a share.[80] It is India's stated objective to increase the production of nuclear power generation from its present capacity of 4,000 MWe to 20,000 MWe in the next decade.[81] However, the developmental economic advising firm Dahlberg, which advises the IMF and the World
72 73

http://www.indianembassy.org/US_Media/2000/pm_us/Armed%20India%20Can%20Help%20Stabilize%20Asia.hm Condoleezza Rice Packs a proliferation punch", Economic Times (2008-7-26). 74 http://www.factualhelp.com/article/Indo-US_civilian_nuclear_agreement 75 The Indo-US nuclear debate from www.gulfnews.com 76 Joint Statement Between President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh 77 http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_bills&docid=f:h5682enr.txt.pdf 78 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-US_civilian_nuclear_agreement 79 U.S., India Reach Deal on Nuclear Cooperation. Retrieved on 2006-03-03 80 http://wpedia.goo.ne.jp/enwiki/Hyde_Act 81 http://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20080720014515AAgQLea

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Bank, moreover, has done its own analysis of the economic value of investing in nuclear power development in India. Their conclusion is that for the next 20 years such investments are likely to be far less valuable economically or environmentally than a variety of other measures to increase electricity production in India.[82] They have noted that U.S. nuclear vendors cannot sell any reactors to India unless and until India caps third party liabilities and or establishes a credible liability pool to protect U.S. firms from being sued in the case of an accident or a terrorist act of sabotage against nuclear plants. Strategic: Since the end of the Cold War, The Pentagon, along with certain U.S. ambassadors such as Robert Blackwill, have requested increased strategic ties with India and a de-hyphenization of Pakistan with India.[83] While India is self-sufficient in thorium, possessing 25% of the world's known and economically viable thorium, it possesses a meagre 1% of the similarly calculated global uranium reserves.[84] [85]Indian support for cooperation with the U.S. centres around the issue of obtaining a steady supply of sufficient energy for the economy to grow. Indian opposition to the pact centres on the concessions that would need to be made, as well as the likely deprioritization of research into a thorium fuel-cycle if uranium becomes highly available given the well understood utilization of uranium in a nuclear fuel cycle. [86]

82 83

http://palashkatha.mywebdunia.com/2011/07/20/hillarry_clinton_pushes_on_nuclear_liability_and_defene_deal.html http://in.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20080702092920AA22Did 84 http://ejournaljair.blogspot.com/ 85 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S.%E2%80%93India_Civil_Nuclear_Agreement 86 http://www.endusmilitarism.org/indo-us_nuclear_agreement_wikipedia_090608.html

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CONTROVERSY IN INDIA OVER NUCLEAR DEAL WITH U.S.A.

Behind the political storm triggered by the civil nuclear deal with the US lies deep-seated
national concern over its long-term implications for Indias security and strategic autonomy. The deal has divided India like no other strategic issue since independence.[87] After all, the deal is not just about importing nuclear reactors for electricity. It will determine what kind of India emerges in the years to come a major independent power with the requisite economic and military strength, or a middling power trimming its sails to the prevailing American winds and still relying on imports to meet basic defence needs.[88] India stands out as the only large country still deeply dependent on arms imports, to the extent that it has emerged as the worlds largest weapons importer. The nuclear deterrent is the only strategic programme it has pursued somewhat successfully. While its nuclear posture calls for a credible minimal deterrent, the country still hasnt developed a minimal, let alone credible, deterrent against its main challenge, China. Yet, New Delhi blithely put the nuclear programme on the negotiating table to reach a deal that implicitly imposes qualitative and quantitative restrictions on the Indian nuclear-weapons capability.[89] India has already paid a very heavy price internationally for its nuclear programme. And the deal seeks to exact a further price, in the name of freeing the country from some of the rigours of US export controls. Americas technology controls and sanctions approach were fashioned largely in response to Indias 1974 nuclear test.[90] Today, the main target of that policy has come full circle doubly. First, India has agreed to become part and parcel of the US-led non-proliferation system just when that regime has begun to visibly corrode. India is to unilaterally adhere to cartels that still exclude it from their membership. Second, in concluding a new accord under Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act, India has paid no heed to the lessons from an earlier 123 agreement, signed in 1963. In the 1970s, America had cut off all fuel supply to the US-built Tarapur reactors by enacting a new domestic law that rewrote the terms of the 123 agreement.[91] The new, iniquitous 123 agreement not only grants the US the right to suspend all supplies forthwith by merely issuing a termination notice, but also omits a standard clause now found in Americas 123 accords with other states that neither party will invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform the agreement.[92][93] India, gaining the right to be merely consulted but granting America the right to take all final decisions, has put itself at the latters mercy. Let us look at the benefits the deal offers. India principally would be able to import power reactors and fuel and in the process help revive the US nuclear-energy industry. India, however, would continue to face stringent US export controls on advanced and dualuse
87 88

http://chellaney.net/2007/08/15/political-controversy-in-india-over-nuclear-deal-with-the-u-s/ http://forums.bharat-rakshak.com/viewtopic.php?t=3372 89 http://chellaney.net/2007/08/ 90 http://chellaney.net/2007/08/15/political-controversy-in-india-over-nuclear-deal-with-the-u-s/ 91 http://chellaney.net/2007/08/ 92 http://mahendrap.wordpress.com/2007/09/04/123-agreement-vs-hyde-act-2/ 93 http://www.hindu.com/2007/09/19/stories/2007091950081000.htm

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technologies critical to rapid economic growth.[94] Even for its civil nuclear facilities, India will not be able to buy enrichment, reprocessing and heavy-water components, however minor. Now look at the price. First, India is set to replicate in the energy sector the very mistake it has pursued on armaments by sinking into an imports dependency. India is today willing to spend tens of billions of dollars to import overly-expensive reactors when it can more profitably invest that money to commercially develop its own energy sources. Second, such imports will be a path to energy insecurity, since the reactor and fuel business is the worlds most politically regulated commerce.[95] Third, the deals strategic costs are exorbitant. Like its conventional weaponry, Indias embryonic nuclear-arms capability will remain subcontinental in range. To ensure that, India has been slapped with a nuclear test ban through a US law, with the 123 accord granting no reprieve. The US President is now required to annually certify to Congress that India is in full compliance with a long list of congressionally-imposed commitments and obligations. India, for its part, has agreed to shut down by 2010 its newly-refurbished Cirus reactor, which produces a third of its weapons-grade plutonium. Nothing better shows the patron-client ties the deal anoints than one simple fact: While the US has an unfettered right to withdraw from all its obligations, Indias obligations are legally irrevocable and never-ending. Even if cooperation is arbitrarily terminated by the US, India will still be stuck with everlasting international inspections on its entire civil nuclear programme. Little surprise thus that the deal has attracted increasing notoriety in India.[96] New Delhi needs to realize time is on its side. As a rising power, India could easily get a better deal, if it were patient and waited a few more years. Its interests, in any case, demand a deal not just restricted to what commercially appeals to America power reactors and fuel but facilitating an end to the full range of US-inspired technology sanctions. The prospect for India in this situation is very bleak but the government of India itself is creating it.[97] In the case of nuclear deal with the US also, India just like in 1991 and 1995 is accepting a subordinate position in relation to USA and the Western countries. USA will never accept any inspection of its nuclear facility by the IAEA. It will carry on developing new nuclear weapons and will test those in laboratory conditions. It has no separation of nuclear facilities into military and civilian sectors. However, India is accepting inspection of its nuclear facility by the American authority without demanding any corresponding right of inspection of the American nuclear facilities by the Indian authority.[98] Just like other two treaties, with IMF in 1991 and with WTO in 1995, this Indo-US deal on nuclear energy is unequal, discriminatory and unjust. The result will make Pakistan much stronger than India in very near future. That serves the geo-political interest of the United States with Pakistan as the bridge to the Islamic world as Pakistan was the bridge to China in 1971, when both USA and China were about to attack India jointly to save East Pakistan.[99] The unfolding scenario will ruin India in the process when India will be forced to surrender also to the demands of
94 95

