HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

Failed Democratic Transition in Cameroon: A Human Rights Explanation1

Susan Dicklitch*
I. INTRODUCTION Respect for human rights in Africa is more often the exception than the rule. Some African leaders claim cultural relativism in defending the withholding of fundamental human rights to women, other leaders claim the need to repress individual human rights and freedoms to preserve stability and economic growth for the whole country. Yet others claim that calls for minority language and cultural rights simply promote sectarianism and treasonous secessionist movements. Whatever the particular case, the rights and freedoms of individual Africans have often been sacrificed at the altar of culture, economic growth, political stability, and national unity. Much of the recent literature on Africa focuses on the prospects for democratic transition and the role of civil society in bringing about a transition to and ultimate consolidation of democracy.2 But few African

* Susan Dicklitch is Assistant Professor of Government at Franklin and Marshall College in Lancaster, PA. She holds a Ph.D. from the University of Toronto. She is also the author of The Elusive Promise of NGOs in Africa: Lessons from Uganda (1998). 1. I would like to thank Christa E. Frank for the excellent research she conducted. Christa also helped write the section on colonial legacies. This research would not have been possible without a grant from Franklin and Marshall College and the Hackman scholars program. 2. See, e.g., MICHAEL BRATTON & NICOLAS VAN DE WALLE, DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTS IN AFRICA: REGIME TRANSITIONS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1997); Michael Bratton, Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational Life in Africa, 41 WORLD POLITICS 407 (1989); POLITICAL REFORM IN FRANCOPHONE AFRICA (John C. Clark & David Gardinier eds., 1997); Rene Lemarchand, Uncivil States and Civil Societies: How Illusion Became Reality, 30 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 177 (1992); AFRICAN STUDIES IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND DEMOCRACY (Mahmood Mamdani & Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba eds., 1995); Celestin Monga, Civil Society and Democratization in Francophone Africa, 33 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 359 (1995); JULIE FISHER, NON Human Rights Quarterly 24 (2002) 152176 2002 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

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countries have achieved a genuine democratic transition3 or consolidation4 beyond a mere adoption of multiparty politics. I argue that this is because few African societies are rights-respective societies, and few African regimes are rights-protective regimes. The focus should not simply be on what type of democracy exists (whether liberal, social, no-party/one-party) but rather, the foundation upon which it is laid. In other words, too much scholarship focuses on the institutions necessary for democracy, but not enough examines the level of human rights culture or rights-respective culture that is a necessary foundation for democracy.5 Ironically, it comes as some surprise to analysts that once stable, relatively economically developed, and so-called democratic countries like Cote dIvoire or Zimbabwe can quickly degenerate into authoritarian and human rights abusive regimes and societies. Cameroon is a similar country, in that it has been a relative paragon of stability and economic growth (at least until the mid-1980s) in Africa. But Cameroons political stability has been artificially based on the suppression of political participation. Cameroon lacks both a rights-respective society and a rights-protective regime, yet, it is formally considered a multiparty democracy. I argue, in the case of Cameroon, that the lack of a rights-respective society and a rightsprotective regime not only undermines the prospects for democratic consolidation, but also heightens the potential for future violence and chaos. When formal mechanisms of democracy are grafted onto a political and social system that lacks a rights-respective culture, competition breeds violence and chaos, not democratic progress. Unfortunately, too many donor countries are satisfied with the mere formal display of democracy, ignoring issues of substantive democracy and human rights abuses. It is important to note that economic and political rights are fundamentally intertwined. Civil and political liberties, for

3.

4.

5.

GOVERNMENTS: NGOS AND THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE THIRD WORLD (1998); CELESTIN MONGA, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF ANGER: CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA (1996). In their seminal work, Diamond et al. argue that a transition to democracy is completed only when the freely elected government has full authority to generate new policies, and thus when the executive, legislative, and judicial powers generated by the new democracy are not constrained or compelled by law to share power with other actors, such as the military. LARRY DIAMOND, MARC F. PLATTNER, YUN-HAN CHU & HUNG-MAO TIEN, CONSOLIDATING THE THIRD WAVE DEMOCRACIES: THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES xix (1997). A consolidation of democracy is brought about by, a number of institutional, policy, and behavioral changes. Many of these improve governance directly by strengthening state capacity; liberalizing and rationalizing economic structures, securing social and political order while maintaining basic freedoms; improving horizontal accountability and the rule of law; and controlling corruption. Id. at xviii. Even the UN and African Charters of Rights fail to argue that political rights can be guaranteed only within a competitive, multiparty framework. From a human rights perspective, it is thus genuine political participation that is key, not political competition. See RHODA E. HOWARD, HUMAN RIGHTS IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 133 (1986).

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example, are sometimes violated because of a lack of economic rights. Instead of narrowly approaching the issue of democracy by focusing on political democracy alone, a human rights approach takes into account both the political and economic aspects of democracy and thus gives us a fuller appreciation of the factors necessary for a successful transition to and consolidation of democracy. This article will first examine the theoretical importance of developing a rights-respective society and a concomitant rights-protective regime, and then apply it to the case study of Cameroon, to explain the lack of democratic development there, and the prospect for future violence and chaos.

