26 Jesus O. Typoco, Jr. v.

. Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc, and Jesus Emmanuel Pimentel,GR 136191, November 29, 1999F : Jesus O. Typoco, (TYPOCO) and Jesus Emmanuel Pimentel (PIMENTEL) were both candidates for theposition of Governor in Camarines Norte during the May 11, 1998 elections. On June 10, 1998, TYPOCO filed apetition alleging that massive fraud and irregularities attended the preparation of the election returns considering thatupon technical examination, 305 election returns were found to have been prepared in group by one person. A reportby the COMELECs ERSD Voters Identification Division disclosed, among others, that the handwritten entries on278 COMELEC copies of election returns particularly under the columns Congressman/Governor/Vice-Governor/Nickname or Stage Name, were written by one and the same person in groups.The COMELEC En Banc promulgated a resolution dismissing TYPOCOs petition for the Declaration of Failure of Elections and/or Annulment of Elections in Camarines Norte for lack of merit, claiming that the groundscited by TYPOCO do not fall under any of the instances enumerated in Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code. I: Whether or not the findings of the ERSD Voters Identification Division can warrant the declaration of a Failure of Elections and/or Annulment of Elections? H: No; Petition DISMISSED R: First, the Court pointed to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166, otherwise known as The Synchronized ElectionsLaw of 1991, from which the COMELEC derives its authority to declare a failure of elections. Second, the courtquoted Section 6 of the same law, which enumerates the causes for a declaration of a Failure of Election. These areexplained in the case of Mitmug v. Commission on Elections , wherein the Court held that two conditions mustconcur: first , no voting has taken place in the precincts concerned on the date fixed by law, or even if there was voting, the election nevertheless resulted in a failure to election; and second the votes cast would affect the result of the election. In Loong v. Commission on Elections , the Court added that the cause of such failure of election shouldhave been any of the following: force majeure , violence, terrorism, fraud of other analogous cases. Further in Borja,jr. v. Commission on Elections, the Court stated that The COMELEC can call for the holding or continuation of election by reason of failure of election only when the election is not held, is suspended or results in a failure toelect. The latter phrase, in turn, must be understood in its literal sense, which is nobody was elected.Clearly then, the Court held that there are only three instances where a failure of election may be declared,namely: (a) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure ,violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous cases; (b) the election in any polling place had been suspended beforethe hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on account of force majeure , violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; (c) after the voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in thecustody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure , violence,terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes. In all instances there must have been failure to elect; this is obvious inthe first scenario whre the election was not held and the second where the election was suspend. As to the thirdscenario, the preparation and transmission of the election returns, which gave rise to the consequence of a failure toelect must as aforesaid be literally interpreted to mean that nobody emerged as a winner.While fraud is a ground to declare a failure of election, the commission of fraud must be suc h that itprevented or suspended the holding of an election including the preparation and transmission of the election returns.The ground invoked by TYPOCO is not proper in a declaration of failure of election. TYPOCOs relief was for COMELEC to order a recount of the votes cast, on account of the falsified election returns, which is properly thesubject of an election contest. The COMELEC, therefore, had no choice but to dismiss TYPOCOs petition in

Carlos vs angeles
FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the position of mayor of the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila (later converted into a City) during the May 11, 1998 elections. The Board of Canvassers proclaimed petitioner as the mayor. The private respondent filed an election protest with the RTC. The court came up with revision reports which also showed that the petitioner got the highest number of votes. Nevertheless, in

its decision, the trial court set aside the final tally of valid votes because of its finding of significant badges of fraud, which it attributed to the present petitioner. The court then declared private respondent as the winner. The petitioner appealed to the COMELEC, and also filed a petition to the SC questioning the decision of the RTC. The private respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the SC. HELD: Both the SC and COMELEC have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus over decisions of trial courts of general jurisdiction (RTCs) in election cases involving elective municipal officials. The Court that takes jurisdiction first shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the case. Relative to the appeal that petitioner filed with the COMELEC, the same would not bar the present action as an exception to the rule because under the circumstances, appeal would not be a speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The power to nullify an election must be exercised with the greatest care with a view not to disenfranchise the voters, and only under circumstances that clearly call for such drastic remedial measure. More importantly, the trial court has no jurisdiction to declare a failure of election. It is the COMELEC en banc that is vested with exclusive jurisdiction to declare a failure of election. Assuming that the trial court has jurisdiction to declare a failure of election, the extent of that power is limited to the annulment of the election and the calling of special elections. The result is a failure of election for that particular office. In such case, the court cannot declare a winner.

Pimentel vs. COMELEC GR 161658, Nov. 3, 2003

Facts: Congress passed RA 9165, Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and makes it mandatory for candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office with certain offenses, among other personalities, to undergo a drug test. Hence, Senator Pimentel, who is a senatorial candidate for the 2004 synchronized elections, challenged Section 36(g) of the said law. Issue: is the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office an unconstitutional imposition of additional qualification on candidates for Senator? Held: Yes. Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, requiring all candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government undergo a mandatory drug test is UNCONSITUTIONAL. Under Sec.3, Art. VI of the Constitution, an aspiring candidate for Senator needs only to meet 5 qualifications: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. LOONG vs. COMELEC 216 SCRA 760, 1992

LOONG vs. COMELEC Case Digest

Facts: On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with respondent Commission his certificate of candidacy for the position of ViceGovernor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region in the election held on 17 February 1990. On 5 March 1990 (or 16 days after the election), respondent Ututalum filed before the respondent Commission a petition seeking to disqualify petitioner for the office of Regional Vice-Governor, on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age. Petitioner Loong sought the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the respondent COMELEC has no jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss was denied by the COMELEC in a resolution which is the subject of this petition. Petitioner Loong contends that SPA No. 90-006 (a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Loong) was filed out of time because it was filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Issue: Whether or not SPA No. 90-006 was filed within the period prescribed by law. Held: No. The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent COMELEC to disqualify petitioner Loong on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall under the grounds of disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly covered by Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel certificate of candidacy. Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the filing of the petition at any time after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission which, although a constitutional body, has no legislative powers. Thus, it can not supersede Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment.