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The Prometheus monument in Tbilisi, Georgia, dedicated to the Prometheus project, was inaugurated by the residents Lech Kaczyski

of Poland and Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia on November 22, 2007. The statue was completed sometime in the last couple weeks. All the taxi drivers tried to convince me that the cliff was being reinforced. So, now we have one more shiny statue. I am not sure how the pagan figure fits into the Christian doctrine. Amirani, is a Georgian partially equivalent of the Greek Prometheus. You see, Amirani has not been credited with bringing fire to humans. He was a demi-god and was punished for battling gods. He was chained to mountains, with his dog licking the chains in order to thin them out, and there are iron smiths coming once a year, sent by gods to reinforce the chains and he also is said to have partially golden skin, but still no goblet of fire... : , , . , , 2007 ' , -22

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. 1. 2. 3. Troebst S., Miedzymorze I zaslubiny z morzem: Mapy mentalne a polityka historyczna w Europie srodkowowschodniej / Zapiski historyczne, T. LXXI, Zeszyt 4. Torun, 2006. s.73. 1 2 . . XX XXI . , 2009 12 , . . : // , 2011, 1(14). ., 2011. Halecki O., Polska w epoce Jagellonow / Polska jej dzieje I kultura, T.1. Warszawa, 1930. s.193-365. Halecki O., Idea jagellonska / Kwartalnik Historyczny, 51. Warszawa, 1937. s.486-510. Konopczynski W., O idei jagiellonskiej / Umarli mowia. Poznan, 1929. s.75-86; Konopczynski W., Idea jagellonska / Dzieje Polski nowozytnej. Warszawa, 1936.t.1 s.405-406.

Kamieniecki W., Idea jagiellonska. Warszawa, 1929; Idea jagielloska w XXI wieku

. ( . Prometeizm) , , . , . (Edmund Charaszkiewicz), , , , , . Marian Kamil Dziewanowski, Joseph Pilsudski: a European Federalist, 19181922, Stanford, Instytut Hoovera, 1979. Edmund Charaszkiewicz, Zbir dokumentw ppk. Edmunda Charaszkiewicza, opracowanie, wstp i przypisy Andrzej Grzywacz, Marcin Kwiecie, Grzegorz Mazur, Biblioteka Centrum Dokumentacji Czynu Niepodlegociowego, tom 9, Krakw, Ksigarnia Akademicka, 2000, ISBN 83-7188-449-4, ss. 56-87 et passim. Edmund Charaszkiewicz, Przebudowa wschodu Europy, Niepodlego, London, 1955, ss. 125-67. Wodzimierz Bczkowski, O wschodnich problemach Polski. Wybr pism. Opracowa Pawe Kowal, Krakw, 2000, wyd. Orodek Myli Politycznej, ISBN 83-7188-405-2. Wodzimierz Bczkowski, Czy prometeizm jest fikcj i fantazj Timothy Snyder, Covert Polish missions across the Soviet Ukrainian border, 19281933, fragmenty w wersji elektronicznej: (s.55, s.56, s.57, s.58, s.59, w: Cofini, Silvia Salvatici (a cura di), Rubbettino, 2005 ISBN 88498-1276-0 . Timothy Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artists Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine, Yale University Press, 2005, ISBN 0-300-10670-X, (s.41, s.42, s.43) Richard Woytak, "The Promethean Movement in Interwar Poland, " East European Quarterly, vol. XVIII, no. 3 (September 1984), ss. 273-78. Woytak cytuje obszernie Edmunda Charaszkiewicza, kluczow posta i eksperta ruchu prometejskiego w koach II Oddziau Sztabu Gwnego WP. Maj I.P., Dziaalno Instytutu Wschodniego w Warszawie 19261939, Warszawa 2007. Sergiusz Mikulicz, Prometeizm w polityce II Rzeczypospolitej, Warszawa, Ksi ka i Wiedza, 1971. , , , . . 1904 , , , . 1940 1927 , (Prometeusz), , , , , , , , . ( 1926 , , , (pl:Instytut Wschodni w Warszawie) . Midzymorze) , .

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Wojciech Materski, Polsko-gruziski sojusz wojskowy 1920 (The 1920 Polish-Georgian Military Alliance), in Andrzej Koryn, ed., Wojna polsko-sowiecka 1920 roku: przebieg walk i to midzynarodowe:

materiay sesji naukowej w Instytucie Historii PAN, 1-2 padziernika 1990 (The 1920 Polish-Soviet War: Course and International Backdrop: Materials of a Conference at the Polish Academy of Sciences Institute of History, October 1-2, 1990), Wydawnictwo Instytutu Historii PAN (Publications of the Polish Academy of Sciences Institute of History), 1991, ISBN 8300034870, pp. 203209. Rukkas, Andriy (2001), Georgian Servicemen in the Polish Armed Forces (1922-39). The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 1556-3006, Volume 14, Issue 3: 93-106

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Akcja Wisa
Akcja "Wisa" (Operacja "Wisa") akcja militarna[1] o charakterze midzynarodowym[2] wymierzona w struktury Ukraiskiej Powstaczej Armii i Organizacji Ukraiskich Nacjonalistw, oraz przesiedlecza dokonana w celu usunicia wybranych grup ludnociowych, m.in. Ukraicw, Bojkw, Dolinian i emkw, jak rwnie rodzin

Z Wikipedii, wolnej encyklopedii

mieszanych polsko-ukraiskich, gwnie z terenw Polski poudniowo-wschodniej (obszary na wschd od Rzeszowa i Lublina), gwnie na Ziemie Odzyskane, ktra miaa miejsce w dwa lata po zakoczeniu II wojny wiatowej. Przeprowadzona zostaa przez formacje wojskowe Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, oddziay Ministerstwa Bezpieczestwa Publicznego (Korpus Bezpieczestwa Wewntrznego, Milicj Obywatelsk, Ochotnicz Rezerw Milicji Obywatelskiej), jak i jej agendy cywilne (Pastwowy Urzd Repatriacyjny). Decyzj w sprawie podjcia Akcji "Wisa" podjo Biuro Polityczne KC PPR. Przyjmuje si, e trwaa od 28 kwietnia do koca lipca 1947, chocia ostatnie wysiedlenia miay miejsce w roku 1950. Szacuje si, i w wyniku akcji wojskowej rozbito siy UPA w liczbie 1500[1] ludzi (17 sotni), oraz uwiziono 2 900 aktywnych lub domniemanych czonkw OUN, a przesiedlenia objy ponad 140 tysicy osb cywilnych. Pierwotnym kryptonimem tej akcji by Wschd, zmieniony pniej na Wisa[3]. Akcja Wisa nie bya to sama z repatriacj ludnoci ukraiskiej w latach 1944-1946, w dalszym cigu budzi liczne kontrowersje i jest r nie interpretowana przez historykw, z ktrych cz twierdzi e jej gwnym zadaniem nie byo zniszczenie UPA wskazuj oni m.in. na fakt, i obja ona rwnie obszary, gdzie UPA w ogle nie dziaaa. W padzierniku 1947 wadze ZSRR przeprowadziy Akcj Z (Zachd), w wyniku ktrej z terenu Ukraiskiej Socjalistycznej Republiki Radzieckiej wysiedlono na wschd ponad 76 tysicy Ukraicw, oskar onych o sprzyjanie UPA.

Tablica upamitniajca wypdzonych podczas akcji Wisa w Beskidzie Niskim Przyczyny

Polski Po-2 uszkodzony podczas walk z UPA w Bieszczadach Spalone przez UPA w marcu, kwietniu i listopadzie 1946 miasto Bukowsko, zdjcie z 1946 Pomnik generaa broni Karola wierczewskiego, za pomnikiem Gra Walter Pod koniec II wojny wiatowej walki pomidzy UPA a jednostkami Ludowego Wojska Polskiego oraz polskiego podziemia niepodlegociowego (AK, NSZ), jako konsekwencje rzezi woyskiej na terenie poudniowo-wschodniej Polski nie ustay, a nawet si nasiliy. Przyczyn intensyfikacji walk bya z jednej strony ch oderwania tego terenu od Polski i utworzenia niepodlegego pastwa ukraiskiego po oczekiwanym konflikcie zbrojnym pastw zachodnich z ZSRR, a z drugiej za strony repatriacja ludnoci ukraiskiej do ZSRR. UPA za wszelk cen chciaa zapobiec wysiedleniu ludnoci ukraiskiej. Atakowaa wic m.in. siedziby komisji przesiedleczych, stacje kolejowe, mosty, wiadukty, tory, linie telefoniczne. Jednoczenie palono wysiedlone wioski, aby zapobiec osiedlaniu si polskich osadnikw. UPA palia i terroryzowaa rwnie wioski i miasta, w ktrych mieszkaa ludno polska. Du e znaczenie mia rwnie fakt e, ukraiscy nacjonalici nie uznali granic ustanowionych na konferencjach teheraskiej i jataskiej. Dziaacze OUN wiedzc, e tereny co do ktrych zgaszaj pretensje wejd w skad Polski, zgodnie z ustaleniami konferencji jataskiej z 1945, i nie uznajc tego faktu, prbowali utworzy wasn jednostk terytorialn pod nazw Zakierzoski Kraj[potrzebne rdo]. Roszczenia do Chema, Hrubieszowa, Przemyla oraz do pozostaych ziem zgaszali w tym czasie rwnie czoowi przedstawiciele wadz USRR, w tym Nikita Chruszczow oraz Oeksandr Kornijczuk[potrzebne rdo] . Wadze polskie twierdziy, e wysiedlenie ludnoci ukraiskiej ma su y zwalczeniu ukraiskiej partyzantki, oraz e ludno ukraiska stanowia dla OUN-UPA baz zaopatrzenia i schronienia, a przede wszystkim zaplecze dla uzupeniania si nowymi ludmi[4]. Okrelenie rzeczywistego charakteru wsppracy tej czci ludnoci ukraiskiej, ktra popieraa OUN i UPA jest problematyczne, gdy OUN prowadzia z pomoc bezwzgldnej su by bezpieczestwa OUN polityk terroru wobec tych Ukraicw, ktrzy nie akceptowali jej metod prowadzenia walki. Ocen t utrudnia ponadto fakt, i UPA stosowaa tak e przymusowe wcielanie ludnoci ukraiskiej do swoich szeregw. ukces dziaa w tym zakresie, chocia rozbito ok. 80% si UPA, by tylko poowiczny[5] poniewa cz oddziaw UPA przedara si do Niemiec (na przykad sotnia Hromenki i Brodycza), inni powrcili na Ukrain (cz

sotni Stacha, Chrina i Bira). Akcja ta w zamierzeniach su ya przede wszystkim likwidacji problemu ukraiskiego na terenie Polski[6] przez rozproszenie ludnoci ukraiskiej, w celu jej pniejszej asymilacji (polonizacji). Przygotowania do akcji mier gen. wierczewskiego Waltera Bezporednim powodem (propagandowym) do rozpoczcia akcji bya mier generaa Karola wierczewskiego w dniu 28 marca 1947 roku. Genera zgin w zasadzce w miejscowoci Jabonki koo Baligrodu w Bieszczadach, gdy udawa si na inspekcj posterunku wojskowego w Cisnej. Wersja mierci generaa w wyniku trafienia pociskiem z broni palnej podawana jest w wtpliwo przez niektrych historykw. Wskazuj oni na istnienie otworu powstaego od ostrego narzdzia w tylnej czci znajdujcego si w Muzeum Wojska Polskiego w Warszawie munduru gen. wierczewskiego, co sugeruje, e mg on zgin nie od strzau z broni palnej napastnikw, lecz od ciosu zadanego no em w plecy przez siedzcego na tylnym siedzeniu samochodu czonka wasnej ochrony. Od dnia mierci wierczewskiego rozpoczy si zdecydowane dziaania strony polskiej, majce doprowadzi do ustania walk w tym rejonie kraju. By mo e obecno gen. wierczewskiego w Bieszczadach miaa su y ostatecznej likwidacji dziaajcych na tym terenie oddziaw UPA, terroryzujcych miejscow ludno, a jego mier miaa by pretekstem do zdecydowanych dziaa majcych przywrci pokj w tym rejonie Polski. Po tym wydarzeniu wadze polskie w cigu kilkunastu godzin podjy decyzj o deportacji ludnoci niepolskiej (ukraiskiej, ale te rusiskiej emkw i Bojkw) z terenw caej poudniowowschodniej Polski. Pozbawienie zaplecza (gwnie ywnociowego, ale by mo e i militarnego) oddziaw UPA i zdecydowane dziaania du ych zwizkw taktycznych Wojska Polskiego doprowadzio w ostatecznoci do ustania walk zbrojnych. Przygotowania rzdu W styczniu 1947 roku jednostki LWP stacjonujce w poudniowo-wschodniej Polsce otrzymay rozkaz sporzdzenia wykazw rodzin ukraiskich, ktre nie zostay przesiedlone w latach 1944-1946. W lutym zastpca szefa Sztabu Generalnego gen. Stefan Mossor zaproponowa plan przesiedlenia Ukraicw na Ziemie Odzyskane[7], jemu te powierzono dowdztwo akcji. Zastpcami mianowano: wiceministra bezpieczestwa publicznego Grzegorza Korczyskiego (ds. bezpieczestwa), pk Juliusza Hibnera (ds. KBW) oraz ppk Bolesawa Sidziskiego (ds. polityczno-wychowawczych). Aby nikt nie przedosta si na teren ssiednich krajw, minister obrony narodowej marszaek Micha Rola- ymierski zwrci si 15 kwietnia 1947 roku do ministrw obrony narodowej Republiki Czechosowacji i ZSRR z prob o szczeln blokad granicy z Polsk. 24 kwietnia uchwa w sprawie Akcji Wisa podjo Prezydium Rady Ministrw RP. Niektrzy historycy (na przykad Ryszard Torzecki z IH PAN) twierdz, e decyzja o przeprowadzeniu Akcji Wisa zapada w Moskwie w poowie lutego, po przygotowaniu planu operacji przez ludowego sekretarza spraw wewntrznych USRR gen. Sierieja Sawczenk, i zaaprobowaniu przez awrentija Beri i Georgija Malenkowa. Dopiero pniej zostay przyjte decyzje Biura Politycznego KC PPR (w marcu 1947) i Pastwowej Komisji Bezpieczestwa RP (12 kwietnia 1947). Siy UPA Wedle szacunkw z dokumentw[8] dowdztwa GO "Wisa" Ukraiska Powstacza Armia dysponowaa na dzie 1 kwietnia 1947 siami zbrojnymi w liczbie 2402 ludzi, cznie z obsad terenow w liczbie 720 ludzi. Dysponujcych broni i aktywnych w walce czonkw UPA oszacowano na 1772 ludzi, rozkad si na poszczeglne oddziay wyglda nastpujco: Sztab UPA w "Zakierzoskim Kraju" 25 ludzi; Okrg nr 1 sztab (37 ludzi), obsada personalna rejonw (249 ludzi), oddziay zbrojne: sotnia "Buraki" (120), sotnia "astiwki" (91), sotnia "Hromenki" (121), sotnia "Kryacza" (81), sotnia "Stacha" (61), sotnia "Bira" (90), sotnia "Chrina" (121), sotnia "Romana" (121); Okrg nr 2 sztab (27 ludzi), obsada personalna rejonw (471), oddziay zbrojne: sotnia "Kruka" (71), sotnia "Kalinowicza" (100), sotnia "Tucza" (90), sotnia "Szuma" (101), sotnia "Bryla" (60), sotnia "Sahajdaczyn" (61), sotnia "Jara" (41), sotnia "Czausa" (51), sotnia "Dudy" (40), sotnia "Kryaty" (41), sotnia "Dawida" (71). Po trzech miesicach dziaania GO "Wisa", siy zbrojne UPA zmniejszyy si z 2402 ludzi do 563[8] ludzi. Grupa Operacyjna "Wisa" Osobny artyku: Grupa Operacyjna Wisa. Do przeprowadzenia akcji przeznaczono cztery dywizje piechoty (6, 7, 8, 9 DP), jedn dywizj KBW oraz trzy dodatkowe puki (piechoty, samochodowy i saperski - 5 Mazurski Puk Saperw - Szczecin). Akcj wspieraa dodatkowo 3 DP. cznie dao to ponad 20 tysicy onierzy. Oprcz tego wspomaga akcj miay oddziay WOP, Milicja Obywatelska, ORMO i UBP. Sowieci wyznaczyli do akcji po swej stronie jedn dywizj pancern, specjalne oddziay antypartyzanckie oraz oddziay Wojsk Pogranicznych NKWD do blokowania granicy. Czechosowacy utworzyli specjaln grup operacyjn oraz oddali do polskiej dyspozycji rodki transportu do pomocy w przegrupowaniu polskich wojsk. Oczywistym jest, e w rzeczywistoci akcja "Wisa" bya du o wczeniej przygotowan operacj rozproszenia pozostaej na ziemiach polskich mniejszoci ukraiskiej, oskar anej o stanowienie zaplecza dla dziaa takich organizacji jak UPA i OUN. Akcja dotkna mieszkacw poudniowo-wschodniej Polski, w tym rwnie Polakw z ma estw mieszanych, oraz inne mniejszoci rusiskie stanowice wikszo mieszkacw wielu miejscowoci. Akcja "Wisa", przeprowadzona zastaa przez Grup Operacyjn "Wisa", dowodzon przez gen. Stefana Mossora, rozpocza si 28 kwietnia 1947 roku o godzinie 4 nad ranem. Przygotowywanie list przesiedlecw Podstawow spraw byo przygotowanie list osb przeznaczonych do wysiedlenia. Pocztkowo wykazy przygotowyway jednostki wojskowe, wspomagajc si informacjami z urzdw gmin, a przede wszystkim z UB.

