Professional Documents
Culture Documents
II0
Cr,nRK
DISTRICT TV
.. .-,-' -'March 12, 2013
To:
Hon, Junn E. Colas Ci.rcuit Court Judge ?15 South Hamilton,8r.10, Rn. 7103 Madison, WI53703
Cado Esqueda lrk of Circuit Court Room 1000 215 South Hamilton IVladison, WI53703 Lestcr,4.. Fines Tamara Packard Susan M. Crawfod Cullen Westorr Pines & Bash LLP 122 W V/ashington Avc # 900 Madison, WI53703
Steven . Kilpatrick Assistant Anorney General P. O. Box 7857 Madison, WIfi707-7857 Steven P. Means
Michael F. Scrcnock Michanl Bcst & Fredrich LLP P.O. Box 1806 Madiso, WI53701-1806
Madison, \YI53707 Daniel J, Borowski Phillips Borowski, S,C. I 0 140 N. Fort lVashington Rd" Mequon, WI53092
Brue N. Cameron
hofessor of lbor Law Univers School of t aw Robcttsou Hll #353 I 000 Regeut Univcrs'ity Drive Virginia Beafih, VA 23464
Reed lrson
Regent
Milton L. Chappell Natioal Rightto Work Legal Defense Foundation Inc. 8001 Braddock Roa4 Suitc 600 Springfield, VA 22160
Kathlcan Meter Lounsbury Bruce F. Ehlke Ehlke, Bero-Lehmm& Lounsbury SC 650? trand Teton Plz Ste 202 Madisort, WI 53719-1 047 Richard M. Esenberg Wisconsln Institrte for Law & Liberry ll39 E. Ituapp Strect Milwaukee, WI 53202 -2828
'Michacl Bcst &, Friedch LLP I00 E. Wisconsin Ay., Str. 3300 Milwaukee, VI 532024124 M. Nicol Padway Padway & Padway, Ltd. 633 r[Y. WisconinAvc., #1900 Milwarkee, \ryI 53203- I 908
6T0/U00'd
9ZtVI
T0Z-U-UVl^l
.AarcnN. Halstead Hawks Quindel, S.C. P.O. Box 2155 Madison V/I53701-2155 Babar2. Quindel Tinothy E. Hawks Hawks Quindel, S.C. P.O. Box 142 Milwaukee, rWI 5320 l-0442'
Michael P. May City Confy Building Room 401 210 Martiu LutherKing, Jr, Blvd, Madison, WI53703-3345
Stuart S. Mukamal Asst. CiWAttorney 200 E. I{r/ells $t., #S00 Milwaukee, V/I53202
Kwt
C. Kobclt
TrlVisconsin Education
Asociation
Andrew T. Phillips Phillips Borowski, S,C. 10140 N, Port TVashingfon Rd. Mequon, VI53092
Mariannc G, Robbins Previant Goldbeig Uclafl, Grlz, Miller t555 N. RiveroonterDr., Ste."202 Milwaukee, WI53212'
John Wdter Strange Jr. r\sst. City Attomey Rm.'401 210 Mrtin Luthcr Kiog, Jr. BIvd. Madison, \VI 53703-3345
Rudoh M. Koryad Deputy City Attorney 200 E. Wells St., #800 Milwaukee, 14 53202-3 5 I 5
Peggy A. Lautcnschlager
You ae hereby notified that the Court has entred the followirrg order:
2012P2067 Madisou Teahr$, Inc. v. Sctt \Valker (t.C. #i:011V1774)
Appellants Scott Walker, Jame Scofi, Judith Neumonn, and Rodney,Ph mov to stay
a circuit couft ordet that declaed unconsitutional ceftain portions of the Mruricipl Emplorment
Rclatons Act (*MERA," located at WIs. Stnr. $$ I I t;70 to I I L77) whilc an appeal from that
ordcr is pending. $pecifically, thc odcr at issue stnrck down provisions prohibiting collective bargaining with mrnicipalities o y subject other than total basc u/.ages; requiring a local
referendum to authorize negotiation of any increase in base wagcs excerding a cost-of-living increase; requirirrg mandatory anual recertifi.cation lections for unions; prohibting the forced
'')
6tr0/00'd
92:.?l
8I0Z-T-UVl^l
No. 20l2AP?067
peymnt of dues from non-uniryme.rnber cmployees; nrohibit{nq payroll dcdustions for union
contributions
to
the
The appellants first sought relicf in thc circuit court, under the proccdures sct forth in
Wts. Srr. $ S0S.07(2)(a)3. and Rur,s 809.12. Iile therefore review th oircut court's decison
to deny a stay under the erroueous-exercis+of-discretion standard, rathe thau considcring the
mattsr de novo. ,$ee ,Sffe'y, Gudenschwnger, 191 Wis. 2d 431,43.940, 529 N.W.zd 225
.so
rclcvant facts, applicd a propu* ,tuoa*d of':*, anA, ttsing a dernonstrure mtionat process,
reachcd a conclusion that a reonabl judge could Eah." LiddIE v, LdIe,l40 Wis. 2d l3?,
136, 410 N.W.?d 196 (Ct. App.
