Others and the Problem of Community

LYNN FENDLER Michigan State University East Lansing, MI, USA

ABSTRACT
Community building has been a key concern for a wide array of educational projects. Recently, educational theories concerned about social justice have begun to challenge assumptions about community in U.S. education by criticizing its tendencies toward assimilation and homogeneity. Such theories point out that a communitarian agenda excludes the Other, the stranger, or the person of difference. This paper analyzes various conicting constructions of community in current U.S. education literature, including the establishment of common values in schools, the attempt to integrate racially diverse views into educational discourse, and the exhortation for political solidarity within underrepresented groups. I analyze the construction of community and suggest that community has three distinct strands of meaning: the appeal to third way kinds of compromise, the appeal to solidarity for empowerment, and the appeal of emotional bonding. After providing examples of these three strands, I argue that current denitions and assumptions about community building can be politically dangerous insofar as differences are appropriated, assimilated, or excluded. Finally, by bringing some examples from feminism and postcolonialism into conversation with education, I suggest that problematizing the idea of community allows for critical appraisal of the meanings of community and difference, commonality, and diversity.

Community building is all the rage. From broad curriculum theories to classroom micro-practices, educators are exhorted to build community as part of the curriculum to promote democracy, moral development, better learning, and citizenship. Terms like community tend to be used so loosely that their meanings become vague and muddy. Generally speaking, however, U.S. educational literature uses community to mean shared values, unied purpose, and/or common beliefs. In other words (and not surprisingly given the etymology of the word) most educational literature assumes that community is based on some sort of commonality.1 Community building has been advocated for various kinds of professional development: to counteract the divisive effects of racism, sexism, and other prejudices;2 to promote constructivist learning;3 and to encourage active participation in a group.4 I recognize the importance of the idea of community for these reasons. At the same time, the purpose of this paper is to
2006 by The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto. Curriculum Inquiry 36:3 (2006) Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK

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contribute a critical perspective on the discourse of community in education. This is a critical review of recent literature on community.5 Community is a notion that is widely celebrated in education and other elds; we do not nd literature that says, We must resist the forces of community building! Williams (1976/1983) remarks on this when he writes, unlike all other terms of social organization (state, nation, society, etc.) [community] seems never to be used unfavorably, and never to be given any positive opposing or distinguishing term (p. 76). I am not opposed to community either, but I am concerned to nd out the ways assumptions about community may have undesirable effects like assimilation and homogenization. My studies in political philosophy suggested to me that community can have unintended effects like excluding diversity, perpetuating the norms of the already privileged, and reducing questions of freedom and liberation to voting procedures.6 The problem with community is that its assumptions may serve to exclude Others. From that perspective, this critical review is designed to make sense of the different ways the discourse of community can have limiting and/or exclusionary effects, despite efforts to the contrary. My inquiry joins other research in education that allows for critical perspectives on community. For example, Furman (1998) writes:
Community is assumed to be based in commonalities, the shared values, visions, and purposes typically mentioned in the education literature. Yet, school populations are increasingly diverse. Efforts to build community schools that focus on articulating and advocating certain values over others may have the perverse effects of alienating segments of the school population who do not share those values, thus defeating the intended purpose of community. (pp. 298299, emphasis added)

As a critical strategy for understanding the assumptions embedded in the discourse on community, my line of inquiry is shaped by the following questions: What is assumed or stated to be the purpose of community? and How is community justied? In my analysis I do not seek the essential denition of community or the meaning of authentic community. Rather, by extending the arguments of Shields (2000), Abowitz (2000), and Noddings (1996), I try to understand the complex historical relations that come together to constitute the discourse of community in educational literature. As Rose (1999) writes:
To analyse, then, is not to seek for a hidden unity behind this complex diversity. Quite the reverse. It is to reveal the historicity and the contingency of the truths that have come to dene the limits of our contemporary ways of understanding ourselves, individually and collectively, and the programmes and procedures assembled to govern ourselves. By doing so, it is to disturb and destabilise these regimes, to identify some of the weak points and lines of fracture in our present where thought might insert itself in order to make a difference. (pp. 276277)

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For purposes of this paper, I examined the term community as it is being used to talk about classroom community, teacher-learning community, and communities of practice. I excluded from the analysis the use of community when it referred to the place outside the school, as in school and community relations. The meaning of the term community has changed over time, so I focused only on recent literature in order to make the inquiry historically specic. I approached the analysis with the assumption that the denition of community has been produced from the interweaving of divergent political projects and intellectual traditions. I expected that the term community would have a political meaning, and, in fact, much debate about community is conducted in traditional political science terms like liberal and communitarian (see, e.g., Abowitz, 2000; Etzioni, 1995, 2000). Surprisingly, however, I found that the current discourse of community in education is not only about politics. Instead, I found that the discourse of community in educational research is inextricably intertwined with psychological notions of identity and affect, and also with leadership and policy issues of accountability. The discourse of community is not just an argument about communitarian versus liberal forms of association; it entails moral regulation, emotional management, and behavior practices that normalize forms of participation and specify particular relations among people. In this paper I suggest two things: (1) there are three discursive strands in educational literature that support the appeal of community and make community seem like a good thing, and (2) these same strands of community perpetuate assumptions about assimilation and normalization. Assumptions about community are not necessarily bad, but these assumptions may be dangerous if we are unaware of them. Community in educational literature is a construct that both embodies and constitutes what it is possible to think about who we can be and what we can (and cannot) belong to. In this analysis I make no claims about what community should be, could be, or necessarily is. Rather, I am doing historical inquiry in the sense that I refer to discourses of community that are specic to U.S. educational literature in the last 10 years. In brief, the rst discursive strand supporting the idea of community is its third-way appeal. As popularized by Tony Blair, Anthony Giddens, and Amitai Etzioni, community is theorized as an alternative to the two unsatisfactory options of state control (communitarianism) and free-market individualism (liberalism).7 The second strand infusing community discourse is the trope of solidarity. Based in the assumptions of labor union activism, community is theorized as a strategic weapon that promises empowerment and ability to effect change. Interestingly, community-as-solidarity is assumed by both mainstream and leftist community advocates. The third strand is an appeal to emotion, a provision that is often couched in terms of safety. Community is advocated on the grounds that it makes people feel welcome and comfortable. In my critical appraisal of the discourse of

