THE AM'I-BANDIT liAR

B,y Col J .C. ~

PAm' nI
the Anti-Bandit War
. "
By Col 1. C. "Iurray

Under Papagos the Anny was made to do whal il was
capable of doing-no more was needed to gain victory
Synop.iI:
The camjJaign with th r. murder 0/ isolated
o{ficia/s and the bf.'ali/lg or fheateniug of righi-wing
ciliu1ZS 01 prominence, Next came allacks on small
uillages (.Inti on larg('r Gendarmerie detachments,
Then, ill lY'17, till: l}aTldils began. to try to hold certain
areas to -proted supply rou.tes and they played
their tnwlp card- the 01 the " Provi.
shma l Democmtic Government,"
Opposing each other in the conflict were two vastly
diUe,'rn L lorce. f, Tlte G)'uk Government tronp.f, nu.m-
bni,lg 265,000 by the end of [hI' tl'llT, received m.ateria l
aid and mililn.ry advice fmm the United States and
Britain, and in the final campaigns wrre able fo make
use of supporting, arms. The gll l' nd/as. on the other
hand, never stronger than 20,000, opemit'd solely as
light mfantry wllh little su.pport }rom artillery and
morla.rs.
Bul thl: CQlllf'Sl tl i rH 1101 as one-sid"l as It appears.
It took time lor' the Creek GOVl:nmHml to orKaniu its
onl1Y into a cohesive fighting fora. Thl! gUl!rrillas,
li{!. hlly and u11II1Ipeded by ser.Jiu fll/its (Jr
territorial responsibility, had good mobility in a tacti
sense and a high degree 01 (luibilit)" Every man
UltM a fighter and bands had nO solt rCtll".
As long as the tailored 'hl!ir tn.ctic.{ /.0 the
forces and arms at their disposal, 'hey hrfd the l()hip
hand. But when to hold ground find pn)/ec/
their supply rOfl.tes they were ;dQ9rred 10 failure .
Field Marshal ,4.l.exaMer Papago.,
Commandu.i n-chieJ Greek Army
Part III
COMBAT EFFICIENCY
THE .[ t:I(M "co)'1 EJ-' . ' lCtf.:,\C"r"
(IS used hl:,re embraces suth facwl"s
as lraining, ronlma.nd and staff func
tioning, d isci pli.ne and morale,
Any judglllel1l. un the training of
the "Democratic Army" depends up-
on the frame of rderence. By onho-
dox standards it W; IS deficient in al-
most every respect. Obviously, how
ever. such standards are n(lt appro-
pri<llt:. Gllcrrilla warfare ha\ been
liule rali nnaii1.ed by the armies of
duly governments, For
example, until recently the U. S.
Army Field Service Regulations de-
voted only eight: paragraphs to the
subject. HislOriGllly. guerrilla war-
[are has been a practical an largely
rebuilt from the ground up whereve.r
the need for it arose. In recent years
it has oct!n emhraced hy inl ernation-
al Communism ;1$ a tactic of revolu-
tion, and the employment of partisan
"ar lale by lhe 101'0:.) III inlt:rllrltiona l
( ,1J1lI1l1U ni 'i lll will ill li llie 1",llT !Hore
dkcli vc ;ulI i-g IH' ni ll:t tl ot II ill l",
\11 (;r('('ct' ,In' " lh'llloll' ;l l ic
did 111)1 h;IH' tt) ,lart fro", the hegin-
nin}.! ill lilt' develllr"llt'llt oj t<te-
Lil '. [I 11,1' ahh: lO dl";nl' "POll a va, 1
(" pnHlicl1 eXI)(: ric nce.
0 1 il , hael '><:rved \\'jt ll
FI..\\ the ol("llpatiulI, hill a
,ta1Hlald III p ,' Iri':llI w;II' brc
hdd "('(>n I.kveiopecl ullcler 'rito III
TIl(> lIew .\rIl \\"
h;1I1 cxpt:n p;II' li ,a n
TIl(' 0 1 (;)'('('Cc l){,lIC' tited
Inll)! tlwil ('xperic'IICc.
1':"idt' lHe w:. " l. 11 the
l ' lIi(cd :-":aliu\B ClIlIIlIlis!>ion Con-
FrrlllliL'1 1111 lhal
" iel. I'd Itl t' fl Inlm I.l1l ' )'rlugec', who
fled , 1(10" tlie hOHlt'l" lol1owin).{ the
alloni\' l' 1C" 'ollll ion in Crct'ct:, II'eu'
lrailH"d in 1411('lrill;, w;lllan; in Yug
l
)'
:-. b , i;( :1LIt! Alhani;!. 11\ YUWhla\'ia,
SI:I\ " p(';,\';'ing (;rec\.;.s '\t'rt :tllllChcd
tlil"('( Ily {(1 till' _\rm)' for Iraill illg.
Tht' Cmnllli"jvll eXcllll ill t d copit, 01
1I1;llIlIal, ill 11 1(' ( ... lcr":: lan-
1I."l'd l or tl ll'ol l ' l ital :lI\ d jll:U '
lil"al ill )..;ucnilla warb rc ill
hOlh YUJ!.()!>I;"'ia :llld ,-\Ihalli ;1. Final-
l y. il \fa,> )eponed lh:ll /ll ior I() (he
IOI"lIl :tl ioll 01 thl' "COH'1 !1l11cnl o f
fl"tT (,rt'etC" (;(' lu'I",1I :"liltli, :1 Yugo-
sial" ill gUt'lrilla w.Jrlillf' , di
n'etcd o perations rrom
Skol'ljl'.
Commanders
Gut'lTilb (hCIl, wt'rt: no t
witholtt theol <.' li(;11 lrnining in
rill .. \I' a .-rint: , lJIIl IhcI C \,'cn: [c\\'
lhl'm thclll. They were
pr;IClital ,oldicl ,declt'd tor their
lO dum:, FOIilurc
Wi h ;'H. ceptt' d :" c\-idcllC col illfoll\pe'
\('1111' and tht: I(';tlkr \I'ho lailed W:\.')
ICI'I"ICcI , The telllpo O( operatio n,
\I a.. ) 111 It t ilal all iIlIOl1'1>t:It:nt le'lder
"';" ,onn
II LIl t' \t;IIItr, \I'cre llualilied h)
.ll ll.1 expt'riellcc ill gucrrilla
IIarblft, t he) wen' It'>, lor ortho-
dox \l"ar t. tre. "I"b .. t:HI III (jl)1l
;1 \I' hith Ikl'l'lIdctl UpOIl the
!"orlllati oll 01 l:ngl'l lIllit '\ ilnd tIP()U
th .. at\()llljnll (II tOll\"('lllillllal ulili
(;tuil'. ll'IHlctl to deprivc lhe
" PCIlIOCFllic Army" o f Icaderl1,hip
;ulr'l";1I(" to its
Fighteri
The of the rlghtel varied
IWI\II'("11 ,,' il le limi ts. Somt ..... ere as
IITII '1llil lilit..:d :l:. )'C"g:Ijtl, lrainill).!; LIS
the thal is, experiell c(' in
l:.L:\S. tl"aining in the $:neJli tes and
CXI)Cl leIH e ill the field. Ot hen fe ll
Llr ,hon of Ihi .. , p:lItin!larly lOlI'art!
sister Irr,incil ;11 Alb"lIiu IQ fi ;r/ll /lim in Gree.C'f'
the end o ( the war. Tn'lilling- in ,he
s;\telliles was continued for lie'" reo
Cl"uib, blu the journey t.here long
alld oftC' lltilll l:S impracticable, Thus
training was given locall y in loo$el y
organized training ct"nters. and some
)'I ' ITUlb n:ccived their onl y training
in the h:tnds themsetv("s, l ' his train-
\1';\5 minimal. ranging downward
Irom 1\1'0 monlhs to almost nothing.
For example, rC{Tui! s utkclt al
K;tn.lh ils:J were giV(' n oli l y 15 d<i)':-'
tra ining prim to lheir partkip<ilion
in lilt' au;)r\.;. o n KarpelL,ioll. Since
1I111 ('h ur the lilll!' was devoted to po
litica l illdol'trinalion, miliulry train
ing' could ha\'C indtldcd lillie mOIl-
thal\ lht.' dCIlICl"lh of fieldcra(t and
hasic \I'('apons il1slruClion, Perhaps
lhe lIelil and most cxtensi.ve traini ng
CIIllC rmm associalion \\'ith vetera ns
on the joh. The guerrilht who sur
\ ' ivecl I>c<.:ame bauie .... ise,
Policy problems of the guerrillas and
their influence on morale
11" lile impression has been {Tea led
lilal the policy and of the
Commu nists ""as flrm and sleadfast ill
all times. il has been ttnimenti o nal.
Whik a clcta il ed analysis 01 guerri lla
and guerrilla mor a le
praniGlblc, some imlic.alioll
u r the ("()Llfusion whi ch beset the
guerrillas efforts C.a. n lie given, Per-
haps an outli ne o( Ihc Mac.:edonian
probkm is the best stanin){ poinl. ;\S
this was chronic.
The Macedonian issue
For ('enlUri cs the ,Irea d elloled h,'
Ihe n(t{llC rdacedonia has been ton'l
by racial strife. The ruled tht.:
an.::! for hUTldrctb o f Toward
lhe end of thc 19th c:emury Serb.
"!ld Creek foughl for control
or tllc awakenillg pOlitic .. 1
of lilt" gillUpS ill '
hahiting the area. After lh e Balkan
hrollghl the f'lId of Turkish
rule, nlll in'ahle minority
tit the various group" continued ttl
exi!>l. When, Wodd War 11,
the ott 1I1);lIion o( \'ugo,lavia brought
RlIlj.{:lri:ln troops into Maccuonia
they werc not ll!lwel
('01111;'11. The Blligarians. hO\\'(' ver ,
hC14an to alienate the newly acquircd
;Ireas hy a poli('y of denationali za-
tion.
TiLO, lea(h: r o{ the Communist
pani$;u\ movcment in Yugoslavia,
saw an opponunily for Comillunism
to make capital fr om this rcaclioll

to Bulgar policy. Tilo's "iew thal
the exploilalion of the Macl'donian
problem be undertaken by
his p:lny did Hal find illllllc.:diate
I:l\"or with the Comintern. That
hod), fell thaI this al"<:a h'IIJ
been pilrliall y OI.t'lll'it'd hy Uulg.,rian
lIOOPS, it morc properly ue
worked b)' Bulgarian Communists.
HO\\'e"(T, ;u the Yug'os lav party
;u hi en:d ,lI'iking ebe
where, the Com intern reviseu its de
dsion and entnhted dt:vdoptnents
the .lre:1 to the Yugosl .. l\ Comlllu,
nlsts .
Svew/;tr Vuknlanovi cTempo was
dirl"cted hy Tilo to t:lke ch;lrge. His
progr:tln was The Commu-
nist Pany would idt:nlif), ilself with
Mace-
donia would occome one of the a u
tonomous rqlUbli c.:s of a new federal
Yugosla\' ii' , or, \\'as sumetimes
vaguely hillled. :., full independent
st<lte. It woultJ incl ude lcnitory of
Creecl'. Hulg;u'ia, as well as Yugo-
slavia. approvetJ . Tiw's
power was growing and some of (he
peoples of lhe ilrea accepled the idea
with
In th e :<pring or 19-13 agrecment
on joint actioll between Yugosb,'
Clnd Crcek in ("tTtain areas
wa) worked (Jut, uUt tJifficuilit:s de-
veloped rcguding the Slav minority
along the bonier. Their 10)'rlll)'
unnrt;tin. When the Bulgars over
ran the nrea in rear of (he Germa n
Army. these Slavs h"d discovered
thelllsel vc .. 10 hc good "Mulgars. This
brought them mnny adva ntagc;.;;. In
('on 1 1"": to their Grc.:d ncighbon,
tht\' hC{ :IIHe nllt slIhjt("( people but
liberated hrmhcr<j. BUl in the spring
of the wind was changing. The
Allies wert their gr ip on
thec:l.\{ern allti 1.-iLI.':,>
parti san Illo\'cmem had :l program
(or a unit ed .\Lltclluni" ulldcr SO"iet
auspicc... P<:rh" ps this li eld it more
promising flilme.
The C,eek Communist toward
the issue
Creek. Communist le.ulers
pated this transformation with
mixed feeliu),;:s. The Inore n,uinnally-
miLlded C;n'c1h cOlLld 110l 100xive
the Sl:t v n,inoritips fOl thei l' ('arl),
t.\oP(Il I:>: .} or the BlIlgOlrs, ;tud \'il;wed
thei l' (olJ" crsiol1 to the
,,' illl '"Va!) a COllllllunist
.. I;l\ Imperia lism any bctter for
G"eect' than Rulg;tr FaS<' ism? :\"ever.
lheles!), the urgt'cl the lor
mmion of Slit V detachment.. \,ith
thdr own t'ommallil ch under the
genelal t!irenion 01 [LAS. 1I ELAS
did llOl slu'ceed, Ihe Slav dewch
llIell ts could 1Jl' withdra ..... n to Yugo
slavia to pn.' p:.t IT tor Ihe {hrust thi4t
wou ld de tach Greek Mac.cdonia
fl otH C;reece and bring il L1ndt'r
control. Thai the CreC'K
woult! ever agree (0
such cr ippling loss or Ll' ITi
tory, or be suffiliently loyal to the
revoluLionary move
ment to bear the ouium or at!vIIGIl'
ing 'illch an unpopular '!love \fa,
doubtful.
The satellites unite on the
Macedonian issue
In Lime TilO hecame the undis
pUled ruft-r or fe, ull i ted Yugosl a ,i;1.
lnver Hodja ill .A.lbanitl became his
protege. llimiU'ov took control ill
Uulgtl l iit . I laving the mutual hond
or Communism, Yup,mb\"ia and Bul-
gal ia buried old :t lld
rCilche(1 a ("Olllmon poli..: y on .\-f ace
t!onia . Bulgaria would ,upporl a
Cret\u'" .\laredoni ::1 al< a 'P .. n or
Yugoslavia . Vugoslavia \\"11 111 11 sup-
port .. s daim to Thr,u-e. ill
exch.mge for L!II: lillle}"", 10'" of Bul
gari:tn Macedonia.
Guerrilla leadership is adjusted to
" internat ional" view
:\It:anwhik the COlllllIUui!)t Part y
in Gret(c did not lare wcll. Ha \'ill/.;
led its lollowers int o the .. honivt:
rcvolution 01 n ecell10cr 194<1 , it had
no alter ll ;,ti ve hut to .. ppl y 10 Com-
in the s;uell ite neighbors l or
support. Asylum, sll pplies aud train
ing \\"(' IT provided the ,cruget:s Il om
(;n'l"IT. Dinni on o f the Communi::!1
Pan), ill Grccc.:e rema ined in Creek
however, nlllil May 1947. At
tha ltilllC ,ontrol sudden ly laken
over b)' satellite personnel.
These occurred ("OIl(Uf'
rend y \\lit h lhe advent of U. S. inlet
e.)t in Greece: They suggest recog-
niti on hv lh e Cominform that the
Grc.d P<tny was 110t all
,uleqll;nc inst rume nt anu thaI suc-
ress in lhe gllerri ll n wa r demall(led
dirt'ction be passl'd to otl ,," 1"
hands.
