Macoco vs. Diaz 70 Phil 97 (1940) A complaint for malpractice filed by one Marcelino Macoco against Esteban B.

Diaz, attorney-at-law, with license to practice in Philippine courts. In order to redeem a property belonging to his wife's father, which had been levied upon sold at public auction, complainant Marcelino Macoco deposited with the provincial sheriff of Ilocos Norte the sum of P380. As no redemption could be done, the money was returned by the sheriff to one Alberto Suguitan, then counsel for Marcelino Macoco. Suguitan used the money according to himself and failed to turn it over to Macoco; whereupon, the latter entrusted its collection to respondent herein, Esteban B. Diaz. It appears that Diaz succeeded in collecting P300 from Suguitan, but he also misappropriated this amount. Respondent admitted the misappropriation. He averred, however, that he had an agreement with Macoco for the payment of the money by him misappropriated; that when this agreement failed, he again entered into a similar arrangement with Hermenegildo Galapia, Lope Ragragola and Pedro Ragragola, who, as he attempted to prove, were the persons to whom the sum of P300 was really due, Macoco being merely a trustee thereof; and that in pursuance of this arrangement whereby he would pay the sum of P300, deducting therefrom 20 per cent for his attorney's fees, he had already made partial payments to said persons. Macoco, however, and Lope Ragragola denied this agreement. Whatever might have been the agreement and with whomsoever respondent might have entered it into, the undeniable fact remains that he misappropriated the money in breach of trust. This makes him unfit for the office of an attorney-atlaw. And his being a deputy fiscal and not law practitioner at the time of the misappropriation, far from mitigating his guilt, aggravates it. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office. Wherefore, respondent Esteban B. Diaz is hereby disbarred from the practice of law, and is hereby ordered to surrender his certificate to the clerk of court within five days from notice. This Solicitor General is hereby ordered to investigate the conduct of Attorney Alberto Suguitan and file later the corresponding report. FAR EAST SHIPPING CO V CA (PPA) 297 SCRA 30 REGALADO; October 1, 1998 FACTS On June 20, 1980, the M/V PAVLODAR, flying under the flagship of the USSR, owned and operated by the Far Eastern Shipping Company (FESC), arrived at the Port of Manila from Vancouver, British Columbia at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning. The vessel was assigned Berth 4 of the Manila International Port, as its berthing space. Captain Roberto Abellana was tasked by the Philippine Port Authority to supervise the berthing of the vessel. Appellant Senen Gavino was assigned by the Appellant Manila Pilots' Association (MPA) to conduct docking maneuvers for the safe berthing of the vessel to Berth No. 4. Gavino boarded the vessel at the quarantine anchorage and stationed himself in the bridge, with the master of the vessel, Victor Kavankov, beside him. After a briefing of Gavino by Kavankov of the particulars of the vessel and its cargo, the vessel lifted anchor from the quarantine anchorage and proceeded to the Manila International Port. The sea was calm and the wind was ideal for docking maneuvers. When the vessel reached the landmark (the big church by the Tondo North Harbor) one-half mile from the pier, Gavino ordered the engine stopped. When the vessel was already about 2,000 feet from the pier, Gavino ordered the anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. The left anchor, with 2 shackles, were dropped. However, the anchor did not take hold as expected. The speed of the vessel did not slacken. A commotion ensued between the crew members. A brief conference ensued between Kavankov and the crew members. When Gavino inquired what was all the commotion about, Kavankov assured Gavino that there was nothing to it. After Gavino noticed that the anchor did not take hold, he ordered the engines half-astern. Abellana, who was then on the pier apron noticed that the vessel was approaching the pier fast. Kavankov likewise noticed that the anchor did not take hold. Gavino thereafter gave the "full-astern" code. Before the right anchor and additional shackles could be dropped, the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the pier causing considerable damage to the pier. The vessel sustained damage too. Kavankov filed his sea protest. Gavino submitted his report to the Chief Pilot who referred the report to the Philippine Ports Authority. Abellana likewise submitted his report of the incident. The rehabilitation of the damaged pier cost the Philippine Ports Authority the amount of P1,126,132.25. PERTINENT RULES on PILOTAGE The Port of Manila is within the Manila Pilotage District which is under compulsory pilotage pursuant to Section 8, Article III of Philippine Ports Authority Administrative Order No. 03-85: SEC. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service. For entering a harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing through rivers or straits within a pilotage district, as well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or another, every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage. In case of compulsory pilotage, the respective duties and responsibilities of the compulsory pilot and the master have been specified by the same regulation: SEC. 11. Control of vessels and liability for damage. On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the service to a vessel shall be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his

negligence or fault. He can only be absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities provided he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize damage. The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand or overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said Master Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined by competent authority in appropriate proceedings in the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. SEC. 32. Duties and responsibilities of the Pilot or Pilots' Association. The duties and responsibilities of the Harbor Pilot shall be as follows: xxx xxx xxx f) a pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes his work as a pilot thereof until he leaves it anchored or berthed safely; Provided, however, that his responsibility shall cease at the moment the Master neglects or refuses to carry out his order. - Customs Administrative Order No. 15-65 issued twenty years earlier likewise provided in Chapter I thereof for the responsibilities of pilots: Par. XXXIX. A Pilot shall be held responsible for the direction of a vessel from the time he assumes control thereof until he leaves it anchored free from shoal; Provided, That his responsibility shall cease at the moment the master neglects or refuses to carry out his instructions. xxx xxx xxx Par. XLIV. Pilots shall properly and safely secure or anchor vessels under their control when requested to do so by the master of such vessels. ISSUE: WON both the pilot and the master were negligent HELD: YES. The SC started by saying that in a collision between a stationary object and a moving object, there is a presumption of fault against the moving object (based on common sense and logic). It then went on to determine who between the pilot and the master was negligent. PILOT A pilot, in maritime law, is a person duly qualified, and licensed, to conduct a vessel into or out of ports, or in certain waters. He is an expert whos supposed to know the seabed, etc. that a master of a ship may not know because the pilot is familiar with the port. He is charged to perform his duties with extraordinary care because the safety of people and property on the vessel and on the dock are at stake. Capt. Gavino was found to be negligent. The court found that his reaction time (4 minutes) to the anchor not holding ground and the vessel still going too fast was too slow. As an expert he shouldve been reacting quickly to any such happenings. MASTER In compulsory pilotage, the pilot momentarily becomes the master of the vessel. The master, however may intervene or countermand the pilot if he deems there is danger to the vessel because of the incompetence of the pilot or if the pilot is drunk. Based on Capt. Kavankovs testimony, he never sensed the any danger even when the anchor didnt hold and they were approaching the dock too fast. He blindly trusted the pilot. This is negligence on his part. He was right beside the pilot during the docking, so he could see and hear everything that the pilot was seeing and hearing. The masters negligence translates to unseaworthiness of the vessel, and in turn means negligence on the part of FESC. CONCURRENT TORTFEASORS As a general rule, that negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or more efficient causes other than plaintiff's, is the proximate cause of the injury. Accordingly, where several causes combine to produce injuries, person is not relieved from liability because he is responsible for only one of them, it being sufficient that the negligence of the person charged with injury is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have resulted to as great an extent, and that such cause is not attributable to the person injured. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the injury would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other concurrent tortfeasor. Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil Code. Disposition Petition denied. CA affirmed. Capt. Gavino and FESC are solidarily liable.