II. DEFINING A RIGHTS-RESPECTIVE SOCIETY AND RIGHTS-PROTECTIVE REGIME According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,6 human rights are rights that one is entitled to simply because one is a human being. These rights apply universally to all people, at all times, and under any circumstances. Human dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all people are fundamental for freedom and justice. A rights-respective society would embody these fundamental values and civil/political, social, economic, and cultural rights as outlined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights7 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.8 Although regimes are often the worst violators of human rights, human rights also protect people against society. Human rights give individuals the right to conduct their lives as they see fit, even when their choices challenge societal or community norms.9 A rights-respective

6. 7.

8.

9.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess. (Resolutions, part 1), at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in 43 AM. J. INTL L. SUPP. 127 (1949). International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 and 1057 U.N.T.S. 407 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976 for all provisions except those of Article 41; 28 Mar. 1978 for the provisions of Article 41), available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm> (visited 18 Nov. 2001) [hereinafter ICCPR]. Current signature, ratification, and reservation status is available at <http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIV/ treaty5.asp> (visited 18 Nov. 2001). International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 Jan. 1976), available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm> (visited 18 Nov. 2001) [hereinafter ICESR]. Current signature and ratification status is available at <http://untreaty.un.org/ ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIV/treaty4.asp> (visited 18 Nov. 2001). RHODA E. HOWARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY 8 (1995).

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society would thus help ensure that citizens must treat each other with concern and respect.10 This interpretation is based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international covenants on human rights that state that: All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act toward one another in a spirit of brotherhood.11 A rights-respective society not only is a watchdog of the regime, but also of itself. A rights-respective society does not develop overnight, nor can it be destroyed overnight. Intricate to the existence of any rights-respective society is the development of a civil society, a fundamental respect for human dignity and difference, and a rights-protective regime that ensures the securement of basic rights (security, subsistence, and liberty) and the rule of law. In short, there are differing degrees of rights-respective societies and regimes, but ultimately, a minimal level of respect for the basic rights of others (either ethnically, religiously, economically, linguistically, racially, or sexually) must be maintained so that all can live a life of dignity and freedom.

III. THE NATURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN CAMEROON Cameroon is far from a rights-protective regime. There have been acrossthe-board violations of civil/political, social, economic, and cultural rights. This situation does not seem likely to improve in the near future.

A. Civil Liberties and Political Rights Violations Within the International Covenant on Civil Liberties and Political Rights (1966),12 civil liberties include the right to life, the right not to be tortured or taken into slavery, the right to liberty, the security of the person, and the right to due process (including protections against arbitrary arrest). Political rights, according to the International Covenant on Civil Liberties and Political Rights13 include the right to freedom of thought,14 expression,15

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

Id. at 17. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 6. ICCPR, supra note 7. Id. Id. art. 18. Id. art. 19.

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peaceful assembly,16 association,17 and the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs18 including genuine periodic elections.19 Political rights and civil liberties are crucial for democracy. As Rhoda Howard argues, the centralization of power into the hands of a ruling class cannot be challenged by ordinary peasants, workers, women, or ethnic minorities unless they have the right to freedom of expression and association and can present their views in an organized manner.20 The human rights record of the Cameroonian government from a civil/ political rights standpoint has been miserable at best.21 Complaints of military and police brutality are widespread. Torture and illegal detention are frequent, while extra-judicial executions are still evident, especially in the Far North Province.22 Since March 1998, some 700 people have been extra-judicially executed by the brigade anti-gang, a joint unit of the army and gendarmerie in the Far North Province.23 The security forces have continued to brutalize the public with the brandishing of automatic weapons, bribery and the resurgence of kale kale,24 especially in the Anglophone provinces.
16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22.

23. 24.

Id. art. 21. Id. art. 22. Id. art. 25. Id. art. 25(b). HOWARD, supra note 5, at 119. Freedom House gave Cameroon a rating of 7 for political rights and 6 for civil liberties with an overall Not Free rating. A 7 is the worst score on civil liberties and political rights, with a 1 as the highest score. See Freedom in the World (2000), available at <http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2000/table1.htm> (visited 12 Oct. 2001). The police forces also seem to be rounding up suspected Anglophone secessionist sympathizers in the southwest and northwest provinces. For example, police arrested about 100 people in various bars and nightclubs in Kumba (SWP) because they were suspected of being SCNC members. Cameroon: About 100 Secessionists Reportedly Arrested in Anglophone Southwest (Radio France Internationale, 25 Apr. 2000). This brigade anti-gang unit was set up to end the attacks by armed robbers, known as coupeurs de route who operated mostly in the Far North region. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 2000: CAMEROON (2000) [hereinafter AI CAMEROON REPORT]. Kale kale is a term used to describe security force actions in which security forces swoop into villages or troubled suburbs in early morning raids, allegedly to apprehend thieves. Kale kale, however, also serves to intimidate innocent civilians who are often forced out of their homes and ordered to sit in the mud while the security forces pillage, loot and brutalize the local population. The author had the unfortunate opportunity to witness a kale kale operation that was wrapping up in Mutengene in the Southwest Province. People of all ages were walking around, sitting in the mud and generally looking dazed and confused, while swarms of gendarmes, police, and military personnel rounded up suspected thieves, and supposed opposition members. See Gendarmes raid Ndop to Recover Missing Gun, THE CAMEROON POST, 26 May 2000, where it was reported that gendarmes made massive and indiscriminate arrests to recover a gun seized on 19 May. Angry civilians apparently seized the gun when gendarmes invaded homes and beat up occupants on allegations that they were planning to boycott the 20 May manifestations (reunification celebrations) as advocated by the SCNC.

