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FORT LEAVEN4WTH
KANSAS School of' Combined Arms Regular Course 1946-1947 The Occupation of' Japan

Type of' Operation Described:

Demilitarization of' Japan's Armed Forces by Units of' Sixth Army.

Lt. Col. W. C. Wickboldt, Inf'antry

The occupation of' Japan, by L't Co] .L: C. Wic kb oldt, Inf. Command and Staff' College 1946-47.

This Document
IS A HOLDING OF THE

ARCHIVES SECTION
LIBRARY SERVICES FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

DOCUMENT NO. N-2253.43_ COPY NO. J.

13 Mar 51 Army-CGSC-P2-1798-7 Mar 52-5M

COW' AND AND STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVEN J ORTH KANSAS School of Combined Arms Regular Course 1946-1947 The Occupation of Japan(

Type of Operation Described: Demilitarization of Japan's Armed Forces by Unite of Sixth Army. \

Lt. Col. ;

C. Wickboldt,

Infantry'

L~A(Y C &S

Table of Contents Index Bibliography Introduction Blacklist Operation Field Order #75, Hdqrs. Sixth Army Geographical Features Military Aspects of Zones of Occupation The Advance Party8 The Landings Operations of a Typical Regiment Conclusions Lessons Learned Meap: 1 2

3 4 5
b

7
9 10 11 12

JAPAN Situation Map A, L 844 C & S College Sketch Japan

BIBLIOGRAPHY A-1 A-2 A-3 Sixth U. S. Army Report of the Occupation of Japan. 22 September 1945- 30 November 1945. The World Almanac- 1946. Occupation of Japan and Japanese Reaction-Military Review Vol. XX\TI June 1946-No. 3.

INTRODUCT ION

The purpose of this monograph is to cover the execution of The following political Operation Blacklist by units of Sixth Army. and military background is cited to facilitate an understanding of this unprecedented operation. The Cairo Conference of November 1943 and The Potsdam Proclamation of July 1945 set the political stage for the surrender of Japan. At the Cairo Conference the Big Three (United States, Great Britian, China) resolved to fight the war in the Pacific to the unconditional surrender of Japan, stripping Japan of all her outer possessions. (1) At the Potsdam Conference, President Truman called upon the Japanese Government to surrender unconditionally and provided for the occupation of Japan at localities to be selected by the Supreme Allied Commander. The formal surrender document signed aboard the battleship Miissouri 2 September 1945 approved the retention of the Emperor as head of the Japanese Government, subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who was empowered to take such steps as he deemed proper to effectuate the terms of surrender. (2) In the Phillipines, the Luzon Campaign was terminated on the 30 June 1945, and the U. S. Sixth Army initiated planning and preparations for the Amphibious assault upon the southern coasts of Kyushu. Known as Operation Olympic with a target date of 1 November 1945. (3) On 2 August 1945, four days prior to the bombing of Hiroshima, a staff study for Operations Blacklist was received at Headquarters Sixth Army. (4) The study outlined general missions for the Occupation of Japan in the event of sudden capitulation and imposed an additional planning mission upon the headquarters staff. At this time the preparations for the invasion of Kyushu had been progressing for over Units were either at or enroute to final staging areas, a month. assault units were undergoind amphibious training, and supplies were Jungle worn equipment was being replaced beginning to accumulate. by woolen uniforms for warfare in a cold, wet climate. Training in the use of the recoiless rifles, the sniper scope, and other equipSuch was the ment not previously available was being emphasized. background, political and military, when AFPAC's staff study for the Blacklist Operation was received on 2 August.

(1)

A-2, p 108; (2)

A-2, p 109; (3)

A-l,

p 9;

(4)

