On the Dialogue Form

(c) 2013; 2019; 2024 Bart A. Mazzetti

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1. General accounts of the dialogue form.

Cf. Encyclopaedia Britannica (11th ed., 1911), s.v. “Dialogue”.

DIALOGUE, properly the conversation between two or more persons, reported in writing, a
form of literature invented by the Greeks for purposes of rhetorical entertainment and
instruction, and scarcely modified since the days of its invention. A dialogue is in reality a
little drama without a theatre, and with scarcely any change of scene. It should be illumin-
ated with those qualities which La Fontaine applauded in the dialogues of Plato, namely
vivacity, fidelity of tone, and accuracy in the opposition of opinions. It has always been a
favourite with those writers who have something to censure or to impart, but who love to
stand outside the pulpit, and to encourage others to pursue a train of thought which the
author does not seem to do more than indicate. The dialogue is so spontaneous a mode of
expressing and noting down the undulations of human thought that it almost escapes an-
alysis. All that is recorded, in any literature, of what pretend to be the actual words spoken
by living or imaginary people is of the nature of dialogue. One branch of letters, the drama,
is entirely founded upon it. But in its technical sense the word is used to describe what the
Greek philosophers invented, and what the noblest of them lifted to the extreme refinement
of an art.

The systematic use of dialogue as an independent literary form is commonly supposed to

have been introduced by Plato, whose earliest experiment in it is believed to survive in the
Laches. The Platonic dialogue, however, was founded on the mime, which had been culti-
vated half a century earlier by the Sicilian poets, Sophron and Epicharmus. The works of
these writers, which Plato admired and imitated, are lost, but it is believed that they were
little plays, usually with only two performers. The recently discovered mimes of Herodas
(Herondas) give us some idea of their scope. Plato further simplified the form, and reduced it
to pure argumentative conversation, while leaving intact the amusing element of character-
drawing. He must have begun this about the year 405, and by 399 he had brought the
dialogue to its highest perfection, especially in the cycle directly inspired by the death of
Socrates. All his philosophical writings, except the Apology, are cast in this form. As the
greatest of all masters of Greek prose style, Plato lifted his favourite instrument, the
dialogue, to its highest splendour, and to this day he remains by far its most distinguished
proficient…. (E.G.)

Cf. Frederick J. E. Woodbridge, The Son of Apollo. Themes of Plato (Boston and New
York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1929), pp. 47-58:

The writings have long been called ‘dialogues’. It is a Greek term and probably meant to the
Greek mind something a little different from what it has come to mean with us. It did not
emphasize the mutual participation of the members of a group in a conversation so much as
the listening of its members, interrupted by their questions, doubts, difficulties, assents and
dissents, to a leader who propounds a theme to them and largely controls its development.
Like its [47-48] cognate term ‘dialectic,’ it reflects the fact that the Greeks of Plato’s day, in
their exchange of opinions, were speakers and listeners rather than writers and readers.
Books there were. Men wrote them and read them, but they were more the treasured
possessions of a few than the current medium for the exchange of ideas among the many.
The messenger was more common than the letter. Men did not go to libraries to read. They
went to dinner, to the market-place, to the entrances of theaters, courts and places of
assembly, to the covered walks in gardens and places of exercise, to listen and to talk. Young
men got the rudiments of learning at home, but they got their education through friendly and
intimate association with their elders in public places or by joining a group under the

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leadership of some man who had won distinction in one or more of the varied human
callings. These leaders were sometimes organized into professional groups with more or less
organized places of resort and with traditions and a regimen which savored of antiquity. We
may think of schools, for we have that word from the Greek, but we should remember that,
whereas we say that a young man went to school ‘to study,’ the Greeks said that he went ‘to
hear.’ Aristotle, in saying that ‘of all the senses sight is the most ennobling, but hearing the
most instructive,’ was not making a psychological observation so much as re- [48-49]
cording a recognized fact. We must think primarily of speaking and hearing, and when we
think of Greek philosophy, we should dissociate our minds from the printed page, remem-
bering the dramatic quality of uttered speech with its impact on the ear and its ready
stimulation of gesture and posture of the body, its eloquence and its silence. Indeed, we may
suspect that many an obscurity which we find in ideas – perhaps the ‘ideas’ of Plato even –
reflects a transition from the spoken fluidity of speech to a fixation of it which tended to
make language less a fickle medium of communication and more a stable reflection of
existing things.
The verb ‘to say’ could do duty as an intellectual term, so that in Aristotle’s methodo-
logical writings, Socrates is said to be a man more significantly than he is one, and ‘being’
not so much is as is said in many ways. Speech was, with the Stagirite, as natural an
operation as any other and an outcome of those forces which had produced man, a body and
soul. To get things properly said, therefore, was as much a natural fulfillment of their
possibilities as to get them hot or cold. Thus logic and the logos – both derivatives of the
Greek verb ‘to say’ – in which we have found so many perplexing doctrines and difficulties,
may have been relatively simple things to the Greek mind. Connecting [49-50] as the two
did the natural act of speech and what that act effects, the logic and the logos of things was
probably nothing more strange or mysterious than the ratio – a Latin word for logos – of two
to four. To have things as ideas may have been little more than to transfer them to sight or
ennoble them in vision. Theory, a word taken from the activity of the eye, might come to
take the superior place and turn philosophy into a theory of things, a theoretical life, a
steadfast vision or intuition. Yet the dialogue and dialectic keep the flavor of the spoken
word. Speech was a real power used for influence, persuasion, and effect. Its instrumentation
in words could readily pass from the naturalness of conversation to a deliberate technique
whereby meanings might be clarified and enforced. To say things over and over or through
and through was an effective way of disclosing what a man meant or whether he meant
anything at all. It might carry him to the point where speech failed and left him in no little
wonder, face to face with the unutterable. The dialogues of Plato are performances amply
illustrative of all this, and the methodological writings of Aristotle are consciously system-
atic of it.
There is, then, justification for regarding the Platonic dialogues as the realistic represent-
tation of something habitual rather than the invention of something new. They reflect pop-
ular and familiar usage. They are [51-52] probably much more naïve and true to life than the
philosophical dialogues a modern might write with a sophisticated consciousness of his
method. Stories of conversations they are, told, possibly, for the delight of the recipient
rather than for the deliberate purpose of arriving at a result or propounding a doctrine. Their
frequent inconclusiveness, uncertainty, and lack of definite result may indicate their
faithfulness to fact and not the tentative efforts of their author to reach or suggest
conclusions. The likelihood of this is enhanced by the fact that the dialogue was a recog-
nized literary form. Sophron lay under Plato’s pillow. ‘Socratic Discourses’ were recognized
by Aristotle as one form in which poetic or literary activity expressed itself. They were
written by others than Plato. Indeed, Greek literature, from Homer and Hesiod down, reflects
an audience spoken to, with the dialogue repeatedly appearing in narrative and often with a
quality as dramatic as if it were rendered on a stage. Even the matter-of-fact Thucydides,
when he would acquaint the reader with the motives, reasons, and ideas which moved the
participants in the great war he described by summers and winters, put these participants on

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a stage and let them talk. He expressed his consciousness of what he did and claimed an
effort at exactness of reproduction. To see in the Platonic dialogue, then, anything unusual,
or extraordinary, so far [51-52] as their form is concerned, may be only to reflect the
sentiment of a later time. To expect from them the kind of result that one might expect from
a clearly reasoned treatise may be only to distort their natural purpose and intent. They
exhibit the talking man, speech entangled in its own subtlety, and that may be, as well as any
other, their purpose and intent. It may, too, be the sufficient reason why it is so difficult to
extract a system of philosophy from them.
The dialogues evidently define their own audience. There is a picture of ‘this our Plato’ in
our histories of philosophy, walking or standing in the Academy, lecturing profoundly to
students as a modern professor of philosophy might. It may be correct. It is, however, not a
picture which the reader of the dialogues would draw. In them we are taken not to a
university, but to the steps of a court-house, to the court itself, to a plane tree by a limpid
stream, to a walk on a highway, to the popular resorts of men and boys, to the homes of the
rich, to a dinner of friends, to the prison, to the chamber of death. We do not go to school.
We go to the haunts of men and boys, conscious of a city’s pulsating life, its conflicting in-
terests, its ambiguous practices, its justice and injustice, its realities and its visions, con-
scious above all of man and his loves, of man who would talk himself into conviction only to
find talking inadequate. With generals there is talk [52-53] about courage, with sophists on
wisdom, with rhetoricians on rhetoric, with psychologists on the soul, with friends on
friendship, with politicians on politics, with the pious on piety, with lovers on love, with the
dying on death. Here is no savor of the classroom, no odor of the pedagogue. A curious, ugly
man goes about with his questions and talk springs into being as naturally as blows from a
quarrel. It is not an audience of men and boys in school which the dialogues reflect. It is an
audience of men and boys in a city, playing, loving, ambitious, seeking, perplexed.
If there is any controlling unity in the Platonic dialogues, it is of the kind implied by the
immediately preceding paragraphs. It is a unity of attitude differentiating itself in view of
scenes appropriate to it. There would be justice in comparing Plato to a portrait painter who
chose his subjects because their countenances revealed a character or mood which, seen by
others, would provoke the recognition of a likeness to themselves. The justice lies in this,
that the reader of Plato is pretty sure to have a personal experience, to find his own thoughts
involved in a rather intimate way, which is far more the way of self-reflection than the way
of criticism of what he reads. A probe goes into him exploring places in his mind and char-
acter which are sensitive to the touch. Or, if he does not experience this inward revelation, he
may experience [53-54] an outward one and behold the human scene with a sense of irony,
sympathy, or concern. He may smile or be stirred to think of doing something. For the effect
produced by Plato is easily a wistful detachment from life or an earnest desire to enhance it.
Both motives may interplay, so that one works while one smiles. There is also in the dia-
logues an apparent sense of modernity upon which readers of to-day often comment. The
reason is not that Plato’s ideas are new and ahead of his time, for they are at least as old as
he is and reflected elsewhere in antiquity. The reason is rather that the modernity of Plato is
his clear vision of human nature. He saw Greeks in his city, but he saw men in his imagina-
tion. He could, in a measure, lift them out of their immediate environment of time and place
and exhibit them as almost of any time and place so far as circumstances were similar and
situations comparable. That is why he is read and reread, why interest in him is so little arch-
aeological. This is only saying that his writings are great literature. He belongs to that human
library of books to be read irrespective of the circumstances which produced them. His unity
resides in the characteristic which put him there.
This may be defined as the dramatization of the life of reason. Intellectuality is put on the
human stage to play its part as a character. It is an instrument also, a tool, the means and
method of arriving at sound [54-55] conclusions and regulating profitable action. In the
dialogues, however, it is lifted out of its practical efficacy and let play. It exhibits its humor
and pathos, its comedy and tragedy. It often goes down to its own defeat, defeated by cir-

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cumstance and its own subtlety, broken off by the inevitable intrusion of affairs, mastered by
irrational impulse or seduced by the stories men tell themselves to bolster up a faith they
cannot establish by reason. Plato is credited with being a great logician, a man of power in
argument. He may have been that in the Academy. He is not that in the dialogues. Here we
are confronted with the devices which men use to get the better of themselves and others.
Tricks abound. Words are wrested from their familiar use to perform feats for which they
were never intended. Adjectives turn into nouns which, losing identification with any con-
crete thing, turn the adjectives into shadows of something man never saw. Calling a man
just, instead of being allowed to stand as the commendation of skill in adjusting conflicting
interests as best he can with the least amount of practical damage, is turned into an inquis-
ition of justice which seems to demand the institution of the perfect city before man can be
just at all. We walk on the earth to get eventually lost in the sky. We cry for a method that
will carry us somewhere, but we are given ‘dialectic’ which is only an invitation to [55-56]
keep on as before, with now this, now that, everlastingly saying yes and no. Now, all this is a
human and not a Platonic peculiarity. This is what we are given to. It is what often turns us
into philosophers. Plato makes a show of it, a veritable drama of the mind. He is the play-
wright of the reason as Euripides is of the emotions. If he has a philosophy, it is philoso-
phizing – the soul operating with the heavenly visions which it sometimes sees and the
earthly limitations which it always knows.
There are, however, restrictions to be put on the attempt to find a unity in any other
fashion. The dialogues are not all such as these paragraphs would make them out to be.
Some of them refuse the characterization altogether and others admit it with difficulty and
straining. The temptation is to pick and choose among them, and the temptation is the
stronger the more conscious we are that there is no sure test of what Plato really wrote. This
temptation will not be here resisted, but it will not issue in an effort to settle questions of
authenticity. Plato suffers little from any disillusionment about his divinity. He rather gains
by a recognition of his humanity. Admitting that he wrote most of what is ascribed to him, it
is surely more extravagant to claim that all the he wrote is excellent than to claim that some
things which he wrote are not. We have little more than dialogues to guide us. [56-57] They
are as uneven in merit as the work of many another to whom greatness is not to be denied.
They abound in trivialities which may have seemed important to the Greeks, but which can
be important to us only through an act of faith. Some of them are about as futile as anything
ever written. A Platonic dialogue of a certain type is very easy to write, for it is possible to
extract from their number a technique and method which some of them do no more than
illustrate, barren of worthy content or imagination. They may have occasional passages
which a reader remembers after he has forgotten what else they contain. It seems at times as
if method and technique had run away with substance and become more important than any
enlightenment of the mind. There are some which express in downright fashion ideas on the
nature of things and on legislation which have, however, little more than archaic interest or
illustrate an immature imagination. Let Plato have written them all, but if he did, then we
have on our hands a problem which we can solve, if we do not pick and choose, only by
forcing upon them an interpretation which must studiously neglect much that they contain.
So here there is to be picking and choosing. Preference will not, however, be given simply
to one dialogue as over against another. Some of them are so preemi- [57-58] nent and so
self-contained that they merit consideration in their own exclusive setting. But even these
will be subordinated in a measure to the themes they illustrate. Accordingly it is with some
of the major themes of Plato that we shall be concerned, themes like love and education and
politics and death. They are pervasive even when Plato may be said to nod. He has done
something with them rather unforgettable when once it has been sympathetically
appreciated. He has caught a distinctly human quality about them and held it a moment for
us to see. There is a severe realism about him which checks the soul in its too ambitious
flight by the intrusion of the body’s presence, disillusioning us often without corrupting us.
He can make us see the futility of thought and yet keep us believing in its efficacy. There is a

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 kind of magic in him which both charms and instructs. We read, sometimes convinced,
always allured. As we read, there recur again and again the themes with which man ever
busies himself. We see man as Prometheus, no longer a hero in a legend, but still intelligence
in chains which he need not break to be free.

N.B. As stated in the first text excerpted above, “The Platonic dialogue…was founded on
the mime, which had been cultivated half a century earlier by the Sicilian poets, Sophron
and Epicharmus”. On the nature of this form cf. the following witnesses:

2. On mimos or ‘mime’ in relation to dialogue.

Cf. Aristotle, On Poets (72 Rose, from Ath. 505 c) (tr. W. D. Ross):

Are we then to deny that the so-called mimes of Sophron, which are not even in metre, are
stories1 and imitations, or the dialogues of Alexamenos of Teos, which were written before
the Socratic dialogues?

Cf. Seth Benardete and Michael Davis, Aristotle – “On Poetics” (South Bend, Indiana, St.
Augustine’s Press: 2002), p. 4:

Athenaeus alludes to this passage at 11.112 (505C): “Aristotle in his About the Poets writes
as follows: ‘Are we not to assert that the completely unmetrical mimes of Sophron are
stories (logoi)2 and imitations, or those of Alexamenus the Tean written before the Socratic
dialogues?’”

For his one reference to this form appearing in our texts of the Poetics, cf. ch. 1 (1447a 28
—1447b 11) (tr. B.A.M.):

But the arts that imitate by bare speech alone, or by metres, either mixing these with each
other or using some one kind of metre, happen to be without a name up to now. 3 For we have
no common name for the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus and the Socratic discourses....

Cf. Anonymous Prologue I (3.11-13). In: L. G. Westerink, Anonymous Prolegomena to

Platonic Philosophy (North Holland Publishing Co.: Amsterdam, 1962), p. 6:

e)zh/lwsen de\ kai\ Sw/fona to\n gelwtopoio/n, th\n
mimhtikh\n w)/sper katorqw=sai boulo/-menoj: o( ga\r
dialo/goj gra/fwn mi/mhsin pro-sw/pwn ei)sa/gei.
He [Plato] imitated also the mimes of Sophron
to complete, as it were, his technique of
character-drawing; for writing dialogues means
portraying characters.

Note that the text from the Poetics determines a common means of imitation, namely, in
bare speech alone—that is to say, in speech without metre; but the text from the
Anonymous Prologue indicates that the object imitated includes character-drawing.

For a definition furnished by a Roman grammarian, cf. Diomedes, Ars Grammatica 3, Cap.
de Poematibus (ed. Keil, tr. Wm. W. Fortenbaugh, n. 708) (tr. rev. B.A.M.):

1
On Ross’s translation of logos here, cf. the excerpt from W.K.C. Guthrie infra.
2
N.B. Logoi certainly means ‘speeches’ or ‘discourses’ and not ‘stories’.
3
Clearly, the texts which supply the term epopoeia here are mistaken, as there is no evidence that the name
for epic poetry was ever applied to the mimos, let alone Socratic Discourses.

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 Mime is an imitation of any irreverent speech or movement, or of disgraceful deeds and
words involving lewdness. It is defined by the Greeks as follows: ‘Mime is an imitation of
life, encompassing things permitted and things forbidden’.

3. Was Alexamenus of Teos the first to write Socratic dialogues?

As W.K.C. Guthrie explains,1 with respect to the Aristotle’s claim about the dia-
logues of Alexamenus of Teos, there are two readings of the text:

The much-discussed fragment of Aristotle’s dialogue On Poets (72 Rose, from Ath. 505 c),
with its doubtful points of reading, adds nothing. In Ross’s translation (p. 73) it runs: ‘Are
we then to deny that the so-called mimes of Sophron, which are not even in metre, are logoi
[to accept Ross’s ‘stories’ here would be misleading] and imitations, or the dialogues of
Alexamenos of Teos, which were written before the Socratic dialogues?’ (If the MS prw/touj,
emended by Kaibel to pro/teron, is correct, the only difference is that the other-wise unknown
Alexamenos is himself being called the first writer of Socratic dialogues.

Cf. Richard Janko, Aristotle, Poetics I, with the Tractatus Coislinianus, a hypothetical re-
construction of Poetics II, the fragments of the On poets (Indianapolis-Cambridge, 1987),
pp. 176-177, Notes to page 56:

1(a) ( = frag. 72R) This fragment is quoted verbatim by the encyclopedist Athenaeus (ca 200
A.D.), Intellectuals at Dinner XI 505C. It probably comes from an argument that poetry
should be defined according to REPRESENTATION, in which Aristotle pointed out that
prose works like mimes and Socratic dialogues are representations even though they are not
in verse; he makes the same point at Poetics 47b10-11. The whole passage reads: Plato, who
“in his Republic expelled Homer and representational poetry, himself wrote dialogues in a
representational way, but was not even the discoverer of their form himself. For before him
Alexamenus of Teos discovered this kind of [prose] works, as Nicias of Nicaea reports, and
Sotion. Aristotle in his On Poets writes as follows . . . ” (frag. 1(a) begins) It is unlikely that
Aristotle himself directly criticised Plato by name for denouncing poetic representation in
dialogues that are themselves representational in form; had he done so, we would surely
have heard of it.

I would translate the passage slightly differently: “Therefore are we not to say that, even
though they are not in metre [oude emmetros], the so-called mimes of Sophron are dis-
courses [or ‘speeches’] and imitations [logous kai mimêseis], or the Socratic dialogues [Sô-
kratikôn dialogôn] of Alexamenus of Teos, the first that were written [tous prôtous graph-
entas]?” Perhaps “discourses and imitations” here should be understood as “discourses as
well as imitations”, taking the kai [= ‘and’] as explanatory, rather than as conjunctive.

But, as Guthrie has pointed out, if proteron is read, the text states that the dialogues of
Alexamenus were written before the Socratic kind; if prôtous, that Alexamenus was the
first to write Socratic dialogues; that is to say, Aristotle wrote that Alexemenos of Teos
was the first to write dialogues, not Socratic dialogues.

In this regard, cf. Benardete and Davis, op.cit., p. 4:

1
Cf. A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. IV, Plato: the man and his dialogues, earlier period (Cambridge
University Press: 1969), p. 12.

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 Athenaeus alludes to this passage at 11.112 (505C): “Aristotle in his About the Poets writes
as follows: ‘Are we not to assert that the completely unmetrical mimes of Sophron are
stories (logoi)2 and imitations, or those of Alexamenus the Tean written before the Socratic
dialogues?’”

Also in this regard, consider the following:

Cf. Aristotle, frag. 72R. ap. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Famous Philosophers III 48 (=
Janko 1987, p. 56, 2., rev. B.A.M.) (= The Fragments of the On Poets) (Greek ed. LCL 184
added by B.A.M.):

They say that Zeno of Elea was first to write dialogues [Dialogous…grapsai]; but Aristotle
in the first book of his On Poets says it was Alexamenus of Styrea or Teos.

Cf. Janko 1987, pp. 176-177, Notes to page 56:

2 ( = frag. 73R.) This too is from Diogenes Laertius, III 37. It may not be a verbatim
quotation, but a paraphrase of what Aristotle says more obliquely in frag. 1.

Clearly, the witness of Diogenes Laertius supports the reading of Benardete and Davis, a
reading with which I agree.

4. Definitions if Mimos.

MIMOS (MIMUS, MIME). According to Aristotle, (1) one of the arts which (like
the Socratic discourses) imitates in bare speech alone Poetics, ch. 1 (1447a 28—1447b 11);
seeing that “the completely unmetrical mimes of Sophron are discourses (logoi) and
imitations”, as are “those of Alexamenus the Tean written before the Socratic dialogues”
(On Poets, ap. Athanaeus 11.112 [505C] tr. Benardete and Davis, rev. B.A.M.); in
common with such Sôkratikoi logoi, the Socratic ‘discourses’ or speeches, both involve
ethopoiia, the portrayal or depiction of character, although the former were acted out,
whereas the latter were narrative (B.A.M., but implied by Aristotle); as defined by a
Roman grammarian, (2) “the mime is an imitation of any speech and movement lacking
reverence, or an imitation of disgraceful words and deeds involving lewdness. It is defined
by the Greeks in the following manner: Mime is an imitation of life, encompassing things
permitted and things forbidden” (Diomedes, Ars Grammatica 3, Cap. De Poematibus, tr.
William W. Fortenbaugh, slightly rev. B.A.M.), a definition bringing out the licentious
character of a certain kind of mimos.

5. The mime compared to the dialogue.

According to Aristotle, then, the mime as composed by Sophron and Xenarchus

was an art which imitates in bare speech alone—that is, without metre, or, as we would
say, ‘in prose’. Although he does not mention the fact in this place, it was dramatic in
manner, and so was acted out rather than narrated. Hence, we take two things from
Aristotle in the Poetics, one stated explicitly, the other implicit: With respect to means,
mime is an art of imitating in bare speech alone; but with respect to manner, it is acted out

2
N.B. As Guthrie pointed out above, logoi certainly means ‘speeches’ or ‘discourses’ and not ‘stories’.

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rather than narrated. In common with the Socratic discourses, which are dialogues, it also
involves ethopoiia, the portrayal or depiction of character.

Mimos is the art which is imitative in being acted out but not in metre.
Dialogos is the art which is imitative in narrative but not in metre.1

6. The dialogue form according to classical sources.

Cf. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, III. 48, “Plato” (tr. R. D. Hicks,
ed. LCL 184), pp. 319-321:

47. Now, as you are an enthusiastic Platonist, and rightly so, and as you eagerly seek out
that philosopher’s doctrines in preference to all others, I have thought it necessary to give
some account of the true nature of his discourses, the arrangement of the dialogues, and the
method of his inductive procedure, as far as possible in an elementary manner and in main
outline, in order that the facts I have collected respecting his life may not suffer by the
omission of his doctrines. For in the words of the proverb, it would be taking owls to Athens,
were I to give you of all people the full particulars.

48. They say that Zeno the Eleatic was the first to write dialogues. But, according to
Favorinus in his Memorabilia, Aristotle in the first book of his dialogue On Poets asserts
that it was Alexamenus of Styra or Teos. In my opinion Plato, who brought this form of
writing to perfection, ought to be adjudged the prize for its invention as well as for its
embellishment. A dialogue is a discourse consisting of question and answer on some
philosophical or political subject, with due regard to the characters of the persons introduced
and the choice of diction. Dialectic is the art of discourse by which we either refute or
establish some proposition by means of question and answer on the part of the interlocutors.

Cf. idem in an alternate translation.

They say now, that Zeno, the Eleatic, was the first person who composed essays in the
form of dialogue. But Aristotle, in the first book of his treatise on Poets, says that Alexander,
a native of Styra, or Teos, did so before him, as Phavorinus also says in his Commentaries.
But it seems to me that Plato gave this kind of writing the last polish, and that he has there-
fore, a just right to the first honour, not only as the improver, but also as inventor of that kind
of writing. Now, the dialogue is a discourse carried on by way of question and answer, on
some one of the subjects with which philosophy is conversant, or with which statesmanship
is concerned, with a becoming attention to the characters of the persons who are introduced
as speakers, and with a careful selection of language governed by the same consideration.
And dialectics is the art of conversing, by means of which we either overturn or establish the
proposition contended for, by means of the questions and answers which are put in the
mouths of the parties conversing. Now, of the Platonic discourse there are two characteristics
discernible on the very surface; one fitted for guiding, the other for investigating.
The first of these has two subordinate species, one speculative, the other practical; and of
these two again, the speculative is divided into the natural and the logical, and the practical
into the ethical and the political. Again, the kind fitted for investigating has also two primary
divisions with their separate characteristics, one object of which is simply practice, the other
being also disputatious: and the first of these two is again subdivided into two; one of which

1
Compare Aristotle’s description of epopoiia as “the art which is imitative in narrative and in metre [peri de
tês diêgêmatikês kai en metrôi mimêtikês]” (Poet. 23, 1459a 17).

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 may be compared to the art of the midwife, and the other is at it were tentative; the
disputatious one is also divided into the demonstrative and the distinctive.
But we are not unaware that some writers distinguish the various dialogues in a different
manner from what we do. For they say that some of them are dramatic, and others narrative,
and others of a mixed nature. But they, in this division, are classifying the dialogues in a the-
atrical rather than in a philosophical manner. Some of the dialogues also refer to subjects of
natural philosophy, such as the Timaeus. Of the logical class there are the Politics, the
Cratylus, the Parmenides, and the Sophist. Of the ethical kind there is the Defence of
Socrates, the Crito, the Phaedo the Phaedrus, the Banquet, the Menexenus the Clitiphon, the
Epistles, the Philebus, the Hipparchus and the Rival Lovers.

Of the political class there is the Republic the Laws, the Minos, the Epinomis, and the
Atlanticus. Of the midwife description we have the two Alcibiades’s, the Theages, the Lysis,
the Laches. Of the tentative kind, there is the Euthyphro, the Meno, the Ion, the Charmides,
and the Theaetetus. Of the demonstrative description, we have the Protagoras, and of the
distinctive class the Euthydemus, the two Hippias’s, and the Gorgias. And this is enough to
say about the dialogues as to what they are, and what their different kinds are.

Cf. The Introduction of Albinus to the Dialogues of Plato. In The Works of Plato, Vol. 6.
London, tr. George Burges (1885), pp. 315-322.

[1.] That1 for a person about to enter upon2 the Dialogues of Plato, it is fitting that he
should know previously what a Dialogue is. For neither without some art and power3 have
dialogues been written, nor is it easy for a person, unskilled in contemplation, to know them
artistically. It is agreeable then for a philosopher, who is making for himself an insight into
every matter of whatever kind, to examine, (first,) 4 the essence of the thing, and afterwards,
what power it has, and not with reference to what is naturally useful and what is not. Now
(Plato) says thus—5 “On every matter, O boy, there is one commencement to those about to
consult properly. It is needful to know, about what is the consultation; or else there must
needs be an erring in this matter. Now it lies hid from the majority, that they do not know the
essence of each thing; (but), as if they did know, they do not, at the commencement [315-316]
1
From the word (/Oti, here and elsewhere, it is evident that the whole of this Introduction is merely
an extract from a longer treatise.
2
I have translated, here and elsewhere, e)ntuxxa/nein, “to enter upon,” or “to meet with,” as being a
meaning more nearly allied to the derivation of the word than “to read,” the sense given by others.
3
Perhaps “meaning” would be the proper rendering.
4
I have translated, as if me\n had dropt out after th\n, to answer e)/peita—
5
In Phaedr. p. 237, C § 29, from whence Fischer reads here peri tou=to instead of para\tou=to.

of the inquiry, agree (amongst themselves), 1 but as they proceed, 2they pay the reasonable
(penalty);2 for they agree neither with themselves nor with others.” In order then that we may
not suffer this,3 while entering upon the Dialogues of Plato, let us consider this very thing,
which I have spoken of, what is a dialogue. [For neither without some art and power have
dialogues been written.]4 It is then nothing else than a discourse composed of question and
answer upon some political or philosophical matter, combined with a becoming delineation
of the manners of the characters introduced, and the arrangement as regards their diction. 5
[2.] Now a dialogue is called a discourse, as a man (is called) an animal. But since of a
discourse there is one kind arranged (in the mind) 6 and another pronounced (by the mouth),7
let us hear about the one pronounced (by the mouth). And since of the latter there is one kind
spoken, as a continued narration, and another by question and answer, questions and answers
are the peculiar mark of a dialogue; from whence it is said to be a discourse 8 by interro-
gation; and moreover9 it is applied to some political and philosophical matter; because it is

10
meet for the subject matter to be related to the dialogue. 10 Now the matter is that relating to
politics and philosophy.11 For as the matter of fable is laid down as adapted to tragedy and
poetry in general, so is to dialogue philosophy, that is (to say), what relates to philosophy.
But as regards that, which is combined with a becoming deline- [316-317]
1
So Heindorf explains diomologou=ntai, which Fischer has restored here, in lieu of ou)de
o(mologou=ntej, from the passage referred to. For the active o(mologou=ntej would require e(autoi=j,
as shown by Alcibiad. I. p. 111, E, quoted by Heindorf, o(i polloi\ dokou=si soi\ o(mologein au)toi
e(autoi=j.
2
So Heindorf understands to\ ei)ko\j a)podido)asi.
3
One would prefer to\ au)to\, “in the same way”.
4
The words between the brackets are evidently a needless repetition.
5
The same definition of a dialogue is found in Diogen. L., iii. 48
6
I have added the words between the lines for the sake of perspicuity.
7
I have added the words between the lines for the sake of perspicuity.
8
I have translated, as if the Greek were o(/qen lo/goj, not o(/qen o( lo/goj—where the article is
improperly introduced.
9
I have translated, as if the Greek were e)/ti de\, not to\ de\—
10
One would expect here lo/g%, not dialo/g%.
11
To complete the definition, one would have expected to find something added to this effect, “which
is discussed the best during a dialogue.”

ation of the manners of the characters introduced, (and) their being different in their
discourses through life, some as philosophers, and others as sophists, it is requisite to assign
to each their peculiar manners; to the philosopher that, which is noble and simple, and truth-
loving; but to the sophist that, which is of many hues, and tricky, and reputation-loving; but
to an individual what is peculiar to him. Added to this, 1 (the definition) speaks likewise of
the arrangement,1 as regards their diction; and reasonably so. For as 2 the measure ought to
be2 adapted to tragedy and comedy, and the fiction (of the subject) to the bruited story, so
ought the diction and the composition, adapted to the dialogue, possess what belongs 3to the
grace of an Attic style,3 and is neither superfluous nor deficient.
1
I have translated, as if o( o(/roj\, had dropt out before fhsi— and peri\ after kataskeuh=j— Fabricius
too perceived that peri was wanting here.
2
Here too I have translated, as if the Greek were oi)kei=on ei)=nai to\ me/tron—not to\ oi)kei=on
me/tron.
3
The Greek is )Attiko\n to\ eu)\xari—as if two things were mentioned; whereas, since to\ )Attiko\n
is eu)\xari, the author probably wrote, what I have translated, tou= )Attikou= to\ eu)\xari—

[3.] But if a so-called discourse, not being made in the form, as I have laid down, but
deficient on these points, is said to be a dialogue, it will not be said correctly. 4Thus that,
which is said in the case of Thucydides to belong to the power to represent the peculiarity of
dialogues, but rather two public speeches composed on set purpose against each other. 4—
Since then we have ascertained what is a dialogue, let us look into the different kinds of the
Platonic dialogue, that is, into their characteristics, how many are the topmost, 5 and how
many of them 6exist subdivided into the uncut.6
[4.] As regards their characteristics, which are two, one explanatory and the other
exploratory, the explanatory is suited to the teaching and practice of truth, but the explora-
[317-318]
1
I have translated, as if o( o(/roj\, had dropt out before fhsi— and peri\ after kataskeuh=j— Fabricius
too perceived that peri was wanting here.
2
Here too I have translated, as if the Greek were oi)kei=on ei)=nai to\ me/tron—not to\ oi)kei=on
me/tron.

11
3
The Greek is )Attiko\n to\ eu)\xari—as if two things were mentioned; whereas, since to\ )Attiko\n
is eu)\xari, the author probably wrote, what I have translated, tou= )Attikou= to\ eu)\xari—
4
Such is the literal version of the unintelligible original; where it is to be hoped that some of the
MSS., not hitherto collated, either exhibit what the author wrote, or furnish a clue to it.
5
On the uncertainty in the meaning of oi( a)nwta/tw, see in the Life of Plato by Diogenes, § 49.
6
I confess I cannot understand the words between the numerals, and especially how the middle aor.,
e)sth/santo, could be found here.

tory to an exercise and conflict,1 and the confutation of falsehood; and while the explanatory
directs its aim to things, the exploratory does so to persons.
[5.] Of the dialogues of Plato there are drawn out in the class of Physics, the Timæus; in
that of Morals, the Apology; in that of Logic, the Theages, Cratylus, Lysis, Sophist, Laches,
(and) Statesman; in that of confutation, the Parmenides (and) Protagoras; in that of
statesmanship, the Crito, Phædon, Minos, Banquet, Laws, Epistles, Epinomis, Menexenus,
Cleitophon, (and) Philebus; in the tentative (class are) the Euthryphron, Meno, Ion, (and)
Charmides; in the obstretrical,2 the Alcibiades; and in the overthrowing, the Hippias,
Euthydemus, (and) Gorgias.
[6.] Since then we have seen their differences, how they exist naturally, and their
characteristics, let us state, in addition, from what dialogues persons must begin their
entrance upon a discourse of Plato. For opinions are different. For some begin with the
Epistles; and some with the Theages. And there are those, who divide the dialogues into
tetrologies;3 and rank as the first tetrology that, which contains the Euthyphron, as in the
charge against Socrates is brought forward; the Apology, since it was necessary for him to
defend himself; the Crito, on account of his staying in prison; and afterwards the Phædon,
since in it Socrates meets with the end of life. And of this 4 opinion are Derkyllides and
Thrasyllus. But they seem to me to have wished to assign an order to the persons (of the
dialogues) and the circumstances of their lives—a matter which is perhaps useful for
something else, but not however for that, which we are wishing now; for we wish to discover
the commencement and arrangement of instruction that is according to wisdom. We say then
that the commencement of a discourse of Plato is not one and de- [318-319]
1
On the difference between gumnesia and a)go)n, as applied to a mental conflict, see at Diogenes’
Life of Plato, §. 49.
2
On the expression “obstretica,” applied to a dialogue, see at Diogenes’ Life of Plato, §. 49.
3
On the so-called Platonic Tetralogies, see Diogenes’ Life of Plato, §. 56.
4
I have adopted, what Fischer suggests, tau/thj before th=j—

fined; for that, being perfect, it is similar to the perfect figure of a circle. For as the
commencement of a circle is not one and defined, so neither is it of a discourse. 1
[7.] We will not however on this account enter upon it in any manner soever, nor
accidentally. For if it is requisite to describe a circle, a person does not describe it, beginning
from any point2 * * * * in whatever state each of us may be with regard to the discourse,
beginning from that he will enter upon the dialogues of Plato. For there is a state according
to nature, for instance, good or bad; and that according to age, where a person, for instance,
is in the season for philosophizing or has passed it; and that, according to a predilection, as,
for instance, in favour of philosophy or3 history; and 4that as in being, for example,
previously initiated (in instruction),5 or without instruction, and that, according to the matter,
as being engaged, for example, in philosophy, or dragged around by (political) 6
circumstances.
[8.] He then, who is, according to nature, well born, and according to age is in season for
philosophizing, and according to a predilection, for the sake of exercising himself, is
proceeding to reasoning, and he, who, according to a habit, has been previously initiated in
instruction, and has been drawn aside from political circumstances, will begin from the

12
Alcibiades 7to be well-turned by the inclination of intellect, 7 and to know of what thing it is
needful to make for himself a [319-320]
1
The Greek is dia\ tou= lo/gou: where evidently lies hid a var. lect. dia\ tou= lo/gou— For other
instances of one reading made up out of two, see my Poppo’s Prolegomena, p. 175, to which I could
now add many more.
2
Fabricius thus supplies the missing matter, “but from that which is nearest at hand; and in like
manner—”
3
I have translated, as if the Greek were h)\, not kai\— On the confusion in those particles, see Porson
on Eurip. Orest. 821.
4 4
- I have adopted the suggestion of Fischer, who conceives that h( de\ kata\ have dropt out between
e(/neka and e(/cin—
5
I have translated, for the sake of the antithesis, as if maqh/sei had dropt out, similar to protetelesme/noj
toi=j maqh/masi in the next §.
6
I have followed Fischer, who has inserted politikw=n before perista/sewn, similar to politikw=n
perista/sewn in the next §.
7 7
- I have translated, as if the Greek were pro\j to\ t$ r(rp$= nou= eu)= e)pistrafh=nai , to avoid the
unmeaning tautology in pro\j to\ traph=nai kai\ e)pistrafh=nai—

care, and, as it were, by a beautiful pattern, to see who is the philosopher and what is his
pursuit, and upon what suppositions his discourse is carried on. 1(Such a person)1 must enter
upon the Phædo next in order; for in it (Plato) states who is the philosopher, and what is his
pursuit; and upon the supposition of the soul being immortal he goes through the discourse
relating to it. After this it would be requisite to enter upon the Republic. For, commencing
with the earliest instruction, he delineates the whole of education, by making use of which a
person would arrive at the possession of virtue. But since it is requisite for us to be versed in
the knowledge of things divine, so as to be able, by possessing 2 virtue, to be assimilated to
them, we shall enter upon the Timæus; for by entering upon this 3 account relating to Nature,
and on the so-called theology, and the arrangement of the Universe, we has clearly have a
recollection4 of things divine.
[9.] But if anyone, to speak summarily, is able to survey correctly 5 the arrangement of the
dialogues, suited to the teaching according to Plato, to him who chooses the doctrines of
Plato * *6 For as it is necessary to become a spectator 7 of his own soul and of things divine,
8
and of the gods themselves, and to obtain the most beautiful mind, 8 he must cleanse [320-
321]
1 1
- I have translated, as if ou)=toj had dropt out between den/seu and t%=—
2
The syntax requires kthsa/menoi, to answer to the plural e)nteuco/meqa, in lieu of kthsa/menon—
3
In lieu of au)t$=, the sense requires tau/t$—
4
Fabricius was the first to read a)namnh/somen for a)n.
5
To avoid the incorrect syntax in ei)— du/nait” a)\n— we may read, as translated, ei)— dunait” eu)=—
6
Fabricius has supplied, what he imagined to be the missing matter, in his Latin version, “Platonicæ
disciplinæ futurus sectator ex Platonis ipsius doctrina hoc faciet quam optime—” But he has
neglected to state on what the dative t%=-ai)roume/n% is to depend, unless perhaps he conceived that
the author wrote t% ta\ Pla/twnoj ai)roume/n% e)nh=n tou=to r(#sta dra=n, or something similar.
7
I have adopted, what Fischer has suggested, qeath\n, required by the subsequent e(autou=, in lieu of
qeata\j—
8
The words between the numerals present a very strange sense, as if it were possible for a person to
be a spectator of the gods themselves and to obtain the most beautiful mind. Unless I am greatly
mistaken the author wrote “dia\ to\ tw=n qew=n au)tou= tou= kalli/stou nou= ti e)/xein —” “through having
a portion of the most beautiful mind itself of the gods—” not kai\ tw=n qew=n au)tw=n kai\ tou= kalli/stou
nou= tuxei=n.