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The 1999 United Nations Special Rapporteur delivered a damning report on widespread torture in Cameroon.25 Detention centers are usually overcrowded with inadequate sanitary and medical facilities as well as insufficient food.26 Many accused of crimes in the Anglophone provinces were jettisoned to prisons in Yaounde or Douala, and tried in Francophone provinces.27 In Yaounde, there are approximately 400 beds for 2700 prisoners.28 Bruises from machetes and lashes indicate that those incarcerated have been tortured, even though Cameroon recently criminalized torture. This persistence of torture in the prison system reveals an inadequate and corrupt system in which the law is flagrantly violated. Even though public officials have admitted to the Rapporteur that they need to create a human rights culture among the public and the forces of law and order, little has changed.29 The accused often do not have a right to an attorney or even to compensation for damages suffered.30 To compound these problems, there is no independent authority to conduct inquiries into offenses committed by members of the forces of law and order.31 In effect, there is little control over the police or the gendarmes, so human rights violations continue largely unabated. Traditional rulers have also committed many serious human rights abuses with absolute impunity throughout Cameroon, but especially in the North and Extreme North provinces. Many of these traditional rulers are members of the CPDM (Cameroon Peoples Democratic Movement) and support President Biya.32 They have often used their powers to pressure their subjects to vote for the CPDM.33 Some traditional leaders have instilled fear

25. 26. 27.

28. 29. 30. 31. 32.

33.

UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (UNCHR), CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING QUESTIONS OF TORTURE AND DETENTION, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR TO CAMEROON 4 (1999) [hereinafter UNCHR REPORT]. Id. For example, Justice Ebong, a respected Anglophone judge who was involved in the 31 January 1999 proclamation of Independence of the Southern Cameroons on Radio Buea, was taken to Yaounde, held incommunicado with no formal charges, even though his alleged crime was committed in the Anglophone Southwest province. UNCHR REPORT, supra note 25, at 13. Id. at 8. Id. at 24. Id. at 23. For example, the Fon of Bali, Northwest Province (a traditional ruler) ordered the killings of three men from the semi-nomadic pastoral Mbororo community over a stolen cattle dispute. An official investigation was launched and an arrest warrant issued against the Fon, but he was not arrested, nor was any further action taken. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2000, at 43 (2000) [hereinafter COUNTRY REPORTS 2000]. For example, the Lamido of Gashiga village in Demra, North Province, reportedly forced his inhabitants to vote for the CPDM on 12 October. See Forceful Voting, THE HERALD (Cameroon), 2021 Oct. 1997, at 5. The Fon of Bafut, Abumbi II advised his people to vote CPDM, because such a vote will attract enormous development in our

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in the general population, and have been the instigators of arbitrary detention and ill treatment.34 The press is also severely restricted; journalists are detained, harassed and sometimes tortured. Press censorship is severe and self-censorship on the increase. Papers are routinely banned, and since 1995, many journalists have been arrested and detained without charge or subjected to attacks.35 Overall, the Cameroon regime has significantly repressed the civil and political liberties of its citizens.

B. Economic Rights There are three basic economic rights: physical subsistence (food), access to health care, and education. The economic rights of Cameroonians have not fared well. In fact, they have worsened since the onset of the economic crisis commonly referred to as la crise. This crisis developed during and after the period of civil disobedience known as operation Villes Mortes (Ghost Town) and the governments often violent response to it. Opponents of Paul Biyas regime called for a general strike in June 1991 that lasted until January 1992, in an attempt to immobilize the economy by shutting down every city and town in Cameroon from Monday through Friday.36 The Cameroon economy experienced a decline in gross domestic product (GDP) as outlined below and a significant reduction in the states revenue base.37 Cameroon has traditionally had a politically and economically stable system. From 1961 to the mid- 1980s, Cameroon had a strong economy. As a low-income developing country, Cameroons economic indicators are not terrible, but what is significant is that the economic conditions are worsening. Structural adjustment programs introduced in 1989 and 1990 and CFA devaluations, as well as a rising level of corruption throughout

34. 35. 36. 37.

area and I want to congratulate all those who came out to exercise their civic rights. See also Bafut Fon Calls for Peaceful Coexistence Between CPDM and Opposition, THE HERALD, 2728 Oct. 1997, at 2. UNCHR REPORT, supra note 25. Each publisher must submit a copy of his publication to the administrative authority prior to circulation. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1998, at 44 (1998). See Jean-Germain Gros, The Hard Lessons of Cameroon, 6 J. OF DEMOCRACY 5, 118 (1995); Piet Konigs and Francis B. Nyamnjoh, The Anglophone Problem in Cameroon, 35 J. OF MOD. AFR. STUD. 215, n.28 (1997). See Milton Krieger, Cameroons Democratic Crossroads, 19904, 32 J. OF MOD. AFR. STUD. 624 (1994).

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society, have contributed to more difficult economic conditions for average Cameroonians.38 Cameroons gross national product (GNP) per capita annual growth rate fell substantially in the 1990s. From 1975 to 1990, the GNP per capita growth rate was 2.5 percent, but fell to 2.2 percent from 1990 to 1998.39 Available economic data from 1975 to 1998 shows that the economy experienced significant growth from 1980 to 1985, but that growth declined from 1985 to 1998. The GNP per capita overall did not fare well either, as indicated below.
GNP per capita (1995 US$)40

YEAR 1975 1980 1985 1990 1998

GNP per capita $616 $730 $990 $764 $646

The decline continued in 1999, with the GNP per capita a mere $588.41 The daily per capita supply of calories also fell, from 2,301 in 1970 to 2,111 in 1997, below the required amount for adequate nutrition.42 Given these trends, it seems as though the population below the national poverty line most likely increased from the available 1984 figure of 40 percent.43 The disparities between the rich and poor are striking with extreme poverty in the North and Extreme North provinces and an abundance of Mercedes Benzes between Yaounde and Douala. Meanwhile, total external debt increased from US$ 6.68 billion in 1990 to US $9.83 billion in 1998.44 Overall, the economic rights of Cameroonian individuals are eroding with corruption and economic recession eating into their overall entitlement.

