f

U S ARMY
SPECIAL WARFARE SCHOOL
FORT BRAGG. NORTH CAROLINA

r
THE
ANTI-BANDIT WAR



;
'lBE A'Im.*BAlIDI'f WAR
l\Y' Col J. C. !61rrs;y
PARr I
FOREWORD
In tlu: con/using welter 0/ inl e1'-
national problems engaging the al
tention of the American public fol-
lowing World War 11, tht: cancer 0/
expansionist Soviel Communism fa.s
ttned itself in many areas without
altracling particular attention. 11
was not until this malignancy
reached out to take control 0/ Greece
-the birthplace of demonacy-lhal
it was clearly isolated and labeled (J,J
such. Thus identified it met deter-
mined resistance, the re.fulling strug-
gle focusing atlention 0/ the free
war/.d first on the local prob lem-
then the larger issue.
Forced into the field of active in-
ternational assistance by the finan.
cial inability of the British to reno
der further assistance to the GreeJu,
the U.S. decided actively to come to
(he support of the Greeks, thus tak
ing the lead in developing a policy
of containment. The influence 01
this policy has been world--wide, bUI
il has Come into open conflict with
expansionist in only
three areas - Greece, Korea and
IndoChina.
The AntiBandit War, the firsl in-
stallment of which appears in this
edition Of the GAZE'ITE, is the first
comprehensive analysis of the first
of these three conflicts.
Some 0/ the conclusions of the
article are unexpected. The effects
0/ U.S. assistance were perhaps more





JUT reaching in Ihe politral, eCOILO'm-
ie Q11d psychological fields than in
st rictly military malten. The mili
t ary defeat 0/ the Communists was
hastened by two lolr/ble events. The
first was Tit a's split with the Comi7l-
form, which ilse lf might not hatle
b een possible had not American (U-
sis/ance in Grcea rusured a friendly
fl onh instead of what might have
othuwise been a segment of Comin-
form eJlci,-clemen/. The second waJ
the appointm!'nl of Field Marshal
Papagos as Commandu-inChief of
the Greek. Govermnel, l Forces.
T he st udy of this fi rst contact be-
tween expo71sionist Sovit:t Commu-
nism and lhe policy 0/ conUJinmwt
is 0/ more than his/oritlzi inteTf!sl.
It is of immediate, currrnl 071d. con-
linuing interest. The problems aris-
ing from the common frontier with
expansionist Communism are not
confined to Greece where the prelien t
settlement rna)' be t ransitory. They
exist along the etltire 20,OOO-miie
frontier of Stalin's former empi re.
At any poi"t along this front t he
patt ern of Comm Imist aggression in
Greece rna)' appear or re-appear in
whole or in part . The Anti-Bandit
War, which wi ll be publish""ed-i"
;nstallmenls, lays the
of this pattern and discloses the mag-
nilUde of the effort required t o de
feM it in Greece.
Port I
IN AUCUST 1949" IN SWIFT
the Greek Goj:!rnment forces,
265,000 strong, drove the; self-styled
"Democratic Aimy," a force of less
20,000 fi ghters, rom the soil of
Greece. Superfici all y this appeared
(0 be no great feat of arms! Indeed,
it seemed scarcely to merit a .second
thought save for the curious circum.
stance that this comparatively smail
force had withstood the Government
fprces for three years. That the
'" Democrat ic Army" had been able
to do this and, in so doing, prevent
the euablishmcnt of condi tions fa-
vorable to lhe recons truction of
Greece, warrants serious study in its
proper context: The probH:ms aris
ing from the common f{onder
Communism exist today in
Burma and Indo-China as well as in
Korea, and the pattcrn of Commu-
nist aggrcssion in Greece, as distinc: t
from thal employed . in Korea, may
. '
By Col J. C. Murray
ftppearelsewhere in whole or in part.
What fanon present when the
Government achieved its euy victo-
ries in Vitsi aDd GrammoJ in 1949
were not present when the guerrillu
undertook. operations in 1946? What
factors present from 1946 to 1948
had altered by 1949, and in what
respecLS? Had changing circum-
stances altered the signi ficance 01
constant facton in the situation? In
short, what were the facton which
led to the defeat of ComrnuQist ag-
gression in Greece in August HH:9?
For the most part. answers to. these
questions are to be found in eventl
in Greece during the yean 19o16-4?_
However. me event! of that period
have their roots in the GttmanItal-
ian-Bulgarian occupation and in the
liberation. Then too.
in Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulpria
had reperarssions in In
addition. Greeet was dear the vor'
tex of the toldwar politicS of the
great powers and its affairs were in-
ftuenctd thereby to a greatd extent
perhap! than those of odler na
tion. Thus reference will be
in this article to trenda and
whith He oU1side the .strict
In partiAan warfare, the Dwnerieal, strength of the guerrUI.
fighten i. I ..... than " he attii;'de of th ..
icaI _ Limits 01 ....
mil-bandit war. Non:ovcr. althoup
.... ankl. dab primarily wic.b c.bc
military upecu 01 c.bc war against
c.bc gucrril .... political _ onom-
ic couQdentiom inevitably intrude.
THE OI/ECTlVES
TIle "Dotooc .. 1ic A...,."
With the signing of the VarkiJa
agremrenl in february 1945. [LAS,
the field force of the Communist.
dominated National Liberation
Front. which had g:alhert"d strength
by monopolizing the cause of
ance to the occupation and husband
ed it (or the pOll-war struggle (or
control of Greece. acknowledged de-
feat. But thi' did not signalize the
COlOntunin Party's abandonment of
the struggle for Although
40,000 wea.pons were surrendered un-
der the agreement, they wen! largely
unserviceable. The better weapons
were cached away for the next
round. Although m()$t of the memo
bers of ELAS returned to their
bOOla, 4.000 crossed the frontier to
find $3:nctuary with the satellite
neighbors. Others remained in the
mountains. potentlal nuclei (or
future bands. These lI.'ere hard-
core Communists or criminals
could not expect to benefit by the
partial amnesty features of the Var-
lisa paCL
As the facade of the National Lib-
eration front. behind which the
Creel Communist Party had orig.
inaUy manhaJled its forces. fell
away. the party leaden. sought new
catalysts, They found them in con
tinued economic disrrns. the inabil-
ity of political iea.1ers to establish an
effective go\'ernment and in extremes
in the treatment of the opposition
by rightist groups,
Having pre\'iously failed to gain
control o[ Greece by political maneu
vering and outright revolution, the
Communists now sought to achieve
it as a consequence of the incorpo-
radon of Greece or parts of it In .1
Communist federation of the
kans. Their purpose 'was to facili-
tate the imposition [rom without o(
,,'hat they had failed to achieve {rom
",iulin. They had only to create the
vacuum into which external lorees,
""hieh stood wailing. could fio"'.
Thus, \\-hen the bands began to
re-form fof!o\\'ing the first post-war
election. the Communists sought to
praotrate c.bc _y ..... diocrodit
c.bc prepuarory CO IIJelr
Io..... but unsu<Ullf"J. do" CO ..
tablUh a .. ..,m ... -GoY.
tmtMnt of ffft' GR'tU'." or to de-
tub GrccIt Ni1<'t!donia and .... n pot-
.ibly Epirut and Til...." thcoup
annexation by Yugoslavia. Albania
and Bulg>ria. ""peeti.ely.
Gomw_t F .....
The assumption of the initiative
by the guerrillas tended to ddinc
objectives of the
These were to establi5b and main-
tain conditions of economic and p0-
litical stability within Gl'ft"Ce. to
suppress the disruptive guerrilla
forces and to interdict the aid to the
guerrillas which began to flow across
the nonhero borden.
SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.
1946-49
Guerrilla Opentions
GuerrilJa warLare di$tinguishable
from that 01 I!MH4 only by its
greater ferocity began to burgeon
here and there during the summer
of 1946. Initially it was confined to
area5 near the northern border but
right,,'ing extremists retaliated in
lind in the south, giVing the dis-
order a seemingly widespread char-
acter which the Communists, unaid-
ed, couJd not hllve accomplished.
Thus attention \\'3$ diverted (rom
the area in "'hieh internal disorder
-could have been attributed to for-
eign intervention and the
nists "'"on an early advantage in their
ability to camouBage the war as a
domestic affair - the Greek people
against the G<:!vernme:m in Athens,
Although the Varkisa agreement
did not $0 promise. it may have
been understood that British troops
were to be ",'ithdr.awn from Greece
following the plebescite on the re-
turn of the King scheduled lor Au-
gust. In vie"" of this, the Commu-
nists refrained {rom extending the
$(Ope of the disorder before then.
But ,,"hen British troops remained
bevond that date, Communist lead
e"; were un",-iHing to delay longer.
Guerrilla acthity. seriously resumed
after the election in March, was un-
leashed on an increased scale in late
September,
The situafion devdoped along
the lines or the following schematic
and highly rationalized outline:
Tke campaign began with the
IINI'de of iIoIaced c4i
ah
iMi .....
WII ............. ...,....oI-n
ftIlas<o. - c.bc _ duat.
cnintJ 01 ript...ma adzao 01 ,..,....
_. Munien ____ """
"for prins i .......... tioa. I'IIWici&y
..... gi .... to both c.bc ..... t _ III
ca .... to d.ioc:oara&e """""'" 01 at\-
..... to their oIIciaIa. Tbcoe acUri-
ti,!, thmo haY)' burdm 011 the
Gendarmerie whid> had to ""taad.
its patrqlling "!!d ditpme ill iotas
in an e4'ort to iuaintain public ......
",le in the aIUcted ataL
A.tach 00 ,maU patrob and polIS
01 the Cendarrr>crie forad c.bc
to ronsolidat.e--to (Ie..
the number of patr'Oll to in.
crease their IU'ength.
Then came raida on .mall villages
abandoned by the Cendarmui .
Their purpose was to obc.ain rood
.and improve bandit security_
Next came attacks on larger
Gendarmerie detachmenu-those of
30 to 40 men. This confined tbe
Gendarmerie to the larger lOWlU in
the affected areas. Finally the Army
was called in.
The tactics wed against the Gen-
darmerie were now called into play
against the Army, Small fJ'Cl'lLS .and
patrols were attad.ed by superior
forces. This (orced the Army to
concentrate. but by thi, time the
" guenillas were able to direct attacu
against the frontier posu of the
Army and agaiNt itolated garriSON
of company "ile.
A number of fairly well.defined
bandit areas now had been estab-
lished in which Army foret'S could
not move or operate except in con
siderable strength.
Within these areas strong bands
conducted systematic raids on
lago and towns. They removed
and animals and drove
inhabitants from their homn,
times murdering the midents of one
\'mage before warning the oo:.:upanu
of othen to leave. Thus, the guer
riUas embarrassed the Government
by creating a refugee problem and
aggravating the food shortage in a
country already within sight of
starvation.
To further isolate the "bandit
areas" from Government influence,
the guerrillas: initiated the attack.
and sabotage of communications.
Endeavoring to protect its own lina
of communication and answering the