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community, I am not arguing that community is a bad thing or that it should be avoided in educational projects. Rather, I am arguing that assumptions about community are dangerous when they function to perpetuate existing inequities and censor possibilities for differences.

COMMUNITY AS A THIRD WAY Third-way thinking is fashionable in many circles (perhaps more in the United Kingdom than the United States), and educational research circulates third-way logic in some constructions of community. In this section I argue that when community building is advocated as a compromise between commonality (which does not allow for diversity) and individualism (which does not allow for unity), then that is an example of third-way thinking. Community-as-third way is an attempt to avoid both too much centralization and too much decentralization. In this section I provide four examples from educational literature that illustrate community as a kind of third-way thinking. Following those examples, I draw from Rose to suggest ways in which community-as-third way may have unintended normalizing consequences. Examples of Third-Way Thinking. An example of third-way thinking in educational literature is Abowitz (2000) who divides models of community between liberalism, a theoretical commitment to extensive individual liberties, and communitarianism, which is more concerned with issues of social cohesion (p. 12). In the spirit of pragmatism, Abowitz rejects both sides of this dualism and proposes instead that we form alliances: Through the particular brand of philosophical praxis utilized in this inquiry, we can understand new languages of public life, languages that lie outside of the dualisms of justice and community as historically created, and which enable us to continue the endless quest for community but with the existential watchfulness required for community maintenance and construction (p. 185). In another example, Furman (1998) refers to this dualism as a paradox. Furman frames her perceptive analysis as a dissonance between modernist and postmodernist concepts of community. She clearly outlines what she sees as the benets and drawbacks of modernist and postmodernist concepts of community, and she strives to reconcile the paradox of community by combining the constructive normativity of modernism with the deconstructive political challenges of postmodernism. She argues in favor of a postmodern notion of community because community . . . continues to be used in a modernist sense, in ways that are a poor match with postmodern conditions, and in ways that serve the interests of the powerful (p. 309). In a third example, Redding (2001) expresses third-way thinking when he writes:

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community . . . has been idealized as a counterbalance to: a) excessive individualism, b) the familys limiting strictures on the individual, and c) the remote, impersonal, and inexorable forces of mass society. (pp. 12)

After providing a historical overview of the term, Redding continues by suggesting ways to restore connections in modern schools. He recommends that common experiences be built into policy events, instructional strategies, and curriculum. Redding concludes by saying, common experiences dene the meaning, the distinct character, and the central purpose of a school community (p. 23). A fourth example of community that inscribes the third-way appeal is Wengers (1998) Communities of Practice. Perhaps the most widely cited reference on community in U.S. educational research, Wengers book develops a line of inquiry that he and Jean Lave inaugurated in Situated Learning (Lave & Wenger, 1991). Community as constructed in Wengers text is less normatively dened than in most other research, and Wenger does not assume that communities are a good thing: Communities of practice are not intrinsically benecial or harmful. They are not privileged in terms of positive or negative effects (Wenger, 1998, p. 85). Rather, Wengers analysis posits that communities are inevitable among people who work together, but that the presence of certain criteriaengagement, imagination, and alignmentcan transform those communities of practice into sites of learning (see especially pp. 173187). Wengers argument is an example of third-way thinking because its overall project negotiates a middle ground between the individualism of psychology and the collectivism of sociology. Lave and Wengers work on communities was innovative in educational psychology because it proposed an alternative to the transfer theory model of learning. Transfer theory explains learning as a set of cognitive skills that can be applied, transferred to an array of disparate tasks. As such, transfer theory explains learning in highly individualistic terms, without regard to social circumstances. In contrast, Wengers theory of learning in communities of practice does not rest on assumptions of individualism, and it explains learning as a product of social interaction. At the same time, communities of practice are not understood as collectivities or sociological structures. In that sense, communities of practice constitute a third way between collectivism and individualism, just as Abowitzs pragmatism constitutes a third way between communitarianism and liberalism. Critique of Third-Way Thinking. Even while recognizing the potential dangers of community building, the theories of community in these examples ultimately resolve into normative frameworks. The fundamental tension between seductive and threatening conceptions of community is evident in Abowitzs (2000) concluding thoughts:

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As a society, we must agree on educational systems that reproduce the best of our culture. Community rhetoric, although often misguided in popular discourses by nostalgic romanticism, may have at its core this recognition of interdependence. The nostalgia can too frequently evoke, however, tyrannical structures and relations. (p. 183)