38.

39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

For example, hotel workers had not been paid in over six months at one of the hotels I stayed at in Limbe, Cameroon in June 2000. Finally, the workers went on strike and demanded to be paid immediately. The owner was quite reticent and claimed that he did not have the money to pay them. He called in the police and gendarmes. If the workers were paid, they certainly did not receive any interest on the money that they were owed for over six months. UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (UNDP), THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000, tbl. 13, at 204 (2000) [hereinafter HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT]. Id. tbl. 8, at 180; WORLD BANK, THE WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 20002001, tbl. 1, at 274 (2000) [hereinafter WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT]. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 40. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000, supra note 39, tbl. 23, at 239. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000, supra note 40, tbl. 4, at 236. Id. tbl. 21, at 314.

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C. Communal/Group or Social Rights and the Minority Rights Problem A communal group can be defined as any group based on the shared ethnicity, origin, religion, or language of its members.45 In a country like Cameroon, with over 250 ethnic groups, a discussion about group or communal rights seems appropriate. Given the linguistic divide between the majority Francophones and the minority Anglophones, such a discussion is not only appropriate, but extremely necessary. The FrancophoneAnglophone division has proven to be one of the most divisive factors in Cameroonian politics. At times called les nemies dans la maison (the enemies in the house) because of their perceived dedication to the dismemberment of the nation, the Anglophones have suffered from an economic, political, and cultural marginalization in the Republic of Cameroon.46 This marginalization has helped to create rising disaffection among the Anglophone minority, and spurred the growth of the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), and its affiliated Southern Cameroons Youth Council (SCYC) which advocates secession from Francophone Cameroon. Issues of self-determination thus become juxtaposed with minority human rights issues. Anglophones feel like second-class citizens, exploited, marginalized and assimilated by the Francophone-dominated state and Francophone population.47 Anglophones feel that their resources (oil, cash crops) are exploited for the rest of Cameroon (especially in the Southwest Province) with little benefit. They have unequal access to education (because of French language deficiencies) and thus to high-paying jobs. Anglophones have also been marginalized in high-ranking appointments to parastatal organizations and government positions, as well as in the military, with only three Anglophones among 2000 new armed forces recruits.48 The Republic of Cameroon has also resorted to more severe human rights repression to quell Anglophone dissent. The government has re-

45. 46.

47. 48.

HOWARD, supra note 5, at 91. See Joseph Takougang, 1992 Multiparty Elections in Cameroon: Prospects for Democracy and Democratization, 31 J. ASIAN & AFR. STUD. 52 (1996); Dickson Eyoh, Conflicting Narratives of Anglophone Protest and the Politics of Identity in Cameroon, 16 J. CONTEMPORARY AFR. STUD. 249 (1998); Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Reconciling the Dual Heritage: Reflections on the Kamerun Idea, in AN AFRICAN EXPERIMENT IN NATION-BUILDING: THE BILINGUAL CAMEROON REPUBLIC SINCE REUNIFICATION (Ndiva Kofele-Kale ed., 1981). Konigs and Nyamnjoh, supra note 36, at 207. In the Cameroonian English newspaper, The Herald, Anglophones sent a bitter petition to President Biya denouncing the marginalisation of Anglophones and tribalism in the army. In particular, the argument was made that junior and less qualified Beti soldiers were often promoted while more qualified Anglophones were simply sidelined and discriminated against. See Anglophone Soldiers Petition Biya over Discrimination in Army, HERALD, 47 July 1997.

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sponded to the rise of the secessionist SCNC with torture and violent tactics in an attempt to suppress their freedom of expression.49 Overall, Cameroonian society suffers from torture, especially in the Anglophone provinces, and widespread extrajudicial murders, especially in the Extreme North province.50 Anglophones also suffer from economic, political, and cultural marginalization. Psychological torture is ubiquitous, while the rule of law remains far from secure.

IV. ACCOUNTING FOR THE LACK OF A RIGHTS-PROTECTIVE REGIME AND A RIGHTS-RESPECTIVE SOCIETY IN CAMEROON A rights-repressive regime did not develop overnight in Cameroon. Structural and historical factors must be examined in order to understand both the origin and perpetuation of human rights abuses in Cameroon. Thus, four key factors will be examined, including colonial legacies, the centralization and personalization of power, ubiquitous corruption, and external intervention.

A. Colonial Legacies Authoritarian colonial policies and the authoritarian political culture that evolved during the colonial and post-colonial period under President Ahidjo and President Biya contributed to the development of a rightsrepressive regime. Cameroon was a unique African colony in the sense that it had three former rulers: Germany, France, and Britain. Germany ruled Cameroon from 1884 until it was defeated in World War I. German rule has been described as featuring economic development and modest prosperity, though accompanied by much brutality and harshness.51 A League of Nations mandate divided post-German-rule Cameroon between the French and the British. The new French and British rulers divided Cameroon into two sections: the former taking 4/5ths and the latter taking 1/5th of the

49.