Aquilino Pimentel vs Attys. Llorente and Salayon Facts: Petitioner, Aquilino Pimentel who was then running for Senator in the 1995 elections filed a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyer's oath. This is in connection with the discharge of their duties as members of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers. Salayon, then election officer of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), was designated chairman of said Board, while Llorente, who was then City Prosecutor of Pasig City, served as its ex oficio vice-chairman as provided by law. Petitioner alleges that, in violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b), respondents tampered with the votes received by him, through illegal padding. He maintains that, by signing the Statements of Votes (SoVs) and Certificate of Canvass (CoC) despite respondents' knowledge that some of the entries therein were false, the latter committed a serious breach of public trust and of their lawyers' oath. Respondents denied the allegations and alleged that the preparation of the SoVs was made by the canvassing committees which the Board had constituted to assist in the canvassing. They claimed that the errors pointed out by complainant could be attributed to honest mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which this matter had been referred, recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration was also denied. He then filed petition before this Court. Issue: Whether or not respondents were guilty of misconduct and violation of the lawyers oath. Holding: What is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per precinct but a systematic scheme to pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expense of petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the election returns. Despite the fact that these discrepancies, especially the double recording of the returns from 22 precincts and the variation in the tabulation of votes as reflected in the SoVs and CoC, were apparent on the face of these documents and that the variation involves substantial number of votes, respondents nevertheless certified the SoVs as true and correct. Their acts constitute misconduct. As a lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer's oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct. In this case, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of office as lawyers to "do no falsehood." The above committed acts would have merited suspension were it not for the fact that this is their first administrative transgression and in the case of Salayon, after a long public service. Under, the circumstances the Court find respondents guilty of misconduct and imposes on each of them a fine in the amount of P10,000.00 with a warning that commission of similar acts will be dealt with more severely. People vs Pablo Esquivel In 1946, a group of armed men robbed two jeepney drivers and divested them of the jeepneys they were driving. They also killed the two drivers. Five of the malefactors were arrested: Amado Dizon, Pablo Esquivel, Ben Pascual, Simplico Navarro and GorgonioRivera. The last two later on became state witnesses. On the strength of these twos testimonies, Dizon, Esquivel, and Pascual were convicted. Only Dizon and Esquivel appealed the conviction. Their appeal is grounded on the fact that Navarros and Riveras testimonies were conflicting. ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction is correct. HELD: No, but only as to the conviction of Esquivel the conviction of Dizon is sustained. It was found by the Supreme Court that in both testimonies sworn by Navarro and Rivera, that Esquivel played no active hand in the commission of the crime. Thetestimonies of the two as to the participation of Esquivel is likewise conflicting as when Rivera testified that it was Esquivel who suggested the killing of the drivers while on the other hand Navarro testified that it was someone else. This was never clarified by the prosecution therefore, Esquivels conviction is based on shaky grounds. The case for the prosecution was not presented with the care and thoroughness which the gravity of the offense demanded. There is absolute necessity for a government prosecutor to lay before the court the pertinent facts at their disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the courts mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecutions prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the state. Trieste vs. Sandiganbayan 145 SCRA 508 Generoso Trieste, Sr., the Municipal Mayor of Numancia, Aklan, was charged by the Tanodbayan with 12 counts of alleged violations of Section 3 (h) of the Anti-Graft Law for having financial or pecuniary interest in a business, contract or transaction in connection with which said accused intervened or took part in his official capacity and in which he is

prohibited by law from having any interest, to wit the purchases of construction materials by the municipality from Trigen Agro-Industrial Development Corporation, of which the accused is the president, incorporator, director and major stockholder. After trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered the challenged decision, convicting the petitioner in all the twelve criminal cases. After the petition for review was filed, petitioner filed an urgent petition to lift the order of the Sandiganbayan. There having no objection coming from the Solicitor General, the petition was granted, hence lifting the preventive suspension. A supplemental petition was also filed by petitioner. The former Solicitor General filed a consolidated comment to the original petition and to the supplemental petition filed by the petitioner. He argued the dismissal of the petition (the urgent petition to lift the order of the Sandiganbayan) on the ground that the same raise factual issues which are, therefore, non-reviewable. In the briefs, however, the new Solicitor