circuit court ated within its discretion in denying the stay. The ptoper standard of law for evaluatius a sty rcqucst. was st forttr by the supreme
oourt in Gudenschwager. A stay pending appeal is appropriae if the rrovirtg party;
(l)
ineparablc iqiury;
it
r'itl suffer
and
Gudentehwager,lgl rtl/is. 2d at 440. These factors are irterrelated corrsiderations that mwt be
balanced. -ld,
I
6I0/00'd
9ZtVI
00U -U -UYl4l
No. 20124F2067
The circuit court evaluated the appellauts' stay request in this. case by balancing thc factors st forth irt udenschwger) The circuit court concluded that the first factor, the likelihood of succcss on appeal, weigbed in favor of a stay, but tlrat this fflctor wus "outweighed
by the [appellanis'] failure 1o shuw neparable harm to thenr if sty is denied and by the harur to others ard to the publio if a stay is granted."
The appellants contcnd that thc circuit.court eruoneous xercised its discretion bsausc
its application of the Guenschwager factors was flawed in multiple respects as a matte,t of law.
if
Gudensthwager factors, the only reasonable xrcise of iscretion would have ben to grant their stay request.
S/s notc tht the way in which the appellants have structrued their argumcnts on appI
complicates ow rcview of the Guifunschwager factos. Rather than discussirrg, individually, the nature of cach factor aud its application to thc facts of this ce, the appellants present purely
legal argumnts-that is, arguments that do not depend on t*re panicular tahrte or particrrlar facts at issue her+as to how the fastors should be interpreted and .thcn, essentially, luurp
together a discussion of harus tlat the appellants rgue will occur if a sfay is not granted.
sta"lt
in a partioulflr
ras do
enumerate
Gudenschwager conrt sms to discuss the risk that a pnon will commit futrrrc acts of sexrul
injrrf
6T0/900'd
9Ztll
eT0U -Z-HVl^l
No, ?0124P2067
As a prantical matter,
enough to accommodate somc variation in the ways n which a particular harut may be analyzed undcr onc or more of the final.three factors. r/e emphasiee, however, that flexibility as to wtuch
factor o facilors pply to a particular harn does not alter the appellants' overall burden to
addess all factors r sorne lannr and, ultimately, to demonshate that the fatos favoring a stay
evtt. though
n Ga,cttschwgeh
Wb \,vill,
however, note throughout our discssio:r points at wich thc appellanrs' framing of a particular argumcnt ignorcs rclcvant considerations or othetr,ise faits to satisfy their bwdeu of proof.
Scpe
af
of
Stcs
n,{ppel'
The first factor looks ate likelihoodof.ncccss pn app1l. The appelluntsmustmak "a strong showing that fthey are] likely to succecd on the.merits of the appeal.-
airt40. "[TJhc
probabil of
is
furversely proportionat
to the amouut of
f $441.