out the false opinions of his conceptions. For not even have physicians deemed the body
capable of enjoying the food brought to it, unless a person shall have previously cast out
what was in it in the way of an obstacle. But after the cleansing out, it is requisite to excite

13
 and call forth the sentiments, imparted by nature, and to cleanse out these too, and to exhibit
them pure, as principles. In addition to this, through the soul being thus 1 previously prepared,
it is necessary to introduce into it its peculiar doctrines, according to which it may be
perfected; now these relate to physics, and theology, and morality, and statesmanship. And 2
that the doctrines may remain in the soul and not be 3 chased away; it will be necessary for it
to be delivered to the reasoning relating to causation, 4 in order that a person may lay hold
firmly of the proposed aim. In addition to these it is meet that, what is not contrary to reason,
should be furnished, in order that we may not be carried aside by some sophist, and turn our
thoughts in a worse direction. That we may therefore cast out false opinions, it will be
necessary to enter upon the dialogues of the tentative character, and which possess the
confuting and the so-called cleansing power. And that a person may call forth into the light
the notions relating to physics, it will be necessary to enter upon the dialogues of the
obstetrical character, for this is peculiar to them; since in those there are doctrines relating to
physics, and to morals, and to statesmanship, and to the regulation of a household; of which
some have a reference to contemplation and a contemplative life; but others to action and an
active life; but both of them 5relate to the being assimilated to god. 5 And that these, after
being imparted, may be not escaping from us, it will be necessary to enter upon the
dialogues of a logical character, [321-322]
1
I have translated, as if the Greek were not w(j, but ou(/twj—
2
I have adopted de\, inserted by Fabricius, after i(/na—
3
The syntax requires either the insertion of $)= after a)napo/drasta, or else the omission of kai\ before it.
4
Such seems to be the meaning of ai)tiaj here. Unless it be said that the author wrote th=j a= ai)tiaj, “the
first cause.” On this sense, of a= and its loss before ai- see here, p. 313, n. 5.
5 5
- Such some will perhaps consider a proper version of e)pi\ t%= o(moiwqh=nai qe%=. But e)pi\ could
hardly, I think, bear that meaning. Hence I suspect the author wroted e)poi/ei to\ o(moiwqh=nai—
where, since the imperfect indicates a custom, e)poi/ei would mean “is wont to make—”

which is also of the exploratory kind. For they possess both the distinguishing and defining
methods, and, moreover, the analytical and syllogistical, through which truths are shown and
falsehoods confuted. Moreover, since it is requisite for us to be not led aside contrary to
reason by sophists, we shall enter upon the dialogues of a demonstrative character; in which
it is in our power to learn thoroughly how it is meet to listen to sophists, and 1 in what manner
to carry ourselves towards those, who act wrongly in matters relating to reason.
1
I have omitted kai\ o(/pwj, which are quite superfluous before kai\ o(/ntina tro/pon.

Cf. Boys-Stones, G. (2017). Making Sense of the Dialogues. In Platonist Philosophy 80

BC to AD 150: And Introduction and Collection of Sources in Translation (pp. 69-70).

C. ALBINUS, Introduction to Plato’s Dialogues, including fragments of DERCYLLIDES,

and THRASYLLUS T20.

[1] Someone who is going to read Plato’s dialogues ought to know just what a dialogue is.
They are not written without skill and ability, and it is not any easier to comprehend them
skillfully if you are not theoretically equipped. The philosopher [i.e. Plato] thinks that, in the
investigation of any subject at all, one ought to examine what the thing is, then what it is and
is not capable of, and what it is and is not useful for. This is how he says it. “There is a
single starting-point, my boy, for those who are going to deliberated well about anything:
one must know what the deliberation concerns, or one will inevitably go wrong about it.
Most people fail to realise that they do not know what things are and, since they do not
know, they are not in agreement at the start of the investigation, and produce the results you
could expect as they proceed: they fail to agree with themselves or anyone else’ [Phdr.

14
 237b-c]. So, to prevent us from having that experience in our encounter with Plato’s
dialogues, we should, as I said, examine just what a dialogue is. Well then: it is nothing other
than speech [logos] which consists in question and answer, concerning some political and
philosophical issue, with appropriate characterization of the protagonists, and appropriate
linguistic disposition.
[2] Dialogue is said to be speech just as man is said to be animal; but speech can be a
matter of inner disposition or something expressed. This in turn might be continuous, or by
way of question and answer: questions and answers are a special property of dialogue. So it
is said to be speech which consists in questions. And it is about some philosophical or
political issue because the subject matter must be appropriate to the dialogue – which is
political and philosophical. Just as tragedy, and poetry as a whole, is underpinned by
mythology as its subject matter, dialogue is underpinned by philosophical material, i.e. what
is relevant to philosophy. And it needs appropriate characterization of the protagonists
because the people involved in speaking are different in their manner of life, some being
philosophers, some sophists, and it is necessary to present behavior appropriate to each: the
philosopher needs to be noble, consistent and a lover of truth, the sophist versatile,
inconsistent and a lover of opinion, and the layman what is proper to him. On top of this, it
talks about linguistic disposition – quite rightly: just as tragedy and comedy need appropriate
meter, and a style appropriate to the story being told, so dialogue needs the right choice and
arrangement of words, amounting to a style that is Attic, gracious, economical, complete. If
an example of speech is adduced which is not composed as I have said, but lacks these
things, and is called dialogue, then it is wrongly so called. So when it is said that something
in Thucydides has the character of dialogue – we deny that it is a dialogue: rather it is a pair
of orations written to express conflicting positions.
[3] Now we have considered what a dialogue is, let us look at the differentiae of the
Platonic dialogue itself – i.e. what character types make up the highest divisions, and what
have been established as subdivisions of these, down to the individual dialogues. A complete
account of the character types will be discussed in what follows, but for now we only need to
know that there are two highest species: the expository and the investigative. The expository
is suited to teaching, action and demonstration of the truth; the investigative is suited to
training, competing and the exposure of falsehood. The expository deals with issues, the
investigative with individuals…

Comparison of translations:

Cf. The Introduction of Albinus to the Dialogues Boys-Stones, G. (2017). Making Sense of the
of Plato. In The Works of Plato, Vol. 6. London, Dialogues. In Platonist Philosophy 80 BC to AD
tr. George Burges (1885), pp. 315-318. [Burges’ 150: And Introduction and Collection of
footnotes omitted] Sources in Translation (pp. 69-70).

C. ALBINUS, Introduction to Plato’s

Dialogues, including fragments of DER-
CYLLIDES, and THRASYLLUS T20.

[1.] That1 for a person about to enter upon 2 the
Dialogues of Plato, it is fitting that he should
know previously what a Dialogue is. For neither
without some art and power 3 have dialogues
been written, nor is it easy for a person,
unskilled in contemplation, to know them
artistically.
[1] Someone who is going to read Plato’s
dialogues ought to know just what a dialogue is.
They are not written without skill and ability,
and it is not any easier to comprehend them
skillfully if you are not theoretically equipped.

It is agreeable then for a philosopher, who is The philosopher [i.e. Plato] thinks that, in the

15
making for himself an insight into every matter
of whatever kind, to examine, (first,) 4 the
essence of the thing, and afterwards, what
power it has, and not with reference to what is
naturally useful and what is not.
Now (Plato) says thus—5 “On every matter, O
boy, there is one commencement to those about
to consult properly. It is needful to know, about
what is the consultation; or else there must
needs be an erring in this matter.
Now it lies hid from the majority, that they do
not know the essence of each thing; (but), as if
they did know, they do not, at the commence-
ment [315-316] of the inquiry, agree (amongst
themselves),1 but as they proceed, 2they pay the
reasonable (penalty);2 for they agree neither
with themselves nor with others.”
In order then that we may not suffer this, 3 while
entering upon the Dialogues of Plato, let us
consider this very thing, which I have spoken
of, what is a dialogue. [For neither without
some art and power have dialogues been
written.]4
It is then nothing else than a discourse
composed of question and answer upon some
political or philosophical matter, combined with
a becoming delineation of the manners of the
characters introduced, and the arrangement as
regards their diction.5
[2.] Now a dialogue is called a discourse, as a [2] Dialogue is said to be speech just as man is
man (is called) an animal. But since of a said to be animal; but speech can be a matter of
discourse there is one kind arranged (in the inner disposition or something expressed.
mind)6 and another pronounced (by the mouth),7
let us hear about the one pronounced (by the
mouth).
And since of the latter there is one kind spoken,
as a continued narration, and another by
question and answer, questions and answers are
the peculiar mark of a dialogue; from whence it
is said to be a discourse8 by interrogation; and
moreover9 it is applied to some political and
philosophical matter; because it is meet for the
subject matter to be related to the dialogue.10
Now the matter is that relating to politics and
philosophy.11
16
investigation of any subject at all, one ought to
examine what the thing is, then what it is and is
not capable of, and what it is and is not useful
for.
This is how he says it. “There is a single
starting-point, my boy, for those who are going
to deliberated well about anything: one must
know what the deliberation concerns, or one
will inevitably go wrong about it.
Most people fail to realise that they do not know
what things are and, since they do not know,
they are not in agreement at the start of the
investigation, and produce the results you could
expect as they proceed: they fail to agree with
themselves or anyone else’ [Phdr. 237b-c].
So, to prevent us from having that experience in
our encounter with Plato’s dialogues, we
should, as I said, examine just what a dialogue
is.
Well then: it is nothing other than speech
[logos] which consists in question and answer,
concerning some political and philosophical
issue, with appropriate characterization of the
protagonists, and appropriate linguistic dis-
position.
This in turn might be continuous, or by way of
question and answer: questions and answers are
a special property of dialogue. So it is said to be
speech which consists in questions. And it is
about some philosophical or political issue
because the subject matter must be appropriate
to the dialogue
– which is political and philosophical.
For as the matter of fable is laid down as
adapted to tragedy and poetry in general, so is to
dialogue philosophy, that is (to say), what
relates to philosophy.
But as regards that, which is combined with a
becoming deline- [316-317] ation of the
manners of the characters introduced, (and) their
being different in their discourses through life,
some as philosophers, and others as sophists, it
is requisite to assign to each their peculiar
manners;
to the philosopher that, which is noble and
simple, and truth-loving; but to the sophist that,
which is of many hues, and tricky, and
reputation-loving; but to an individual what is
peculiar to him.
Added to this,1 (the definition) speaks likewise
of the arrangement,1 as regards their diction; and
reasonably so. For as2 the measure ought to be 2
adapted to tragedy and comedy, and the fiction
(of the subject) to the bruited story, so ought the
diction and the composition, adapted to the
dialogue, possess what belongs 3to the grace of
an Attic style,3 and is neither superfluous nor
deficient.
[3.] But if a so-called discourse, not being
made in the form, as I have laid down, but
deficient on these points, is said to be a
dialogue, it will not be said correctly.
4
Thus that, which is said in the case of
Thucydides to belong to the power to represent
the peculiarity of dialogues, but rather two
public speeches composed on set purpose
against each other.4
—Since then we have ascertained what is a
dialogue, let us look into the different kinds of
the Platonic dialogue, that is, into their
characteristics, how many are the topmost,5 and
how many of them 6exist subdivided into the
uncut.6
[4.] As regards their characteristics, which are
two, one explanatory and the other exploratory,
the explanatory is suited to the teaching and
practice of truth, but the explora- [317-318] tory
17
Just as tragedy, and poetry as a whole, is
underpinned by mythology as its subject matter,
dialogue is underpinned by philosophical
material, i.e. what is relevant to philosophy.
And it needs appropriate characterization of the
protagonists because the people involved in
speaking are different in their manner of life,
some being philosophers, some sophists, and it
is necessary to present behavior appropriate to
each:
the philosopher needs to be noble, consistent
and a lover of truth, the sophist versatile,
inconsistent and a lover of opinion, and the
layman what is proper to him.
On top of this, it talks about linguistic
disposition – quite rightly: just as tragedy and
comedy need appropriate meter, and a style
appropriate to the story being told, so dialogue
needs the right choice and arrangement of
words, amounting to a style that is Attic,
gracious, economical, complete.
If an example of speech is adduced which is not
composed as I have said, but lacks these things,
and is called dialogue, then it is wrongly so
called.
So when it is said that something in Thucydides
has the character of dialogue – we deny that it is
a dialogue: rather it is a pair of orations written
to express conflicting positions.
[3] Now we have considered what a dialogue
is, let us look at the differentiae of the Platonic
dialogue itself – i.e. what character types make
up the highest divisions, and what have been
established as subdivisions of these, down to the
individual dialogues.
A complete account of the character types will
be discussed in what follows, but for now we
only need to know that there are two highest
species: the expository and the investigative.
The expository is suited to teaching, action and
to an exercise and conflict, 1 and the confutation demonstration of the truth; the investigative is
of falsehood; and while the explanatory directs suited to training, competing and the exposure
its aim to things, the exploratory does so to of falsehood. The expository deals with issues,
persons. the investigative with individuals…

Cf. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, III. 48 (ed. & tr. R. D. Hicks):

)/Esti de\ dia/logoj <lo/goj> e)c e)rwth/sewj kai\ A dialogue is a discourse consisting of question
a)pokri/sewj sungkei/menoj peri\ tinoj tw=n and answer on some philosophical or political
filosofoume/nwn kai\ politikw=n subject,
meta\ th=j prepou/shj h)qopoii/aj tw=n
paralambanome/nwn prosw/pwn kai\ th=j kata\ th\n with due regard to the characters of the persons
le/cin kataskeuh=j. introduced and the choice of diction

Cf. Albinus, “Introduction to the Dialogues of Plato”, 2 (Gk. ap. G. C. Field, tr. George
Burges):

ou)k a)/llo ti h)\ lo/goj e)c e)rwth/sewj kai\ It is then nothing else than a discourse
a)pokri/sewj sungkei/menoj peri\ tinoj tw=n composed of question and answer upon some
filosofoume/nwn kai\ politikw=n pragma/twn, political or philosophical matter,
meta\ th=j prepou/shj h)qopoii/aj tw=n
paralambanome/nwn prosw/pwn kai\ th=j kata\ th\n combined with a becoming delineation of the
le/cin kataskeuh=j. manners of the characters introduced, and the
arrangement as regards their diction.

Comparison of texts.

Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent The Introduction of Albinus to the Doctrines of
Philosophers, III. 48, “Plato”, p. 319 Plato, The Works of Plato, Vol. VI,
tr. George Burges (1885), p. 316

A dialogue is a discourse consisting of question It (dialogue) is then nothing else than a dis-
and answer on some philosophical or political course composed of question and answer upon
subject, some political or philosophical matter,

with due regard to the characters of the persons combined with a becoming delineation of the
introduced and the choice of diction. manners of the characters introduced, and the
arrangement as regards their diction.

Anonymous Prologue IV (14.1-15.50) Gorgias, Encomium of Helen1

It (dialogue) is a logos without metre, consisting All poetry I regard and name as speech [logos]
of questions and answers by various characters, having metre….

with the appropriate characterisation (ethopoiia)

….

1
Cf. On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. George A. Kennedy (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1991), 283-88. I have supplied this definition solely for purposes of comparison.

18
Cf. L.G. WESTERINK. “Anonymous’ Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy” Amsterdam
1962. Theosophy Library Online, “Albinus”.

For Albinus, a proper study of the dialogues is tantamount to a true higher education which
affects the entire nature of the student. In the Eisagoge, Albinus insisted that such an
undertaking requires careful preparation.

For as it is necessary to become a spectator of his own soul as well as of things divine and
even of the gods themselves, and to attain to the most beautiful mind, he must cleanse out the
false opinions of his conceptions. For not even physicians have deemed the body capable of
enjoying the food brought to it unless a person shall have previously cast out the obstacles in it.

Once the mind has become fundamentally agnostic, the feelings and emotions must also be
summoned and purged of old matrices of reaction, so that they stand forth as pure principles.
Only then can specific doctrines be introduced and assimilated in a way that can perfect the
soul and elevate the whole nature. These doctrines must be elicited from the soul, separated
from false (and therefore damaging) views and fortified by reason, which combines
contemplation and action.
Albinus divided the dialogues into two broad classes, hyphegetikos and zetetikos,
explanatory and exploratory, the former offering teachings and the latter purging and
awakening the soul. He rejected the traditional order of study used even today, beginning
with Euthyphro (the indictment of Socrates), followed by the Apology (his trial), Crito (his
imprisonment) and Phaedo (his last day and death). Wisdom decrees, Albinus argued, that
the dialogues are each complete and independent and yet form a whole like a circle, which
has no discernible beginning or ending. The moral and intellectual condition of the student
should determine the starting-point and order of the dialogues to be studied. For one well
prepared by birth, present age and education, Alcibiades is a good beginning, for it deals
with self-knowledge, the beginning of all wisdom. In time, one should turn to Phaedo, which
teaches the importance of the philosophic life, given the immortality of the soul. Then one
can take up the Republic, for it presents a comprehensive theory of education. Eventually,
one may turn to Timaeus, the treatment of Nature and things divine, leading towards a
recollection of divinity. Such a course is not simply an introduction to the works of a great
thinker: it is a path of moral and spiritual development that transforms one’s being, awakens
the powers of the soul and achieves its apotheosis in a vision of the Divine. Beginning with
the obstetrical or maieutic dialogues, one passes through positive doctrines to a state of
consciousness which transcends description, a journey which encompasses self-realization
and contributes to universal enlightenment.

Cf. D. A. Russell, Criticism in Antiquity, Appendix, pp. 178-180:

ANONYMOUS

Why did Plato compose dialogues?