General, filed a Manifestation For Acquittal, concluding that: (1) petitioner has divested his interest with Trigen; (2) Sales of stocks need not be reported to Sec; (3) Prosecution failed to prove charges; (4) No evidence to prove petitioner approved payment; (5) Testimonial and documentary evidence confirms that petitioner signed vouchers after payment; etc. Issue: WON the Solicitor General made a conscientious study and thorough analysis in the case. Held: Yes. Considering the correct facts now brought to the attention of the Court by the SolGen and in view of the reassessment made by the Office of the issues and the evidence and the law involved, the Court takes a similar view that the affirmance of the decision appealed from cannot be rightfully sustained. The conscientious study and thorough ananlysis made by the Office of the Solicitor General in this case truly reflects its consciousness of its role as the Peoples Advocate in the administration of justice to the end that the innocent be equally defended and set free just as it has the task of having the guilty punished. This court will do no less and, therefore, accepts the submitted recommendation that the decision and resolution in question of the respondent Sandiganbayan be reversed and that as a matter of justice, the herein petitioner be entitled to a judgment of acquittal. People vs Madera 57 SCRA 349 In April 1970, while Elino Bana was sleeping in his house, he was shot by Raymundo Madera. Behind Madera were Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres. Elino Bana died before he could be brought to the hospital but he made a dying statement wherein he positively identified Madera as his shooter. Two of Banas sons who were at the house when the shooting happened identifiedMadera as the shooter as well as the two behind him. The trial court convicted the three for murder. They appealed. ThenSolicitor General Estelito Mendoza recommended the conviction of Madera but also recommended the acquittal of Marianito andGeneroso. ISSUE: Whether or not the conviction is correct. HELD: No, insofar as Marianito and Generoso is concerned Maderas guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. But Marianitos and Generosos guilt were not established. Their mere presence behind Madera when the latter shot and killed Bana is not constitutive of their guilt without any showing that they shared the criminal intent of Madera. It must be shown that they had knowledge of the criminal intention of the principal, which may be demonstrated by previous or simultaneous acts which contributes to the commission of the offense as aid thereto whether physical or moral. This was absent in the case at bar. The Supreme Court lauded the Solicitor General for recommending the acquittal of the two. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the prosecutors finest hour is not when he wins a case with the conviction of the accused. His finest hour is still when,overcoming the advocates natural obsession for victory, he stands up before the Court and pleads not for the conviction of the accused but for his acquittal. For indeed, his noble task is to prosecute only the guilty and to protect the innocent. PETER PAUL DIMATULAC and VERONICA DIMATULAC vs Hon. Sesinando Villon et al G.R. No. 127107 Oct. 12, 1998 Facts: On or about November 2, 2005 all the accused under the leadership of Mayor Santiago Yabut went to the house of PO3 Virgilio Dimatulac. Some of the accused positioned themselves around the house while the others stood by the truck and the mayor stayed in the truck with the body guard. Accused Billy YAbut, Kati YAbut & Franncisco Yambao went inside the house strongly suggested to go down to see the mayor outside and ask for sorry. As Dimatulac went down to the house and he was shot to kill as a consequence he died. The assistant prosecutor Alfonso Flores found that the Yabuts were in company with one another that the offense committed was only homicide not murder and hereby subject to bail P 20,000.00 for each of the accused. The herein petitioner appealed the resolution of Alfonso Flores to the Secretary of Justice. Pending appeal to the DOJ, Judge Roura hastily set the case for arraignment. Issue: Whether or not arraignment to lesser penalty oh homicide is proper while the case is pending in the DOJ subject for Review. Held: In the case it is not proper. Indubitably then, there was on the part of the public prosecution, indecent haste in the filing of information of homicide ,he should have ask the petitioner as regards to the status of the appeal or warned them

that the DOJ would not decide the appeal within the certain period. It is indubitable that petitioner had the right to appeal to the Secretary of Justice. Section 4 of Rule 112 of the rules of court provides that If upon petition by the proper party the secretary of Justice reverses the resolution of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the fiscal concerned to file the corresponding information without conducting any preliminary investigation to investigate or to dismiss or move for the dismissal of the complaint or information. There is nothing that forecloses the power of authority of the secretary of justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases despite information already having been filed in court. The secretary of justice is only enjoined to refrain far as practicable from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from action of the prosecutor once the complaint or information is filed in court. In Any case, the grant of a motion to dismiss, which the prosecution may file after the secretary of justice reverses an appealed resolution, is subject to the discretion of the court. We do not hesitate to rule that court committed grave abuse of discretion in rushing the arraignment of the Yabuts on the assailed information for homicide. The DOJ could have, even if belatedly, joined cause with petitioners to set aside arraignment. So must it be where the arraignment and plea of not guilty are void. Tatad vs Sandiganbayan 159 SCRA 70 Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavitswere in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of AmityTrading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused. Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law forpreliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavitsand counteraffidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. PEOPLE V PINEDA SANCHEZ; July 21, 1967 FACTS - On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses Teofilo Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in Pugaan City of Iligan, were asleep. It was then that guns (rifle, caliber 22) and paliuntod (homemade gun) were fired in rapid succession from outside the house. Teofilo Mendoza fell dead. Thereafter, defendants below destroyed the door of the house, entered therein, and let loose several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza, all minor children of the couple and wounding Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza. - Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres were indicted before the CFI of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five (5) separate cases for murder. The five informations were based on facts gathered by the prosecuting attorney from his investigation. - Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases (Tomas Narbasa and Tambak Alindo) moved for a consolidation thereof into one (1) criminal case. Their plea is that said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by one impulse. The respondent Judge approved the motion and directed the City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file one single information and drop the other four cases. The City Fiscal sought reconsideration thereof. The respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He took the position that the acts complained of stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on the part of the accused, not by different and separate sets of shots, moved by one impulse and should therefore be treated as one crime though the series of shots killed more than one victim; and that only one information for multiple murder should be filed, to obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one. Hence, this appeal to the Court on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, and for other reliefs. ISSUE WON the City Fiscal shall file only one information. HELD - YES, ruling Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes where a single penalty is to be imposed: first, where a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and, second, when an offense is a

necessary means for committing the other (delito complejo). It is to be borne in mind, at this point, that apply the first half of Article 48, there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law. The respondent Judge reasons out that consolidation of the five cases into one would have the salutary effect of obviating the necessity of trying five cases instead of one. To save time, indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless, the statute confers upon the trial judge the power to try these cases jointly, such that the fear entertained by respondent Judge could easily be remedied. Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan City correctly presented the five separate informations four for murder and one for frustrated murder. A rule of presumption long familiar is that official duty has been regularly performed. A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his conviction. In case of doubt, we should give him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in our courts being unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a criminal suspect's right to due process the sporting idea of fair play may be transgressed. So it is, that in People vs. Sope, the Court made the pronouncement that "it is very logical that the prosecuting attorney, being the one charged with the prosecution of offenses, should determine the information to be filed and cannot be controlled by the off ended party." - The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to be substituted for that of the prosecutor's on the matter of what crime is to be filed in court. The question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating Fiscal. The information he lodges in court must have to be supported by facts brought about by an inquiry made by him. It stands to reason then to say that in a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject to dictation. We are not to be understood as saying that criminal prosecution may not be blocked in exceptional cases. A relief in equity "may be availed of to stop it purported enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly administration of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the statute relied upon is unconstitutional or was held invalid." Nothing in the record would as much as intimate that the present case fits into any of the situations just recited. Disposition The writ of certiorari is granted. City Fiscal of Tacloban vs Espina 166 SCRA 614 (1988) People vs Mendoza 231 SCRA 264 (1994) TAN, JR v GALLARDO 73 SCRA 308 ANTONIO; October 5, 1976 NATURE Original action for certiorari and prohibition FACTS - Solicitor General Estilito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Alicia Simpio-Diy and Solicitor Eduardo L. Kilayko for respondents. Estanisloo A. Fernandez and Dakila F. Castro & Associate as private prosecutors. - petitioners seek the annulment of respondent Judge's Orders in the Criminal Case People of the Philippines v Jorge Tan, Jr, Cesar Tan, Teofanis Bondoc, Osmundo Tolentino, Mariano Bartido and Librado Sode for frustrated murder and Double Murder of the son and uncle of Mayor Inigo Larazzabal. - Judge Pedro Gallardo made the two