Dziaania te byy utrzymane w tajemnicy. Gdy akcja przesiedlecza zacza si rozwija, a jej cele stay si powszechnie znane, obowizek sporzdzania list spocz na wadzach powiatowych. Pierwsza wersja wykazu wdrowaa do UB, gdzie bya korygowana i uzupeniana, a nastpnie przekazywana wojsku. Rwnie wojsko miao prawo dokonywania kolejnych poprawek na listach. Ludno ukraiska prbowaa unika znalezienia si na listach i wysiedlenia na r ne sposoby. Zaopatrywano si w faszywe dokumenty to samoci, starano si o metryki rzymskokatolickie w celu potwierdzenia polskoci, bowiem jednym z gwnych kryteriw kwalifikacji do wysiedlenia byo wyznanie religijne. Osoby wyznania grecko-katolickiego i prawosawnego, niezale nie od faktycznego pochodzenia etnicznego, traktowano jako Rusinw. Urzdy zasypywano podaniami o zezwolenie na pozostanie w dotychczasowym miejscu zamieszkania, powoujc si na wieloletnie zamieszkanie, pozytywny stosunek do polskoci, zwizanie z miejscem, prac, wiekiem lub zym stanem zdrowia. Przysyano tak e petycje z zagranicy od organizacji emigrantw lub prywatnych osb, ujmujce si za krewnymi. Powoywano si na czonkostwo w PPR, posiadanie wysokich odznacze pastwowych, su b w wojsku polskim lub radzieckim, przedstawiano zawiadczenia lojalnoci z UB. Wszelkie te dziaania okazay si niewystarczajce do pozostania na miejscu. Przesiedlenia Przesiedlenia objy ok. 140 tysicy osb pozostaych po wyjazdach na Ukrain oraz po wywzkach w gb ZSRR po podpisaniu umowy o wymianie ludnoci midzy Polsk a radzieck Ukrain w latach 1944-1946, a zamieszkujcych Polesie, Roztocze, Pogrze Przemyskie, Bieszczady, Beskid Niski, Beskid Sdecki i tzw. Ru Szlachtowsk. Ostatnie wyjazdy zwizane z Akcj miay miejsce od stycznia do kwietnia 1950, kiedy to wysiedlono 32 rodziny (mieszkajce w pasie przygranicznym) z powiatu nowotarskiego. Akcja "Wisa" oficjalnie zakoczya si uroczystoci dekoracji na granicy polsko-czechosowackiej onierzy najbardziej zasu onych w walkach z "bandami". Punkty zborne Na terenie dziaania ka dego puku tworzono jeden lub dwa pukowe punkty zborne. Lokalizowano je, uwzgldniajc odlego od stacji zaadowczej, sie drg oraz poo enie wzgldem wysiedlanych wsi. O wicie wojsko otaczao wie, aby nie dopuci do ucieczki ludnoci do lasu. Gromadzono wszystkich mieszkacw w jednym miejscu i ogaszano podjcie akcji wysiedleczej i jej warunki, czyli "Przepisy porzdkowe": Ka dy, kto pozostaby we wsi po wysiedleniu, bdzie uwa any za czonka bandy i jako taki traktowany Wyra a si zgod na zabranie tylko ywego inwentarza, podstawowego sprztu rolniczego, oraz do 25 kg na osob niezbdnej odzie y, naczy kuchennych, i zapasu ywnoci na drog Pozostay majtek ruchomy ma by przewieziony w pniejszym czasie i rozdzielony wrd przesiedlecw Odlego od wsi do punktu zbornego ludno musiaa przeby pieszo lub wasnym transportem (ze wsi wyruszano najpniej o 11). Bya oczywicie eskortowana przez wojsko w celu ochrony przed ewentualnym atakiem UPA, jak rwnie przed ucieczk tych, ktrzy mog w le rozumianym interesie wasnym prbowa odczy si od transportu, nara ajc si na niebezpieczestwo ze strony band[9]. Niekiedy odlegoci od punktu zbornego byy znaczce dochodziy do 6070 km (rednio 3040 km). W punktach zbornych przesuchiwano wszystkich, przydzielajc odpowiedni kategori zagro enia (od A do C, A najwy sza). W punktach tych ludno pozostawaa a do skierowania do odpowiedniej stacji zaadowczej i podstawienia wagonw (czasem nawet do miesica). Pozostawione mienie Instrukcja przewidywaa 2 godziny na spakowanie si i opuszczenie domw. W tym czasie niemo liwoci byo spakowanie dorobku swego ycia, ograniczeniem byy te przepisy, nakazujce zmieszczenie caego dobytku maksymalnie na 2 wozach konnych. Nie pozwalao to na zaadowanie wikszych narzdzi, mebli, zapasw ziemniakw i zbo a. Z koniecznoci zostawiano te cz zwierzt hodowlanych. Pozostawione mienie wykorzystyway wojskowe su by kwatermistrzowskie, wysyajc zapasy pozostawione przez przesiedlecw do aprowizacji jednostek wojskowych w centralnej Polsce. Korzystay z nich rwnie oddziay GO Wisa. Aby zapobiec marnotrawstwu reszty zapasw, wadze zatrudniay osoby, transportujce na stacj mienie, w zamian za 40% jego iloci[10]. W ten sposb sankcjonowano rozporzdzanie cudz wasnoci bez zgody prawowitych wacicieli. Mienie trwae miao by zabezpieczone przy pomocy LWP i przekazane lokalnym wadzom, a nastpnie komitetom osiedleczym lub Samopomocy Chopskiej. Zgodnie z ustaleniami wojsko i administracja lokalna miay jednoczenie przystpowa do zabezpieczania mienia, ale administracj powiadamiano niezbyt czsto. Skutkowao to ogaacaniem gospodarstw przez pozosta ludno polsk, tak e przybya komisja inwentaryzacyjna nie miaa czego spisywa. Liczne byy przypadki rozdzielania mienia pomidzy ludno polsk oraz dowdcw oddziaw wojskowych operujcych w terenie. Przejty sprzt wykorzystywano, wynajmujc go miejscowym rolnikom do robt polowych, powierzano na przechowanie z prawem u ytkowania, lub magazynowano z przeznaczeniem na pomoc przyszym osadnikom.

Pomnik ofiar terroru komunistycznego w Centralnym Obozie Pracy Ministerstwa Bezpieczestwa Publicznego w Jaworznie, odsonity 23 maja 1998 Opuszczona i zniszczona cerkiew greckokatolicka w nieistniejcej ju wsi Krlik Wooski Obz w JaworznieOsobny artyku: Centralny Obz Pracy w Jaworznie. Inteligencj, ksi y greckokatolickich, osoby podejrzane o wspprac z UPA i organizacjami nacjonalistycznymi oraz czsto tak e osoby przypadkowe, kierowano z punktw zbornych do wizie lub Centralnego Obozu Pracy w Jaworznie, utworzonego w kwietniu 1947. W obozie tym znalazo si prawie 3873 winiw (2781 Ukraicw w tym 823 kobiety, 22 ksi y greckokatolickich, 3 ksi y prawosawnych), z czego ponad 150 zmaro. Obz w Jaworznie by w rzeczywistoci byym obozem koncentracyjnym (filia KL Auschwitz). Po II wojnie wiatowej obz zosta zaadaptowany na potrzeby nowego re imu decyzj Biura Politycznego KC PPR. Centralny Obz Pracy w Jaworznie funkcjonowa jeszcze do stycznia 1949. Pniej wrd skazanych w obozie tym znaleli si przede wszystkim polscy dziaacze niepodlegociowi, onierze AK, grnicy, Niemcy. Stacje zaadowcze Stacji zaadowczych byo pocztkowo 12: Nowy upkw i ukawica (na terenie dziaania KBW) Besko i Komacza (6 DP) Szczawne-Kulaszne-Wysoczany, Pisarowce i Zagrz (7 DP) Zau i Olszanica (8 DP) Sanok, Przeworsk i Be ec (9 DP) Pniej doszo jeszcze kilka, midzy innymi Werbkowice, Chotyw. Za sprawy zwizane z bezpieczestwem wysiedlanych, organizacj zaopatrzenia, transportem kolejowym, opiek medyczn odpowiada komendant stacji zaadowczej z swoim zastpc ds. polityczno-wychowawczych. Podlegali mu: dowdca ochrony przesiedlonych w punkcie zaadowczym kierownik zaadowczy (przygotowywa dokumenty podr y i odprawia skady) dowdca kolumny transportowej (dowo cej wysiedlonych z punktw zbornych) kierownik PUR (organizowa przygotowywanie i wydawanie posikw, stawianie namiotw, zapewnia pomoc sanitarn). Grupy docierajce do punktu zaadowczego przyjmowa komendant. Sprawdza on zgodno wykazu ze stanem faktycznym i w obecnoci przedstawiciela PUR potwierdza ich odebranie. Nastpnie wsplnie z nim ustala skad rodzin do poszczeglnych transportw, a urzdnicy PUR wystawiali zawiadczenia przesiedlecze na temat zabranego mienia ruchomego i pozostawionego nieruchomego, co miao posu y do ustalenia wielkoci otrzymywanego gospodarstwa w nowym miejscu i wysokoci ekwiwalentu za pozostawione mienie. Od chwili skompletowania konwoju i opuszczenia stacji zaadowczej za przesiedlecw i ich bezpieczne dostarczenie na miejsce odpowiada dowdca konwoju. Zabiera on z sob wykaz przesiedlecw i ich mienia, oraz dwie zalakowane koperty. W jednej znajdowaa si nazwa kocowej stacji rozdzielczej, w drugiej wskazwki dla kierownika punktu rozdzielczego czy rodziny z danego transportu mo na osiedla w maych grupkach, czy te wycznie pojedynczo. Punkty rozdzielcze Punkty rozdzielcze znajdoway si w Olsztynie, Szczecinku, Poznaniu i Wrocawiu. W punktach tych organizowano pomoc sanitarn i ywnociow. Decydowano rwnie , na ktry punkt rozadowania ma si uda transport. W ka dym punkcie rozdzielczym znajdowa si oddzia wojskowy liczcy 50 onierzy, speniajcy funkcje wartownicze i porzdkowe. Kierownik punktu rozdzielczego prowadzi ewidencj chonnoci powiatw. W przypadku cakowitego zasiedlenia powiatu kierownik wykrela powiat ze spisu i zaprzestawa wysyania tam transportw. Stacje rozadowania Stacje rozadowania byy chronione przez oddziay wojskowe liczce 25 onierzy. Na czele ka dej sta kierownik stacji rozadowania. Nadzorowa on rozdzielanie ludnoci do poszczeglnych powiatw i gromad, zwracajc uwag na kategorie bezpieczestwa (A, B, C). Rozlokowywaniem przesiedlecw zajmowali si wjtowie. Po przybyciu transportu do stacji rozadowania ludno z reguy czekaa kilka dni (zwykle 2-7) na przewiezienie do miejsca osiedlenia. Osiedlanie

Ludno osiedlano na podstawie Planu Ewakuacyjnego z dnia 18 kwietnia 1947, opracowanego przez Ministerstwo Ziem Odzyskanych . Przewidywa on rozmieszczenie wysiedlecw w wojewdztwie szczeciskim i olsztyskim. Zarzdzenie Departamentu Osiedleczego MZO z 27 czerwca 1947 zabraniao osiedlania przesiedlecw: w pasie 50 km od granic ldowych pastwa w pasie 10 km od starych granic z 1939 w pasie 30 km od wybrze a morskiego w odlegoci mniejszej ni 30 km od miast wojewdzkich Pismo ministra MZO z dnia 31 lipca 1947 nakazywao dodatkowo, aby przesiedlecw o ujemnej opinii osiedla najwy ej po jednej rodzinie z jednego transportu na gromad. Rodziny o opinii pozytywnej mogy by osiedlane po kilka cznie, przy czym liczba osb nie moga przekroczy 10% mieszkacw danej gromady. Wkrtce po rozpoczciu wysiedle okazao si, e nie da si osiedli takiej liczby ludnoci w zgodzie z tymi przepisami. Wadze terenowe powszechnie je wic naruszay. Po przyjedzie do stacji rozadowania i odbiorze od kierownika stacji ludnoci zajmowali si wjtowie. Poniewa powszechny by brak wpisanej kategorii bezpieczestwa na listach przesiedlecw, wjtowie czsto sami decydowali o przyznaniu takiej kategorii, lub te nie zwracali na ni uwagi. Rodziny z kategori A i B polecono osiedla po jednej na wie lub folwark. Dopiero wobec braku miejsca do zasiedlania zezwolono na dosiedlanie kilku rodzin z kategorii C, pod warunkiem, e rodziny te pochodziy z r nych regionw, i nie znay si wczeniej. W sumie osiedlono 95 846 osb pochodzcych z wojewdztwa rzeszowskiego i 44 728 osb pochodzcych z wojewdztwa lubelskiego (nie podano danych z wojewdztwa krakowskiego)[11]. Konsekwencje operacji Zobacz w Wikirdach tekst Dekret z dnia 27 lipca 1949 r. Zobacz w Wikirdach tekst Rozporzdzenie Ministra Sprawiedliwoci z dnia 26 stycznia 1970 r. Chocia w dyrektywie nr 7 gen. ymierski jasno poinstruowa gen. Mossora, e gwnym celem Akcji "Wisa" s przesiedlenia, a bezporednia walka z UPA jest celem ubocznym, drugorzdnym, to w rezultacie akcji "Wisa" UPA stracia okoo 70% stanw osobowych i baz zaopatrzeniow (praktycznie ca siatk cywiln) na obszarze wok Rzeszowa[12]). Jej konsekwencj byo czciowe wyludnienie obszarw Roztocza, Pogrza Przemyskiego, Bieszczadw i Beskidu Niskiego oraz zniszczenie dziedzictwa kulturowego tych regionw. Przestao cakowicie istnie kilkadziesit miejscowoci. Na "zachd" wyje d ali rwnie Polacy, ktrzy opuszczali swe rodzinne strony po spaleniu wsi i miasteczek przez oddziay UPA, oraz braku perspektywy rozwoju tych terenw. Akcja wizaa si te z nieuchronn utrat dobytku ruchomego i nieruchomoci przesiedlecw oraz w wikszoci przypadkw znacznym pogorszeniem warunkw bytowania, jak rwnie z cakowit dezorganizacj ycia rodzinnego. Po przybyciu na tereny Ziem Odzyskanych przesiedlecy otrzymywali mienie porzucone oraz domy po wysiedlonych na zachd Niemcach. W wielu przypadkach byy to jednak domy uszkodzone lub zrabowane przez szabrownikw lub pierwszych przesiedlecw[13]. Dochodzio do kwaterowania kilku rodzin w jednym domu lub osiedlania w stajniach i innych budynkach gospodarczych[13]. Zdecydowanie negatywn ocen Akcji Wisa wydao Kolegium Ministerstwa Spraw Wewntrznych z dnia 19 czerwca 1956 roku. W protokole z posiedzenia kolegium czytamy e: by to ogromny bd w stosunku do ludnoci ukraiskiej[14]. Akcja osiedlecza ludnoci polskiej Jednoczenie z akcj wysiedlecz rozpoczto w wojewdztwie rzeszowskim akcj skupiania i osiedlania ludnoci polskiej. Do 30 czerwca 1946 utworzono 28 nowych posterunkw MO i przystpiono do tworzenia nastpnych 53. W 61 wsiach zorganizowano ORMO w sile 1778 czonkw. Utworzono jednoczenie Wojewdzki Komitet Zasiedleczy, w ktrego skad weszli przedstawiciele administracji wojewdzkiej, PUR i wadz wojskowych. Rozpocz dziaalno 12 czerwca 1947. Komitet mianowa penomocnikw powiatowych. Do 30 czerwca 1947 osiedlono 6600 osadnikw, a do 30 lipca 13 500. Byo to du o mniej, ni zaplanoway wadze. W celu wzmocnienia bezpieczestwa i nadzoru nad procesem osadniczym w Baligrodzie, Birczy i Lubaczowie rozlokowano po jednym batalionie KBW. Wspczenie W 1990 Akcj "Wisa" potpi Senat Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. W 2002 Prezydent Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej Aleksander Kwaniewski wyrazi ubolewanie z powodu przeprowadzenia tej akcji. W styczniu 2007 wiatowy Kongres Ukraicw za da od Polski oficjalnych przeprosin za akcj "Wisa", jak rwnie wypacenia odszkodowa dla jej ofiar[15]. 24 lutego 2007, Przemyl, Konferencja naukowa powicona akcji "Wisa", przyczyny, przebieg, konsekwencje[16] 27 lutego 2007 Prezydent Polski Lech Kaczyski i Prezydent Ukrainy Wiktor Juszczenko we wsplnym owiadczeniu[17] potpili akcj "Wisa"[18][19], i stwierdzili, e bya ona sprzeczna z podstawowymi prawami czowieka[17]. Prezydent Juszczenko stwierdzi 27 kwietnia 2007, i "winowajc tej operacji by totalitarny re im komunistyczny"[20] 28 kwietnia 2007 owiadczenie wywoao reakcj polskich historykw, Grzegorz Motyka z PAN stwierdza, i polskie wadze musiay i miay prawo zwalcza UPA, ktra d ya do okrojenia terytorium Polski[21], ale nie mo e to usprawiedliwia zastosowania odpowiedzialnoci zbiorowej. Z kolei Ewa Siemaszko[22] zauwa a, i jako jedynego

winowajc poczucia krzywdy zwizanej z akcj "Wisa" dostrzega si komunistyczne wadze, natomiast pomija si antypolski program i dziaalno OUN-UPA[23]. Zobacz te W Wikimedia Commons znajduj si multimedia zwizane z tematem: Akcja Wisa Zobacz w Wikirdach tekst Dokumenty dotyczce Akcji Wisa Ukraicy w Polsce Ukraineraktion Wysiedlenie Polakw ze Lwowa Przypisy 1. 1,0 1,1 Nowa Powszechna Encyklopedia PWN, Pastwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, Warszawa, 2004, ISBN 83-01-14179-4, s. 629 2. Andrzej Olejko: Dziaania lotnictwa polskiego i czechosowackiego w operacjach przeciwko UPA podczas Akcji Wisa fakty i relacje uczestnikw walk. Rzeszw: Instytut Historii Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego, 2012, s. 34-40 3. Projekt organizacji akcji Wschd przygotowany przez MON i MBP; Archiwum IPN, MBP 743, k. 255257 4. Stanisaw Rzepski: Szlakiem 37 PAL. Wydawnictwo Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, Warszawa 1965, s. 254 5. Biuletun IPN Nr 8, wrzesie 2001 s. 12 6. raport wojskowy dot. ostatecznego rozwizania problemu ukraiskiego; Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe, Sztab Generalny WP, IV -111-512, Akta GO "Wisa" 7. Akcja Wisa, IPN, s. 31 8. 8,0 8,1 Grupa Operacyjna "Wisa", kalkulacja si U.P.A. (si zbrojnych U.P.A. i personalnej obsady terenowej) na terenie dziaania Grupy Operacyjnej "Wisa" na dzie 1.04-23.07.1947 r. 9. CAW GZPW IV.112.290 Poradnik terenowy onierza, k.61 10. Aldona Chojnowska Operacja Wisa, Zeszyty Historyczne nr 101, s. 44 11. A. Szczeniak, W.Szota: Droga do nikd. s. 459 12. Droga do nikd. Dziaalno OUN i jej likwidacja w Polsce Warszawa 1973 13. 13,0 13,1 "Z emkowskiej skrzyni", t. I i II, Strzelce Krajeskie 2004 14. Protok posiedzenia Kolegium MSW z 5 czerwca 1956 r., IPN, MSW I/9, k. 206-215 15. Ukraina: dania przeprosin za akcj "Wisa". Onet Wiadomoci (wersja zarchiwizowana przez Internet Archive z dnia 17.02.207) 16. W Przemylu zakoczya si konferencja naukowa powicona akcji 'Wisa' 17. 17,0 17,1 Niesprawiedliwa akcja "Wisa". 18. W 2007 obchodzimy 60-t rocznic akcji Wisa, ktra w historii wspczesnej Polski staa si przykadem niesprawiedliwoci, bdcej skutkiem dziaa totalitarnych wadz komunistycznych. W 1947 roku doprowadzia ona do deportacji z poudniowo-wschodniej Polski wielu tysicy obywateli polskich pochodzenia ukraiskiego i rozproszenia wsplnoty ukraiskiej w Polsce: Wsplne owiadczenie Prezydenta RP i Prezydenta Ukrainy z okazji 60-tej rocznicy Akcji Wisa Warszawa, 2007 19. "Wydarzenie to jako sprzeczne z podstawowymi prawami czowieka zostao potpione w 1990 roku w specjalnej uchwale przez Senat RP. Dzisiaj, podzielajc t ocen, chylimy gowy przed wszystkimi jego ofiarami. Potwierdzamy jednoczenie wol kontynuacji procesu pojednania, odkrycia prawdy historycznej o minionych wydarzeniach i upamitnienia ofiar bratobjczych konfliktw" Wsplne owiadczenie Prezydenta RP i Prezydenta Ukrainy z okazji 60-tej rocznicy Akcji Wisa Warszawa, 2007 20. Juszczenko w rocznic akcji "Wisa": zrobili to komunici.. 21. "Rzeczpospolita" 28 kwietnia 2007: Grzegorz Motyka.Bogumia Berdychowska: Akcja "Wisa" nieuzasadniona represja. 22. Autorka m.in. fundamentalnej pracy "Ludobjstwo dokonane przez nacjonalistw ukraiskich na ludnoci polskiej Woynia 1939-1945" 23. Ewa Siemaszko: Wysiedlenie bardziej potpiane ni ludobjstwo. Rzeczpospolita, 29 kwietnia 2007 Literatura Akcja Wisa 1947, Warszawa-Kijw 2006, IPN, ISBN 83-89078-93-7 Zeszyty Historyczne nr 102, Aldona Chojnowska: Operacja "Wisa. Pary 1992, ISBN 83-85521-16-X Linki zewntrzne Uchwaa Prezydium Rady Ministrw z dnia 24 kwietnia 1947 w sprawie przeprowadzenia deportacji Ukraicw w ramach akcji Wisa" Akcja Wisa Instrukcja MZO z 10 listopada 1947, dotyczca zasad osiedlania rodzin ukraiskich kilka dokumentw dotyczcych Akcji Wisa http://www.mlodszaeuropa.pl/news/106/91/Akcja-Wisla.html