By vilille of their geograph ical
position. lhi " task naturall y fell 10
Yugoslm'i:J , Bulgaria anti Alba nia .
The ll Mllmpl ion of power in the
Greek CUllll11unist Party by satellite
LCtUI.(>T oJ a gup.rrilltf blind
per')()I111el constituted a ')l' ldc-
ltlent hel \feen lI iltl Onali sm ill1<1 in-
Lernalioll:rli slll in the Creek Com
munist hi t r;,rdIY. Grce ks who:-.c na
llOl,a li.) II' a gt'lluine inLer
II ;Hwn ... 1 approach to the pl-obl em
,li !llinaICci ffom of
illllut;l1f"e. rhus IKITty i<'acll"rship
t(Ju !t! with equal facili t y for
t he uJI1Lrol of or fur the d(,'
!;J(hllll' llt 01 from Gret:ce.
Since Ceneral Markos, who b<.'camt:
co mmander of the " De mocrati c
Anny" in n t'Ccmber 19 11i, un-
affeeted by thC'$C t hanges. it can be
assumed that he was in h"nnollY
with developments.
Influence of peace offensives of USSR
The policy problems of tht: guer-
rilla were not exdusi\'ely
local in charancl'. Greece a
microcosm in ",hirh were clupllcared
to some eXlCIll the de"c1opments in
the macrocosm ot East-West relations.
Thus, on occasion, the guerrilla lille
was brought into h<lnnony \"iLh
Soviet errons to :lppe:.r
reasonable, On 10 September
General Markos put forwiud Lenns
on .....,hich he W:lS " prepan-d to t:OIne
to an Ag:-tin in June
1948, Rulg<Jria indicated a LO
resume negotiations with Greece.
Albania slated that relations with
Tito was read Out of the Cominform
'IS a dt'yiatjolli5L The development,
however, appe.:lred to have no im
mediate CUt:Cl upon the' guerrilla
war. Tiro, though stallding his
ground firmly, was <luelllpling a
reconciliation with the Cominform.
He had nothing to gain by alienating
it further by precipitate :lclion in
the Gl'eek maUcr. he may
even have entertained lhe idea of
ctlminuing to suppOrt the guerrilla
war on his own inili,Hive in the in
tert'st of Yugoslav Communism. /\ s
for the leaders i.n Greece, they
awaitcd dc,elopments. WOFd went
out to the bands that there was to be
p....u-. -I"" rroop ...... kepi In ."" darlc
Greece could be improved. The
propaganda line shifted from biuer
attacks against the Army LO a plaint
that persecutions inspired in Greece
hy the U. S. must hait. Zachariades,
leading Greek Communist and rigid
adherent of the ?\,(oscow Ii ne, reo
appeared at the headquaners of the
"Govcmment of Fret: Greece" and
Ihe Markos Junta Jaunched a peace
offensive, broadcasting ' offers to ne-
gOliate peace terms, This was in
June, however, and the return of
Zachariades and Yugoslayia's omis
sion from the peace offensive were
indications of what was in the wind.
Tito-Cominform rift, guerrilla
leadership re-adjusted
In July an event took place which
must have seemed little short of
catastrophic to the guerrilla leaders.
no discussion wncerning Tito or his
relations with the Cominform or
with bandilry,
Til o's effons at re(:ol1(:i1iation met
no success. There was no advantage
to him in continuing to support the
bandit war in the interests of the
Cominform, alld it was hccoming
evident to him that he could nOt do
il in his own interests. Not only
were his resources required at home
now that he ('ou ld no longer get sup-
plies from the USSR, but he could
use assistance from the West in any
prolonged struggle with the Comin-
form. Such help would not be forth-
coming so long as he aided guer-
rillas. Yugosla\' :lid to the guerrillas
waned. By January 1949 supplies
from Yugoslavia had fallen off to a
mere trick Ie. A few weeks laler, on
4 February, General Markos and
others of the guerrilla leadership
" resigned." It is not clear whether
Markos resigned voluntarily because
of Yugoslavia'S growing detachment
or whether he was fQl'ccd out.
One version is (hat a decision was
laken at a General Assembly in the
VitSl area to form an Independent
:\Jatedonia La include all or a por-
lion of Yugoslav Macedonia. Thus
an autonomous Macedonia, which
I\ad been Tito's inspiration, was to
be turned against him. Markos and
others opposed this development
anll advocated that the "Democratic
Army" reorganize into small groups
to ca rry on a war for which guer
ritlas were suited. As a result they
were removed from power and
placed under detention, Inasmuch
as many of the guenillas were fol-
lowers of Markos, the report was
circulated that his removal resulted
from illness.
I n this fashion did guerrillil
movement adjust itself to the
Cominform ri(t, control passing to '
Cominformoriented leaders as op-
posed to those oriented toward
Yugoslavia . Yugoslav assistance grew
less until July, when Tito announced
the closing of the frontier. Mean-
while, the Cominform attempted to
djrect the guerrilla war through Al-
bania and Bulgaria with increased
panicipati on of other satellites, but
the key positi on which had been
Yugoslavia'S could not be filled.
Moreover, if Tito's influence in the
"Democrati c Government" had been
purged, the Cominform was unable
to penetrate Yugoslav Macedonia.
The Slave-Macedon ian Army ex-
pecled to spring into life as a result
of the Cominform indorsement of
an Independent Macedonia did not
malerialize. Greek reaction, toO, W<l$
unlavorable. The leadership might
be internationalist in its views. but
there was wide di scontent with this
idea among the rank and file.
Guerrilla morale
That changes in policy and leader-
ship of this magnitude c.-Quld have
failed to affect the moral e of the
"Democratic Army" seems most un-
likely, There are in the sum of its
efforts indications that it was moti.
va ted by a kind of desperation rath-
er than a conviction of urgent, im
mediate, historical purposefulness.
And yet it kept going. The answer
lies in the strict discipline of the
Communi!'>t leaders and the fan thal
the "fighlers" were kept in ignorance
of developments.
For example. the removal of :\Iar-
los, whic:h signalized the elimi.na-
lion of Yugoslav influence in (he
guerrilla movement, arouseu only an
undercurr-elll of dissatisfaction with-
out troublesome activity on the pan
of adherents. The great
mass of the guerrillas was carried
along by the leaders and by a deluge
of propaganda concealing adverse
developments or rationalizing them
in the light of the party line.
There were two orders of morale
among the guerrillas. The first was
the morale of Ihe hard-core Conllnu-
nist. Initi;llly, a high proportion of
the guerrilla.s were o( this cast. but
with the increase of forced recruit-
ing there arose a morale problem.
The morale of the (orced recruit,
while not necessarily low, was of a
different onler. It df:pended upon
lhe amount of his po'litical indonri-
nation_ \Vhen the new reo
cruit was stnl across the borders for
indoctrination. -When this couldl
not be done, his indoCtrination was
carried out in Greec. e. This training
being incomplete, continuous propa-
ganda had to be carried on within
the bands in order to leep up
morale. :\lore time was spent in this
type of activit), than in military
training. A good percentage of
forced recruits favorably
to indoctrination, but few became
zealots.
Beginning early in 1949 the op-
portunities for the of
recruits decreased sharply because of
the increasing aggressiveness of the
Army whic:h lept guerrilla units on
the move. The new, limited mining
was scarcely adequate to convert a
forced recruit into a hardened guer-
rilla who could endure the rigors o(
guerrilla life without complaim. As
1949 ,,'ore on the leaders had more
and more diffic:ully in maintaining
morale. By July, probably the ma-
jority of the 18,500 guerrillas would
have surrendered if given a chance;
and by the time of the Vitsi and
Grammos baules, guerrilla morale
was at the lowest ebb since the start
of the war.
The Greek Nationa' Army
Those who are inclined to regard
the Gte..ek. Army tolerance for
its early showing in the allli-guerTilla
war would do \\'ell to turn b;lrk the
pages to (he year 1940. The results
anained in six months of combat
with the Italian Army afford a stril
ing manifestation of combat efficien-
cy. FacLOrs wbich went into it were:
A well (I"ailll'd regular Army as a
nucleus for expallSioll.
Trained reserves.
Competent commanders and staff
officers.
High national morale, universal
and lrllSlinting public support and
outstanding lombat esprit.
These fauors were di ss ipated in
the period between the Greco-Italian
war and the war with the guerrillas.
Unlike the Navy. which withdrew
from Greece during the occupation
and acquired valuable experience in
the ;\Ieditcrranean. the Army was
unable lO withdraw and was forced
to surrenc.ier in Greece. (ollowing
which it WitS dissolved. A Greek
Army of the Middle East was formed
in Egypt but few Army personnel
were able to join it. The force was
so sma ll that few officers received
training or experience of value.
Moreover. the force was not well-
disciplined and it saw combat onl y
at EI -Abmein and Rimini . Conse-
quently. (rom April [941 to the sum-
mer of 1915, the Greek Army (for
all pranical purposes) was nonexis
lent and eluring this lime much of
its know-how was dissipated.
An Army dissolved for four years
is not rebuilt in a day, and efforts
started in 1945 did not progress
rapidly. Early efforts were devoted
primarily to administrative mallers
- the aClivation of units, procure
menL nnd issue of uniforms, weapons
and equipment, the recovery and
restoration of facilities and the re-
establishment of services. Training
proceeded slowly and the guerrilla
activity of the faU o( 1946 found an
Army unprepared for active opera-
tions. In an effort to speed up train
li ng and to provide small units spe-
cially trained ,in anti -guerrilla war-
fare, the British Military Mission
pushed the formation of Commando
units, but even this prog-raITl moved
slowly.
In April 1947 the Army started its
first large-scale offensive, and from
that time onward its units were so
engaged that training was thought
to be impracticable. Moreover, there
was on the part of officers. who had
A, forc.ed recruifing
guerrilla morale went down
long becn deprived at command re-
sponsibility or who had it thrust
upon thelll without adequat e prep-
aration, a Jack of .--rpprccialioll of
tbe importance o( Iraiuing, panin, .
larly in (Ire units. There \\;\:) a lend-
ency to h:c:] that training within a
unit which had already seen active
combat enlailed a los", of bee for
the ullit and il s personnel . This in-
difference to unit training Wn$ not
discouraged by the policies ot the
Briti sh Militarv MissioJl.
His Government . which
gave suppOrt to the legal govern-
ment ot Grecce in Deccmher 19H,
was critici7.ccI sharply for its "inter-
vention"' in Greek affairs. There
after it becamc semitive to further
involvement. It would suppl y the
Arroy, advise it on lcdmiGtl and or
ganizational mat[crs in
the ,H Iraining- ccnters. but
il would nOl risk operational
advice or the auachment of advi.'\ors
to field Consequently, liule
unit or field training was condllcted
until th e fall oJ 19'J8 when it was
initiated Ilmler the aegi s of the U, S.
Mission.
The Britjsh :\filitary .. iolL did
assist at training centers and schools
where basic individual ano technical
training was gi ven.
the Army had' been formed so rapid-
ly that few of its personnel. had bene-
fited Crom sue h tf.lining. The ract
thal the hrst c"llups were old reo
::.ervisu who h,tl i had basi(; tfaining
prior to the war mitigaled this cir-
CIlIll,'aIllC. \V,.i k thi) W;lS an advan-
tage initially, it $uhstcluently bccame
a disadnlllage. These "old" resel
Vi S1S weI'(' lound to be indfcni\"e in
field s(,f\'icc.
In the spting of El-!8 wa'l; no
plall hy which lh(!se older Olen w uld
he repl:lccd by youuger In
fact, the prevailinl{ ("cil
ing Je(t Itll spate tor tht' tfaining of
replacemellts. To meet this siUl:Jtion
a temponlr), of 15.000 was
approved. In order 1.0 get the great
(.; t <I. 1ll0U Ilt uf nCh' hlood
during Ihe period of the increase.
Ihe lengt h oC recruit tr:lining \': IS rc-
duced (mm 17 to eighl, and final1)
six weeks. This was emirel), in<"lde
(Iuate, considering that liule training
could be expttu."(1 once these men
reported lO thei r units. By the eno
o October, nearl y 50,000 o( these
halftrained repl acemen ts had been
distributed to the combat units.
It may be said, then, that lhe level
o( training in the Army lIever ex
ceeded individual training; and that
as the older reserves were replaced.
the Icvel of individual training was
becoming less sa tisfactory. In view
of this, interest developed in the
previollSly neglected field of unit
traini ng. T o stop the w<l.r to im-
prove training was nOt to be con
sidered, but some things could be
done (0 alleviate the situation with
out inted ering unduly with [he
cou rse of planned operations. In
.July 1948 a training section was es
tablishcd in the U. S. Military Mis
slon to encourage unit training.
The illili ,1I plUg!";"" W,IS not far
reaching. nor it particu larly ("c
fective. li S grcatcst value. 1clY in its
recognition of the problem. Eight
dl:mollStT;:!.tion I'lttlOOlh were formed.
These were lr:lillcd in thc presenta
lion of seel ion and platoon comba t
problems. A platoon was then as
signed 1O each of the Anily di\' isions.
There it presrnled its demonstra
tions to units o ( the division as op-
erations permitted. the
pre:s(' nt;)lion of \eries of tactical
exercisc), Ihe and platoons
of the unit umlt'r training repealed
them. Frt'llut:ntl), lhe time allowed
\\'"s insuffidt' llt, but most of the
units had completed the exercises in
one form or ;lIlother prior to the
opening of the final campaign.
At the end o( the revitalization
program. recruit training was ex
tr uded to 17 weeks. Thus the need
for small unit trainiJlg in field units
wa .. no urgellt, in the
summer of 19'19 the hitherto ne
glected field of comp'lIlY and baltal
ion exerr ise.'i W<"IS opened up. Such
unit's as could be sp.-.red ..... ere made
available for this training- which was
conducted wilh the assistance of
U. S. field teams. At.:romplishmen ts
werc limited because of operational
commitlllcnt!!. in preparation for the
August offensive. H o ..... ev er. the
groundwork was laid for morc ex
tensive field training following the
successful conrimion or the cam-
paign.
Thi s survey gives an indication of
the st<t.le of uainillg which was reo
Rected in the Army's combat effi
ciency. It would be incorrect to
leave the impression that the limjted
ventures in unit and fi eld training
- to Irain alter fombal IDa. to lo.e lace
made during the last yea r of the war
m,ttle a signifi GlIlt contribution to
victory. Infantry still performed less
effi.cien d y than could be desired at
the attack in Vitsi in August 1949.
Howevcr, the efforts WCI'e of value.
The Greek has an active and inquir
ing mind and, if he is made to see
the value of something, he is not
slow in adopting it. The efforts of
the field teams, arousing the interest
of the soldiers, combined with the
command interest which led to the
acceptance of the program to per
suade the Army as a whole that train
ing was impon<tnl. Returns on this
program will be fou nd in the present
and futUJ"e efficiency of the Army.
leadership and morale
As the Army enjoyed a sur-:riority
of 10 to I in men and materials.
its prOlonged inability to eliminate
the raises a question as to
the qualit y of its direction. Win the
ineffectiveness of the Army tbe re-
sult of failure of commanders to
employ effect ively the forces placed
al their disposal? Did the absence of
effectiv{' leadcrship prolong the wtlr?