The appellant$' first legal argrlnent is that the circuit corut misapplied this'stay faotor by
the specific claims of euor the appellants proposed to raisc on appeal. Thcy srguc that the
inversety proportional relationship described
the fitst and second factors requires a cicuit corrrt to closcly evaluate ttre meits of a movant's
l
60/900'd
LZ.tI
8T0-ZI-UVll
No, 20124P2067
appellte issues in ordet to dctermine whsre the iszus fall on a continuum of likely $uccss.
Stated auother vny; the appellants oonteud that the circuit
somes ftom showing an especially high likelihood of success on appeal-:'.e., the benefit that
they are required ody to make a lessm showing of ineparuble harm-by stopping its analysis
after conoluding that the appellants had satisfied the basic ttueshold of more thar a ere
possibility of sucess. The respondents, on the othsr hand, take fhe positon that it would be improper for the
circuit court or this court to cngage in a substantive evaluation of the mcrits of the appeal. Th
respondents cnectly Foirrt out that, irr a simitar situation, lhe GEwchwagrcourt itself did
just what the cicuit oorrrt did hcre*the Gudenschwger court simply epplied the prestmrption,
hroadly dete,lmined that the appcllants had a likelihood of success on appeal, and movcd orr to consider the other factors. See d. al. Ml-44. Accordingly; the respondents have declined to provide a substantive discussion of thc issucs on appeal. Although w agxe with the gcneral proposition that the requued showing for.irreparable hatm is inversely proportional to the strengfh of a movant's showing regarding the tikelihood
sussess on appeal, we corrclude that,
of
a
irl a case
to
recerrtly erracted statute like the one before rs, the proper mtlrse is thc one followed by the
in
presrunption of constitutionlity and conclude that the appellants bave mnde a showing thalthcV e likely to succeed on the merits of the appeal, witllout attempting to more Frcissly identify
the appellants' likelihood of success, In reaching this conclrsiorr, we rake the following
observations
0/00
'd
LZttl
I0U -U I-UVl^l
No. ?0124P2067
ur
experience with
issues.
in the otext of
stay
motions tells us tlat cases gencrally fall into one ofthree categoties: (1) "near frivolous" appeals
in whioh the appellant obviously has virtually no chance of succes on appeal; (?) "rrear cefiflil
to win" appeals in which the appcllant obviously h a ve.ry high chancc of succcss on appeal;
*Iniddle grourrd" appeals in which and (3)
.As
ild
s \v
will
constitutiouality of stotutes automatically puts the prcsent case, at a r,rfurimum, in the last of
these, the middle-ground ctegCIry.
The appe.llants have atemped to perzuade us that thi,q case falb into tlre ncar-cettain-to-
win category, an appeal tht we can determine from thcir motion has a very high likelihood of
sus$ ol f,ppal. The appellants assert thst the dcqision under review is
the settled law tlrt employees have ro constrtutional guarantee to any level or tpe of collective
bargainiflg:' and that the circuit court placed primary reliance o Ee that has no application
.:
complex, and it is not readily apparcnt that thc authority citd hy thc appellants is either on point or controlling. Siniilady,
court. placed substantial reliancc
dir*tly
it is not readily
is inappositc. Ard,
complex issues raisd in the bsence of adversaial briefing. Thus, we are not persuaded that this
is a near-sertain-to'win situation or tht the circuit cowt was'required to conclude that the
appcllants had such a hish likelihood of success on appeal as to lower,thc nesessary showing on
any ofthe three harm factors.
We concludc, instead that this is a middle-ground case. The presunrption apptied by the
suess,"
dcfined elswhere
:
tn
Gudenschwager as
,7
6
0/800
'd
LZttI
80U -Z-UVll
No. 20134F2067
broadly speaking, dcfines orr middle-ground category. It woul.d not b nppropriate for
us to more
case
F'irst, the appellarrts effectivcly invite rs to..tcntatively decide tlre mcrits of the appeal,
thus giving the appearance that we have prejudged thc appcal. The appellants provide lengtly ard detailed arglrments
rrys $er
to
in a
meaningful vvrry, we would necessarily need to identifu legal principles arrd authority and
indicate ow thinking on the mcrits. This seems to nm sfoul of thc nderschwger court's cenrrn with not appearing to havc prcjudged the merits.