,



growing political demaml for pro.
(cetion of towns and public utilitles
further reduced the Army's potential
(or offensh'e operations.
The Go',emmcnt lorces. by 110\\
engaged In lull-scale operatiom
againit \he bands. achjeved some
success: but the bandits 3,\'oidcd be
ing brought to decisi,c action, The
Anny frontier posts had been forced
{O conc("mrate, leaving large stretches
of the frontier unwatched. \Vhen
guerrillas in the north were hard
pressed (hey withdrew across
1),;01; Thu fHO.\t tUTl1ed out to fu a
dud dl.lt' /argdy to em immedlQte rt'11011
h) /ht' ("mud SaHOl1! Spaial Commillu
on the 1:Io1A4I1$, .. nd rke L"r1.ir.-d Slatts COl'-
ernmenl, The former on 29 Dectrober
<ld(Jpud lIlt J"t/Olt'll1g r{'saltlllOtl:
,. The Commitra ij of the opinion that
a ftrog_HUon, fuclo, of lIu mOi'l'-
men! dt'ftribing iHdf d$ rh( 'PrtJrfiJionlll
Dt'fflocrali( Grak Go;:um.unt'
b.\ diucJ or IndiTt'l't Illd ilnd dS)i.!t.allCf fD
an inHlnt'cfl'onal), tmt!!l agaiml Ih!!
(.OHfI"l'ntnt of d .\Jt'mba Df tht' Cniud
SaljollS 1'1'1 dt'fillllU oJ illltrnational la:.',
pl!t1.U tr('atio .and principlts of tht Cnarln,
u'O!.dd (.I gral(' threat (0 Ih!!
'maml!!lIimrt of pl"tla and
...
71,0 liG\; farfT, in if! ryr$1 upnr"
AC6CAN SCA
Cr"mmol Area

A,.... 15 _
[he border where pursuit was ar
rested by satellite frontier guards.
Having tested the oHensive capa
bilities (I{ the Armv. the bandit$
in late 1947 began to try to hold
ground in certain areas to protect
their suppJy routes, Moreover, the
Communists were ready to play their
trump card, the establishment o[ the
"Pro\'isional Democratic Govern-
ment," To give substance to {his
fiction they had to be able to show
{hat a reasonably large area was con
trolled by the "Free Government."
This government was proclaimed in
/lIT (omml/!tI! pOi'1"'d oul Iha, Iln)
act of 4lSaciatian tdth thllt "(;m'{'mment"
{)II pari af .1Iba'lWl, Bulgana alld fugo-
tladll, of tnt t)P(' tnr'imgtd ill tnt a!Drt-
rtsolu/io'1, might rtndu impossibJt
Ihe !mpll'mtn/fllion &1 ill mandatt Qnd
n,rght ,mpd Special CammiHu to fU'
(H'] melld ate toi'H'arotion of a sptciaJ Uf-
nf Hu Gtllerll/ Asumbly.
A pUB ull'llu by tht U. S. Dl'ptJ,lmtrj'
t:1 SIdU on lkumbtr )0 put tht
011 as 10f/ot,.S'
"Tht rfaim of cuU!fn CQmmVO'list gutr
rtlla Itader.s that inl:')' hal't l's/llbfuntd at
10mt unknQII'1'l point Il 'First Prouisionat
llimocralic Of Fra GrUCl!' is
Il Inm.spr;r-nl d("t1(t, Ihe trut PV1'pOU o!
'hich u"iU hI' dtar to n't":"OI'It'. It iJ only
a pharl' HI Iht famifiar "Dort 01 'trlain
!be en- ..... OIl If DII" ...... ' ....
J!lf7.t
c-.w. SIIatoIr
The outtiDc _ ..
military ....... C(" apenliw' ..
!be HD<moaatic "'" it ...
nOt concral !be uIimt Le. III_
of guetrilla stra"'SY; !hat II. !hat it
wu economic. polilical aad -.
istic and. only in rl:J.e ... iMlft("
military. The guerrilla o/fmoi.., ....
directed not againSt the armed
forces. but against unarmed civil
iaru. the public services. lioeI. 01
communication. transportation COlD-
merce, industry and agriculture--the
warp and woof of the economic, p0-
litical and JOCial ordu. Such opera-
tions as were conducted aga.imt the
Army were direCted to attairunem 01
greater freedom of acuon as rqm:b
the real objective. desll"l1ction of
lhe economic. political and aocia1
order. The guenilla strategy was
neither offensive nor defensive; it
\\'as eV3$ive. Later it began to de-
velop a defensive charactu in cer
tain areas along the northern fron-
tier. Elsewhere. evasion remained
the keynote of military strategy.
Meanwhile the real war, the war of
destruction and saootage of tbe liCe
of the nation. continued unabated.
Campaig of tfte Creek
N.'ional Army
The Army's first major campaign
was initiated in April J947. The
plan was to attack fif'${ in central
Greece and then s",,-eep gradually
northward to the border, destroying
the guerrillas along the way. There-
after the oorder would be sealed
agai n H reinfiltration, Tactically,
areal containing guerrilla concen-
trations \\'ere to be isolated and sur
t'il'mtntJ Io rn'l!rthrou> tht: ttgitim41l! IlJltl
fte&gniud GOL't'n'lmt'tll Gnd to
,hrtGif!n Iht /.e1Ti:orial illugnt) Q"d po-
hlH'df Irldtptndt'llu oj (.ruct. II cam( 41
tto In iudl, 1'1 u'ould not fJI4/tri
oUy changt Inl! ("'!slong .ritual ion.
"But if othtr {OUntrjl'S U'ffl! to rteog-
niu tnt: group, lhis would nth ... Ja'l-
ous implicatiom. It u:ould bt ckarl; ron-
Irory to' th< principles of JIlt Cnit('d N.
(io''/! Chdr/n. if thl! (ountry C01l-
ct'rntd Wtrl" mu Of Gre<et's n<ighbor$ to
Iht' /torth, <lei ... auld cO'lUlhWe an opnt
durt:gard 0/ tnt t('unt rt"comm.enMtiQN 01
tnt Unittd .''''lltiQrJs AJt1mhfy, llJ ut /01'th
in /ht ruol!Jti&l1 of last OctQbt1'."
.11 a rtJuit 01 no Jtrnn4l
r!!Copitiem oj tnt of !"rtf
G1'l!ut" took "rna,
rounded. whereupon the trapped
guerrillas were to be annihilated.
After some months it \\'as recog
nized that this campaign was a fail-
ure. During its course the guerrillas
waxed in strength and influence. A
of operations planned for Ihe
winter months was cancelled. Fol-
lowing a re-organization. a new se-
ries of operaJions was bt'gun in April
1918. A preliminary phase LO dean
up soudHentral Greece appeared to
go well, but the timetable lagged
and the guerrillas consistemly ea-
caped the planned encirdemenu.
The campaign culminated in a bat-
tle for the Grammc)S Mountain area
which began 011 29 June. There, 112-
to 15,000 guerrillas defended them-
selves for two-and-a-half months
against the attack of 50,000 Govern.
mel}( troops_ The guerriHas evenLU-
ally withdrew into Albania, but im
mediately re-appeared in the \\h.
Vitsi area lO the northeast. Opera
tions agClinst this new position failed.
Meantime, guerrilla activity in-
creased elsewhere, panicuJarly in the
Peloponnese where the guerrillas
gained the initiative.
By midwinter the guerrillas had
re-established (hemsehes in the
Grammos area but the Army, em-
ploying 25,000 men, wresting
the iniliative from 3,500 guerrillas
in the Peloponne,e. Meanwhile,
the Army was preparing the
campaign. It opel1ed wilh another
clearing operation in cenlral Greece.
As in 1948, this phase proceeded suc-
cessfully. By the end of June it was
in the mop-lip stage and tlle con
centration of troops for the Gram-
mos-Vjtsi phase was started. Folio\\'
ing a diversion in the Grammos
area, an attack. was launched in the
Vilsi area on 10 August. Within
three days [he po:sition had heen
overrun. Of a guen-illa garrison of
7,000, apI!>roximalcly 5,000 withdrew
to Albania. In the Grammos opera-
tion launched on 24 August, the 200
square miles of the :u'ea was occu-
pied in five days. Four thousand
guerrillas withdrew inlO Albania.
NUMERICAL STRENGTHS
The "Democratic Army"
Guerrilla manpower may be meas-
ured in terms of three categories of
personnel - those serVing with the
bands in Grt."Cce, self-defense collabo-
rators and bandit reser\'es outside
EL..4S - nuclei for }Ulure bOn(h
Greece. The rlTSt category indicates
the immediate combat strength of
the "DelllQ('!;lIic Army." The num
ber of collaborators gives a measure
of the intelligence, security and ad
ministrative sen ices 'J"ai!ahlc: to the
bClnds. The llumbers outside Greece
included wounded righters, recruiLS
in training aUtI pt.:'fsonncl engaged in
training or logistical activities. To
these may he added a numher of
older men and ,,"omell and abducted
children of no combat value_ This
figure provides :m index as to the
number of replacements and reserves
available to the bands. It is, there-
fore, a Oleasure of their staying
power.
Supplementing the three categor-
ies of penonnel Listed above were
undetermined hundrcd:s of Yugo
stan, Alhaniam and Bulgarians who
worked hehind the horders of those
coulltries [0 aid the guerrillas.
Personnel with bands in Greece
The rebeh started operations in
1946 with a strength of 2,500 fight-
ers. By lhe end of the year it had
reached 8,000. In April 1947 it was
14.250 alld ill November 18,000,
when:: it began {n level off. From
this time ollll'ard the number of
guerrilla fighters, in spite of a one-
time peak of :!ti,OOO, W,lS maint;lined
so constantly betwc{'n 20,000 to 25.-
000 to raise the conjecture mat
this may have been thc established I
personnel allowance for the bands in
Greece.
Since the guerrillas might logically
have sought (0 their com-
bat strength' until they could over-.
come the Government by sheer (orce
of numbers, the suggestion that they
may have been working under a
manpower ceiling arouses specula-
tion as to 'why, if it was the case,
did the guerrillas accept this ceilingr
Was the decision based on political.
opera tional or 10gisticaJ grounds? On
the surface there would seem to be
no objection on political grounds to
unrimited expansion_ However, most
of the latler,day recruitS had had no
previous affiliation with the Commu-
nist Party. Though they might be
indoctrinated in Communism they
could not be exdoctrinated from
Hellenism. Since the leaders at this
time were working for the partition
of Greece, they may have thought it
unwise to admit too much national-
ism to the bands. Greek
ism was acceptable as a propaganda
line but it could be permiued no
real voice in the guerrilla govern-
ment.
Operationally there was surely a
requirement for greater strength.
But was the requisite control mech-
anism present? Perhaps the decision
'to limit the number of fighters was.
dictated by the inability of the lead-
ers to comrol Ihem in combat when
the percentage of forced recruits in
relation to volunteeTS became tOO
high. Possibly, too, the limitation
was based upon logistical considera-
tions. Dependence upon the satel-
lites for logistical support was gTeat.
The botlleneck may have been the
non-availability of equipment and
supplies, or it may have been in the
limited capaeity of the sometimes.
tenuous supply line from sources in
the satellite sanctuary to users in
Greece_ Whatever the reason, the
number of fighters serving with the
guerrillas remained in (he vicinity
of 20,000 to 25,000, except during
the initial build-up and again just
prior 10 the collapse. At this latter
time the strength had fallen to less.
than J 8,000.
Collaborators
The numerical strength of the
"self defense" element of the guer-

".