A-l,

p3

Blacklist Operation The plan dor Operations Blacklist called for the occupation of Korea by the Tenth Army, of Hokkaido and Northern Honshu by the Eighth Army, and of Western Honshu, Shikoku, and Kyushu by the Sixth Army. Major forced assigned to the Sixth Army for the occupation were I Corps, X Corps, and V Amphibious Corps which, together with supporting units, totaled 240,000 troops. The general missions assigned to the army commanders directed the rapid occupation of strategic center in order to isolate Japan from Asia, seize control of the higher echelons of government, immobilize the enemy armed forces, and initiate operations against any racalcitrant elements in Japan or Korea. Once initial control had been firmly established, each commander was to assume responsibility for: a. The demobilization of the Japanese Army. b. Institution of military government. c. Recovery of Allied prisoners of war. d. Extension of such control over the Japanese as was required to implement the post-war government and aid the armies of occupation. e. Insurance that the terms of surrender were carried out. (5) In general, swift occupation of the selected strategic centers at the earliest possible date after surrender, decentralization of planning and operations within major commands, and instant readiness to meet armed resistence at the time of or subsequent to the initial landings were to characterize the operation. Since there was no indication that Japan would surrender prior to actual initiation of the Kyushu invasion, preparatory activities incident to an assault and invasion continued without interruption. Concurrently, however, work was initiated to prepare troop lists, determine supply requirements, gather intelligence, and determine more specifically the role the various staff sections were to assume in execution of special tasks such as demilitarization and demobilization of the Japanese Armed Forces, military government, etc. The destruction of Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 by a single atomic bomb and the entry of Russia into the war increased the possibility of early surrender to such an extent that planning for the occupation was still further intensified, although planning for the Kyushu invasion did not cease. After the initial report of the Japanese offer to surrender on 10 August, however, further action on the Kyushu Operation was deferred, and preparations for the occupation were accelerated accordingly. Following the official announcement of the Japanese offer to surrender on 15 August, GHQ, AFPAC, officially suspended the Kyushu Operation and issued a warning order to initiate the occupation of Japan. (6)

(5)

A-1

p 10; (6)

A-1

p 11.

Field Order #75, Hdors.

Sixth Army

Field Order 75 Headquarters Sixth Army, dated 21 August 1945, assigned zones and missions to its major subordinate commands as follows: 1. I Corps (25th, 33nd, 98th Divisions,) area of central Honshu. Nagoya-Osaka-Kyoto

2.

X Corps, (24th and 41st Divisions,) Kure, Okayama area of Southern Honshu and the island of Shikoku. V Amphibious Corps (2d Marine Division, 5th-32nd Division) Kyushu and the Shimonoseki area of Western Honshu. (7)

3.

(7)

A-l, p 12

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Geographical

Features

Briefly the zone of occupation assigned to Sixth Army extended over 46,000 square miles, including the islands of Kyushu, Shikoku, and the western half of Honshu. Largest and most important of the three areas was Western Honshu with the cities of (1) (2) Nagoya Textile manufacturing center Osaka (Population 3,252,340)---Industrial Center (population l,328,084)--Aircraft,

(3)
(4)

(5)

Port (population 967,334) --Kobe Kyoto (population l,039,726)---Resort Kure (population 276,085)-N----aval Base

Next in importance was Kyushu with a population of ten million spread among its 15,000 square miles of precipitous mountains. Chief of the cities are: (1) Nagasaki (popultion 252, 633)--Shipbuilding Center (2) (3) (4) Sasebo (population 205,980)--Ship repair base Yawata--4ocation' of Imperial Iron ahd Steel Works Kagoshima--Principal Port

Least important of the t2hree islands is agricultural Shikoku, which is characterized by rugged sharp-sided mountains and narrow, deep,winding valleys, and which has a population of about 3,300,000 people. (8)

(8)

A-1,

p 5

Military Aspects
"Of the 1, 6 00,000'Japanase ground force troops stationed in Japan at the termination of hostilities, 850,000 (comprising the Second General Army) were located in the Sixth Army area of occupation. In all, this area could muster 24 infantry divisions, 6 depot divisions, and 10 independent mixed brigades. In addition, there were 120,000 army air personnel, 110,000 personnel of the Shipping Command, and 30,000 railway troops, giving a grand total of approximately 1,000,000 military personnel in all the area which was to be occupied by the Sixth Army troops." (9)

(9)

A-l, p 6

The Advance Party After the formal surrender of the Japanese on 2 September, radio communications had been established between Headquarters Sixth Army on Luzon and the Second Japanese General Army, which controlled that area of Japan to be occupied by the Sixth Army. In order to assure the smoothe and orderly entry of Sixth Army forces into Japan, an advance echelon was organized to precede the troops and obtain information of the situation in the area to be The advance party consisted of 19 officers and 2 enoccupied. listed men, representing each of the General Staff Sections as well as Medical, Engineer, Finance, Military Police, Military Governmrent, Signal Procurerment, Trahsportation, Quartermaster, and Headquarters Commandant Sections. Similar advance parties were organized for I Corps, X Corps, and VAC. After the arrival of the Advance Party at Wakayama on 20 September a meeting was arranged with the Chief of Staff of the Second Japanese General Army who was instructed to: (1) Clear the Japanese armed forces, except for unarmed caretaking personnel, from those locations where our troops were scheduled to land. (2) Prohibit the movement of Japanese armed forces on certain highways. (3) Restrict the movement of civilian traffic on the dates and in the areas of the several landings. Direct the establishment of contact by the appropriate (4) senior subordinate Japanese commander with the I and X Corps and VAC in their respective areas, including initial contact with respective advance parties. Direct the immediate establishment of liaison with the (5) Advance Party at Wakayama and later with Headquarters Sixth Army at Kyoto. This me ting was quite formal and impressive and started many processes n essary to accomplish the occupation and also had the ; effect of serving notice on the Japanese Army that the Allied Forces knew exactly what they wanted and had organized their plans well. Later additional directives required the Japs to report the amounts and places location and amounts of their ordnance material; of storage of chemical warfare material; amounts and locations of certain engineer supplies; and ordered the establishment of direct liaison with Japanese civilian government officials, the Japanese Imperial Railways, the Japanese banking system, medical organizations, communication facilities, and other Japanese activities of special interest. a liaison officer In each prefecture the Japanese established who assisted the Home Ministry Governor in carrying out military These liaison officers were quite efficient in achieving directives. results. (10)

(10)

A-l, p 23

The Landings On 21 September representatives of the Fifth Fleet closely inspected the Sasebo coastal area for possible Japanese reaction against VAC landings, particular attention being paid to localities suitable for suicide craft. After a thorough survey of the entire coastal area surrounding Sasebo in which no craft of offensive potentialities were seen, the Navy deemed the harbor safe for entry of the 5th Marine Division. Following a month of continued intensive planning and preparation the V Amphibious Corps inaugurated occupation by landing the 5th Marine Division at Sasebo on 22 September and the 2d Marine Division at Nagasaki on the following day. Later landing of the 32d Division at Sasebo on 15 October enabled the Corps to extend its control over all Key areas in its assigned zone which included Kyushu and the southwestern tip of Honshu. Successive landings on Honshu of the 33d Division at Wakayama on 25 September, the 98th Division at Wakayama on 27 September, and the 25th Division at Nagoya on 25 October effected occupation of the I Corps area. The X Corps completed the occupation with the 41st Division at Kure on 6 October and the 24th Division on Shikoku on 22 October. The original plan contemplated the accomplishment of the occupation mission in three phases. Phase I landings by V Amphibious Corps in the Sasebo-Nagasaki area, and by I Corps in the Kobe-Osaka area. Phase II called for landings at a later date by I Corps at Nagoya and the overland movement of a V Corps unit to Fukuoka. Phase III envisioned an overland movement by I Corps to Tsuruga and landings by X Corps at Kure, Kocki, and Okayama. Basically this plan provided for the establishment of control of Japanese Armed Forces and Civil population; the imposition of prescribed terms of surrender by occupying Key areas such as Nagasaki, Sasebo, and Osaka; and the extension therefrom of occupation and control as troops became available during phase II and III. During the early days of the occupation a number of reasons induced the abandonment of the phase concept just described. For instance, the attitude of the Japanese people, the complete capitulation of the armed forces, and the cooperation of Japanese authorities facilitated initial control and disarmament so that the operations evntually became a movement of troops into areas that were awaiting occupation and that were prepared for our surrender policies. Furthermore the uncertain conditions of mined harbors, the effect of typhoons in landing areas, and the availability dates of shipping disrupted the original timing of landings to such an extent that there were no distinguishable phases in the operation; in one case Phase III landings in X Corps area preceded Phase II landings at Nogaya contrary to original plans. (11)

(11)