Edmund Charaszkiewicz
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Edmund Kalikst Eugeniusz Charaszkiewicz (Polish pronunciation: [ dmunt xara kjevit ]; Poniec, October 14, 1895 December 22, 1975, London) was a Polish military intelligence officer who specialized in clandestine warfare. Between the World Wars, he helped establish Poland's interbellum borders in conflicts over territory with Poland's neighbors. Also, for a dozen years before World War II, he coordinated Marshal Jzef Pisudski's Promethean movement, aimed at liberating the non-Russian peoples of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Unionan objective that Pisudski deemed crucial if Poland, sandwiched between Germany and the Soviet Union, were to preserve her justregained independence. Early career Edmund Charaszkiewicz was born on October 14, 1895, in Punitz (in Polish, Poniec), in the Province of Posen, an area of the German Empire that had been annexed from Poland by Prussia in the Third Partition of Poland (1795). He was the son of Stanisaw Charaszkiewicz, a building contractor, and Bronisawa, ne Rajewska. Edmund completed his elementary schooling in Poniec, then attended secondary schools successively in Krotoszyn, Katowice and Krakw. In the latter city, before World War I, his family lived at ulica Duga 63 (63 Long Street). In Krakw Edmund graduated from secondary school on December 17, 1915, while already a soldier in the Polish Legions.[1] In that period, it was common for secondary-school students in Galicia to join Polish patriotic paramilitary organizations. On November 1, 1913, Charaszkiewicz, aged 18, joined the Riflemen's Association and in 191314 attended an Association noncommissioned-officers' school, using the pseudonym Kalikst (his second given name).[2] Soon after the outbreak of World War I, on August 4 or 5, 1914, Charaszkiewicz enlisted in the Polish Legions. He served successively in several units and convalesced from several illnesses. In November or December 1917 he was inducted into the Polish Auxiliary Corps (the former Second Brigade of the Polish Legions), in which he served till February 1918 as senior sergeant major. He was then released from the Legions to serve in the German Army. In order to avoid such service, and because he was liable to arrest and internment as a former Polish Legionnaire, he went into hiding from February 18 until June 1918 in Krakw, and from November 1918 in Warsaw, where he worked at the Ministry of Military Affairs of the Polish Armed Force. His superiors there were two future Polish generals: Colonel Marian egota-Januszajtis and Major Stefan Pasawski.[3] Just after the close of World War I, on November 15, 1918, Charaszkiewicz joined the Polish Army in the rank of sublieutenant. During the Polish-Soviet War (191921) he participated in battles at Nowowiciany, Podbrodzie, Bezdany, Vilnius and Ejszyszki. During the Polish defense of Vilnius, he was taken prisoner by the Lithuanians and was interned, July 19 August 18, 1920. He escaped and, on returning to the Biaystok Rifle Regiment (Biaostocki Puk Strzelcw), temporarily commanded the 11th Company (September 21 October 6, 1920), then served as a junior officer in the 9th Company. On February 27, 1921, for conspicuous valor behind Soviet lines, he was recommended for Poland's highest military decoration, the Virtuti Militari.[4] Military intelligence Meanwhile, on December 15, 1920, Charaszkiewicz had been assigned to the Polish General Staff's Section II, or Intelligence specifically, to its Upper Silesia Plebiscite Department. During the Third Silesian Uprising he served (May 2 August 15, 1921) as deputy commander of demolition squads known as the Wawelberg Group. For his courage and steadfastness in action against the Germans, as he blew up mined structures in the face of withering enemy fire and thereby halted the German advance, he was on February 18, 1922, again recommended for the Virtuti Militari.[5] On June 27, 1922, Lt. Charaszkiewicz was decorated with the Virtuti Militari, 5th class.[6] Charaszkiewicz would later (February 16, 1940, in Paris) describe the Polish military-intelligence operation in the Third Silesian Uprising as a model operation of its kind: its objectives were clearly defined; the requisite personnel were skilfully recruited and trained; the necessary explosives, weapons, ammunition, equipment and supplies were smuggled into the operational areas and cached well in advance; and the plans were efficiently and resourcefully executed.[7] He would later favorably contrast the Third Silesian Uprising with the indecisive preparations for, and execution of, Poland's takeover of Zaolzie 17 years later, in 1938.[8] Moreover, the preponderant political circumstances in Poland, Germany and the world favored the Polish cause. The Silesian-Polish population gave its enthusiastic support, and all its social groups were recruited except for the communists, who for their part evinced a benign neutrality, having been instructed to back the Polish proletariat.[9] Between 1918 and 1923, Charaszkiewicz completed three years of the four-year law curriculum at Warsaw University.[10] After the Third Silesian Uprising (May 2 July 5, 1921), in 1922 Charaszkiewicz was assigned to the General Staff's Section II. In evaluations, he was commended for his strength of character, initiative, energy, enthusiasm, and devotion to duty, especially in covert operations in Lithuania, with which Poland had a running dispute over Vilnius. In 1927, when he was decorated with the Silver Cross of Merit, he was cited for actions in the rear of the Soviet Army in 1920, actions in the Third Silesian Uprising, and actions in the Polish-Lithuanian neutral zone to secure the lives and property of Polish citizens against Lithuanian irregulars.[11] Charaszkiewicz's service record noted that his qualifications for intelligence work included a knowledge of German, French and English. He was promoted to lieutenant on June 1, 1919, to captain on July 1, 1925,[12] and to major in 1935.[13] By 1931, until World War II, Charaszkiewicz served, last in the rank of major, as chief of "Office [Ekspozytura] 2" of the General Staff's Section II. Office 2, which had been so named on April 1, 1929, was charged with the planning, preparation and execution of clandestine-warfare operations.[14] In the face of growing threats from Germany and the Soviet Union, Polish organizing

of a "behind-the-lines" (pozafrontowa) clandestine network had begun immediately after the post-World War I wars for Poland's borders. Charaszkiewicz had been assigned to this network already on April 15, 1922.[15] Especially after Adolf Hitler's accession to power in 1933, Polish clandestine organizations were vigorously built up. They were meant, in future military actions, to paralyze enemy road and rail transport and destroy enemy military depots. Clandestine centers were created in Poland as well as in neighboring countries, chiefly Germany and the Soviet Union.[13] Personnel for the clandestine networks were recruited with great care. Thanks to this, the intelligence services of Poland's neighbors learned nothing about them until mid-1939, when the rising German threat prompted mass Polish training of irregular forces.[13] Prometheism Main article: Prometheism Office 2 was also responsible for "Promethean operations," conceived by Jzef Pisudski. The idea was to combat Soviet imperialism by supporting irredentist movements among the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. Thus the Prometheists' ultimate goal was nothing less than the dismemberment of the Soviet Union.[16] As Pisudski and his adherents (the "Pisudskiites") exerted a preponderant influence on Poland's government through nearly the entire interwar period, the Promethean agenda became integral to the operations of many Polish public institutions concerned with eastern European affairs.[16]

Tadeusz Schaetzel Tadeusz Peczyski Colin Gubbins After Pisudski's May 1926 coup d'tat, Section II intensified its engagement with Prometheism. The movement's leaders included prominent Sanation figures such as Colonel Walery Sawek and the publicist and Sejm deputy, Tadeusz Howko. Great importance was attached to Prometheism by Section II's successive chiefs, Colonel Tadeusz Schaetzel and Colonel Tadeusz Peczyski, and by deputy chief Lieutenant Colonel Jzef Englicht. The movement's intelligence operations were directed by Edmund Charaszkiewicz. Contacts were maintained with Ukrainians and Cossacks, and with representatives of several peoples of the Caucasus: Azeris, Armenians and Georgians.[16] In its prosecution of the Promethean agenda, Office 2 worked with official institutions such as the Institute for Study of Nationality Affairs (Instytut Bada Spraw Narodowociowych) and the Polish-Ukrainian Society (Towarzystwo PolskoUkraiskie) and its Polish-Ukrainian Bulletin (Biuletyn Polsko-Ukraiski), published from 1932. The latter Society included such experts on East European affairs as Leon Wasilewski, Stanisaw o and Stanisaw Stempowski, and its founder and prime mover as well as the Bulletin's editor was Wodzimierz Bczkowski, a leading figure in the "Promethean movement." From March 1934 Charaszkiewicz was a member of the Commission for Scientific Study of [Poland's] Eastern Lands (Komisja Naukowych Bada Ziem Wschodnich) and the Committee on [Poland's] Eastern Lands and Nationalities (Komitet do Spraw Ziem Wschodnich i Narodowociowych) at the Council of Ministers. He had already become a spokesman for the oppressed peoples east of Poland who wished to deepen their national selfawareness and groom leaders for their liberation.[17] Since 1927, Wasilewski, Sawek, Schaetzel and Howko had been laying foundations for Promethean movements in Paris, Warsaw and Istanbul. They had been studying questions involving national self-determination and federative polities with help from academic experts at institutions such as the Eastern Institute (Instytut Wschodni) in Warsaw and an analogous one in Vilnius, as well as at an Institute for Study of Nationalities (Instytut Bada Narodowociowych) and at several publications.[18] Charaszkiewicz's deputies at Office 2 were two officers from the Third Silesian Uprising: Major Feliks Ankerstein (1929-39), who during that Uprising had commanded a group (from April 27, 1921, the subgroup "Butrym"); and Major Wodzimierz Dbrowski, who had commanded group "G" in the Destruction Office (Referat Destrukcji).[19] Covert operations It appears that, as of 1935, Office 2 employed 11 officers, seven of them in Office [Referat] "A" (for the West Germany, East Prussia, Danzig, Czechoslovakia), headed by Ankerstein, and 22 civilian contract workers. The officer cadre were fairly stable; most of the officers served in Office 2 for at least six years.[20] A principal task of Office 2 was organizing and conducting clandestine operations outside Poland, chiefly in bordering countries, and preparing

resistance cells in areas of Poland that, in the event of war, might be occupied by enemy forces. Office "B" (responsible for the East), headed in 193739 by Major Dbrowski, prepared clandestine actions against the Soviet Union, conducting "Promethean operations" among non-Russian peoples (e.g. Caucasus, Tatar, Ukrainian and Cossack migrs) and creating covert organizations at Poland's borders with Soviet Belarus and Ukraine. Office "A" (the West) was tasked with preparing and running clandestine operations against "Western" countries of interest.[21] Agents of Office 2 operated in Germany, Danzig, Czechoslovakia and Lithuania. They also penetrated anti-Hitler German migr communities in Czechoslovakia and especially in France. In 1935 Charaszkiewicz and Ankerstein organized in the Free City of Danzig a covert "Group Zygmunt", which in September 1939, on the outbreak of World War II, would conspicuously defend the Polish Post Office in Danzig. "Group Zygmunt's" networks were to cover Poland's western border, Pomerania and the Free City of Danzig, and were to concentrate on sabotage and clandestine operations in the event of these areas' temporary occupation by the enemy.[21] The signing of the Polish-German Non-aggression Pact of January 26, 1934, had produced a reorientation in Polish foreign policy. Czechoslovakia's Zaolzie area (which was in dispute between Poland and Czechoslovakia) had lain outside Office 2's sphere of interest, but from spring 1934 covert propaganda and clandestine operations began to be developed there.[22] Charaszkiewicz suggested to an old Polish Legions comrade, Wiktor Tomir Drymmer from September 15, 1933, to the outbreak of World War II, director of the Polish Foreign Ministry's Consular Department the creation of an organization covering all countries that harbored substantial Polish communities. They agreed that this would be necessary due to the inevitability of war with Nazi Germany. They were also agreed that the organization was to be strictly covert, both in Poland and abroad; was to be of a nationalist character; and was to be elite rather than large-scale in nature. The organization's regulations were drawn up by Captain Ankerstein.[22] Eventually it was decided that the organization should be run by a "Committee of Seven" (K-7) comprising half Foreign Ministry personnel Drymmer, his political deputy Dr. Wadysaw Jzef Zaleski, Tadeusz Kowalski, and the latter's deputy Tadeusz Kawalec and half Office 2 personnel: Charaszkiewicz, Ankerstein and the latter's deputy, Captain Wojciech Lipiski. Later, Lieutenant Colonel Ludwik Zych, chief of staff of Poland's Border Guard (Stra Graniczna), would be coopted.[23] K-7 set about recruiting young Poles residing in Czechoslovakia, Germany, Lithuania, Latvia and Romania's Bukovina. They were trained in small groups in Poland, to be deployed in wartime. Beginning in May 1938, K-7 conducted courses in Warsaw, Gdynia and several other Polish localities.[24] In Zaolzie, about 1935, the first Polish clandestine operations had taken place; later, during Poland's 1938 annexation of that territory, K-7 members participated. The proceedings were directed from Warsaw by Drymmer and Charaszkiewicz, and on the ground by Ankerstein and later Zych.[24] After the Zaolzie takeover, preparations began on October 7, 1938, for a covert operation codenamed om ("Crowbar")[25] in easternmost Czechoslovakia's Carpathian Rus, coordinated with Hungarian operations conducted from the south. The Polish commander on the ground was again Major Ankerstein, while at Warsaw Charaszkiewicz was again in overall command. The operation took place in October and November 1938 and helped bring about the First Vienna Award (November 2, 1938). In mid-March 1939, the operation's objective was fully accomplished:[26] the restoration of Carpathian Rus to its pre-World War I master, Hungary, and thereby also the recreation of the historic common Polish-Hungarian border. Six months later, during the September 1939 invasion of Poland, the common Polish-Hungarian border would become of pivotal importance when Hungarian Regent Mikls Horthy's government, as a matter of "Hungarian honor," declined Hitler's request for permission to send German forces across Carpathian Rus into southeastern Poland to speed Poland's conquest. Horthy's refusal allowed the Polish government and tens of thousands of Polish military to escape into neighboring Hungary and Romania; and from there, to France and French-mandated Syria, to carry on the war as the third-strongest Allied belligerent after Britain and France.[27] Office 2's next task was organizing "behind-the-lines covert-operation networks" (siatki dywersji pozafrontowej) that were to undertake intelligence, sabotage and covert operations upon the outbreak of war, especially in areas occupied by the Germans. Charaszkiewicz was a conceptual founder of these networks. Particularly intensive work on them began early in May 1939. These structures were given diverse names such as "Secret Military Organization" (Tajna Organizacja Wojskowa, or TOW) and "Mobile Combat Units" (Lotne Oddziay Bojowe). In many cases in Silesia, in southwestern Poland, and in western Poland after Poland had been overrun by Germany in September 1939, these networks became the foundations for the first local underground resistance organizations, which in many cases later became part of the Union for Armed Struggle (Zwizek Walki Zbrojnej, or ZWZ).[28] One such organization that arose on the foundation of a "behind-the-lines covert-operation network," in Krakw on September 22, 1939, was the White Eagle Organization (Organizacja Ora Biaego, or OOB), which soon, in 1940, became part of ZWZ. The OOB was a major organization that, in addition to southern Poland, also held some sway in Silesia, Warsaw and Lublin. The order to form OOB was issued by Charaszkiewicz's deputy, Major Ankerstein, who had returned from Hungary to Krakw expressly for that purpose. He also conducted a three-day covert-operations training for Organization members before making his way back to Hungary and proceeding on to the West.[29] Before the war, a network of clandestine groups was created, tasked with paralyzing lines of communication and destroying enemy supply depots and command networks. Their membership was drawn from varied backgrounds, including the Riflemen's Association (Zwizek Strzelecki), Reserve Noncommissioned Officers' Association (Zwizek Podoficerw Rezerwy), Reserve Officers' Association (Zwizek Oficerw Rezerwy), referrals by County Offices of Physical Education and Military Training (Powiatowe Urzdy Wychowania Fizycznego i Przysposobienia Wojskowego, or PUWFiPW), the Polish Scouting Association (Zwizek Harcerzy Polskich, or ZHP), the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), and a host of other organizations.[30] The preparatory work was coordinated by a Department for Planning Wartime Intelligence and Covert Operations (Wydzia Planowania Wywiadu I Dywersji Wojennej), created in late 1937. Its tasks