50. 51.

In March 1997, approximately fifty-seven people were arrested after they were suspected of terrorism. The government blamed the attacks on administrative and security officials on the SCNC. Many of the people arrested were tortured, both physically and emotionally. Some were forced to rape married women and walk barefoot on glass bottles while others were beaten and starved. Many have died because of the torture, several are still serving their sentences, while others have been released. The trial was widely regarded as a charade and a travesty of justice. Even the charges that were brought against the detainees were read in French even though the detained were mostly Anglophones. UNCHR REPORT, supra note 25. AI CAMEROON REPORT, supra note 23. TAMBI EYONGETAH MBUAGBAW et al., A HISTORY OF THE CAMEROON 63 (1987).

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country.52 It is this separation which has divided Cameroon geographically, culturally, socially, politically, and psychologically. The two colonizers ruled Cameroon very differently: the British practiced indirect rule and instituted British common law, while the French centralized rule and practiced French civil law with the ultimate goal of assimilating the Cameroonians into French culture.53 For nearly half a century, Britain and France inculcated quite contrasting political and legal systems into their respective territories. The British divided their territory into two regions: British Northern Cameroons and Southern Cameroons. Much of the governing was done in conjunction with neighboring Nigeria. This was much more efficient for Great Britain. British Northern Cameroons was under the administration of Northern Nigeria and maintained very little contact with Southern Cameroons, largely because of poor infrastructure.54 Southern Cameroons was under the authority of the Eastern region of Nigeria. In 1922, the League of Nations accepted this arrangement and France and Great Britain ruled their respective areas as Class B mandates.55 World War II, the elimination of the League of Nations, and the rise of the UN completely changed the nature of colonial rule. British Cameroons became a UN Trust Territory in 1946. The ultimate end of the trusteeship was self-government or independence.56 Until that point was reached, the UN was to be involved in the political and economic inner workings of the colony. French Cameroon achieved independence in 1960 and established itself as a self-governing entity, albeit maintaining strong ties with its former colonial power, France. The British Cameroons were governed as an extension of Nigeria with British Northern Cameroons part of Northern Nigeria and British Southern Cameroons as part of Eastern Nigeria. Ultimately, British Northern Cameroons joined Nigeria, since there was a greater cultural tie between the two regions. However, Southern Cameroons never really belonged anywhere. They fought for years to be recognized as a separate region in Nigeria. When Nigeria gained independence from Great Britain on October 1, 1960,

52. 53. 54. 55.

56.

See id. at 79. Id. at 9193. Nicodemus Fru Awasom, Colonial Background to the Development of Autonomist Tendencies, 15 J. THIRD WORLD STUD. 163, 166 (1998). As such, France and Great Britain were responsible for peace and good governance. In addition, they had, full powers of administration and legislation in the area, subject to the mandate. France and Great Britain were thus under no obligation to prepare their respective territories for self-government. See Victor Julius Ngoh, The Origin of the Marginalization of former Southern Cameroonians (Anglophones), 16 J. THIRD WORLD STUD. 3 (1990). MBUAGBAW et al., supra note 51, at 99101.

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Southern Cameroons continued to govern itself, no longer a part of the Nigerian Federation.57 In 1959, John Ngu Foncha, head of the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP), won the election over E.M.L. Endeley of the Kamerun National Council (KNC), on a platform which supported secession from Nigeria and reuniting with French Cameroon after independence.58 However, when the Cameroon delegation went to the United Nations later that year, it returned with a plebiscite that had only two choices. The first choice was independence through unification with the Federation of Nigeria, the second independence through unification with French Cameroon, with the stipulation that the actual plebiscite would be held no later than March 1961.59 Self-government was not an option. Foncha accepted these choices without the full support of the KNDP. Nevertheless, on 11 February 1961, despite the confusion and complaints about limited choices, Southern Cameroons voted overwhelmingly to join French Cameroon, not Nigeria.60 At the Foumban Constitutional Conference in 1961, the Anglophone delegates had only several hours to review a constitution which they had never seen before. In many areas, Foncha fell short. He did not distribute the constitution earlier, nor did he secure legal assistance or insist on a loose confederation. The Constitution was subsequently adopted by French Cameroon without the vote of the Southern Cameroons House of Assembly.61 The Southern Cameroons in 1961 became part of the new United Federal Republic of Cameroon. Even though Cameroon became a united federal republic, it was far from a nation; the society did not share common customs, a common history, a common language, or common origins. All it shared was a specific territory and government.62 Cameroon thus developed as a divided nationstate along linguistic lines, in addition to the religious divisions between the Muslim North and the Christian and animist South. These divisions were exacerbated by the policies of Cameroons first President, Amadou Ahidjo, and his successor, Paul Biya.

57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

See Awasom, supra note 54, at 16870. See Konigs and Nyamnjoh, supra note 36, at 21112 & n.11; see also MBUAGBAW et al., supra note 51, at 11519. The plebiscite read: a) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent federation of Nigeria, or b) do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Republic of Cameroon? Self-government was not an option. See Konigs and Nyamnjoh, supra note 36, at 212. See id. Because of this, many Anglophones argue that the Southern Cameroons are not living under a legal constitution and that Cameroon needs to pick up where it left off with the Foumban Constitutional talks. BERNARD A. MUNA, CAMEROON AND THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST CENTURY 21 (1993).