T\t
that its conclusion that the State had madg'a showing of a likelihood of
on appeal
"should iu uo way be construed to mean ttrat wc have prejudged thc merits." Id. at 441 n.2.
Second, we gre vuith th respondcnts thaq in a similar ciroumstgnce, the supremc court
the
odshtution.I of riliscoruirr's sexual predatorlaw After explaining tbt the challcnged sexunl
prcsurrptio
of constitntiouality, the
Gadensehwager court
concluded that the Statc hnd madc a strg showing that it was likcly to succeed on the merits
of
its appeal,
chances
Id. at441. The Gudenschwagetcourt did not more specifically dcternrina thc $tte's
of success on appeal with regard to bpecific legal issups. That is, the Gaenschwuger
corrt did no more than to make a broad+tokcs finding.that the State's chartces of suocess on
:
ground ce like this, wc havc no guidance on how we might go about identifying more
specifically the chanes of success without venturing too deply into the medts and prejudging a
cas.
I
60./600'd
iJ
'--...^,!-,--
rl-.{
i.:
,1r
'-.'
LZill
eT0U -U I-UVl^l
No. 20I24P2067
Our discwsion hre focuseE ofl orrr rol and not the circurt ourt's analysis of the
likelihood of success'faotor, but the nct result is the same. tike thc circuit cout and like the suprern conrt
in
Gudenschwager,
presumption
sf
constitutionality of regulady enacted $tatutes.and weigh tlus factor ir favor of the appellants.
Since we decline to addrcss the appellants'
f,ore specifrc
appal, \ry move on to their next claint of legal enor, which reltcs to the:second stay factor,
itjttty
if
a stay is not gruted. Gudenschwager diects that an alleged ineparabte lqitry q'must be iu tcrms of its substantiality, the likclihood of its occuumce,. and thc proof providcd
eialuated
by the movant."
Id. at44l-42,
The appellants contend tlat thcy, as state actors, will b ineparably hrmed as a mattcr
of
law
sircuit corrrt ened in failing to sck[owlcdge that the State "s,rffers ineparable
injury whenever ralidly enacted legislation is declared void." The appellants flrther contend
rrd. 100%
say,
thc appallants claim that, any time a circuit court decision preve,nts the eforccment of a statute,
there is, by dcfinition, irreparablc injury of zuch dcgree as to rcliwe a govcrnrnent appellant the bwden of making any additional showing on tlus factor. We disagree.
of
spratc aspccts
of the
(l)
if
to
any. other
I
6T0./0T0'd
LZ=VI 802-Z-UYld
No. 20124P2067
if
Lw DrcuoNARy 856 (gt ed. 2009) (tctm "irrcparable injury" gencrally means that monetary
lamgs would provide an inadequate remedy), Even accpting the appellanls' first proposition
always uniformly substantial. To the contrary, we are persuaded that the degree of ineparable
.:
injrrry resultiug ftom void,ing legislation raries widety depending onthe legislation at issue.
Our conclusion is zupported bytwo obscwations, First, there is no reasofl to suppose that Gudenschwager's direction that an alleged ineparable injury must be cvaluted interms of the
proof submtted on its subshntiality and probability does not apply when tegislation is declarcd
rnconstihtional. ,{,frer all, a declarahon that a stgtute was unconstihrtional was thc vcry topic at
issue
Gtdlenschwrrger.
it is self-evidcnt that not all
'
Seond,
of
thefu application or thc depth of thcir impact. $uppose, for example, th state legislatue wcre to
amend WIs. Sr,r. $ 1.10(3)( to rrrake the spanovr,. rather than the ro-bin, the state bird.
Suppose firther that a circuit court struck down the legislation as unconstitutional bascd on some
alleged dcficicucy in the legislative procss, and'the Btate moved to stay the circuit court's
decision.