included organizing mobilization procedures for the foreign intelligence network and assuring its functioning under wartime conditions, as well as securing covert support for the army at the front.[31] Spring 1938 saw expanded training of clandestine networks. Courses organized by Office 2, disguised as civil-defense training, might cover cryptology, intelligence microphotography, toxicology, railway sabotage, hand-to-hand combat, new weapons, explosives, and suppression of fires. In view of the enemy's growing preponderance in armor, artillery and especially air forces, it had been decided to increase the tasks set for covert-operations networks. On June 3, 1939, Section II sent, to army commanders, regulations for covert operations; among other things, it was set down that only those members of a covert unit should know each other who were to carry out practically defined assignments.[30] In summer 1939, weapons and explosives began to be distributed to clandestine centers and patrols. Deliveries were also made to networks created within the Third Reich. Despite the secrecy of the preparations, German intelligence obtained information on the Polish networks, and German security agencies received orders to suppress the Polish networks. When overt war did come in September 1939, the mass terror applied to the Polish population by the Germans, in many instances though by no means universally paralyzed the Polish clandestine networks.[32] In September 1939, during the Polish retreat before advancing German forces, Drymmer and other clandestine-operations leaders, as early as their stop at Kazimierz Dolny on the Vistula River, left behind K-7 members and freshly sworn-in individuals. Likewise, at a Polish consulate in Romania's Bukovina, K-7 trained a group of young men in covert action. Major Charaszkiewicz himself, at the outbreak of war, became head of Department (Wydzia) F at the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief and carried on this function from September 1 to September 20, 1939. According to other information, he was special-assignments officer to the Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Edward Rydz-migy, and in that capacity with the Marshal's approval commissioned the creation of at least one underground organization about September 12. Next Charaszkiewicz, along with other K-7 members, crossed Poland's border into Romania. There he organized a group of officers who were to return to occupied Poland to set up another underground organization.[33][34] In Romania, Charaszkiewicz established ties with a Sanation group, the "Schaetzel-Drymmer group," that was illdisposed to Marshal Rydz-migy and supportive of Foreign Minister Jzef Beck. Charaszkiewicz also played a substantial role in creating an Office (Ekspozytura) "R" of Polish intelligence headquartered in Bucharest, with satellite outposts scattered about Romania. It was important not only to the conduct of intelligence work but to liaison with occupied Poland.[35] In Bucharest, in October 1939, Charaszkiewicz received from his British colleague, Lt. Col. Colin Gubbins soon to become the prime mover of the Special Operations Executive (S.O.E.) a very warm letter informing him that Gubbins had been personally searching for him, and offering every possible assistance, including financial (Charaszkiewicz declined the money). Through Gubbins' good offices, Charaszkiewicz obtained from the British military attach a British visa.[36] France and Britain Charaszkiewicz never used the visa. On October 31, 1939, he arrived in France, where at first (November 1939 April 1940) he found himself without assignment at the Bessieres barracks. After a brief stay (April May 1940) in an officers' camp at Vichy, he joined the Officers' Legion at Niort.[35] During the "phony war," the new Polish premier and commander-in-chief in exile, General Wadysaw Sikorski, investigated the causes of Poland's defeat in September 1939. Officers with pertinent knowledge were instructed to submit reports. Probably it was in response to this that Charaszkiewicz drew up the series of intriguing reports in late 1939 and early 1940 that comprise the bulk of his Collection of Documents that was published 60 years later, in 2000.[37] Sikorski, whose own military and political career in Poland had been stymied while the Pisudskiites held sway after the May 1926 coup d'tat, now sidelined many officers deemed to have been close to the Pisudskiites. Perhaps that was why an officer as experienced in clandestine warfare as Charaszkiewicz, then only 44 years old, apparently was never again entrusted with such operations.[38] After France's capitulation (June 22, 1940) Charaszkiewicz managed to evacuate to Great Britain. In Scotland he was accommodated at the Douglas officers' camp (JulyAugust 1940), then the Broughton officers' camp (AugustSeptember 1940).[35] He organized, and served as deputy commander, then commander, of armored trains "C" and later "D" (October 1940August 1943) of the 1st Armored Train Command (1 Dywizjon Pocigw Pancernych). On August 3, 1943, he was transferred to the Polish Infantry Training Center (Centrum Wyszkolenia Piechoty), then to the Administrative Department (Oddzia) of the Polish Ministry of National Defense. Next, to the conclusion of military operations and till February 1946, he was deputy chief, then chief, of the Information Department of the Inspectorate of Polish Military Headquarters. On May 27, 1945, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel. From February to April 1946 he directed the General Department (Wydzia) in the Inspectorate for Civilian Affairs, and in September 1946 he joined the Polish Resettlement Corps. He was demobilized September 11, 1948, and settled in London.[39] Charaszkiewicz took an active part in Polish migr life: in the Pisudskiite "League for Polish Independence" (Liga Niepodlegoci Polski) and in the Jzef Pisudski Institute (of which he was for many years president). He founded and for some years edited the Institute's periodical, Niepodlego (Independence). He was also prominent in the Silesian Insurgents' Association (Zwizek Powstacw lskich). He continued to be a foremost exponent of Prometheism, whose perhaps most important voice he had been over the many years of his involvement with the movement.[40] During his career as an intelligence and covert-operations officer, Charaszkiewicz helped pioneer modern techniques of asymmetric warfare. Just before World War II, during a week's visit to London, he shared information on these with Britain's Colonel Holland, Lt. Colonel Gubbins (future leader of the Special Operations Executive), and technical specialists. In his reports about these meetings, Charaszkiewicz noted how far Poland's techniques outstripped Britain's.[41] He died in London on December 22, 1975.[42]

Decorations Charaszkiewicz received many Polish decorations, including the Cross of Virtuti Militari (Silver Cross, 1922), the Order of Polonia Restituta (3rd [Commander], 4th [Officer] and 5th [Knight] classes), the Cross of Independence with Swords (1931), the Cross of Valor (Krzy Walecznych, 1922, three times), the Silver Cross of Merit, and the Silesian Sash of Valor and Merit (lska Wstga Walecznych i Zasu onych), as well as numerous foreign decorations.[42] See also Prometheism Midzymorze Wawelberg Group Akcja om History of Polish intelligence services List of Poles List of guerrillas Notes 1. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., introduction to Zbir dokumentw ppk. Edmunda Charaszkiewicza (A Collection of Documents by Lt. Col. Edmund Charaszkiewicz), p. 5. 2. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., p. 5. 3. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., pp. 56. 4. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., pp. 67. 5. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., pp. 78. 6. ^ Wesolowski, p. 231. 7. ^ Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Referat o roli dywersji w Trzecim Powstaniu lskim" ("Report on the Role of Covert Operations in the Third Silesian Uprising"), pp. 3155. 8. ^ Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Referat o dziaaniach dywersyjnych w Czechosowacji" ("Report on Covert Operations in Czechoslovakia"), p. 103. 9. ^ Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Referat o roli dywersji w Trzecim Powstaniu lskim" ("Report on the Role of Covert Operations in the Third Silesian Uprising"), pp. 3940. 10. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., p. 9. 11. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., p. 10. 12. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., pp. 1011. 13. ^ a b c Andrzej Grzywacz et al., p. 14. 14. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., p. 11. 15. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., p. 12. 16. ^ a b c Andrzej Grzywacz et al., p. 15. 17. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., pp. 1516. 18. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., p. 16. 19. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., pp. 1617. 20. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., pp. 1718. 21. ^ a b Andrzej Grzywacz et al., p. 18. 22. ^ a b Andrzej Grzywacz et al., p. 19. 23. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., pp. 1920. 24. ^ a b Andrzej Grzywacz et al., p. 20. 25. ^ Pawe Samu et al., Akcja "om", passim. 26. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., pp. 2021. 27. ^ Jzef Kasparek, "Poland's 1938 Covert Operations in Ruthenia" and Przepust karpacki (The Carpathian Back Door); and Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Referat o dziaaniach dywersyjnych na Rusi Karpackiej" ("Report on Covert Operations in Carpathian Rus"). 28. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., p. 21. 29. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., pp. 21-22. 30. ^ a b Andrzej Grzywacz et al., pp. 2223. 31. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., p. 22. 32. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., pp. 2324. 33. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., pp. 2425. 34. ^ Before the war, one of the leaders of a covert-operations network had been Henryk Jzewski. Grzywacz et al. remark (p. 25) on the evidently strong influences, in the early establishment of the Polish World War II underground movement, of individuals connected with the Sanation political camp and with Section II's Office 2. 35. ^ a b c Andrzej Grzywacz et al., p. 25. 36. ^ Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Raport o wsppracy z wywiadem angielskim przed wybuchem wojny" ("Report on Prewar Cooperation with British Intelligence"), p. 134.

^ Edmund Charaszkiewicz, Zbir dokumentw ppk. Edmunda Charaszkiewicz (A Collection of Documents by Lt. Col. Edmund Charaszkiewicz). 38. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., pp. 2526. 39. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., pp. 2526. 40. ^ Andrzej Grzywacz et al., pp. 2627. 41. ^ Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Raport o wsppracy z wywiadem angielskim przed wybuchem wojny" ("Report on Prewar Cooperation with British Intelligence"), pp. 13134. 42. ^ a b Andrzej Grzywacz et al., p. 27. References Edmund Charaszkiewicz, Zbir dokumentw ppk. Edmunda Charaszkiewicza (A Collection of Documents by Lt. Col. Edmund Charaszkiewicz), opracowanie, wstp i przypisy (edited, with introduction and notes by) Andrzej Grzywacz, Marcin Kwiecie, Grzegorz Mazur, Krakw, Ksigarnia Akademicka, 2000, ISBN 837188-449-4. Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Referat o roli dywersji w Trzecim Powstaniu lskim" ("Report on the Role of Covert Operations in the Third Silesian Uprising"), in Zbir dokumentw ppk. Edmunda Charaszkiewicza (A Collection of Documents by Lt. Col. Edmund Charaszkiewicz), pp. 3155. Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Referat o dziaaniach dywersyjnych w Czechosowacji" ("Report on Covert Operations in Czechoslovakia"), in Zbir dokumentw ppk. Edmunda Charaszkiewicza (A Collection of Documents by Lt. Col. Edmund Charaszkiewicz), pp. 88105. Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Referat o dziaaniach dywersyjnych na Rusi Karpackiej" ("Report on Covert Operations in Carpathian Rus"), in Zbir dokumentw ppk. Edmunda Charaszkiewicza (A Collection of Documents by Lt. Col. Edmund Charaszkiewicz), pp. 10630. Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Raport o wsppracy z wywiadem angielskim przed wybuchem wojny" ("Report on Prewar Cooperation with British Intelligence"), in Zbir dokumentw ppk. Edmunda Charaszkiewicza (A Collection of Documents by Lt. Col. Edmund Charaszkiewicz), pp. 13134. Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Przebudowa wschodu Europy" (The Restructuring of Eastern Europe), Niepodlego (Independence), London, 1955, pp. 12567. Adam Szymanowicz, "Dziaalno Ekspozytury nr 2 Oddziau II Sztabu Gwnego Wojska Polskiego wobec ludnoci mazurskiej w latach trzydziestych XX wieku" ("The Activities of Office 2 of Section II of the Polish General Staff in Regard to the Mazurians in the 1930s"), Zapiski historyczne, tom (vol.) LXXI, zeszyt (no.) 4, 2006, pp. 5572. Wiktor Tomir Drymmer, W su bie Polsce (In Service to Poland), Warsaw, 1998. Sergiusz Mikulicz, Prometeizm w polityce II Rzeczypospolitej (Prometheism in the Policies of the Second [Polish] Republic), Warsaw, Ksi ka i Wiedza, 1971. Jzef Kasparek, "Poland's 1938 Covert Operations in Ruthenia," East European Quarterly, vol. XXIII, no. 3 (September 1989), pp. 36573. Jzef Kasparek, Przepust karpacki: tajna akcja polskiego wywiadu (The Carpathian Bridge: a Secret Polish Intelligence Operation), Warsaw, Sigma NOT, 1992, ISBN 83-85001-96-4. Kazimierz Badziak, Giennadij Matwiejew, Pawe Samu, "Powstanie" na Zaolziu w 1938 r.: Polska akcja specjalna w wietle dokumentw Oddziau II Sztabu Gwnego WP (The "Uprising" in Zaolzie in 1938: a Polish Special Operation in Light of Documents of Section II of the Polish General Staff), Warsaw, Adiutor, 1997, ISBN 83-86100-21-4. Pawe Samu, Kazimierz Badziak, Giennadij Matwiejew, Akcja "om": polskie dziaania dywersyjne na Rusi Zakarpackiej w wietle dokumentw Oddziau II Sztabu Gwnego WP (Operation Crowbar: Polish Covert Operations in Transcarpathian Rus in Light of Documents of Section II of the Polish General Staff), Warsaw, Adiutor, 1998.

37.

Prometheism
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Prometheism or Prometheanism (Polish: "Prometeizm") was a political project initiated by Poland's


Jzef Pisudski. Its aim was to weaken the Russian Empire and its successor states, including the Soviet Union, by supporting nationalist independence movements among the major non-Russian peoples that lived within the borders of Russia and the Soviet Union.[1] Between the World Wars, Prometheism and Pisudski's other concept of an "Intermarum federation" constituted two complementary geopolitical strategies for him and some of his political heirs.[2] Sources of Prometheism Pisudski's elaboration of Prometheism had been aided by an intimate knowledge of the Russian Empire gained while exiled by its government to eastern Siberia. The term "Prometheism" was suggested by the Greek myth of Prometheus, whose gift of fire to mankind, in defiance of Zeus, came to symbolize enlightenment and resistance to despotic authority.[3] A brief history of Poland's Promethean endeavor was set down on February 12, 1940, by Edmund Charaszkiewicz, a Polish military intelligence officer whose responsibilities from 1927 until the outbreak of World War

II in Europe in September 1939 had included the coordination of Poland's Promethean program. Charaszkiewicz wrote his paper in Paris after escaping from a Poland overrun by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.[4] "The creator and soul of the Promethean concept [wrote Charaszkiewicz] was Marshal Pisudski, who as early as 1904, in a memorandum to the Japanese government, pointed out the need to employ, in the struggle against Russia, the numerous non-Russian nations that inhabited the basins of the Baltic, Black and Caspian Seas, and emphasized that the Polish nation, by virtue of its history, love of freedom, and uncompromising stance toward [the three empires that had partitioned Poland out of political existence at the end of the 18th century] would, in that struggle, doubtless take a leading place and help work the emancipation of other nations oppressed by Russia."[5] A key excerpt from Pisudski's 1904 memorandum declared: "Poland's strength and importance among the constituent parts of the Russian state embolden us to set ourselves the political goal of breaking up the Russian state into its main constituents and emancipating the countries that have been forcibly incorporated into that empire. We regard this not only as the fulfilment of our country's cultural strivings for independent existence, but also as a guarantee of that existence, since a Russia divested of her conquests will be sufficiently weakened that she will cease to be a formidable and dangerous neighbor."[6] The Promethean movement, according to Charaszkiewicz, took its genesis from a national renaissance that began in the late 19th century among many peoples of the Russian Empire. That renaissance stemmed from a social process that led in Russia to revolution. Nearly all the socialist parties created in the ethnically non-Russian communities assumed a national character and placed independence at the tops of their agendas: this was so in Poland, Ukraine, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia and Azerbaijan. These socialist parties would take the lead in their respective peoples' independence movements. While all these countries harbored organizations of a purely national character that likewise championed independence, the socialist parties, precisely because they associated the fulfilment of their strivings for independence with the social movement in Russia, showed the greater dynamism. Ultimately the peoples of the Baltic Sea basinPoland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania won and, until World War II, all kept their independence. The peoples of the Black and Caspian Sea basins Ukraine, Don Cossacks, Kuban, Crimea, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Northern Caucasus emancipated themselves politically in 19191921 but then lost their independence to Soviet Russia.[7] In 191721, according to Charaszkiewicz, as the nations of the Baltic, Black and Caspian Sea basins were freeing themselves from Russia's tutelage, Poland was the only country that worked actively together with those peoples. In these efforts, Poland met with opposition from the western coalition; the latter backed the (anticommunist) "White" Russians in their endeavor to rebuild the erstwhile Russian Empire. At the same time, according to Charaszkiewicz, Germany, with her occupation forces, strengthened her influences in Lithuania and Latvia, manipulated Ukraine's Lt. Gen. Pavlo Skoropadsky toward Ukrainian federation with a possible future non-Bolshevik Russia, and attempted a German hegemony in the Caucasus against the political interests of Germany's ally, Turkey. Germany's true intentions were at last made manifest in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, concluded with the Bolsheviks in 1918.[8] During Skoropadsky's period in power in Ukraine, Germany was at war with both Bolshevik and Imperial Russia. Germany did, however, have an alliance with the Cossack territories of Don and Kuban; these declared their independence from Russia, and Skoropadsky channeled German armaments aid to them. The western Allies, however, chiefly France and Britain, did not want to see Russia lose territory and, following Germany's collapse in 1918, forced Skoropadsky to propose Ukrainian federation with Russia thereby causing his fall from power and eventual Bolshevik victory in Ukraine, much as also happened in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Immediately after the loss of independence by the peoples of the Black and Caspian Sea basins and the annexation of those lands in 1921 by Soviet Russia, Poland was the only country in Europe that gave material and moral support to the political aspirations of their Promethean (pro-independence) migrs. Only after Hitler's accession to power (January 30, 1933), states Charaszkiewicz, would Germany begin showing a strong interest in the Promethean question. Likewise Japan and Italy evinced some interest,[8] and France and Great Britain lent moral support.[9] Nevertheless, German propaganda and competition with Poland here notwithstanding, Germany's approach departed from the basic ideological tenets of Prometheism; the German approach essentially constituted, in Charaszkiewicz's words, "an elastic, opportunistic platform for diversion, amenable to exploitation for current German political purposes in any direction." He emphasizes that in this field there were never any organizational or ideological ties between Poland and Germany. The legitimate national representatives of the Promethean migrs allied with Poland showed a marked political loyalty to Poland.[10] Principles Throughout the years 191839, according to Charaszkiewicz, the Polish Promethean leadership consistently observed several principles. The purpose of the Promethean enterprise was to liberate from imperialist Russia, of whatever political stripe, the peoples of the Baltic, Black and Caspian Sea basins and to create a series of independent states as a common defensive front against Russian aggression. Each Promethean party respected the political sovereigny of the others. Any disputes between Promethean parties were placed in abeyance pending the liberation of the several parties from Russia. By mutual consent of the Polish and Ukrainian Prometheans (if occasionally less than whole-heartedly on the Petlurists' part), largely Ukrainian-populated areas of southeastern Poland were treated as an internal Polish sphere of interests and were off-bounds to Ukrainian Promethean organizing.[11] The Polish Promethean leadership, writes Charaszkiewicz, regarded the other Promethean nationalities as equal partners in the common struggle against Russian imperialism. Contrary to what has sometimes been thought, according to Charaszkiewicz the Polish General Staff did not treat the various Promethean migr communities merely as political instruments to be exploited for ad hoc purposes of diversion.[12]

Prometheism had no organizational or political backing in any Polish political party of the left, right or center. Within the Pisudskiite camp [obz Pisudczykw] itself, Prometheism found many opponents. Paradoxically, among young people in Poland's National Democratic Partyarch-rivals of the Pisudskiites [Pisudczycy]and some other opposition youth organizations, the Promethean question was spontaneously taken up and gained advocates.[12] The history of Poland's interwar collaboration with the "Promethean peoples" falls into five periods.[12] First period (191821) In the first period (191821), Poland established her new eastern boundaries in wars with Soviet Russia and Ukraine; her borders with Germany, in the Pozna and Silesian uprisings, and in plebiscite operations in Warmia and Mazury; and her southern borders in plebiscite operations and a brief war with Czechoslovakia over disputed areas of Cieszyn Silesia, Spisz and Orawa.[12] In the Baltic basin, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia emerged as independent states. Poland was among the first countries to extend them recognition,[12] although Polish-Lithuanian relations were strained following the Polish-Lithuanian War. In the Black and Caspian Sea basins, this period saw the emancipation of Ukraine, Crimea, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Don, Kuban and Northern Caucasus. Signs of national renaissance also appeared in Idel-Ural and Turkestan; there, however, it was limited to the calling of "National Assemblies."[13] Poland's role in the Promethean process was marked by the conclusion of a PolishUkrainian political and military alliance (the Warsaw Agreement, April 1920) with Symon Petlura's Ukrainian People's Republic, Pisudski's expedition to Kiev (begun April 25, 1920), the designation (February 1919) of Bohdan Kutylowski as Polish minister to the Ukrainian People's Republic, the accreditation of a Polish minister to Caucasus, the naming of a military mission to Caucasus, and the Crimean Republic's motion at the League of Nations (May 17, 1920) that Crimea be made a protectorate of Poland.[14] Marshal Pisudski's immediate collaborators in this period included Witold Jodko, Tytus Filipowicz, Gen. Julian Stachiewicz, Col. Walery Sawek, Col. Tadeusz Schaetzel, a Maj. Czarnecki, August Zaleski, Leon Wasilewski, Henryk Jzewski, Juliusz ukasiewicz, Tadeusz Howko, Marian Szumlakowski, Jan Dbski, Mirosaw Arciszewski, Maj. Wacaw Jdrzejewicz and Roman Knoll.[15] Second period (192123) During Poland's second Promethean period (192123), after the Treaty of Riga that ended the Polish-Soviet War, Poland went forward with her independent life within established eastern borders alongside the Baltic states. The states of the Black and Caspian Sea basins, however, lost their independence, being absorbed by the Soviets. What Charaszkiewicz terms the "legitimate" governments and political representatives of these Promethean countries emigrated: 1. the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic, to Poland, France and Czechoslovakia; 2. the government of Georgia, to France; 3. the government of Azerbaijan, to Turkey and France; 4. the governments of Kuban and Don, to Czechoslovakia; 5. the Northern Caucasus' Mountain National Center, to Turkey; 6. the Armenian National Center, to France; 7. the Tatar National Centers (Crimea, Idel-Ural, Turkestan), to Turkey, France and Poland.[16] During this period, Marshal Pisudski still remained in power, first as Chief of State (Naczelnik Pastwa), later transitionally as chief of the General Staff (Sztab Gwny). Promethean affairs now also involved the successive chiefs of the General Staff, Gen. Wadysaw Sikorski and Gen. Stanisaw Haller, and the chief of the General Staff's Section II (Oddzia II: intelligence), Col. Ignacy Matuszewski.[16] Poland worked together with Promethean political migrs who were in official contact with Poland's Foreign Ministry, with Polish diplomatic offices in Istanbul, Bucharest, Prague, Tehran and Paris, and with the Polish General Staff. As early as 1922, the first group of Georgian officers, recommended by the Georgian government, were accepted into the Polish Army.[16] Third period (192326) In the third period (192326), after Pisudski had removed himself from power, successive Polish governments eliminated the Promethean question from their agendas. The Soviets realized Joseph Stalin's nationalities program in the Soviet Union's non-Russian areas by inaugurating the Autonomous National Republics, while suppressing the last impulses toward independence on the part of those Republics' populations.[17] Polish contacts with the Promethean migrs were continued, without the knowledge or consent of the Polish government: in military matters, by Col. Schaetzel, Maj. Czarnecki and Captain Henryk Suchanek-Suchecki, chief of the Nationalities Department (Wydzia) in the Ministry of Internal Affairs; and at the Foreign Ministry, by the chief of the Eastern Department, Juliusz ukasiewicz. An exception to the Polish government's official attitude pertained to Georgian Prometheism, which enjoyed support with both the foreign minister, Aleksander Skrzyski, and the chief of the General Staff, Gen. Stanisaw Haller.[17] Fourth period (192632) The fourth period (192632), from Pisudski's return to power in the May 1926 Coup to the conclusion of the 1932 Polish-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, was the period of the most determined, organized and active collaboration with Promethean organizations.[17] In 1927 the Promethean problem was given official organizational form at the Polish Foreign Ministry and General Staff. In the previous periods, Prometheism had been treated at various high echelons but had possessed no single official home. Now a close coordination was established between Poland's Foreign Ministry and General Staff, as politically representing the Promethean question, and with the ministries of Military Affairs and

Internal Affairs, as indirectly involved with it (the Military Ministry, with foreign contract officers; the Internal Ministry, with internal Polish-Ukrainian affairs).[17] Important events in this period included: General Promethean affairs 1. the creation of an Eastern Institute in Warsaw, with a program in Near and Far Eastern studies, the Institute being treated as a political instrument for general Promethean matters; 2. the establishment, at the Eastern Institute, of an Orientalist Youth Circle, a youth organization dedicated to general Promethean affairs, with offices in Krakw, Vilnius and Harbin; 3. the founding of a quarterly, Wschd (The East), devoted to Promethean affairs; 4. the establishment of academic scholarships for Promethean students at Warsaw, Vilnius, Pozna, Krakw, Paris, Berlin and Cairo; 5. the founding of four Promethean clubs, in Warsaw, Paris, Helsinki and Harbin; 6. the founding, in Paris and Helsinki, of the propaganda monthlies, Promethee and Prometheus; 7. the establishment of collaborative links with France-Orient in Paris.[18] Ukrainian affairs 1. the organization of a military staff for the Ukrainian People's Republic, including an organizational-operational section (subordinate to Poland's Gen. Julian Stachiewicz), an intelligence section (subordinate to Poland's Section II), and a propaganda section (subordinate to the Polish General Staff's Office Z); 2. the recruitment of Petlurist Ukrainian officers as contract officers for the Polish Army; 3. the creation of three separate press agencies: in Warsaw ("A.T.E."), Paris ("Ofinor") and Bucharest ("Ukraintag"); 4. the founding of a Polish-Ukrainian Bulletin; 5. the creation in Warsaw of a Ukrainian Institute of Learning; 6. the founding of a General Ukrainian Council coordinating Petlurist migr centers in European countries.[18] This period saw two fundamental political events in Ukrainian Promethean affairs: the May 26, 1926, assassination, in Paris according to Charaszkiewicz, at Soviet instigation of Otaman Symon Petlura; and the 1930 trial, in Kiev, of Serhiy Yefremov, which demonstrated the existence of a secret national organization in Ukraine that was in contact with the Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic.[18] Caucasus affairs See also: Georgian emigration in Poland the organization, in Turkey and Iran, of offices for contacts with Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Caucasus Mountains (the Georgian organization carried out about 20 expeditions to their country, and the Caucasian Mountain organization kept up regular contacts with their country on at least a monthly basis); 2. the creation of a Caucasus National Committee and the elaboration of a constitution for a Caucasus Confederation; 3. the recruitment into the Polish Army, as contract officers, of a further group of Georgian officers, as well as of Azerbaijanis and Caucasus Mountaineers, upon recommendation by their legitimate national representatives.[19] This period saw the following notable political events in Caucasus affairs: the December 7, 1930, assassination in Paris, by the Soviets, of the Georgian minister Noe Ramishvili; and pronouncements by Shalva Eliava, the "Soviet governor of Caucasus," at the 1930 Georgian communist congress in Tiflis, that the national movement in the Caucasus was under the influence of the Caucasus National Committee.[20] The growing revolutionary ferment in the Caucasus, especially in Azerbaijan, collaboratively engaged all the Caucasus national elements.[20] Idel-Ural and Turkestan affairs 1. the development of pro-independence propaganda in Idel-Ural, Crimea and Turkestan, and intense Soviet polemics against the Promethean press; 2. the establishment of ties with these countries; 3. direct participation in the World Moslem Congress in Jerusalem (1931), whose political aspect, due to the participation of Promethean representatives (Said Shamil, a Caucasus Mountaineer and grandson of Imam Shamil, and ayaz sxaq, a Kazan Tatar intellectual), turned against the Soviet Union. In this period, the world Moslem press, especially of Egypt and Arabia, conducted an intense anti-Soviet campaign. Said Shamil Bey was chosen as secretary of the Congress' executive center.[20] Charaszkiewicz notes the occurrence, in Crimean political actions, of "Wallenrodism," revealed at the trial of Veli Ibrahim, who was sentenced to death by the Soviets. Likewise the trial of Soltanliev (a direct collaborator of Joseph Stalin's during Stalin's tenure as commissar for nationalities affairs) disclosed methods used by the Volga Tatars and the peoples of Turkestan in fighting the Soviet government.[21] Cossack affairs A successful campaign was waged that helped stimulate a separatist movement among many Cossack migr groups. This injected a substantial political diversion into White Russian migr ranks.[22] This Prometheist period also 1.

witnessed a development that was independent of the movement, but which was destined to play a role in regard to it. There was heightened diversionary activity in Poland by the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), supported by both Germany and Czechoslovakia and even by Lithuania. There were many acts of expropriation and sabotage against the Polish community and government by members of OUN combat units in southeastern Poland. This in turn led to "pacification" operations by the Polish authorities against the Polish-Ukrainian community.[22] The pacifications, Charaszkiewicz emphasizes, were never discussed in advance with Polish Promethean officials. Those at the Foreign Ministry and at the General Staff were not pleased with these operations, which made Promethean activities that much more difficult.[22] A greater shock to the Prometheists, Polish and Ukrainian, however, was the death of Tadeusz Howko, murdered by OUN members on August 29, 1931, at Truskawiec.[22] Charaszkiewicz is far from blaming all of Poland's difficulties with her minorities, especially the Ukrainians (who in most of southeastern Poland were the majority), on external, especially German, influences. He argues that Poland had "no planned, consistent and constructive internal policy" with regard to her minorities. This lack could not bode well for the Promethean effort, when every fifth Polish citizen (that is, six million people) were Ukrainian.[23] Moreover, the Soviet Union sought to an equal degree to exploit Poland's internal disarray indeed, in 192131, to a greater degree than the Germans. Soviet communist propaganda in Poland's Eastern Borderlands (Kresy Wschodnie), combined with a pro-Ukrainian Soviet attitude toward Soviet Ukraine, created strong pro-Soviet sentiment among Polish Ukrainians. This sentiment would persist until the subsequent mass Soviet resettlements, arrests, executions and famines of 193338.[24] The period 1926 32 was marked by the participation of a large number of Poles in the Promethean endeavor: 1. at the Foreign Ministry: Tadeusz Howko, Tadeusz Schaetzel, Stanisaw Hempel, Adam Tarnowski, Mirosaw Arciszewski, Roman Knoll, Juliusz ukasiewicz, Marian Szumlakowski, Stanisaw Za wilichowski, Jan Gawroski, Zygmunt Mostowski, Wadysaw Zaleski, Kazimierz Marian Wyszyski, Karol DubiczPenther, Wadysaw Pelc, Ksawery Zalewski, Wadysaw Wolski, Piotr Kurnicki, Wacaw Knoll; at the General Staff: Brig. Gen. Julian Stachiewicz, Col. Tadeusz Schaetzel, Col. Tadeusz Peczyski, Col. Jzef Englicht, Maj. Edmund Charaszkiewicz, Maj. Wodzimierz Dbrowski, Maj. Stanisaw Gliski, Maj. Jerzy Krzymowski, Maj. Karol Krzewski-Lilienfeld, Capt. Stefan Nowaczek, Capt. Jan Rybczyski, Lt. Jan Helcman, Jzef Skar yski, Aleksander Eugeniusz Piwnicki, Stefan Sipa, Lt. Antoni Zarba; 2. at the Ministry of Internal Affairs: Henryk Suchanek-Suchecki, Stanisaw aniecki, Emil Mikiewicz; 3. at the Ministry of Education: Aleksander Kawakowski, Franciszek Salezy Potocki, Zdzisaw Meyer, Juliusz Znaniecki, Adam Miobdzki; 4. in the socio-political sphere: Senator Stanisaw Siedlecki (president of the Eastern Institute), Wacaw Sieroszewski, Stanisaw Trzeciak, Antoni Wincenty Kwiatkowski, Antoni Okoo-Kuak, Prof. Olgierd Grka (general secretary and director of the Eastern Institute), Stanisaw Korwin-Pawowski (general secretary of the Eastern Institute), Bolesaw Bielawski, Stanisaw Jzef Paprocki (director of the Institute for Study of National Minority Affairs), Leon Wasilewski, Wodzimierz Bczkowski, Feliks Ibiaski-Zahora, Wacaw Wincenty ypacewicz, Wadysaw Wielhorski (director of the Institute for Study of Eastern Europe, in Vilnius), Marian wiechowski, Prof. Jan Kucharzewski, Prof. Marceli Handelsman, Prof. Stanisaw Poniatowski, Prof. Ludwik Kolankowski, Prof. Oskar Halecki, Prof. Stanisaw Franciszek Zajczkowski, Prof. Jzef Ujejski, Prof. Stanisaw Szober, Andrzej Strug, Marian Malinowski, Alfred Szczsny Wielopolski, Wojciech Stpiczyski, Jzef obodowski, Prof. Marian Zdziechowski, Wadysaw Woydyno.[25] Additionally, thanks to Tadeusz Howko's exceptional leadership in Promethean matters, a number of Polish government ministers participated indirectly or directly: Walery Sawek, Aleksander Prystor, August Zaleski, Janusz Jdrzejewicz, Wacaw Jdrzejewicz, Bronisaw Pieracki, Adam Koc, Stefan Starzyski, Marian ZyndramKociakowski.[26] A separate category of Promethean ideological endeavor comprised the work of Adam Skwarczyski.[27] In this period (192632), favorable political circumstances within and without Poland, adequate financing and, above all, full mutual confidence among all the participants, led to an exceptional level of Promethean activity in the conduct of propaganda within the Promethean countries, in the political efforts of the Promethean migrs, and in propaganda outside Poland.[27] Regular conferences were held, usually involving Tadeusz Howko, Brig. Gen. Julian Stachiewicz, Col. Tadeusz Schaetzel, Henryk Suchanek-Suchecki, Maj. Edmund Charaszkiewicz, and an official from the Foreign Ministry. Charaszkiewicz would present an extensive report on work accomplished, and this would be followed by discussion of various Promethean topics.[27] The Promethean project was entrusted to Office 2 only in late 1927 or perhaps in 1928. Before that, it had never been a domain of the Polish General Staff's diversion unit (Office A.1, later Office U); thus Charaszkiewicz's predecessor, Col. Puszczyski, had not been encumbered with this responsibility. Puszczyski, Charaszkiewicz explains, had not initially attached importance to Prometheism, due to an overoptimistic assessment of the new Soviet Union; but in time he came to support the Promethean concept.[28] Fifth period (193339) The last, fifth period of prewar Polish Prometheism (193339) was, in Charaszkiewicz's words, one of "seven lean years." A number of developments contributed to this: 1. The Polish-Soviet non-aggression pact (1932) stopped Polish policy-makers from continuing Promethean work in the field. It was felt that in the Soviet Union a process of national renewal was to some extent taking place spontaneously in the Promethean countries, thanks to the existence of autonomous republics, to Soviet support of general education in the national languages, and to natural reactions of protest among local peoples to 1.

economic, religious and cultural phenomena; and so activity on the ground could be dispensed with for the moment. The solidarity and strength of the political migr communities should, however, continue to be maintained. The conclusion of the Polish-Soviet pact led to the Polish Foreign Ministry and all Polish governmental authorities distancing themselves from external Promethean undertakings. This substantially reduced the effectiveness of those endeavors and created a view in international Promethean circles that Poland was slowly moving away from Prometheism. Henceforth the whole Promethean question, including the administration of funds, became concentrated within Office 2 at the General Staff's Section II (intelligence). 2. The deaths of Ramishvili and Zawilichowski (1930) and of Howko (1931), the most active promoters of Prometheism, were an irreparable loss to the movement. 3. The worldwide economic crisis, and resultant austere government budgets, suddenly reduced available funds by nearly 50%, bringing all Polish efforts down to merest maintenance levels. 4. The death (May 12, 1935) of Marshal Pisudski, founder of Prometheism, was yet another powerful blow. In Charaszkiewicz's view, it left Prometheism "a political idea of rare visionary power... that required prophetic [powers of] political prediction" lacking a patron of comparable authority. Pisudski's death was experienced as a personal loss by the Promethean peoples. Henceforth the movement's efforts continued more by virtue of inertia than by encouragement from new Polish decision-makers. 5. Adolf Hitler's rise to power in Germany, the creation of an anticommunist bloc in the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo axis, and its eagerness to collaborate with national Promethean movements, created a difficult, complicated situation for the Promethean organizations that remained in Poland's political orbit. While the Promethean political forces aligned with Poland were of higher quality and potential, the Germans' relentless propaganda created a dangerous rival to Polish Promethean efforts. The latter in this period, according to Charaszkiewicz, "were utterly devoid of activity, character and plan." 6. The rise of danger on Poland's west fostered a view in many Polish minds that the country's eastern border should be quieted.[29] Until Pisudski's death in 1935, little changed in respect to personnel on the Polish Promethean side, apart from the official distancing of government leaders, especially in the Foreign Ministry, due to the concluded Polish-Soviet pact. With the shift in government leadership beginning in June 1935, there ensued a clear decline in Polish Promethean leadership. The "group of colonels" lost their influence; Col. Tadeusz Peczyski took a much less active role; and his successor, Col. Marian Jzef Smoleski (generally known as "Jzef Smoleski"), and Charaszkiewicz's immediate superior, Col. Jan Kazimierz Ciasto, did not embrace Prometheism. Tadeusz Kobylaski, Col. Schaetzel's successor as chief of the Foreign Ministry's Eastern Department, though inclined to support Prometheism, lacked a deep enough political foundation and faced substantial financial impediments. The attitudes of Marshal Edward Rydz-migy and the chief of the General Staff, Brigadier General Wacaw Teofil Stachiewicz, remained to the last uncertain.[30] World War II and since The Promethean agenda continued, during World War II, to interest other countries, including Germany (especially in regard to Ukraine), Finland (struggling with the Soviet Union), France and the Soviet Union's neighbor, Turkey.[31] Edmund Charaszkiewicz concluded his February 12, 1940, Paris paper with the observation that "Poland's turning away from these [Promethean] processes can in no way halt [them], while leaving us sidelined and exposing us to enormous losses that flow from the age-old principle that 'those who are absent, lose.' [Poland]'s central position in the Promethean chain dictates to us readiness and presence at any disintegrative processes in Russia, and a leading Polish participation at their accomplishment."[32] After World War II, Poland was in no position to resume an acknowledged Promethean program. The 1991 disintegration of the Soviet Union, however, largely vindicated the predictions of those Poles and others who had anticipated the event and, in some cases, had worked for it. On November 22, 2007, at Tbilisi, Georgia, a statue of Prometheus was dedicated by Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and Polish President Lech Kaczyski. Erected in the land where, according to Greek myth, the Titan had been imprisoned and tortured by Zeus after stealing fire from Olympus and giving it to man, the statue celebrates the efforts of Poles and Georgians to achieve the independence of Georgia and of other peoples from the Russian Empire and its successor state, the Soviet Union. See also Demographics of the Soviet Union Edmund Charaszkiewicz Giedroyc Doctrine Historical demographics of Poland History of Polish intelligence services Lenin's national policy Midzymorze PolishGeorgian alliance Predictions of Soviet collapse Treaty of Warsaw (1920) (also known as the Polish-Ukrainian alliance) Volhynia Experiment

Notes 1.