To some extent these questions must
be answered in thc affirmative. A
lack of competen t and aggressive
commanders plagued the Army in
1947 and 1948. A comparatively low
stan<i<ud of professional training
was not the only cause of command
failures. Important too were a cer-
tain lack of discipline and the abo
sence of <t strong "wi ll to fight."
Non-military influences in the Army
1n some countries effective consti tu.
tional barri.ers havc heen established
bctween military power and domes-
tic politics. Others ha ve been less
successful in this respect. Greece
has been among the latter. Personal
relationships between individual
miiit;)ry offiters and political leaders
were not uncommon, and many mili-
tary officers had channels bypassing
the Army command and the War
Ministry through which they could
reach the Government. ' Moreover.
the Army command, which owed iu
tenure to the Government. could
not dinegard the wishes of the po
litical figures who made it up. Thus,
the militar y command's conLrol over
the Army tended to be circum-
scribed by political considerations.
These nonmilitary influences d
(n lcd .\ nll)' dT\( it'll' dmilll; the
Sl:lgc5 o f t he ami -ba ndi l war.
Incompetent (:ould not be
di!l char;.;t.'d \,' jth()tll g()v(:l"IIllIl"lu ;.li
a<.:tioll, and thi!'. ,,";1'; difficult to ob-
lain. A, tlempt:. t o remove officns
wen.! prOjtl' u'tI ill!o Lilt: rca 11 11 o(
poliljn wllnc they were nOl smccp-
t ible o f a sound The in-
ability 01 the Ann)" to )TJ1l()\'t' in-
cfllnpetcUl OInd in)'lI hord in,Hc officen:;
1t' lIIkd 10 ues lroy for aUlhor-
ity. .<iuhorelill J.te commanders occa-
siona ll y (our. -
de nt th;ll nu great mi:. lorrune would
accrlle to them throllgh their railul'e
to ollt,y, T o the hJ.hir ot h;tl l-
in the execution of fi eld
orders whi c. h pl'e\;liled in 1947 a nd
1918. nt;IY be allrihuted o f the
Army's lac k o f
Politi cal inAuences also aJTei:lcd
the conduct of o perations. Follow-
ing the I!H7 campaig n,
the Army \\" ,l s forccd by potitical
pressure LO it'\ (orces to
proviue Pl"OtlX tion for \'a riou'i (owns
and \'illagl's, Thi :-i of the
in sla t ic h' -:urisons left tht'
gll crrilb rree to lOam ulllllol e.qcc\ .
Wht.'ll t il <: ,-\nll Y attC' lll pted to o rel er
into the field or to coni cntrale
the m fo r 1lI<t jor operations, plt)(eSlS
wel c made by political
rqJl'eo;e ntali vcs fro m the a reas fr om
whi l II thc pro tecti on was being
slri ppeel . Thesc pro tests calOe down
on the War and on several
occhiollS brought the ca ncell a tion
01 pl :H1ned opel'<Hi ons , The effect of
thi s upo n the cond uct o f the war can
scarcely be ovcr-I..'., li mated, The glllT
rill :h could ha\'e been eliminated by
continuous press ure, b ut thi s J.Jl"es-
sure could no t be exerted by troops
dispo\,tl ror stal ic cl erc- lIsc_ The
Army did not es<.:ape this predica-
me nt u nlil the N:ltional Ddl'nse
Corps was formed ,
Had a ,ak u la led risk wi th respect
to thc ci vil com1Jlunit y been ac-
ceplf"d whi.le Ihe /\nny went after
the b;' lldits, they could have been
1"1111 to earth very Illuch ea rlier . It
!l ignin' :1 nt ' that the NDC - formed
til free the Anny fr o m defensive
(111I; ('s , W;I " progressIvely re-
l it'ved fro m sit ch duties as soon as
Army o ffen sives retlul:ed the capa-
hilit ies o f the guerrill as, 111 effect,
the NDC beca me a 50,000 increase
in the of the Al'my_ Had
nrm milit ary direct ion over t he
Army bec ll esta bli shed at an e(l rlier
d:llc, th is illCl'e:lsc mi ght not ha ve
Iiccn rcquired.
shortcomings in
commanders and staff officers
An Army's most valuablc ".ssel is
Ihe p.-ofessiollal educati oll ut ilS uffi
cer corp.", T his asset, which is !l ub-
j<:n Hl diS!li p:uion jmt :15 ;m: the
ollier ,lsseLs IIf the .. \ JIII \, is the lIlost
dilfi<':lIit to recovcr. It i:t' a mallCt' not
of mon ths but of years.
The prolcssionat uffic'ers uf the
,>I' e-war pcriod were l10t numerOllS,
,\Ian ), of thclll ht'caruc Gts llalri es in
lht.' \\':I I"S wi th Jt ,tl y and
J\[,my good ollict.'J"s 1fl<Ide
un .. ncpl:1hle aftt'r Ille liiJel"alioll hc-
cause of their ass()ci:!tion with the
EL.\S for ces.
Most of (he remain ing offi c.ers ..... ere
Sf'p;lralet! i"rom thei r professioll .. nel
from the rt.'!ll>onsibilili elo of ('om-
lliand for more t han fOil I' ,cars.
Thll s the :\nn)' needed a of
time ( 0 reesuLlish o ffit.er corps.
This it was not gr;lIlled , The ,\rlll Y
was railed lIpon to tala ;' the fi eld
even before it W,IS fully orga ni7cd ,
Thl.'l"c WCI'C, rherdo,-e, ShOft COlllilios
. r
10 pro essional (Iualifi.c- alions a!llong
commanders and Staff offi ccrs whi l' h
tended to reduce the effc.:Clj\'CnesJi of
tht., ,\rlll Y in its earlit"!" Clp, ' ratioos,
These were manifest in .
recognition .1nd application of the
basic principles of war . For example,
the initi:ttive w:u sll"t',sed.
It was not a lways tha t
decisive results coul d be olHailied
onl ), by offcll 'i ivc :Inion, The prin-
ciple o f economy o f (orce rega rds
stalic garrisons was Ion).; 1I1.'),;"lectc-d.
The impo rlance of W:lfi not
always ap preciatcd. and reconnais-
sance and secur il Y measures were
ohen Slighted , The lactical ilHcgrity
of troop units was not always re-
spected and there were numerous
instances of piece'lIlealin){ of forces
in formati o ns whi ch had no adt'-
quale mechanism of contro l and no
recogn izable chain o f command,
. henl'(' no ("I)JIlInand
Adequate were not ail'oays
J1l;'tintained. Co-ordinJ.tion between
units {n.:t.jLlenlly left llHI(:h LO be d(,l-
sired. and were: somct imes per-
mitled t o drift into act ion withnul a
d ear-cut plan,
Less than optimum
in the use of military Staffs in exer-
cising the responsi bili ties of com,
mand. sometimC$ res ulted from in-
adequa te underSlanding o f naif
principles and A\'ail-
An army'. greale.. Que' - prQfe .. ionaUy compe,pn' officer.
able.., illtllli;;t'lic c wa:, nOl ll::.ed
in the preparation at plam. CUl1lhnt
informa ti on was 1I0 t a!\\'ays
both verticall y find
Comh:H orders \\' ('1'<.: sonu.: rillles
vague and indeflililc and $uhj r' c t to
multi p le inu.'rprela tioll . Finally,
.;taH offiCl 'ls we n ' ofH II col
l<llera l duti es or SlH:h !lallln; <h to
limit effect ivc performance o( their
primary dilli es.
In the fidd of ac..hnini., tLlti on, Ihe
rcspoll .... ihility of cCH11IlIa nd a, reo
gards comfort and welfare ol t he
individual sold ier nOt sufficientl y
stressed. There was a tenden cy 10
ll egleCl supply and mailllenance di s-
cipline.
The "will to fight"
A factor which contributed 10 the
ineffectiveness of the Army, along
with the slaw o( it , uaining and
defi cien cies in the proh::.sional quali
rlCations of its offi cer corps, in the
earli er effort , was the lack of a
slrong " will to figh!." This lack of
offellsive spirit, whi ch was com
pounded of lll<J ny clements, ff'{l
upon i tself. Pro longed 1;11 k of !o ut"
cess developed a sense of frus trnt ion
and (utility. The Army CHile 10
bel ieve that it W<lS clIgagcd in a
Sisyphc:J11 lask. The s:l mc opera lions
were repealed ag'ain and again, an d
t here was no elld in \ Vhat W<lS
the good of sacriflcin;..;' men and ef-
fon in a bold atlnck w sei ze fi n ob-
)(,fl ive, \\'hen it waS Lt'rla ill lhal the
o bjt,,-ctiw' wOl1ld ha\'e to he
ag;,in next mOllth or next
ycar? T his fceding 01 hopdc5S1lcs.s
reached its nndir whell thoughts of
\ lewr )" hy the early
S oC l hc I!Jl8 c lI lI!Ja igll, were
d:ls hcu LO the gTollncl by the gucr-
r illa defense of the Vit si area. An
othf'r yc<t r of \\, ;11' had passed and
t he end \ \'as Il() nearer, T he situa-
tion appeared no be tter than at th e
01 the campaign.
Thi5 IHalign<lm thing received
nouri shment from other
Among thcm was the lack of disci-
pl ill e. ' I 'he h;!hit of q uesti oninp;
ordrr<; , \\' bi ch \ ,': IS mClIlionrd c;lrli.C'f,
allcned the Army's confidence ill its
colllllland ;Hld leadership. .\ spi ri t
of indl'( i,ioll W<l S [O.Herl'd which
mi.lil'lled :tg-ai nst ;lclion. T o
take ion involves the ac
of ri sks .. \ miscalculation
01<1 )' '! t'Slilt en I;tilure ;lIU( ccnsure.
Since the handits seldom attacked
a large military fom1 3tiol1 , a com-
mander who tC1l11fhri/l'd redured hi s
chances of mak ing an rrror. The
ill:!cti on of a COUlInandt'r might have
tli sa!itl'ous clfens upon ;\ clmpflign,
but if there were 110 error" of com
on his pan, it ,,'as difficult
to pro('cell ag:-.imt him, Consequent.
Iy. lhe rOIllTll;ll1cic-r s S(lIil el ill1(,s
showed a tende ncy to wait lor the
guerrilla .... to ca ll the LUes, Failure to
take the initiati ve produced k;,lr of
the enemy's capabi lities and weak-
ened conlidence on the pan of the
.\nny as 10 it s own capabilili6. Thi s
lack of complur. selfconrldence led
the Arm}' to wavcr in its belief of
ultimat e vi ctory.
This wea kening of confidence in
ultimate vi ctor y was nOt confin ed to
the nnITow rlehl of military opcra-
h exte nded into the wider
field where tht! objcni,'c was the
of sccurilY and ceo
nomic wl' ll-bei ng for the people of
(;.I"('('(..e. Thl' had SII C
ce(' dcd in (Te:ui ng a silllalion ullder
IIhi( h the (;ove rnment's dlcnive
IIC,:o; S was IWlIlpered . If tl'le
wa, inl ;lpahle of consol idating:
such gains the Arll1)' might make,
why g'o on wit h it? \Vhy make fruit
less sacri li('es? Why nnt "pe,ace a t
:lny pri((''' now, inste;\C! of lat er?
The soldier who had less than
l confi dence in the ultimatc olltcome
had jl('r.mmd gTi('v:l HCCS \\'hich re-
duced his spirit. The origi.
n<ll call-ups wcn' of the
older c1a:s.ses who fought in the \\'ar
with h a!y. As there was I'or a long
lime no r('placement program, these
tllen had no prospect of relief-only
<l vis la of a sLJ ccession of military
until they Slopped a hul-
let or s lepped on a mine. Quite
apart from the soldier's feeling that
he was being call ed upon to risk
life and limh whil e younger men
watched frolll t he sidelines, was his
concern for hi s family. Many of these
older men were marr ied and their
pay was so low that their families
li ved on the verge of starvation.
Fina lly, there were some active
Communists in the Army and a
widespread tolerance o( varying de
grees oC Communi st ideologies. Eco-
nomic conditions in Greecc produced
many ci tizens. Commu
nist teachings, once driven under-
ground by Mecaxas, gained consid er-
aule currency during the occupation
and resis tance. Many so1diers and
even officers were mildly lolerant o(
Communist ideologies and possi bl y
even sympat hcLic toward the guer-
rilla COlUse. To evalunte this factor
one must recall that the issue be
tween Soviel ex pansioni st Commu-
nism and Democracy had not been
clearly defined. By gaining control
oC the movement duri ng
Worl d War II, the Communists had
ident ified themselves with the de-
(eme of Greece. Thus lhey had
King Paul visit s the frolll
ga ined ;h adhel{' \Ii' 1):lI,iIHic
Greeks. It wotl ld takt' tillle luI' Ihelll
to remglli.o,: the (h:, j' ::; cd SiUl.l li oll-
111 ;lt l he IlII 100Ign lought
lur Gl eere :lIul freedom, bUl fo r the
Kremlin a nd sl:wery.
The wcakt'lled
prodlll'l 01 Ihese llI any filt tors, mani-
rested i belr in in a dis-
incli n.atiull to COlile to real
with l he enemy. In t he soldi('r, il
l"CSult<:tI in lhe ttegc:nenllion of t he
baltle i n w a P"t) tl'actefl
fire lighl fi ()ll1 \\hi .1I till' ;;uerl ilia
was ahle to :11 wi ll. There
W;JS 110 leal eHon lo <"iOSt \,jth h ll11
lO secure hi, dnII IHlilJ1\ The ll et
result was incl cd .. i'e au ion.
The appointme nt of General Papagos
as Commander -in-Chief
Efforts made Ihe Britis h ilnd
Americall l\'f i",iolls prior to 19'19 lO
persuadc thl' Cflvernlll C' lll to g ive
the Arm)' :l fn'e I'ein in the ('ondu Cl
of operat ions, alit! to e rH"our;lge Ihe
Army to t ake more anion
were not 100 prO( h H." l iq:, It was not
un til lhe d,lI"k weeks or Ihe Vitsi
slalemale or 19-18. when na liooal
morale rtl'oI'Pc.'f..I to an " II-lime low.
thal the Co\'ernmenl took a subslan,
tial step 10 impl ove the si lUation,
I n Ocwht r. Primt' Mini ster Sopholl-
lis General Al exander Papngos
propoSII1.!{ Ih,1l ht" al'cept supreme
cOll1l l1<1011 or the C;rl'ek land forces.