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B. Centralization and Personalization of Power President Amadou Ahidjo continued to centralize power in the Federation. In 1972, Ahidjo abolished the United Federal Republic of Cameroon that was put in place after reunification, and in its place established a centralized, unitary state. He divided the country into ten provinceseight Francophone and two Anglophone (the Northwest and Southwest Provinces).63 He claimed that the unitary system was necessary because Cameroon was such a small country, and therefore could not afford the expense of maintaining a complex and cumbersome system of three separate governments and assemblies.64 Power was increasingly centralized in the hands of the President, while the position of Vice-President as well as West Cameroons separate Assembly and House of Chiefs were abolished.65 These actions, along with a growing brutal repression of any group in opposition to Ahidjo, further confirmed Anglophone suspicions that they would be marginalized in this new system. Ahidjo used force to try to unify two different countries, two different cultures, two different economies.66 The abolition of the federal system created the basis for future Anglophone claims of marginalization and exploitation. In 1982, Ahidjo hand-picked his successor, Paul Biya. Many had hoped that Biya would push the country further along the democratic path. Although Cameroon became a multiparty democracy in 1990, this transition, like many other African transitions, was in name only. Biya carved up the North into three administrative provinces (Adamawa, North, and Far North) to undermine the power of the Muslim leaders in the North.67 Biya started out with a democratic agenda, but following the bloody 1984 coup attempt, began to centralize and personalize power even more than Ahidjo.68 Beti and Bulu ethnic groups (from Biyas region) began to dominate government and parastatal organizations. Repression was justified in the name of national unity, political and economic stability, and the security of the state. Many citizens were willing to forgo their short-term individual liberty for the sake of economic development and national unity.69 Under President Biya, the National

63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

See Gros, supra note 36, at 11415. MBUAGBAW et al., supra note 51, at 132. See id. at 13233. Id. at 128. See id. at 13940. The minister of armed forces, Gilbert Andze Tsoungui (a Beti) alleged that the 1984 was 99.9 percent northern-inspired. See Cameroon Coup Attempt: 99.9 Percent Northerners, 3479 W. AFR. 865 (1984). MUNA, supra note 62, at 14.

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Assembly became a rubber stamp, and the judiciary became corrupt, inefficient, and far from independent.70 For example, the President is the head of the Supreme Command of Magistrates and signs promotions, transfers, and the like. This has helped to undermine the rule of law and promote the personal/patrimonial rule of Paul Biya. As Gabriel argues, Both Ahidjo and Biya practiced presidentialism, built up an excessive clientelistic network to control a highly diverse country, and in order to obtain the loyalty of their clients, engaged in a massive redistribution of state resources.71 Co-optation of potential and real opposition forces was the crowning achievement of Biya and the CPDM. The CPDM has remained an important actor in Biyas personal/ patrimonial rule, remaining in power since Biya took over in 1982, creating a virtual one-party state. Opposition parties were only legalized in 1990 following widespread riots, many concentrated in Bamenda, Northwest Province. There are now some 150 political parties operating legally, but only three main opposition parties: the Social Democratic Front (SDF), the Union Nationale pour la Democratie et le Progres (UNDP), and the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC).72

C. Co-optation Until 1992, elections were simply a formality, with the CPDM and Biya assured of victory. Multiparty presidential elections were held in 1992 and 1997 with legislative elections in 1997.73 Biya and the CPDM remained in power, but the elections were widely criticized as fraudulent by both international and domestic observers.74 The UNDP and a faction of the UPC party joined the CPDM in a coalition government after the 1997 elections.75 Biya used patronage to win the support of individuals as well as regions, offering plumb ministerial posts to new coalition members and maintaining an alliance between his southern-based tribe and the northern Muslims.76

70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76.

See Joseph Takougang, Cameroon: Biya and Incremental Reform, in POLITICAL REFORM IN FRANCOPHONE AFRICA, supra note 2, at 165. Jurg Martin Gabriel, Cameroons Neopatrimonial Dilemma, 17 J. CONTEMP. AFR. STUD. 187 (1999). Id. at 178; see also COUNTRY REPORTS 2000, supra note 32, 2b. COUNTRY REPORTS 2000, supra note 32, 3. Id. at 43. Freedom House, Freedom in the World: 19992000: Cameroon, available at <http:// www.freedomhouse.org/survey/2000/reports/country/cameroon/html> (visited 12 Oct. 2001); see also COUNTRY REPORTS 2000, supra note 32, 3. For example, Biya appointed Bello Bouba Maigari, the leader of the UNDP (a party with significant Northern Muslim support) the lucrative position of senior minister in charge

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Biya also used patronage and key appointments to divide the Anglophone opposition. In 1997, Biya appointed Peter Musoke, an Anglophone elite from the Southwest Province, Prime Minister. Musoke replaced Simon Achidi Achu, an Anglophone elite from the Northwest Province.77 This appointment created greater Southwest Anglophone loyalty to the CPDM and further widened the gulf between the Southwest and Northwest province Anglophones. As Eyoh argues, cleavages between regional factions of the Anglophone elites have been sustained by a state-centered process of elite formation.78 Biya seems determined to remain in power, either through the use of the stick or carrot (co-optation). In 1996, President Biya had the constitution amended to allow the president to remain in power for seven years. Thus in 2004, Biya can run for another seven year term. If he wins, he will have held power in Cameroon for almost three decades.79 This centralization and personalization of power has led to the development of the big-man syndrome. The man with power (from the President to lower civil servant officials) uses his power as he sees fit, and the population generally looks up to the man with power to solve all their problems. The big man is thus above the law. This creates a negative human rights culture where the man with the most power can and does abuse the rights of men (and women) beneath him, because he has the power to do so, and because he makes the argument that it is in the national interest to do so. In other words, when you are the big man you dont have to respect the rights of others. In short, the centralization and personalization of power in Cameroon created a negative human rights culture, whereby the rights of some could be sacrificed for the so-called rights of others. This alienated the Anglophone minority, and undermined the rule of law, further promoting chop politics.80