^ Richard Woytak, "The Promethean Movement in Interwar Poland," East European Quarterly, vol. XVIII, no. 3 (September 1984), pp. 27378. 2. ^ "Pilsudski hoped to build not merely a Polish nation state but a greater federation of peoples under the aegis of Poland which would replace Russia as the great power of Eastern Europe. Lithuania, Belorussia and Ukraine were all to be included. His plan called for a truncated and vastly reduced Russia, a plan which excluded negotiations prior to military victory." Richard K Debo, Survival and Consolidation: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 19181992, Google Print, p. 59, McGill-Queen's Press, 1992, ISBN 0-7735-0828-7. 3. ^ In ethics, "Prometheism" is an individual's voluntary subordination of self to the good of a larger social group or even all mankind. This altruistic concept relates to the myth of Prometheus, and denotes rebellion against divine decrees and natural forces, and self-sacrifice for the sake of the general good. In literature, the Promethean stance is exemplified by Kordian in Juliusz Sowacki's Romantic drama Kordian (1834); by Konrad in Part III of Adam Mickiewicz's Forefathers' Eve (Dziady); by Dr. Judym in Stefan eromski's Homeless People (Ludzie Bezdomni, 1899); by the Biblical Adam in Jan Kasprowicz's Dies irae (Latin for Day of Wrath); and by Dr. Rieux in Albert Camus's The Plague (1947). 4. ^ Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 1416, 56, 76, 81. 5. ^ Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 56. 6. ^ Quoted in Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 56. 7. ^ Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 5657. 8. ^ a b Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 57. 9. ^ Snyder, 2005. 10. ^ Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 5758. 11. ^ Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 5859. 12. ^ a b c d e Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 59. 13. ^ Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 5960. 14. ^ Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 60. 15. ^ Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 6061. 16. ^ a b c Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 62. 17. ^ a b c d Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 63. 18. ^ a b c Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 64. 19. ^ Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 6465. 20. ^ a b c Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 65. 21. ^ Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 6566. 22. ^ a b c d Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 66. 23. ^ Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 6667. 24. ^ Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 67. 25. ^ Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 67-74. 26. ^ Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 75. 27. ^ a b c Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 76. 28. ^ Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 7677. 29. ^ Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 7778. 30. ^ Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 7879. 31. ^ Charaszkiewicz, 2000, pp. 7980. 32. ^ Charaszkiewicz, 2000, p. 80. References Edmund Charaszkiewicz, Zbir dokumentw ppk. Edmunda Charaszkiewicza, opracowanie, wstp i przypisy (A Collection of Documents by Lt. Col. Edmund Charaszkiewicz, edited, with introduction and notes by) Andrzej Grzywacz, Marcin Kwiecie, Grzegorz Mazur (Biblioteka Centrum Dokumentacji Czynu Niepodlegociowego, tom [vol.] 9), Krakw, Ksigarnia Akademicka, 2000, ISBN 978-83-7188-449-8. Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "Przebudowa wschodu Europy" ("The Restructuring of Eastern Europe"), Niepodlego (Independence), London, 1955, pp. 12567. Etienne Copeaux, Le mouvement promthen. Cahiers d'tudes sur la Mditerrane orientale et le monde turco-iranien, n 16, juilletdcembre 1993, pp. 945. M.K. Dziewanowski, Joseph Pilsudski: a European Federalist, 19181922, Stanford, Hoover Institution, 1979. Jonathan Levy, The Intermarium: Madison, Wilson and East Central European Federalism, 2007, ISBN 9781-58112-369-2. Sergiusz Mikulicz, Prometeizm w polityce II Rzeczypospolitej (Prometheism in the Policies of the Second [Polish] Republic), Warsaw, Ksi ka i Wiedza, 1971.

Wodzimierz Bczkowski, O wschodnich problemach Polski. Wybr pism (Poland's Eastern Problems: Selected Writings). Opracowa (Edited by) Pawe Kowal, Krakw, Orodek Myli Politycznej, 2000, ISBN 978-83-7188-405-4. Wodzimierz Bczkowski, Czy prometeizm jest fikcj i fantazj (Is Prometheism a Fiction and Fantasy?) <http://www.omp.org.pl/index.php?module=subjects&func=printpage&pageid=7&scope=all> Zaur Gasimov, "Zwischen Freiheitstopoi und Antikommunismus: Ordnungsentwrfe fr Europa im Spiegel der polnischen Zeitung Przymierze", Jahrbuch fr Europische Geschichte, no. 12, 2011, pp. 20722. Zaur Gasimov, "Der Antikommunismus in Polen im Spiegel der Vierteljahresschrift Wschd 19301939", Jahrbuch fr Historische Kommunismusforschung, 2011, pp. 1530. I.P. Maj, Dziaalno Instytutu Wschodniego w Warszawie 19261939 (The Work of Warsaw's Eastern Institute, 19261939), Warsaw, 2007. Timothy Snyder, Covert Polish Missions across the Soviet Ukrainian Border, 19281933 (p.55, p.56, p.57, p.58, p.59, in Confini, Silvia Salvatici (a cura di), Rubbettino, 2005). Full text in PDF Timothy Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist's Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine, Yale University Press, 2005, ISBN 0-300-10670-X (p.41, p.42, p.43) Describes the careers of Henryk Jzewski. Richard Woytak, "The Promethean Movement in Interwar Poland," East European Quarterly, vol. XVIII, no. 3 (September 1984), pp. 27378. Woytak cites extensively from Edmund Charaszkiewicz, "a key figure and an expert on the Promethean movement in Polish intelligence circles."

Map showing the geographic distribution of ethnic groups within the USSR as of 1974. The aim of Prometheism was to counter the Russian threat to Poland by exploiting the nationalist divisions among ethnic groups within the Russian system.

Jzef Pisudskifather of the Promethean strategy Prometheus, by Gustave Moreau, tortured on Mount Caucasus

Pavlo Skoropadsky Symon Petlura Walery SawekTytus Filipowicz Henryk Jzewski Juliusz ukasiewicz Stanisaw Haller Wadysaw Sikorski

Noe Ramishvili Tadeusz Schaetzel Tadeusz Peczyski Wacaw Jdrzejewicz Aleksander Prystor Stefan Starzyski Wacaw Stachiewicz

Intermarium
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Midzymorze (Polish pronunciation: [mj ndz m ], known in English as Intermarium, was a plan, pursued after World War I by Polish leader Jzef Pisudski, for a federation, under Poland's aegis,[1][2][3][4][5] of Central and Eastern European countries. Invited to join the proposed federation were the Baltic states (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia),[6] Finland, Belarus, Ukraine, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.[7][8] The Polish name Midzymorze, which means "Intersea" or "Between-seas," was rendered into Latin as "Intermarium." [9] The proposed federation was meant to emulate the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, that, from the end of the 16th century to the end of the 18th, had united the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Intermarium complemented Pisudski's other geopolitical visionPrometheism, whose goal was the dismemberment of the Russian Empire and that Empire's divestment of its territorial conquests.[10][11][12][13] Intermarium was, however, perceived by some Lithuanians as a threat to their newly established independence, and by some Ukrainians as a threat to their aspirations for independence,[14][15][16] and was opposed by Russia and by most Western powers, except France.[17][18] Within two decades of the failure of Pisudski's grand scheme, all the countries that he had viewed as candidates for membership in the Intermarium federation had fallen to the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany, except for Finland (which nonetheless suffered some territorial losses in the Winter War).

One of the Intermarium Federation proposals. Light-green indicates Ukrainian and Belarusian territories that, after 1921, came under the control of the Soviet Union. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth at its greatest extent Precedents Commonwealth Main article: PolishLithuanianRuthenian Commonwealth Polish-Lithuanian union and military alliance had come about as a mutual response to a common threat posed by the Teutonic Order. The alliance was first established in 1385 by the wedding of Poland's Queen Jadwiga and Lithuania's Gediminid dynasty in the person of Grand Duke Jogaila, who became King Wadysaw II Jagieo of Poland. A longer-lasting federation was subsequently established via the creation of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, an arrangement that lasted until the late-18th-century Partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Under the Commonwealth, proposals were advanced for the establishment of an expanded, Polish-Lithuanian-Muscovite or Polish-Lithuanian-Ruthenian, Commonwealth. These proposals were never implemented. Czartoryski's plan Between the November and January Uprisings, in 183261, the idea of resurrecting an updated Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was advocated by Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, residing in exile at the Htel Lambert in Paris.[19] In his youth Czartoryski had fought against Russia in the Polish-Russian War of 1792 and would have done so again in the Kociuszko Uprising of 1794, had he not been arrested at Brussels on his way back to Poland. Subsequently in 1795 he and his younger brother had been commanded to enter the Russian army, and Catherine the Great had been so favorably impressed with them that she had restored to them part of their confiscated estates. Adam Czartoryski had subsequently served Tsars Paul and Alexander I as a diplomat and foreign minister, during the Napoleonic Wars establishing an antiFrench coalition. Czartoryski had been one of the leaders of the Polish November 1830 Uprising and, after its suppression by Russia, had been sentenced to death but eventually allowed to go into exile in France. In Paris the "visionary"[20] statesman and former friend, confidant and de facto foreign minister of Russia's Tsar Alexander I acted as the "uncrowned king and unacknowledged foreign minister" of a nonexistent Poland.[21] In his book, Essai sur la diplomatie (Essay on Diplomacy), completed in 1827 but published only in 1830, Czartoryski observed that, "Having extended her sway south and west, and being by the nature of things unreachable from the east and north, Russia becomes a source of constant threat to Europe." He argued that she would have done better, cultivating "friends rather than slaves." He also identified a future threat from Prussia and urged the incorporation of East Prussia into a resurrected Poland.[22] His diplomatic efforts anticipated Pisudski's Prometheist project in linking efforts for Polish independence with similar movements of other subjugated nations in Europe and in the east, as far as the Caucasus.[23] Czartoryski aspired above all to reconstitute with French, British and Turkish support a Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth federated with the Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Romanians and all the South Slavs of the future Yugoslavia. Poland, in his concept, could have mediated the conflicts between Hungary and the Slavs, and between Hungary and Romania.[24] The plan seemed achievable[25] during the period of national revolutions in 184849 but foundered on lack of western support, on Hungarian intransigence toward the Czechs, Slovaks and Romanians, and on the rise of German nationalism.[26] "Nevertheless," concludes Dziewanowski, "the Prince's endeavor constitutes a (vital) link (between) the 16th-century Jagiellon (federative prototype) and Jzef Pisudski's federative-Prometheist program (that was to follow after World War I]."[24] Pisudski's "Midzymorze" Jzef Pisudski's strategic goal was to resurrect an updated, quasi-democratic, form of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, while working for the disintegration of the Russian Empire, and later the Soviet Union, into its ethnic constituents.[27] (The latter was his Prometheist project.)[27] Pisudski saw an Intermarium federation as a counterweight to Russian and German imperialism.[28][29] According to Dziewanowski, the plan was never expressed in systematic fashion but instead relied on Pisudski's pragmatic instincts.[30] According to British scholar George Sanford, about the time of the Polish-Soviet War of 1920 Pisudski recognized that the plan was not feasible.[31] Opposition Pisudski's plan faced opposition from virtually all quarters. The Soviets, whose sphere of influence was directly threatened, worked to thwart the Intermarum agenda.[17] The Allied Powers assumed that Bolshevism was only a

temporary threat and did not want to see their important (from the balance-of-power viewpoint) traditional ally, Russia, weakened. They resented Pisudski's refusal to aid their White allies, viewed Pisudski with suspicion, saw his plans as unrealistic, and urged Poland to confine itself to areas of clear-cut Polish ethnicity.[32][33][34] The [33][35] Lithuanians, who had re-established their independence in 1918, were unwilling to join; the Ukrainians, similarly seeking independence,[18] likewise feared that Poland might again subjugate them;[33] and the Belorusians, who had little national consciousness, were not interested either in independence or in Pilsudski's proposals of union.[33] The chances for Pisudski's scheme were not enhanced by a series of post-World War I wars and border conflicts between Poland and its neighbors in disputed territories the Polish-Soviet War, the Polish-Lithuanian War, the Polish-Ukrainian War, and border conflicts between Poland and Czechoslovakia. Pisudski's concept was opposed within Poland itself, where National Democracy leader Roman Dmowski[36][37] argued for an ethnically purer Poland in which minorities would be Polonized.[38][39] Many Polish politicians, including Dmowski, opposed the idea of a multicultural federation, preferring instead to work for a unitary Polish nation-state.[37] Sanford has described Pilsudski's policies after his resumption of power in 1926 as similarly focusing on the Polonization of the country's Eastern Slavic minorities and on the centralization of power.[31] While some scholars accept at face value the democratic principles claimed by Pisudski for his federative plan,[40] others view such claims with skepticism, pointing out a coup d'tat in 1926 when Pisudski assumed nearly dictatorial powers.[13][41] In particular, his project is viewed unfavorably by most Ukrainian historians, with Oleksandr Derhachov arguing that the federation would have created a greater Poland in which the interests of non-Poles, especially Ukrainians, would have gotten short shrift.[15] Some historians hold that Pisudski, who argued that "There can be no independent Poland without an independent Ukraine," may have been more interested in splitting Ukraine from Russia than in assuring Ukrainians' welfare.[42][43] He did not hesitate to use military force to expand Poland's borders to Galicia and Volhynia, crushing a Ukrainian attempt at self-determination in disputed territories east of the Bug River which contained a substantial Polish presence[44] (a Polish majority mainly in cities such as Lww, surrounded by a rural Ukrainian majority). Speaking of Poland's future frontiers, Pisudski said: "All that we can gain in the west depends on the Entente on the extent to which it may wish to squeeze Germany," while in the east "there are doors that open and close, and it depends on who forces them open and how far."[45] In the eastern chaos, the Polish forces set out to expand as far as feasible. On the other hand, Poland had no interest in joining the western intervention in the Russian Civil War[44] or in conquering Russia Failure In the aftermath of the Polish-Soviet War (191921), Pisudski's concept of a federation of Central and Eastern European countries, based on a Polish-Ukrainian axis, lost any chance of realization.[47] Pisudski next contemplated a federation or alliance with the Baltic and Balkan states. This plan envisioned a Central European union including Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Scandinavia, the Baltic states, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece thus stretching not only west-east from the Baltic to the Black Sea, but north-south from the Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea.[47] This project also failed: Poland was distrusted by Czechoslovakia and Lithuania; and while it had relatively good relations with the other countries, they had tensions with their neighbors, making it virtually impossible to create in Central Europe a large block of countries that all had good relations with each other. In the end, in place of a large federation, only a Polish-Romanian alliance was established, beginning in 1921.[48] Compare the history of the Little Entente (1920-1938). Pisudski died in 1935. A later version of his concept was attempted by interwar Polish Foreign Minister Jzef Beck, a Pisudski protg, whose proposal during the late 1930s of a "Third Europe" an alliance of Poland, Romania and Hungary also gained little ground before World War II supervened.[47] The failure to create a strong counterweight to Germany and the Soviet Union, such as Pisudski's Midzymorze, according to some historians, doomed the prospective member-countries to their eventual fate as victims of World War II.[28][29][49][50] World War II and since The concept of a "Central European Union" a triangular geopolitical entity anchored in the Baltic, Black, and Adriatic or Aegean Seas was revived during World War II in Wadysaw Sikorski's Polish Government in Exile. A first step toward its implementation 1942 discussions between the Greek, Yugoslav, Polish and Czechoslovak governments in exile regarding prospective Greek-Yugoslav and Polish-Czechoslovak federations ultimately foundered on Soviet opposition, which led to Czech hesitation and Allied indifference or hostility.[47] A declaration of the Polish Underground State from that period called for the creation of a Central European federal union, without domination by any single state.[51][52] Other forms of the concept have survived into the late 20th and early 21st centuries, including regional-security proposals that were not framed as being Polish-led. Poland's neighbors, however, continued to perceive the idea as imperialist.[53] After the Warsaw Pact collapsed, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic joined NATO in 1999; and Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, in 2004. Ukraine had also expressed interest in joining under the Viktor Yushchenko administration.[54] The current government of Ukraine has no such desire.[55] In 2004 Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and the Baltic states joined the European Union; and in 2007, Romania and Bulgaria. On 12 May 2011 the Visegrad Group countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) announced the formation of a battlegroup under the command of Poland. The battlegroup would be in place by 2016 as an independent force and would not be part of the NATO command. In addition, starting in 2013, the four countries would begin military exercises together under the auspices of the NATO Response Force. Some scholars see this as a first step toward close cooperation in the Central Europe region.[56] See also Prometheism