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Pakistan, a NATO ally of USA and China, the most important business partner of the U.S corporations and on whom the fate of the US Dollar depends.[100] The controversy over the The U.S.-India civil nuclear deal remains as fierce as ever, From the time it was unveiled more than three years ago as an agreement-in-principle, its backers have framed the deal in terms of broader strategic objectives.[101] Supporters in India have argued it will cement U.S.-India ties and facilitate technology transfers in fields beyond commercial nuclear power. Backers in the U.S. have argued the deal will make it easier for Washington to call on India as a counterweight to Chinas influence, and expand commercial opportunities for Americans. But none of these claims is entirely realistic. In fact, these arguments merely distort the debate. Some argue that it would have helped had Prime Minister Manmohan Singh done what he had repeatedly promised: "build the broadest possible national consensus in favor of the deal." He should not have turned the deal into an openly partisan issue, for it will have to be implemented well after his governments term.The danger now is that if the opposition wins the national election, it may re-open negotiations on the nuclear deal. That could risk sending the wrong signal about Indias general commitment to maintaining positive relations with the U.S., given the significance this particular deal has assumed in that relationship. Political uncertainty in India will continue to remain given the strong partisan opposition. The deals backers in Washington have also been guilty of overselling it, albeit in different ways. On the strategic level, they have argued that the deal will bring India into the U.S. camp as a regional counterweight to Chinas growing influence.[102] But it appears unlikely that India would allow itself to be used as a foil against an increasingly assertive China, lest Beijing step up military pressure along the long disputed Himalayan frontier and surrogate threats via Pakistan, Burma and Bangladesh. India, as would any country, will continue to craft policy based on its own interests. The Bush administration is also going overboard in touting the commercial benefits. The Bush administration letter to Congress states, the deal is supposed to help revive the U.S. nuclear-power industry through exports and "access to Indian nuclear infrastructure," allowing "U.S. companies to build reactors more competitively here and in the rest of the world not just in India." With its acute shortage of nuclear engineers, the U.S. intends to tap Indias vast technical manpower. But not all of this is entirely realistic, especially expectations that India will be a boom market for U.S. nuclear exports. Even with the deal, nuclear power will continue to play a modest role in Indias energy mix. With the proposed import of eight 1,000-megawatt reactors within the next four years, the share of nuclear power in Indias electricity generation is unlikely to rise above the current 2.5%.[103] The Indian economy will probably not get much of a boost from the deal as a result. Furthermore, private investment in nuclear power will be hindered by many factors. The messy terms of the deal itself, with its many eclectic provisions designed to assuage nonproliferation concerns, will still impose many barriers on the transfer of nuclear fuel and technology, and not all of the conditions are even explicitly spelled out. Political uncertainty in India will also remain given the strong partisan opposition.

100 101

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The nuclear deal does play a role in bolstering U.S.-India ties. India has agreed to fully support U.S. non-proliferation initiatives. And as a thank-you for the role President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice personally played in securing the suppliers groups approval, Prime Minister Singh is expected to sign shortly three agreements that U.S. officials say are critical to forge closer bilateral military ties. [104] These will facilitate cooperation on logistical operations, provide for monitoring of the end uses of transferred weapons systems, and enhance communications interoperability. But the two sides could have made progress on all these fronts independent of a civil nuclear deal. The deal may also benefit ongoing negotiations over sales of military equipment to India. In addition to the orders it recently placed for American maritime reconnaissance aircraft and military transport planes, India one of the worlds biggest arms importers is gearing up to buy other American weapon systems. Upon the ratification of the nuclear deal by Congress, America is most likely to clinch the intense international competition to sell India 126 fighter-jets in a $10-billion contract. Yet such progress isnt dependent on a civil nuclear deal. Indeed, that may be the greatest danger of the current discussion. Because it has become such a controversial issue, the nuclear deal is threatening to overwhelm the broader dialogue India and the U.S. need to sustain about their relationship. The raging controversy hasnt done anyone any good.[105] With the U.S senate approval of the Indo-US nuclear deal, Indian establishment completely forgot the future effects of that deal.[106] Now the government of India is trying to erase out Indias nuclear deterrent against Pakistan as well by saying that without this Indo-US nuclear deal, there will be no future development of the nuclear energy in India. [107][108]The nuclear deal it has little to do with the nuclear power generations but it aims at the elimination of Indias ability to produce any nuclear weapons. Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), which India has refused to sign so far, is about to be imposed upon India through a back door with devastating consequences for Indias immediate future.[109] Already the US senate has imposed a new clause that in future national security organizations of USA, which means CIA and FBI, would now collaborate with India regarding nuclear non-proliferation.This in effect would imply that US organizations would make sure India will not be able to gain any advantage to use its nuclear facilities to create nuclear weapons. Dr Homi Sethna, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and one of the founding-father of Indias nuclear program, said that what India has signed would be worse than joining the NPT regime. Regulatory Board, has exposed the very enormous financial price that India will have to pay as well, between Rs 300,000 to Rs 400,000 crores in nuclear reactors that will be totally dependent for their existence on a yearly audit of our policies by the US Congress. [110] Dr A. Gopalakrishnan, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, has outlined how precisely commitments made by Dr Singh to Parliament and the people have been blatantly undermined and notes that if the deal goes through in its present form, it will "compromise the sovereignty of this country for decades to come". He has exposed the very enormous financial price that India will have to pay as well, between Rs 300,000 to Rs
104 105

http://chellaney.net/2008/09/14/controversy-over-u-s-india-nuclear-deal-hasnt-done-anyone-any-good/ http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122098853203415865.html?mod=googlenews_wsj 106 http://www.ivarta.com/columns/OL_061219.htm 107 http://blogs.ivarta.com/Indo-US-Nuclear-Treaty-Its-Implications/blog-13.htm 108 http://www.ivarta.com/columns/OL_061010.htm 109 Ibid. 110 http://blogs.ivarta.com/Indo-US-Nuclear-Treaty-Its-Implications/blog-13.htm