The traditional political debates about community provide the terms of Abowitzs analysis. At the same time, the mandates of educational policy formation and leadership form the matrix for understanding the debate. In the end, community is constructed as a privileged and normative condition that can address administrative concerns: But disparaging or ignoring community ideals, per se, in the name of justice, will not wish away the human needs for companionship and solidarity with others (Abowitz, 2000, p. 183). A similar tension is present in Furmans (1998) notion of paradox: Indeed, even postmodernist educational critics recognize that the human need for community transcends the negations of a postmodernist critique (p. 309). After wrestling with the downsides of both liberalism and communitarianism, in the end Furman resolves the theoretical problems by proposing a nested model for community: Normative postmodernism . . . provides a new metaphor for communitythe interconnected web of global communitywhich requires cooperation within difference and an acknowledgement and celebration of otherness (p. 307). Her third-way solution to this paradox is a continuum that extends from smaller, valuational kinship groups, to a global postmodern community based on the ethics of acceptance of otherness with respect, justice, and appreciation (p. 318). I nd two problems with Furmans nested theory of community. First, her concept of local-level valuational kinship is vastly different from her concept of a global-level postmodern community. She characterizes the local level as a community of commonality and solidarity; in contrast, she characterizes the global level community as one of pluralism and liberal tolerance. Furman portrays the local level as communitarian, and she portrays the global level as liberalist. The conict between unity and diversity is not so much resolved as separated into two distinct spheres. So Furmans nested model does not deal with the paradox that frames the entire analysis, namely, How is diversity incorporated at the local level? and What is to be the relationship between local communities and a global community? The problems of diversity are not addressed at the local level, and the problems of unity are not addressed at the global level. The second problem with Furmans theory of nested community is that her model denes a particular vision of community. Her nested theory constructs a model of community from above, as it were. By dening community according to this model, Furmans theory promotes a top-down vision of community. The nested denition of community building promotes a perspective on community that does not provide for visions of

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community that are radically different from hers. Although Furmans argument incorporates postmodern critiques of modernist norms, in the end those critiques are subordinated in favor of a coherent and normative resolution. The paradoxes and nuances of Furmans (1998) analysis (balancing communitarianism with diversity and pluralism) tend to get buried in compromises for the sake of coherence: I have attempted . . . to unravel the paradox of community and postmodernism by shifting both concepts away from their more extreme interpretations toward closer theoretical alignment (p. 323). The rhetoric of the third way is seductive because it appears to bypass the compromises of communitarianism and the selshness of liberal individualism. However, third-way thinking embodies its own disciplinary mechanisms. For example, Gee (2000) argues that communities of practice are new and ideal forms of tacit indoctrination, replacing the brute force of direct orders and coercion. . . . In them, people may form value-laden identities through immersion in practice without much overt reection and critique (p. 519). Gees analysis points directly to the ways communities of practice reinforce new practices of capitalism, and the analysis can be extrapolated to technologies of governance in general. Roses (2000) critique of third-way thinking focuses more on the construction of the citizen as a moral subject, an examination of what he calls ethopolitics. Rose (1999) also explicates a double movement in the shifts in governance patterns from the society to the community:
Organization and other actors that were once enmeshed in the complex and bureaucratic lines of force of the social state are to be set free to nd their own destiny. Yet, at the same time, they are to be made responsible for that destiny, and for the destiny of society as a whole, in new ways. Politics is to be returned to society itself, but no longer in a social form: in the form of individual morality, organizational responsibility and ethical community. (pp. 174175)

The discourse of community, then, becomes a vehicle of self-governance by which educators can envision their participation in ways that appear to avoid both centralization and individualization. Third-way thinking paves the way for community to be instantiated as a new site for government, while appearing to operate outside the structures of government. Membership and participation in any given community enacts the simultaneous processes of inclusion and exclusion (Popkewitz, 1998; Popkewitz & Bloch, 2001); however, third-way thinking appears to be an inclusive middle ground, so its mechanisms of exclusion, censorship, and normalization are not readily available for critique. Nowhere is the normalization impulse of community more blatant than in Sergiovannis (1994) widely cited book, Building Community in Schools, where he writes: Community building is the secret weapon that can help domesticate the wild cultures that now seem so omnipresent in our schools (p. xiv).

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COMMUNITY-AS-SOLIDARITY Educational literature is generally critical of the melting-pot model of building community; most educational inquiry tends to recognize the problems of assimilation and homogeneity. However, another way to promote community is to appeal to solidarity. The vision of community-as-solidarity is that people of different backgrounds can voluntarily come together in support of a common goal. We can see this vision as being related to labor union organizing because solidarity has been endorsed as a strategy of empowerment, especially within structuralist frameworks of dominance and oppression. In this section I analyze literature in education that exemplies the ways in which solidarity has been mobilized as a strategy for community building: rst an example from a relatively mainstream theoretical approach, and second an example of a Marxian approach. While analyzing those examples, I draw from Laclau and Mouffe to suggest that in spite of efforts to the contrary, solidarity tends (ironically) to reproduce existing power hierarchies and foreclose possibilities for diversity. U.S. Liberal Mainstream. As the title of their book asserts, Guarasci and Cornwell (1997) are primarily concerned with laying out a theoretical framework of democratic education in an age of difference. Guarasci and Cornwell critique the problems of classical and modern denitions of democracy. They explicitly decry the dangers of assimilation: Homogenized commonality is the enemy of respect for difference, identity, and privacy (p. 20). Instead, they promote a multicentric version of community:
The world of interdisciplinary studies is where connection, integration, and synthesis are prized. Interdisciplinary studies call for a curricular design and a college experience in which interculturalism is the very means of forging connectedness, mutuality, and common destiny. (p. 9)

It is clear that Guarasci and Cornwell are aware of the dangers of homogenization, and they reject traditional notions of melting-pot democracy. However, they equally strongly reject appeals to identity politics, which they deem to be instances of cultural isolation (p. 4). For Guarasci and Cornwell, the politics of difference is not a debate or a problematic, but rather a normative stance to be opposed:
Although we live in a world that is obsessed with difference as both sanctuary and threat, reliance on the politics of difference and separation is a doomed strategy. The politics of difference fails to produce a democratic community and it fails as an enduring means to personal liberation as well. (p. 17)