Notes

PolishGeorgian alliance Polish-Ukrainian alliance Giedroyc Doctrine

1. ^ Aviel Roshwald, "Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, the Middle East and Russia, 19141923", Routledge (UK), 2001, ISBN 0-415-17893-2, p. 37 2. ^ Richard K Debo, Survival and Consolidation: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1918-192, McGill-Queen's Press, 1992, ISBN 0-7735-0828-7, p. 59. 3. ^ James H. Billington, Fire in the Minds of Men, Transaction Publishers, ISBN 0-7658-0471-9, p. 432 4. ^ Andrzej Paczkowski, "The Spring Will Be Ours: Poland and the Poles from Occupation to Freedom", Penn State Press, 2003, ISBN 0-271-02308-2, p. 10 5. ^ David Parker, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W. W. Norton & Company, 2001, ISBN 0393-02025-8, p.194 6. ^ Mark Hewitson, Matthew D'Auria Europe in Crisis: Intellectuals and the European Idea, 19171957 2012 Page 191 "... of the other national movements that had found themselves included in Pisudski's project, especially the Lithuanians. ... The somewhat nostalgic image of 'Intermarium', the land of cultural and historical diversity destroyed by the wave of " 7. ^ Miloslav Rechcgl, Studies in Czechoslovak history Czechoslovak Society of Arts and Sciences in America - 1976 Volume 1 - Page 282 "This new policy, which was labeled the Intermarium, or Third Europe Project, called for the establishment of ..." 8. ^ Fritz Taubert Mythos Mnchen: 2002 page 351 "... range dtente with Germany and in the chance of creating a Polish-led "Third Europe" or "Intermarium" as illusory." 9. ^ Tomasz Piesakowski Akcja niepodlegociowa na terenie midzynarodowym 1945-1990 1999 Page 149 "... przyjmujc aciskie okrelenie "Intermarium" (Midzymorze). Podkrelano, e "Intermarium" to nie tylko pojcie obszaru geopolitycznego zamieszkanego przez 16 narodw, ale idea wsplnoty wszystkich wolnych narodw tego obszaru." 10. ^ "Jzef Pilsudski, Polish revolutionary and statesman, the first chief of state (191822) of the newly independent Poland established in November 1918." (Jzef Pilsudski in Encyclopedia Britannica) "Released in November 1918, [Pisudski] returned to Warsaw, assumed command of the Polish armies, and proclaimed an independent Polish republic, which he headed." (Pisudski, Joseph in Columbia Encyclopedia) 11. ^ Timothy Snyder, Covert Polish missions across the Soviet Ukrainian border, 19281933 (p.55, p.56, p.57, p.58, p.59, in Cofini, Silvia Salvatici (a cura di), Rubbettino, 2005). Timothy Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist's Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine, Yale University Press, 2005, ISBN 0-300-10670-X, (p.41, p.42, p.43) 12. ^ "Pilsudski hoped to build not merely a Polish nation state but a greater federation of peoples under the aegis of Poland which would replace Russia as the great power of Eastern Europe. Lithuania, Belorussia and Ukraine were all to be included. His plan called for a truncated and vastly reduced Russia, a plan which excluded negotiations prior to military victory." Richard K Debo, Survival and Consolidation: The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 19181992, Google Print, p. 59, McGill-Queen's Press, 1992, ISBN 0-7735-0828-7. 13. ^ a b "Pilsudski's program for a federation of independent states centered on Poland; in opposing the imperial power of both Russia and Germany it was in many ways a throwback to the romantic Mazzinian nationalism of Young Poland in the early nineteenth century." James H. Billington, Fire in the Minds of Men, p. 432, Transaction Publishers, ISBN 0-7658-0471-9 14. ^ Oleksa Pidlutsky, "Figures of the 20th century. Jzef Pisudski: the Chief who Created a State for Himself," Zerkalo Nedeli (the Mirror Weekly), Feb. 39, 2001, available online in Russian and in Ukrainian. 15. ^ a b "The essence of [Jzef Pisudski's "federalist" program] was that after the overthrow of tsardom and the disintegration of the Russian empire, a large, strong and mighty Poland was to be created in Eastern Europe. It would be the reincarnation of the Rzeczpospolita on "federative" principles. It was to include the Polish, Lithuanian, Belarusian and Ukrainian lands. The leading role, of course, was to be given to the Polish ethnic, political, economic and cultural element. [] As such two influential and popular political doctrines with regard to Ukraine the "incorporationist" and the "federalist" even before the creation of Polish statehood, were based on ignoring the right of the Ukrainian people to self-determination and put forward claims to rule over the Ukrainian territories" Oleksandr Derhachov, editor, Ukrainian Statehood in the Twentieth Century: Historical and Political Analysis, Chapter: "Ukraine in Polish concepts of foreign policy," Kiev, 1996, ISBN 966-543-040-8. 16. ^ Roman Szporluk, Imperiia ta natsii, Kiev, Dukh i Litera, 2001, ISBN 966-7888-05-3, section II (Ukrainian) 17. ^ a b Between Imperial Temptation And Anti-Imperial Function In Eastern European Politics: Poland From The Eighteenth To Twenty-First Century. Andrzej Nowak. Accessed September 14, 2007.

18. ^ a b Alfonsas Eidintas, Vytautas Zalys, Lithuania in European Politics: The Years of the First Republic, 19181940, Palgrave, 1999, ISBN 0-312-22458-3. Google Print, pp. 7881 19. ^ Marian Kamil Dziewanowski, "Polski pionier zjednoczonej Europy" ("A Polish Pioneer of a United Europe"), Gwiazda Polarna (Pole Star), Sept. 17, 2005, pp. 1011. 20. ^ "The Prince [Czartoryski] thus shows himself a visionary (emphasis added], the outstanding Polish statesman of the period between the November and January Uprisings." Dziewanowski, "Polski pionier zjednoczonej Europy," p. 11. 21. ^ Dziewanowski, "Polski pionier zjednoczonej Europy," p. 10. 22. ^ Dziewanowski, Polski pionier zjednoczonej Europy, p. 10. 23. ^ Dziewanowski, "Polski pionier zjednoczonej Europy," pp. 1011. 24. ^ a b Dziewanowski, "Polski pionier zjednoczonej Europy," p. 11. 25. ^ "Adam Czartoryski's great plan, which had seemed close to realization (emphasis added) during the Spring of Nations in 184849, failed" Dziewanowski, "Polski pionier zjednoczonej Europy," p. 11. 26. ^ Dziewanowski, "Polski pionier zjednoczonej Europy", p. 11. 27. ^ a b Jonathan Levy (6 June 2007). The Intermarium: Wilson, Madison, & East Central European Federalism. Universal-Publishers. pp. 166167. ISBN 978-1-58112-369-2. http://books.google.com/books?id=wNb4RXDxEt4C&pg=PA166. Retrieved 11 April 2011. 28. ^ a b Janusz Cisek (26 September 2002). Kociuszko, we are here!: American pilots of the Kociuszko Squadron in defense of Poland, 1919-1921. McFarland. p. 47. ISBN 978-0-7864-1240-2. http://books.google.com/books?id=hNuGZOGk6UoC&pg=PA47. Retrieved 11 April 2011. 29. ^ a b Joshua B. Spero (2004). Bridging the European divide: middle power politics and regional security dilemmas. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 36. ISBN 978-0-7425-3553-4. http://books.google.com/books?id=RaLqtGuwyoEC&pg=PA36. Retrieved 11 April 2011. 30. ^ Review of Joseph Pilsudski: A European Federalist, 19181922, by M. K. Dziewanowski. Reviewed by Kenneth F. Lewalski in the Journal of Modern History, March 1972. Accessed September 16, 2007. 31. ^ a b George Sanford, Democratic Government in Poland: Constitutional Politics since 1989. Palgrave Macmillan 2002. ISBN 0-333-77475-2. Google Print, pp. 56 [1] 32. ^ Adam Bruno Ulam, Stalin: The Man and His Era, Beacon Press, 1989, ISBN 0-8070-7005-X, Google Print, p.185 33. ^ a b c d Polish-Soviet War: Battle of Warsaw. Accessed September 30, 2007. 34. ^ Norman Davies, White Eagle, Red Star, Polish edition, Wydawnictwo Znak, 1997, ISBN 83-7006761-1, p.228 35. ^ Piotr ossowski, Konflikt polsko-litewski 19181920, Ksi ka i Wiedza, 1995, ISBN 83-05-127699, p.1316 and p.36 36. ^ (Polish) Wojna polsko-bolszewicka. Entry at Internetowa encyklopedia PWN. Last accessed on 27 October 2006. 37. ^ a b "Pilsudski dreamed of drawing all the nations situated between Germany and Russia into an enormous federation in which Poland, by virtue of its size, would be the leader, while Dmowski wanted to see a unitary Polish state, in which other Slav peoples would become assimilated." Andrzej Paczkowski, The Spring Will Be Ours: Poland and the Poles from Occupation to Freedom, p. 10, Penn State Press, 2003, ISBN 0-271-02308-2 38. ^ Manfred F. Boemeke, Gerald D. Feldman, Elisabeth Glaser, The Treaty of Versailles: A Reassessment After 75 Years, Cambridge University Press, 1998, ISBN 0-521-62132-1, Google Print, p.314 39. ^ Roman Dmowski has been quoted as saying: "Wherever we can multiply our forces and our civilizational efforts, absorbing other elements, no law can prohibit us from doing so, as such actions are our duty." J. Tomaszewski, Kresy Wschodnie w polskiej mysli politycznej XIX i XX w./Midzy Polsk etniczn a historyczn. Polska myl polityczna XIX i XX wieku, vol. 6, Warsaw, 1988, p. 101. Cited through: Oleksandr Derhachov, ibid. 40. ^ Aviel Roshwald, Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, the Middle East and Russia, 19141923, 2001, Routledge (UK), ISBN 0-415-24229-0, Google Print, p.49 41. ^ Yohanan Cohen, Small Nations in Times of Crisis and Confrontation, SUNY Press, 1989, ISBN 07914-0018-2 Google Books, p.65 42. ^ "The newly founded Polish state cared much more about the expansion of its borders to the east and southeast ('between the seas') than about helping the dying [Ukrainian] state of which Petlura was de facto dictator." "A Belated Idealist," Zerkalo Nedeli (Mirror Weekly), May 2228, 2004. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.) Pisudski is quoted to have said: "After Polish independence we will see about Poland's size." (ibid) 43. ^ A month before his death, Pilsudski told an aide: "My life is lost. I failed to create a Ukraine free of the Russians." <(Russian)(Ukrainian) Oleksa Pidlutskyi, Postati XX stolittia, (Figures of the 20th century), Kiev, 2004, ISBN 966-8290-01-1, LCCN 2004-440333. Chapter: "Jzef Pisudski: The Chief who Created

Himself a State," reprinted in Zerkalo Nedeli(Mirror Weekly), Kiev, February 39, 2001, in Russian and in Ukrainian. 44. ^ a b THE REBIRTH OF POLAND. University of Kansas, lecture notes by professor Anna M. Cienciala, 2004. Last accessed on 2 June 2006. 45. ^ MacMillan, Margaret, Paris 1919 : Six Months That Changed the World, Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2003, ISBN 0-375-76052-0, p.212" 46. ^ JOSEPH PILSUDSKI. Interview by Dymitr Merejkowsky, 1921. Translated from the Russian by Harriet E Kennedy B.A. London & Edinburgh, Sampson Low, Marston & Co Ltd 1921. Pisudski said: Poland can have nothing to do with the restoration of old Russia. Anything rather than that even Bolshevism. Quoted from this site. 47. ^ a b c d Tadeusz Marczak, "Midzymorze wczoraj i dzi" ("Midzymorze Yesterday and Today"), a Polish-language version of the paper, "Myezhdumorye vchera i syevodnia" ("Midzymorze Yesterday and Today"), published in Belarus Polsha: Put k sotrudnichestvu. Materialy Miezhdunarodnoy Nauchnoy Konfierientsii (Belarus and Poland: the Path toward Cooperation. Materials of an International Scholarly Conference), Minsk, Belarus, 2005. 48. ^ Hugh Ragsdale, The Soviets, the Munich Crisis, and the Coming of World War II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge ISBN 0-521-83030-3 49. ^ Alexandros Petersen (18 February 2011). The World Island: Eurasian Geopolitics and the Fate of the West. ABC-CLIO. pp. 7778. ISBN 978-0-313-39137-8. http://books.google.com/books?id=PZDriQW8DHIC&pg=PA78. Retrieved 12 April 2011. 50. ^ Alexandros Petersen (18 February 2011). The World Island: Eurasian Geopolitics and the Fate of the West. ABC-CLIO. p. 153. ISBN 978-0-313-39137-8. http://books.google.com/books?id=2QwHa1iec0C&pg=PA153. Retrieved 12 April 2011. 51. ^ Jzef Garliski (April 1975). "The Polish Underground State 1939-1945". Journal of Contemporary History (Sage Publications, Ltd.) 10 (2): 219259. doi:10.1177/002200947501000202. JSTOR 260146. P. 246 52. ^ Krystyna Kersten (1991). The establishment of Communist rule in Poland, 1943-1948. University of California Press. p. 50. ISBN 978-0-520-06219-1. http://books.google.com/books?id=RD3-e7ZxrEC&pg=PA50. Retrieved 8 April 2011. 53. ^ Monika Wohlefeld, "Security Cooperation in Central Europe: Polish Views," NATO, 1996. 54. ^ Joint Press Conference with the NATO Secretary General and the Minister of Defence of Ukraine. June 14, 2007. Accessed September 25, 2007. 55. ^ Yanukovich kills Ukraine's bid to join NATO. Aprile 6, 2010. Accessed July 1, 2012. 56. ^ http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110516-visegrad-new-european-militaryforce?utm_source=GWeekly&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=110517&utm_content=readmore&elq=84 a3d197577d4cb7bdc735a17f957a58 References Janusz Cisek, Kilka uwag o myli federacyjnej Jzefa Pisudskiego, Midzymorze Polska i kraje Europy rodkowo-wschodniej XIX-XX wiek (Some Remarks on Jzef Pisudski's Federationist Thought, Midzymorze Poland and the East-Central European Countries in the 19th20th Centuries), Warsaw, 1995. Marian Kamil Dziewanowski, "Polski pionier zjednoczonej Europy" ("A Polish Pioneer of a United Europe"), Gwiazda Polarna (Pole Star), vol. 96, no 19 (September 17, 2005), pp. 1011. M.K. Dziewanowski, Czartoryski and His Essai sur la diplomatie, 1971, ASIN: B0072XRK6. M.K. Dziewanowski, Joseph Pilsudski: a European Federalist, 19181922, Stanford, Hoover Institution, 1979. Peter Jordan, Central Union of Europe, introduction by Ernest Minor Patterson, Ph.D., President, The American Academy of Political and Social Science, New York, Robert M. McBride & Company, 1944. Jonathan Levy, The Intermarium: Madison, Wilson, and East Central European Federalism, ISBN 158112-369-8, 2006 [2] Sawomir ukasiewicz, Trzecia Europa: Polska myl federalistyczna w Stanach Zjednoczonych, 19401971 (Third Europe: Polish Federalist Thought in the United States, 19401971), Warsaw, Institute for National Remembrance (Instytut Pamici Narodowej), 2010, ISBN 978-83-7629-137-6. Anna Mazurkiewicz (University of Gdask), review of Sawomir ukasiewicz, Trzecia Europa: Polska myl federalistyczna w Stanach Zjednoczonych, 19401971, in Polish American Studies: A Journal of Polish American History and Culture, Published by the Polish American Historical Association, vol. LXVIII, no. 1 (Spring 2011), ISSN 0032-2806, pp. 7781. Piotr Okulewicz, Koncepcja "miedzymorza" w myli i praktyce politycznej obozu Jzefa Pisudskiego w latach 19181926 (The Concept of Midzymorze in the Political Thought and Practice of Jzef Pisudski's Camp in the Years 19181926), Pozna, 2001, ISBN 83-7177-060-X. Antoni Plutynski, We Are 115 Millions, with a foreword by Douglas Reed, London, Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1944.

David J. Smith, Artis Pabriks, Aldis Purs, Thomas Lane, The Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Routledge (UK), 2002, ISBN 0-415-28580-1 Google Print, p.30 (also available here). External links [3] Stefan Troebst, "'Intermarium' and 'Wedding to the Sea': Politics of History and Mental Mapping in East Central Europe," European Review of History, vol. 10, issue 2 (Summer 2003), pp. 293321. Retrieved 9 September 2007. The idea of the rebirth of the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth (2010)

Jzef Pisudski Jzef Beck Wadysaw Sikorski

Coat of arms of PolishLithuanianRuthenian Commonwealth during January Uprising 1863 with Polish White Eagle, the Lithuanian Pahonia and Ruthenian Archangel Michael. Adam Jerzy Czartoryski

Giedroyc Doctrine
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jerzy Giedroyc (Maisons-Laffitte, 1997)

The Giedroyc doctrine (Polish: doktryna Giedroycia) was a political doctrine espoused by some postwar Polish emigrs, focusing on reconciliation among East-Central and East European countries. The doctrine was named for a Polish emigr publicist, Jerzy Giedroyc, who developed it in the 1970s in the journal Kultura with Juliusz Mieroszewski (the doctrine is sometimes called the Giedroyc-Mieroszewski doctrine[1][2]) and other emigrs of the "Maisons-Laffitte group".[3][4][5][6][1] The doctrine can be traced to the interwar Prometheist project of Jzef Pisudski.[6] The doctrine urged the need to rebuild good relations among East-Central and East European countries. This called for Poland to reject any imperial ambitions and controversial territorial claims, and to accept the postwar border changes.[3][6][5] The doctrine supported independence for Belarus and Ukraine.[3] It also advocated treating all East European countries as equal in importance to Russia, and refusing special treatment for Russia.[4][1] The doctrine was not hostile to Russia, but called on both Poland and Russia to abandon their struggle over domination of other East European countries in this context, mainly the Baltic states, Belarus, and Ukraine (hence another name for the doctrine: the "ULB doctrine", where "ULB" stands for "Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus").[5][3][4][1] The doctrine supported the European Union and aimed at removing East-Central and East European countries from the Soviet sphere of influence.[3] After Poland regained its independence from Soviet influence following the fall of communism in 1989, the doctrine was implemented in Poland's eastern foreign policies. Poland itself began integrating into the European Union, eventually joining the EU in 2004.[3][6][4] Poland has likewise supported Ukrainian membership in the European Union and NATO.[3] The doctrine has resulted in some tensions in Polish-Russian relations.[3] The doctrine has been questioned by some commentators and politicians, particularly in the 21st century,[4] and it has been suggested that in recent years the doctrine has been abandoned by the Polish Foreign Ministry.[5] Others, however, argue that the policy remains in force and is endorsed by the Polish Foreign Ministry.[1][7] See also Intermarium (Midzymorze) Polish Government in exile Prometheism Territorial changes of Poland References 1. ^ a b c d e ivil Dambrauskait , Tomas Janelinas, Vytis Jurkonis, Vytautas Sirijos Gira, Lithuanian Polish Relations Reconsidered: A Constrained Bilateral Agenda or an Empty Strategic Partnership?, pp. 12627 online, also http://www.lfpr.lt/uploads/File/2011-26/Dambrauskaite%20el%20al.pdf PDF 2. ^ Nazwa *. "Do uczniw Giedroycia | Tygodnik "Przegld"". Przeglad-tygodnik.pl. http://www.przeglad-tygodnik.pl/pl/artykul/do-uczniow-giedroycia. Retrieved 2013-03-07. 3. ^ a b c d e f g h Aleks Szczerbiak (23 April 2012). Poland within the European Union: New Awkward Partner or New Heart of Europe?. CRC Press. pp. 19041905. ISBN 978-1-134-17902-2. http://books.google.com/books?id=wACSxUX-wZAC&pg=PA1904. Retrieved 7 March 2013. 4. ^ a b c d e Piotr A. Maci ek, Sownik Polityki Wschodniej, http://politykawschodnia.pl/wpcontent/uploads/2011/03/S%C5%82ownik-Polityki-Wschodniej1.pdf PDF 5. ^ a b c d "The Giedroyc era ended in foreign policy". Liberte World. 2011-03-08. http://liberteworld.com/2011/03/08/the-giedroyc-era-ended-in-foreign-policy/. Retrieved 2013-03-07. 6. ^ a b c d Andreas Lorek (February 2009). Poland's Role in the Development of an 'Eastern Dimension' of the European Union. GRIN Verlag. pp. 23-24. ISBN 978-3-640-25671-6. http://books.google.com/books?id=lsmgmbbKD9MC&pg=PA23. Retrieved 7 March 2013. 7. ^ "O Giedroycia sporu nie ma. Rozmowa z Radosawem Sikorskim", Nowa Europa Wschodnia 1/2010, pp. 6977. http://www.new.org.pl/files/docs/new110.pdf PDF External links Jeli nie ULB, to co? Doktryna Giedroycia w XXI w. ("If Not ULB, Then What? The Giedroyc Doctrine in the 21st Century", 17 June 2010) Bartomiej Sienkiewicz, "Po egnanie z Giedroyciem" ("Farewell to Giedroyc", Rzeczpospolita, 28-05-2010). Zdzisaw Najder, "'Doktryna ULB koncepcja Giedroycia i Mieroszewskiego w XXI wieku" ("The ULB Doctrine: Giedroyc's and Mieroszewski's Concept in the 21st century"). [1]. Marcin Wojciechowski, "Co po Giedroyciu? Giedroyc!" ("What Comes after Giedroyc? Giedroyc!"), Nowa Europa Wschodnia (New Eastern Europe), 1/2010, pp. 6977. http://www.new.org.pl/files/docs/new110.pdf PDF

Volhynia Experiment
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Volhynia Experiment was a cultural and political program by the interwar Polish government in the province of Volhynia whose purpose was the create a Ukrainian identity that was also loyal to the Polish state. It was hoped that this program would furthermore lead to pro-Polish sympathies in Soviet Ukraine and serve as a possible aide in Polish plans concerning the Soviet Union.[1] The Volhynian Experiment was opposed by both Ukrainian nationalists from neighboring Galicia and by pro-Soviet communists. History

Henryk Jzewski In 1928 Henryk Jzewski, the former deputy minister for internal affairs in the Ukrainian government of Symon Petliura, was nominated the voivode, or governor, of Volhynia, to carry out the program of cultural and religious autonomy for Ukrainians in that region. Jzewski, a Pole from Kiev (where, unlike in Galicia, Poles and Ukrainians had a history of cooperating with one another),[2] was a Ukrainophile who felt that the Polish and Ukrainian nations were deeply connected and that Ukraine might one day become a "Second fatherland" for Poles. [3] Like many Poles from Kiev, he was bilingual in the Ukrainian and Polish languages. [4] Jzewski brought Ukrainian followers of Symon Petliura, including former officers in Petliura's army, to his capital of Lutsk in order to help in his Volhynian administration. He hung portraits of Petliura alongside those of Pilsudski in public places, [3] founded the Institute for the Study of Nationality Affairs and educational society for the Orthodox (which expanded to 870 chapters in Volhynia), subsidized Ukrainian reading societies (by 1937, it had 5,000 chapters), and sponsored Ukrainian Theater. The use of Ukrainian language, instead of Russian, during church sermons was encouraged. A loyal Ukrainian political party, the Volhynian Ukrainian Alliance, was created. .[5] This party was the only Ukrainian political party allowed to freely function in Volhynia.[3] Its programme called for democracy, a separation of church and state, and equality for all citizens. Although many of its supporters, former officers of Symon Petliura, had committed anti-Jewish pogroms in Volhynia during the period the Revolution, under Jozewski's influence antisemitism was not tolerated. [3] Two groups competed with Jozewski and his pro-Polish Ukrainian allies for the allegiance of the Volhynian Ukrainians: the Communists and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), based in Galicia. The Communists referred to the Volhynian Experiment as a "Petliurite Occupation", and set up a front party, the Peasant Worker Alliance. The Peasant Worker Alliance, whose affiliation with the Communist party was unknown by most of its supporters, grew to be the most popular party in Volhynia, until it was banned by Jozewski in 1932. Soviet-based partisans fought Jozewski's police in the marshes of northern Volhynia. [3] While the Communists were coming to Volhynia from the East, Ukrainian nationalists entered from the South. The OUN saw Volhynia as fertile ground for the expansion of its Ukrainian nationalist ideal. By 1935 it was reported that 800 OUN members were operating in Volhynia; they had penetrated many of the Ukrainian institutions that Jozewski had created. According to Jozewski's rivals in the Polish military, the pro-Polish Petliurite Ukrainians in Volhynia failed to match the OUN in terms of organization and numbers.[3] During the period of his governance, Jzewski was the object of two assassination attempts: by Soviet agents in 1932 and by Ukrainian nationalists in 1934.[6] Cancellation of the Volhynia Experiment After his sponsor Pilsudski's death in 1935, Jzewski's Ukrainian programme was cancelled. The anti-Ukrainian Polish elements in the Polish military took control over policies in Volhynia. Jzewski was criticized for allowing Ukrainians to buy land from Poles, Orthodox churches were demolished or converted to Catholic use during the "revindication" campaign, and by 1938 Jzewski himself lost his post.[1][7] Under his successor, all state support for Ukrainian institutions was eliminated, and it was recommended that Polish officials cease using the words "Ukraine" or "Ukrainian." [8] The Polish army Generals believed that filling all state offices in Volhynia with ethnic Poles would ensure fast mobilization and prevent sabotage in case of a Soviet attack on Poland.[9] Ukrainians were systematically denied the opportunity to obtain government jobs.[10] Although the majority of the local population was Ukrainian, virtually all government official positions were assigned to Poles. Land reform designed to favour the Poles[11] brought further alienation of the Ukrainian population..[12] Military colonists were settled in Volhynia to defend the border

against Soviet intervention.[9] Despite the ethnic Ukrainian lands being overpopulated and Ukrainian farmers being in need of land, the Polish government's land reforms gave land from large Polish estates not to local villagers but to Polish colonists.[10] This number was estimated at 300,000 in both Galicia and Volhynia by Ukrainian sources and less than 100,000 by Polish sources (see osadnik) [13] Plans were made for a new round of colonization of Volhynia by Polish military veterans and Polish civilians and hundreds of new Roman Catholic churches were planned for the new colonists and for converts from Orthodoxy.[8] Volhynia after the Experiment The ultimate result of Polish policies in Volhynia was that a sense of Ukrainian patriotism was created; however this patriotism was not tied to the Polish state.[1] As a result of the anti-Ukrainian Polish policies that followed the Polish government's cancellation of the Volhynian Experiment, both Ukrainian nationalists and Communists found fertile ground for their ideas among the Volhynian Ukrainian population.[8] Eventually, the Polish population of the area would be destroyed in the Massacres of Poles in Volhynia. References 1. ^ a b c Timothy Snyder. (2004). The reconstruction of nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999 . New Haven: Yale University Press. pg. 144-149 2. ^ Timothy Snyder. (2003). The Reconstruction of Nations. New Haven: Yale University Press. pg. 121 3. ^ a b c d e f T. Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist's Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine, Yale University Press, 2005, pg. 67-77 4. ^ Ivan L. Rudnytsky, Peter L. Rudnytsky. (1987).Essays in modern Ukrainian history, Volume 1987, Part 2. Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies Press at the University of Alberta, , pg. 174 5. ^ T. Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist's Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine, Yale University Press, 2005, pg. 67, 302, 384 6. ^ T. Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist's Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine, Yale University Press, 2005, p. 15. 7. ^ T. Snyder, Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist's Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine, Yale University Press, 2005, pp. 138, 147, 164-166. 8. ^ a b c Timothy Snyder. (2005). Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist's Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine. New Haven: Yale University Press, pg. 165-166 9. ^ a b Timothy Snyder. Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist's Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine. Yale University Press. 2007. pp. 156-157, 176. 10. ^ a b Roger Dale Petersen. (2002). Understanding ethnic violence: fear, hatred, and resentment in twentieth-century Eastern Europe. Cambridge University Press, pg. 122 11. ^ Snyder, op cit, Google Print, p.146 12. ^ Timothy Snyder, The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999, Yale University Press, ISBN 0-300-10586-X Google Books, p.144 13. ^ Subtelny, O. (1988). Ukraine: a History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pg. 429. ISBN 08020-5808-6

PolishGeorgian alliance
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The PolishGeorgian alliance was a short-lived alliance (19201921) between the Second Polish Republic and the Democratic Republic of Georgia. Georgia had gained its independence following the 1917 Russian Revolution; Poland, a year later, following World War I. Both countries had a history of problematic relations with their Russian neighbor.[1] Polish leader Jzef Pisudski wanted to create a large East-European Midzymorze federation for common defense. He saw Georgia as a possible candidate for such an alliance.[1] Plans for a Polish diplomatic mission to the Caucasus, to the new countries of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, had been laid as early as April 1918 but began to be realized only in March 1920.[1] By that time, a Polish brigade (Polska Oddzielna Brygada) had been formed of the Polish soldiers of the Russian army serving in the Caucasus. This brigade played an important role in keeping order at Tiflis, capital of the nascent Georgian republic. The brigade was disbanded under the German pressure in June 1918. Most of its personnel joined the Polish 4th Rifle Division of General Lucjan eligowski in Odessa and then returned to Poland.[2] In 1920, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Stanisaw Patek sent a message to Georgia, proposing an exchange of diplomatic representatives and improved relations.[1] The Georgians, threatened by Russian revolutionary factions and by Turkey, enthusiastically accepted the proposal.[1] Soon after, Polish Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Tytus Filipowicz visited Tbilisi with a diplomatic mission.[1] Plans for a Polish-Georgian military alliance were drafted to have included Polish aid (equipment and munitions) for the Georgian military. Before the treaty was ratified, the Red Army invaded Georgia.[1] Deputy Minister Filipowicz (who had been named to be Polish ambassador to Georgia) was arrested in Baku, Azerbaijan, when the Red Army invaded that country about the same time.[1] Polish personnel in Georgia, led by Wiktor Biaobrzeski, managed to create a provisional consular office before Georgia was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1921.[1] Aftermath After the Soviet invasion of Georgia, the good Polish-Georgian relations resulted in large-scale Georgian emigration to Poland. Among the Georgians who moved to Poland, were parents of general John Shalikashvili (the general himself was born in Warsaw). Poland aided Georgian pro-independence activists for many years. Several Georgian officers were enlisted in the Polish Army in the interbellum, with such names as Zakaria Bakradze, Alexandre Chkheidze, Ivane Kazbegi, Viktor Lomidze and Valerian Tevzadze. All Georgian officers were sharing the privileges of the military and enjoyed a good relationship with their Polish fellow officers.[3] See also Midzymorze (Intermarum) Prometheism

Notes

Polish-Romanian alliance Polish-Ukrainian alliance Georgian emigration in Poland

1. ^ a b c d e f g h i Wojciech Materski, "Polsko-Gruziski sojusz wojskowy" ("The Polish-Georgian Military Alliance"), Polityka: Wydanie Specjalne (Politics: Special Edition), 2/2008, ISSN 1730-0525, p. 69. 2. ^ WF Reddaway, JH Penson, O. Halecki, R. Dyboski (1980), The Cambridge History of Poland, p. 475. Cambridge University Press 3. ^ The Soldiers of Georgia in Polish Service (1923 1939), by Dmitri Shalikashvili References Wojciech Materski, "Polsko-gruziski sojusz wojskowy 1920" ("The 1920 Polish-Georgian Military Alliance"), in Andrzej Koryn, ed., Wojna polsko-sowiecka 1920 roku: przebieg walk i to midzynarodowe: materiay sesji naukowej w Instytucie Historii PAN, 1-2 padziernika 1990 (The 1920 Polish-Soviet War: Course and International Backdrop: Materials of a Conference at the Polish Academy of Sciences Institute of History, October 12, 1990), Wydawnictwo Instytutu Historii PAN (Publications of the Polish Academy of Sciences Institute of History), 1991, ISBN 83-00-03487-0, pp. 203209. Rukkas, Andriy (2001), "Georgian Servicemen in the Polish Armed Forces (192239)". The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 1556-3006, Volume 14, Issue 3: 93106

Georgian emigration in Poland


From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The documented ties between Georgia and Poland reach back to the 15th century, when the Georgian (Kartlian) Constantine I sent a diplomatic mission to the Polish King Alexander Jagiellon. Later, Polish King Jan III Sobieski tried to establish contacts with Georgia. Many Georgians participated in military campaigns led by Poland in 17th century. Bogdan Gurdziecki, a Georgian, who was the greatest authority on all things Persian working in the Polish king's diplomatic service, made frequent diplomatic trips to Persia, on which he obtained, among other things, guarantees upholding earlier privileges for missionaries. Already during the rule of King Jan Kazimierz, he sent on missions to Isfahan, and King Jan III Sobieski availed himself of Gurdziecki's talents in like manner (in 1668, 1671, 16761678, in 16821684, and in 1687). Gurdziecki remained at the court of the shah for several years in the capacity of special resident and representative of the Polish king; it was he who delivered to the shah Suleiman news about the victory of the Christian forces at Vienna (1683). Several Georgian politicians, intellectuals and military officers left Georgia for Poland after the Soviet armies invaded the Democratic Republic of Georgia (DRG) in February 1921, taking over the government and establishing the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic in the same March. Although not very numerous and consisting of a few hundred members, the Georgian community of Poland was very active politically and culturally. The best remembered are, however, the Georgian military personnel who served in the Polish ranks from the early 1920s until the end of World War II. Georgian Prometheism Active diplomatic contacts developed between the short-lived DRG and Poland was part of Jzef Pisudskis wellknown political concept known as Prometheism. Its aim was to greatly reduce the power of Tsarist Russia and subsequently, the Soviet Union, by supporting nationalist independence movements of the major non-Russian peoples that lived within the borders of Russia or the Soviet Union.

Polish and Georgian officers serving in the Polish Army, 1925 The Georgian Promethean groups were one of the most active within the movement. This was not overlooked by the Bolsheviks, who in 1930 organized the assassination of Noe Ramishvili, a prominent Georgian political leader and a major promoter of Prometheism. The 1932 Polish-Soviet mutual nonaggression pact precipitated the downfall of the Promethean movement though the Georgians continued their activities in various cultural and social organizations. The most important was the Committee of Georgia founded as early as 1921 by several Georgian intellectuals led by Sergo Qurulashvili. They had close contacts with the centers of Georgian political emigration across Europe, primarily in

Paris. The Committee organized various meetings and social activities and provided material support for the Georgian migrs. It also published its own publications, ProGeorgia (1922), and Propartia (1923). From 1923 to 1924, Qurulashvili also directed the journal Schlos Wschodu pertaining to the Georgian problems. The Georgians organized also the Union of Georgian Students and the Polish-Georgian Society led by Prince Pavle Tumanishvili. The activities of these organizations were limited, however, due to financial difficulties. Georgians in the Polish military service

Major Giorgi Mamaladze, later murdered in the 1940 Katyn massacre St. Grigol Peradze Immediately after the fall of the DRG, Noe Zhordania, the head of the Georgian government-in-exile, addressed the friendly nations, particularly France, Greece and Poland, to help in maintaining the professional military cadres. The government of Poland promptly responded, and from 1922 to 1924, hundreds of Georgian Junkers and officers, recommended by Zhordanias government, were accepted in the Polish military schools. Several professional officers of the former DRG attended military training courses at the Polish army centers. Although not obligated to do so, virtually all of them were subsequently enrolled in the Polish army as contract officers. In the subsequent decade, the total number of Georgian military servicemen reached 1,000. At the outbreak of World War II, most of the Georgian officers took part in the 1939 Defensive War, and several of them commanded their own regiments composed of Polish soldiers. The most notable officers were: Zakaria Bakradze, genera dywizji, deputy commander of Polish 15th Infantry Division. Aleksandre Chkheidze, genera brygady, deputy commander of Polish 16th Infantry Division. Ivane Kazbegi, genera brygady. Aleksandre Koniashvili, genera brygady. Kirile Kutateladze, genera brygady. Aleksandre Zakariadze, genera brygady. Viktor Lomidze, the commander of ORP Gryf. Jerzy Tumaniszwili, captain of the navy, who was awarded Virtuti Militari. Valerian Tevzadze, podpukownik, the commander of the northern sector of the Polish defences during the siege of Warsaw. Mikheil Kvaliashvili, major, the commander of a cavalry battalion within the 15th Uhlans Regiment. Several Georgian officers were captured by the Soviet forces during the 1939 campaign. General Chkheidze, Major Mamaladze, Captain Skhirtladze and Captain Rusiashvili were killed during the infamous Katyn Massacre, from 1940 to 1941. Many others spent several years in the gulag camps. During the occupation of Poland, the Germans reorganized the Warsaw-based Committee of Georgia and placed it under their tight control. The occupation administration encouraged the Georgian soldiers in the Polish service to join the Georgian Legion of the Wehrmacht. Some of them responded to the Nazi request, but subsequently joined the Polish resistance movement. The notable Georgian Orthodox priest and Professor Grigol Peradze of Warsaw University ended his life in the Auschwitz concentration camp (1942), when he deliberately entered a gas-chamber instead of a Jewish prisoner who had a large family. John Malchase David Shalikashvili, general of the United States Army who served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1993 to 1997, was born in Warsaw, Poland where his father also served in the army. After the war,

most Georgians either left for Western Europe or were deported to the Soviet camps though some of them (e.g., General V. Tevzadze) remained in the Polish anti-Communist underground for several decades. External links (Georgian) Wozniak A., Georgian migr Societies and Organizations in Poland (Georgian) Karabin Robert, Prometheism. Caucasian Peoples in the Polish Struggle for Independence 19181921 (Georgian) Karabin Robert, A History of Georgians in the Polish Military (English) The Soldiers of Georgia in Polish Service (1923 - 1939) by Dmitri Shalikashvili (translated by Maria Shalikashvili) Documentary polish film about Georgian contract officers in Polish army

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