Gener:!1 rilp:lgn..:, although hole.!-
ing a n honorary appointment in th e
Court. ""as in military relirement at
the t ime, IJrior to ,.vorl d W:)r II he
had been Chier o f the Armv Gene ra l
Sta ff, U pOIl Greece's in\' oln:IlIl'1I 1 in
(ha t WiI.r he iJCGll lle Comm"nder-in
Chief of the Army, In Ih is cap<l cil v
he had directed ,t he Ann y ill the wa'r
aga i nst hal y, The Gnman uuupa-
tion of Greece and his impri.sonmenl
ill GeI"l U,IIl )' dcpri ved t he gencnll.
until a hlter c.bte, o( a full
ul 101 lhi, :,e r vin.',
his Il, ililary re(JUla lioli
\\' <15 C':-tabl i"hed <lnd he ttnivel-
!:I .lily 1t::!:I penu.! as .. patriot.
Gencr<l l Pitpagos (JiLl not immedi-
:Jl el)' <lCl t'(H th\: GoVernlOelll 's pru-
posal. He I {"p li t,,, lkll he lOIIlt..! J o
,'0 only il t ('I 1:l ill wen;
;u'-- (cpted by the Govcrnment. TJlesc
includeu, <l IlIOtlg o the r
Ihill oS, Ih\.: e:'>ublishtllent 01 his juris.
tli . I i OIl as Commander-illCh ic! with
powC!!' to d irect o pelat io ll ), to dc( i(le
all jll ilLll ... ) pertai ni ng 1O milit<lr y
olg:a ll il:atinll <lIHI to post <I ud
officers, He \CIS 1O have the right to
!'l'("alt (0 a(livt: d ut y any l e t ired offi-
,'er. \\'Ill'IT,Ll 110 I'etired officers were
to be )"et:l) lIetl without h is ilpproval.
The Govt. n llilellt, a ller long (Ie \;le,
these provi!:los,
The iml ;t nn', whe re it i!:l possible
to pu t a flllg'er Oil le<l<i c l"ship and ils
va llie ill a crisi) are r<lre r lhan mili-
(<If)' hi Slu1 wou ld have us believe:
thl' role el the COlll lllander is oft en
e)(ag-ge raled . Hm P"p:lgos had quali-
hcalion ... h:hich wCI'e newed at this
time, H;i\' illg refuwd to accept the
pOSt ilS CO\l]mander-inChief unlil
far. re"c h ing commitments as to hi s
au thor ity had been lllaLie, he was in
a position to ex en " lil m d ireCli011
o n Ihe condUCt 01 mililary oper a-
tions, Such dil'enioll was needed at
this time to ex ploit fully the many
favorab le factors in the silllc1 ti o n
whi ch hOld been c rea ted by U. S. as-
sistance, Ihe falli ng out of T ito and
d,C Cominform, and ,he increasing
re<'og-niti o n o( t he true nature o f the
gll erri ll a wa r in Greece,
No dC\'c\oplllcm could h;we been
more fonuitous t han th e appoi nt-
me n I of Papagos. Improvemenls in
the e HeCLi'"l'IlC'Ss o f the Am\" ,,c,.'i"e
already lIudcf\\"'ly "lid the 'iJf',\; in,
ning's ol decisi\t, action were notilt' ,
,lllle, Huwl'vt:f. it ,," l/. P:qx lgus who
(oll,!ilit\;Ij( II and
Ihe Al"luy l(l the fmilion of iu po--
lellti a lities, Ht' tliscip lilll'
in Ihe . \1111 )" hy l il (' rClllm' :J i
or II11"Uilabl c: Offi !Tr" He strc,,<,d
' lni o ll <l ntl ordered Iht"
Grec k .\rillcd FOin' s illto :t 01
Idf<' Il :- ive opera ti ons h'hich d e priw'd
the guen ill .a ol the iniliati'l' and
afforded h illl no res l>il e. li e
the guerri lla .. 11 0 opponull it" 10 n'-
cr uit re pl acement s for
bailie ,asualties. h ut h:.nicti
unt il Ihey were driven f l"l)lI1 Clt:cce,
lJnt\<'J" Pap;lj.\o,", the \\ a\ !;!,al
":lnLzed illto "Cl ion . Its m:lOpowcr
\\' as not iucreased, ils trai nlng ",.is
lIot gre:lIl y improved <lnd ""Ol'i
no significa1l1 incre,lse in Cfl'l ip-
lIIent. The Army silllph m:lde
to do what it \\' as cap<lhk 01 lining.
and no more th;lll t his W,b then
needed to g .. in Ill(' "icw!")'. Seven
mont hs "rler the appoilllllll' lll of
P<lpagos as COlllmander-ill,Ch ief the
wa r was :-I t an cnd,
Contributions of U. S. and Britis h
Military Missions
the apl' "int' llf' llt fir
Pctp:t gos, lhe fllnflion, vi'
lhe U, S. and British Mil i tary
"ions came illlo their own <IS a 1U(';l ns
of the effu-il' lh Y 01 the
Arm)" T he missions provided <1
meclt;llli .,nl lJ y wh ich {all ib il'l tile:
Army tl o\\ 11 to di vision le, 'el could
be brought to the .. uellti on of the
Commallder-in,Chie f, a long wil h im
pania l .. <ivl(e and re n:lIIll1l'll(lati(lIh
{or illl prllvl' Il HlltS. The vallie of the
missions depended not onl y upon
their acccptnn("e but upon lhe :.hi l-
ity of the CCllIIIHi mlerinChie f to
implell,c llt lheir recommendat iollS.
Papagos had . p!"i or to his appoint
mf' nt, 'iought lO res l r in the intlul'JWC
of the mi ssions, Ho wC':ver. (ollowing
his :'ppoioilltem he (\"ery inui
ca tion o f nppreciating the V;dUl' o (
thell" services. Moreo\'er. unlike his
predecessors he was capable o f im-
plemenlil ' J{ lheir rec()llllTIC' lld:lt io ns.
His su(cess was Llue in no :\:nall part
to lhe manner in h' hi ch he accepted
the advice and rcnllnJlll'lld :l!ions
the U, S. and Briti sh Mission,\, a nd
m"de full use or the m,
'l'BE ANTI-BANDIT WAll.
By Col J.C. Hurray
PAll.T IV
the Anti-
By Col J. C. Murray
Synopsis:
The Ihree-year conflict had drawn Ollt sina 1946 with
Ihl! j!uerrilla.r, li/{hll)' equipped and unimpeded by lerri
lorial responsibility, holding the in i{intivt: .
. " s long as the guerillru lailored their tadics to the forces
Q7Ut arms at their disposal they held the whip-hand. But.
when established the "provision al Democratic Govt'm.
ment" and tried to hold grollnd to proteel their supply
Toul es the)' were doomed ',.0 failure.
In addition t o theiT tactical blunder, Ihe guerrill4S .re
u ived (Ina/her heary blow when Tit a split with the Comin
rj orm, and finally closed the Yugoslav border 10 guerrilla

III til e meantime, moving slowly, the Greek Govunment
had marshalled ilf f orces and wlt h mofulQ/ Old and military
'aivl ,r from the Un Ited Stal ef fi nd Bn/flln had finally budt
-tiP its forces to 265,000 well equ.ipped troops. Even so,
war d ragged on becau$t! tile Government f orces lacked
coJ,,:siveneu and their movements were mflrked by inded
a(lion.
Th en in 1949, General Alexander Papagos came ot/ t of
reti remen t to accept the post of supreme commander of
Cruk land ! orceJ. Seve n months after his appointment the
war wa..r at an end.
Bandit War
Part IV
DISPOSITION OF FORCES
THItll GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS
enter prominently into a
tion of the disposition of
These are the frontier. the
rains and the sea. The influence of
me sea and its importance as a
means of communication are dis,
cussed later. The frontier mav he
regarded as the source of the as
weU as the greatest aHy of the "Dem-
ocratic Army" in prolonging it. The
mountains. too, were an asset of in-
etimabie value to (he guerrilla!>.
Without them the war in Greece
could scan-ely have been sustained.
Fl'OIttier
Between the Dardanelle5 and the
head of the Adriatic the coastline of
Europe is either mountainous or a
narrow coastal pIain hacked by
mountains. There are few passes
through the mountains. and the
ports owe their importance to their
position near passes which connect
the hinterlands wilh the traffic lanes
or the Mediterranean. As land rOutts
leading to the Adriatic from Bul-
garia and southern Yugoslavia are
long and poor, these seek.
an ourlet to the nearby Aegean. By
lb possession of :\facedonia and
Western Thrace, Greece controls
these nawral (raffic routes, Conse-
quen[ly. Bulgaria and Yugmlavia
ha\'e al ..... cast en\ious eyes on the
ports of Salonika and Alexandtoup-
olis. on the of the Axim and
Strimon and the Gap.
The Soviet Union. (00, is inter-
ested in this area. The Sovietization
of the central Ballans would be of
greater value to the USSR if the
productivity of the region were fully
developed. and this would be aided
bv access to the
through the nearby Aegean ports.
important, however. bringing
this coastline within the Soviet fold
"would isolate Turkey from Europe
and male It easier for Russia to
achieve her ancient ambition of
gaining free access to the
ranean hy seiling the Dardanelles.
The present northern frontier of
Greece is a composite product of the
fin.t and second Balkan wars, the
Greco-Turkish 'war, \Vorld War J
and the subsequent treaties. It has
almost no desirable characteristics.
From an ethnological standpoint,
there are seeds of disrord in the
racial minorities srattered through-
Out the atea.
The weakness of the frontier from
an economic standpoint Jies in the
fan [hal Yugoslavia and Bulgaria
are interested in free access to the
Bulgaria in
lar seek." access to the Aegean coast,
'filitarily, the prewm frontier com-
pletely satisfies no one. Yugoslavia
and Bulgaria lend to regard the
coastal region to the south as. a
bridgehead of their Jones.
\\'as not Salonika used as .a base for
an expeditionary foree of ';00,000
during Wurld \\'ar f, and were not
plans made for irs for that pur"
po,e during World \Vat fI:
From the Handpoint of Ihe Greeks.
defense of the frontier co; ;t HCl"cuiem
wk., From the Adriatic lO the Turk
isb border the frontier
more than 700 milC$. If Creece's
eight wartime divisions were dis-
posed along the border, the average
divisional frontage would be
100 miles, But its length is only a
part of the problem" The trace of
the frontier, running from one end
to the other through a maze of moun
tains, has no defensive strength. To
the north lie other moun rains per
mitting defeme on successive post
lions. bur. the coastal plain to the
south affords no such possihilities.
Thus, the historic routes between
the Aegean and the central Ralhr. ..
which cross the {ronlier in the val
leys of the- Strimon and the Axio<i
and at lhe Monastir Gap. prejudice
defense of (he frontier from tht
south far more than from the north.
Long and defem-hely weak, lhe bor-
der is also inaccessible. Except near
the routes just named, it is remote
and communication with it is. almost
nonexistent. Orthodox military for,
mations cannot operate there and
mountain unit ... can move and be
supplied only with
An additional disadvantage to the
Greeks in defending the fromier ;s
that the eastward projection has no
depth" The sea coas[ lies only a few
miles from the fmntier, and in thi ..
region laleral ('ommunkatiom on
land are limited to one road and one
railroad, bOth \ uJnerahle to anad ...
Relations between Creece
an;J adiacent countries
Xorth of the frontier lie Albania,
Yugo)i;nia and R(l!garia.:111 of which
came under Communist nomination
following the withdrawal o ( the
German occupation forces. Relations
between these l'ounlries and Greece
were nOl harmonious following the
war. Buigarian troops holtl o("cupied
Gree(e eluring the war ami post
occupation feding was high. Com-
nl1l1li ns in all Ihrec s<ltclliles were
c'oOlrilllllillg to the unrest in Greec-e
in orner to expand the sphere of the
Cominform. In July HJ.!5 the Lhree
satellites simu ltaneously a
propaganda campaign dire("[ n i at
GreCl'e, The Yllgoslav Govermil cm
sent a strongly worded nOle 10 the
Greek Governmen t denouncing
imag inary violations of [he bo rder
and cruelti es to Slavs in Greece.
Shortl y thereafter. Alban ia presented
a si milar nOle relating LO the Chams
in [pirus .. thelie aniow. seemed
to indicale the or a plot
agaillSl the inlegril \' o r lhe [ronLier.
the Rightest press of Athens reo
5J>onded Wilh claims on the terri
tories 10 the north,
On July !1 the Yugosia,' alld .\1-
hanian C.U\-crnme nts formed a
of alliance, Communique .. j'Slied ;11
(he time indi cated (hal it w,,' cl i
rerled prirn;1riJ y again<iL lorc'("(t:' . . h
this agil;niou "'enl fnrw;u d
Lhe l' SS R, ;IS H propaganda 1l!()\'C, in-
ll"od w cd till ! Creek [)l"tJh!t:1l1 LO lhe
SeCUril\' COlliHil or t he l-uilCd Xa-
I ions l;y a C OI uplaint thaI
ill (;1 \'l'll' \I"('re ('I lliangerilll;
world !Je;l((". Foll owin),{ rC'icn;on of
pro1t"'L li 1(:" Ukra ni;.Ul \ Iini strr
01 FOH' il-:,l1 .. ,II.Iil ' (ol1'lplaillt"d In the
Securil\' COII II("iI in .-\ugust Ihat the
poli('Y 1111 ' Cl'cel<. (;o\"ernment haci
proolll . .:nl a ,ilu:uiol1 in t he Ralkam
which thn';ll {,llcd \\'orlri peace. In
Ihe to
Creeei' 'ITlll hnlne "(111 On
Decelllher (;n'('( took lhe inili:l'
ri"e ;11](1 n'qllc,Led the Sl'("lll'ity COIlII'
(il ((I inH'Lig.lLc rll t' !II;IHt'r of the
'lIpplill h ljlll-{ ]>IIJ\' iderl the C reek
lillll' the l.OIlIlCil
10l"Jllcd .1 10 III;!kc iHi
OIHlh"' IICl t inll"' l ig:llilill. In J'\O\TIII-
her HlI lg;l ri: I ;lI\d
(; lllert"d illlo ilil :dli :llll'e \1 ili('h w;u
follm,vd a .)i1l1i l;! )' trealY hl'",een
nul:': :l1 i;1 ;llld ,\Ibania.
TIlt" Jilin 1\"(::1"C t.hen rlc:n' Jy dr<ll rn,
:1 11<1 \"hen the b;lndit s on 21 De("ell1,
Ger 1017 :lllnOllnCt'd :'I "Gon: rI11llt:Tlt
of Fn( CI C' c{e," tht, an nounrt' lOent
was 'I' i th en t hllSi :l"m in AI
hani;\ . ;lml TIIII:,::t ria. <l nr!
MI,. .. : ,Iae IoMl road &caJ dangerow
i\;l tiomti COlllmiuers rl Jr Aid lO t he
Cred:. People were (ol"luetl. :\rt,;ttl
whi le. the Uni ted Nali ons
)i oll h<lri reponed l haL ' Yugos!:nj;)
:lnd, LO a k sst'r extem, Albani " ;111 ([
Blli gari a have supported (he glleI '
l'ill ,1 w:lrrure ill Gre('ce."