A further question deserving investigation is why Plato used the dialogue form (charakter).
But before discussing this let us explain what dialogue is.
It is a logos without metre, consisting of questions and answers by [178-179] various char-
acters, with the appropriate characterisation (ethopoiia).…
It is worth inquiring why, when Plato elsewhere is hostile to variety 1…he has nevertheless
himself used the literary form of the dialogue, made up as it is of various characters. It may
be suggested that the variety of character in comedy and tragedy is not the same as in Plato.
In comedy and tragedy, the characters are good and bad and remain the same, whereas in
Plato, although both good and bad characters are to be found, we see the bad changed by the

19
 good, instructed and purified and generally withdrawn from their material life. ‘Variety’ then
is different in Plato and in the other authors; so he is not guilty of self-contradiction.
We have therefore now to explain the reason why he employed this form of writing.
Our answer is that it is because the dialogue is a sort of universe ( kosmos). For, just as in a
dialogue, there are different persons speaking as is appropriate, so in the universe as a whole
there are different natural things uttering their different voices; for each speaks according to
its proper nature. Plato therefore did this is imitation of the works of the divine craftsman,
namely the universe.
An alternative reason is that the universe is a dialogue. For, just as in the universe, there
are superior and inferior natures, and the soul agrees now with the one and now with the
other, so in the dialogue there are characters who refute and others who are refuted, and our
soul, like a judge, surrenders itself first to the one and then to the other.
Or again, it may be because, as Plato himself says, a speech is analogous to a living
animal, and the finest speech will therefore be analogous to the finest animal—and that is the
universe. Now the dialogue, as we have seen, is analogous to this; it is therefore the finest
kind of speech.
A fourth argument is the following. Our soul enjoys imitation, and the dialogue is an
imitation of different persons. He therefore does this to charm the soul. That the soul does
take pleasure in imitation is shown by the fact that, as children, we like stories.
A further argument of the same kind is that he adopted this form of writing so as not to
present us with bare facts, stripped of persons. For example, in discussing friendship, he
desired not to speak of friendship itself but of friendship existing in certain individuals, and
similarly with ambition. Seeing others refuted or commended, as it were, our soul is com-
pelled to assent to the refutation or admire those [179-180] who are commended. This is like
the souls in Hades who see others punished for their sins and become better out of fear of the
penalties they endure.
A sixth argument is that he adopted the dialogue form because he was representing dia-
lectic. A dialogue consists of persons asking and answering questions, just as dialectic arises
from question and answer. He therefore used this form of writing in order to compel the
soul, as dialectic does, to bring to birth the thought it has within it; he does not believe the
soul to be an uninscribed tablet.
Seventhly: he wants to make us attend to what is said by making the speakers different, and
prevent us from nodding off because one person is instructing us all the time. (This
happened to Aeschines the orator, on a public appearance…standing on the platform and
speaking, with no conversation, question or answer, he failed to keep the jury awake, and
they drifted off into sleep; the orator observed this, and said ‘Have a good dream about the
case!’) Those who take part in a conversation are aroused by asking and answering ques-
tions.

I.e. in the discussion of music and drama in Republic II-III.

Cf. Olympiodorus, In Gorg., Proem 1 (in The Philosophy of the Commentators 200-600
AD, ed. Richard Sorabji, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005, tr. RJ, KL, HT, p. 51):

Note that a dialogue contains characters 1 in conversation, and it is for this reason, because
they have characters, that Plato’s works are called dialogues. In his Republic, he criticises
those who produce comedy and tragedy and banishes them, because tragedians encourage
our inclination towards pleasure-seeking. So it is worth inquiring why he himself follows
their practice and introduces characters. We reply that if we were following the constitution
of Plato, those who introduced decadent discussion would actually have to be beaten with
blows (plêgai). But since that is not the way we live, characters are introduced – not untested
1
Note how, as in the Poetics, the same word does double duty for both ethos as well as the agent possessing
such a character.

20
 ones as in drama, but characters subject to scrutiny and chastisement. He criticises Gorgias,
you see, and Polus, Callicles and Thrasymachus too, as shameless and never given to blush-
ing, whereas he praises upright men who live a philosophic life.

Cf. Ryan Fowler. “How and Why to Read Plato in the Early Common Era ” [Second
Handout accompanying his video presentation]; via The Kosmos Society; An Online
Community for Classical Studies (Harvard University):

CHS—How and why to read Plato in the early common era Fowler1

a. Albinus Introduction to Plato’s Dialogues (Eisagōgē or Prologos) 1

This is for the person about to delve (entunchanesthai) into the dialogues of Plato, it is
appropriate first to understand this: what a dialogue really is.

b. Plato Sophist 263e

Stranger: Well, then, thought (dianoia) and speech (logos) are the same; only the former,
which is a silent inner conversation (dialogos) of the soul with itself, has been given the
special name of thought (dianoia). Is not that true?

c. Lucian Literary Prometheus 6

For one thing, there was no great original connexion or friendship between Dialogue and
Comedy; the former was a stay-at-home, spending his time in solitude, or at most taking a
stroll with a few intimates; whereas Comedy put herself in the hands of Dionysus, haunted
the theatre, frolicked in company, laughed and mocked and tripped it to the flute when she
saw good; nay, she would mount her anapaests, as likely as not, and pelt the friends of
Dialogue with nicknames--doctrinaires, airy metaphysicians, and the like. […] But Dialogue
continued his deep speculations upon Nature and Virtue, till, as the musicians say, the
interval between them was two full octaves, from the highest to the lowest note.

d. Justin Martyr Dialogue with Trypho 3.3-4

“‘I delight,’ said I, ‘in such walks, where my attention is not distracted, for discussion
(dialogos) with myself is uninterrupted; and such places are most fit for philology.’ “‘Are
you, then, a philologian (phiologos),’ said he, ‘but no lover of deeds (philergos) or of truth
(philalēthēs)? and do you not aim at being a practical man so much as being a sophist?’”
e. Dionysius of Halicarnassis On Literary Composition 25

For the former [Isocrates] spent ten years over the composition of his Panegyric, according
to the lowest recorded estimate of the time; while Plato did not cease, when eighty years old,
to comb and curl (ktenizōn kai brostruchizōn) his dialogues and reshape them in every way.

f. Diogenes Laertius Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 3.48

They say that Zeno the Eleatic was the first to write dialogues. But, according to Favorinus
in his Memorabilia, Aristotle in the first book of his dialogue On Poets asserts that it was
Alexamenus of Styra or Teos. In my opinion Plato, who brought this form of writing to
perfection, ought to be adjudged the prize for its invention as well as for its embellishment.

1
https://kosmossociety.chs.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/CHShandout.pdf [accessed 9/3/2019]

21
e. Basil of Caesarea Letter 135.1

I know that your intelligence is perfectly well aware that the heathen (exōthen) philosophers
who wrote dialogues, Aristotle and Theophrastus, went straight to the point, because they
were aware of their not being gifted with the graces of Plato.

f. Albinus 1

After all, they have not been written without a certain art or power, nor is it easy for
someone unskilled in theoretical work (theōrias peirōs) to have technical knowledge
(technikōs gnōrisai) of them.

g. Maximus of Tyre Dialexsis 11

If someone having come upon Plato’s discourses is in need of further explanation, and if the
light that comes from him seems to be dull and he provides little of his clear brilliance, then
that person may very well not see the sun rising, the moon’s brilliance, the evening star
setting, or the morning star’s arrival.

h. Diogenes Laertius 3.55

Now, as you are an enthusiastic Platonist, and rightly so, and as you eagerly seek out that
philosopher's doctrines in preference to all others, I have thought it necessary to give some
account of the true nature of his discourses, the arrangement of the dialogues, and the
method of his inductive procedure, as far as possible in an elementary manner and in main
outline, in order that the facts I have collected respecting his life may not suffer by the
omission of his doctrines.

i. Albinus 1

So, in order that we do not suffer this fate while delving into the dialogues of Plato, let us
examine the very thing I started with: what a dialogue really is. Well, it is nothing other than
an (uttered) speech (logos) composed of question and answer (ex erōtēseōs kai pokriseōs)
concerning some sort of political or philosophical concern(s) (pragmatōn) together with a
fitting characterization (meta tēs prepousēs ēthopoiias) of the persons (prosōpōn) taking part
and the arrangement of (or according to) their diction (kata tēs lexin).

j. Albinus 2

A dialogue (ho dialogos), then, is said to be a “speech” (logos), just as a man [2.1] is said to
be an “animal.”

k. Albinus 2

But “regarding the appropriate characterization of the persons introduced,” there are
differences in our discussions throughout our lives: some are philosophical, others are
sophistic —We must attribute the appropriate characteristics to each: for the philosophical—
noble and simple and truth-loving (philalēthes); for the sophistic —the artfully changeable
(poikilē) and unstable (palimbola, perh. “reversed”) and reputation-loving (philodoxos); and,
for the private type—that which is appropriate.

l. Albinus’ categorization of the dialogues (4)

22
physical: Timaeus
logical: Cratylus, Sophist, Statesman, Parmenides
political: Republic, Critias, Minos, Laws, Epinomis
ethical: Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Symposium, Letters, Menexenus, Cleitophon,
Philebus
tentative: Euthyphro, Meno, Ion, Charmides, Theaetetus
obstetrical: Alcibiades, Theages, Lysis, Laches
probative: Protagoras
refutative: Hippias Major and Minor, Euthydemus, and Gorgias.

m. Albinus 4

Since, then, we have looked at the differentia (or “difference” διαφορὰν, sg.) of the
dialogues, how they develop naturally (κατὰ φύσιν), that is, their types (χαρακτῆρας,), let us
also state which one of the them someone should start with in order to understand
(ἐντυγχάνειν, or “read”?) the doctrine of Plato, because there are differing opinions.

n. Albinus 4

Some people begin with the Letters, some with the Theages. There are those who separate
them out into tetralogies, and they order the first tetralogy into the Euthyphro, Apology,
Crito, and the Phaedo—the Euthyphro, since it reports the charge against Socrates; the
Apology, since it is necessary that he defend himself; thereafter is the Crito, because of the
conversation in the prison; and then the Phaedo, since in this dialogue Socrates reaches the
end of his life. This is the opinion of Dercyllides and Thrasyllus; however, they seem to me
to have chosen to assign an order based on the dramatic characters and circumstances of
their lives, which is perhaps useful for another reason, but not for our present concern.
Instead, we want to discover the start and arrangement of instruction that is in accordance
with wisdom (archēn kai diataxin didaskalias tēs kata sophian heurein). We say, then, that
the start of Plato’s doctrine is not singular and set.

o. Albinus 4-5

His teaching (or “doctrine,” logos), being perfect, is like the perfect form of a circle: just as
the start of a circle is not singular and determined, neither is his doctrine. Therefore, we will
not delve into his teachings in a haphazard manner. When someone needs to draw a circle,
for example, he does not draw it starting from any point whatsoever; so, starting from
whatever attitude each of us may have with regard to his doctrine, he will delve into the
dialogues.

p. Albinus 5

Of course, our attitudes regarding his doctrines (logon, sg.) are many and different: one
refers to natural aptitude (kata physin), for example, whether one is naturally talented
untalented; one refers to age, for example, whether one is the right age for philosophizing or
past one’s prime; one refers to motive, whether for the sake of philosophy or history; one
refers to habit (kata hexin), whether one has been previously instructed or ignorant
(protetelesmenos ē amathēs [perh. “uninitiated”]); and one attitude refers to material
conditions (kata tēn hulēn), whether one has time for philosophy or is dragged around by
circumstances.

q. Albinus 5

23
 Someone well-born by nature, who is at the right age to philosophize, who proceeds toward
reason for the sake of practicing excellence according to his motivation, who was previously
taught by instruction in the (mathematical) sciences according to his disposition, and who
has been released from political entanglements—such a man will begin with the Alcibiades,
for the sake of reversing (his previous course), and turning toward and recognizing what he
ought to care about. Since it is a moral exemplar, so to speak, to see what the philosopher is,
what his study is, and by what sort of hypothesis his instruction is carried forward, it will be
necessary to delve into the Phaedo next in order; for Plato says in this dialogue what the
philosopher is, what he studies, and, upon the hypothesis of its immortality, he goes through
his account of the soul. After this it would be necessary to read the Republic; because Plato
describes all the types of education—starting from the earliest age—by which someone
would arrive at the possession of virtue. In addition, since it is also necessary to have
knowledge of divine matters, so that someone who has acquired virtue is able to become
assimilated to them (homoiōthēnai autois), we will delve into the Timaeus.

N.B. For a complete translation of Albinus’ Introduction, with helpful commentary and
explanatory notes, see Part I of Dr. Fowler’s study, Imperial Plato. Albinus, Maximus,
Apuleius. Text and Translation, with an Introduction and Commentary. Las Vegas; Zurich;
Athens: Parmenides Publishing, 2016.

24
7. Supplement: On dialectical arguments and the role of question and answer in the
dialogues of Plato.

Cf. Robin Smith, Dialectic and Method in Aristotle, II. Dialectical Argument and the Art
of Dialectic:

In the Topics, [Aristotle] defines a dialectical deduction (sullogismos) as one with premises
which are endoxa, as opposed to the ‘true and primary’ premises characteristic of
demonstrations. If we concentrate only on this point, we may wonder exactly what this class
of endoxa is. However, in other places Aristotle notes another equally important difference
between dialectical arguments and demonstrations: the premises of dialectical arguments are
questions (An. Pr. 24a25, Top. 104a8). What differentiates dialectical arguments from
demonstrations is that there are two parties to a dialectical argument, one of whom presents
the argument to the other as a series of questions held out for acceptance or rejection. 11 In
demonstration, one chooses as premises the true and primary propositions which underlie all
further truths about the subject matter at hand; no audience is necessary, and it is the task of
the learner not to question but to accept. However, in a dialectical argument, the questioner
can only develop an argument on the basis of an answerer’s responses. Consequently, the
questioner must take account of the opinions of that answerer and whether the premises
needed are acceptable (endoxos) to the answerer.
11
This is exactly what the term pro/tasij, ‘something held out,’ would suggest.

Cf. Charles Griswold, “Plato On Rhetoric and Poetry”. 5.1 Rhetoric in the Phaedrus
(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy):1

If the audience is philosophical, or includes philosophers, how would the true, artful,
philosophical dialectician address it? This question is not faced head-on in the Phaedrus, but
we are given a number of clues. They are introduced by means of a myth — by a kind of
“poetry,” if you will — and they help us understand the sort of discourse a philosopher will
on the whole wish to avoid, namely that which is written. According to reflections inaugur-
ated by the Theuth and Thamus myth, the written word is not the most suitable vehicle for
communicating truth, because it cannot answer questions put to it; it simply repeats itself
when queried; it tends to substitute the authority of the author for the reader’s open minded
inquiry into the truth; and it circulates everywhere indiscriminately, falling into the hands of
people who cannot understand it. Very importantly, it interferes with true “recollection”
(anamnesis, 249c1), that process described at length and (for the most part) poetically in the
dialogue’s “palinode,” by which the knowledge latent in the soul is brought out through
question and answer (274d-275b). Writing is a clumsy medium, and thus would not match
the potential effectiveness of philosophical give and take, the “Socratic dialogue” which best
leads the philosophical mind to truth. This desirable rhetoric is “a discourse that is written
down, with knowledge, in the soul of the listener; it can defend itself, and it knows for whom
it should speak and for whom it should remain silent” (276a5-7). Dialectical speech is ac-
companied by knowledge, can defend itself when questioned, and is productive of know-
ledge in its audience (276e4-277a4). Of course, all this raises the question as to the status of
Plato’s dialogues, since they are themselves writings; we will return to it briefly below.

Some Excerpts from Plato:

1
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/plato-rhetoric/[4/29/05])

25
 o “Let us examine the question together, my dear friend, and if you can make any
objection while I am speaking, make it and I will listen to you…” (Crito 48d)
o “And I think, I said, we ought to investigate together the question whether you do
or do not possess the thing I am inquiring about, so that you will not be forced to
say anything against your will and I, on the other hand, shall not turn to doctoring
in an irresponsible way.” (Charmides 158d)
o “So in what direction will one discover the path that leads to the statesman? For we
must discover it, and after having separated it from the rest we must impress one
character on it…” (Statesman 258c)
o “If you have no objection, make a trial of the boy and converse with him in our
presence… Euthydemus answered with a mixture of bravery and confidence. It
makes no difference to us, Socrates, as long as the young man is willing to
answer.” (Euthydemus 275c)

8. The dialectical premiss according to Aristotle.

Cf. Aristotle, An. Pr., I. 1 (24a 25-26) (tr. A. J. Jenkinson):

The demonstrative premiss differs from the dialectical, because the demonstrative premiss is
the assertion of one of two contradictory statements (the demonstrator does not ask for his
premiss, but lays it down), whereas the dialectical premiss depends on the adversary’s choice
[25] between two contradictories.1 But this will make no difference to the production of a
syllogism in either case; for both the demonstrator and the dialectician argue syllogistically
after stating that something does or does not belong to something else.

Cf. Aristotle, Top., I. 11 (104a 8-11) (tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge):

Now a dialectical proposition consists in asking something that is held by all men or by most
men or by the philosophers, i.e. either by all, or by most, or by the most notable of these,
provided it be not [10] contrary to the general opinion; for a man would probably assent to
the view of the philosophers, if it be not contrary to the opinions of most men.

With regard to the foregoing, cf. Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, A Greek-English
Lexicon:

dialog-os, ho, (dialegomai)

A. conversation, dialogue, Plat. Prot. 335d, Demetr.Eloc. 223; d. tês psuchês pros
hautên Plat. Soph. 263e; hoi Sôkratikoi d. Arist. Fr.72; ta en tois d. debating argu-
ments, IDEM=Arist.APo.78a12: generally, talk, chat, Cic.Att.5.5.2.

II. perh. speech or series of speeches, debate (cf. dialexis ), IG3.1128, al.

III. = dialogismos 1, PHib.1.122 (iii B.C.), PTeb.58.31 (ii B.C.).

dialekt-os , hê,
A. discourse, conversation, Hp.Art.30; theois pros anthrôpous Pl.Smp.203a;
discussion, debate, argument, Id.Tht.146b; opp. eris, Id.R.454a.
1
Hence the dialectician does ask for his premiss, as the next passage plainly states. (B.A.M.)

26
 2. common language, talk, d. hê pros allêlous Arist.Po.1449a26; hê
eiôthuia d. Id.Rh. 1404b24 .
II. speech, language, Ar.Fr.685; kainên d. lalôn Antiph. 171; d. amniou,
opp. ta endon drakontos, Hermipp.3; articulate speech, language, opp.
phônê, Arist.HA535a28; tou anthrôpou mia phônê, alla dialektoi pollai
Id.Pr.895a6 ; but also, spoken, opp. written language, D.H.Comp.11.
2. the language of a country, Plb.1.80.6, D.S.5.6, etc.: esp. dialect,
as Ionic, Attic, etc., Diog.Bab.Stoic.3.213, D.H.Comp.3, S.E.M.1.59,
Hdn.Gr.2.932; also, local word or expression, Plu.Alex.31.
III. way of speaking, accent, D.37.55.
2. pl., modes of expression, Epicur.Ep.1p.24U.
IV. style, panêgurikê, poiêtikê d., D.H.Comp.23,21: esp. poetical diction,
Phld.Po. 2 Fr.33, al.
V. of musical instruments, quality, ‘idiom’, Arist. de An.420b8.

dialekt-ikos , ê, on,
A. conversational, khoros Demetr.Eloc.167 .
2. d. organa organs of articulate speech, opp. phônêtika, Gal.16.204.
II. skilled in dialectic, ho erôtan kai apokrinesthai epistamenos
Pl.Cra.390c ; ê kai d. kaleis ton logon hekastou lambanonta tês ousias;
Id.R.534b ; dialectical, Arist. Metaph.995b23; d. sullogismos
Id.Top.100a22 ; pros tous d., title of work by Metrodorus, D.L.10.24, cf.
Phld.Rh.1.279 S., al.
III. hê dialektikê (sc. tekhnê) dialectic, discussion by question and answer,
invented by Zeno of Elea, Arist.Fr.65; philosophical method, hôsper
thrinkos tois mathêmasin hê d. epanô keitai Pl.R.534e: to -kon Id.Sph. 253e;
peri -kês, title of work by Cleanthes, D.L.7.174.
2. the logic of probabilities, hê d. peirastikê peri hôn hê philosophia
gnôristikê Arist.Metaph.1004b25, cf. Rh.1354a1.
IV. Adv. -kôs dialectically, Pl.Phlb.17a, etc.; for the sake of argument, opp.
kat’ alêtheian, Arist. Top.105b31, cf. de An.403a2; by argument on general
principles, opp. scientifically, Phld.Rh.2.134 S., Mus.p.89 K.: Comp. -
ôteron Pl.Men. 75d ; more logically, Dam.Pr.97.

Cf. The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copy-
right ©2000:

Dialectics n. 1. The art or practice of arriving at the truth by the exchange of logical
arguments.

Cf. Plato, Lysis 206c (from: Plato’s Lysis, tr. Christopher Rowe):

‘It’s not easy to say,’ I said. ‘But if you were prepared to get [206c] him to come and
exchange words with me (moi . . . eis logous elthein), perhaps I’d be able to demonstrate to
you what one should say in conversation (dialegesthai) with him instead of the things these
people claim that you actually do say, and sing as well.’