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400,000 corers in nuclear reactors that will be totally dependent for their existence on a yearly audit of our policies by the US Congress. [111] The argument of Prime Minister Dr. ManMohan Singh, as he said in the Parliament recently, that otherwise India would be a nuclear Pariah is false. In 1974, USA has imposed sanctions so that India cannot get any nuclear related materials or technology. After 1998 USA has imposed more sanctions on India so that it cannot get any defense related technology or materials at all. [112] However, India since 1974 has received every nuclear technology, and materials including conventional nuclear power plants, Fast Breeder reactors, reprocessing and enrichment plants and heavy water plants from the Soviet Union and Russia without any restrictions attached to these. As a result, India is al most self-sufficient regarding nuclear technology and can produce nuclear weapons despite all the efforts of the United States to stop it.Only for the last two years, because of its membership of the NSG, Russia now wants to supply nuclear power plants with added safeguards that the plants cannot be used to produce any nuclear weapons. [113] However, at the same time, it has offered offshore nuclear plants to India, which would be without any restrictions. India can have both or either of the on-shore or offshore nuclear power plants from Russia and as a result for the future development of electricity production, India does not need US support at all. [114] CPI (M) is opposing the treaty by saying India does not need nuclearvpower plants. That is a non-issue here. Even if India needs nuclear power plants to supplement it energy requirement in future, India does not need nuclear power plants from USA. Russia can still supply whatever India needs at a much lower price. [115] The treaty has little to do with nuclear energy development in India but deals with the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and how to prevent India from becoming a nuclear weapon state. It is very clear that the treaty does not treat India as a present or future nuclear weapon state. The treaty will never legitimize Indias nuclear weapons, but will ruin any prospect of India to have any independent nuclear deterrent against even Pakistan; China is far cry. With India signing the Indo-US treaty, Pakistan without any treaty with the US will receive whatever it wants from China and will go on producing nuclear weapons but India cannot. [116] The reason is that the treaty will force India to separate Indians nuclear facilities including the research institutes into two groups, military and non-military. About 90 percent of all nuclear facilities which can produce plutonium for nuclear weapons will be included in the civilian sector and there will be regular inspection by the IAEA and the US authority to make sure that these facilities will not be used to produce nuclear weapons. If India, in this situation, wants to keep its option for nuclear weapons, it needs to reconstruct every facility once again at a prohibitive cost. India for the military part of the nuclear sector will not be able to import technology or materials from any of the countries of the NSG, including Russia. Thus, Indias nuclear weapons program will disappear. This is the real aim of the Indo-US treaty. [117] Prime Minister Dr. ManMohan Singhs declaration in the Indian parliament that India would maintain the option to test nuclear weapons is very theoretical. In practice, India will be
111 112

http://www.ivarta.com/columns/OL_070506.htm http://www.ivarta.com/columns/OL_061219.htm 113 http://blogs.ivarta.com/Indo-US-Nuclear-Treaty-Its-Implications/blog-13.htm 114 http://www.ivarta.com/columns/070704-india-russia-nuclear.htm 115 http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2007_07_08_archive.html 116 http://www.ivarta.com/columns/OL_061010.htm 117 Ibid.

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unable to do that because of lack of availability of appropriate facility to develop and test nuclear weapons in near future. [118][119]

118 119

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16
POLITICAL OPPOSITION TO THE DEAL IN INDIA

Although many mainstream political parties including the Indian National Congress support
the deal along with regional parties like Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam and Rashtriya Janata Dal. Also, in November 2007, former Indian Military chiefs, bureaucrats and scientists drafted a letter to Members of Parliament expressing their support for the deal. [120] However, its realisation has run into difficulties in the face of stiff political opposition in India. The nationalist Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) and the leftist members of the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition took stands against the India-U.S. civilian nuclear deal. The Samajwadi Party (SP) which was with the Left Front in opposing the deal changed its stand after discussing with ex-president of India and scientist Dr A P J Abdul Kalam. Now the Samajwadi Party is in support of the government and the deal. The Indian Government survived a vote of confidence by 275-256 after the Left Front withdrew their support to the government over this dispute. [121] Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP): The main opposition party BJP which laid the groundwork for the deal criticized the deal saying that the deal in its present form was unacceptable to the BJP and wanted the deal renegotiated. The BJP had asked the government not to accept the deal without a vote in the parliament. However, the government remained steadfast on its commitment to the deal and has refused to back down on the agreement. Veteran BJP leader Lal Krishna Advani, in a statement to the Indian Express newspaper, seemed to indicate willingness to support the government provided some legislative measures.[122] However his party refused to follow that line and stuck to its earlier stand. Left Front: The primary opposition to the Nuclear deal in India, however, comes from the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and its parliamentary allies (CPI, RSP, AIFB). November 17 the left parties had provisionally agreed to let the government initiate talks with the IAEA for India specific safeguards which indicated that they may support. The CPI(M), an external parliamentary supporter of government as it stipulates conditions that in some areas are more severe than the clauses in either the NPT or the CTBT. They alleged that the deal would undermine the sovereignty of India's foreign policy and also claimed that the Indian government was hiding certain clauses of the deal, which would harm India's indigenous nuclear program, from the media. On July 9, 2008, the Left Front withdrew support to the government reducing its strength to 276 in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of the parliament). The government survived a confidence vote in the parliament on July 22, 2008 by 275-256 votes in the backdrop of defections from both camps to the opposite camps. [123] United Nationalist Progressive Alliance (UNPA): The UNPA was divided over support of the nuclear deal. While the Samajwadi Party supported it after consultations with Abdul Kalam, the other members of the UNPA led by the TDP opposed it saying that the deal is against India's interest. The SP was eventually suspended from the UNPA.
120 121

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opposition_to_the_Indo-US_civilian_agreement_in_India www.endusmilitarism.org/indo-us_nuclear_agreement_wikipedia_090608.html 122 IndianExpress.com 123 http://www.ivarta.com/columns/OL_061010.htm

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Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP): The BSP also opposed the nuclear deal, saying that it was anti-Muslim. The party joined hands with the Left Front and the TDP in voting against the government in Parliament on the nuclear deal. [124] Others: In 2006, some Indian ex-nuclear scientists had written an appeal to Indian Members of Parliament to ensure that "decisions taken today do not inhibit India's future ability to develop and pursue nuclear technologies for the benefit of the nation". Various Indian political and scientific personalities have repeatedly expressed concerns that the United States may use the India-US civilian nuclear agreement as a diplomatic weapon if Indian foreign policy was not in conformity with geopolitical interests of the US. [125] Issues in the Indian parliament: Following the passing of the Act, negotiations on implementing the cooperation through a 'Section 123 Agreement' were concluded on July 27, 2007. For this agreement to be sent to the U.S. Congress, India must have negotiated a safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group must have agreed to modify its export control standards to permit nuclear cooperation with India. On June 19, 2008, news media reported that Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh threatened to resign his position if the Communists in India continue to oppose the nuclear deal, an opposition that Singh declares as irrational and reactionary. On July 08, 2008, Prakash Karat announced that the Left Front is withdrawing its support to the government over the decision by the government to go ahead on the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act. The left front had been a staunch advocate of not proceeding with this deal citing national interests. On July 9, 2008, India formally submitted the safeguards agreement to the IAEA. This development comes after the Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh returned from the 34th G8 summit meeting in Tokyo where he met with U.S. President George W. Bush. Other world leaders of G8 have also endorsed the agreement, suggesting that it is likely to gain support from the IAEA & NSG. India has also already secured the approval from China which it thought might hold some reservations against the deal. Australia which is a key exporter of Uranium for India after the deal becomes active has also suggested its approval. According to The Hindu sources, External Affairs Minister's Pranab Mukherjees earlier statement said I cannot bind the government if we lose our majority, implying that United Progressive Alliance government would not put its signature on any deal with IAEA if it lost the majority in either a 'opposition-initiated no-confidence motion' or if failing to muster a vote of confidence in Indian Parliament after being told to prove its majority by the president. Left Front withdrew support to UPA government on same day. On 22 July 2008 the UPA faced its first confidence vote in the Lok Sabha after the Communist Party of India (Marxist) led Left Front withdrew support over India approaching the IAEA for Indo-US nuclear deal. The UPA won the confidence vote with 275 votes to the opposition's 256, (10 members abstained from the vote) to record a 19-vote victory. [126]