The Mountains
Greece is composed of mountains
with small, inl errn oll-
l ane valleys, The Pindu'lli
oaend southeastward rrom the AI
l w tian border 160 mi le<; to lhe GuH
of Korin t h, A southw:!ni ex tensi on
rises in the Peloponnese. The range
in width from 10 l O fiO
lLS maximum hC' igtll is 7,50() fn ' L
;Illd it mmliulles ;1 nC:lrly perfect
barri cr to CCtst-wC's t ("ommllnic:lI ioll
the ,-\lbani :m horder awl
the Gulf of Kori mh. Pa<;..<;,
how('vt"1". the haTTit"T in nnnh
celllTal CrC-I'I 't' :11 :tn elC'\-at ioli of
a ho lll 5.000 reel. Ground Hl O\'emenl
:lnY\"here i n Iht, Pilldm limi ted b,
de-cp, n:lITO\I' h:,\"ing- fe\\'
Hood pi aim.
,-\nnLhl' l" mOIl!1t:1ill \fOUllt,
V crm i (J 11 - 01 ylll I' ll' -- Pel inn,
a ;)rc a long- the
lI'nLern Ilr the ACg"e;ln of
Salnnib. Tt I"('at illLinn at its
wnt h el n e-x l n 'l nit y to join with the
Pindm r; lIlg l' o f Thessal y
Pbill . A wil le pla Te' all thi s
with the Pindus north of !he same
plaill.
A lo ng- lhe nonhern CoaST o rhe
Aegea n, the Rhodope Mountains
from Bulgaria illto eastern
'\ facedonla ann Thracc, ,.vh ile not
hi gh as lhe Pillt)us thi s range, too,
I , and rugged.
HecallSe of t bese mount ains and
ot her'S o{ Jesser signi fi cance. move
mel1 t ill Gree("e is channeli led alo ng
the fcw roules rollowing lhe p"sse.\
which connect the intermontane val-
leys, Elsewhere, particularly i n the
grc;tt areas can be reached
only on 'fnot or by mule.
for m:lliollS (annot ojlerate in these
;mn Lhey h:\ve tr<ldilionallv
enjoyed freedom from
(he pol ice po wer of the various gov,
h:l vc c:ontrolled thc'
t erritory t h roughou l i,,. compli catcd
hi:. (o r\. \ t a n y o f (hcs:e h a\'C'
heell ;1'\'11 for f.;cl H'ra ti nns hy banrli c,
a<; 01'<'1 :I ting :1110
Guerrilla dispositions
The fir st ;Jetivity of th(' bands wa"
nlllfil1<.: d l() the nonherrl
hordel', Here fli t h'111ds enj oyed ;,
t:H"l i('a i such as iii rare!y
g- i\ 'l'n to ;'\ny beJlig-crelll. could
Hill he dl'ci"i i\'c1y eng-agc(!. Wher.
evc,' tht' }' h"cre hard prelised, the),
... impl y wilhdr(:w across the
"urn lit "'as stopped hy the hordtlr
guards nf IIlot' satellites while the
guerrillas p,"epan:d to reappeal' a t a
new point, or at rhe sallie poim tlfter
the Governmcnt forces had with-
dra ..... n . This unnculral t.:ontluct on
the pan of thc lIeighuol"ing COUll-
tries was one of (he poi nts that the
Greeks complained ahollt ill their
petition to the Uni ted Nations.
The case of the Greek GO\"I.:rn-
ment in estahl ishing th('se LKt ... hI'.
fore the Pnited Nations IUC,iU-
diced hy a Communist propaganda
ca mpaign designed to create the iIll-
preSSion that unrest in Gn:en:: W;IS
not tOnfined (Q the lIorder an:,IS hut
spread over all Greece. This neatl"tl
an impression that the war had a
widespread (haracter which was
scarcely consistent wilh tht' faus.
Meanwhilc the ComnnllJists pene-
lraled into south amI <.:e lll,, t! Greece
in order to stir tip opposi ti on to the
c.o,erll111ent in order ( 0 leud sup
pon to their propagant';t tampaign.
The Pindlu Iletwel'n \Iet-
wvan and the Gulf uJ Korinth and
the range hetween \'ennioll and
Pelion pro,ided perhaps a dozen
areas sui table for gllen'iJ la vpeya-
I ions. IThe,. were pWl('ned' by lh('ir
From them it was
possible within a few hums 1(1 raid
vi!lages on the p!':tins and har:lss the
roads winding- the narrow
valleys, i\lo\,(!llIent from onc arca t.u
another was compal':tlin:ly ea.;;,, par-
ti cularly at night. 1 !Jcse <Ire,,:>, \\Tn:
organil.ed il:o. b;lSCS 01 openlliolls. hut
the bands were [lot ("olllmiu(.'d 10
their defense. rhe) [ollowl'I.l gllcr
t'ill a lanirs here. JIlo\'ing frotll area
LO area 10 avoid hong (,llgaged.
The estahlishment of concentra-
lions in snmll and cellu:ti Gn:ece
involved an adt li cional ("()lnmi lmCllt
on lhe jliJrt of the guerri lla h igh
commiuld .. \ lille ot comnltlnicOl li ons
by wllich !oupplies could be for-
wanlt:d LO concentrations was
essential. As the Government forces
w ntroJled the established routes, the
Pindus rall g<: was used lor this p ur-
p{)se. An ar'i'a of tht northern Pin,
lIus had to be secured to prOtecl lht'
point ;H \\ hich supplits could be
moved frot ll .\I bania or Yugos lavia
into Greeu [or fonvarding via lhe
Pindus rOLHl:. To meet this require-
mem the thcm-
ielves to tht deftoll e of the base areas
l( Grammos nnd Vi tsi. Although
tlternal(;s til the Pindus route were
;ometimes used, this decision re-
mained a ke),w)ne of their stralegy
until the tnd of the war.
'Vhcn the base areas were threat-
e]leri the guenillas redoubled their
harassing attacks elsewhere lO divert
Government forces from that front.
During the I the great-
e'i t e.ffort was Illade in lhe Pelopon-
nest' when' there had been little
previous ani\i ty. BeclUse few Gov-
ernment troops werc in that area t he
\,ere very successful. 'Vhen
lhe Army delayed sending rein(orn:-
lllelll.S !oevcLd dt:J'JU licli fro III th e
Pdopollllese withdrew from lhe
GO"l'rlll1lellt. Thl' policy of non-
reillfolTtlllellt waS followed. ho,",,'-
t' el, until the swlcm .. tlc in "iLsi be-
(";1111<: winter.IJolilul. wllt:n an o\'er
wht:!ming rOnT [Q lhe Pdo-
\lnllllc.'ie. The gutlrillas had grown
by that (ime 10 a strength of ='.500,
hut (iwir was unfavor-
able. The naval patrol in til t Gull
of Korillll! pn:vclIlr.:d their escape to
the lll tli nialld and the guenilltls i n
lhe l'c!oponllese were Iiquit.iated in
early 1949.
The of concentra-
tions in sOUlh and central Greece
;lnd lhe iJase: areai in the northern
Pilldus did not 1I1edn that the other
.lrr.:as along the northern fronlicr
wert iI1:.. niv;ued. On Lh e contrary,
perhaps six mountain regions adja-
cent lO Yugoslav ia and Bulgaria
were 11SI.:d intCl"mittelltly as operat-
ing lJaM:s. ;Iml approximatel y one
fihh o f the total guerrilla stre nglh
was disposed there A gn;<lL ,H.lvall-
tagr.: enjQ)'l!d by lhe guerrillas oper-
;Jling in j\raCt:uonia aMi Thrace was
their 'lbility to mO\'e from are<l. to
area ullder cO\er uf lhe frontier.
YlIgosla\"ia ()(:cupied a cemral posi-
tion in this cover ed rOUte uf com-
Illunicalions. The Tiro-Cominform
rift, then'fore. with the resultant
dU10ure of the border, was a serious
blow as regards the disposilion of
die guerrillas.
In the 1948 campaign the guer-
rillas were able to oppose (heir main
strenglh 10 the Army first. in the
Gralllnlos a nti subsequently in the
Vitsi region. In 1949, through occu-
pying bOlh areas simultaneously they
allowed their forr.:es to be split. The
Army conducted iu rom:e ntration so
that the guerrill as were unable to
determine where the main effort was
lU be made. Follov,,jng a holding
<l.[(ack in Grammos the attack
delivered in Vitsi. The operation
was compleled so (Iuidd y that no
reinforcement \ClS possible. Thc
Vil'ii force Wit S so disorganized and
demoralized Ihm it was unable to
reinforce th e Gra11l 1110S position,
The guerri ll as had mmmiued the
[rllal error of allo\\ing their forces
1(1 lie divided. They had perhaps
.I uticipated Lhat they wou ld he able
10 shi ft {orccs frOll! oll e area to the
oUler a.,' Lhe y had in 191tL Their ill
ahili ty to do so tOlllribllled lO th t ir
dcIe<ll.
Di spos itions of the Army
As of 1911' tht.: .\nllY was org..lLI -
i1.cd inlo all Army Command and
l \\'0 The [ouller was loc:l ted
at Volos: lhe latter a t and
Saloni ka respecl ively . .'\l this time
-..
01 .....
-
-
- --,..;..---
- .Ic i .
w, sr.
(our divi ions and twO
btil,rade1 assi gned to one corps were
in l ' hcss., ly. Epmu and
cent ral 1\f;-.t"C'donia. Three di\'isi ol1s
ami independent brigade as
signed to the other corps wen:
InCHed in CJ.J(cm Murcdolli.J. :wd
Thratt. tl nd fou r bri-
gades Wt l e diJposr<i' in sOUlhcrn
reece and 1h(l Prlop(ll1nesc. Subse
qucnuy a third corps \\b 3Ctivatcd
The nsignmcnl ot (:0"P-' :m.:ali and
the disposition o( troops .... ari ed
thcre:tr,CI' ill an:ordallcc with opera-
requirements.
Greece has (hrcl: major lilles of
land c:ollllllunic3ri ons. One parallels
the Pind", n Hlge on the west 10 con
neet the: Gulf o( Korinth with the
Al batl ian border. A second. passing
bt:lween the Pi nLius and fhe
Pdion T;'luge, conncel llib with
SaJonika, the Monaslir Gap and (he
si ngle li ne or e:" sl-\ ... rnmmunica-
D
lions. The lhird folluws the nort..h
:o hore of (he Aegean p:ua llcling the
northern fronti er. T he major ity or
the towns are SilUaLed on ur lIear
these three routes. 'Vilh l.he guer-
exerc- ising a prcQrious but
tenacious conlfol over the mount.ain
;1fC:as of tbe Pindus range. the
ermion-Pelion range and along Ute
nonhern borders of Macedonia and
Thr:lce. Ihe5c routes and Ihe towm
'Kauered along them were eXlremely




vulnerabL From operaling bases in
the moun Ii_ins the guerrillas could
readily to harass them at
any pOilU. The war, therefore, de-
veloped as a war without a fixed
irOnto
Early efforts to arrest guerrilla
activity LOok the form of putting om
fires. That is, the Army responded
to allacks by counter-attaeks which
came lOa late, by pursuits which
were too leisurely to maintain con-
tact, and by local searching opera-
liollS. Uncoordinated reactions of
this lype accomplished lillie as the
guerrinas attached no importance to
any particular area. ''''hen attack.ed
in one area they moved to another,
sometimes ollly to relllril to the first
as soon <IS the Government (orces
had withdrawn.
By April 1947 a major co-ordi-
nated deilnng operation was laid
on. Jt was designed to drive the ban.
dits from the Gulf of Korinth nonh.
ward to the frontier after ..... hich the
fronlier was to be sealed. This effon
failed through bad liming, poor co-
ordination and lack of aggressive.
ness. During its course the guerrillas
became a(:li"e that the Army was
forced to cancel plans for a winter
campaign and look to the protection
of the civil community and its lines
of communication. For [his purpose
troop unilS were dispersed widely.
Had troop units so dispersed been
employed in local clearing opera
tions in accordance with a co-ordi
nared plan, it might have been as
dteClive as a general clearing opera-
tion. But co-ordi nation was Jacking
and the troops in place of engaging
in aClive opera Lions established Slatic
defenses of towns aud awaited devel-
opments. This. of course, did nOt
seriously interfere with the guerrilla
program as there could never be
enough LTOOpS to defend all areas by
such passive efforts.
the guerrilla m;aimained the ini(ia-
tive. This Hcated a demand for
more defensive forces and prevented
the concentration of Army troops for
operations until the National De
fense Corps had been formed.
Through the organization of the
National Defense Corps the Army
was able to concentrate enough
lroops to undertake another major
clearing operation. As the extent
and importance of sa tellite aid to
the guerrillas was recognized. the
U. S. Aill: 4,000 mule, came late,.
idea of first seizi ng the northern
border and thus isolating the guer
rillas from their sources of supplies
and replacements must have been
considered, However, the concentra-
tion of the major portion of the
Army in nonhern Greece would
have exposed sOlllhern and ce ntral
Crt'eee dangerousl y_ Moreover, once
the frontier had been seized il must
be garrisoned a nd troops so em-
ployed would nOt have been avail-
able for the subsequent clearing
operations. Once again the opera-
tlon was de:ooigned to proceed from
south to lIorth.
The operation wem well initially
and the guerr illas ..... ere driven back
upon their lines of communication
until they reached the Crammos
area. Here a front ..... as established.
\Vhe n it was broken they retired to
the Vicsi area where anolher front
was established. The Army could
not drive the bandits from this posi.
tion and the frollt a srale
mate. \tfeanwhile the guerrillas, hav-
ing filtered through the Army lines.
resumed operations in sOllth and
central Greece. particuJady in t.he
Peloponnese, This required the
Army to redispose its forces to mop
up its rear before ' it could resume
operations on the fronL Three divi.
sions were left to contain the guerril.
las in the base areas. Guerrilla activi-
ty elsewhere prevented the reconcen
tralion of the Army on this front for
several months. A third south to
north swe.cp brought the main
strength of the Army against the
main area of Vitsi and Grammos in
August 1949. The ensuing ballie. in
which lhe Army's only disadvantage
was the defensibility of the terrain,
lasted only a lew days.
Olll-jllg these operations the dis-
positions of the Army afforded it
excellent communications. Its troops
and supplit's moved free I,. between
(he located ports of
Perllesa. The advantage accruing to
Piraeus. Volos. Corinth, Palras and
the Army through Government con
trol of the sea was matched by it!i
conlro! of land communi,;a tiolls be
(Ween [he ports a nd major in-
land bases at L:uisa. Kosani
loannina and such forward bast:s as
FIOf'ina and Argos Orcstikan. The
Army, therefore. enjoyed a high de-
gree of Rexibility. It could
concenu'ate and support brgc forces
in almost any area in Greece. pro-
vided the guerrillas did not stir up
too much (rouble elsewhere.
Comparison of dispositions
and summary
Owing to the disposition of forces
factor the guerrilla had the advant
age of good terrain (or e \'asion and
fol' defense. The northern frontier.
behind which he was able to condll('t
all manner of military activity in
areas denied lO the Army. \lias a par
ticular advantage. This was (<tncd
Jed in part by Yugoslavia's decreas
ing support following [ht: Tito-
COlninform split. Outside the north-
ern bases areas. where tbc Army con
trolled the routes of communication
and the guerrillas operated from
adjacent and inter \'ening l1louruaill
areas. the war developed as a war
without a fronl. Here the Army' s
control of communications gave it
stratcgic f1cxibility and taClical
i ng power. \ 'Vhc!lever Anny forces
ventured off the established routes,
as they to engage the guerrilla,
rhey fonnd the terrain (he greatest
obstacle. The guerrilla had superior
observation, the ability to execute
rapid tactical movements and the
ubility to interpose terrain obstacles
between himself and the Govern-
ment forces.