"rilla movement can only be e'!itimat-
ed. The value of the colla bora LOr
lay in the fan that he was not known
-in daylight a peasant tilling his
fields. at night he might bear inteHi.
gence (0 a guerrilla headquarters or
place Illines jn the highway. Some
were disco\' ercd; others never will
be. Their number was great. The
magnitude is indicated by lhe cap-
lUTe or surrender of 1,600 collabora-
lOrs in connection with the mili[;u)
ddeat of a force of 3,600 guerrillas
in lhe Peloponnese in early 1949.
The ratio o[ collaborators to guer-
rillas was even higher on the main-
land. particularl)' near lhe nonhcTIt
frontiers where the guerrillas exn"
(ised domination for long periods of
lime and where the price of sur"i\.:Il.
in many instances, was cullabor;nion.
An indication of the potential [or
collaboration is available elsewhere.
The three eleetions held since 1949
show thitt at least 200,000 maJes of
voting age \\Iere favorably disposed
toward, or susceptible to lhe influ
ence of the Communists_ This does
nOt mean, of (ourse, that all were
active eollaborationists, but it is a
(actor olO be kept in mind in assess-
ing the strength o( the guerrillas.
Bandit reserve outside Greece
Many of those serving in the bands
when warfare was renewed had en-
joyed the hospitality o( the northern
neighbors prior to the call to action.
The number crossing into the satel-
lites {()lIowing the signing of the
Varkisa agreement was about 4,000,
and the numbers of bandits har-
bored in Alhania, Yugoslavia and
Bulgaria thereafter did not {all be-
low this. A representative estimate
of t.he numher of Greek rebels in Ihe
sateJlites cluring the war is: Albania
-4,500 cumbat ano 6,500
noneffeetiycs, including older men
alld women, wounded fighters and
children; Bulgari:-.-2,OOO to 2,500
eombat cffeLti\'es and 2,500 non-
effectives; and Yugoslavia - 4,000
combat effectives and perhaps 10.000
non-effectiyes.
Few of dlese reserves were com-
mined during Lhe final and
these Irom Albania ami Bulgaria
only. Tito's dosing of the Greek.-
Yugoslavia border in July 1949 quar-
antined 4,000 combat in
Yugoslavia and drove a wedge be-
tween the main strength of the gut.'r-
rillas in central Greece and 2,000 to
2,500 guerrillas in Bulgaria and
2.500 in east Nbcedoni:t and Thrace.
The latter, havi!lg b"" t'n deprived of
the protected eaSL-weH route north
o( lhe frontier, could not move to
thesuppol t of central Gn: t:tt as Gov
crnmclu {orce.i controll ed the region
between sea and fronti er in c.:emral
Macedollia. Thus, lhe closing of the
border resulted ill an o'Hright loss
to the guerrillns of -1 .000 fi ghte.rs nnd
isolated as many as 5,000 morc trom
the balan(c of tht: guerrilla forces.
l'his was a personnel loss oC from 30
to 35 percent.
Sources of guerrilla manpower
Sometime ea.rly in tilt" war, possi .
bly aher the (rontier incidents were
Gilled to lhe: atlt;lllion of the United
Xati ons in December 1946, a guer
rilla policy decision must have been
readied th'lt (;n..:\.: ks ollly would. be
ill the war against GI"('ece. The
hearings before the Un jlul Nations
Commission produced cddcnce
of the presence anulIlg tht gllerrillas
of personnel of for eign nationality.
There were occasional o[
indiyidu,lls or smaiJ p:mit:s wearing
lh.e uniforms of Yugosla .... ia, Bulgaria
or Albania Greek. territory.
But the sense of t he cvidence sup
ports lhe vi !"'\\' that in order to fur -
ther the concept of civil war there
was initially a d t!c.; ui on aga jnst em-
ploying in Greece the int el' ll,niona}
brigades or the Spanish civil war.
Later there were indications that
this policy Hlay have heen revised.
There were rumors, for example, of
for duty in Greece in the
satellites, in East Germany and even
in Western nalions, including lhe
United Stales. It sllch eniistlllents
were actually made, the war had
come to an end before they appeared
on the field of battle.
The guerri lIa leaden, therefore.
had only one major sourCe of man-
The earliest addi
tions to the original 2,500 were the
easiest. Perhap'i nOlhing was needed
beyond the establishment of a rally-
ing point. T hey were ex-partisans,
advenmrcrs anti ((iminal .. , but they
included some simple cOUnlry folk
who had fallen viclim to COllllll uniu
propaganda. There were aho citi-
l.e llS who had been the victim of UIl-
reasoning since tbe
11)1-1 revolution. \feanti.me, a \'igor-
OilS c<llilpaign of pnlpaganda justi-
fying and extolli ng the program of
the guerrillas and caluminating (he
GOv\.: l ltrUent. Wit s launched. In the
absence of effective action on the
part of the Go\'Cm menl, [he com'ie-
(ion was growing that the guerrill as
might win this seconu roulld. T his
pros. pect attr;l cted many
from Idtist elements of popula-
tion.
By Novemher 1947 the. guerrilla
'Hren lh had reached :, fi gurt:: of 18,-
500, in Stl?stance the: fi gure at which
il was maintained lor lhe ne.. ..u two
), c:ars. Voluillcer recruiting, how
ever, was no longer suppl ying the re-
quired numbers. The most extreme
Terrorism - a parl of gucr,.,Ua $trat.egy
of the diss identS had already joined
up. The 1947 campaign o( the
Army, although far hom successful,
wa$ produli ng siglJifi cant guerrilla
casualties. I hei r dfect was dual.
The guernll as ll:qui red more per-
sonnel to ma int ain lhei r strength
just as pOlemi :d recruits were dis-
COli raged Crom 1"1l1i\tillg. Moreover,
there was at Ihis tillLe increasi ng evi-
dence of U,S. interest in Greece
whi ch tended to fill the vacuum of
direction and objective created by
the inefleclivenessof the Government
and by lhe waning of the Unit ed
Kingdom's effort in Greece. Evidence
of U,S. intcreli l was not confined lO
the purposellil ullerances of Amer i-
can officiah. \ filil:ll"y equi pment and
war materials were beginning 10 be
unloaded at the porLS to spread out
over the land. This was a language
the pragma tic Greek could ben un-
derstand. A "wait and see" at titude
developed among potential volun-
teers.
No longer able to main tain their
strength by volunteers, the guerrillas
resorted 10 forced recruiting - a
melhod of procurement based upon
threats, holding of families as hos-
tages and recruiting raids during
which young men .and women of
combat age were abducted, Thi s
eventuall y became the pri mary meth-
od of obtaining personnel. Of 18,-
500 guerrillas in Greece just before
lhe final baules, as many as 11 ,000
were forced recruits. Moreover, the
increasing numbers of women sug-
gest that even this method of re-
cruiting could no longer provide
male fighters to maint a in lhe
.trength of the bands,
Casualty rate in relation
to recruiting rate
From 1946 (0 early 1949 lhe guer-
rill as suffered an average of approxi-
mately 1,500 casualties per month
and recruited at the rate of about
2,000. From January to July. the
six months preceding the withdraw.
al of the "Democratic Army" from
Greece. there we re significant
changes in both casual tv and recruit-
ing rates. The rose to a
monthly average of 4,000 while the
latter declined to an average of
1,000.
These trends were resulting in a
growing shortage of guerrilla man-
power, Evenlually they could have
led on ly to contraction of the guer.
'rilJa order of hau le. T he decl ine in
recruiti ng may have I II LIl cause or
it may ha\'c bet H dft( l. GuerrillllS
may have been u n;!.!>l , to procure
sufficient recnLi ls lO lilaintain their
strength or guerrilla leaders may
have reached a as to the
future conduct of the war. If a
cause, the decline in recruiting must
have been a "'eigllLY fanor in in
duci ng the guerrill a leaders to
pend military operatiuns.
Goyernment forces
Ground forces employed by the
Government in military or pa"a-mili-
tary functions during the anti-bandit
war included the :\"alional Armv, the
National Corps, the ' Gcn.
darmerie and 3tmL u ci"iliam. -the
streng-ths of all components were ili -
creased from time to rime ;)s th<:
A.bove: A.s 'h e
J! r e'tJ, the g u. errillas
rirll/t('d m ore Wunlf' lI
Ui/till: ( ;oll,tfmrfllon
lir e ro"utif' '/ - ,,/, I, .y
Cov(' r" nt l' ",
Relow: M" ( ; rrtnltllll ..;-
200 811'lflrr. 1"I,p,1
;" n five-day ,tl m/milt "


magnitude of the task of eliminating
the guerrillas was more fully appre-
ciated and as the means for main-
taining larger forces became avail-
able.
The National Army
When (he Government returned
[0 Athens in OctOber 19+1, the only
remnants of the prewar Army were
twO unil s; [he 3d Brigade of 2,000
men and the "Sacred Squadron" of
600 to 800 officers. The United King-
dom underLook to equip and train a
n(' w Army. The objt:ctivc W3i to
make it an efIec.:tive force of 100,000
by 1948. Howc,-cr, by April 19'17 the
need' for employing the Army against
. the bandits resulted in decisions to
revise slrength upw;:ud to 120,000
alld to shorten the pl anned training
program.
In early it was increased to
132,000. A temporary increase of
15,000 ""<IS decided upon tn April LO
permil tbe training of repl accments
(or casualties during the projC(lCU
camp;li gn. This brought the iluthor-
il eu o[ the Army to 1-1 7,000.
In :"JO\"('Inbcr tilis le1 1ljl0l;IrY ,lrellgth
Wll S ]ll;).de pcrnwnem.
As realization of lhe inconclusive
Ch<lraC1Cl" o the" 1918 campaign
spl"ead. hoth the Government
and the British Mi ss ion ad-
\'oGltcd (unher inlTt'<Ises in the
strength o( (ht' Army. In fact, it was
one o( the conditi ons put forward
by General Papagos <I S a prerequi site
to his accepwnce of the position ilS
Commander-in-Chief that it be
raised to 250,000. This, however,
proved to be unnecessary.
The National Defense Corps
The problems experienced by the
Army in protecting the civil com
munity during the summer and fall
of 1947 suggested Lhe formation of
an organization to provide a static
defense of lowns and villages. Im-
mediately after the liberation, when
there had been no instrumentality
to ta_ke control of the territories pre-
\'iously dominated by ELAS, a N a-
lional Ci vil Guard had been formed.
It had combined (:enain of the nor
mal functions of the police and the
Arm)'. It was hastily organized, poor
1)' controlled, ,lIld given to excesses.
and no o ne was sorry when the Gen-
uarmeri e replaced it in November
HJ-G. This experience, however, pro-
vided a prccedem which was drawn
upon in meeting the new problem.
In October 1947 it was decided (0
form a National Defen se Corps un-
del' Arm)' cOlllrol. The initial au
thori 7;! lioll was (or 40 bau alions of
;-,tII) men each - a tolal of 20,000.
for the ball<lliom were pro-
viciNi by the Army and the fillers
\\"vr(' ('x !.(:rvicemen. Men fro tl! the
i),II11e locality were placed in the
sallle battalion" A[l er a short period
of t!"::tining a batl:.Jion was posted to
the rt"' gion from whieh ils members
came. The theory was thaI they
could live at home. functi oning on a
"minut el\lan" h<lsis. In this way i[
was hoped that we civil community
could be protected and the Anny
freed to go after Lhe guerrillas with
out greatly increasing Lhe dislocation
of th'e national life and economy_
Funher, it was expected that the
poorly organized civilian compo-
nents could be dissolved and the
Gendannerie reduced LO its normal
strengLh.
In January 1948, the goal for the
N alional Defense Corps was changed
to 100 battalions o.f. 500 men each-
a total of 50,000. Ninetyseven of
these units were eventually formed.
but the " minute-man" principle was
gradually abandoned. More and
more NDC battalions were "vital-
ized" and redesignated as light in-
fantry ballaliom. As such, Iheir
status was undistinguisbable from
other units of the Anny.
Gendarmerie and Civil Police
The Gendarmerie in Greece is an
anned police force which, under the
Ministry of jllstice, maintains order
except within [he limits of towns
having municipal police. Its normal
strength is abollt 20,000. The organ
ization h:HI falleu illto disrepute
through continuing to fUll ction un-
der the German occupation authori
ties and, ail hough there was no evi-
dence of extensive aCli\'e collabora-
tion, it was col)sidered necessary to
rebuild it fr om the ground up fol-
lowing the Iibt:ration. In this task
the Government was ;Iided by a Brit
ish Police anu Prisons Mission. Un-
der its guidance tht: Gendannerie
was reconstituted and in NO'Vember
1945 it resumed its duties. O"1ing
to (he growing threat to public order
its strength was increased to 32,000,
but even this was insufficient. The
disorder had grown beyond police
proportions. Efforts to use the Gen-
darmerie in army-like operations
were unsuccessful. It was not
equipped or trained to -function in
tbis mann('I". Moreover. whiLe the
GendJrmerie played soldier, its pri-
mary function suffered" A poli ce-
wan's usefulness depends on his lo-
cal knowledge - a familiarit y with
people and pl::tces that enables him
(0 del(; (t the unusual. Police can-
not be organized in large unhs and
moved fr om place to place without
sacrificing an imponant principle of
police orgaILiza[ion. Consequently,
when tbe National Defense Corps
\\":b fonned thc Gend:..tnne,"it: II
reduceel in :>In!ligt h and confined Itl
poli ce wOlk. hs strength there:ifrcr
was mai ntained at aboul 25,OllO.
Armcc4 civilians
During :md foll owing lhe 19-1-1
re\"ohltion, riglHisl banels ,,cre
formed W cOlllh;ll EL\S trOOps.
Thev "ere not well controlled and
wcn.: somclime.s guilty o[ excesses
whjl h hdpcd to s,,ell thc r:mk" of
tho!>!." oppmt 'd In the Gon' llllllf:nl.
IlSCII UClll lr 'I"hen lighting hroke
(Ju t 3(':li n. Bri ti sh ;md later \lHcr i,
COIr, ;'\dl"isors ohj(,(" led to armi ng
fhj s did !l 01 p,'evenl lilt>
or civilian
fiN Nlu ipping t h !'ll \ 1 ilh
I L',l prJn
C
-1\.ttl, lh l/! [Q ti le Go\-cnl-
nl cflt. the
Ame.rr were rorted 10 rt..ocognilr
I Mot Ih;: ("omhilled dlort$ or lhe
Anm :\: lIi(mOiI Corpo; ;Il U.I
(; el)(I:l IIIIC' i l 1,IHlld Ilot IlllHe( 1 ,,1 1
,he \illagcs trom gucnilla atl;I ck.
They Iherdore approved the distri ,
hutioll 01 LO rcrt :lin {i\ili;1l1