It cannot be the csse that a ourt oonsiderirrg *h*ther to grsnt a sty in those
afford exactly the
same weight to the appellants'
cicr.mstnces would
cla of ineparable
harm
if it
stnrck down, for c:rnmple,,a statutc with the cffcctthat all high,ray
nstruction in the stat must immcdiately com to a halt. Thc point of this example is not that
l0
6T0,/T
T0'd
8Z.tt
i0z-zI-uvl,{
No. 20l2AP?067
not.
Rther,
Rather than a per se hnn rule, a proper analysis of the ranrifications of staying or not stayrng a decision declaring statutory provisions uncoustitutional requrres an analysis that looks at thc partcular tegislation at issuc. The appellants do.not challenge the circuit sourt'$ finding
tlrat they faited to offer any facts or gumnt as t the stated Gudenschwagu criteria of
zubstantiality tlrrt war applicable to their claim of.an irrparable injruy to the rpresenttionl
interests of the State. rMe conslude, there.fore, that the circuit orJrt did not
affi
an iruprope,t
standard
of lnw or otherwsc
in'its
:
a$$essrfilt
of that
appellants.
We pausc here to note that the appellans madc a decision to diecus other potential hrs tht might ocrr in th abseuc.sf-a shy,. such as sttewide onfusion among municl
employers, only as part of their argumflts rclatirig to the last two facfors, without addressing
zuch harms in the context of the second irreparable injury factor. Logically speaking, we believe
of
if
stay. were
waighing in favor of a stay), so that such hrri cculd mor clearly bc balanced agaiust all of the allegations
of
subatantial harm
to
if
a stay
wrc
imposed (i.e,, the. main harm factors weighing agist a stay). Howver, as w. stad abovc, this
thetefore, discws other potential irreparable injruies that might result if a stay wer not granted
as those claims have been framed
by the
appellants.
tt
6T0/U0'd
8Z=Vt
8ToU-ZT-Vhl
No, 201?4P2067
D etn
Regarding the framework of the stfly analysis, the appcllants ncxt asscrt tht th thrd and
for.uth stay factors should. be considered together in this cas iu light of thc."multitude"
of
intetested parties and public interes that oould be affccted by the decision ueth+r to stay the
cottt's ordcr. This assertipn ties directly to another argumeut thc appellants make, that
the
circuit court erred irr limiting its discrssion of other interested partics to the rnrions that brought this suit. The appellants corrtend. ftat thc circuit court should bave exparrded its definition of
interested parties
thousands of
of
out that the intcrests of those employers and employccs re not unifonn
lVe
age
tlrat the interests of municipal employcrs and employess-and, for that mttr,
members of the puhlic gerrerally-are not mouolithic arrd could be considered on either side
of
the stay ecuatin. Ve have already explained, howcvcr, that the crrx of the bdurcing test is to
difflerence whethc
interests of those municipal employets and eurployecs who support the challenged provisions
of
MERA urdcr the rubric of "other intercstcd parties," or as prt of its consideration of the public interest. Wc are satisfied from orr own review of the circuit court's desision that the court did
consider allcgcd harms to the ilrterests of municipal employes and employecs who support the
challenged provisions
discussion
of whcther the
appellants had
demousFated that there was widespread coufusion resulting from the oircuit cor.ut's order.
t2
6T0/8T0'd
8Z.il
I0U -U I-UVl^l
No. 20124P206?
wefi it .eitoial
lif
The appellsts' hallenge to the way tlre circuit court categorized the interest$ of
mnnicipal employers and other+-whom thc appellurts claim would be hffined by the absencc
a
t
of
portiou of its decison. That is, the circuit court did not
ore
employers and otlrers, but athcr gavc little weight to the evidence the appellants offered on this
topic.