The guerrillas' control of com-
munications outside the base areas
was of a low order. This inAuenced
adversely his ability to concentratt
forces and to supply them, par.
ticulad), during a protracted engage
men t. This disadvantage was mini-
mal so long as the "Democrati c
Army" conducted guerrilla-type op
erations using small bands. Jt grew
in significance as the bands formed
inlo banal ions. brigades and divi
sions.
SUPPLY AND EVACUATION
The "Democratic Army"
General
The supply si tuation of the
"Democratic Army" HI;}Y bf dcscril.lf'd
in terms of oV('rall availability of
'illpplies and their distribution. The
twO were cloi'dy interrelated .
The guerrillas were supported by
foreign aid, hut not all supplies were
imponed. In fact, the quantities of
supplies ;lIld equipment involl, .... ed
were relatively small, hut rhi s small
quantity of sllpplies was still essen-
(ial to lhe conti nuance of Ihe guer-
rilla movement in Greece.
Requirements
The l'. S. soldier uses each da), of
(,()Illbat pounds of supplies, in-
( Iud ing: 6 pounds of 1'3 lioIlS, 6
pounds of eq uipment, 5 pounds of
fuel and oil and 20 pounds o[ am-
munition. Had the guerrillas used
supplies on a comparable: basis their
25,000 men would have needed a
million pounds ()I' four hundred 2V2-
ton truckloads daily. Needless 10
say, they did not use supplies on this
scale.
The a\'erage guerrilla was inured
10 hardship. His need's were lew.
He was sa ri sfied with a diet of bread,
milk, cheese, lamb and goat. Such
items as salt, sugar, mffe.c and tobac-
co \\'e.re difficult to come hy and were
sometimes missing. His equipment
compri sed boats, dothing, a blanket,
a knife or baronet and a firearm.
Medical supplies, while negligible on
a pro rala basis. didl in the aggregate
(ol1$l ilUte a signifir:al1l quamity. The
amJIIllnilion carrif'd on the indi-
vidual was 20 to 30 rounds, while
200300 ",'e,"C carried (or machine
guns. Owing to this low initial
allowa nce and the difficully of eC-
(e<"ling r6upply in combat, ammuni
li oll wa!i used sparingly. The mine!
hO'i'l' cver, was used extensively.
In consi dning ammunition rt
quiremellls, a distinction must be
madc between troops operating with
in the defended base areas and those
operating t'lsewhere. The nllmb!!r
of artillery, AT and AA guns and
hea\')' mortars in the former areas in-
creased requirements there. Omil
ting this special case, the daily reo
suppl y for the average guerrilla did
not exceed fi ve pounds m:tde up as
ollo\\'s: l'alions- 3 pounds, equip-
ment-I pound and ammunition-
I pound, a total of 5 pounds.
Sources of supply
As regards sources of supply, a
distinction must be made again be-
[ween guerrillas operating in south
and c.entral Greece and those operat-
ing in I he region of the northern
frontier, particularly within the dc
fended base areas. Guerrillas sca t
tered over thousands of square mile),
in the former areas were ahle co
procure a high proportion of sup-
plies locally. Virtually all rations
were so ohtained. Foodstuffs were
procured by requisition upon peas-
ants living within bandit-controlle.d
an'as. In addition, raids were madt:
III)on towns and to obtai n
food, and it was common practice for
the g'tlcrrillas to drive off flocks of
and goats for later consump'
lion. Other sources were raills upon
.. tores of lhe Army and Gendarmerie.
and Communist supporters in the
larger towns sometimes sent food to
the hills_ Difficulties in geuing such
supplies pasl the authorities pre
vented the last named becoming a
ma jor source.
Other supplies, 100, could he oh.
lained loca lly. Clothing. weapom
and a mmunit ion in sig nifi ca nt
quantities were secured by raids on
Arroy and Gendarmerie stores, but
a more lucrati ve source was the
armed civilians who frequentl y sur
rendered their weapons when COn
fronted by strong opposi tion. Arms
and ammunition were sometimes
taken in hattI e, and on occasion de
serters from the Army carried their
arms over to the guerrillas. 1 n addi -
tion. wag in supply
discipline and often leCt ammunition
sc,lltet'ed over positions.
Local procuremen t. however, did
not satisfy handit requ irenlen ts for
equipment and ammuniti on. The
major portion ()f items and
clothing came from the sa tellites.
Transportation was by mule trains
sent norlh by thc hands to pick up
their supplies. The most commonly
used suppl y routes followed the
Pj ndus rnnge. However, the Ver-
mion-Pelion range was used 10 some
exten t, and efforts were sometimes
made to use other areas such as
MOll rgana wes t of the Pindus.


Terrnin: the Guerrilla'. greate.1 a .. et
Alter Ihree yel,,. 01 fighling-a return to rwrmlllcy
The requirement lor transpori
probably varied between one and
two pounds per day for each guer-
rilla opera liDg in and central
Greece. This stems insignifical1l, but
neither the supplies nor their quanti
ty were insignificant. Without these
supplies, which could not be ob
tained locally, the guerrillas could
not function etlectively. They were
vital, therefore, to guerrilla opera
tions.
Fi ve thousand guerriHas ill' sou th
and central Greece would have used
50 to 100 animal loads dail)'. Taking
120 lililes as the distallce
from the base <l re<ls to the users, the
lurn around lime was in the neigh
horhood of two Thus. 700 to
1400 animals would have heen em,
ployed constantly in this traffic. even
il no allowallcc is made (or in
transit. These wel'e allllillly quitl-
high. J"'ulc trains were intercepted
frequently by rhe Air Force or Arm)'
units and damilged or destroyed.
The problems involved in organ
i/ing the J'Uulillg and protection of
the suppl)' trains mm'ing between
Ih<: base areas and the bands in cen
tral and s()ulhern Greece were many.
They were greatcst when the Arnly
",,'as active. During such times the
bandits were expc,\ding more sup
plies than normally. They were
forced to aballdon Slores which cou ld
not be carried. Tht:)' were unahle to
requis.ition supplies tn arcas lhrough
which thc)' might p:lssing. as thi s
took. lime and provided information
to the Army. Similarly raids upon
(Owns or Army Slores were imprac-
ticable. Finally. the mule trains
from lhe north had greater dilliculty
in getting through. and nOt infre
lJuently the L<lllds were unable to
keep their rendelvous with such
trains. On top o thi!), greater num
bers o( c<lsuahies required eV<tl'wltion
to the nonh. On many occasions,
bands expcri(:nced local and tempo-
rary slwnages or supply due to (hc,;(;
factors. Dilring lhe 1949 campaign.
however, lhe operations of the .\ rm)'
so reduced the cffectiveuess or the
guerrilla supply s)'stem as to render
it incapable o( meeting the mini-
mum of the bands in soulll
and central Greece.
FOI' the hands operating near lhe
nonhern frontier the patlcrn of the:
supply operation was differenl. In
Macedonia and Thrace-rich agri-
(ultur<ll Jami..-th>: procurement of
fo<Xlstutb. was no problem. Other
da'-Sts of !lupply could be distributed
so easily (rom the border that the
dependelKe of the guerrillas upon
local procurement Was reduced, A
greater proportion of clothing, arms
and ammunition came from the
ate1lites than was the ca5E: in south
and central Greece.
In the defended bases 01 Vil.!ii and
GrammO$ the guerrilla$ exercised
complete control and aU rC$Ources of
the region were at their disposal.
There J, linle agriculture in these
areas lhough, and as the demitv of
troops \\;as high not all rations
be procured .. locally. Likewise, there
were few local li()urces of anns, am-
munition and clothing.
1)' the support of 10,000 guerrillas in
the base areas might ha\ie required
as much as 50,000 pounds of sup'
plies daih:, but delivery and distribu-
tion wert comparalh"ely easy.
As the pro\'ision ot .soup-
plies the satellites was iUegal, it
was conducted clandestinel" outside
the base areas where traim
the border under the cm'er
of darkness and at remote points
alcng the fromier. The bulk of the
supplies, however. crossed the fron
tier on the routes coyered bv the
"itii and Grammos positions. Roads
leading from Yugoslavia and Albania
intQ these areas could accommodate
not onJy animals but cans and motor
yehides, and, since were pro-
tenet! b,' the fortified areas ;outh or
the bonier. the bandits enjoyed great
freedom in [heir
The receipt, storage and
i
distribu*
tion of supplies for 10,000 bandits
whhin the base areas and the for-
wardi':g of supplies for 5,000 bandiu
in routh and central Greece resulted
in the acculHuialioQ of various
logistical activities in the areas.
Located there was the Director of
the Central Ordnance of General
Headquarters. There were exlmh'e
food depots where the food was
stored in houses on the oU15k.irts of
,-ill ages. Ammunition was stored in
the open on the slopes of hiHs on
both sides of roads where it was
acceiSible. Among {he logisti-
cal installations were (ailor shops,
shoemaker shops. armories. saddlen.
a base post office and a hospital.
Other ;05raiJations included an Offi
een'school, two training camps with
a capatit) o{ 300 men each and a
camp for prisoners of war.
Sahllli'" .iII
Vinually all hospital facilities in
the routhern pan of the satellites
were filled habitually with bandi{
wounded. Many camps were main-
tained {or refugees from Greece. At
!iOme of them rebel 6ghten were
trained and with amu
prior LO their departure for Greece.
Not too much is kno,m concc:nting
the me<:hanism through which aid
"'-as provided. It is hud to deter-
mine what roles the governmenlS
played in this program or how much
was done by the "iodeties of
a nee to the Greek people." \"here
Communism had only just emerged
from a fe"oJutionary movement 10
become the Government. the line
between official and quasi-0f6cial ac-
tivity is indistinct. Non-military sup-
plies may have been colle<:ted and
moved (0 the frontier by [he several
"committees for aWSlance to the
Greek.s," but certainly an lOCieties of
this nature ",,ere Government-spon-
5Ored. Purely military su ppJin. in
all probabiHty '\\'ere provided direct-
[he
Th. Tito-Cominform rift
Yugoslavia occupied a key pmi*
lion in the provision a[ foreign aid
'0 <he Greek guerrilla>, It had
pivotal position geographically. Bul-
garia was remOle from the area of
greatest guerrilla activity. Yugoslavla
Jay between Albania and Bulgaria.
than that It completely .ur-
rounded Albania 50 that the latter
had no access to the USSR or other
satellites except via Yugoslav terri
tory.
As the Gramm()$ area was adjacent
to Albania, supplin moved to Greece
through <his area h.d to paM through
Albania. but this does not mean they
had their WUKe there. On the con-
trary, the gtea[er pan came from
YugO!iavia. The Vitti position could
be reached from either Albania or
Yugoslavia. Prior to January 1949
[he bulk. of supplies, entering Vitsi
came from Yugoslavia. During the
month of January, however, suppliet
from Yugosla"ia declined to atmost
nothing and virtually aU supplies reo
ceivcd after that date came from
Albania. This and the low levels in
certain dasses of supplin found it,
the Viui and Grammos p(nltions after
[he col1apse of [he guerriJb. defenll
SUggeslS (hal the Tit<t-CominroTl
rift so affected the supply
or the "Democratic Anny" tJ'at
was. by Ihe spring of 1949, no long.
capable of carrying on operation .. 0
the scale of 1947 and 1948. Inti ....
this may have been the proximal
cawe of the guerrilla colla!"",
TIl. CneIt N.HotuI A"",
Supplies and were pm
vided the National Army 011 du
basis of authorized tables of equip
ment. These tables provided fe\\
luxuries and were in some cases to(
spare. The British had been unabh
to meet all requirements. but thr
m()$[ essential combat supplies ant"
equipment had been provided. Wid
U. S_ aid [he Army WlU completeh
equipped by the middle 01 194.
Thereaher procurement wudesigu(t:
<0 k .. p it so equipped and supplied
and to meet the requirements
by increatel in the forces or in thel
.llo .... nce&. Supply shortages pro!',.
bly never aeriously affected the com
bat efficiency of the Anny_ If so, rt
was in any case fully equipped anti
supplied according 10 the acceplt:d
standards by the middle of t9-lt'l
Thereafter there ..... ere no !ignificalll
shortages.
As regards the distribution of &UI"
plies, <he Army had been h.nd;
capped prior to the inception of the
U, S, aid program by shor<g'!!'" in
motor transport. \Vhen these
shortages "'-ere made up it ""as dh,
CQ,-ered that too much reliance had
been placed upon motOTJ and that
there was a greater Tequiremen t for
animal transpon, one U. S. mission
in the organization and
training of animal transport and in
<he 'umm .... of 1948 placed orden for
mules. In June 1949 all infan
try battalions were placed on the
mountain unit establishment and
all \'ehidn were withdrawn to the
brigade mOlor transport platoon,
Supplementing the animals organic
to the units. 12 mule tranlport com'
pania were organized. While these
changH in the organization of trans-
port increaSC'd the flexibility of tht,
Arm) in its anti-guerrilla warfare, it
would scarcely be neceuary to take
the view that the Anny had previous
ly been handicapped in iu oper.
dons by inadequate meana for the
transportation and distribution o{
supplies.
1'BE ANTI-BANDIT WAR
By Col J.C. Murray
PART V
By Col J. C. Murray
the Anti
ConcluaioD
AIR FORCES
ON 10 AUCUST 1949 THE AIu.cy
launched i15 long-awaited attack in
the Vi lSi area. From the 6ru, light
aircraft were over the area searching
for, and attacking targelS in assisting
the ground advance. By nightfall
169 sorties had been flown, higher by
63 than any other day in the waf
The average daily sortie rate during
the five days of the VilSi operation
was 126.
Again on 24 August, when the
Army started the Jast large-scale at-
tack of the war in the Mt. Grammos
area, air was active. Following a day
o[ sustained air operations by Spit-
fires and C47 convened bomben.
the newly fanned Helldiver (SB2C)
Squadron, flying an JS-plane forma-
tion, made its debut in combat.
During the period 24 to 29 August,
planes supported the Grammos at-
tack with 826 sorties. During the
six-day period perhaps 250 tons of
bombs, rockets and napalm were de-
Jivered against the guerrillas.
The victory in Vi lsi was a result of
{he effectiveness of artillery and air
support and to a piece of unex-
peCted luck in the unopposed occu-
pation of a key terrain fearure by a
group of CommandOs. The partici-
pation of air in the Grammos battle
was no le:s.s effective. While the:se
two inStance!/. are not representative
of the air effort throughout the anti-
bandit war, they do afford at one
time it useful measure of what was
aa:omplished and an indication of
what might have been accomplished.