Initi ally the Ill!"t or
o
.III'
ilcd 3roups \n?re \1. .... 0 :md \I.\Y,
The former ,,as ol g;.lIIi /.ed 11\ local
political for dcfel hC of their
Inn\ I t, dt"lIlj l\l'li' pro,
\ illcd by til" G')\('Lllllllnt. Thl" \I .\\"
units \l" l;n: ci"ili :tlb rC(TlIill'tl by the
:\rm}' ror sc n ' ice ill the gCIICI"ai vi<:in-
i ty of t he ir hOI\)(!!,. Thl' of
bo(h oqptli mrjr.ms ""(:I 'C VUi UlllC,' Cl';,
",' I"I"t" lWt p:lid ;HHI c('Iu ld I1Ul b (;
to !lenc. AlthQugh hOLh
.f!. !'OliPS coll:l],orOi ted wiLh the AI IlI)"
j LJ OIctu=l1 (onnu\ (WC'", them \ 1 ;1"
limited.
t ;t 1.111.:.1 d .llt' \\ .('J"('" or
:1",J ipptll fiJI hnUlC dt
fCl1sc before tlll!Ll ,Iep;-.n.urc l10rn
rr fugc. . Hili "Ie (!t-rensc or :t
\ilbge "":I!> l""!>l ablishcu by an
unit prior to lhe H' lUrn of the wom-
en and (hildn:n, This new progralll
W;(!) hy the ; \rlll), ;inu
its ((}1\!I1l.l11dcrs " CIT respollsihle tur
tl H: {tlnctiouillS or \rE.\ \\i lhill
their are:1S,
Defense of civil community and
its effect upon the size of the
Government forces
Fl O'" the first the GOVCl11l1lelH
I,as cOllfron tt"d by rhe 1Ig;l y fact lh:n
its t',IU It n Hl"i t
prot ect t he ('j, iJ power and pOI}ula,
l io\! so lhnt tl"" e(n ll' i!UV cou ld n m
Li nlle' 10 fllflCli!.Jn, nnti II Illll"( clt."-
'!trOr l he h.mdit Cored, HUl the 0:11
d it fOl ces ct)uld br ;11111
dts t, oyt.' d olth
o
by "i{grcs.s;\C fJw I II
and, in Ihe Ilf :in) r
ITlent.allly oth4"f 111:"11 the {. 'I
Ll.lrmer1e (or ' \ it dd t!11\f'. lhr .rn,
. mc.:nt 01 Ih(: lI!aja r poniun uJ


the Army in such operatioru would
ba.., left the civil coDlJlluruty with-
OUt diJ:t,ct prot<ction. Aft.,. its fin.
more Of less fruitless series of offen-
sive operatiom in 1941, the Army
succumbed to polilinl ptasures to
make static dispmitioru of troops
for the protection of the civil com-
munity. This defensive mmiOfl was a
bottoml ... pit which long .bsorbed
much of the Anny's capacity for
more productive undertakings.
Eventu.lly this highly unsatisfac
tory situation was alleviated by the
formation of the National Defense
Corps and by the arming of civiliaru.
Thus. by an increase in GQvemment
forces of 50,000 for local defense
purposes and by utilizing to some
extent the tapacilY of (OOlmunities
to protect thetn$('!ves, more profit-
able employment of the Army be-
came prauicable.
The question may be raised as to
whether action could not have been
taken before the war was it yearand-
a-half old to Qrganize a ch'i)
that could have stood up to irregular
,,'arfare without tbe Army assuming
direct responsibility for it. A civil
defense able to function with a mini-
mum of asSistance from the Atmy
would have permitted the latter to
concentrate on its other mi$$ion-
that of seeking out and destroying
the guerrilla,.
The question abo atises as to what
might have happened if the danger
to the civil community had been ac
cepted as a calculated risk while the
Army \'to"em ahead with offensive op-
erations. Had this been done. it is
probable that the war would have
ended earlier and that the total dam
age to the community would
have been less than was actuaHy sus
tained.
Economic .spech of tile strength
of tho Covernmont lore ..
Perhaps the best countermeasure
to the guerriUas would ha\'e been a
strong economy. but the existing
economy was so weak that iu col-
lapse could 1:><; a\'Uided only through
relief and rehabilitation. The drach-
ma budget was limited and appro-
priations under the U. S. aid pn>
gram were not unlimited. Concen-
tration of all available res.ources on
the military program might well
have resulted in coHapse of the
omy whid., after all. was the
mary target of the guerrillas. ft was
""""""'Y. therefore, in the alloca
tion of funds. to steer a nice coune
bet_n the Charybdis of military
weaknm and the Scylla of economic
weakneu. In fact. the military esti-
mates "'ere always exceeded which
resulted in in the funch
available for reconstruction. Eco-
nomic recovery was delayed thereby,
but sufficient relief wu provided to
forestall outright collapse on the
economic front.
It is evident that careful (oMid-
eration had to be given to the size
of the armed forces. The Greek. au-
thorities. particularly the military,
tended to disregard this and to pms
for increases in the strength of the
Army_If the Army was to have sole
responsibility for the protection or
the civil community, many more
troops could ha""C been employed in
garrison duty. There was, however.
a limit to the number of troops
which could be employed profitably
in offensive operations. Some think
that the strength ultimately arrived
at through progressive increases was
greater than needed-"Ilke using a
sledgehammer to tJll a fly." How
ever, both the British Military Mis
sion and the Greek Co\i!tnnlent at
the end of the 1948 campaign advo-
cated further increases. In opposing
this view the U. S. MisMon tool the
position that the forces as then con-
stituted "'ere adequ.,He to cope with
the guerriBa menace provided they
were properly trained, employed and
led, Its objective was to increase the
effectiveness of the Army rather than
to increase its size. In view of the
judgment of history. the soundness
of this pmition can scarcely be ques-
tioned.
Though it will now be agreed that
the forces employed by the Govern
ment were adequate in strength,
there remain the theoretical argu
ments as to whether the forces might
not have been even smaller, if the
problem of civil defense had been
handled differently, if the combat
force\ had been differently em-
ployed. or if they had been different
ly constituted.
Summary
The great disparity in numerical
strength between Go\'ernment (orces
and guerrilla fighters is shown in the
rollowing tabulation, which
sents the approximate status as of
the month of July 1949;
Govn1,mnsl Ftn'Us
G .... National 150,000
NationallJel"eue Corpo .. 50,000
Gendarmerie ..... _ ....... _...... 25.000
Civil Police .. .... _ .... 7.!iOO
Civilian compooenu. .. __. ?
"DtmOC7'<tlit:' Arm,,"
With bands in
Guerrillas in !latellites , __ ..
CoII.boraton ... .... __ ... __
Satellite personnel .. _._ ..
18,000
10.000
?
?
28.090
This great numff'ical disparity be-
tween the combat personnel of the
tWO sides was the basic factor in es-
tablishing the relative strengths and
o( the combat elements
of opposing sides. It was the magni.
tude of this difference which defined
the strategic and tactical patterns of
the war-patterns ,,'hich tended (0
minimize any direct relationship be-
tween the armed strength of the con
testanlJ.
A significant relationship between
Ihe numben of combatants did e.xUl.
however .. As Government forces: were
increased by the formation or the
N.tion.1 Defens< Corps. the Anny
was able to concentrate and employ
large formations in otfensi .... e
tions. These resulted in more casual-
ties among the guerrillas. At the
same time recruiting was rendered
more difficult_ Increased casualties
and decreased recruiting over a tong
period could have but one result.
The numerical strength of the guer,
riUas was being reduced progressi\-'e.
Iy for a period of six months prior to
its colJapse, A$suming that this re-
duction resulted (rom the more ex
tensive operations or the Army, rath.
er than a decision by the guerrilla
leaders to limit the $Cope of opera-
tions because of Yugoslavia'S dimin-
ishing support. this trend must have
weighed heavily in the Communist
dedsion to cease military operations.
t\nother factor. the importance of
which can scarcely be over-estimated
in connection with this decision. was
the 10$5 of one-third of the effective
strength of the guerrillas by Tito's
dosing or the Yugosfn.Greek bordn
on !O July 1949.