9. Note on h( dialektikh.

27
 Insofar as h( dialektikh/ (sc. te/xnh), “the art of dialectic”, or “the dialectical art”, can
mean discussion by question and answer (LSJ), and insofar as a dialectical proposition (or
premiss) consists in asking a question in order to elicit an answer (cf. Aristotle, op. cit.),
the adjective dialektiko/j (‘dialectical’) can be taken to mean in the form of a discussion by
question and answer, and hence as equivalent to Aristotle’s phrase, en tōi dialegesthai
logōn (Soph. Ref., I. 2, 165a 37). The latter phrase, which I have translated as “in the form
of a discussion”, must therefore be understood to include in its notion the fact that it takes
place by question and answer. It is in accordance with these witnesses, then, that I
understand the meaning of ‘dialectical’ when I say that “dialogue is an imitation of a
conversation that is dialectical”. In this regard, compare the definition of ‘dialogue’ handed
down by Diogenes Laertius (and in a slightly different form by Albinus): “A dialogue is a
discourse consisting of question and answer [ex erôtêseôs kai apokriseôs sungkeimenos] on
some philosophical or political subject, with due regard to the characters of the persons
introduced and the choice of diction” (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, III. 48, “Plato”,
tr. R. D. Hicks, p. 319). Diogenes goes on to define dialectic as “the art of discourse by
which we either refute or establish some proposition by means of question and answer on
the part of the interlocutors”, giving further warrant to our understanding of the term.

As for the meaning of ‘conversation’, according to the usage of Plato cited above
(cf. Lysis 206c), dialegesthai, or engaging in a conversation, consists in logous elthein, an
exchange of words (and hence takes place between two or more people), a difference
which is more general than “taking place by question and answer” since, while every in-
stance of question and answer involves an exchange of words, not every exchange of
words involves question and answer.

10. A division of conversation understood as the object imitated by dialogue.

Cf. Duane H. Berquist, “The Protagoras of Plato as a Part of the Introduction to

Philosophy” (pro manuscripto):

Plato’s dialogues are an imitation of conversations (the word dialogue comes from the Greek
word for conversation) and mainly of conversations whose purpose is knowledge or the
appearance of knowledge. Such conversations are divided by Aristotle in the Sophistical
Refutations (Ch. 2) into four kinds. If we call conversations for the sake of knowledge or the
appearance of knowledge discussions, these four are the teaching discussion, the dialectical
discussion, the examination discussion, and the sophistical discussion. The sophistical
discussion is for the appearance of knowledge—the sophist would rather have the appear
wise than be wise. If the discussion is for the sake of knowledge, then the two men
conversing either both know the subject (in which case, there is no need for the discussion)
or one knows and the other does not (in which case, the one who knows can teach the one
who does not know) or neither knows (in which case, a dialectical discussion is in order). If
it were always clear who knows and who does not know, there would be no need of the
remaining kind of discussion—the examination discussion whose purpose is to test a man
and see if he knows what he thinks he knows.
All four kinds of logical discussion are represented in Plato’s dialogues and especially the
examination and dialectical ones. In addition, Plato shows the order of the examination
discussion to both the dialectical discussion and the teaching discussion.

Cf. Aristotle, Soph. Ref., ch. 2 (165a 37-165b 1) (tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge; slightly
rev. B.A.M.):

28
 Of discourses in the form of a discussion [en tōi dialegesthai logōn] there are four kinds:
didactic [didaskalikoi], dialectical [dialektikoi], examination [peirastikoi], [165b] and
contentious [eristikio] arguments. Didactic arguments are those that reason from the
principles appropriate to each subject and not from the opinions held by the answerer (for the
learner should take things on trust): dialectical arguments are those that reason from
premisses generally accepted, to the contradictory of a given thesis: examination arguments
[5] are those that reason from premisses which are accepted by the answerer and which
anyone who pre-tends to possess knowledge of the subject is bound to know—in what
manner, has been defined in another treatise: contentious arguments are those that reason or
appear to reason to a conclusion from premisses that appear to be generally accepted but are
not so. The subject, then, of demonstrative arguments has been discussed in the Analytics,
while that of dialectic arguments and examination-arguments has been discussed elsewhere
[sc. in the Topics]: let us now proceed to speak of the arguments used in competitions and
contests.

Cf. ibid., ch. 3 (165b 14-21) (tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge):

First we must grasp the number of aims entertained by those who argue as competitors and
rivals to the death. These are five in number, refutation, [15] fallacy, paradox, solecism, and
fifthly to reduce the opponent in the discussion to babbling—i.e. to constrain him to repeat
himself a number of times: or it is to produce the appearance of each of these things without
the reality. For they choose if possible plainly to refute the other party, or as the second best
to show that he is committing some fallacy, or as a third best to lead him into paradox, or
fourthly [20] to reduce him to solecism, i.e. to make the answerer, in consequence of the
argument, to use an ungrammatical expression; or, as a last resort, to make him repeat him-
self.

Cf. Aristotle, Top., I. 2 (101a 25-101b 3) (tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge):

2 [25] Next in order after the foregoing, we must say for how many and for what purposes
the treatise is useful. They are three-intellectual training, casual encounters, and the
philosophical sciences. That it is useful as a training is obvious on the face of it. The
possession of a plan of inquiry will enable us more easily to [30] argue about the subject
proposed. For purposes of casual encounters, it is useful because when we have counted up
the opinions held by most people, we shall meet them on the ground not of other people’s
convictions but of their own, while we shift the ground of any argument that they appear to
us to state un-soundly. For the study of [35] the philosophical sciences it is useful, because
the ability to raise searching difficulties on both sides of a subject will make us detect more
easily the truth and error about the several points that arise. It has a further use in relation to
the ultimate bases of the principles used in the several sciences. For it is impossible to
discuss them at all from the principles proper to the particular science in hand, seeing that
the principles are the prius of [101b] everything else: it is through the opinions generally
held on the particular points that these have to be discussed, and this task belongs properly,
or most appropriately, to dialectic: for dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path
to the principles of all inquiries.

11. On the four forms of discussion.

The difference “an exchange of words”, being in the definition of ‘conversation’ or

‘discussion’, is common to all four forms of dialogic species as given by Aristotle at the
outset of the Sophistical Refutations. Hence even the teaching discussion involves such an

29
exchange. But does every discussion proceed by question and answer? It is undeniable that
the teaching discussion, insofar as it employs demonstration, is not by question and
answer, since the demonstrator lays down his premiss rather than asking an opponent for it.
On the other hand, as Aristotle makes clear (Top. I. 2, 101a 34 ff.), even philosophical
inquiries employ dialectic for various reasons (see below), so that even here question and
answer has a place.

30
12. Supplement: St. Thomas Aquinas, On Fallacies (excerpt).

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, De Fallaciis ad Quosdam Nobiles Artistas (On Fallacies: For the
Benefit of Some Gentlemen Students for an Arts Degree), proem, & cap. 1-2 (tr. B.A.M.):

CPP

quod duplex est modus ratiocinandi, scilicet That the way of reasoning is twofold, one
rectus et non rectus. correct and the other incorrect.

quia logica est rationalis scientia, et ad The reason for the foregoing statement is that
ratiocinandum inventa; ratiocinari autem con- logic is rational science, and has been dis-
tingit recte et non recte: covered for the purpose of reasoning; but
reasoning happens correctly and incorrectly:

utrumque enim ad logici considerationem
spectat, ut per rectam ratiocinationem ad rei
veram cognitionem perveniat, et falsam ratio-
cinationem vitando errorem falsitatis evitet.
for the consideration of logic looks to both, so
that by correct reasoning one may arrive at a
true knowledge of a thing, and by avoiding
false reasoning one might escape the error of
falsity.

uterque ratiocinandi modus competit uni Each way of reasoning belongs to one man,
homini, et ad seipsum et ad alium. both with respect to himself and with respect to
someone else.

nam et secum aliquis considerans potest recte For someone considering within himself can
et non recte ratiocinari, et cum alio conferens. reason correctly and incorrectly, and also when
he is conversing with another.

sed cum aliquis secum considerans ratiocinatur But when someone considering within himself
non recte, praeter intentionem hoc accidit quia reasons incorrectly, this happens beyond his
nullus sui ipsius deceptionem intendit. intention because no one intends his own
deception.

cum autem ad alium ratiocinatur non recte,
contingit quandoque ex intentione ratiocinantis,
cum scilicet aliquis de altero intendit vel
experi-mentum sumere, vel victoriam habere
ad sui gloriam.
But when someone reasons incorrectly with
another, it sometimes happens from the
intention of the one reasoning, when, namely,
someone intends either to take the measure of
another, or to have the victory and his own
glory.

ratiocinatio autem quae ad seipsum est, Now the reasoning which is with oneself can
syllogismus solum dici potest, sive aliqua alia only be called ‘syllogism’, or some other
species argumentationis. species of argumentation.

sed ratiocinatio quae est ad alterum, non solum But the reasoning which is with another is not
est syllogismus vel argumentatio, sed dispu- simply syllogism or argumentation, but
tatio: disputation.1
vertitur enim inter duos, scilicet inter For it goes on between two, namely, between
1
Notice that ‘disputation’ is initially defined here as reasoning that is not merely syllogism or argumentation,
both of which may take place within a single person, but reasoning with (or toward) another. As St. Thomas
goes on to show in the next section, disputation is a “syllogistic act”—that is, an act of reason using the
species of argument called ‘syllogism’—’of’ one person with respect to another (the one opposing, and the

31
CP1T

de disputatione in genere. Of disputation in genus.

CP1-

disputatio est actus syllogisticus unius ad Disputation is a syllogistic act of one person
alterum ad aliquod propositum ostendendum. with respect to another for the purpose of
showing something that has been proposed.

per hoc quod dicitur actus, tangitur By the fact that it is called ‘act’, the genus of
disputationis genus; disputation is touched upon;

et per hoc quod dicitur syllogisticus, tangitur
disputationis instrumentum, scilicet syllogis-
mus, sub quo comprehenduntur omnes aliae
species argumentationis et disputationis sicut
imperfectum sub perfecto;
and by the fact that it is called ‘syllogistic’ the
instrument of disputation is touched on,
namely, the syllogism, under which is
comprehended all the other species of
argumentation and disputation, as the imperfect
under the perfect.

et per hoc distinguitur disputatio ab actibus And by this [difference, namely, ‘syllogistic’,]
corporalibus, ut currere vel comedere; et ab disputation is distinguished from bodily acts,
actibus voluntariis, ut amare et odire. like running or eating, and from acts of the
will, like loving and hating.

nam per hoc quod dicitur syllogismus For by the fact that it is called ‘syllogism, it is
ostenditur esse actus rationis, shown to be an act of reason,

per hoc autem quod dicitur unius ad alterum
tanguntur duae personae opponentis et respon-
dentis, inter quas vertitur disputatio;
but by the fact that is called “of one person
with respect to another” the two persons of the
one opposing and the one responding are
touched upon, between whom the disputation
goes on.

etiam hoc additur ad differentiam And this [last difference] is added to

ratiocinationis quam habet qui secum differentiate it from the reasoning which one
ratiocinatur. has who reasons with himself.

per hoc autem quod dicit ad propositum By the fact that it is called “for the purpose of
ostendendum tangitur disputationis effectus, showing something that has been proposed”,
sive terminus aut finis proximus, the effect or term or proximate end of
disputation is touched upon,

et per hoc distinguitur disputatio a syllogismis
exemplaribus, qui non inducuntur ad
ostendendum propositum aliquod, sed ad
formam syllogisticam exemplificandam.
and by this disputation is distinguished from
exemplary syllogisms, which are not
introduced in order to show something
proposed, but in order to exemplify syllogistic
form.

other responding), in order to manifest something proposed. Further note that the one responding is
answering a question put to him by his opponent, so that disputation is therefore seen to proceed by question
and answer.

32
CP2T

de qatuor speciebus disputationis. Of the four species of disputation.

CP2-

disputationis autem quatuor sunt species:
scilicet doctrinalis, dialectica, tentativa et
sophistica, quae etiam alio nomine dicitur
litigiosa.
doctrinalis sive demonstrativa est quae ad
scientiam ordinatur, procedens ex primis et
veris et per se notis et propriis principiis illius
scientiae de qua fit disputatio;
But there are four species of disputation, to wit,
the teaching, the dialectical, the probing [or
examining], and the sophistical, which is also
by another name called ‘contentious’.1
The teaching or demonstrative is that which is
ordered to science, proceeding from primary
and true as well as per se known and proper
principles of that science about which the
disputation is made;

and this goes on between the teacher and the

et hoc vertitur inter docentem et addiscentem. learner.

But the dialectical disputation proceeds from

dialectica vero disputatio etiam est ex
probabilibus procedens, et ad opinionem vel
propositum tendens.
probabilia autem dicuntur quae videntur
omnibus aut pluribus vel sapientibus, et his
autem omnibus vel praecipuis et maxime notis.
tentativa autem disputatio est quae ordinatur ad
experimentum sumendum de aliquo per ea
quae videntur respondenti.
sophistica autem est tendens ad gloriam ut
sapiens esse videatur: unde dicitur sophistica
quasi apparens sapientia.
et procedit ex his quae videntur esse vera sive
probabilia, et non sunt, vel simpliciter falsas
propositiones assumendo, quae videntur esse
verae, vel in virtute falsarum propositionum
argumentando.
logicales enim argumentationes sunt in virtute
verarum propositionum, ex quibus tota virtus
probable things, tending toward opinion or
what has been proposed.
But those things are called ‘probable’ which
appear to be so to all or to the many or to the
wise, and by all, or by most, or by the most
notable of these.2
But the probing is that which is ordered to
taking the measure of someone through those
things which appear to the respondent.
But the sophistical tends to glory in order that
one may appear wise: and so it is called
‘sophistical’ as it were ‘appearing wise’.
And it proceeds from those things which
appear to be true or probable but are not, or by
assuming simply false propositions, which
appear to be true, or by arguing in virtue of
false propositions.
For logical argumentations are in virtue of [or
in the power of] true propositions, from which
the whole virtue of argumentation depends, just
as the following argumentation:

1
Cf. Aristotle, Soph. Ref., I. 2 (165a 37ff.) (tr. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge; Greek added by B.A.M.): “Of
arguments in dialogue form [en tōi dialegesthai logōn] there are four kinds: Didactic [didaskalikoi],
Dialectical [dialektikoi], Examination-arguments [peirastikoi], [165b] and Contentious [eristikio]
arguments,” etc. Note that “arguments in dialogue form” are what St. Thomas calls ‘disputations’.
2
Cf. Top., 100b 21-23 (tr. Robin Smith) : “The endoxa are what seems so to everyone, or to most people, or
to the wise (and of them, to all, or to most, or to the most famous and best accepted)”; ( e)/sti de\ pro/tasij
dialektikh\ e)rw/thsij e)/ndocoj h)\ pa=sin h)\ toi=j plei/stoij h)\ toi=j sofoi=j, kai\ tou/toij h)\ pa=sin h)\ toi=j plei/stoij h)\
toi=j ma/lista gnwri/moij).

33
argumentationis pendet, sicut ista
argumentatio:
socrates est homo, ergo socrates est animal,
procedit ex virtute huius propositionis: de
quocumque praedicatur species, et genus: quae
est simpliciter vera.
sophistice sic argumentatur: socrates est
animal, ergo est homo, quae in virtute huius
propositionis falsae procedit: de quocumque
praedicatur genus, et species.
34
Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is an
animal, proceeds from the power of this
proposition: of whatever the species is
predicated, so is the genus: which is true
without qualification.
But the sophistical argues thus: Socrates is an
animal, therefore he is a man, which proceeds
in virtue of this false proposition: Of whatever
the genus is predicated, so too is the species.
13. Some differences in the definition of dialogue.

I call speech involving an exchange of words, and hence taking place between two
or more people, a conversation or discussion. But as Albinus notes, a conversation or
discussion may be spoken as a continued narration, or proceed by question and answer. I
call a conversation or discussion proceeding by question and answer dialectical. But a
narration, whether continued or by question and answer, is speech consisting in the
exposition or setting forth of something happening. But by ‘something happening’ I mean
either what has happened or the sort of thing that might happen in accordance with
necessity or probability (Cf. Aristotle, Poet. 9, 1451a 36—1451b 11). Again, speech is
narration if it relates that this happened after that (or that this is the sort of thing that
might happen after that, etc.).

In sum:

A dialogue is a conversation that is dialectical.

But that conversation is ‘dialectical’ which proceeds by question and answer.

Conversation itself, however, is speech involving an exchange of words, and hence taking
place between two or more people.

A narration is the exposition or setting forth of something happening, whether that is some-
thing that has happened, or whether it is the sort of thing that might happen in accordance
with necessity or probability.

Again, speech is narration if it relates that this happened after that, etc.

14. Some dictionary definitions pertaining to dialogue:

Cf. The Oxford English Dictionary. s.v. “dialogue”:

Dialogue. 1. A conversation carried on between two or more persons; a colloquy, talk

together. b. Verbal interchange of thought between two or more persons, conversation. 2. A
literary work in the form of a conversation between two or more persons.

1. Talk between two or more people or between characters in a play, film, novel, or the like.
2. An exchange of opinions or thoughts in an effort to reach agreement or mutual under-
standing.
3. A literary work in the form of a discussion between persons.

15. Definitions in brief:

 Conversation: n. Speech consisting in an exchange between two or more persons.

(after Andrew Ford); syn. ‘discussion’ (B.A.M.) (cf. Plato’s Lysis)
 Dialectic: n. Discussion by question and answer. (LSJ)

35
  Dialectical: adj. In the form of a discussion by question and answer. (after LSJ)
 Dialogue: n. A conversation that is dialectical (that is, “speech consisting in an
exchange between two or more persons” taking place “by question and answer”).

Composition of genus and differences:

speech
consisting in an exchange between two or more persons
(such discussion being) by question and answer

A division:

speech
conversation (= speech consisting in an exchange between two or more persons)
dialogue (= conversation that is dialectical)
dialectical (= in the form of a discussion taking place by question and answer)

Dialectical conversation or discussion is called ‘dialogue’, a name given also to a species

of imitative art. In this latter sense, dialogue is an imitation of a conversation that is
dialectical.

On the end or that for the sake of which. The end of the teaching discourse is learning in
the sense of episteme, science or knowledge; that of the dialectic is opinion; that of the
peirastic elenchus; that of the eristic, sophistical refutation. Hence, one could take the final
cause of a dialogue from the foregoing possibilities.

36
16. Aristotle on the composition of the lexis and muthos.

Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 6 (1449b 35).

[35] But by ‘language’ [lexis] I mean the composition itself of the metres [verses]….

Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 6 (1449b 36—1450a 10).

But since imitation is of action [praxeus, “the things men do”], and it is enacted by certain
definite doers [tinon prattonton] who must be of a certain sort with respect to character and
thought [to ethos kai ten dianoian] (for it is through these that we say actions also are of a
certain sort, <…> and it is [1450a] according to these that all men either succeed or fail), and
since the plot is the imitation of the action, |<and> there are by nature two causes of actions,
thought and character,|1 (for by ‘plot’ here I mean the [5] composition of the things done
[sunthesin ton pragmaton], but by ‘characters’ [ta ethe] that according to which we say those
who do things [tous prattontas] are of a certain sort, and by ‘thought’ [dianoian] that
through which those speaking demonstrate something, or declare their meaning), it is
therefore necessary that there be six parts to every tragedy with respect to which tragedy is
of a certain sort. And these are plot, characters, language, thought, the appearance [of the
actors], and melodic composition.

Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 6 (1450 a 14-23).

Now the greatest of these is the makeup [15] of the things done [ton pragmaton sustasis].
For tragedy is an imitation not of men but of action [praxeon, “the things men do”], and of
life [biou], and of happiness [eudaimonias, “living well”]. For happiness, like unhappiness,
exists in action, and the end is a sort of action, not a quality. Now men are of a certain sort
by virtue of their characters, but [20] by virtue of their actions they are happy or the reverse.
So they do not act in order to imitate character; rather they take on character for the sake of
[imitating] actions. Consequently, the things done and the plot, 2 are the end of tragedy, and
the end is the greatest thing of all.