Air i pport of ..... "" toKes
It is a truism today thal successful
ground operations cannol be con-
ducted without air superiority. But
air superiority alone merely frees
ground forces from the eilects of
enemy air action. This favorable
:here a new Grttk Air Force came
into being. The Hellenic Bomber
Squadron was employed, as a part
of the RAl'. primarily in long range
patrols in the Mediterranean. The
Greek Air Force was not prepared
by its wartime experience for its role
in the anti-guerrilla war.
Until late 1946 operational con-
trol of the Greek Air Force remained
under the RAF. while
tive control was exercised by the
Greek Air Staff, When it became
necessary to employ the Air Force
goi.... the bandits, the RAF "'lin-
au1 program was instituted,
Pattem of lir Ictioft
By this time the pattern of air
actioo was developing. Air opera-
tions against the guerrillas were of
two general types. The tint con-
sh.ted of air operations aimed at
"isolation of the battlefield."
ever. an Greece was a batrlefield and
the objective of such operations was
simply the destruction of guerrilla
forces. The $e(:ond type of air action
was direct support of ground troops .
Three techniques were employed
Bandit War
The defeat of the guerrillas w ......... de pouihle by
their departure from proper guerrilla organization,
and by 80 doing, they opposed weakness to 8tre"lrtb
condition can be exploited tully
only II the air has ,be capability 01
eflecti,,'ely supporting the ground
forces. No one questions the neces-
aity of achieving air superiority nor
the value of interdiction. However,
at such time, when aircraft can be
employed most effectively in the di
rect support. there must be an effec-
tive technique for the delivery of
such support,
In Greece the infantryman paid
the forfeit for past neglect of the
dO:St: support problem. There was
no aerial war, Control of the air was
achieved by defaulL The primary-
indeed the: only task of the Royal
HeHenic Air Force-was the attack
of ground targets either independ
entlyor in conjunction \'toith gr9und
units. While: independent attacks
were of great value. there were many
occasions when aircraft could have
been employed most ad .... antageously
in direct support of ground troops.
Destruction of guerrillas by any and
all means was the objective, and the
air effort must be Valu,ned in this
lighL ,\Va$ the air et(ort. complete
with its manpower and material
problems. warnnted by the results?
In seeking the answers. familiarity
with the background of the RHAF
i$ essential.
History and composition of RHAF
Follo""'ing the Allied withdrawal
from GrC'e(:e in 1941, many Greek
ainnen made their way to. Egypt
quished operational controL This
forced a reorganilation of the Air
Force. At this time it consisted of
58 obsolete aircraft and approxi-
mately 291 pilots (all veterans of war
service; no pilot training had been
undertaken since the liberation).
An order was placed with the UK
for 250 war-surplus aircraft. Deliv.
ery was expedited because of the
bandit waf and was completed dut
ing the summer of 1947. This order
included Spitfire fighters. Wellingron
bomben. C.41 transports and liaison
craft. The WeHington bomber was
found to be inoperable in Greece,
and they were grounded.
The middle of 1947 then, found
the RHAF with a strength of about
5,000, or which 400 were flying per"
sOnnel. Its units were: two fighter
squadrons of Spitfires, one liaison
squadron of Harvards (T -6), Austen
and L-Ss. one transport squadron of
C47. and AruolU, one refresher Bigh'
of Spitfires and other types; and one
projected fighter squadroo.
Aircraft on hand were sufficient to
support thee squadrons; training 01
pilotS had been resumed and some
50 cade .. had fwl completed ad
vanced training in England. Schools
were established to train pilots.
chanics and electrical. hydraulic, air-
frame and signal technicians. Train-
ing was conducted under the
vision of the RAY De1egation.
sisting of 15of6cen and ISO men. It
was at this juncture that the U. S.
in conducting the first type of
tions, Fif$l. there were pre-planned
strikes on targets localed in
by ground intelligence or by aerial
pholography. The second. armed re-
connaissance. was nor-many COIl-
dueled only when information
catcd the probability of finding a
profitable largel. as .. ben I:atp;<
enemy formation was mown to be
on the march in a given locality.
The third technique. and the one
most commonly employed, was to
loca'. targe .. by the employmenl of
reconnaissance aircrafl. These re-
mained on station until the arrival
of strike aircraft to guide them ooto
the largel.
Independent air operamo.
A high percentage of the total air
effort went into attacks of this type.
They were delivered against trt.lOpl
on the march. in bivouac or in con-
centrations for attack 01' defense.
They were delivered against bandit
headquarters, bandit-held towns.
supply installations and defensive
posicions. They tended to restrict
daylight movement of guerrillas.
They harowed his concentrations
and punished his forces during with
drawal from action. Tbe only
ing facton to this ipdependent air
campaign were the availability of
pilou.. suitable aircraft and the difi..
culty of target identification. TJ:iese
operations were being conducted
over Greece. not hostile territory,


Cuerrilitu, haggard and haraned -lhe tables hatllurned
Such shortag .... s had, in Greece. a
grC:Hcr significance lhan they might
h:we had in a more highly imJU5'
trialized coulIlry where sk.illed pt:.-
sOllllcillli15ht have been dr:tfted from
induslry .lnd where could
have supplied (he L/cililics
equipment. I\'ot ill Green:.
Indusll'Y wuld supply fc\\' of the
skiJls required hy the Air Force .. \ir-
craft lechniLians had fO be trained
and lhe n\'eragc recruit had h:ld
lillie prnious experiellce which
would aid in him into a
lcchui t.:a l spccialisL (he con-
st11l ction of ;1ir6elds exceeded the C:d -
o( the post-war economy of
Litllc cou ld b..: done with
rcspt'ct to the procuremenl o f equip-
mCIH and lhe dc\-clopmcol of f:u.:i li-
tit's except through the British )oris-
sinn.
Unforlunately, the nef'd for air
power coincided in with tht:
Government"s di scovery that
it could no longtr bear the financial
burden of aiding Greece. A pro
gram of aircraft procurc;ment was
initialed and supported until the
li. S. coult.! ta ke over the re_sponsi -
bilil,Y. While it was an adequa te
initia l program so far as numbers of
aircrnft were concerned, the spare
pan; j>1"O!-;T!\nl did not discoullt suffi-
the maintenancc cap.lhiliLies
of the RHAF and the air effort soon
5uffert:d as a rc!>"Uit.
t i. S. assumption of rlllanciaL re-
spollsibi li ty. nine momhs after tbe
eml oC flritish aid. did not result in
any hilid new air program. The re-
for lhe orga nizalion and
tritining of die RHAF (which implies
thl' arrcpt::wce of Ll high degree of
for its performance in
baltle) remained for lhe most part
with the RAF Delegation, whereas
the rcsponsihiJit)' for providing lhe
IlleanS was vestel1 in the American
Mi ssion. A similar arrangement was
found to be satisfactory as regards
the Navy where the prior provision
hr the British of long.l ife capital
items was the domi ll am considera-
tion. As the .'\ir Force. how-
('vcr, it scn icf' wlu:rc material is a
paramoullt and where
equipnlclIl consists of relatively com
plica ted OInd short li,ed items, it is
ullsouncl to separate responsibility
ror perform:llll...e ion hall ic from con-
tml of the material means to im.
prove that performance. The RAF
Delegation was in the unfortunate
position of being responsible for lhe
opera ting efficiency of the RHAF,
while the U. S. Mission was in a
posltion to monitor any recommen-
dation for its improvement entailing
the expenditure of funds. This ex
pl"L"!lSC\ the relationship in the worst
lC.:rms and may be mislead-
ing. The fact remains that indeci-
sion and hate measures are inherenc
in any such division of responsibi l-
ily.
Some of the factors wbich mili-
lateel agailHl getting maximum re-
turn from the air enort have been
enulll cr:Hetl <1bove. The)' induded
lack of aggressive hadt>rship. Com-
munist iufiltralion. separation of re-
sponsibility from comrol of the
Illeam to acmmplish the missi on
and the illadc:qtlilcy of the existing
nuclem to effen a rapid and efficient
expansion. The last nantcl1 com-
prhed a host of shortages of all
kill th: pilots. technicians. facifilin.
equipment <llId know- how. There
" ere '1(llIi(ioll<.l 1 C01llrihutOI,)T fact'JI"S.
which wcre: (I) the limited
suit ability of aircraft, the
of effeni\' e and (3) lim-
il ed {"(lIllprdu:n.llioll of the GIIXlbHi
lies of close suppon aircraft.
Limited suitability of aircraft
Except for the C.'17 COI\\"Cl"lcn
bom,her. tlte Spilfire was the only ai r-
C1";.fl a,aibhle [or the aLlC1c k of
grou nd targets lIllli! jmt five
before the war was terminated in
lhe sl'lolld CrallllllOs ballie. It was
then Ihat Ihe Sfl2C m:lde its debut.
Thi s event prcsaged a vast impro,e-
mell l in tht eITeui\"elles5 of air oper-
adom just as the cufl'lin dropped.
Forty-nine SB2C!> "'ere purch.lSed'
from surplus stock!! o( Ihe U. S.
Na,' Y" A comparison of the charac-
terislics of this aircraft and the Spil.
fire indicatcs how fOrluitous this de-
velopment was. The Spitfire had
limited enl1uranct:. limited ammuni-
tion capacity, limited nbil ity to lo-
cate the target :)Ol1 gre:ncr vulner-
ability 10 groulld fire. 'While lhe
SB2C 'vaseqllipped with dive brak.es.
enabling it to make a steep.angled
l1ive attack and a structural design
which permitted highangle rocket
firing and sll"iifing. Ihe Spitfire had
limited ability to atrack a ground
larget at an effective altitude and in
an effective ang'le of glide. The Sn2C:
had an al1dilioilal ;ld,;ulI:lge in
low stall speed and in iu ahility to
take off and land on short runways.
From this brief comparison it is
apparellt that a lIIuch hiHlter rcturn
could have been obt:tint:<l {rom the
air effort had a more suitable type
been available 10 RHAF carlier.
Conspicuous by its ahsenee from
the arsenal or the RHAF Wa!> the
light homber. In Augusl 19'18, the
RHAF (:onvened a certain numher
of C47s inlo bombers. Obviousl)"
it could not equal in performance a
designed {or Ihis purpose.
Air -ground technique
The rul1imentary character of the
air suppOrt technique in use at the
time was disclosed in the Romcli
opertltion jn April and May 1948.
In that operation, in which lhrfe
divisions and supporting Iroops, as
well as some Commando and NDC
units. were employed over many hun-
dreds of square miles of area, only
live c:c l' ;cIJif.: 01 (fil l,
"ilCr;Ii( \q'lC: av:\il
;Ibl e III lli e j,),]l/lIlld IIllih."1 hn(' werc
e lllpll Jyc.; d Ipll \\ iLil Lll(" :IWIlIIL IJ:lllal
iOI1 \ , blll :It IJI igadc alld
hC:ldqu:lll <: r, . Vl:lli( 1t:"llllJlllltl"d ra
tli 'l' \1('11; I)J lil[ll: fir Ill) v;clll(" ,ilIfT
tlrt "Y wc re )"f 1:1111'IJIIll(l"
il i , IIflt
1] 11(1<-1 [hnc
1'00/ I 1" " "'"lIi e and poor
IIU-, lf h 0 1 [:'II-;t:t' :wel
flu"udl y 1(1)01'""' In;(lu("'HI )' lIull iflCel
til <: c UOIl.
0, ..... ;" 111'11<: [hall ;J d<:ruiell fY
ill , oruI IIIIllic;tlioll'_ It j, all indi -
(;]lioll "r thc 1,1( k 01
or nJOlrIlandcr,. Oil lhl" alld
ill til e dir :dike, or the..:
01 IIl <: air we:ll,oll " Il .. e..:vj(1cncc
thal the (;xi, tillg" air p(Jlellli;tl \\"<1<;
lIlll IJc inJ..{ lully dt:vcl0l'cd" \1,,1("
ovcr, IOllg :1'" (hi.., (OIHlilioll IT
lIIaill <:d 1I]{'rc I'";",, I IJ:lIl( (" thai
the ad\':J III ;q,{C o( lllfll"(" ('xlI"lI",i\(" (Os"
1'II Iitaiion HI lhl: l-\ue..:nill:I\'
I. y ,I J.; n::llt:t" diu] I ill lilt"
:tir wou ld 11<: r<:: di lt:d"
It lat c ill I' I-Ix I,d oll" till"
more dd(OC"" ill Ihi,
lioll h,,,) h(1.: 11 (OH"I("( tltl. 0\11111-' 1';1( l.
;.ir '"I'I'"n \iJ.;ll;d lI11il S lllOJ('
wi de ly d i!ouihlll Cl 1. Hilt (;\' c.: n 1I1t".; n
til(' I, asi .. "f t1j,lri hllti oHo fllle 1'(01'
lir igade, wilh a a t I he el;v; , ;,,"
hc<tdquancr" w,,, in,l(lcqll;ltl"" Fail -
ure to rrovide air sign:!1
unils to the COJl)ntill1t!O ,l',roups prior
10 the of 19'19, Ilr to an"c pt
,til of the of tht:
r' Iiding forces, to "dt! to tht:
evidenre lh;H the air pOlential wa'i
1I 0l rll\ly arpreciated.
Thc Commando gr"oups had hec: n
<; antiguerrilla for ces"
They were c llIl'l (ly<:d, h owever, in
mi'isiom which 'i.Carccly justified the
o f special uni ts. The
Briti sh Mission ativocaLed th:l t they
he r eorgani l.cu as pursuil forces (0
range widel y and rapidl y through
the moulllainouc; coun try in pursuit
o ( the elusive guerrilla" They were
10 hc air supported, air supplied
and, insofar as practicable, airborne
nnd air transported.
T he union of the capabilities of
tact ica l air with those of the raiding
forces would have multiplied thei r
effeClivcnesso Such a union might
we ll have produced the most effec-
tive synthesis of means for conduct
i ng nea rly all phases of the nnti-
guerrilla war. except toe deli berate
.. Hack oC fortified areas.
Summary
"I 111 "11 " \, 01\ , I , igllilil a lit C:J ilurc 10
\1\lIalilt" the whi( It lay
III 1111 1("1 ("X ld"i l:n ifll) f,] lil t"
\\(\Ikll( "" !ll Ihe j.!,llCI I ilb 0- hi, 1;ll k
!II ail ,llld po,iti\'<: Ill c, n" to
flllld l: ll ir. F:Jld lY t<:(iJlli(lun \\'el"e
{"IUIIIl{"d 1)( "(, 111" " 01 thi, taillllC as
lI"(:n: ;1I "'!1 ]Jl/!1 1 !I1ainl (:llallll.:, th<:
(oIHi/llll'd "'" o j :lilC i",dl 01 liluiled
;Jllt! ,III thc othc) Jaetors
wili , h 1(J III J(,d (" eel c" ora rul! return
(III ih ill\(;\ IW<: 1I1 jll tll <: :tir. It ...... as
biluH.:, tOil, whic II IJrc\Tlt t<:d the
;.t IOt:lli h ll t il IIII' a il 01 :c grcatcr [lIn',
lion "I Ihl
o
tot:ll <: lIorc
III jUdJ.; IHCltl tuday it
HlIl q 1,," kl'JII ill lIIiHCI Ih,lt the plan.