TBB AlflI-BANDIT WAR
By Col J .C. Mu:rray
PARr II
the Anti-
$,.nopt;,:
In }'J./ft, IUWIrl!; ptt:t'lou.sl) Illlled to gum (UU/H)t 01
Greea by polilmt/ ffwllelwt'llng and Qlflright uvolu-
tlOI1, the {;ul1Il1um;sls suught tu nchu:lJf! It by inco;.
pmMwg, Gru(f!, Qr pmlJ of ii, In a CommlmtSl
rt'dt'm(lon of {ht' 8alkllus,
The frullpoign began 7J!ilh the murder uf iSQlalt'd
of I' cia Is and the [;c171mg OJ' {/lrc-alcrtmg oj right-wing
Cllr;'(,IU 01 pr(lmint'lue. Xext catne atln("ks OIl nnatl
viJiug,es and Ult fargel" Gendarmerie detachments.
Tbt'll in 19-/; tlu' bandits vt'gan to lry to hold urlain
nrea.) 10 proJect tlldr supply routes and lhry played
Iheh trump ("tlrd -lhe establishment of lhe "Pravis-
.fional DemU(Hlfic Government,"
The of Ihis first mfact Ue!u.'un t'xpmuionisl
Sm.,jet COU!'Ilttlllsm Imd lhe policy of conlninment
fhrmld be of immediafe, currtnt and continuing
eM. The .\Ott-Bandit \Var lays bare tht: nnafomy 01
this pattem of CommuniJt aggrtSJiol1 and discioJtJ
Iht: mngllilude of the ellar! )'eqllirt:d ta defeat it. In
rlie finnl aim/pM. it (f)ok a period of thue years and
2I'ij,OOO u:ell-eqllipped Govermnent tlOQPJ to ddeat tJ
(mw of less than 20.000 gHerrilias. Part II tfle
sec<md Im/ollment nl (t live. parI tnlirft'.
By Col J. C. Murray


Bandit War
When 8 wmnlJlDder fail. to tailor hi. tllctic. to the fo""," at hi. clispooa!, he is
doomed to failure. The guerrinas found this out in the mountAins of northern Greeee
Part II
COMPOSITION Of fORCES
FROM THE START OF THE BANDIT
war LO iu end. the "Democratic
Army" consisted almost exclusively
o( light infantry. The guerrillas had
a "cavalry brigade" and some anti-
aircraft and field artillery. Artillery.
however. was of lillie value. Neither
the guns nOf quantity 0' ammu-
nitioll could be COllcentraleu Cor
employment. Except in the Gram-
mas and Viui areas, where it was
used both in defense and in slippon
of guerrilla aHacks. anilkry was
t"mployed only in delivering spor-
adic har;using fire on tOwns or vii
lages. It contr ibuted to the campaign
of terrorism agai nst the civil popu-
lation. but iu military significance
was slight.
The services of the "Democrati c
Army" were, for (he most part, es-
tablished beyond the {ronlier where
they were protected frum altack.
They included training cemers,
transient <;amps. hospitals and (or
warding points for supplies. Within
Greece. except in thc b<l.<.e areilS.
services were provided by til t:
themselves or by collaborators.
upabilities Ind limitations
Since they were lightly etluipped
and unimpeded b)' service elemcnts
or terriLOri al responsibilit y. the guer
rillas had good mobili Ly ill a Lanifal
sense and a high tlegrce uf fle"ihil
ilY. B.mds could be subdividetl with-
OUt appreciable loss oC combat dfi-
ciemy. Con\'er..ely, they ('()ulcl be
increased t.o the limits oC e::ffeClive
("ontrol. [very man was a fighter.
The hands had no soCt rear. The\'
wuld face [0 the rear or to a Hank
wil h faci lity .
EVdsi. on dnd temporary local con-
centration of superiur forces - each
an impurtant p .. ge in the book. or
guerr illa tactical doctrine - were
aided by this AexibililY. When
by cllcircit!lIIcllt, bands
could. split into small gl'tlUpS to lie
up until the danger passed or 5:Jip
through Army lines to re-am:mbk
rar (rom the closing noose. Offen
sively. a temporary local concentra-
tion of supl'rior cCllld be huilt
up in reilr of Army lines or in the
midst of Government-controlled ter-
ritOry by the infiltration or such
small groups.
Conn:.tIIlH.' lll. toO, was aided by
the [actor 01 c:omposition. or non
descript appearance and wit hout
hea\' ), etluipmc:: nt. the gucrrillas
could sometime$ Inelr inlO the d\'il
ropulaLion. Their (ormations were
so inconspicuous by contrast with the
large. comparati\'ely
COl-lIlllns oC the Army that the for
mer invariably hCld the advantage o(
better combat intelligence.
The vi.rtual absence of service
troops which gave the guerri llCis
muc:h in [;tcti cal mobility and flexi -
bililY oC employment was also the
source of their greaten weakness.
Randit logistics, except in the bor-
der areall, cou ld not support sus
tained combat operations and fai led
entirely uncleI' the dcmands oC a
protra(led engagement.
Finally. as regards firepower the
guerl"ill as had <I high volume at shon
ranges, but lillie al medium and
1I0ne at long ranges. The guerrillas
were at their uest in an ambush '
",-hirh thcy could break off, if need
be. to disappc-ar into rough terrain_
Guerrilla blinker -Iwlding ground proved d'ta,lrow
They 'I'erc excclk'm in a raid on an
undefended localit) ur a night raid
against a del ended locality pro\ idcd
they had huilt lip previously, as 'was
their custom, a local superiority of
Lorce. They ,,'ere at their worst in a
cia) light attack against a fortified
position or in an effort to defend by
holding ground. They were incapa-
blc of winning military
ag<linsl onhodox lormatiom, but
they were well fittcd La conducl war
against the civil populace.
The attempt to defend
the base areas
The "Democratic Army" was em-
pluyed initially in accordance with
its capabilities; that is, in ambush-
ing small lorces, in raids against
poorly defended localities and in
of public utilities. As rc-
gards the Army, the guerrillas prac-
ticed haraSSlllent <lnd evasion. In
1948, however, the "Democratic
Army" beg'an [Q hold ground. The
old tactics were not given up. 111-
deed, when Army pressure on guer-
rilla positions had to be eased, raids
in other became more fre-
quent and more determined. It was
simply that a new strategy was supel--
imposed upon the old.
Its decision [Q hold ground placed
the "Democratic Army" at a disad-
vantage and contributed to its de-
feat, Organizational changes were
'made to decrease th..: disadvantages
rof the new tanics, but the guerrillas
could not <lIter materially the com-
position at fanor. By the de-
cision to hold ground they opposed
light infantry in large, relatively
static concentrations to allack hy
balanced furces. Thus thcy exposed
weakness to strength and their mi-
tial success in the Vitsi area was due
only to the Army's inability to ex
ploit its o\vn strength. :\rorcm"er,
I though the guerrillas turned the
Govcrnment's 194R offensive inLO :\
<;talemate in front of Vitsi, they suf-
fered severc casualties in men and
morale from which [hcy nner lully
recovcred.
General organization
Colonel C M. Woodhouse, .... ar-
time commander of the Allied
sion to the Greek guerrillas, in com
mentillg nn the contrast in strunure
between ELAS (Communist-domi-
nated p<lrLisans) and EDES (rightist
partisans), once observed that,
\1'hl"IC,l) (11(:; iaU<:"1 forces in
small lunds COllllll;tnded by COIll-
parati\'ely illdepeudelll junior offi-
rers, the "amaLeur uf
EL.\S developed a Llrge, cClltrali/ed
army o( divisions and corps, III
\\ hich the chain of command was
also a inilitary hierarchy_ In his
view this type of organization W:l.S
excellent for imposing military law
on the alea,> dominated by EL\S,
but poor for gllerrilla operatiom.
'Vhen guerrilla operations were
resumed in 19'j(i, circumstances were
different. The guerrill;l'i \\"Cre unablc
to assume responsibility for the gov-
ernance or the ci\'il population_ A
territorial org:ulization was cre<lted
but it was separate from the organi-
zation for combat. The zone of
operations was di\'ided into sectors.
"Sector hcadquarters" cxercised eo-
ordinatioll within their areas but
did not con({-ol operations_ Their
ta.\ks were the establishment of com-
munications, intelligence, logistics
and the handling o( political mat-
ters. Within thc sectors wcre the hill
masses used by (hc combat units <IS
operating bases. The com hat units
were bands of differcnt sizes which
moved about freely within a sector
or bet.ween sectors. In other words
this was, by "Voodhouse's slanrianb,
a good organization for guerrilla
operations.
During 1947 til(' loosely-organized
hands of 60 to 70 men grew into bi-
companies and battalions as guer-
rilla strcll;;th in<rcOlsed. The gucr-
rillas explained their faLiure to take
thc offensive during the winter 1947-
48 on the grounds of organizational
\1 eaknesses. In preparation for [he
Army's offensive, the guer-
1illas decided to consolidate the
areas they held, and 10 effect "im"
provcments" in their military or-
ganization to permit war on the
plains_ In short, they were departing
hom an organizational structure
suitable for their purposes.
Reasons contributing to this deci-
sion can only be surmised. Perhaps
there were militaristic tendencies
among the "amateur strategists."
Perhaps guerrilla strength had grown
to the point that the leaders antici-
pated challenging the Army in full-
scale warfare. Perhaps the difficul
ties experienced in directing and co-
ordinating numerous independent
bands were too great. More prob-
ably, however, the decision to re-
organize resulted primarily from the
decision to defend an area along the
north.ern borders. The employment
of the bands in a task of this nature
would require more effective means
of control.
The decision to defend repre-
sented a departure from the princi-
ples of guerrilla warfare. To attempt
to hold territory indefinitely is to
rely upon force of arms and the
guerrilh who relies npon force of
arms alone is doomed to defeat.
What induced the guerrilla lead-
ers to make this decision? It may have
been to give suhstance to the fiction
Storming guerrilla position


ul lhe "Gon'raUll'lll ul Crcc("c.
w at-CJuire a lerrilOl i:d ua.,e {;C) III '
parable (0 YCllan in China or the
" People's Republic" in Korea; or it
ma)' rcllcl l cd gUl'l'lilla rClog-
t!idon lhal Lhey cuu ld nol. (o!Hillll C
without Sli PpliClo Irom
acruss lhe horder. T o Ihelr
1i1)S the), must uch:ntl :t 11<1.\l'
::n:a lhroll);!,h whi ch supplies
pass on lhe \\'''y lO the bantl-..
In c ... r1r HilS t he hot tt.:dioll:' 01
194 i grew' i lllU lH"igad cs. a nd ill ,\1;1\
a guerrilla di \'i s.icn \\';JS lormed.
llJt:: end 01 19-1g the gucrrill as 11a;1
eight division:;. (' iglll divi
siunli LUlIlroll cti sOllle iJri).{<. lC.lcS.
4::! b,lltalions, 25 bj("ompanies and
18 imlcpemlcm CUrtlPiillit."S.
The ga lherill3 01 light illf:llllry
into numina l "tl.i\' isLOIl'i' did not
make them divisiolls in lilt! Sense of
a force of combined ;IrJIlS. :\0 ::. up
poni_ng arms were added. The ;w ail
able forces were si mpl y &>alhered
into larger formalioll s. T ht: sc ,,'cre
not capable or meeting on equal
term.s the units of the Army which
could find, fiX and fi ght them with
greater success lhan il had the slllal!
er band,. The peculiar advamag-e5
of the guerrilla had been sacrificed.
This depauure from pruper guer-
rilla organi zation and lacliu
the Army during- its 1949 ca ll1paign.
Government forces
The combat arms 01 the .\rmy
1:OIlStllwd of ar-
murt:d reconnaissanc(', tanks and
combat ellgineers. Originally sup'
porti ng arms Were not org;lIIic 10
the di\"i sion. They were under Ihe..'
tolllrol of var ious direct orates of the
general slatf and uniu wen: at
lached w, or placed ill Sl1PPU)"{ of.
c:orps or di\"illions according lO cir-
runHtant:es, The di ... i::.ioll , then. con -
sisLed of li tt le more thall in fant,",,
hcadquaners and signal
Supporting arms, however, were es
tabl ished to provide cenain aHa("h
ments. :\ U1011fH<l in di\'l:-i on W; I;;
normally reinforced by a ca\' :llry
a machine gun company,
c:ngincer.'i and a reRiment of llIoun
l;:tin Jrtillery. Field di,jsions wcrt
similarly r einrorC"ed, except armorrd
cavalry and field artillery repl:Hed
cavalry and mountain art ill ery.
The basic difference between fi eld
a nd mountain di"isions, th e
strengths ot whi ch were ahout 10. 500
and 8,500 respectively. lay in the
Greelc Army -truek 0 the JoothiU., mule. to ,he firefight
1111.:;II IS prm'id crl ror their transpor
tation . T ile field division, ol which
d lCI L" were lhrce, "' : organized fo r
\1 ar Oil the plai ns. Thus, it was
CtluipJlnl wilh motor The
1I10Ulluin d ivision was provided a ni
m:d tran'fpnn, Tll crc wcre four such
divi.ll irlOs. The relative avaiJabilities
of a ni lll.Jl and motor resources and
oper' .J.llonal requi n.:llI t:nts re-
ru lted i n Ul:t n y vari ation s fro m t hese
sl:1nri ;uds ;15 the war \\lore Oil,
finally, by the spring of 191D, the
lit cn-cx in illg eig ht di visioll s Wl:re
plnced under lhe same estahlishmenL
new divi sion, 'he of
\\'illcll WilS about indudltt as
org:llIi( (' IClll L"l1ts all enginl"Cr unit, a
SCOUl compa ny and ;1 battt:ry of
75111111 pack. h owillers,
The .. tHud' lnl a compro-
mi se between the specialized field
;md mountai n divisions. could opcr
;HC cJfl'(" i i\"{' I\' o\'cr all\, terrain. The
new org:lni; ation aiso recognized
Ul.ll Lhc habilual widespread em,
ploylllt,nt of ATTII)' units 1l1:Hlt: it
II CCt5StlTY to include as organic parts
of the division a mod icum of engi-
neer :tnillery !': upport.
Infa ntry
III all. six lYP{'li (If infanllY werc
employed by the Govcrnmi.: nl. 111
to rhe mountain and fi Gld
inCillllrics referred to above, there
were Commando infantry, Nation,","}
Ddemw Corps - subsequenLly light
inCant)'\" Gcnrhlrmerie and armed
ci vilian." components.
Commando ( raiding for ce) units
At the omCl of guerrilla activity
the Army was not yet full y orga n-
izerl . " was deficient in training
and, to some extent, in equipment,
and the organ i"l.'lUoll of i ts c.ombat
uni ts, even those o( the mountain
t yp c, W;( )o not cl1lirely sui table fOI
comiJ01[ :tgains( t.he
small guerri ll a bands of th at period .
Thcre was, however. a p!O)'cholog'ical
need for a measure of e",rl.,.
in arrest ing the of lhe
gucrri llas. ln this ill1ation the Brit
Military Mis.1ion, i ts think.ing
conditioned perhap:s by lhe
of the Ililed Ki nguom in tile
early d;). ys of "" orld \ Var II, spon
sored organi zation or ("".omman ..
dos to training and ( 0 pro\' idc
small u lI il S spcci4llly lra ined 1.0 com
hat guerri llas. I
IXOl or: \ paraH!"! 1Il..ll," d Q"'lI brf ",,-'CI"
condi li ons In ;H I ll b li l1M;" .lind
i" Ih.:: UK itt Ihe limc ot Ihe ""hhrlrawaJ
rl"Om Uunki ,'k, II WU Ihe laUc:r which Inc
hi rth. 10 Ihe C..omDl;U(do concept in t UI
bill!. The (\nll ) . raC:t.() wilh a .honlxe 01
Imill('(1 11Il;:11 :Iud I 0(
could nOt fi r-Jd it siJl, nHk'm l (!lite, nnv
IlC'Otdc:d rnr r"bllihIJII JII the
timi", il .... , Ih()IIJc hl IMI kline
ml:"$UTM; he r:l l..C;:tl 10 keep l ilt'
('11(",11')" .. n llUd 10 II1*' ajn 1he
"P11I\ al huntc. The amw(' r WJ\ I he r"rll
'1l :!lUh') -lmall 11011" til plrked mt n or .
I " !:l Id atld mil. l he If
\lil'rt:: IlslIa ll) launched hom Ihe: 1oI!: :1. 0'-
from III(; :il il". It 'IIr,U a ' b:lck In Ihe wvlJ"
strate a. born (If limitctl mcalR.
only Ih in, chol t coli id be <lone :u Ihe
IIIIH' eXT!:' pl If) do IICl th i ng.
TI,t, i"';HJr c1(ploiu of the rlt
Worl d War J I rei\"cd con!idc:nble. l1I \m
ahlt publicil,'. 111r rt w;u lOme O; rt'"f'lmm
udon will I til e idc::J In Ihe U. S. TN
),Ja,lnc. C.mps (ol"luc!'d :1 It "" l.I. f1 il.t dc:Ii)l-
naltd "R:Ji d c" ." The .,,"uny 'or m.e: d
h ..... as .!oi)(}n that thl"
C, S, had no ftal reqlliremenl lor a "bold:
10 l he wall" unit of I.bis lH)C!. ACIII. U,
lhey wen:: a milil:uJ hl 'Cury.
these units were short livcd. '
FOrlY Commando companies were
formed initi.lil),. SulHequcntly these
werc organized into four groups of
five companies each. The strength
of the group was OIhout In the
summer of 1949 the tour Commando
groups were placed under twO hri-
gade headquartcrs and a fifth group
was organi1ed.
As had happened in the UK and
in the U. S .. the best fighters were
concentrated in the Commando
units. They received better pay.
equjpment, training. condi-
tions and more publicity. Every-
thing was done to set them up aj a
special o( pel"Sonnel. This
they beGUile, but the reason for it
lay not ill this favoritism. The real
$ources of their esprit de corps were
their imense military aelivity and a
succession of mili tary victories.
Owing to their offensive spirit and
the widespread confidence they in-
sp ired. the Commandos began to
gain a monopoly of the right to fight
the guerrillas. Other uniLS, recog-
nizing their superiority, were can
tent to let them do so. Commanders.
"ppreeialing their quality and the
readiness with which they under-
took operations, began to use them
in preference to other troops in op-
erations of all kinds_ It became nec-
essary [or the Commander-in-Chief,
who regarded these troops as a k.i nel
of stra tegic reserve, to state their
proper role. Commandos were to be
used along the following lines:
l. In night raids to open gaps
in defensive works for later exploita-
tion by infantry.
2. In deep raids into enemy-con-
trolled territory_
3. In penetr!ltions to attack. the
rear of enemy troops pinned down
by fire, especiall y near the end of the
fight.
4. As strategic reserves to be
transported to the point of employ-
ment by rapid me:dns such as air
crak
Except (or an initial reluctance to
accept the idea of specia l unitS. the
Commando concept was not ques-
tioned in Greece. They were re-
garded as lightly anned. highly mo-
bile and very effective.
Actu ally the Commandos were not
lightly armed; they carried more fire-
power than a c:orresponding numbel'
o f infantl"'?rmen from a standard unit.
Their mobility is qUe1tion:tble since
they h<td no means of transponation
Government - monopoly on right, 1,0 fighl,
s;tVe walking. Except Cor artus, how-
ever, they were lightly equipped.
Consequently. they cou ld be mo\'et!
readi ly in tran:.poTtation Irom eXter
nal sources. Tht:)" could operate.: d -
[eCliV"ely at night owing to their
high state of rraining. They could
gain stll-prist: owing to their light
CqUipllll"llt, their ability to
(ong marches and their superior
fieldcrail. and they cou ld mak.c deep
penetr;ltions of (he.: n)llllJal-palml
lype owing to their abi li ty to march
and to operale for short
with mini muill equipnwllt. They
were not 5uilahle [or :'Il1.stained opel--
ations a nd they were dependent to it
far greater degree than Slillldard
units upon external athnininrative
.<,ervices.
It is doubtful if the functions as-
signed Commandos were of such a
narure as to warram the mainte-
nance of spe"iai units, with the con-
centration of clrort and dislo( 'ation
o( mora Ie that such a course of
action entails_ TO;I degree the effec-
tlvencss of the
achieved at the expense of the stand-
ard infamry units . . ,""'ill, proper
training rhe latter ({Hlld have pel'-
{armed the missiollx assigned the
CommandCK. They wulcf, in addi
tion. have held grollnd on the
ensive 01 ha:c taken their place in
an attack against a fortified position.
They could sustain theTllselves,
moreover, without rcli anre
upon (he sen icc and supply agencies
of the Army.
H the decision to lonu Commando
units was jusli fied by the condi(iom
existi ng ; It the time that decis ion
was made, the decision to maintain
them lllddinitcly cannot be justihed
0 11 grounds. The Army had
become engaged in large-scale opera-
tions and sufficient Lime had passed
LO get reg-ular units organin:d and
equipped.
The Briti ., h had in mind the fur
ther development of tJ,e Commandos
as task forces for sustained pursuit
and destruction of hands operating
away from the main rebel bases-
an employmclll which might have
justified rheir continuance as special
units. The pursuil rorces were to be
air il upplit:d, air 5upported and, in-
sofar as praClic:ahle, airborne and air
transported. This concept was not
implementel.!. however. and the
Commandos were retained in their
original role.
National Defense Corps-
light infantry
The National Defense Corps bat
talion had a strength of 500. The
ballaliom were formed from older
of reservists to provide static
tldenses for towns. lines o{ commu-
nication and vit;!.1 installations_ As
(hese" IInits were posted, Army units
were freed for a more aCtive role_
No sooner was this done than the
of the Defense Corps itSelf
was to include local offen-
sive operations. This Wit..>; followed
by of an increasillg

number of Deiense Corps units and
their redesignation as light-infantry
lJaualions, As the Army became
more "<.live, light infantry was used
inueai\ingl}' in the searching opera-
lions wili<: h us(....J so iHuc.h of lhe
Army's lime.
Gendarmerie
Jnili:11 efforts or lhe Gendarmerie
to 1I1H.Jertake armY-lype operations
LO meet the rising tide oC disturb-
ances were unsuccessful. "'hen it
was recogniled that the problem of
-maintaining public order had grown
Leyoncl police proportions it became
a funuion of the Ami}' , ami lhe
Gendarmerie returned lO iLS nOTmal
role. However. it continued to as-
siSt in military operations. Mobile
patTols were the principal means of
co-operation between Gend ... nnerie
ilnd Army. These detachments. con-
sisting of tWO or three squads, were
equipped with Dren gUllS, guns.
rhe 2-ind\ radios. Fol-
lowing operations or the Army, the
patrols conducted st:arches (0 insure
that areas were free of guerrillas.
This mobile detachments were
hroken down into station detach-
ments with a stalic mission. This
enabled ,hem to operate as police,
Armored and tanks
Armored cavalry and tanks did
rrot p laya significant role, Unable
1.0 penetrate the mountain areas
where most of the fighting took
riace, armor normally reinforced
the garri,\ons o( towns, Jt tended to
raise the moral,e o( the soldiers and
particularly the townspeople. who
were impressed by such tangible evi-
dence of strength. Occasionally ar-
mor was used to support a counter-
offenSive LO drive guerrillas out of a
captured lown . Armor may have
disturbed the guerrillas. Their ex-
tensive use o f AT mincs, and t.hcir
efforu to build up an 30li-t<lnk (a-
pability by the acquisition of AT
guns and by the designation of in-
fall try "tank fighters" sugges t as
mtlrh, Jt is doubtful, hO\\'ever; if
Ihe largely p5)'chological <Jdv301age
which :1ccrued to the Army by it..s
possession of armor justified the ef-
fon which' went into the mainte-
nance or this arm.
Supply and service elements
Unlike: ' the guerriJl",s, the Army
was supponed by extensive supply
and service elements. By virtue or
lLS dispositions alld ilS greal numeri-
ca l supcriority, the Army w mrolled
all essential routes o[ conul1unica
lion, Thi), with its rt:)UUH,CS in
molO!' :lIul ;'Ilrilll:lL tl'all)pOn, gave it
strategic mobility and Slaying power
which tended to off5ct lhe gucnillas'
gre:uer taclic'a l m(lhility, 'Mowr
transport had liule \I:llne in til{'
nwulltainuus count r y to whiCh the
guerri11as wit hdre",' 10
nullify the Army's 'ldvOilltOlgCS in
transport and he",vy weapons, II
did. however, cn:rhlc lhe Army to
maim;'!in b rger 101'ces operating ill
the impassahle ar'etl. Thruugh its
use. re.suppl y ('(lIIld he brought lip
10 a roadhead, whcOle it could be
forwarded by animal transport, The
guerrilla, b)' contra)t, had to get
al ong wi,fll the sLl PIJ li<;s he ran-ied
with him as he wilhdrew to the hiils,
plus wh.llever he could g:llher off
the count ry or move in hy a long.
slow :1nd in",dcqu:tte system of anj
mal transport.
Summary
Owing to the composition o[
forces, the Army enj oyed
two great advantages over the
"Democratic Army," First, it was
capable of fieit'lillg- babnced forces
of combat arms, whereas the guer-
rillas wcre infantry only, Second, it
was adequ;Jl('ly supported by supply
:md sC'rvice elements, This gave it
strategic mobility and tanic .. 1 Sl<ly-
ing power, The guen-illa. on the
othel' h ::md. had few st'Jvice forma-
lions otr(side the h<tse areas, Thus,
his units in sOlllh and Greece
had liule s(rategil.: mobility and lim-
it'ed sta) i llg PO\\'(' T,
At lhe o nse t or the war the guer-
rillas employed their rorces in ac-
toniaru-e with their C'J.pauililies. In
19-18, however. they bcg7ln to ddend
certain areas along the non hern
horder and to employ la rger ronn a-
tions in south and cemral Crtece_
In so doing- they pillced tlle.nuch es.
at a disadvantage- with respell tn the
superior :Inns and logistic c.1 pabili-
ties or the Government rOf('cs. fol -
lowing the 19'Its call1paig'n thc gucr-
rillas allcmpleti LO CflIlSlilutc.: tlni i-
Jery and other supponing arrm. hut
their efforts met with lillie ' ;;5,
Thdr final military dde-a t w.1.'I due
in part to lhcir eElort to oppose a
balanced force o( Wilh inbn-
try The gue rrillas at 110 li nl e
IlacI thc capahi lil y of directl y OpPfl<l
ing the Army, Why they alloweu
to be placLxI i ll tlli s p;)si
tion is difficu lt to uIH,lonaand.
ARMAMENT
The " Democrati c Army"
The rable of equipment for il
gucrrilla brigade. the strell)r!,th .)f
which was about 1.500, provjekti tilt'
following- armamen t :
Pistols 55
Rifle<
SMC,
LMC, 81
HMGs fi
Light mortars
Medium morl :lrs
27
6
So rar as is known. no guerrilla
brigade ever attained a of
1.500. and i t is improbahle that <1 11\
Defen.e CorD' - (rom "Home Guard." 10 IiK'" infantry
, ,
II I ,'.ti III
I h 1111.. 11. '
101 .qpppcd I II Ih, -
0111',1. idll", ll " .. wi!.
.. t , 1,al.lI It ' 1.I,d by ), 11( II
'. ll l,hck .. ", tl.(' t hle h
. ,HI illliic;lliuli uf )!,tl('lrill;\
I'. :lh n ::) pI.:LI 10 ;11111;1I1ICIII.
Prohahh no more: ac.:CllralC (. ..
0 1 11K II Ilu hc: r:- ;lIld typ(':<- fI( we,'pon,
in the 11 ;1111;, of g-lIcrril1.ls cotultl lit,
m:,dc III:ln o lle arrived :'It hy ili:-
lriblililig :lI'lU" tcJ the uII,,1 !IlIlnllel
of guerrilla:.; ill llccorcl :Hl cc willi Ihl'
lalios eSlahli,hcd hy thi s (;1111<: . II
would lJe lIel"e:.sary to add .he linl '
number or lu':.vier newscrn::d
wcapons not included in the brig;ldc
table of equipment. ,These included
liglll fielel :llld moulltain arlillel)"
light AA and AT guns and a few
he:Jvy mortars. The lotal number of
weapons would also include those
slOred locally and the resources 01
lhe governments to the nOrlh_ Then:
is little e\' itlence that the gll('rrilblo
ever expericn("ed shortages in w("al' -
ons, except in isolated instances
where were due to difficnilie!l
in dislribmion rather than to an
over-a 11 shortage.
The guerrilla we;l!.:.ness in weap
ons was the result not of shon sup-
ply blll of lad o[ slandardization.
There was infinite variety in their
weapons. Thi s diversity was the
procluct of their manifold sources.:!
It gave the guerrillas many
aches and prevented them gettmg
maximum performance fIom their
armament. \l\feapons training CQuld
not be standardi zed. \'\'eapons main-
(enance was rendered difficult by a
shortage of spare pans and by the
fact thal parts were not interchange
able between the various makes.
Perhaps worst of all was the fact
that ammunition supply was inn.-
nitely complicated. Weapons were
often out of action hec."l use ammuni-
tion of the proper type was not
availahle at the lime and place,
while local supplies of ammunition
The invaded Greece in
No\'ember 1940 and (he Gn.:ek!i dro\"e (hem
back. inlO Albania where lQey held them
until (he Germans alueked in April Hl41.
Dul'ing lhi5 time mueh Italian equipment
had been eapllln:d :md when the Greek
Army w;,.s a ponion of this equip.
menl , along wilh some from the Grcrk
Army. {nund It, WlIIy into hiding or imo
Ihe h;tnds of Ihe JK<lple. Br- rorr- long Ihe
Germans bCS::::In suppl yi ng arms 10 Ihe
Stturilv battaliOlls. Some of Ihis ultimalely
[r-ll in;o the hand. oE IUS. Italy h.l\inK
3llrrendered. an Iialian di,ision surrcn
dertd 10 Alli ed. in Greecc
Mine$! A mechumzeti had to dig
were somctimes partially useless,
These problcms wcre mngnified uy
the t1eploymel1l of gller
rila units and poor communi cations.
A signifi('ant increase tOwards the
end of the Wdr in German weapom,
riAes, in particular, may have ueen
due less to th-: exhaustion of Balkan
stores than an ellort on the part of
the gucrrilla to standardize
Apart from their v:Jriety, guerrilla
weapons were those used by infantry
the world over. The conditions of
the war, however, brought lhe mine
into great prominence. The guer
rilla, having no motor transpon,
could place ami-tan k mines at wi\(,
knowing that they would not inter-
fere with own movements. The
Jimited road net and poor traffic.-
;:bility of the terrain off the roads
insured a pron.tahle return. Anti
tank and ;lllti-personnel mines wcre
employed extensively both offen-
ELAS ahle 10 disai'l)\ Ihe divi!oi lon .. nd
keep ils In Driti5h na,'al uni(s
heg;tn lo dcli,'cl' arms l<l the CnlIsts o(
Grr-ecr-, Albania and YUgO!la ... ia. Finally.
the Gr-rmilm. when they withdrew from
Greece. Ir- lr of ilmmllnilion and
.... knowing Ihal would hI"
against the lind the Bri(ish.
Alter Ihe war [he Tiro putha.n! 10
power in Yugosl;H'ia and Chetnik <"'q uip.
menl ... s well as abandoned Cerm .. n equip.
melli, came under their connol. 'When lhr-
Yugosla\ia. Army "'as supplied wilh new
cqllipmmt fr<lm Ihc USSR, of Ihi5
maleria.1 found its illiO Greece.
sively :tml defensi\'ely ; lIld 101' SCtuu
lage. Their weight ,I di srulv;w .
tage but tens of tilOll S:tIl(b wert:
IrallSpOrled into Greece and the
hundreds of legless men one sees
there today give convincing: evi
dence of their effectiveness. The
mine was lhe most effective singl e
weapon in the guerrilla arsenal.
AN EXAMINATION of the quanlities
of aTms and ammunition recovered
in the base areas at the conclusion
of the final campaign is in{onnative,
It will be recalled that the guerrillas
were driven out of the Grammos
area late in the summer of 1948, .it
which time the Army searched the
area for stores. It will b<r re("alled.
too, that the Vitsi area had been
lightly garrisoned until it was rei n-
forced by troops from the Grammos
position. Thus, with minor excep
tions, the al'ms and ammunition
found there had been built up in
the Vitsi area after November 1948,
and in the Grammm area after
January 1949. The inventory dis
closes that:
The supply of intlOtl"Y weapons
was plentiful.
An effort had been made by lhe
guerrillas ollowing the 1948 cam-
paign 10 build lip firepower in the
base areas by the acquisilion of artil-
lery, anti-tank. anti-aircraft and in-
fantry guns as well as heavy mortars.