In sum: “[T]ragedy is an imitation not of men but of action, and of life, and of happiness.
But happiness, as well as unhappiness, consists in action, and the end is a certain action,
not a quality.” (Poetics ch. 6, tr. B.A.M.)

N.B. Aristotle states that tragedy is an imitation of three things: ‘action’, ‘life’, and
‘happiness’, and that it is not an imitation of one thing, ‘men’. The end mentioned here,
namely, ‘action’, is “the proper work of man” (Nic. Eth.); and this is understood as a
certain form of ‘life’. But what is the meaning of ‘life’ here? Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas: life
is the substance or existence of a certain kind of thing; but it also means an opus vitae, a
‘work of life’, or ‘vital activity’. Aristotle, of course, intends the latter meaning: an activity
of the soul according to (or not according to) reason. In particular, it is the active or
practical life.

1
Following the emendation suggested by Vahlen and accepted by Benardete and Davis in their translation of
the Poetics (cf. Aristotle – “On Poetics”, Translation by Seth Benardete and Michael Davis [South Bend,
Indiana, St. Augustine’s Press: 2002], p. 19), I have moved the phrase in | upright braces | here from just
above, as it makes better sense of the text.
2
Or the things done—that is to say, the plot.

37
 According to Aristotle, human life consists in “the activity of the soul in
accordance with perfect virtue”, and this constitutes the definition of ‘happiness’:

“The end of human being is eudaimonía (happiness) the exercise of the dispositions
of the soul in conformity with excellence, throughout a complete lifetime (NE 1098a 12-
20)”.

“Likewise, happiness, which is activity [energeía] in accordance with the exercise

of sophía as the highest virtue, (and sophía is the disposition associated with theoría), is
self-sufficient and an end unto itself (NE 1176b 2-6).”

[N.B. Each of the foregoing texts is a summary, not a quotation.]

“But tragedy is an imitation not of men but of action, and of life, and of happiness.
But happiness, as well as unhappiness, consists in action….” (Aristotle, Poetics ch. 6, 1450
a 19, tr. B.A.M.).

“Happiness is a certain action, for it is faring well” (Aristotle, Phys., II. 5, 197b 4,
tr. Glen Coughlin), from which it follows that ‘unhappiness’ is faring badly.

Action is the way in which one ‘goes through life’ or ‘fares’, whether well or badly,
consisting in a sort of ‘life’, and hence in ‘happiness’ or ‘unhappiness’.1

Happiness is faring well.

But faring well is a sort of action.
Therefore happiness is a sort of action.

happiness is a sort of life

life is a sort of action
therefore happiness is a sort of action

‘Action’ is the actuality of a virtue or operative power.2

Cf. Phys., II. 5 (197b 4) (tr. Glen Coughlin): “Happiness is a certain action, for it is faring
well”.

1
Cf. Plato, Rep. X, 603 c (tr. Allan Bloom, slightly rev. B.A.M.): “Let us put it before ourselves in this way.
Imitative art, we say, imitates men performing forced or voluntary actions, and, as a result of the action,
supposing themselves to have fared well or badly [ê eu oiomenous ê kakôs pepragenai], and in all this feeling
pain or pleasure”. Cf. also Aristotle, Phys., II. 5, 197b 4 (tr. Glen Coughlin): “Happiness is a certain action,
for it is faring well”; from which it follows that unhappiness is faring badly. Hence, as Aristotle explains, “…
tragedy is an imitation not of men but of action [praxeon], and of life [biou], and of happiness [or “living
well”, eudaimonias]. For happiness, like unhappiness, consists in action, and the end is a sort of action, not a
quality. Now men are of a certain sort by virtue of their characters, but by virtue of their actions they are
happy or the reverse” (Poetics ch. 6, 1450a 16-20, tr. B.A.M.).
2
Cf. the following texts from St. Thomas Aquinas: “Now just as being itself [ipsum esse] is a certain
actuality [actualitas] of the essence, so acting [operari] is the actuality of an operative power or virtue.” (Qu.
Disp. de Spirit. Creat., art. 11, c.) “But the act [actus, = energeia] to which an operative power is compared
is an operation [operatio].” (Summa Theol., Ia, q. 54, art. 3, c., tr. B.A.M.) “For action [actio, = praxis] is
properly the actuality [actualitas] of a virtue, just as being [or existence, esse] is the actuality of the
substance or essence.” (Summa Theol., Ia, q. 54, art. 1, c., tr. B.A.M.)

38
As concluded below:

According to Aristotle, happiness consists in the human good, understood as

“activity of soul in accordance with virtue” (and, “if there are more than one virtue, in
accordance with the best and most complete”), “in a complete life” (cf. Aristotle, Nic. Eth.,
I. 6, 16 ff., tr. W. D. Ross).

Happiness is a certain kind of life.

Again, the human good consists in a certain ergon; but the ergon—the ‘work’ or
‘task’ or ‘function’ of man—is a certain kind of life, namely, an activity or actions of the
soul implying a rational principle (ibid.); for “he is happy who is active in accordance with
complete virtue”, being “sufficiently equipped with external goods, not for some chance
period but throughout a complete life”, and “who is destined to live thus and die as befits
his life” (ibid., ch. 10, 1100a 5 ff., tr. W. D. Ross) Or again, happiness consists in being
“active in accordance with complete virtue”, and being “sufficiently equipped with
external goods, not for some chance period but throughout a complete life”, as belonging
to one “who is destined [= “marked out”] to live thus and die as befits his life”, (see Nic.
Eth. I 10, 1100a 5 ff.) and that this happiness is a form of “life”. Now tragedy portrays men
failing to be active in accordance with complete virtue, and not sufficiently equipped with
external goods throughout a complete life, and so not destined or marked out to live thus
and die as befits such a life. Obviously, then, tragedy will be mostly about unhappiness.

17. The Socratic discourses in relation to character.

Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 1 (1447a 28—1447b 11):

But the arts that imitate by bare speech alone, or by metres, either mixing these with each
other or using some one kind of metre, happen to be without a name up until now. For we
have no common name for the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus and the Socratic discourses
[Sôkratikoi logoi]....

Cf. Aristotle, Pol. II.6 (1265a 10-11) (tr. B. Jowett):

The discourses [logoi] of Socrates are never commonplace; they always exhibit grace and
originality and thought; but perfection in everything can hardly be expected.

Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. III, 16 (1417a 16-20) (tr. W. Rhys Roberts; slightly rev. B.A.M.):

The narration should depict character; to which end you must know what makes it do so.
One such thing is the indication of moral purpose; the quality of purpose indicated
determines the quality of character depicted and is itself determined by the end pursued.
Thus it is that mathematical discourses depict no character; they have nothing to do with
moral purpose, for they represent nobody as pursuing any end. On the other hand, the
Socratic discourses [Sôkratikoi logoi] do depict character, being concerned with moral [20]
questions.

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. XIII. 4 (1078b 22-33) (tr. W. D. Ross):

39
 But when Socrates was occupying himself with the excellences of character, and in
connexion with them became the first to raise the problem of universal definition
(horizesthai katholou zêtountos prôtou) (for of the physicists Democritus only touched on
the subject to a small extent, and defined, after a fashion, the hot and the cold; while the
Pythagoreans had before this treated of a few things, whose definitions—e.g. those of
opportunity, justice, or marriage—they connected with numbers; but it was natural that
Socrates should be seeking the essence (ti estin), for he was seeking to syllogize, and ‘what a
thing is’ is the starting-point of syllogisms; for there was as yet none of the dialectical power
which enables people even without knowledge of the essence to speculate about contraries
and inquire whether the same science deals with contraries; for two things may be fairly
ascribed to Socrates—inductive arguments and universal definition, both of which are
concerned with the starting-point of science):—but Socrates did not make the universals or
the definitions exist apart: they, however, gave them separate existence, and this was the
kind of thing they called Ideas.

Cf. Aristotle, On the Parts of Animals, I. 1 (642a 25-30) (tr. William H Ogle):

[25] The reason why our predecessors failed in hitting upon this method of treatment was,
that they were not in possession of the notion of essence, nor of any definition of substance.
The first who came near it was Democritus, and he was far from adopting it as a necessary
method in natural science, but was merely brought to it, in spite of himself, by constraint of
facts.

In the time of Socrates a nearer approach was made to the method. But at this period men
gave up inquiring into the works of nature, and philosophers diverted their attention to
political science and to the virtues which benefit mankind. [30]

Cf. Aristotle, Metaph., IV. 2, 1004b 15-26) (tr. W. D. Ross; slightly rev. B.A.M.):

So too there are certain properties peculiar to being as such, and it is about these that the
philosopher has to investigate the truth.
—An indication of this may be mentioned: dialecticians and sophists assume the same guise
as the philosopher, for sophistic is Wisdom which exists [20] only in semblance, and
dialecticians embrace all things in their dialectic, and being is common to all things; but
evidently their dialectic embraces these subjects because these are proper to philosophy.

—For sophistic and dialectic turn on the same genus of things as philosophy, but this differs
from dialectic in the nature of the faculty [or ‘power’] required and from sophistic in respect
of the purpose of the philosophic life [tês de tou biou têi proairesei]. [25] Dialectic is merely
critical where philosophy claims to know, and sophistic is what appears to be philosophy but
is not.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In IV Meta., lect. 4, nn. 3-6 (tr. B.A.M.):

3. Then when he says, But an indication… he gives here the second argument for showing
the same thing, which is by an indication, which goes like this: The dialectician and the
sophist are clothed in the same garb as the philosopher, as having a likeness to him. But the
dialectician and the philosopher dispute about the things mentioned: therefore, it belongs to
the philosopher to consider them. But to manifest the first he shows how the dialectician and
sophist have a likeness to the philosopher, and in what they differ from each other. 1

1
deinde cum dicit signum autem hic ponit secundam rationem ad idem ostendendum, quae est per signum,
quae talis est. dialectici et sophistae induunt figuram eamdem philosopho, quasi similitudinem cum eo

40
 4. Now they agree in this, that it belongs to the dialectician to consider all things. But this
could not be the case unless he were to consider all things insofar as they agree in
something: because of one science there is one subject, and of one art there is one matter,
with respect to which it works.

Since, then, all things agree in nothing but being, it is obvious that the matter of dialectic is
being and the things which are of being, with which the philosopher is also concerned. Like-
wise sophistic also has a certain likeness to the philosophy. For sophistic is an outwardly
visible or apparent but not an existing wisdom. But what has the appearance of something
must have some likeness to it. And so the dialectician and the sophist must consider the same
thing as the philosopher.1

5. But they differ from each other. The philosopher [differs] from the dialectician in power.
For his consideration is of greater power than that of the dialectician. For with respect to the
things mentioned the philosopher proceeds demonstratively [i.e. from proper principles].
And so it belongs to him to have science of the aforesaid things, and he has the power of
knowing them by certitude. For the effect of demonstration is certain knowledge or science.
But, with respect to everything mentioned, the dialectician proceeds from probable things;
and so he does not produce science, but a kind of opinion. And this is so because being is
twofold, namely, ‘being of reason’ and ‘being of nature’.

Now ‘being of reason’ is said properly of those intentions which reason discovers in the
things it considers, like the intentions of genus, species and similar things which are not
found in the nature of things but follow upon the consideration of reason. And [being] of this
sort, namely, the being of reason, is properly the subject of logic. But intelligible intentions
of this sort are coextensive with the beings of nature, by the fact that every being of nature
falls under the consideration of reason. And so the subject of logic extends itself to
everything of which being of nature is predicated. And so he concludes that the subject of
logic is coextensive with the subject of philosophy, which is being of nature. And so from its
principles the philosopher proceeds to proving the things which are considered about the
common accidents of this sort of being. But the dialectician proceeds to their consideration
from the intentions of reason, which are outside the natures of things. And so it is said that
dialectic is tentative because to make trial of properties is to proceed from extrinsic
principles.2

habentes: sed dialectici et sophistae disputant de praedictis: ergo et philosophi est ea considerare. ad
manifestationem autem primae ostendit quomodo dialectica et sophistica cum philosophia habeant
similitudinem, et in quo differunt ab ea.
1
conveniunt autem in hoc, quod dialectici est considerare de omnibus. hoc autem esse non posset, nisi
consideraret omnia secundum quod in aliquo uno conveniunt: quia unius scientiae unum subiectum est, et
unius artis una est materia, circa quam operatur. cum igitur omnes res non conveniant nisi in ente,
manifestum est quod dialecticae materia est ens, et ea quae sunt entis, de quibus etiam philosophus
considerat. similiter etiam sophistica habet quamdam similitudinem philosophiae. nam sophistica est visa
sive apparens sapientia, non existens. quod autem habet apparentiam alicuius rei, oportet quod aliquam
similitudinem cum illa habeat. et ideo oportet quod eadem consideret philosophus, dialecticus et sophista.
2
differunt autem abinvicem. philosophus quidem a dialectico secundum potestatem. nam maioris virtutis est
consideratio dialectici. philosophus enim de praedictis communibus procedit demonstrative. et ideo eius est
habere scientiam de praedictis, et est cognoscitivus eorum per certitudinem. nam certa cognitio sive scientia
est effectus demonstrationis. dialecticus autem circa omnia praedicta procedit ex probabilibus; unde non
facit scientiam, sed quamdam opinionem. et hoc ideo est, quia ens est duplex: ens scilicet rationis et ens
naturae. ens autem rationis dicitur proprie de illis intentionibus, quas ratio adinvenit in rebus consideratis;
sicut intentio generis, speciei et similium, quae quidem non inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed
considerationem rationis consequuntur. et huiusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, est proprie subiectum logicae.
huiusmodi autem intentiones intelligibiles, entibus naturae aequiparantur, eo quod omnia entia naturae sub

41
 6. But the philosopher differs from the sophist by proairesis, that is, by choice or pleasure, in
other words, by the desire of his (way of) life. For the philosopher and the sophist order their
lives and actions to different things—the philosopher to knowing the truth; but the sophist to
this, that he appear to know although he does not know.1

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In I Post. An., lect. XX, n. 171 (tr. Duane H. Berquist).

It should be known that for another reason dialectic and logic and first philosophy are about
what is common. For first philosophy is about the common because its consideration is about
the common things themselves, to wit, about being and the parts and passions of being. And
because reason is employed about all that is in things, while logic is about the acts of reason,
logic also will be about what is common to all things, that is about the intentions of reason,
which are related to all things. But not thus that logic is about the common things as
subjects. For logic considers as subjects, syllogism, statement, predicate, or something of
this kind.2

Cf. Aristotle, Rhet., I. 1 (1354a 1-10) (tr. W. Rhys Roberts):

[1354a] Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic. Both alike are concerned with such things as
come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science.
Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt
to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves [5] and to attack others.
Ordinary people do this either at random or through practice and from acquired habit. Both
ways being possible, the subject can plainly be handled systematically, for it is possible to
inquire the reason why some speakers succeed through practice and others [10]
spontaneously; and every one will at once agree that such an inquiry is the function of an art.

Cf. Aristotle, Rhet., I. 2 (1356b 29–37) (ed. & tr. J. H. Freese; rev. B.A.M.):

Now, that which is persuasive is persuasive in reference to someone, and is persuasive and
convincing either at once and in and by itself, or because it appears to be proved by
propositions [30] that are convincing; further, no art has the particular in view, medicine for
instance what is good for Socrates or Callias, but what is good for this or that class of
persons (for this is a matter that comes within the province of an art, whereas the particular
is infinite and cannot be the subject of a true science); similarly, therefore, rhetoric will not
consider what seems probable in each individual case, for instance to Socrates or Hippias,
but that which seems probable to this or that class of persons [35]. It is the same with

consideratione rationis cadunt. et ideo subiectum logicae ad omnia se extendit, de quibus ens naturae
praedicatur. unde concludit, quod subiectum logicae aequiparatur subiecto philosophiae, quod est ens
naturae. philosophus igitur ex principiis ipsius procedit ad probandum ea quae sunt consideranda circa
huiusmodi communia accidentia entis. dialecticus autem procedit ad ea consideranda ex intentionibus
rationis, quae sunt extranea a natura rerum. et ideo dicitur, quod dialectica est tentativa, quia tentare
proprium est ex principiis extraneis procedere.
1
a sophista vero differt philosophus prohaeresi, idest electione vel voluptate, idest desiderio vitae. ad aliud
enim ordinat vitam suam et actiones philosophus et sophista. philosophus quidem ad sciendum veritatem;
sophista vero ad hoc quod videatur scire quamvis nesciat.
2
Sciendum tamen est quod alia ratione dialectica est de communibus et logica et philosophia prima.
Philosophia enim prima est de communibus, quia eius consideratio est circa ipsas res communes, scilicet
circa ens et partes et passiones entis. Et quia circa omnia quae in rebus sunt habet negotiari ratio, logica
autem est de operationibus rationis; logica etiam erit de his quae communia sunt omnibus, idest de
intentionibus rationis, quae ad omnes res se habent. Non autem ita, quod logica sit de ipsis rebus
communibus, sicut de subiectis. Considerat enim logica, sicut subiecta, syllogismum, enunciationem,
praedicatum , aut aliquid huiusmodi.

42
 dialectic, which does not draw conclusions from any random premises—for even madmen
have some fancies—but it takes its material from subjects which demand reasoned
discussion, as rhetoric does from those which are common subjects of deliberation.

18. Aristotle on êthos (‘character’).

Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 6 (1450a 6-7):

…[B]ut by ‘characters’ [ta êthê] [I mean] that according to which we say those who do
things [tous prattontas] are of a certain sort….

Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 6 (1450b 9-12):

But character [êthos] is that which choice [proairesin] reveals; <that is,> what sort of thing
<…> one [10] chooses or avoids. Consequently, those speeches have no character in which
it is not entirely <clear> what the speaker chooses or avoids.

Cf. Aristotle, Poetics ch. 15 (1454a 19):

Now one will have character [êthos] if, as has been said, by speech or action he make clear
what his choice is; and a good [character] if a good [choice].

Cf. Aristotle, Nic. Eth., III. 2 (1111b 5-6) (tr. W. D. Ross):

For choice [proairesis] is thought to be most proper to virtue, and to reveal character more
than actions do.

Cf. Aristotle, Nic. Eth., III. 2 (1112a 2) (tr. W. D. Ross):

…[F]or by choosing what is good or bad we are men of a certain character….

Cf. Aristotle, Rhet. III, 16 (1417a 16-1417b 20) (tr. W. Rhys Roberts):

The narration should depict character; to which end you must know what makes it do so.