124 125

www.endusmilitarism.org/indo-us_nuclear_agreement_wikipedia_090608.html Ibid. 126 Ibid.

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17
THE U.S. DOMESTIC DEBATE ON THE INDO-U.S. NUCLEAR DEAL

The agreement for the Indo-US civilian nuke deal was reached between Prime Minister Dr.
Manmohan Singh and the US President Mr. George W. Bush on July 18, 2005 during Dr. Singh's State visit to the US. Later, on March 2, 2006, the deal was clinched when Mr. Bush visited India. Since then, it has been awaiting Congressional approval. The US Congress on December 8, 2006 passed the legislation seeking approval to the landmark Indo-US civilian nuclear deal, shrouded in uncertainties regarding its fate ever since it was clinched in 2005. On 27 September 2008, the House Resolution 7081 -- or the Berman Amendment authored by Congressman Howard Berman, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was approved by 298-117 in the House of Representatives. [127] Out of the 435-member Democrat controlled House, 178 Republicans and 120 Democrats supported the deal whereas 10 Republicans and 107 Democrats opposed the 123 Agreement. [128] One might argue that the vote in the House demonstrated the strong bipartisan support to let India and the US resume nuclear commerce after 30 years, but one needs to acknowledge that it was lesser than the 359-68 backing which enabled the US law, the Hyde Act, to pass in 2006. [129] The Democrats, being the non-proliferation hawks, have remained staunch opponents of the IndoUS nuclear deal. There have been various arguments by the Democrats both in the House and the Senate against the Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Agreement. There were objections that the Indo-US nuclear deal would promote arms race and thereby contributing to instability in the region. Edward John Markey, a Democrat in the House, opposed the nuclear deal on the ground that the nuclear rules amended at the highest levels for India would provoke Iran, Pakistan and North Korea to do the same. [130] Meanwhile, Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, a California Democrat supported the bill and said the deal furthers our countries strategic relationship while balancing nuclear non-proliferation concerns and India's growing energy needs. [131] After the House passed the bill, various arguments were raised in the Senate before the passage of the deal. For instance, Senator Jeff Bingaman, a senior democrat from New Mexico, moved an amendment that sought to link nuclear exports to India to a Presidential determination that New Delhi has halted production of fissile materials, thus linking the deal to FMCT. The amendment was characterized as a killer condition by Richard Lugar, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. [132] Lugar held Bingaman
127 The New York Times, September 27, 2008, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/washington/28nuke.html. 128 US House clears n-deal, PM says happy but wait for the final outcome, Indian Express, September 29, 2008, available at: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/us-house-clears-ndeal-pmsays-happy-butwait-for-final-outcome/367135/0. 129 H.R. 5682 *109th+: Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, Jul 26, 2006 (109th Congress), GovTrack, available at: http://www.govtrack.us/congress/vote.xpd?vote=h2006-411. 130 US- India nuclear deal receives final congressional approval, CBC News, October 1, 2008, available at: http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2008/10/01/usindia-nuclear.html. 131 House Approves nuclear pact with India, USA Today, September 27, 2008, available at: http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-09-27-nuclear-pact_N.htm. 132 The Hindu, November 18,2008 , available at:

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amendment as an unacceptable pre-condition and pointed out that India had made it clear that it would not accept any unilateral caps. He argued that Senators need to take into consideration Indias security environment, where on the one hand, Pakistan continues production of fissile material and on the other, China which has not committed itself to any moratorium on fissile material production. The Bingaman amendment was, however, rejected by a margin of 73 to 26. [133] Another objection was raised by Senator Barbara Boxer, a democrat from California, regarding Indias relationship with Iran. The Boxer Amendment said that India should suspend military to military cooperation with Iran, including training exercises until such time the Government of Iran no longer supports acts of international terrorism as determined by the Secretary of State. [134] Although Lugar admitted that Iran is a destabilising force, he categorized the amendment as a killer amendment. Senator Joseph Biden too criticized the amendment saying that the civilian nuclear deal would be gone if anything surfaced of India dealing with Iran in the areas of nuclear weapons and/or sensitive technologies. The Boxer amendment was rejected by 59 to 38 votes. Similarly, another amendment, which required U.S. nuclear supplies to be cut off if India tests nuclear weapons, was rejected by the Senate on the ground that it was unnecessary, since the condition was already part of the Hyde Act, which gave the deal preliminary approval. [135] Another objection raised in the Senate was that by signing the deal, the US would ignore its three-decade policy of promoting the non proliferation regime. It was argued that such a deal undermined attempts to prevent states like Iran and North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. Senator Byron Dorgan, Democrat of North Dakota, opposed the deal and called it a grievous mistake that would reward rogue behavior. Similarly, Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, criticized the deal calling it a non-proliferation disaster. Kimball held that the deal did not bring India into the non-proliferation framework as the deal made a country-specific exemption from core non-proliferation standards that the US had spent decades to establish. [136] Sen. Tom Harkin, an Iowa Democrat too condemned the deal and held that the deal, if passed, would reward India for flouting the most important arms control agreement in history -- the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty -- and undermine the case against hostile nations that seek to do the same. [137] He also criticized the deal on the fact that it was hustled through [the House of Representatives] without any hearings and without a vote in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and in the Senate, the Foreign Relations Committee held just one hearing with just one witness who spoke in support of the agreement. Harkin is currently the chairman of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry. There were also arguments by the critics that the deal does not require India to cap its fissile material production considering United States, France, Britain and Russia are all moving to
http://www.hindu.com/2006/11/18/stories/2006111817831600.htm. 133 US Senate rejects killer amendments, The Hindu, November 18,2008 , available at: http://www.hindu.com/2006/11/18/stories/2006111817831600.htm. 134 Ibid. 135 US Senate approves nuke pact with India, Live Mint: The Wall Street Journal, October 2, 2008, available at: http://www.livemint.com/2008/10/02080248/US-Senate-approves-nuke-pact-w.html. 136 Senate backs far-reaching nuclear trade deal with India, The Washington Post, October 2, 2008, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/story/2008/10/01/ST2008100103654.html 137 http://www.domain-b.com/defence/general/20081002_civil_nuclear.html.

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limit their production. The deal also does not hold any restriction on the number of nuclear weapons that India plans to produce. It was argued that although India has promised not to use US nuclear fuel and its assistance in any form for the nuclear weapons programme it would allow India to use it own nuclear fuel for weapons production. The Indo-US nuclear trade would free up Indian domestic sources of fuel to be solely dedicated to weapons production. This argument was rebutted by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, stating that Indias nuclear weapons program was more related to the politico-military environment in the region than quantification of fissile material available. She argued that India had a restrained minimum deterrence program [138] thereby suggesting that India has sufficient stocks of uranium for its modest weapons program and thus did not need the uranium freed up by the deal to advance its program. Mr. Tellis, who served as an advisor to the then US Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill, acknowledged the internal contradiction of US foreign policy goals -- to harness India as a counter to China as also to uphold its nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, he argued that the US does not have to jettison its non proliferation regime, rather apply it selectively based on each individual country and their friendship and value to the US. [139] The Senate ratified the deal 86 to 13 demonstrating somewhat the same level of bipartisan support as it did for the Hyde Act (The Hyde Act was approved by 85-12 in the Senate on November 16, 2006), thereby handing a rare foreign policy victory to President Bush in the twilight of his administration. The support extended by Senator Joseph Biden, the top Democrat on the Committee and current Vice President of United States, and Senator John Kerry, former Presidential candidate, in favour of the bill at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee made passage of the deal much easier. [140] 37 Democrats and 49 Republicans voted in favor of the bill whereas 12 democrats and 1 independent voted against it. [141] Both the presidential candidates Sen. Barack Obama and Sen. John McCain too had voted in favour of the bill. While the Indo-US nuclear deal acted as a factor that strengthened India-US relations during the Bush Administration, one cannot predict the centrality or even the fate of the issue under the Obama Administration. The Obama Administration has made it clear of its nonproliferation objectives through various policy documents within the US and at international levels. The aim is to push for the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) with greater vigor. [142] President Barack Obama in his speech at Prague on 5 April 2009 made it clear that the CTBT issue would be dealt with immediately and aggressively as also vowed to seek the US Senate ratification for the treaty. However, there has to be a two-thirds majority (67 votes) for the ratification to come into effect. As of now, analysts believe that at least 60 votes would be certain. Once the US ratifies the CTBT, there could possibly be pressure on India to sign and ratify the same. Obama Administration and Nuclear Issues: Implications for India:
138 Indo-US Nuclear Deal gets thumbs up in Senate hearing, The Times of India, available at: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/NEWS/World/US/articleshow/msid-1479757,curpg-2.cms. 139 The Truth behind the Indo US nuclear deal, The Hindu, July 29, 2005, available at: http://www.hindu.com/2005/07/29/stories/2005072903221000.htm. 140 US Senate approves nuclear deal, Rediff News, October 2, 2008, available at: http://in.rediff.com/news/2008/oct/02ndeal2.htm. 141 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/02/washington/02webnuke.html. 142 http://www.observerindia.com/cms/export/orfonline/modules/analysis/attachments/implications-forindia_1253193126213.pdf

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After the passage of the Indo-US nuclear deal, the developments and pronouncements made by the Obama Administration on CTBT during the first half of 2009 have been equally political. The Obama Administration has allocated US$26 million for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). [143] It is for the first time in 13 years that such a support has been extended to the CTBTO by any US administration. Both President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have also launched a major diplomatic offensive to get other non-signatories like India to come on board. Clinton also listed negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut off Treaty (FMCT) on the non proliferation agenda. Both the CTBT and FMCT have been opposed by India. [144] There have been various speculations about the pressure that India may face on this issue from the Obama Administration. The fact that the two non-proliferation hawks, who vehemently opposed the nuclear deal, are now leading Obamas non proliferation agenda to seek a worldwide ratification of CTBT added more hysteria to it. Both Gary Samore, Coordinator for Weapons of Mass Destruction and Arms Control and Ellen O. Tauscher, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security strongly opposed the Indo-US nuclear deal during its passage. [145] During the debates of 123 Agreement, Tauscher consistently maintained the position that the deal will lead to nuclear arms race in South Asia. Tauscher predicted that the deal would not be of great benefit to the US as India would possibly buy nuclear technology from Russia and other suppliers. Samore was also against the deal as he did not believe that the nuclear deal was necessary to establish better US-India relations. Once the US ratifies the CTBT, there can be pressure on India to do the same. Samore has confirmed about a private pact with China, once the US Senate ratifies the CTBT, China would do the same. Samore held that there would not necessarily be an American pressure, but international pressure on India to ratify the CTBT will be significant. Additionally, comments by Blackwill that New Delhi may face pressure from the Obama Administration to sign CTBT and FMCT resulted in consternations in India. [146] Blackwill warned India of possible downturn in its relationship with the US and advised the new government in India to launch an intense diplomatic offensive to build stronger ties with the US. In this backdrop, Hillary Clinton, during her recent visit to India, stressed that the civil nuclear deal stands on its own merit and will not be held hostage to India signing CTBT. She held that the Obama Administration is trying to get CTBT passed in the Congress and hopes that this would be an option for the Indian government, thereby leaving it to New Delhi to decide on the signing of the CTBT. Former Assistant Secretary of State, Karl Inderfuth, also dismissed concerns about any further complication of the nuclear deal. [147] India has refused to sign the CTBT on the ground that it tends to create a nuclear apartheid by dividing the world into nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states. The statement by Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon that India wont stand in the way of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) provided it actively contributes to nuclear disarmament articulates the current position of India on CTBT. This is also evident from the
143 The US and the CTBT, June 15, 2009, available at: http://www.ipcs.org/article_details.php?articleNo=2893. 144http://indiatoday.intoday.in/index.php?option=com_content&issueid=88&task=view&id=25261&sectionid=4&Itemid= 1. 145 http://news.rediff.com/report/2009/apr/10/ctbt-more-pressure-on-india-to-sign-ctbt.htm. 146 The indian News, May 5, 2009, available at: http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/ex-us-envoy-warnsof-india-us-ties-downturnsounds-ctbt-alert_100188624.html. 147 http://news.rediff.com/report/2009/apr/10/ctbt-more-pressure-on-india-to-sign-ctbt.htm.

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statement by Shyam Saran, Special Envoy for Nuclear Issues and Climate Change, that if the world moves categorically towards nuclear disarmament in a credible time frame, the Indo-US differences over the CTBT would probably recede into the background. The decision taken by India on CTBT should not be on mere pressure but on consideration of Indias long term strategy with respect to the non-proliferation regime. Before taking a decision on CTBT, India needs to consider a few issues. First issue is related to the Boxer amendment. Although the Boxer Amendment was rejected in the Senate, it demonstrated the delicateness of the Iran issue in both India and the US. Indias Iran vote at the IAEA was a clear indication, to many, that India totally caved into US pressure. [148] Now that the IndoUS nuclear deal is signed and sealed, it might do well if India used its diplomatic cards to mediate with the US and thereby facilitate a better understanding between the two countries. Second, India should play its cards well and obtain adequate safeguards before signing the CTBT. The developments in the neighbourhood should be of greater concern than the US ratifying the treaty. India needs to prioritize its regional security interests and ensure that Pakistan, Israel, China and North Korea also ratify the treaty. After obtaining adequate safeguards, New Delhi, however, could reconsider its 1996 stance vis a vis the treaty. It is believed that the signing of CTBT would have little impact on Indias nuclear arsenal and its weapon status. Instead of merely vouching for the global nuclear disarmament and calling the present nuclear regime a failure, India should consider the changed atmosphere at regional and international levels to achieve a better bargaining position on these issues. India should move forward by leaving aside the political negotiations of old rhetoric and focus on cold strategic calculations in this regard. Besides the CTBT ratification would also strengthen the Indo-US relations. With regard to FMCT, it is possible that there would not be any pressure on India in the near future as the FMCT negotiations would take several years before it reaches any completion. [149] India, however, would need to face bigger battles on the FMCT negotiations. India would need to find partners and ensure that its existing fissile material stocks are not brought under the treaty. Thus with bigger battles ahead, signing and ratification of CTBT by India would only allow itself more maneuvering space in the negotiations on FMCT.

148 http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/2890 149 http://news.rediff.com/report/2009/apr/10/ctbt-more-pressure-on-india-to-sign-ctbt.htm.

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18
MAJOR ISSUES

In order to achieve the objectives of the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement by United States
of Americas President George W. Bush & Prime Minister of India Dr. Manmohan Singh, both countries initially wrangled on the issue of sequencing of steps that attracted significant public attention. After submission of the separation plan, the US administration started convincing members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to make India specific exceptions, which could allow India to acquire advanced nuclear technology from these countries. India is now in the process of negotiating safeguard agreements and an Additional Protocol for its designated civilian nuclear facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The two other controversial issues that still needs to be negotiated, which would make Indias intentions more obvious are; Indias position on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Separation of Civilian/ Military Facilities: Before the March 2, agreement, the US wanted India to put great majority of its 22 nuclear reactors on the civilian list. Presuming the great majority means three quarters of the total number of reactors, it would have meant that India should have declared as many as 17 reactors, including the six already under IAEA safeguards, as civilian. [150] Additionally, US asked India to place its current and future Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) under safeguards, which India claims to be an indigenous test program, still in its infancy, and cannot be declared as civilian. India hopes to use the FBR for future energy needs that sought to bridge the gap between the shortage of natural uranium that India faces and the vast thorium reserves it has. [151] Another factor that could have contributed to Indias refusal to place FBRs under safeguards is that U-333, - a by-product of fission in FBRs, is a suitable fuel for Indias nuclear powered submarine that is being developed under R&D program euphemistically called the ATV project. By putting FBRs under safeguards, Indian scientists feared that their indigenous research would be exposed through external inspections and Indias intellectual property rights over this new technology may be diluted if inspectors monitor every stage of their ongoing research. [152] Nuclear experts familiar with the origin of the FBR technology disagree with the Indian claim of ingenuity as the technology has its roots in France. Some in India viewed US insistence to bring maximum number of nuclear facilities including the FBRs under safeguards an attempt to cap Indias fissile material production. It was therefore strongly resisted by the Indian nuclear bureaucracy including head of Indias Atomic Energy Commission Dr Anil Kakodkar. Prime Minister Singh also came out openly in support of his scientists and declared; we have made it clear that we cannot accept safeguards on our indigenous fast breeder program, and added; we have taken into account our current and future strategic needs and programs after careful deliberation of all relevant factors, consistent with our nuclear doctrinethere has been no erosion of the integrity of our nuclear doctrine, either in terms of current or future
150 151

V. Sudarshan, Be Civil Please, Outlook, February 2006, p.34 Ibid. 152 Gen. (Retd) V P Malik & Brig (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, Indo-US N-Deal: Overcoming the Last Hurdle, Observer Research Foundation Analysis, March 2, 2006

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capabilitiesit will be the autonomous Indian decision as to what is civilian and what is military. Nobody will tell us what is civilian and what is military the number of thermal nuclear reactors that India would agree to put under civilian list would be equal to 65% of the total installed thermal nuclear power capacity. [153] Gary Milhollin in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee commented on the Indian offer and said; In effect, Indias offer is like that of a counterfeiter with a 22 room house, who offers to let the police look into 14 rooms as long as they stay out of all the othersEveryone knows that it will be the eight undeclared ones that make the bomb [154] India also managed to keep the FBRs out of the civilian list, yet another major concession to India which prompted George Perkovich to comment; this is Santa Claus negotiating. The goal seems to give away as much possible. [155] Type of Safeguards: The Joint Statement of 18 July, 2005, refers to India taking a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. [156] An unlikely voluntary arrangement on the pattern of five NWS could have enabled India to offer more number of facilities for safeguards and withdraw these whenever required citing national security interest. Such a provision if agreed, could have essentially placed India squarely in the company of NWS. It was however, out rightly rejected by the Administration as well as the Congress. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, Robert Joseph, while testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said; US would not view a voluntary offer arrangement as defensible, and the safeguards must be applied in perpetuity. Similarly, Chairman Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Richard Lugar had made it clear at the very onset of the nuclear debate that the Committee will judge the efficacy of the separation plan in terms of three key criteria. He identified these as safeguards, nonassistance and transparency. [157] There are currently three types of safeguards agreements in vogue, INFCIRC/66, INFCIRC/153, and Voluntary Safeguards Agreements. It is not yet clear what will be the final outcome of the on going negotiations between India and the IAEA. [158] India could ask for a facility specific safeguards on the pattern of INFCIRC/66 agreements on its designated civilian facilities individually or collectively for all of its civilian facilities in the agreed separation plan. These would then be in perpetuity and would thus preclude future use of any of these designated civilian facilities for the production of nuclear material for nuclear explosive purposes, and would also eliminate possibility of withdrawing any of these facilities from safeguards for national security purposes. [159] The other type of safeguards INFCIRC/153, which is also known as comprehensive safeguards agreement, is essentially for non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). The existence of a weapons oriented component in the Indian nuclear program automatically rules out possibility of a comprehensive safeguards arrangement under INFCIRC/153, [160] as technically India and
153

Prime Minister Singhs Statement on Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperation with the United States in Parliament, February 27, 2006. <www.hindu.com/thehindu/nic/suomotuu.htm> 154 Gary Milhollin, Testimony on US India Atomic Energy Cooperation hearing for Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, April 26, 2006 155 Steven R. Weisman, Dissenting on Atomic Deal, The New York Times, March 3, 2006. 156 Indo-US Joint Statement, July 18, 2005, The Hindu. 157 Seema Mustafa, Nuke Plan Not Given to Cabinet, Sent to US, The Asian Age, January 7, 2006 158 INFCIRC, an abbreviation of Information Circular, is a designation the IAEA uses to record its agreements with states and organizations. INFCIRC/66 and INFCIRC/153 are model agreements; the actual agreements with states will bear different numbers. INFCIRC/66 agreements predate the NPT and were used in bilateral safeguards arrangements, whereas INFCIRC/153 agreements are full-scope safeguards under the NPT. 159 <www.arsmcontrol.org/act/2005_10/OCTCover.asp> 160 C. Raja Mohan, N-Deal: Now Focus on IAEA Safeguards, Indian Express, 25 December 2005, p.2.

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Pakistan both do not fall into the category of NNWS. During the on going discussion on the type of safeguards with the IAEA, India would continue to push for a favorable arrangement, which could help in an implicit recognition of India as a NWS. As PM Singh in his address to the Indian parliament had earlier stated; United States [has] implicitly acknowledged the existence of our nuclear weapons programas a responsible State with advanced nuclear technologies, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other States which have advanced nuclear technology, such as the United States. An Indian Embassy backgrounder on the agreement also noted that the NWS including the US, have the right to shift facilities from civilian category to military and there is no reason why this should not apply to India. [161] Nuclear Suppliers Group: The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was created as a result of Indias nuclear explosion of 1974, which formulated rules to preclude the possibility of any future misuse of nuclear technology provided to a country for peaceful purposes. It is a group of 45 countries, aimed at regulating nuclear trade within the group and with other countries, who are signatories to the NPT. India is not an NSG member, neither a NWS, nor a signatory to the NPT, therefore it is ineligible for nuclear trade with other countries, as long as NSG amends its rules or makes India specific exceptions through a consensus decision. In order to convince members of the NSG to allow nuclear trade with India, US has already initiated consultations with the group. The Administration hopes that it would be able to convince the NSG to make India specific exception that would allow full cooperation with India without abandoning NSG consensus rules or the full-scope safeguards condition of supply. [162] Initial responses from some of the major nuclear suppliers including UK, France and Russia have all been positive. Whereas, member countries such as Sweden, Denmark, Austria, and Ireland have indicated their reservations on the basis of their non-proliferation policies. Taking a lead from Indo-US nuclear cooperation agreement, France was quick to sign its own variant of the deal with India, [163] and Russia, not wanting to be left behind, has already supplied nuclear fuel for Indias nuclear reactors at Tarapur. China has so far been cautious in its approach towards the nuclear cooperation agreement and has called for abiding by the rules of the global non-proliferation regime. [164] Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty (FMCT): Following nuclear tests of 1998, India decided to increase its fissile material production for two reasons; first, to provide Indian policy makers with an option of deploying a larger nuclear arsenal than originally intended; and second, as insurance in case a global fissile material cutoff regime, which could require India to immediately terminate the production of weapons grade fissile materials, were to unexpectedly materialize, and for this purpose the idea of using Indias power reactors in a low burn-up mode to increase the production of weapons grade plutonium and possibly produce tritium was also explored. Indias continued reluctance to declare a moratorium and its insistence on a multilateral verifiable FMCT seems
161

Ashley Tellis, India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, p.25. 162 Sept 8, 2005 HIRC US-India Hearing, Nov 2, 2005 SFRC US-India Hearing, in, US Nuclear Cooperation With India: Issues for Congress, CRS Report, updated January 12, 2006. Page 19. 163 Paris Ready to Sell reactors, Deccan Chronicle, 31 January 2006. www.deccan.com/home/homedetails.asp. 164 Hurdles Ahead for Landmark Nuclear Deal, BBC NEWS, 3/3/06. <www.bbc.co.uk>

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to be an attempt to exploit this extended window of opportunity as long as the major parties do not resolve their differences and a consensus is reached at the CD. Unless the FMCT is negotiated, India is under no obligation to halt production of fissile material. In one important respect, India has received more leniency than the five established nuclear haves have asked for themselves: The US, Britain, France, Russia, and China say they have halted the production of the fissile material that goes into nuclear bombs, while India has only promised to join universal ban that would include Pakistan, if such a thing ever materializes. The US Administration does not seem interested in demanding a moratorium on fissile material production from India as is apparent from Under Secretary Robert Josephs testimony to the House International Relations Committee hearing in which he stated; [US remains] committed to achieving Indian curtailment of fissile material production and we have strongly encouraged a move in this direction. but we will not insist on it for purposes of this civil nuclear initiative. Indian officials on the other hand, have repeatedly asserted that; there is no commitment at all to cease production of fissile material ahead of conclusion of [such a] multilateral FMCT. Some of the Washington based Indian experts suggest that India should not cap its nuclear weapons program, and restraining Indias ability to build up its nuclear stockpile could threaten to place New Delhi at a disadvantage vis-vis Beijing, a situation that could not only undermine Indian security but also US interests in Asia. Ashley Tellis, while testifying before House International Relations Committee stated; Congress should not support any amendments that are intended to limit, or have as their effect a limitation on, Indias capacity to produce fissile materials for its nuclear weapons program.Accordingly, any effort to stipulate that an Indian fissile materials production moratorium would be a precondition for implementing the deal in effect functions as a poison pill that would sunder the accord. The Indian leadership, while ruling out any such probability asserted that; there will be no capping of our strategic program, and the separation plan ensures adequacy of fissile material and other inputs to meet the current and future requirements of our strategic program, based on our assessment of the threat scenarios. No constraint has been placed on our right to construct new facilities for strategic purposes. Michael Krepon, a leading critic of the agreement quipped: its a sweetheart deal for India The Administration told Congress that the agreement would be about the growth of Indias electricity and not the growth of Indian bomb making potential and that standard clearly has not been met. [165] Nuclear Deal and Minimum Deterrence: ONE needs to look into the extent to which the deal impinges on the credibility of Indias minimum nuclear deterrence. Will the deal constrain Indias nuclear weapons programme? This is much more a question of interpretation. Indias consistent perception has been that the deal has more to do with energy security and less to do with arms control. India, as is well known, has a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear weapon testing. [166] There is a strong view that Washington is trying to legally institutionalise Indias unilateral moratorium. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had confirmed that the civil and nuclear facilities separation plan would not limit our option now or in the future to address evolving threat scenarios with appropriate responses consistent with our nuclear policy of restraint and responsibility. India, has taken care of its current and future deterrence requirements. The
165 166

US Critics Slam Indo-US Deal, Indian Express, March 3, 2006. <www.expresindia.com> www.mainstreamweekly.net/article207.html

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US is trying to tie the assurances of perpetual fuel supplyas envisaged by the Indian nuclear separation planinto a no nuclear testing condition. These clauses form part of the bracketed portion of the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (123 Agreement). [167] If Inida conducts a test the consequence, however, would be for the US and the Nuclear Supplies Group to end their nuclear cooperation with India. Provided India is able to withdraw its civilian facilities from the in perpetuity IAEA safeguards, the clock, in effect, would be turned back to the status quo of July 2005. The American President will have to certify every year that he is satisfied with the behaviour and programmes of India in the nuclear field, especially with respect to the augmentation of the nuclear arsenal. P. K. Iyengar, the former Atomic Energy Commission Chairman, contends that additions to the agreement of July 18, 2005 would, in effect, cap Indias strategic programme for a minimum credible deterrent. His contention is that it is not clear whether India would have an option of accelerating its own well-established nuclear power programme based on the Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor. [168] Nuclear Deal and the Non-Proliferation Regime: The main concern is proliferation because India has refused to sign on to NPT. Bharat Karnad, the well-known defence analyst, contends that the kind of things mentioned in the preamble of the deal has all things like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Comprehensive Test ban Treaty and the Iran issue. [169] Well known nuclear scientist Homi Sethna has opined that India would be better off signing the NPT, which permitted the exit of any signatory nation, rather than the nuclear deal with the US that would bind the country for perpetuity. However, experts like David Albright, Leonard Weiss and Daryl G. Kimball had, in a briefing at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on February 16, 2006, feared that Indias reluctance to place all its reactors under permanent inspections smacked of a clandestine effort to increase weapons production, and also belied the Bush Administrations contention that the deal would bring into compliance with the non-proliferation regime. Their point was that Indias separation plan did not justify changes in US non-proliferation laws on international norms to make farreaching exceptions to allow transfer of sensitive civilian nuclear technology. However, a few critics strongly feels that it is better to have India inside the non-proliferation system than outside. [170]

167 168

www.mainstreamweekly.net/article207.html Ibid. 169 Ibid. 170 Ibid.