Guarasci and Cornwell promote community-based learning as a pedagogy for evoking the interplay of difference, community, and intercultural

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citizenship (p. 48). They cite examples of community-based learning (sometimes called service learning) in order to build a sense of campus community (p. xi). Their book provides examples of educational practices that engage students as participants in a democratic community as part of the learning process. Guarasci and Cornwell make extensive efforts to reach out and include different groups of people and dissenting voices. In an effort to be multicentric, the authors do not limit their citations and references to the canonized speakers for Western democracy. Interestingly, they draw from writings by Anzalda, Foucault, hooks, Lorde, Noddings, Spivak, and West to support their stance against homogenized commonality (p. 20). In a subsection titled Community and Multiplicity, Guarasci and Cornwell cite Lorde (1984) as they defend a multicentric community. To analyze Guarasci and Cornwells theory of community, I offer here a close and critical reading of one section. I compare Guarasci and Cornwells interpretation of Lorde with Lordes original text. Here is Guarasci and Cornwells interpretation:
As Lorde . . . puts it, we will then develop the tools to break the seeming insurmountable barriers of difference and end the destructive force of invisibility brought on by parochialism and false homogenization. By direct encounter and experience, students and teachers increase their comfort with the other, with the different, as they begin to see their connection to difference as well as its presence within themselves. This is Lordes springboard for creative change within our [own] lives. (Cornwell & Guarasci, 1997, pp. 2021, emphases added)

Here is Lordes (1984) original text:

Too often, we pour the energy needed for recognizing and exploring difference into pretending those differences are insurmountable barriers, or that they do not exist at all. This results in voluntary isolation, or false and treacherous connections. Either way, we do not develop tools for using human difference as a springboard for creative change within our lives. (pp. 115116, emphases added)

The thrust of Lordes original text is recognizing, exploring, and using human difference to make creative changes. In contrast, Guarasci and Cornwells appropriation seems to suggest that we need to break the barriers of difference and begin to see connection. In Lordes text, difference is a source of strength, a springboard; in Guarasci and Cornwells text, difference is a barrier to be broken. This is a subtle but profound alteration in meaning. Finally, Lordes original vocabulary of treacherous connections was tellingly paraphrased as false homogenization. Guarasci and Cornwells interpretation infuses community with the discourse of solidarity and thereby transforms Lordes idea of difference in a way that favors homogeneity and diminishes possibilities of difference.

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In linguistic moves such as these, the impulse toward solidarity, even as it tries to be inclusive, ends up by denying the possibility of difference and/or reinscribing existing power hierarchies. Marxian Solidarity. Many critical theories in education derive from Marxian premises. Examples from Halsey, Lauder, Brown, and Wellss (1997) anthology, Education: Culture, Economy, Society, illustrate how community underlies Marxian political programs in critical theories of education. The analyses in these chapters attempt to preserve demographic categories (e.g., race, class, and gender) and account for their overlap at the same time. The multiplication of categories has been a key element in cultural studies of education as these critical theories attempt to recognize diversity while they maintain a structural basis for understanding collectivity and solidarity. The tension between homogenization and fragmentation is evident when Halsey et al. (1997) write: The . . . problem of modern capitalist societies concerns the alienation caused by the homogenization of culture and the resultant loss of personal identity through a process of assimilation into a common culture (p. 3). They assert that a central problem for critical educationalists has . . . been to reconcile the relativism and nihilism of a set of theories denying the possibility of social progress with a politics of difference advancing the liberation of women and people of colour (p. 14). In these quotations, we can read the concern about homogenization and assimilation that accompany some versions of community. So Halsey et al. construct a particular kind of community when they advocate culturally autonomous schooling on the grounds that such community building will increase the likelihood of empowerment, participation, and voice in the larger society:
While the projects of culturally autonomous schooling will take years to realize, and hence to evaluate, they need to be judged against the broader aims of the preservation of living cultures and languages and as a way of getting out from under: education here is seen as providing a platform for access to power and full democratic participation in society. (p. 18)

Halsey et al. argue that homogenization and assimilation are bad, and culturally autonomous (i.e., segregated) communities are good for purposes of solidarity and empowerment in the face of a different dominant culture. I nd this concept of community troublesome because of its assumptions about who needs solidarity and who does not. Halsey et al. seem to imply that culturally autonomous schooling is appropriate for minorities and underrepresented people but not for all cultural subgroups. When they argue in favor of sex-segregated or race-segregated schooling, they mean to support women and racial minorities; they do not intend to support exclu-