Silcablc uf :O ll!"h wcapuns had
b('('n made :lv.nlahl, 1)\, [ill' sillt:llitcs.
\\'1111<: :tdc'qu:ltc: of .\T alltl
.\.\ alllllltilliliull had been aCCttlllll
laled, 5[od .. ;. 01 <ll'lillC:1 Y ;Jllllllltllilioll
had 1101 heell huilt Ill} LO the level
Il'lJll i rnl for :t ... (:tiIl Cd ddellse of
lht.' hase ;1Ie;15.
TIl\,: o[ "lI1lllll '
nil ion wt:n.! lilllilcd.
thcn.:: arc nu mill'}' illdictl iOIlS
or ;[ general ol small ,Inus
;Ollllllllli[ioll. the e"idence of
inYClllOl'Y ("allllot he ac.:n' ptcd as ("011-
('ill .,]\"{' in Ihi:-. "('g;ud. Tht'I'c is no
rC:lMJU, ho\\,/..'\"('r, to douht the
age 01 'Inil.kry il.\ll.\llunilioll. It may
h;I\'e IX"ell due tu the in;,hilil\' of the
supply "'ptCllI 10 trallspurt
heavy aunlluui l iull lO maintaiu an
;ulcqu;tll: ll'vel Ag;lin, Balkan sture.\
in anillcry ammunilion may havc
heen exhausted. }Iol'e likely. how
ever, it was due tr) the fan thaI
YllgOS!:tvi<t . holding mrul of
Wit S no lUIl;':(,1" I'eleasi ng thC11l
to the glJt.:rrill ;u . T llio; explanation
would be conSi)t clH with a shortage
or small arms allllllunition and HOt
inn)[Jsistcnl wilb the I'elatin:ly I-?,oml
level s of AA and AT :l1l1nlUllltion
whi ch werc found, since lhese types,
unlike 5.111:111 <111d arlillc!"v. were
lillie used. .
Covernment forces
In respect to :trmament the objec
live of creating a army in
Grc(!ce had not been attained when
operations against dle guerrillas be
gan. Although there was a standard
tahle of equipment, the weapons on
hand v;Jried from unit to unit ac
cording to the availability of equip.
mene.
The principal, infantry weapons
were the .303 rifle, the Stell gun and
the Eren gun. The last named was
distribUlerl one per squad or aboU(
per batwlion. The only crew
served weapons in the ballalion were
monars. A 2illeh mortar was placed
in e<Kh rille platoon. "'I'he only bat
talion weapon was the ginch mar
lar. In summary. t.he armamem of
the battalion induded:
3 or 4 - ginch mortars
12 - 2'lnch mortars
Approx 86 - Eren guns
Approx 600 - .303 riRes
Approx 75 - Stell SMGs
The brigade consisled of three
battalions. No supporting arms were
introduced at this leveL The divi
, iUll, ill l \I! II, (UIl !> i'::'ICd ul three l!l i ,
1-;:.11(" . :-\n ,\UPI"JI'lillg :lnllS werc
IIrg; IIlH \\'Ilh the lIo\\,cvet,
.1 lIlcdilllll 1II,lLhill C g-un I oIllP:JIlY ur
J() \'i t kcr:; was uonnally all ;'l"hcd
:llJd t lu' n ' W;IS ,lvai!alJk 101' lilt
pon 01 (' ;11.. 11 divisloll :Jhout two bat
teries of ;milh.:ry ;tlld a rel.:ullllaj)
,alii C s'lll:lt!! 1111.
The :lIlilkq ' was OIg:lllized illiO
eight IfxilllelllS. Illt,ulllain
1llC.' 1H I.:ull.sisterl of two Imlteries ul 3.7
Jl\()Ulll a in huu-ill_cn. SUlUClilltCS at
l:t(I H: d W:l S ;' h:tlll'I' Y uf 1,2 llHlrWI S,
rile field reRiment (Ullsisted 01 ['.1'0
batteries or :!;j. pounde rs . 1n adc.L
lion, there wcre two hilucrics of
Increases in armament under
U. S. aid program
U. S. llli lil:II'Y aid made it pu!>sible
to let lily StllllC 01 the short ( OlUilll)s
ill arm;! mclH. bllt cil:ll!gc) GIOI C
To cUlIlplclely t eo
eqllippnl l ht.: Al"lIIy with U. S. wrap
om would have n:quired marc
lh;1Il were availalJ h: and
ex u: n. .. i\'c rClr:.linillg. Hri l i311 cql,i?
IIlent, hO\\'('\'l.:I' , W' I.$ by lat e wn de
tcriul'OJting "al" :, ul"pluses il t lhe
U,K, wen.: heing e xhausted rapi dly,
especially SIII :l 1I anllS and cr e\\'
served This approaching
exhallstion of Bri l ij h stocks ncceo.
sil ;lled the gradual replacement o{
Tan.ks - not prncI,iwl lor guerrilla hunting
medium al'lillery ulilsi sting 01 tour
J.5s each.
The annored reconnaissance
equipped \\'ilh [he U. S,
swut car anrl the Briti shmade
Humber armored car, were OIKan
i1.etl into recollnaissance regimellt s,
of which there were three, To com
plete the list of armament, it is only
ne(CS3ary to add three small tank
IInits equipp('<l with British Cc' nlaur
tanks o( limited serviceability, and
laler 1he U. S. Sherman.
A camal inspcnion of this arma
ment establishment reve:l.!s that it is
light. even by muuntain standards.
PanicuLtrly striking are irs defici en
cies in machine guns and artillery.
Blit limited numbers and firepower
of the wcapons were not the only
shortcomings. Mu,h or lhe equip.
ment had been war surpl'us in the
first place and ordnance mainle
nance was defici ent.
lOall}' itcms. Bringing the L' . S . .\l b
sion into a held which had previous
ly been lhe o[ the
ijritlsh that o{ org:lIliJ ....
policy, this development, to-
getht!r with the resources :It the di s-
posal of thc U. S . .\1issiun. brought
about certain improvements in the
armament establi shment. The im
provem(:H(s Gillie gr3du:dl y, h01\"
ever, and did not hit their [ull stride
unlil afler hustilities we re on:}".
Tht, first change in <tnll :U1t Clll w;a
lhe .\UhSlitulion of the 60mm (or lilt!
2inch m,ortar. Tilis was fullowed b)'
the gradual suhSlituti()n of [he 81111111
(or the 3jnch mortar. The ah5cnce
of sufficit!1ll artill ery suitable for
mountain operatiOn!; havillg been
noted. lhe 'j5mm pack. howitzcr was
procured and delivery made in
the spring of 19-::18. A baltcry of
(our guns was provided each divi
sion. a development which went a
long way towards increasing its sel(-
sufficiency and its effeCliveness in
mounlain warCare.
By February 1948, the eontracling-
qualllili es of British weapons dic
tated their concentration in certain
units. A was reached to
replace the .303s, the Bren guns and
the Vickers machine guns in three
divisions and nine light infantry
baualions with the 1903 riRe, the
BrowniIlg automa tic riRe and the
M191 9A4 machine gun, respectively.
The changeover was eHeeled in two
of the three divisions prior to the
final battle.
The advent of the U. S. light TIIJ'
chine gun served to bring aboul a
reorganization of the machine gun
establishment, nOl only in the three
divisions (() be U. S.ecptipped hut
the five Britishequipped divisions
as well. The divisioTl machinl! gllO
company was replaced by a four-gu n
platoon in each infantry battalion.
This increased the machine guns in
the division from an emirel), inade
quate 16 to 36, and placed them or
ganically at the level of theil' normal
employment .
To meet the need (or a directfire
weapon suitable for anacking cov.
ered emplacements, two new weap'
om were introduced in July 1949-
the 2.36 rocket lau ncher and the
75 mm recoi lless riAe. Rock'eL
launcher teams were organized on
the basis of nine per division. and a
mu Ie-transported recoilless riRe com
pany was formed. The laHer was to
be assigned to the highest com-
mander in the battle area who cou ld
re-assign its elements in accordance
with the tactical plan and the na
lure of the enemy fortifications. The
early collapse of the guerrillas did
not permit Cull evaluation of the
usefulness of chese weapons.
Armament of raiding forces
When the decision was reached to
re-equip three divisions ""ith U. S.
arms it was also decid("d to reequip
the Commando5. Prior (0 that dale
they had been equipped with the
rine, a high ratio of Bren guns
and su bmachi ne guns. but no mao
chine guns. 111 this Cilse the 1\,.( I riHe
ralhe r lhan the Springfield replaced
the .303. Fiftyeight Browning au to-
Lllati c rilles per group replaced a 1ike
number of firen guns, and BreI!
on hand ill eX('C5S of this num-
ber were re tained. Five 2.36 rocket
I;Iu nchers \Vere issued. Machine guns
were issued for a group machine
gun platoon. The conver5ion of the
Commando units was accomplished
quirkly and all five groups were reo
equipped prior to the final cam
paign.
Arms for civilian components
The problem of arms for civilians
was always vexing. Fotlowing the
liberadon, the Government had pe1
milled the distinuion between offi-
cial and unofficial mea ns of com
balling guerrillas to berome hazy.
\Vht n the in November
1946 requested arms for civilians in
north Greece, the United Kingdom,
s(il( smarting from the effcc:ts of cri.
tic:islll (oll owing- its support of the
Greek. Government in 1944, flally
refused. However, other arms were
and the question of resupply
of ammunition arose periodically
thereafler. At a later date and with
improved organization o( the civil
ian components during the re-settl(,"
ment of refugees, .. :iOS riRes of lim
ited servlceability were issued for
civilian use.
Armament of National Defense Corps,
light infantry
The initial weapons allowance for
Defense Corps battal;ons included
riRes, Sten guns, 25 Bren guns and
twelvc 2inch monars. As additiona l
equipment became available they
were armed \\ilh four 81 (010 mar
tars and four Vi(kers machine gUf1S,
and the number or Bren guns was
increascd to 36. The machi ne gUll
gi\'cn (0 the Nne ball,llion even
before the regular Army battalion.
presumably uecause of the stalic de
fensive role of the former and i:.s
isolation.
Adequacy of armlment
In view of the limited capabilities
of artillery, particularly prior to the
Y iui gll.erriUa ba.rion-
i'ormfltion or the mountain llOwilzer
batteries, and in vi ew of the tailurc
tv develop fully the air support po-
tential, the conclusion is inescapable
tha t the Army was 1l0t armed to
meet the gue rrillas on the most
favorable terms. Some improvements
in infantry fi"epower were made in
the fi nal year of lhe war; an increase
. in machine guns and their incorpo
ration in the infantry battalion, the
,eequipment of lhe raiding forces to
include machine g'uns and !\f 1 riRes
and the issuing of rocket I:wnchers
and recoi ll ess riRes. These develop'
men IS, however, c<tlne lOa late to
have any material effect during (he
war. In all probability the war
would have ended where it endtd
and when it ended had no changes
in armament occurred.
This is not to s:lY that these
changes should not have been made.
It is unfortunate that they we,e nOI
made earlier. Until these changes
were made the infantry had been
less efficient than it might have been.
As a matler of faCt, throughout
mos t of the W,if it was equipped by
the standards of 191 8 rather Ihan
those of 1948. In our own forces we
seek a proper balance between fir e
power and manpower, erring, if ::Jl all ,
on Ihe side of providing more fire
power than can be e="p toited full y.
When possible we ., hould do as
much for our allies. This observa-
tion, of COUl'Se, is made with the
benefit of hindsight. No one cou ld
foresee in Apri l 1947, when the aid
program began, that
would drag on uncil September
1949.


lr .. y artillery Jound a target
Comparison of armaments and
summary
\ CfJ lllPai i.'i.oll the total
!lumbers of guerrilla and Govern
men t weapons has no more slgnifi.
Cl'HlCC lho'ln a cOlll par ison lxlween
we Lot aJ pCl"lIonnel stl t,t 'glhs of the
TC"5pcctivl' In the early stages
uf Ihe W;Jr Ihe g uerrilJ>t , man t9r
!llan, l\'<I!t ;Ill wcll-:trnwd <IS the sot-
dier of the N:Hion;1\ Army . .'\11 Army
uni t had no ;tdvanlClgc in hrepower
over a gucHi l!;, unit of equal sileo
exct'pt when the fonner had tht:
benefit a t anillery :lnd air support.
This h"'elltT;lli zaliorl IIIU.' .t be quali-
hed owing ((J the diversity 01 guer-
rllla weapuns, with consequem lack
01 :.landardiL3ti on in training and
JJOOr mailH.('II <1 ncc. 311d tu the in-
itbility o f the to provide
.lIllmuni lilln for sustained com hal
except nto!IT the nonhern
This condition, which was nOI
ulndiorat.ed apprec.:iably until ma-
chine guns were placed in the in-
Idntry battalio n and numhcrs
increased in the summer of 19'19
emphasiles the imporlance of anil:
lery and air support. The effccli\'e-
ness of however, leh something
10 be As regards artillery,
the greatest limiting fa ctor was the
terrain. Mountain artillery alone
wuld be employed in most areas
and of times even it could IlOt he
moved to the battle area. A second
fact or was the limited availability
of arlillery. panicula rly mountain
q pes. With the wide dispersal of
units it was not possible to provide
artillery suppOrt whenever and
wherever it might have been em-
ployed profitably. The factor of
availability was altered in mid-I94R
with the itTrival of the U. S. pack
howitzer and the organi zaLi on o( a
b<luery for each division, Thereafter,
a modest amount of artillery support
could normally be provided wher-
ever it was required.
An additional limiting (actor was
the technique used in controlling ar-
tillery fire . The artillery or observer
was used for the ;UliustlllClH of fire
"a ther than the forward observer.
This technique was not always ca
pahle of providing the kind of clost. ...
in fire S1IppOrt needed to rei nlorc'e
the fires of inlantry weapons.
In contrast to the fluid operations
elsewhere. the "u:u'ks madt into the
northern base areas wert: prepared
deliberatel y and the Army was alJle
to concentrate it.s artillery, When
this was done, artillery support ap-
l)roached the sta tus or <I decisive
ractOL
That the guerrillas rccognilcli
l.reir weakness vis-a-vis the artillery
of the Anny is attested by their e{,
between their derc:!t in the
Grammos in 1918 :lnd the final
cam,paign. to build up an artillery
al m in the base areas, panindarly
Vilsi which they occupied the long-
el. Artille ry pieces or various typo
were ohl3ined. bUl the guerrillas
were un able to constitute an effec,
live artillery arm, Tllt'ir f::tilure may
be attributed LO a lack of artill ery
knowhow; to th e ac!.ion of the air
lorce in seeking out and des troying
gun positions; and to inability to
obtain adequate supplies o f artillery
ammunition,