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19
CONCLUSION

The Indo-US nuclear deal had to pass through various stages before it reached where it is
now. There have been differences of opinion with regards to interpretation of the terms of reference and their respective understanding with regards to these various agreements and arrangements including the Indian propensity to conduct nuclear tests; fuel assurances; development of strategic fuel reserves; and transfer of technology. Political statements by both the parties are instrumental in giving insight into the way the deal is likely to be implemented in effect. Thus while the Indian side insists on its right to conduct nuclear tests in the future, the U.S. and other NSG member countries interpretation of the arrangements suggests an understanding that a future Indian nuclear test is most likely to result in the termination of agreement ( in case India chooses to exercise that right). Likewise, on the question of fuel assurances to India there appears divergence in understanding for US considers conditions of supply as an indication of political good will and part of US political commitments having no legal connotations or legal obligations. Conversely, the Indian perspective on the issue is that it is a necessary condition of supply and can lead to a termination of agreement by India if need be so. [171] Similarly on the issue of transfer of sensitive technology to India, there appears/ exists a near consensus or a shared opinion within the NSG member states to exercise utmost restraint for the transfer of technology to the recipient. Despite these reservations or other points of divergence exhibited by the Indian position on the issue caused due to Indias interpretation of the various provisions in the agreement, nothing has stopped the de jure acceptance of India in the nuclear club.Today, the international non-proliferation community is once again poised to see the passage of India to come to age as a legally accepted nuclear weapon state with full rights to the global nuclear trade. As a country with an exceptional non-proliferation record, even without being a member of the NPT, India maintains a policy of non-transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Reaffirming Indias position before the international community, the Indian Prime Minister reiterated this longstanding commitment in the US-India Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 for the future too. [172] The pre-eminence of US power in the global security system is quite apparent after the collapse of the Soviet block. [173] However, it is difficult and even impossible for the US to successfully tackle security issues like terrorism and WMD proliferation without cooperation from other major countries such as India. Any future cooperation on the issues that have an effect on the core national interests of the two countries has to be durable and reliable. India has already demonstrated its willingness to contribute to the international struggle against terrorism. For example, at the crucial early stages of the global war on terrorism, in 2002 and 2003, the Indian Navy escorted US ships transiting the Malacca Straits with high value
171 172

http://www.sassu.org.uk/pdfs/The%20123%20Agreement%20and%20Hyde%20Act.pdf http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/nuclearagreement.htm 173 Ibid.

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military cargo. As a victim of terrorism, India well understood American concerns.India has a shared interest with the US on the issue of non-proliferation.The source of proliferation in the neighbourhood has been of grave security concern for India as much as it is a cause of worry for the US and the international community. Illegal nuclear and missile transfers by China and Pakistan have not only made the task of successive US administrations difficult, they have also had serious consequences on international security. It would be therefore unwise for India and US to continue to fight such threats independent of each other. [174] India as a nuclear weapon state, with an impeccable record of non- proliferation, has not sought to destabilize the nuclear order under the NPT, nor has its decisions in the nuclear field harmed US interests. Therefore, it would not be prudent and profitable to link US-India nuclear Indo-US Nuclear Deal and Non-Proliferation cooperation to the larger problems of international nuclear non-proliferation. The assumptions of any potential claim by China to accord a similar special status to Pakistan should also not come in the way of the US-India nuclear deal. The primary purpose of the Indo-US deal is to strengthen non-proliferation and not to scuttle it. China and Pakistan, on the basis of past records, can hardly make a similar claim. [175] At another level, full cooperation in the nuclear energy sector between US and India will help remove mutual misperceptions flowing from the hard line positions of the past that were based on principles and values regarding the nature of the international nuclear order. As a state with a large nuclear programme that is outside the NPT, Indias intention to assume additional responsibilities, as proposed in the Joint Statement of July 2005, would clearly strengthen the international non-proliferation systems and not undermine them. Indias participation in global non-proliferation efforts would therefore be of great advantage to the US and other concerned states. [176]

174 175

Ibid. http://www.sassu.org.uk/pdfs/The%20123%20Agreement%20and%20Hyde%20Act.pdf 176 http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/nuclearagreement.htm

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Legislation Indo-US Civilian Nuclear Agreement Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Henry J. Hyde United State- India Peaceful Atomic Energy Co-operation Act of 2006

Articles Rajagopalan R., Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Implications for India and the Global NRegime, 62 Instiute of Peace and Conflict Studies (2008) Ntoubandi F., Reflections on the USA-India atomic energy co-operation, 13(2) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 273 Sing B.B., The Hyde Act 2006: Indias Nuclear Dilemma,1(4) Atoms for Peace: An International Journal 307 Laxman S., N-Trade: Its a $40 Billion Opportunity,Times of India, September 11, 2008 Albright D. & Basu S., Separating Indian Military and Civilian Nuclear Facilities, Institute for Science and International Security, December 19, 2005.

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Newspaper Weblinks:
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http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2008-10-09/news/27714736_1_civilnuclear-cooperation-exports-of-nuclear-materials-bush-visits-india http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8272354.stm http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/02/washington/02webnuke.html?hp www.thehindu.com/news/international/article321649 http://indiatoday.intoday.in/index.php?option=com_content&issueid=88&task=view &id=25261&sectionid=4&Itemid=1. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/USA/House_of_Reps_clears_Ndeal_France_set_to_sign_agreement/articleshow/3536151.cms http://zeenews.india.com/news/archives/123-of-indo-us-nuclear-deal_467563.html The Indo-US nuclear debate from www.gulfnews.com The New York Times, September 27, 2008, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/28/washington/28nuke.html. US House clears n-deal, PM says happy but wait for the final outcome, Indian Express, September 29, 2008, available at: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/ushouse-clears-ndeal-pmsays-happy-but-wait-for-final-outcome/367135/0 US Senate approves nuke pact with India, The Wall Street Journal, October 2, 2008, available at: http://www.livemint.com/2008/10/02080248/US-Senate-approvesnuke-pact-w.html. US Senate approves nuclear deal, Rediff News, October 2, 2008, available at:http://in.rediff.com/news/2008/oct/02ndeal2.htm.

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