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sive schools for the cultural subgroup of rich, White, heterosexual males. Presumably, Halsey et al.s concept of culturally autonomous schooling is not for wealthy, White, able-bodied, heterosexual males because they are assumed to have a de facto community and privileged access to resources. If Halsey et al.s idea of culturally autonomous schooling is not supposed to be applied to everyone in the society, then I become concerned about decit-model thinking that may underlie the distinction between those who are perceived to need autonomous schooling and those who are perceived not to need it. If culturally autonomous schooling is designed to compensate for the disadvantages of some demographic groups, then culturally autonomous schooling is applied remedially, which may convey decitmodel thinking. Presumably, Halsey et al. intend for this sort of community building to serve as a means to an end. That is, the need for community does not apply to the society at large but rather to isolated cultural groups, providing a platform for access to power and full democratic participation in society (Halsey et al., 1997, p. 18). Halsey et al.s promotion of community-for-solidarity raises other troublesome questions for me: What is suppose to happen when the cultural subgroup reaches (as they say) power and full democratic participation in society? Do they no longer need culturally autonomous schooling? At what point will the subgroup be considered ready for admission to the society at large? And then on what grounds should that larger composite entity be called a community? Will everyone be assimilated? Will the differences eventually wither away? Conversely, by what means is the possibility for cultural (or other) differences maintained in the context of the larger society? Halsey et al.s theory of community does not address these issues, and so their suggestion of culturally autonomous schooling has not fully accounted for the participation of Others in their vision of community. To summarize my criticisms of community-for-solidarity, I argue that solidarity platforms (like that of Halsey et al.) reiterate existing hierarchical power relations because some groups are positioned as decient and in need of remediation, and other groups are seen as normal and acceptable as is. I see this as an example of decit-model thinking in which those who are excluded from the community are regarded as lacking, in need of assistance, or deserving of support from those more fortunate. At the same time, the group that is seen as forming an acceptable community is not regarded as pathological or in need of therapy or intervention in any way. As Skutnabb-Kangas (1990) argues, This static and ethnocentric view, where the whole burden of integration is on the incomer alone, and where the dominant groups values are presented as somehow shared and universal, rather than particularistic and changing, like all values are, still prevails in many countries (p. 87). So in the model of community-assolidarity, unintended consequences arise: the status of the included is afrmed and maintained, and the status of the excluded is also afrmed and maintained.

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Critical theorists who promote solidarity for empowerment frequently decry the tendencies toward fragmentation or separatism. McLaren (1997), for example, writes that is it important to maintain a sense of totality in emancipatory projects: Without a shared vision (however contingent or provisional) of democratic community, we risk endorsing struggles in which the politics of differences collapses into new forms of separatism (p. 492). Apple (1997) writes, I say all this because of very real dangers that now exist in critical educational studies. One is our loss of collective memory (p. 599). These critical researchers are interested in forging community at a very broad level: This book attempts to build a coalition that enables dialog, to identify terrains of mutual support, and to articulate common concerns and agendas (Halsey et al., 1997, p. 8). A similar strategic solidarity for empowerment is articulated by those who embrace cultural feminist project. Arnot and Dillabough (1999), for example, write:
we must counter the false antithesis expressed about the distinctions between modern feminist thought (e.g., equality) and post-modern feminist thought (e.g., difference), and even more signicantly, the fragmentation of the eld. . . . We must reconcile modernist questions of feminist solidarity and social structure with postmodern concerns about hierarchies of identication and difference. (p. 180, emphases added)

This example illustrates the denition of community in which theoretical diversity and even incommensurability are good up to a point, but that for purposes of political mobilization, solidarity is ultimately required. In the assumption that empowerment requires solidarity I can see some ironic consequence insofar as solidarity minimizes attention to differences. Mouffe (1992) articulates how visions of solidarity, regardless of how comprehensive, cannot avoid establishing exclusions of some sort:
The idea of the common good species what we can call . . . a grammar of conduct that coincides with the allegiance to the constitutive ethico-political principles of modern democracy: liberty and equality for all. Yet, since those principles are open to many competing interpretations, one has to acknowledge that a fully inclusive political community can never be realized. There will always be a constitutive outside, an exterior to the community that is the very condition of its existence. It is crucial to recognize that, since to construct a we it is necessary to distinguish it from a them, and since all forms of consensus are based on acts of exclusion, the condition of possibility of the political community is at the same time the condition of impossibility of its full realization. (p. 30)

Here, Mouffe concisely summarizes the analytical argument for problematizing community-as-solidarity that is evident in the above examples from educational literatures. Insofar as educational research denies the constitutive outside, that research has ignored pervasive practices of exclusion that are inherent in all attempts at inclusion. Such a stance not

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only ignores the practices of exclusion, but also forgoes a critical perspective that might address the mechanisms by which exclusion is exercised. In another critique of solidarity, Laclau (1992) historicizes the relationship of the universal to the particular, asserting that the integrationist assumption of liberal democratic community was originally conceived for far more homogeneous societies and that this theory was based on all kinds of unexpressed assumptions that no longer pertain (p. 89). This point suggests that critical curriculum theorizing may prot by exploring the ways community platforms reiterate unintended impulses toward commonality. By bringing Laclaus and Mouffes analyses into educational discourse, it becomes possible to take another look at the ways community-building practices tend toward homogeneity and assimilation despite their explicit intentions to the contrary. If some sort of constitutive outside is inevitable in all political communities, then it is dangerous to celebrate and promote community building as if it were unproblematic. Instead, it would behoove researchers to keep constant vigil and continually challenge the ways community constructs inclusions and exclusions simultaneously.