life sentences to death penalty allegedly after meeting with Mayor Larazzabal and receipt of other paraphernalia such as whisky and wine according to the court stenographer. - Jan 14, 1976 - SolGen, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, submitted his Comment to the petition. They are "persuaded that there are bases for stating that the rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolution on the motion for new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice therefore, they interpose no objection to the remand of the aforementioned criminal cases "for the rendition of a new decision by another trial judge." - Jan 30, 1976 - private prosecutors submitted their Comment in justification of the challenged Orders of the respondent Judge and objected to the remand of this case. - Feb 12, 1976, the petitioners moved to strike out the "Motion to Admit Attacked Comment" and the "Comment" of the private prosecutor on the ground that the latter has "absolutely no standing in the instant proceedings before this Honorable Court and, hence, without any personality to have any paper of his entertained by this Tribunal - private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear before this Court, to take part in the proceedings, and to adapt a position in contravention to that of the Solicitor General. ISSUES 1. WON private prosecutors have the right to intervene independently of the Solicitor General and to adopt a stand inconsistent with that of the latter 2. WON respondent Judge should be disqualified from further proceeding with the criminal cases HELD 1. NO

Ratio Private prosecutors cannot intervene independently of and take a position inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General. Reasoning - Participation of the private prosecution in the instant case was delimited by this Court in its Resolution of October 1, 1975, thus: "to collaborate with the Solicitor General in the preparation of the Answer and pleadings that may be required by this Court." To collaborate means to cooperate with and to assist the Solicitor General. It was never intended that the private prosecutors could adopt a stand independent of or in contravention of the position taken by the Solicitor General. - Since a criminal offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State, it is but natural that the representatives of the State should direct and control the prosecution. > Suarez v Platon: the prosecuting officer "'is the representative not of, an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall he done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one." > People v Esquivel: that there is an absolute necessity for prosecuting attorneys to lay "before the court the pertinent facts at their disposal with methodical and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence, to the end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution's prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the state." - It is for the purpose of realizing the aforementioned objectives that the prosecution of offenses is placed under the direction, control, and responsibility of the prosecuting officer. - Role of the private prosecutors is to represent the offended party with respect to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense. This civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party either expressly waives the civil action or reserves to institute it separately. Thus, "an offended party may intervene in the proceedings, personally or by attorney, specially in case of offenses which can not be prosecuted except at the instance of the offended party The only exception to this is when the offended party waives his right to civil action or expressly reserves his right to institute it after the termination of the case, in which case he lost his right to intervene upon the theory that he is deemed to have lost his interest in its prosecution. in any event, whether an offended party intervenes in the prosecution of a criminal action, his intervention must always be subject to the direction and control of the prosecuting official." > Herrero v Diaz: "intervention of the offended party or his attorney is authorized by section 15 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court, subject to the provisions of section 4 of the same Rule that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the Fiscal." - the position occupied by the offended party is subordinate to that of the promotor fiscal because, as the promotor fiscal alone is authorized to represent the public prosecution, or the People of the Philippine Islands, in the prosecution of offenders, and to control the proceeding, and as it is discretionary with him to institute and prosecute a criminal proceeding, being at liberty to commence it or not or to refrain from prosecuting it or not, depending upon whether or not there is, in his opinion, sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, except when the case is pending in the Court of First Instance, the continuation of the offended party's intervention depends upon the continuation of the proceeding. Consequently, if the promotor fiscal desists from pressing the charge or asks the competent Court of First Instance in which the case is pending for the dismissal thereof, and said court grants the petition, the intervention of the person injured by the commission of the offense ceases by virtue of the principle that the accessory follows the principal. Consequently, as the offended party is not entitled to represent the People of the Philippine Islands in the prosecution of a public offense, or to control the proceeding once it is commenced, and as his right to intervene therein is subject to the promotor fiscal's right of control, it cannot be stated that an order of dismissal decreed upon petition of the promoter fiscal himself deprives the offended party of his right to appeal from an order overrruling a complaint or information, which right belongs exclusively to the promotor fiscal by virtue of the provisions of section 44 of General Orders, No. 58. To permit a person injured by the commission of an offense to appeal from an order dismissing a criminal case issued by a Court of First Instance upon petition of the promoter fiscal, would be tantamount to giving said offended party of the direction and control of a criminal proceeding in violation of the provisions of the above-cited section 107 of General Orders, No. 58. - from the nature of the offense, or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense. - Solicitor General represents the People of the Philippines or the State in criminal proceedings pending either in the Court of Appeals or in this Court. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478, "Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General", provides: SECTION 1. Function and Organization, (1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. * * * The office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government, and as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and functions: (a) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is the party. (k) Act and represent the Republic and/or the people before any court, tribunal, body or commission in any matter, action or proceeding which, in his opinion, affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require. It is evident, therefore, that since the Solicitor General alone is authorized to represent the State or the People of the Philippines the interest of the private prosecutors is subordinate to that of the State and they cannot be allowed to take a stand inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General, for that would be tantamount to giving the latter the direction and control of the criminal proceedings, contrary to the provisions of law and the settled rules on the matter.

2. It is already moot because the judge is no longer in the judicial service DISPOSITION SC grants the petition and hereby remands the case to the trial court in order that another Judge may hear anew petitioners' motion for new trial and to resolve the issue accordingly on the basis of the evidence. Cabral vs Puno 70 SCRA 606 (1976) Caes vs IAC 179 SCRA 54 (1989) People vs Sendaydiego 81 SCRA 120 (1978) PCGG v. SANDIGANBAYAN, et. al. GR No. 151809-12, 12 April 2005, En Banc (Puno, J.) Matter is defined any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law. The act of advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. On July 17, 1987, pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 1 of then President Corazon C. Aquino, the PCGG, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages against respondents Lucio Tan, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos and others referred to as dummies of the Marcoses. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division). In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by means of taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos. Shortly thereafter, respondents Tan, et al. filed with this Court petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction seeking to, among others, nullify the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the comments thereon, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) for proper disposition. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. are represented by their counsel Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, who served as the Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986 during the administration of former President Marcos. The PCGG opined that Atty. Mendozas present appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in the case involving the sequestered shares of stock in Allied Banking Corp. runs afoul of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility proscribing former government lawyers from accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service. ISSUES: Whether or not the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 violates the interdiction embodied in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility HELD: The petition is denied. The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of matter referred to in the rule and, second, the metes and bounds of the intervention made by the former government lawyer on the matter. The American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined matter as any discrete, isolatable act as well as identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law. Beyond doubt, the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at bar is advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila. We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear as daylightin stressing that the drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the scope of the term matter and cannot disqualify. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as x x x drafting, enforcing or interpreting governmentor agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law. The petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading; hence, it has to be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the record is arid as to the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence The client with a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter

The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official independence of lawyers in the government service. The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed with a great degree of independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the trust of their office. Any undue diminution of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on the rule of law. Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 was not yet adopted by the IBP and approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable.