d2015member

Ildefonso de la Rosa (administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased Go-Lio) v. Enrique Ortega Go-Cotay (1926) Villa-real, J. Partners: Go-Lio and Go-Sengco (both now dead) When they died, de la Rosa now represents Go-Lio and Ortega represent his father, Go-Sengco. During the Spanish regime, Chinamen Go-Lio and Vicente Go-Sengco formed a society for the purchase and sale of articles of commerce and opened a store in Nueva Ecija. Later, both partners died. Go-Sengcos son Ortega took charge of the businesses. Go-Lios son came to the Phils and appointed de la Rosa as administrator of the intestate estate of his father. Ortega refused to share with Gio-Lios son, alleging that the business was his exclusively. 1918: De la Rosa (plaintiff) then filed with the CFI a complaint against Ortega (defendant) praying that defendant Ortega deliver of the properties of the partnership. CFI appointed commissioners to make an inventory, liquidate, and determine the belonging to plaintiff de la Rosa. In order to prevent a commissioner from assuming receivership position, defendant Ortega filed a bond. Defendant Ortega appealed and it eventually reached the SC. However, SC eventually ruled that appeal was premature and remanded the case to the court of origin. Court appointed new commissioners, one appointed by the defendant, and the other by the plaintiff (since original commissioners resigned). Both submitted reports. After trial, LC disapproved one of the report but approved, with slight modifications, the report of the other saying that the result of the liquidation showed liabilities to the amount of P89,000. This means, plaintiff had nothing to recover from defendant as there was NO profit.

Issue/Held: Is plaintiff entitled to any amount from the defendant? --- YES Ratio: August 3, 1918, defendant assumed complete responsibility for the business by objecting to the appointment of a receiver and giving a bond. Until that date, his acts were those of a managing partner, binding against the partnership; BUT thereafter his acts were those of a receiver whose authority is contained in Sec 175 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A receiver has no right to carry on and conduct a business unless he is authorized or directed by the court to do some, and such authority is not derived from an order of appointment to take and preserve the property. It does not appear that the defendant as a receiver was authorized by the court to continue the business of the partnership in liquidation. This being so, he is personally liable for the losses that the business may have sustained. The partnership must not, therefore, be liable for the acts of the defendant in connection with the management of the business until August 3, 1918, the date when he ceased to be a member and manager in order to become receiver. Defendant is sentenced to pay plaintiff.