COMMUNITY AS AFFECT, EMOTION, AND CARING Recognizing the complexities inherent in theorizing community, recent literature has been integrating the affective aspects of community, especially the notion of caring (Noddings, 1995, 1996). In some cases, the vocabulary of political science is subordinated in favor of the language of affect and emotion. Emotion is also fashionable in research now with such concepts as emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1995) and feeling power (Boler, 1999), so it is not surprising that emotions play a part, together with third-way thinking and solidarity, in the constitution of community for education. In this section I analyze examples in the literature of community-as-affective-bond, and argue that the discourse of emotional safety functions simultaneously to include and exclude. Abowitz (2000) calls attention to emotion under the rubric of feminism, and she criticizes liberal reason for its detachment: Liberal reason, as constructed against emotion, has come to mean that which is antithetical to passion or feelings (p. 82). Abowitz argues that community necessitates the integration of affective elements, our subjectivities can intersect over common issues and problems. Such work involves the affective domain as well as the logical thought patterns of weighing evidence and evaluating statements and ideas (p. 82). Abowitz does not dichotomize reason and emotion, neither does she romanticize the emotional realm. At the same time, she points repeatedly to the inescapable role of emotions in community building, for example, if we were to take the affective seriously, schools would be places where the time and scale of the institution would allow for

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the kinds of work that facilitate the full expression of feeling and thinking that should accompany learning and teaching (p. 144). Similarly, bell hooks (2003) emphasizes the need for educators to undermine the socialization (p. 36) that occurs under domination, and she describes community as something that must cross differences. Hooks advocates what she calls beloved community, and casts the project in emotional terms:
One of the dangers we face in our educational systems is the loss of a feeling of community, not just the loss of closeness among those with whom we work and with our students, but also the loss of a feeling of connection and closeness with the world beyond the academy. (p. xv)

This is an example of the discursive construction of community as an emotional feature of curriculum. Stronger appeals to emotion have been brought into U.S. educational research through frequent deployment of the concepts Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Interestingly, these terms in U.S. literature usually appear in German (italicized, though not always capitalized). Readers familiar with Tnniess original work might be surprised at the ways these 19th-century concepts have been appropriated and transformed from analytic descriptors to normative values in educational inquiry. Tnnies (1887/1957) used the terms Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft to describe various existing forms of associations among people. Gemeinschaft describes relationships in which there is an a priori and necessarily existing unity (1887/1957, p. 65). Further, Gemeinschaft describes relationships in which emotions are factors (blood and proximity), but Gemeinschaft does not necessarily implicate the emotional aspect of those relationships. However, recent U.S. educational research on community endows the term with other meanings and other uses. For example, in one chapter, Merz and Furman (1997) carefully summarize Tnnies concepts as analytic descriptors. In the course of their argument, however, community becomes constituted via normative understandings of Gemeinschaft: we believe that schools have become too gesellschaftlich (p. 89); Noddings . . . work is highly consistent with making schools more gemeinschaftlich (p. 72); and Gemeinschaft can be created by choice, but for schools to do so requires giving up some choices and tolerating some idiosyncratic procedures and outcomes (p. 98). This research deploys the terms Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft to understand how schools are organized. In doing so, they set up a theoretical framework in which Gemeinschaft signies an intimate sense of belonging, and this framework makes it possible to extend an analytical lens onto emotional relationships in schools. The analytical categories serve as warrants for new research agendas. Research must now observe, record, analyze, and evaluate a whole array of emotional relationships so that administrators and policy makers can propose therapeutic interven-

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tions that will build communities in their schools. In this way, educational research itselfwith its technologies of surveillance and rehabilitation exercise normalization and governance in the process. Sergiovanni (1994) advocates perhaps the strongest appeal to emotion as the foundation of building community in schools: The need for community is universal. A sense of belonging, of continuity, of being connected to others and to ideas and values that make our lives meaningful and signicantthese needs are shared by all of us (p. xiii). Sergiovannis school community is often described with religious terminology; community requires altruistic love. To be blunt about it, we cannot achieve community unless we commit ourselves to the principle love thy neighbor as thyself (p. 29). The norms of community are described as commandments, and infringements are called sins. Sergiovanni distinguishes authentic community from substitutes for community. This distinction is necessary because other criteria for community do not exclude gangs, which Sergiovanni means to do. So certain tightly bonded, purposeful groups of people (like gangs) do not meet the criteria for authentic community because he regards their sense of belonging as dysfunctional. The recent trend that constructs community on the basis of emotional appeals raises four contentious points: the dichotomization of reason and emotion, the universality of emotions, the construction of enemies, and the modern separation between individual and society. I address the problems of each of these points in turn. To argue that emotion and affect need to be included in rational debates is to assume that rationality is not already shaped by emotion. When researchers normalize concepts and criticize communities for being too gesellschaftlich, they perpetuate a very old dualism of mind and body, cognition and emotion. Many writers recommend that affect and emotion be brought back into social relations and understandings (see, e.g., Beatty, 2000; Blackmore, 1996; Bodine & Crawford, 1999; Cherniss & Goleman, 2001; Cooper & Sawaf, 1997; Dirkx, 2001; Goldstein, 1998, 2002; Hargreaves, 1998a, 1998b, 2000; Zembylas, 2005). This effort to reintegrate emotions with reason seems to suggest that it is possible to separate emotion from reason in the rst place. However, as critical histories clearly argue, systems of reason and rationality have always been shaped by emotion, religion, belief systems, and power dynamics: The archaeology of the human sciences has to be established through studying the mechanisms of power which have invested human bodies, acts and forms of behaviour (Foucault, 1980, p. 61; see also Rose, 1989, 1999). The separation of reason and affect perpetuates the assumption that reason is somehow objective and impartial; the separation does not recognize that systems of reason have been produced as the effects of culturally and historically specic power relations that always entail an array of human faculties. Second, the feelings that are identied as aspects of the affective domaintrust, caring, and safetyhave also been constructed in histori-

