G.R. No.

L-4977

March 22, 1910

DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee, vs. THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
Facts: This is an action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, 15 years of age, by his father, his nearest relative. On the day of the incident, plaintiff went to see certain Mr. Murphy, an employee of the defendant but he was not there so they wandered in the company premises where they saw the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. They saw brass fulminating caps scattered intended for use in the explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. They picked these caps and brought them home where they made series of experiments. Plaintiff opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled with a yellowish substance they got matches, and applied a lighted match to the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Plaintiff David was struck in the face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds. It was proven that caps, similar to those found by plaintiff, were used, more or less extensively, on the McKinley extension of the defendant company's track; that some of these caps were used in blasting a well on the company's premises a few months before the accident. RTC ruled in favor of plaintiff. Issue: WON defendant should be held liable for the injury caused to plaintiff despite the fact that the latter went inside the premises without any invitation from the defendant. Held: No. Alluding to the doctrine of implied invitation to visit the premises of another, says: In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied license might sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of others. Thus leaving a tempting thing for children to play with exposed, where they would be likely to gather for that

purpose, may be equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of it; and, perhaps, if one were to throw away upon his premises, near the common way, things tempting to children, the same implication should arise. Children here are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity and impelled by the restless spirit of youth, boys here as well as there will usually be found whenever the public is permitted to congregate. In a number of case, it was held that the owners of premises, whereon things attractive to children are exposed, whereon things attractive to children are exposed, must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly." The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child from entering his premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are accustomed to roam about of to which their childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to enter, and where the child does enter under such conditions the owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to guard the child against injury from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the owner, is clearly a breach of duty, responsible, if the child is actually injured, without other fault on its part than that it had entered on the premises of a stranger without his express invitation or permission. However, the court found this not applicable in the instant case because plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that he knew what he was about. We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and reckless act

G.R. No. L-50959 July 23, 1980 HEIRS OF PEDRO TAYAG, SR., petitioners, vs. HONORABLE FERNANDO S. ALCANTARA, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and ROMEO VILLA Y CUNANAN, respondents.
Facts: Pedro Tayag Sr. was riding on a bicycle along MacArthur Highway at Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac on his way home, he was bumped and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus driven by Romeo Villa, as a result of which he sustained injuries which caused his instantaneous death. petitioners, heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr. A complaint for damages but it was suspended by the respondent judge on the ground that the criminal case for homicide was still pending resolution. Later, the respondent was acquitted in the criminal action, hence, respondent judge dismissed the civil case for damages. The petitioners opposed the motions alleging that their cause of action is not based on crime but on quasi-delict. Issue: Whether or not the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. 5114. Held: Yes. Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or commission complained of as a felony. such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. Evidently, the above quoted provision of the Civil Code refers to a civil action based, not on the act or omission charged as a felony in a criminal case, but one based on an obligation arising from other sources, like quasi delict. All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely: (1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private respondent; (2) damage caused by the said act or commission; (3) direct causal relation between the damage and the act or commission; and (4) no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.

The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi delict the acquittal of the driver, private respondent Romeo Villa, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 836 is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. 5114 for damages based on quasi-delict.

already serving his sentence and has no property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already before he hired him something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily

G.R. No. L-48006

July 8, 1942

liable. Further, Barredo is not being sued for damages arising from a criminal act (his drivers negligence) but rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee (Article 1903).

FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
Facts: At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with a kalesa thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustinos parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo the owner of the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in the selection of their employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him. ISSUE: Whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. HELD: Yes. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and this is more expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is