Although the appellants did not prwide us with copree of thcir affidavits with their stay rnatarials,
wc surrnise from the parties' arguments and the cjrcuit.court's order that thc
allegations thcrcirq madc by several officials reprcscnting nonparty public employers, are as
effect of the circuit court's order on such topics the scope of issuss that must be bganed
with publc unions, the status of bargaining representative tbt werc deccrtifi.ed prrsuant to
MERA prior to the effective date of the circuit otut's decision, and the continuing validity of
rrilatcrel chauges implcmented by municipal employr (?) this confwioq will bave a negativo
impact on the municipal budgeting process; and (3) the confision could lcad to litigation.
First, aszuming that confision ovcr whcther th crcuit court's decision has statewide binding effect is a significant potential issue, w note ttrat thc appcllants.takc thc position that it olcarly does not have statewide effect.
If
limited as the appellants rgu, the appallants bve no reed for a stay
is
no
underlyiug cause for confision on the part of nonparty muuicipal employers. The circuit court
essentially made this point when
6T0/70'd
8Z.ir
T0-z-url
No. 2012F2067
hecEuse thc affinuts did not stte that they had actuolly read the
General
to allay their
couftsiort or
as
absence of a stay would affect the likelihood of the hatms that the appellants onteud f{ow from the alleged confiision.
The appellants
assert$g,"q$lig-:er-wetherttre
"
oug*tiuu
statc-widFwill
bve
puci
appellants to be arguiug that municipal employms aross the state might spend mor as a result
of engaging in contract negotiations based on confrsion over whether they are uow required to f!otiate
wold have an
cffcct on the municipalrty's budget. Flowevcr, the appellants do not explain why the dsk flowing from this alleged corrfision does not cut equally both ways. It may be that some cmploycts will
choose to play
il
if
in supplemurtal
In their motion for a stay, the appellants iudicated tha the cicuit corut's decision was not binding state-wide. trn response t our request for supplemental briefing the appcllants expanded on this topio and moro forcefully argued that thc circuit corrt's decision is not binding stste*wide on nonparties.
wide. But we rojt out of hand tho proposition that thc circuit court's decisiorr has the
We acknowlodgo that the respondent'rgu that tlre circuit court's deeision hc,tc ir birtdirtg statesarne effcot as a published opinion of this court or thc suprcmo court. mors intercsting iesue is whcthor, if a union zuos, a different circuit corut might exercise its discretion to apply the dosino of iszuc preolusion or a sirnilar doctine nnd, therehy, cffective choosc to follow the cirouit cort'$ deoision harc. So fat as wo can tcll; differcnt courts might mako different decisions on tht topic and, in any evenL this is not the sort of
sttewide effect that would
justi
a stay order
inthis csse.
l4
60/90'd
EZtVr
T0Z-ZT-UVhl
No. 20124F2067
if Act
l0 is ultimately upheld.
zuch an effect is not hrm, in the appllnts' view, but ralher the proper cows. But this action also cffies with
it
some
ap'pellate
proccedings regardirrg the merits, tlrey raay irrcrrr litigation costs and, ultimately, be required to
compersate union members for losses owrng to the cmploycrs' compliance with chauges ilt
'
uiiconsttulional.
us tbt
confiuion<vr
wherther th
of bargaining (taking into account tlre parties' apparcnt agrccrncnt that the unccrtain legal status
of the challenged statutory provisions an affct the ntue of the baryaining itself and, for
example, result in conditioual agreements) is substantially greater than the risk of not bargaining
suh
us.
The appellarts assert that conflrsiou<ver whethcr the circuit court' decision here is binding state-wide-will lead to litigation. In this regard, the appellants uc apparcntly talking
about sce,arios
ohalleugcd MRA provisions and are then sued by union members for a failure to bargain in good
of a stay
l5
6T0./90'd
8Z:.i\
T0U
-ZI-UVl^l
No^ 20I2,{F206?
would affect such litigtion. rWhether a $tay is or is not ganteq nothisg brought to orrr attntion
by the appellants prohibits nonparty unions ftom suing municipal employers who dccline to
bargain on topics covered f
prevent srch rnions from filiug suit. Indeed, because the impositiori of a $ty does not resolvc
effect on whether nonparty unous filed suit. Untit the Wisoonsin Supre,mc Court finally rcsolvss the issues, either by issuing a definite ruling on the merits oi by issuing an ordcr declining'o
revicu, a msrits decison ofthis courL it seems that ongoing litigation is ineviable.