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cally specic circumstances. To essentialize these affective aspects is to assume the universality and naturalness of feelings that are culturally and historically specic. In other words, comfort has no essential meaning; there is no reason to assume that an atmosphere that feels safe, welcoming, and caring to one person will feel that way to another person. More important, when people acknowledge difference in anything but trivial ways, that experience can be expected to be precisely unfamiliar, and therefore uncomfortable and disconcerting. People who face systematic injustices daily generally recognize that feelings of trust and safety are not prerequisites of participation, but privileges endowed by existing hierarchies. Therefore, it is misguided to require a sense of caring or safety as a basis for community because these dimensions are neither universal nor natural. People learn to recognize when they are supposed to feel safe and when they are not as discourses of community are circulated and reiterated. Some researchers call for a community in which such things as participation and safety are negotiated among members. For example:
Democratic community is aimed not just at improving student behavior but at creating the kinds of ties that bond students together and students and teachers together and that bind them to shared ideas and ideals. When students share the responsibility for developing norms and when their commitment to these norms is expected, they know they belong. They get the message that they are needed. They experience community. (Sergiovanni, 1994, pp. 120121)

However, processes of negotiation and dialogue are not neutral or immune from cultural bias. Norms of interaction will always favor some and exclude others. Even when norms of behavior are stated in such seemingly innocuous terms as respect, those norms generally remain unspecied: Under what circumstances are humor and laughter considered respectful? How much time between conversational turn taking does courtesy require? How loud can voices be? What terms of address are acceptable? What observations should remain politely unspoken? What vocabulary is uncouth? What rhythm of eye contact feels impertinent? What body postures appear offensive? As abstract concepts, comfort and respect are easy to afrm. However, in practice (as operationalized behaviors) comfort and respect are not the same to all people in all places. Therefore, affective bases for community can be just as exclusive as they are inclusive. More importantly, even when communities ostensibly establish their own norms, they fail to recognize the power that circulates as socialization or governmentality. Negotiations about norms are shaped by a variety of expectations that include reliance on modern expertise. As Rose (1989) has argued extensively:
Yet our conceptions of normality are not simply generalizations from our accumulated experience of normal children. On the contrary, criteria of normality are elaborated by experts on the basis of their claims to a scientic knowledge of

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childhood and its vicissitudes. . . . [E]xpert notions of normality are extrapolated from our attention to those children who worry the courts, teachers, doctors, and parents. (p. 131)

As Rose points out, what we understand to be respect is a conglomeration of expert advice, television images, intimate encounters, stereotypes, and ethical commitments. Third, assumptions about community can construct enemies in attempts to prevent extremism, fragmentation, and alienation. One corollary of demarcation of community is the simultaneous construction of ally and enemy, same and Other. The prospects of building community in response to an enemy threat are not new. Nations, gangs, tribes, and movements have typically established their unity and identity not on the basis of what they support but on the basis of what they oppose. In his provocatively titled book, Democracy Without Enemies, Beck (1998) points out the ways communities create enemies:
In all previously existing democracies, there have been two types of authority: one coming from the people and the other coming from the enemy. Enemy stereotypes empower. Enemy stereotypes have the highest conict priority. They make it possible to cover up and force together all the other social antitheses. One could say that enemy stereotypes constitute an alternative energy source for consensus. (p. 143)

After historicizing the relationship between communities and enemies, Beck argues that the current historical milieu, after postmodernity, is comprised of a new constellation of social relations. Fourth, like Rose, Beck (1998) argues that it does not make sense anymore to talk about an agonistic or dichotomous relation between the individual and the collective: Individualization therefore, to pick out one peculiarity, is a collective fate, not an individual one (p. 34). Beck uses problematic terms such as imposed freedom, programmed individualism, and do-it-yourself biography to convey that the idea of a modern autonomous individual is anachronistic:
But what drives millions of people in all the countries of the globe, seemingly as individuals but actually following a generally shared dream, to break out of marriage and live together in sin outside of the comfortable legal safety net? Is this a type of ego fever that can be treated by hot compresses of us? Not likely. A new relationship between individual and society is announcing itself here. (p. 35).

The simultaneous construction of community and enemy is analogous to the processes of inclusion and exclusion. The discourse creating communities/enemies entails appeals to nationalism, pride, and a sense of belonging. Insofar as community is constructed as an emotional bond, the discourse of psychology, which deals with the domain of affect, gets folded into the meaning of community.

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Educational psychology has based discussions about community on assumptions about identity. For example, Wengers (1998) communities of practice are delimited by participation and nonparticipation:
When communities dene themselves by contrast to othersworkers versus managers; collaborating versus rebellious students; or, more broadly, one ethnic, religious, or political group versus anotherbeing inside implies, and is largely dened in terms of, being outside. This situation makes boundary crossing difcult, because each side is dened by opposition to the other and membership in one community implies marginalization in another. (p. 168)

This construction of community is infused with assumptions about identity, which usually connotes coherence, individuality, or ascription. In a landscape dened by boundaries and peripheries, a coherent identity is of necessity a mixture of being in and being out (Wenger, 1998, p. 165). When identity is assumed to be coherent, then community membership becomes the problematic issue: we dene who we are by the ways we experience our selves through participation as well as by the ways we and others reify our selves. . . . We dene who we are by the ways we reconcile our various forms of membership into one identity (Wenger, 1998, p. 149). Modern identity is commonly understood in terms of demographic ascriptionslike race, class, and genderthat rely on sociological categories (Castel, 1991; Hacking 1990; Popkewitz, 1998). A great deal of educational research on community understands difference in those terms. But other, more nuanced versions of diversity have become available in postcolonial literature. Cameron McCarthy, for example, has advanced theories of race in terms of nonsynchrony (1990) and counterpoint (1995) that disavow unities of race and identity:
I offer a critique of essentialist theories of race. I suggest that such theories have limited explanatory and predictive capacity with respect to the operation of race in education and in daily life. Further, I argue that one cannot understand race, paradoxically, by looking at race alone. (1990, p. 246)

When constructions of identity are problematized, constructions of community, Otherness, and inclusion are also disrupted. In recognition of the theoretical difculties inherent in the term community, Lynda Stone (1993) has proposed the term heteromity, saying, I think the time has come to disavow community because the concept itself carries the historical and ideological baggage of the failures of western liberal association (p. 98, italics in original). She characterizes heteromity as being uid, decentered, and differentiated. Both McCarthy and Stone contribute dimensions of the discourse of community that avoid assimilation and homogeneity.