Ili ll).\ III I II] t ;' !!li -J.; !l c rrilJ:. war ("{)II .
III :1 ,, (II C I",,, jl)!! 01 thrce "nlllla)
(;11111' ,11).\11 pt;"I". ( "; 11 h of ...... hie h WCiS
Army raitiin:,: purries
c:xpc("l( "d 10 "t' ("oluiuslve" This,
toupln l willi (hc that aid funds
\"CI"(; "jI \H lljll iawd fI]] ,III annual
wi(h liltliled ;",uralllC of fur-
ther ('oll lln; ( IHc lIl.s. did nol promote
IOllgoll..'rl ll ,,1""lIing. : \II }O substallti<ti
int.T<:; I'C i ll lhc 3il.c o r improvcment
in the dlcoivene'\.., of (he Air Force
c() uld nOI havc bee n effec.:teu within
the span o f a few monlhs. H.<ttl the
ullimale extent a nd dur;)tion of hos
tilitics heen when the b<tn-
dits rlrst became activc in 1946 or in
194 i. plallning for the Air Force
mighl have been approached in a
diHc r<:nt manner.
The fOTt:go lJlg discl.lssion in no
way the great advances in the
of the Air Force be-
tW("CII PHfi :!lId I !H!), J"nJlll
:lllIIm t IUlthillJ,{, til t Ail Flm c dcvc! "
IljJ<:(1 til Ilu
o
poinl \111(' 1<: it {I, uld
dcli vcr d ll"lti v(: /\lthotll!,l ,
Ihe 111111111(:1 f,l 1I0w II ,lIul Ihc
Illllliher 01 tl) lh oj I>olllh\ tlruppcII
do Ilot ill th(: IlI'I(:lvcs i udi ( ;Jl C thc
(Ir ail" J.;t: JlUilU"
progn."" /];H/ beet] madc in IIlhl"l"
ell<:c lil"{:ll(:"'s
of thc RHAF Wa., (lIle 01 lhl: clIO( i,i v(."
fanor, in IIl <: Vil,i alld

NAVAL FORCES
Pattern of naval operations in the
anti-guerrilla war
There no ..... a r at durillJ.;
the g ue rrill;l uprhing:" Hn ..... evcI, Ill)
1lllIHhc r (If ll]ell ("(JII.
U"jhUh:d mUlt! IH tI .. : IIhim:'lc vic-
.. Jupported by RHN
LOry tha n lhme o( the Royal Hel-
leni c N a vy. Its rol<.: was Ilot a dra
mati c one. On an average of about
Caul' t imes a week.. ships were cd led
upon to d e liver p,unrlre ashore 10
assist in the defc m(' or a bcl('<lgucred
COilS tOil vill age ()I" to an
Army unit operating ne:ll" tll<:
OCttimes guerrill :ts would or
captu re a caiq ue and it would he
n ecessary ror the Navy to go ill pllr
of it. Somc limcs a I1;)V,11 la nd-
ing pa rty would be put ashore to
inveslig:,ue reponed g uerrilla activ-
ityo Freq uentl y, Army raiding panics
were embarked and landed to make
such searches or to make ancillary
landil1gs in conjunction with larger
op erations ashore. On one occasion
,



,

Ruonlllrllcrion: lJabotage had taken. it, toll
the I,-as ca lled upon to par-
ticipat e in a hlrgc-IiGtl a mphibious
landing. The da) -lo-f.by dudes of
,he RH:\ ','cn: the pat rolling of
Gl"e( i;ln II and the provi!ol on o(
sea uOl mpon for l he 1II()"cmem o(
tmop" tlnd slJppiiC's. Thus the 1'\avy
m ... i11l a ined {oll ll vi o( Lhe !>t"fI$ sur
rounding Lreccc, denying lhose
\fate" t the gt, r rri ll as. By pro\' id-
ing sea it in the
fILII exploitation of lhe ;tth:1l1Iagcs
which accrued to Ihe
thro ugh ils LOllllnand or the sea.
Recent history, size and compo!>ition
of the Royal Hellenic Navy
T he ::'\a\'Y at the inception of hos-
tili ties was in better shape than
e ilher the .. or the Ail' Force.
Unlike thelll, it had been able 10
withdra \\' most of its forces \\'hen
Greece fell to the Germans. Thus
it h<td, on r c; lUrn [0 Greece
,,'j th the exil e gO\'erument, a good
nucleus o( experi enced ;lnd
ratings. The \\'arlirnt: lic I\'i th the
Royal :'\a\'\' 'Ll' lll a inta i ned. . ....
British :"\lal:".1 )[i::..sion has estab
in Gteece and the LTK lo<tned
Greece enough ships to lIl e t; l its re
quircllIents: 1.1ter, additional ships,
particularl y l)pes, These
... hips IIelt h:If(Uy fir>; ! li nc and their
upk('cp requ ired COIHinuous maime-
nalH.C - i! SCI iotls liisadYalltage since
the r.c-nH:IIlS hold '1abOl:lgcd the reo
pair f"dlil ies of the X:\I' Y on their
withdraw",l from Cn:ece. The ships,
ne\'enheless, were adequate [or their
me during the ;Illtii);mdit W<lr. The
number of allocatcd to
the i'\avy was nOt great, bUl it was
adequate. Up until the lime t he
U. S. took ovrr its logis ti ca l support
the strength o[ the RHN W:\5 about
12.00U. In early 1948 thi s was in-
c.rea.!)cd fronl 12,000 LO 13,500 in
order to permit an increase of patrol -
ling and number of ships available
for the tl'<lnspon i ng of troops and
supplies,
Value of control of sea
communications
The auvantages the Government
enjoyed through its monopoly of
nin ;,tl pO\\'er w(' re of great signill .
c<t nn:, for Greece is ui stinctl y mari-
liml:. Except for its long, nonhern
floillier il is insu lar. lls highly in-
dented co;:mline is nearly 2,000 miles
in lellgth, and no inl and point is
more than 75 miles from thf' sea. It
is bisected by the Gul[ of Corinth
\\ hi ch lIli:lhs Pel oponnesus, south
of the Gulf, an i,l:lnd by itself. The
Grecian island", moreo"er, constit ute
.1 substantial portion of (hc total ter-
ritory. Becillise of its maritime
charac.:lt"r, an d bc( ause oC its poor
land communications, the sea has
been especi:,lly import a nt to trans-
ponation and cOlllmunica[ions in
Grcccc. The wictesprt"ad use of sea
transpOrtatjoll, in 111m, has reslLlled
ill the neglcCt of lanel communica-
tions LO such ;In extent that even be-
fore \Vf)rld War II no significant
militLlry could ha\le been
toncilu.:lcd without reCOUr'ie to the
sca.
During the occupation the rail and
road .. udl a'i tht")' were, wcre
rc nli(:T(.: d by sahotage::. Re
had .\can:ely hefore the
more program of 'I .. hot:tge
'ponsorcd by lhc was
inaugurated, L'uller thc,,; <in.um-
control of lhl: wa ttrs sur
Greece afforded all almosl
decisive ad\'antage, in (Oll( n:te lernu
it meant thal lhe gO\'t"rnment could
move ils troops and freely
[mill OTIC part of Gn.:C({; to another,
\\' hich gav(, iL grecu mohili
ty. The "Del1l()(.r;llit Army," on the
other hand, \\,<1<, rC'Ilrined to land
transpon <1nd was deni ed strategic
mohilil)' .
11 may be said that the (aClor of
I..Ommand of the se:. has bcen as
signed LOa much imponanu', since
rhe guerrillas had no na\'al capabili.
ty. True, but it wa'i herallsc lhal
eapabilit)' W.h denied them by the
Navy. Save for the Navy, the guerril.
las cOldd have gained and
a limited conlrol 01 the sea lanes.
Tha t they could get of
;"lny of the hundreds of Cliques whi ch
ply lhe walen sUITounding Greece
\I'as often demonslrated. Had they
heen able to operate (ho:,c
the coursc o[ lhe war would have
been very different. I nstan(cs of at-
tempts to use from Albania
[or Sllpply purposcs occurred in the
Peioponnesm in Seplember 1948,
Had there heen no I'estraining in-
Ouence in the form of a Grec:k l\"avy,
it is e\'en possible that armed \lesse\s
might ha\'e found their ,,'ay into
guerrilla hands.
Patrolling was carried out to en-
force shipping and sailing regula.
lions, :md suspicious veS$Cls wert
taken jmo custody for ill\lestiR:ltion.
Some o( lhe specific objecti\'es of
patrolling directed against the guer-
rillas 'were : (I) Pn:"enling escape
(2) Prc\'eilling reinforcement CS)
Pre\'eming resupply (4) Pre"enting
reinfestation of cleared areas (5)
I so lating gucrrilla concentrations
(6) Keeping the Communi.st virus
froll) spreading to areas whi c.h had
not been affened p.-e'o'iously by PT{"
\-ellling the mO"f'lllcnt of agenh and
organizers (7) Guarding the islands
around Greece on which priwners of
war were interned,
U.ited S_ assistance to RHN
Since the Greek. :-':avy was meeting
its operational requirements with the
equipment then on hand, the tJ. S.
Naval Group. upon its arri\'al in
Greece in the summer of 194i. de-
duced that its miMion could be ful-
filled by pJ'Oviding the minimum
supporr. An exception (.0 this policy
was made in the case of six patrol
crah procured from U.S, naval sur.
pluses to permit an extension of
paltolHng. The Navy Group
sored the repair and construction of
the facilities of the damaged 1'\3\'31
Ba.se at Salamis Island. as thes.e were
required to enable the Navy to keep
its ship$ operating. Assistance was
given to the development of training
facilities at Sacaramanga """hieh were
required in order to bring training
standards to an acceptable level.
As a result of this pollcy to limit
expenditures, the end of the ... 'at
found the Greek Xav", with no better
equipment than it started with.
whereas both the Ann\' and the Air
Force had. for all practical purposes.
been completely re-equipped.
CONCLUSIONS
On the political. psychologicaJ and
economic frollts. facton which con-
tributed to the defeat of the
riHas were;
I. The British .nd U. S. Procram.
.f aid to GlftCe
The presence o[ British ltOOpS in
Greece at the onset of guerrilla op-
erations exercised a re5training
ftuence on the USSR and the
lites. preventing direct intervention
in Greece and open aid to the guerw
riHas. U. S. patticipation strength-
ened this restraining inDuence. The
British and American aid programs
sustained the government of Greece
and enabled it to mobilile, equip
and supply large military forces.
""hile at the same time Slaving off
the collapse o[ the national economy.
American interest, moreo\'('r,
tended to fill the vacuum when UK
alone could no longer provide sup-
port on the required scale, American
assistance Was provided O'n such a
scale as to improve the morale of the
Greek nation by giving it hope that
peace might be restored and thai a
degree o[ e<"onomic stabilin' might
be once again achieYed.
2. n. Tito-C:-inlwm rift
Yugoslavia held a phOlal geo-
graphical position among the three
!.3tellile countries along Greece',
northern frontier, YugotJa\' Com-
munism quite naturally. Iherefore,
had taken the lead in the
directed aggTe$$ion against Gree<:e.
The Tito-Cominform rifr hroke
down the mechanism to
provide support to the guerrillas and
resulted in a division "'ilhin the
Ie.denhip ot .he guerrilla.. Al-
though this dh'ision was raoh'Cd in
favor of the Cominfonn. the rilt
tended to deprive lhe guerrilla move-
ment of the conviction of immediate
purposefulness. Moreover. the
lishment of a new mechanism for
providing omislance to the guerrilla!
was scarcely practicable owing to the
ley geographical posi.ion 01 Yugo-
The full implications of the
Tilo--Cominform rift were nOt felt
imrnediately. but were experienced
progressively from the faU of 1948
until July ]949. at which time the
Greek.ugosla\' border was dosed by
order of Tho.
Tbe Tito-Corninform rift was. to
some extent, a product of British
and American aid to Gree<e. Had
Tho felf that the guerillas could win
in Greece with attendant encirde-
ment of YugO!ilavia Communist
g<wernments, it is doubtful that he
would ha\'e had the courage to stand
his ground in (he dispute with the
Cominronn. Thus. the Tito-Cornin
(orm rih which aided Greece in the
antibandit war was itself, to a cer-
tain extent, it by-product o[ British
and American aid. particularly the
lauer.
On the military front, facton con-
tributing to the defeat of the guer-
rillas were:
The ,ppointm.nt of GeM,,1
IS Commlnder in Chief (If the
Govemmlftt Forces
The appointment of General
Papagos resulted in the fuller de-
\"{;Iopmcnt of the combat potential
or the Greek Anlled Forces, By the
relier and di'imissal of unsuitable
commanders and b,' emphasiLing
(ontinuous. aggressiH> offensive oJ)"
er.:uion, against the guerrillas, Gen-
eral Papagos used the eXlsting miH
tan fOfCe5 more effenh-eh.. There
no increaM' in {he
>,[rength of th(' armed forces during
his tenure. Jr ''''it.'' tbat {he
for(("$, as they existed; were used
more effectively. Continuous pres-
sure kept the guerrillas on the move.
inDicted heavy and af-
forded them no opportunity fo re-
supply or replace casualties. Thus.
their relative combat power
1y declined during the six months
period which pIeded their final
coll.po<.
The PapagO$ appointment brought
the pJanning and advisory function
of fhe U. S. and British Missions inw
their o""n as {acton contributing CO
the vkwry.
n. T'tIo-C:-holorno rift
The Tito-Cominfonn rift reduced
the amount of military aid available
10 .he guerrillas. By January 1949
supplies furnished through Yugo-
slavia had fallen oft to a mere trickle.
There are indications that small
anus and artillery ammunition may
have gone into short s.upply prior to
the final (ollapse of the guerrilla op-
erations. The finat bJow to the guer-
fiHas which resulted from this rift
was the dosing of the Greek.\'ugo-
day frontier in July 194!1 This de-
prl\,M the guerrillas of the effe({il.'e
use of approximately 30 percent of
their fighters and denied them the
use or rhe regions north of the
frontier as a protected manem'er
area, Supply shortages and man-
power 1000se!> resulting from the Tito-
Cominform rift may its
6calion as the proximate cause or the
guerrilla coHapse,
The ""mal .b.tndonme.t of guerrilb
tatOO by lite "Dtmocratic Anny"
The tendenc\' of the "Democratic
Army" during }'948 and 1949 towards
a mllitarr ",'hich depended
lor its S\l(cess upon the organilation
of Jarger formations and the employ-
ment of military lactics, im-
plied a growing reliance upon mili-
tary Coree alone. Vnder the existing
condition!'. such development
played into [he hands o[ the go\'ern-
menl The guerrillas were op-
posing weakness to strength, The
decisi\'e defeat of the guerrillas
made possible by their depanure
from proper guerrilla organilation
and tactin in their effort to ddefHI
the base areaSc along the northern
fromier and the gathering of their
one-tilltt: Somali hands into larger
(onnatiom, ranging in she up to Ihe
di\"isJon. -
,
INSTRUCTIONAL SUPPORT BRANCH'
- 1 st Specia! Forces Schoo;
-
t
I-
d
:;
-t
f
,
,
".
' .
,