Irr sutr, the appellants have not persundcd us that tlre ciicuit court
\'as required
to givc
ny ore weight than it did to their affidaviu alleging statewide confision. It appears to us that
the sort of confisiorr the aplell*rts highlthr i$'iiot''iroiict of thc circuit court's decision, but rathsr a product of ground-breaking legislatiou that is now subject to constitutionnl challcnges.
As we have explained, as best we an discem from thc materials and arguments prescntcd to us"
it
will not
constitutional issues are finally resolved by action of oru flrprmc corut. ,4ssumptinn Anilerinfr Clrrrs of Subsnnfial Hrm
Thc appcllants' final argument is thatthe chcuit coutt cned by "assuming the correchcss
of its deision" when considering under the third and fourth factors whethff any sub*antial harm
might result to other intcrested parties or the public if a stay were granted:
ft*
rgua tht the premisc that rurion mcmbers would suffer any hsnn-*urhcthcr fiscal in natrre or
an intangible violation of their corutitutional rights-rests upon r assurnption tbat ttre ciri1
ld
60./T0'd
6ZttrI
802-U -UVl^l
No. ?012^14067
trrd
aviscerated the presumption that the appellants are likdly to sucsd on appeal."
on a
misapprehension
of how the
Gu.denschwager
factors tht a court is to balance any harm tfat might result in the absence of a stay, in the event
tnt the
imposition of a sta in the event.that the decson on appeal is ultimately afiirmed. This is thc only logical way to read the fastors, See Gailenschrl,t,l9l Wis. 2d at 440. Couary to the appellants' assrtion, making an ssumption uuder the third or fourth factor that thc decision on appeal will bc affrrmed doc not conffict with a determination made
unde'r the
have explained above, a movant car establish a likelihood of success on appeal by making a showing that there is "morc
a1
ppel
factor docs not require a finely calibrated evaluation of the merits, or even a determination that
is more likely than not that an ppel would succeed. j\nd, as wc hve xptin{ w are not
pcrzuadad tht lttis case falls into that catcgory of ces in which
are nearly ccrtain to
win on appeal.
Therefore, v/e se nothing iuconsistnt about assuming that the:circuit corxt's decision
weighing that against the harm tbt could result in the abscncc of a stay assuming that thc circuit
court's decisioa were reversed. Rather, we believe those ae precisely the competing
possibilities that ac zupposed to be balanccd in considering whcthr to grant a stay.
t7
6T0/g0'd
Z:VI
I0U -Z-UYl^l
6T0'd
TVTTT
No.
?01?,FX067
Having rejected the appeltanTs' legal challenge to how the third and fourth fator$ shottld
be interpreted in relation to thc first factor, wc reiterate that it was the appellants' burden nder tte third ard fourth factors to show that no intertsted parties would
b.
hsnncd
if
a stay wcre
granted. The appeltants did not develop, either before the circuit tourt or this cott, any fact"
based argumcnt as to why
their
the
negotiations
to
challenged provisions. Thereforc, ttre cirflrit court did not apply an improper staudad of law or otherwise erroncously exercise its discretiou when it determined that the appellants had fatld to
meet their burdcn of showing a lack of substntial hErm to othcr intcrestd partics or thc public.
Rather, we conlud that the circuit cowt reassably cousidered, as weghiug against a
compelled to $Ent wagc increases higher than thc cost of living, whereas, in the absence of a
stay, public employees would be flatly prohibited from bargaining on benefits or work
condltisns, and would bc limited
uttirnate
lvighiry of suoh factors was within the ciruitcorrt's discrction, we circuit court's decision that a stay ws not warranted.
an
Fremgen
l8
6T0/6tr0'd
6ZtVI
E0U -U T-UVl,