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CONCLUSION The deployment of community as a way to think about relations in educational research is bolstered by compelling appeals to third-way moderation, solidarity for empowerment, and emotional comfort. Through these discursive mechanisms, community is a problem for Others. The discourse of community has become a mechanism of governance and a forum for specifying norms and rules of participation. At the same time, the connotations of the word community and its associations with moderation, empowerment, and caring open new doors of research and analysis. Qualitative studies in education are designed to measure the degree of emotional attachment among working groups of teachers; policy research contrasts successful schools with failing schools and concludes that success is both correlated with and caused by a feeling of intimacy between school and community; trust and friendship become quantiable and calculable in case studies of mentor teachers relationships with their apprentices; and textbooks of teaching methods provide rubrics that evaluate the degree to which a lesson on punctuation contributes to a sense of belonging in the classroom. The ideal of the educated person constructed through the discourse of community becomes one who takes on personal responsibility for regulating his or her moral welfare as a member of a community. As Rose (2000) writes:
Those who refuse to become responsible and govern themselves ethically have also refused the offer to become members of our moral community. Hence, for all of them, harsh measures are entirely appropriate. Three strikes and you are out. Citizenship becomes conditional on conduct. The counterpart to the moralism of these community-based programs is the enhancement of the powers of the penal and psychiatric complexes and the transformation of social workers and other caring professionals [e.g., educators] into agencies of control concerned with risk management and secure containment.

The spirit of community that Rose highlights is enacted in schools through zero-tolerance policies and Ritalin prescriptions. Research and discussion about community has recently overshadowed educational debates that have been cast for centuries in terms of society and democracy. Casting the debate in terms of community is no more or less restrictive, oppressive, or disciplinary than casting the debate in terms of society or democracy. However, when associations and relationships in education are framed in terms of society and democracy, different kinds of questions rise to prominence. For example, Gutmann and Thompsons (1996) inuential work, Democracy and Disagreement, analyzed the political consequences of various models of democracy: procedural, constitutional, and deliberative. When educational debates are framed in these terms, research asks other questions and evaluates other dynamics: Are the rules of behavior explicit and applicable to everyone? On what grounds is com-

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pliance justied? What sorts of actions constitute transgressions? So the criteria for participation stipulated in a democracy discourse are different from the criteria stipulated in a community discourse. Young (1990), whose work focuses on the politics of difference, argues that community aspirations are fraught with dead ends. She writes:
Too often contemporary discussion of these issues sets up an exhaustive dichotomy between individualism and community. Community appears in the oppositions of individualism/community, separated self/shared self, private/public. But like most such terms, individualism and community have a common logic underlying their polarity, which makes it possible for them to dene each other negatively. Each entails a denial of difference and a desire to bring multiplicity and heterogeneity into unity, though in opposing ways. (pp. 228229)

Most educational research about community cites Young as well as Gutmann and Thompson. But the community debates in educational research are not only about political theories of justice and inclusion. These debates are folded into issues of school safety, accountability, and management. When safety is a primary concern, there is resistance to the idea of politicizing the debates about school management. Community carves out a space for discussion that feels politically neutral, and therefore less alienating, less threatening, and less divisive. The idea is to bring people together, so third-way thinking ts the bill by appearing to be moderate and centrist. Solidarity provides a sense of security in the face of enemies, and a sense of identity in encounters with others.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am grateful for many critical readings and generous contributions to my thinking about this paper. My heartfelt thanks go to the Research Community Philosophy and History of the Discipline of Education, in Leuven, Belgium; to my colleagues Dorothea Anagnostopoulos, Steve Ryan, and BetsAnn Smith; and to the editors and ve anonymous reviewers at Curriculum Inquiry.

NOTES
1. Examples of work in education that dene community as common ground include Allen (2000), Arthur (2000), Calderwood (2000), Fine, Weis, & Powell (1997), Guarasci & Cornwell (1997), Retallick, Cocklin, & Coombe (1999), Salomone, (2000), Sergiovanni (1994), and Tierney (1993). 2. See, for example, Boyle-Baise (1999), hooks (2003), Miele (2004).

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3. See, for example, Brown & Campione (1994, 1996), Lave & Wenger (1991). 4. See, for example, Keiffer-Barone (2005), Rico & Shulman (2004), Shulman & Sherin (2004). 5. The major pieces of literature included for analysis in this paper are Journal of Curriculum Studies from 2004, vol. 36, no. 2 (a recent special-topics issue that contains nine articles on community in educational research); Redding & Thomas (2001) (a compilation of 10 years of articles in School Community Journal ); Sergiovanni (1994) and Etzioni (1995) (which have been widely cited in educational literature); Salomone (2000); and Lave & Wenger (1991). 6. I drew from elds other than education as a strategy to gain perspective on assumptions that were embedded in educational discourses of community, for example, Beck (1998); Guttmann & Thompson (1996); Laclau (1992); McCarthy (1990); Rose (1989, 1999, 2000); Scott (1992); Young (1986). 7. Popular press has dubbed this Goldilocks politics in reference to that folktales refrain of not too hot; not too cold; just right.

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