One such thing is the indication of moral purpose [or ‘choice’, proairesis]; the quality of
purpose indicated determines the quality of character depicted and is itself determined by
the end pursued. Thus it is that mathematical discourses depict no character; they have
nothing to do with moral purpose, for they represent nobody as pursuing any end. On the
other hand, the Socratic dialogues [= Sôkratikoi logoi, ‘the Socratic discourses’] do depict
character, being concerned with moral [20] questions. This end will also be gained by
describing the manifestations of various types of character, e.g. “he kept walking along as he
talked,” which shows the man’s recklessness and rough manners. Do not let your words
seem inspired so much by intelligence, in the manner now current, as by moral purpose: e.g.
“I willed this; aye, it was my moral purpose; true, I gained nothing by it, still it is [25] better
thus.” For the other way shows good sense, but this shows good character; good sense
making us go after what is useful, and good character after what is noble. Where any detail
may appear incredible, then add the cause of it; of this Sophocles provides an example in the
Antigone, where Antigone says she had cared more for her brother than for husband or
children, since if the latter perished they might be replaced, [30]

But since my father and mother in their graves

43
 Lie dead, no brother can be born to me.1

If you have no such cause to suggest, just say that you are aware that no one will believe
your words, but the fact remains that such is our nature, however hard the world may find it
to believe that a man deliberately does [35] anything except what pays him.
Again, you must make use of the emotions. Relate the familiar manifestations of them, and
those that distinguish yourself and your opponent; for instance, “he went away scowling at
me.” So Aeschines described Cratylus2 as “hiss- [1417b]
1
Sophocles, Antigone, 911, 912.
2
[Aeschines may be the friend of Socrates and Cratylus (who was Plato’s instructor in
Heraclitean philosophy), but this is uncertain.]

ing with fury and shaking his fists.” These details carry conviction: the audience take the
truth of what they know as so much evidence for the truth of what they do not. Plenty of
such details may be found in Homer:

[5] Thus did she say: but the old woman buried her face in her hands:1
a true touch – people beginning to cry do put their hands over their eyes.
Bring yourself on the stage from the first in the right character, that people may regard you
in that light; and the same with your adversary; but do not let them see what you are about.
How easily such impressions may be conveyed we can see from the way in which we get
some [10] inkling of things we know nothing of by the mere look of the messenger bringing
news of them. Have some narrative in many different parts of your speech; and sometimes
let there be none at the beginning of it.
In political oratory there is very little opening for narration; nobody can “narrate” what has
not yet happened. If there is narration at all, it will be of past events, the recollection of
which is to help the hearers to make better [15] plans for the future. Or it may be employed
to attack some one’s character, or to eulogize him – only then you will not be doing what the
political speaker, as such, has to do.
If any statement you make is hard to believe, you must guarantee its truth, and at once
offer an explanation, and then furnish it with such particulars as will be expected. Thus
Carcinus’ Jocasta, in his Oedipus, keeps guaranteeing the truth of her answers to the
inquiries of the man [20] who is seeking her son; and so with Haemon in Sophocles.
1
Odyssey, xix. 361.
2
Or possibly, ‘and then arranged your reasons systematically for those who demand them.’
3
[A tragic poet of the fifth cent.]
4
Cp. Sophocles, Antigone, 635-8, 701-4. (emphasis added)

Cf. Aristotle, Rhet., II. 21 (1395b 1-19) (tr. W. Rhys Roberts):

One great advantage of Maxims to a speaker is due to the want of intelligence in his hearers,
who love to hear him succeed in expressing as a universal truth the opinions which they hold
themselves about particular cases. I will explain what I mean by this, indicating at the same
time how we are to hunt down the maxims required. The maxim, as has been already said, a
general statement, [5] and people love to hear stated in general terms what they already
believe in some particular connexion: e.g. if a man happens to have bad neighbours or bad
children, he will agree with any one who tells him, “Nothing is more annoying than having
neighbours,” or, “Nothing is more foolish than to be the parent of children.” The orator has
therefore to guess the subjects on which his hearers really [10] hold views already, and what
those views are, and then must express, as general truths, these same views on these same
subjects. This is one advantage of using maxims.

44
 There is another which is more important – it invests a speech with moral character.
There is moral character in every speech in which the moral purpose is conspicuous: and
maxims always produce this effect, because the utterance of them amounts to a general
declaration of moral [15] principles: so that, if the maxims are sound, they display the
speaker as a man of sound moral character. So much for the Maxim – its nature, varieties,
proper use, and advantages. (emphasis added)

19. Aristotle on the depiction of character.

As Aristotle states, the end pursued determines the quality of the proairesis or
moral purpose indicated, which in turn determines the quality of the êthos or character
depicted, for which reason the philosopher differs from the sophist tês de tou biou têi
proairesei, “in respect of the purpose of the philosophic life”, as he elsewhere states (cf.
Metaph., IV. 2, 1004b 15-26). Hence a narrative will have character to the extent it
portrays someone as pursuing an end, and so a Socratic discourse will have character
insofar as it portrays Socrates (and his interlocutors) as pursuing an end. But it should be
noted that proairesis, here translated as ‘purpose’, is defined in the Nicomachean Ethics as
“the deliberate desire of things in our own power” (III. 3, 1113a 10), and so is most
accurately rendered as ‘choice’. Hence Aristotle distinguishes the philosopher from the
sophist according to their ‘purpose’, understood as ‘choice’, taking the form of a deliberate
desire of things in their power. Whereas the philosopher claims to know, making
knowledge the object of his choice (and whereas the dialectician is ‘merely critical’ of
what the philosopher claims to know—which is to say, passing judgment on it according to
common intentions, as is explained in logic), the sophist desires only the appearance of
knowledge, and not the reality. This last point is made clear by St. Thomas Aquinas in his
commentary on the passage in question (cf. In IV Meta., lect. 4, n. 6, tr. B.A.M.):

But the philosopher differs from the sophist by proairesis, that is, by ‘choice’ or ‘pleasure’,
in other words, by the desire of his [way of] life [desiderio vitae]. For the philosopher and
the sophist order their lives and actions to different things—the philosopher to knowing the
truth; but the sophist to this, that he appear to know although he does not know.

In sum, in the view of St. Thomas, Aristotle is saying that the philosopher and the
sophist differ by proairesis, which St. Thomas glosses as electio, ‘choice or pleasure’, and
explains as meaning desiderio vitae, ‘desire of life’ or ‘desire of his way of life’—that is,
the thing which gives him pleasure, or the thing which he desires to get out of life, which,
for the philosopher, is the possession of wisdom, but for the sophist, merely the appearance
of wisdom. St. Thomas’s simple gloss of proairesis as ‘choice or pleasure’ may be
elaborated upon by the addition of a phrase Aristotle adds in explanation of the word in the
Poetics (ch. 6, 1450b 9-10): “what sort of thing one chooses or avoids”, resulting in the
following formulation:
But the philosopher differs from the sophist by proairesis, that is, by “choice or pleasure”
(understood as ‘what sort of thing one chooses or avoids’), that is, “desire of (his) life (or
way of life)”. For the philosopher and the sophist order their lives and actions to different
things—the philosopher to knowing the truth; but the sophist to this, that he appear to know
although he does not know.

On this matter, compare also the following text from the Neo-Platonist Albinus:

45
 But as regards that, which is combined with a becoming delineation of the manners of the
characters introduced, (and) their being different in their discourses through life, some as
philosophers, and others as sophists, it is requisite to assign to each their peculiar manners;
to the philosopher that, which is noble and simple, and truth-loving; but to the sophist that,
which is of many hues, and tricky, and reputation-loving; but to an individual what is
peculiar to him.1

In this text, ‘delineation of the manners of the characters introduced’ translates

êthopoiias tôn paralambanomenôn prosopôn, which means, more literally, ‘the depiction
of the characters of the persons introduced’, namely, in a Platonic dialogue. Albinus goes
on to distinguish such persons with respect to “their discourses through life”—that is to
say, in their conversations with respect to their ‘life’ or ‘way of life’, a remark that is easily
understood if it is taken to refer to Aristotle’s account of the distinction between the
philosopher and the sophist as noted above. Hence, the character of the persons imitated in
a Platonic dialogue will be determined by the portrayal of the various ends they pursue as
this determines their proaireseis, which in turn determines their êthê, as this is revealed in
and by their logoi or dialogoi, their ‘discourses’ or ‘conversations’.

20. On the character of Socrates.

Cf. Graham Dennis, Plato’s Philosophy of Education: Dialectical Poetry and the Art of
Healing. Socratic Irony:2

In order to understand the ironic and esoteric distance which separates Socrates from other
men (the mere mortal, the thnetos) we must turn to an analysis of the Greek aristocratic
virtue which carries within it a code for communication between the ‘higher’ and ‘lower’—
great-souled men, and men of lesser soul. Here we may find a formula for Socratic irony.
Aristotle’s megaloyuxia (megalopsychia), which we translate as ‘magnanimity,’ can also be
translated as ‘great-souled’ (the literal rendering) or ‘high-minded.’ High- mindedness 22 is
distinguished from vanity in that the high-minded man thinks he deserves great things and
actually does deserve them, whereas the vain and foolish man thinks he deserves them and
does not.23 Further, according to Aristotle, the high-minded man must be sincere, and thus
his speech must be “free and truthful.” Most of all, he must care more for the truth than what
others think of him. The dou\loj (slave) is a flatterer, he is constantly trying to impress men
of higher station. Regarding the great-souled man Aristotle says:

He must be open in hate and open in love, for to hide one’s feelings and to care more for the
opinion of others than for the truth is a sign of timidity. He speaks and acts openly: since he looks
down upon others his speech is free and truthful, except when he deliberately depreciates himself
in addressing the common run of people. He cannot adjust his life to another, except a friend, for
to do so is slavish. That is, [by the way,] why all flatterers are servile and people from the lower
classes are flatterers.24

The prohibition against “adjusting his life to another, except a friend” reminds us of a
companion passage in book VIII of the Nicomachean Ethics concerning friendship:

1
“The Introduction of Albinus to the Doctrines of Plato”, in The Works of Plato, A New and Literal Version
chiefly from the text of Stallbaum. Vol. VI. containing the doubtful works: by George Burges, M.A. Trinity
College, Cambridge. London: Henry G. Bohn, York Street, Covent Garden, (1885), pp. 315-316) (emphasis
added).
2
(http://examinedlifejournal.com/archives/vol2ed8/paedia.shtml as retrieved on Dec 25, 2006)

46
 . . . those who are equal must respect the principle of equality by giving equal affection to one
another and by establishing equality in other respects, while those who are unequal must make a
return proportionate to their superiority or inferiority.25

Both of these passages provide a language or framework for understanding communication

between men of equal soul, on the one hand, and those of unequal soul, on the other. Great-
souled men only speak openly (without eironeia) to one another. Further, the great-souled
man cannot adjust his life to another. Since the great-souled man cannot adjust his life, he
must adjust his speech (“depreciate himself”) when consorting with “the common run of
people.” We will now suggest that it is in this sense that one should understand the
prohibition in the Theaetetus: heaven has debarred Socrates from speaking openly to men of
lesser soul. To “give birth” is to bring to light or reveal the contents of one’s soul. The
prohibition against “giving birth” derives from the now defunct ancient ethics of
magnanimity. The great-souled man can only speak openly to the friend in the highest sense,
the friend who is another self.
From Alcibiades we have discovered Socrates’ power as a seducer: his erotic irony makes
him appear the lover when in truth he is the beloved. Now we have discovered from
Aristotle why Socrates is the consummate ei)/rwn (ironist). According to Aristotle, the high-
minded man should speak openly and truthfully (without irony) except when he deliberately
depreciates himself in addressing the common run of people. Throughout the Platonic
dialogues we encounter Socrates “depreciating himself.” He does not speak openly to his
interlocutors nor to us, the readers. Socrates is simply following the ethics of magnanimity
which demand ironic distance, dissimulation, and affected ignorance when there is
communication among unequals. We discover in Socrates’ ironic distance a thick, virtually
un-conquerable opaqueness, like a dark cloud shielding us from the brilliant sun that lies
behind it. Just as Moses veiled his face after coming down from the mountain of God
(Sinai), Socrates’ noetic brilliance is veiled from us through ironic distance. The analogy is
not in-exact. From Exodus we learn that Moses veiled his face before the people, and
removed the veil when he was in the presence of God. 26 Rather than openly displaying the
Socratic radiance to the unlearned ‘many,’ Plato prudently veils that brilliance through the
use of irony.
Socratic distance, then, suggests that we are not his equals. And even this truth is hidden
behind the ironic veil of flattery, self-deprecation and affected ignorance. Plato doesn’t
simply “announce” Socrates’ greatness, rather, he has bequeathed to us the riddle of his
ironic distance. But Plato did not write dialogues simply to confound his readers. Ironic
distance is not an end in itself, but rather a prudent means to a higher end. Plato invites us in
his dialogues, on very strict conditions, to solve his riddles. Regarding those conditions
David Bolotin says:

The reader himself must become involved in the dialogue and concerned to learn the truth about
the matters it discusses. In particular, whenever an argument or an assertion by Socrates, though
satisfying to his interlocutor, fails to convince us, we must not hesitate to interject our own
questions. If we refrain from this questioning, we implicitly assume that Socrates is wrong and
that we are wiser about the matter at issue than he. And yet many of our objections could stem
from unacknowledged ignorance on our own part. . . . Our own questions to Socrates can even
lead us toward the heart of the dialogue. Indeed, the dialogue is like an able teacher, a teacher who
has more to say to us the more willing we show ourselves to learn. Only after opening ourselves to
the possibility of such learning can we hope to ascertain what the dialogue really means, or what
Plato really thought.27

We are now in a position to confirm what we suspected was implied by the midwife analogy
in the Theaetetus: Socrates is “debarred from giving birth” not because he is barren 28 but
because he is great-souled. Rather than announcing, outright, Socrates’ greatness, Plato has
bequeathed to us the dramatic spectacle of the ethics of magnanimity in the ironic distance of

47
 Socrates. Through the exhibition of ironic distance we are gently reminded of our poverty—
we must not rashly assume we are Socrates’ peers. Socrates only speaks openly (without
irony) to Aristotle’s friend in the highest sense, the friend who is another self. His wisdom
surpasses ours, and thus, our wisdom begins with the recognition of our own poverty. As
Bolotin asserts, if we think we are wiser than Socrates we will learn nothing, the riddles will
remain. The genius of a Platonic dialogue is that it cannot be understood unless you become
the student of Socrates, arrogance only increases the ironic distance.
22
We will follow Ostwald’s translation (1962) of megalopsychia as “high-mindedness.”
23
See Nicomachean Ethics IV, iii (1123b 1-4).
24
ibid. IV, iii (1124b 25-1125a 2).
25
ibid. VIII, xiii (1162b3-4).
26
“Whenever [Moses] entered the Lord’s presence to speak with him, he removed the veil
until he came out. And when he came out and told the Israelites what he had been com-
manded, they saw that his face was radiant. Then Moses would put the veil back over his
face until he went in to speak with the Lord” (Exodus 34.34-35).
27
Bolotin (1979) Plato’s Dialogue on Friendship, pp. 12-13.
28
As a literal reading of the passage would lead us to believe.

References.

Bolotin, David. Plato’s Dialogue on Friendship: An Interpretation of the Lysis, with a New
Translation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979).
Ostwald, Martin. Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall/
Library of Liberal Arts, 1999).

21. The eiron according to Aristotle.

Cf. Aristotle, Nic. Eth. IV. 7 (1127b 23-32) (tr. H. Rackham):

Self-depreciators, who understate their own merits, seem of a more refined character [than
boasters], for we feel that the motive underlying this form of insincerity is not gain but
dislike of ostentation. These also mostly disown qualities held in high esteem, [25] as
Socrates used to do. Those who disclaim merely trifling or obvious distinctions are called
affected humbugs (baukopanourgoi), and are decidedly contemptible; and sometimes such
mock humility seems to be really boastfulness, like the dress of the Spartans, for extreme
negligence in dress, as well as excessive attention to it, has a touch of ostentation. But a
moderate use of [30] self-depreciation in matters not too commonplace and obvious has a
not ungraceful air.

The boaster seems to be the opposite of the sincere man, because Boastfulness is worse
than Self-depreciation.

Cf. Aristotle, Nic. Eth. IV. 3 (1124b 25—1125a 2) (tr. Martin Ostwald):

He [sc. the great-souled man] must be open in hate and open in love, for to hide one’s
feelings and to care more for the opinion of others than for the truth is a sign of timidity. He
speaks and acts openly: since he looks down upon others his speech is free and truthful,
except when he deliberately depreciates himself in addressing the common run of people. He
cannot adjust his life to another, except a friend, for to do so is slavish. That is, [by the way,]
why all flatterers are servile and people from the lower classes are flatterers.

48
Cf. Aristotle, Nic. Eth. VIII. 13 (1162b3-4) (tr. Martin Ostwald):

...those who are equal must respect the principle of equality by giving equal affection to one
another and by establishing equality in other respects, while those who are unequal must
make a return proportionate to their superiority or inferiority.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In IV Eth., lect. 15, nn. 846-849 (tr. C. I. Litzinger):

846. Next [14], at “Dissemblers,” he considers the vice belonging to the defect. On this
point he does two things. First [14] he compares this vice with boasting; and then [15] points
out its difference at “Some people especially etc.” He says first that dissemblers who
minimize the truth about themselves seem to have more pleasing ways than boasters,
because they apparently do not speak this way for the sake of gain but as if fleeing from
vanity.
847. At “Some people especially” [15] he explains how this vice is practiced in different
ways, saying there are some who especially deny about themselves things pertaining to great
renown, for example, Socrates denied that he was wise. There are others who want to show
by certain insignificant and obvious things that they do not pretend more excellent things
about themselves than they possess. Such are called blato-panurgi, i.e., men who have their
delight in a certain cunning pretense. Panurgi is a Greek word for “cunning fellow,” while
blaton means something done amusingly. These, he says, are readily despised because their
pretense is too obvious. A defect of this nature in external things sometimes seems to pertain
to boasting when in this way they want to appear better and more observant of moderation,
like the Spartans who wore clothing humbler than became their state. For this reason an
excess and an immoderate deficiency in externals seem to pertain to boasting precisely
because a certain singularity in a man is displayed in case of each.
848. Still others exercise this vice in a mitigated form, since they neither altogether deny
famous deeds done by themselves nor do they even attribute to themselves negligible qual-
ities, practicing the vice in matter obvious and at hand. People like this seem to be pleasing,
as was just said (846).
849. Then [16], at “As being more vicious,” he considers the opposition between the vice
and the virtue, saying that the boaster is more in opposition to the truthful man because more
vicious, as we have already noted (837). The worse vice is always more opposed to virtue.

Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, In IV Eth., lect. 10, nn. 774-776 (tr. C. I. Litzinger):

774. At “He speaks” [14] he gives the third trait, saying that it is a mark of the
magnanimous person to speak and work openly because he pays little attention to others.
Consequently, he publicly divulges his words and deeds. That a man hides what he does and
says arises from fear of others. But no one fears those he contemns. Therefore, these two
things are interchangeable, viz., that a man freely divulge things and that he cares little for
others. However, we do not say that the magnanimous man cares little for others in the sense
that he despises them—as it were depriving them of proper respect—but because he does not
value them above their worth.
775. At “He is truthful” [15] he assigns the fourth trait, saying that the magnanimous man
does not speak falsehood but the truth, except perhaps that he playfully utters certain things
in irony. However, he does use irony in the company of common people.
776. Next [16], at “He cannot conform,” he indicates the trait concerned with pleasure
that arises from companionship, saying that the magnanimous person does not easily
associate with others; he finds company only with his friends. The servile soul has a
tendency to occupy himself with the intimate affairs of everyone. Consequently all flatterers,

49
 who want please everybody without distinction are obsequious, i.e., prepared to be
subservient. People of low station who lack greatness of soul are flatterers.

For additional witnesses to character-drawing and related matters, see my paper On Plot
Construction and the Portrayal of Character.

50
22. Definitions of Dialogos in sum.

DIALOGOS (‘DIALOGUE’). (1) Conversation, dialogue (LSJ, s.v. dia/logoj),

which, in the first place, is speech taking place between two persons (B.A.M.); 1 understood
with respect to the productions of Plato, (2) “a discourse consisting of question and answer
on some philosophical or political subject, with due regard to the characters of the persons
introduced and the choice of diction” (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent
Philosophers, III. 48, “Plato”, tr. R. D. Hicks, LCL 184),2 being taken with reference to
dialectic understood as “the art of discourse by which we either refute or establish some
proposition by means of question and answer on the part of the interlocutors” (idem); or
again, as may be gathered from Aristotle, with reference to the so-called Sôkratikoi logoi
(‘Socratic discourses’), (3) a species of the art which imitates “in bare speech alone”
(monon tois logois psilois, Poet. 1, 1447a 28—1448b 11); its object being (presumably) 3
the ‘conversation’ (Gr. dialogos) engaged in by the persons represented (who, in the first
place, would be Socrates and his interlocutors), and hence their êthê or ‘character’ as well;4
in a narrative rather than dramatic manner; 5 that is to say (in sum and generally speaking),
(4) the art which imitates a conversation understood as a discourse (logos) consisting of
question and answer upon some political or philosophical subject, with the characterization
and language appropriate to the persons introduced (and hence which consists in the
depiction of character in bare speech alone), in a narrative rather than a dramatic manner,
the purpose of which is to instruct the listener or to rouse him to inquiry (B.A.M.).6

Endnote A.