A-i, p 24

Operations of a Typical Regiment "The infantry regiment was, in the occupation of Japan, the chief instrument of demilitarization and control. The entire plan for the imposition of the terms of surrender was based upon the of the prefectures within the presence of infantry regiments in all (12) Japanese homeland and in Southern Korea." The following is an analysis of the actions of a typical Soon after landing regiment accomplishing its occupation mission. at Matsuyama, Shikoku on 22 October, the 19th Infantry Regiment of and motor to the principal the 24th Infantry Division moved by rail Divisional Milicity of Kochi, in the center of Kochi prefecture. tary Government personnel preceded the unit by twenty-four hours and arranged for billets in Jap Military Barracks near the city. During the establishment of the troops in their new bivouacs, regimentsl staff officers studied available Japanese operational maps and at a special conference with senior Jap naval and military commanders in the zone, the details of the execution of demilitarization were determined. It was surprisingly learned that the Japs had already demobilized agout eighty per cent of their forces prior to our arrival. Only necessary caretaking personnel remained to secure The Japanese furnished us voluminous large dumps of military supplies. Detailed operational copies of inventories of all classes of supplies. maps indicated the almost inaccessible locations of fixed, heavy artillery and underground stores. Verification of the locations of installations was made by numerous patrols and spot checks revealed a high degree of accuracy With this information the regimental commander was of inventories. ready to carry out his responsibility of supprvising the execution He was particularly charged with (1) seizing of the surrender terms. all Jap armed force installations and the disposition of all material therein; (2) the security of all enemy stores not subject to immediate disposition, and (3) the supervision of demobilization of Japanese armed forces when their services were no longer required for maintenance of captered arms and material. Based on an equal number of large dumps in each area the regimental zone was subdivided into battalion zones which were further subdivided with individual companies going to their assigned areas In some instances companies moved large to initiate demilitarization. of arms and ammunition from inland mountain supply dupps quantities Other units located near the beaches that were inaccessible to trucks. were confronted with naval armament such as submarines, suicide craft, and large torpedoes. The infantry company was the working unit which actually accomplished the destruction or consignment of material, or the demobilization of Japanese Armed Forces that remained within the company The company commander was empowered to seize installations zones. within his zone and, with the use of available Japanese army personnel not yet demobilized and laborers obtained through the Japanese Home Ministry representative in his area, either destroy or turn over to the U. S. Army Japanese Home Ministry all materiel within the installation. this work and to see that complete personnel were used only to supervise destruction was accomplished. The company commander disposed of material in accordance with in the All materiel fell procedures outlined by higher headquarters. (explosives following categories: that to be destroyed or scrapped and armament not needed for souvenirs or training purposes were chief items: that to be used for our operation (telephones, radios, and vehicles); that to be returned to the Japanese Home Ministry (fuel, lumber, etc.); that to be issued our forces as trophies; or that to be shipped to the U. S. for training purposes or as war trophies. Material not marked for destruction was disposed of by prescribed methods. Japanese labor hauled explosives aboard Japanese trucks to approved burning areas, or if the installation was located near a deep sea waterway the explosives were dumped at sea. (13) (12) A-l, p 35; (13) A-i, p 36 -10-

Conclusions Physical control of the zone of responsibility proved remarkably easy, for the Japanese were compliant and cooperative. The absence of casualties indicated the complete capitulation of the Japanese Armed Forces and civil population. The terms of surrender were carried out efficiently and without incident or injury to occupation troops. At the close of the period, 30 November, demilitarization of Japan had progressed so satisfactorily that some regiments which had completed their assigned missions were able to withdraw to bivouac areas for training and rehabilitation. Because of their disciplined loyalty for the Emperor, the armed forces of Japan faithfully obeyed Allied directives for demilitarization. An estimate of the number of American lives that were spared by the substitution of Operation "Blacklist" for the operation "Olympic" is best illustrated by a quotation from Major General Willoughby, G-2 AFPAC: "The enormous initial military risks of landing with token forces on the Japanese mainland, into a collossal armed camp, the obvious gamble of landing with only two and a half divisions, confronted by sixty-four Japanese divisions, thirty-six brigades and forty odd regimehts, were apparently not fully appreciated. All possible landing areas, in the event of American armed landings, were completely orggnized by the Japanese Army and each one of these areas had the potentiality of another Okinawa. There were perhaps five or six such areas, along the East .Coast of Japan--Kyushu, Shikoku, the Kanto Plain, the Sendai Corridor The Japanese General Staff had enough divisions and and others. At Okinawa, brigades to make an attack expensive everywhere. from two to two and a half Japanese divisions exacted a total of approximately 40,000 American casualties on land, not to mention the shattering "KAMIKAZE" attacks on the Fleet. This affords a completely authentic yardstick to forecast what it would have The sinister ratio that taken in losses had we gone in shooting. 26 Jap divisions exact 40,000 casualties spells: Location KYUSHU SHIKOKU KANTO SENDAI No. Divisions 13/14 Divisions " 4/5 " 22 2 " Total The conclusions are inescapable:!" (14) Casualties 200,000 80,000 400,000 30,00 710,000

A-3, P 3

Lesson Learned 1. There was a need for more complete and accurate intelligence concerning conditions in Japan. Engineer, Transportation, and Signal planners had a difficult time gauging capacities in, Japan. Military Government Personnel were very much surprised to find an effective, efficient and cooperative Japanese Government system. Timely issuance of Staff Studies and Warning Orders by High Headquarters enabled subordinate Headquarters to effectively execute operations. Occupation forces should not plan upon using demobilized enemy specialists in disposition of Technical Material-nor should they be confronted with a large scale demobilization of their own forces by a Readjustment Program. Disposition of material was delayed pending decisions as to requirements of technical intelligence, museum and memorial pieces, operations, trophies. The prevalence of naval mines made dumping materials at sea a hazardous and slow process. The creation of U. S. Navy and Air Force liaison groups was necessary to provide technical advice and assistance to ground force troops.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.