1
Cf. Andrew Ford, From “Socratic logoi” to “dialogues”: Dialogue in Fourth-century Genre Theory. The
logoi in Socratic logoi: “The prefix dia- characterizes the speech as an exchange between two or more per-
sons, but does not imply that the exchange is particularly ‘dialectical’ or ‘dialogical’”.
2
Esti de dialogos <logos> ex erôtêseôs kai apokriseôs sungkeimenos peri tinos tôn philosophoumenôn kai
politikôn meta tês prepousês êthopoiias tôn paralambanomenôn prosopôn kai tês kata tên lexin kataskeuês.
The same definition is found in the Middle Platonist Albinus: “[Dialogue] is nothing else than a discourse
composed of question and answer upon some political or philosophical matter, combined with a becoming
delineation of the manners of the characters introduced, and the arrangement as regards their diction”
(Albinus, The Introduction of Albinus to the Doctrines of Plato. In The Works of Plato, Vol. 6, tr. George
Burges, p. 316). Compare also the following from the anonymous ‘Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy’:
“[Dialogue] is a logos without metre, consisting of questions and answers by various characters, with the
appro-priate characterisation [ethopoiia]” (Anonymous, ‘Introduction to Plato’, tr. D. W. Russell, Criticism
in Antiquity, p. 178); or again, dialogue is “that which consists of persons asking and answering questions,
just as dialectic arises from question and answer” (idem).
3
As no statement of the object imitated by dialogue is found in the Poetics, I have worded the difference in
conformity with Aristotle’s principles. On this point, see Endnote A.
4
According as the e is pronounced short, ethos meaning “a natural or quasi-natural [i.e. acquired] disposition
to act in a certain way” (St. Thomas Aquinas, In III Sent., dist. 23, q. 1, art. 4b, c., tr. B.A.M.).
5
See Endnote B.
6
See Endnote C.

51
On the meaning of Sōkratikoi, cf. Diskin Clay, “The Origins of the Socratic Dialogue”, 1.
Sōkratikoi; in Vander Waerdt (1994), p. 24:

But what precisely does the adjective ‘Socratic’ mean? Were these logoi Socratic in that they
resembled the kind of discourse Socrates gave his name to—that is, the heuristic method of
question by someone who professes to be asking more than rhetorical questions, and answers
by someone who might not be able to produce a satisfactory response? This was indeed a
feature of some of the Sōkratikoi logoi, but Aristotle’s conception of poetry as mimesis and
the term mimoi suggests a larger interpretation of the adjective: just as the mimes of Sophron
represented the different sexes and the variety of human types engaged in their characteristic
pursuits, the authors of the Sōkratikoi logoi imitated the character of Socrates as he engaged
in his characteristic manner of conversation and interrogation.

Cf. also Proclus, Commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeus of Plato (tr. Thomas Taylor), p.
55:

For he who in a written work narrates the deeds of the most excellent men, composes a
history. But he who narrates the speeches of these men, if he intends to preserve the manners
[= ‘character’] of the speaker, assumes a disposition similar to the speaker. For words are
seen to differ according to the inward dispositions. For thus we deride most of those, except
Plato, who have written the Apology of Socrates, as not preserving the Socratic manner in
their composition.

On the meaning of logoi, cf. Andrew Ford, From “Socratic logoi” to “dialogues”:
Dialogue in Fourth-century Genre Theory. The logoi in Socratic logoi:

The final step in this study may be described as asking just what the logoi signifies in
Sôkratikoi logoi. Obviously the word is polyvalent and in most passages is sufficiently
under-determined to refer to Socratic “discourse” “argument” or “conversation.” In addition,
the logoi in the phrase could sometimes designate the genre as a form of “prose” as opposed
to poetry. Nor can one exclude the concrete sense of “a body of writings” (as in
mathêmatikoi logoi), for the need to name a genre becomes acuter the more a growing body
of texts makes that genre noticeable to the culture.

Endnote B.

This difference, which is implicit in the text, has also been worded by me. A further
differentiation is provided by Diogenes Laertius, III.52: “For some dialogues they call
dramatic, others narrative, and others again a mixture of the two”. Cf. also Thomas Taylor
in his “Introduction to the Philosophy and Writings of Plato” (= Taylor 1804):

The form under which they appear, or the external character that marks them, is of three
sorts: either purely dramatic, like the dialogue of tragedy or comedy; or purely narrative,
where a former conversation is supposed to be committed to writing, and communicated to
some absent friend; or of the mixed kind, like a narration in dramatic poems, where is
recited, to some person present, the story of things past.

In making this threefold distinction, the foregoing authors are following Plato, Republic III
394 b-c (tr. Alan Bloom, Gr. ed. John Burnet):

52
 Of poetry and tale-telling, one kind [394c] proceeds wholly by imitation—as you say,
tragedy and comedy [hoti tês poiêseôs te kai muthologias hê men dia mimêseôs holê estin,
hôsper su legeis, tragôidia te kai kômôidia]; another, by the poet’s own report [hê de di’
apangelias autou tou poiêtou]—this, of course, you would find especially in dithyrambs [—
heurois d’ an autên malista pou en dithurambois]; and still another by both—this is found in
epic poetry and many other places too [—hê d’ au di’ amphoterôn en te têi tôn epôn poiêsei,
pollachou de kai allothi], if you understand me.

Plato’s first type, which Taylor calls “purely dramatic”, has, as Plato earlier noted, a
counterpart in narrative, which is said to occur when “someone takes out the poet’s
connections between the speeches and leaves the exchanges.” And (Socrates adds), “That’s
the way it is with tragedies” (i.e. in the ‘purely dramatic’ as opposed to the ‘narrative’)
(394 a-b, tr. Alan Bloom). He had just given an example of his second type when, after
summarizing a passage of the Iliad in prose without speaking as if he were another person,
he had said: “That, my comrade…is the way simple [394b] narrative without imitation
comes to pass.” Hence, a narrative is ‘purely dramatic’ when “someone takes out the
poet’s connections between the speeches and leaves the exchanges”, as is the case with
many of Plato’s own dialogues, as, for example the Crito.

For Aristotle’s treatment of this difference, cf. Poetics ch. 3 (1448a 19-24) (tr. B.A.M.):

But there is yet a third difference of these [arts] in the [20] manner by which each of these
things might be imitated. For in the same things one might imitate the same things some-
times by narrating (whether becoming another person as Homer does, or in the same manner
without changing), or in the manner of imitating all the agents as engaged in action [ prat-
tontas kai energountas]”.

In this passage ‘in the same things’ names the means, and ‘the same things’ names the
objects. Aristotle’s division may be summarized as follows: a poet may imitate ‘the same
things’ either (1) ‘by narrating’ or (2) ‘in the manner of imitating all the agents as engaged
in action’—that is, by having the agents acting out their actions on the stage, which is to
imitate dramatically, simply speaking. But if ‘by narrating’, the poet may do so in two
ways, either (a) by ‘becoming another person’ after speaking in propria persona; or (b) ‘in
the same manner without changing’—that is, by speaking in propria persona throughout.
It should be noted that there is a third case that Aristotle does not consider here, which
arises when the narrating takes place entirely by ‘becoming another person’, which is the
‘purely dramatic’ narrative of Plato’s division. It should also be noted that Aristotle’s last
member corresponds to Plato’s first, which he says “proceeds wholly by imitation”; where-
as the second subdivision of Aristotle’s first member corresponds to what Plato calls “the
way simple narrative without imitation comes to pass”.

Compare also the following from Albinus, “Introduction”, tr. Burges, p. 316:

Now a dialogue is called a discourse, as a man (is called) an animal. But since of a discourse
there is one kind arranged (in the mind) and another pronounced (by the mouth), let us hear
about the one pronounced (by the mouth). And since of the latter there is one kind spoken, as
a continued narration, and another by question and answer, questions and answers are the
peculiar mark of a dialogue; from whence it is said to be a discourse by interrogation.

53
What Albinus calls a ‘continued narration’ corresponds to Plato’s ‘simple narrative’;
whereas the kind which proceeds ‘by question and answer’ is a subdivision of the Platonic
kind described above as ‘purely dramatic narrative’.

In sum, with respect to manner, an imitation may be either dramatic or narrative, and if
narrative, it may be mixed, or purely narrative, or purely dramatic: mixed, as when the poet
‘becomes another person’ after speaking in propria persona; purely narrative, as not
involving such ‘impersonation’; purely dramatic, as consisting entirely in impersonation.

Endnote C.

For this last difference, being that for the sake of which, or the final cause of this species of
imitative art, cf. the primary partitioning of Plato’s dialogues which has been handed down
from antiquity, a division based upon the several ends proper to the object being imitated,
insofar as that object is a form of conversation: “Of the Platonic dialogues there are two
most general types [Tou dê <dia>logou Platônikou du eisin anôtatô charaktêres], the one
adapted for instruction [ho te huphêgêtikos] and the other for inquiry [ho zêtêtikos]”
(Diogenes Laertius, III. 49, “Plato”, tr. R. D. Hicks). (For Diogenes’ subsequent divisions,
see above.) Cf. also Albinus, “Introduction”, tr. Burges, pp. 317-18: “As regards their
characteristics, which are two, one explanatory and the other exploratory, the explanatory
is suited to the teaching and practice of truth, but the exploratory to an exercise and
conflict, and the confutation of falsehood….”

23. The definition of dialogue as arising out of various dicta of Aristotle.

1. That, along with the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus, the Socratic discourses are
among those arts which have no name in common, but which imitate in bare speech
alone.

 The means of imitation: “bare speech alone”, i.e. speech without metre.

2. That unlike mathematical discourses, the ‘Socratic’ represent somebody pursuing

an end and therefore depict character, doing so inasmuch as they are concerned
with moral questions.

 The object of imitation: somebody pursuing an end.

 The manner of imitation: narration (such narration depicting character by
representing somebody pursuing an end).
 The subject-matter of imitation: moral questions.

3. That Socrates, “occupying himself with the excellences of character [which

obviously pertain to “moral questions”], ...in connexion with them became the first
to raise the problem of universal definition...”; and, in doing so, sought “the
essence (ti estin); for he was seeking to syllogize, and ‘what a thing is’ is the
starting-point of syllogisms; for there was as yet none of the dialectical power
which enables people even without knowledge of the essence to speculate about
contraries and inquire whether the same science deals with contraries; for two

54
 things may be fairly ascribed to Socrates—inductive arguments and universal
definition, both of which are concerned with the starting-point of science)”.

 The object of imitation: the person of Socrates (who is the principal person
represented in a Socratic discourse):
 That is to say, Socrates employing “inductive arguments” seeking
“universal definition” in his pursuit of “the essence” with respect to his
investigations of “the excellences of character”, doing so by means of that
“dialectical power which enables people even without knowledge of the
essence to speculate about contraries and inquire whether the same science
deals with contraries”.1

4. That the philosopher differs from the dialectician in power or ability insofar as the
former concerns himself with being in terms of its proper principles, while the
dialectician considers all things in terms of common intentions, whereas “the
philosopher differs from the sophist by proairesis, that is, by ‘choice’ or ‘pleasure’,
in other words, by the desire of his [way of] life [desiderio vitae]. For the
philosopher and the sophist order their lives and actions to different things—the
philosopher to knowing the truth; but the sophist to this, that he appear to know
although he does not know” (St. Thomas Aquinas).

 The object of imitation: character as revealed by choice, which in turn is

revealed by the end pursued: the philosopher, who orders his life to
knowing the truth, differing from the dialectician in power, but from the
sophist in the desire of his life, as the sophist is devoted only to appearing to
know the truth.

5. That of discourses in the form of a discussion [en tōi dialegesthai logōn] there are
four kinds: didactic [didaskalikoi], dialectical [dialektikoi], examination
[peirastikoi], and contentious [eristikio] arguments.

 The four kinds of discourses (or ‘arguments’, logoi), all of which are found
in the dialogues of Plato):

1. didactic (proper to demonstrative science)

2. dialectical (proper to dialectic)
3. examination (proper to dialectic)
4. contentious (proper to sophistical refutation)

6. From the foregoing considerations, ‘dialogue’ as the genus of the ‘Socratic dis-
courses’, may be defined as:

 an imitation of somebody pursuing an end (the end pursued revealing the

choice, and hence the character, of the person so depicted, being concerned
with moral questions)
 in bare speech alone—that is, in speech without metre
1
That Socrates so proceeded, while not stated here by Aristotle, is evident from the dialogues of Plato, and so
may be presumed to be implied by what Aristotle does say.

55
  by narration (that is, with the character being depicted in a narrative rather
than a dramatic manner)
 for the sake of truth (truth being that to which the lives of the philosopher
and dialectician are ordered)1

7. As for the character of Socrates, it is marked by irony, a practice to be understood

with reference to the great-souled man, who, while he expresses himself openly and
truthfully to his friends and equals, “deliberately depreciates himself in addressing
the common run of people”, since “[h]e cannot adjust his life to another, except a
friend, for to do so is slavish”, such depreciation, as belonging to a dialectician,
needing to be understood as a necessary tool of any teacher—that is, of anyone
seeking to instruct the ignorant; it being of no avail for the latter to be told the truth
baldly, rather than being led by the hand, as it were, as we elsewhere explain.

8. It should also be noted that, inasmuch as the discourse or conversation is represent-

ted by means of narration depicting a person pursuing an end, it follows that ‘dis-
course’ or ‘conversation’ itself may be put down as the object of imitation, the
logos here being ‘in the form of a discussion’, as Aristotle puts it. Hence, just as
tragedy is an imitation of an action that is serious, so dialogue is an imitation of a
conversation that is of a certain sort, namely, dialectical, that is, in the form of a
discussion. Now the “imitation of an action” is called a “plot”, but the plot is also
the “argument” of the work, as one speaks of the “plot” of a play as its “argument”.
But the corresponding part of a dialogue, the conversation imitated, is its
“argument” as well; ‘argument’ here being taken to name the whole discourse, and
not just the species of reasoning embodied in it.2

9. Now, as we have seen, besides discourse in the form of argument, the portrayal of
character is also a component of dialogue. Further, just as character is subordinate
to plot in the makeup of tragedy, so too, êthopoiia (or prosôpopoeia as classical
writers also name it), holds the second place among the composing parts of
dialogue. In sum, then, the principal parts of dialogue would be ‘argument’ and
‘portrayal of character’.3 In the third place is lexis, the ‘language’ in which the
imitation is made.

24. The definitions of tragedy and dialogue in comparison.

Tragedy

By genus and differences:

1
In addition to these remarks, it should be noted that the final cause or that for the sake of which the
discussion is pursued in the Socratic discourses, being barely touched on in the foregoing passages, needs to
be elaborated by the commentator, a task undertaken above.
2
A usage, it may be added, which has the advantage of coinciding with the most common English rendering
of logos in the relevant acceptation of that term, an instance of which is the Pickard-Cambridge translation of
the Sophistical Refutations passage cited above.
3
Cf. Encyclopedia Britannica 11th ed. (1911), s.v. “Dialogue”: “Plato further simplified the form, and
reduced it to pure argumentative conversation, while leaving intact the amusing element of character-
drawing”.

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Tragedy is an imitation of an action that is serious. (genus: imitation; differences: an action
that is serious)

By form and matter:

But by “imitation of an action” Aristotle means ‘plot’, which is the “composition of things
done”1, as he also states, being of the sort to arouse fear and pity. (form: composition;
matter: things done (or done, said, or suffered, etc.)

Dialogue

By genus and difference:

Dialogue is an imitation of a conversation that is dialectical. (genus: imitation; differences:

a conversation that is dialectical)

By form and matter:

But by “imitation of a conversation” may be understood ‘argument’, which is also a

composition of sorts, namely, of questions and answers regarding some proposition. 2
(form: composition; matter: questions and answers regarding some proposition) (on this
point see further below)

25. Comparison with tragedy.

Whereas

tragedy is an imitation of an action that is serious

dialogue is an imitation of a conversation that is dialectical

Whereas

tragedy imitates in speech having metre

dialogue imitates in completely unmetrical speech

Whereas

tragedy is acted out rather than narrated

dialogue is narrated rather than acted out

Whereas

tragedy principally consists of plot and character

dialogue principally consists of discourse and character

Whereas
1
That is to say (more fully), the things done, said, or suffered by the characters portrayed, which are actions
and passions, as Aristotle explains in many places in the Poetics.
2
Or, e.g., “on some political or philosophical subject”.

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 tragedy with respect to its plot is the imitation of an action
dialogue with respect to its discourse is the imitation of a conversation

Whereas

plot (muthos) is composed of things done (sunthesin ton pragmaton)

discourse (logos) is composed of question and answer (ex erôtêseôs kai apokriseôs
sungkeimenos)

26. By question and answer:

What is tragedy? An imitation of an action.

Of what sort is the action? Serious.

What do we call “an imitation of an action”? ‘Plot’.

What is ‘plot’? The composition of the things done.

What is dialogue? An imitation of a conversation.

Of what sort is the conversation? Dialectical.

What do we call “an imitation of a conversation”? ‘Argument’.

What is ‘argument’? The composition of questions and answers regarding some

proposition. (Note that ‘conversation’ is not merely ‘speech’, but a sort of speech, namely,
that involving an exchange of words.)

According to Aristotle.

The ‘Socratic discourses’, a type of dialogue, are defined as a species of the arts which
imitate by bare speech alone—that is, without metre (Poetics, ch. 1). But what does this
form of imitative art imitate? And in what manner? And to what end?

As known by observation:

Dialogue is an imitation of conversation (= the object), doing so in a narrative rather than

dramatic manner (= the manner), involving the appropriate characterization and language,
in order to instruct the listener or to rouse him to inquiry (= the end).

According to Diogenes Laertius and Albinus.

Dialogue is “discourse consisting of question and answer on some philosophical or

political subject”, “with due regard to the characters of the persons introduced and the
choice of diction”.

Hence the following definition, elaborated in the manner of Aristotle’s Poetics:

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 Dialogue, then, is the art which imitates conversation, in bare speech alone—that
is, without metre, in a narrative, rather than a dramatic, manner (albeit the narrative is itself
‘dramatic’), with due regard to the characters of the persons introduced and the choice of
diction [or language], in order to instruct the listener or to rouse him to inquiry.
By ‘conversation’ I mean discourse consisting of question and answer—that is,
dialectical discourse.
By ‘bare speech alone’ I mean significant vocal sound apart from metre—that is,
logos pezos, or ‘prose’.
By a ‘narrative which is itself dramatic’ I mean the manner of narrating whereby
the poet assumes the person of another.
By ‘due regard’ I mean what is suitable to the subject represented.

Forms of definition:

 by genus and difference: it is ‘an imitation of conversation’; or again, ‘an imitation

of persons (asking and answering questions)

 by form and matter: it is ‘discourse consisting of question and answer’, ‘on some
philosophical or political subject’ etc.

27. The principles of the definition, after the Poetics.

object (that which is imitated):

(a) by genus and difference: ‘imitation of conversation’, ‘with appropriate

characterization’ (‘imitation’ being the genus; ‘conversation, with appropriate
characterization’ being the difference; the former being the principal object
imitated; the latter the secondary)
(b) by form and matter: ‘a discourse consisting of question and answer on some
philosophical or political subject’, ‘with due regard to the characters of the persons
introduced’ (‘discourse’ being the form, the rest being the matter)

means (that in which what is imitated is imitated): (1) ‘with language appropriate to the
persons introduced’ (‘in bare speech alone’); that is, ‘with due regard to the choice of
diction’

manner (the way in which what is imitated is imitated): in a narrative rather than a dramatic
manner (that is, ‘narrated rather than acted out’, i.e. ‘by dramatic narration’)

final cause (that for the sake of which what is imitated is imitated): ‘in order to instruct the
listener or to rouse him to inquiry’.

(c) 2013; 2019; 2024 Bart A. Mazzetti. All rights reserved.

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