D. Ubiquitous Corruption One of the greatest obstacles to the realization of a rights-protective regime and rights-respective society is the ubiquitous corruption throughout

77. 78. 79. 80.

of industrial and commercial development for bringing his UNDP party into a CPDM coalition government. COUNTRY REPORTS 2000, supra note 32, 3. Eyoh, supra note 46, at 259. COUNTRY REPORTS 2000, supra note 32, 3. Chop politics or politics of the belly refers to the insidious corruption that has developed within the state structure. Individuals justify corruption on the basis of eating or needing to feed their families. See JEAN-FRANCOIS BAYART, LETAT EN AFRIQUE: LA POLITIQUE DU VENTRE (1989).

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Cameroon. It pervades the entire system, beginning with President Biya, and working down to the lowest public official.81 Cameroon has been ranked the most corrupt country in the world for 1998 and 1999 by the German NGO Transparency International.82 There is little recourse to justice for the poor in Cameroononly for the rich or those with access to bribery money.83 This is exacerbated by the fact that very few lawyers are willing to take on human rights cases. The system clearly does not lend itself to this work, and often those who need representation on human rights cases cannot afford it. At a lower level in the justice system, the theme appears to be, as long as you dont cough it up, youre going to jail.84 At a higher level, there is the 30 percent rule: to get anything through the Finance Ministry you had to pay a 30 percent fee.85 More disturbing, however, is the fact that mob/vigilante justice is on the rise, partly because the rule of law is not enforced, and people are becoming frustrated and disillusioned by the lack of recourse to justice. Police and gendarmes routinely stop cars for bribes, thieves are able to buy their way out of prison, and traditional rulers rule with impunity, as long as they support the CPDM.86 This has resulted in a rise of mob justice and cases of necklacing, and the beating to death of suspected thieves.87 An overall
81. In an example of high level corruption, Prime Minister Peter Musonge signed a two billion CFA contract to modernize the deteriorating telephone system in the Southwest province. The contract went to a French firm that had been disqualified by experts at the National Tenders Board, because it was incapable of handling all aspects of the contract and because the equipment it was offering was obsolete. See Musonge Picks Disqualified French Firm to Modernise SW Phones, HERALD, 1719 Sept. 1997. Dr. Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Transparency International 1999 Corruption Perceptions Index, available at <http://www.gwdg.de/~uwvw/1999_CPI_FD.pdf> (visited 12 Oct. 2001). Judges move back and forth between the bench and the bar. This movement creates a system in which the magistrates feel that they have to protect one another, thereby preventing any just decisions. See Interview, Eta Besong, Jr., (Barrister) Buea, Cameroon (10 June 2000). INTER PRESS SERVICE, 20 Nov. 1999. Howard W. French, Outcome of Cameroon Vote: Fear of the Future, N.Y. TIMES, 14 Oct. 1997, at A3. For example, two policemen in Kumba, SW province on 7 July 1997, beat a taxi car driver to near death because he dared to frown at their extortionist tendencies at Meta quarters junction. HERALD, 2122 July 1997, at 5. In another case, a gendarme left a tailor from Yaounde incapacitated for twenty-one days after the tailor asked for his identification card back. See Gendarme Brutalizes Tailor in Yaounde, HERALD, 56 June 2000. See, e.g., Mundemba: Soldiers at War with Population, HERALD, 57 Feb. 1996; Abeng Kingsley Muna, Mob Lynches Thief, HERALD, 2831 Mar. 1996 at 5; Morara Victor, Ndiam: Irate Youths Threaten to Lynch Chief, HERALD, 2528 Apr. 1996; Abeng Kingsley Muna, Douala: Mob Action Claims Two, HERALD, 35 June 1996, at 5; Mob Justice, HERALD, 47 July 1997, at 5; Fru Ndi Says Any Soldier Who Kills a Civilian Will be Lynched, HERALD, 89 Oct. 1997; Mob Justice, HERALD, 2729 Oct. 1997; Bandit Loses

82. 83.

84. 85. 86.

87.

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increase in insecurity and violent crime has developed throughout Cameroon in the 1990s.88 It is not democracy per se that has resulted in an overall increase in insecurity and violence crime in Cameroon, but rather, the lack of a rights-protective regime and a rights-respective society. This can be applied to other case studies such as democratic Russia and South Africa. Corruption undermines the fabric of trust and working together for the common good in a society. The depth of corruption in Cameroon has resulted somewhat in a free-for-all. Once you get the opportunity to take advantage of eating you do so, whether you are a gendarme, a teacher, or a lowly civil servant. This is reflective of an overall collective weariness and discouragement89 among the general population and the lack of elite investment in democracy and human rights. As one analyst observed, the problem in Cameroon is not that one group has its hand in the public till but that all of them do!90

E. External Intervention No understanding of the development of a rights-repressive system in Cameroon would be complete without examining the role of external forces. As noted earlier, Cameroon had three colonial masters: the Germans, the British, and the French. The Germans and British have essentially removed their presence from Cameroon. Although Cameroon became part of the Commonwealth in 1995, the British have had little influence, and it seems little interest in influencing, the political, economic, or cultural development of Cameroon.91 Germany and the United States actually suspended economic aid to Cameroon in 1992 after Biya fraudulently won

88.

89. 90. 91.

Eyes, HERALD, 2930 Oct. 1997, at 5; Peter Adi Fonte, Population Tortures Bandit to Death, POST, 8 Nov. 1999, at 2; SDF Mobilizes to Lynch DOs, Magistrates, POST, 6 Mar. 2000. For example, The Herald reported that a young Canadian was shot four times on 20 January as he drove into the family residence. Others have been attacked and cars stolen. A Russian was intimidated and his passport seized, while within the span of two years, there have been 150 cases of assault on diplomats. See Emmanuel Tumanjong, Acute Insecurity in Yaounde: Diplomats Poised to Sanction Biyas Regime, HERALD, 57 Feb. 1996, at 1. Even the United States Ambassador to Cameroon was pistol-whipped in an attack outside his official residence in March 2000. See also COUNTRY REPORTS 2000, supra note 32, 1a. See, e.g., CELESTIN MONGA, THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF ANGER: CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 53 (1996). Gabriel, supra note 71, at 177. Even though Cameroon has been a member of the Commonwealth organization headed by Queen Elizabeth II for five years, and has failed to fulfill its commitments to the rule of law and human rights as set forth in the Harare Declaration, it has not been castigated by the organization.

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the elections. Yet the World Bank and Western diplomats (the United States, the Netherlands, Germany, and France) have been trying to persuade opposition party leaders to join the government.92 As part of la Francophonie and the CFA zone,93 Cameroon has remained heavily under French political, economic, and cultural influence. The French have been willing to support the Biya regime and its bad human rights record, in order to maintain political and economic stability as well as continued French influence and access to Cameroonian oil and other natural resources. The Villes Mortes (Ghost Town) campaigns of 1990 1992 helped precipitate la crise and destroyed the small savings that the average Cameroonian had.94 Biya was able to withstand the impact of the Ghost Town campaigns because of continued funding that the French government provided.95 This had the effect of deflating the hopes of opposition members and average Cameroonians that sustained mass protest could actually influence peaceful change in Cameroon. French aid helped ensure that Biya was firmly entrenched in Cameroon. Even though the 1992 elections were widely recognized as fraudulent, France sent a congratulatory letter to Biya along with millions of dollars in foreign aid throughout the 1990s.96 France also wrote off US$ 534 million of Cameroons debt in 1994.97 As Gabriel argues: [To] a large extent . . . clientelistic politics were financed from non-Cameroonian sources.98 In essence, through inaction and continued aid to Cameroon, France has condoned continued regime human rights abuses in Cameroon. However, the French were not alone in supporting the Biya regime. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank also provided Biyas regime with crucial economic support. In 1997, the IMF extended a US$ 220 million enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) loan, which allowed for a major debt rescheduling deal with the Paris Club amounting

92. 93. 94.

95. 96. 97. 98.

See SDF Admits Being Moved to Join CPDM Government but Fru Ndi Says No Way, HERALD, 1113 July 1997; Mukong Says SDF Has Lost Track, Wants Rebirth Convention in Bamenda, HERALD, 12 Nov. 1997, at 1. The CFA Zone is the Communaut Financiere Africaine. The former French colonies in West and Central Africa are linked to France and its economic policies and the French franc. Operation Villes Mortes, the general strike called by Biyas opponents in June 1991 (lasting until January 1992) was an attempt to get the government to agree to a sovereign National Conference. The campaign effectively shut down major cities and towns in the Littoral, West, Northwest, and Southwest provinces. See Gros, supra note 36, at 18; see also Konigs and Nyamnjoh, supra note 36, at 215, n.28. See Gros, supra note 36, at 120. Mark Huband, A Flawed Victory, AFR. REP. 43 (Jan.Feb. 1993); Krieger, supra note 37, at 625; Gros, supra note 36. Edith Hodgkinson, Cameroon: Economy, 29 AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA 266, 268 (2000). Gabriel, supra note 71, at 176.

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to US$ 2 billion over a three-year period.99 Meanwhile, foreign debt remains at 98 percent of the GNP,100 but Biya continues to refuse to account for oil revenues from off-shore oil sources in the Southwest province. It has become apparent that many Cameroonians are frustrated with both the corruption and the violation of their human rights. These people come from all segments of society, but the majority tend to be Anglophones. They have looked to the international community to enforce the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and various other human rights treaties, as well as to foreign countries. While the UN has sent a Special Rapporteur who has made critical statements about the government, very little has changed.101 If anything, external engagement (especially French) has helped perpetuate a rights-repressive regime and encourage continued endemic corruption. Overall, structural and historical conditions have not aided in the development of a rights-protective regime or a rights-respective society in Cameroon.

V. THE IMPEDIMENTS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RIGHTS-RESPECTIVE CULTURE In addition to the above structural/historical factors, the weak development of civil society must be examined, to understand the factors that not only contribute to the development of a rights-repressive regime, but also impede the development of a rights-respective society.

A. A Weak and Divided Civil Society Hope for change rests with civil society, but not just any civil society. Civil society needs to be democratic, rights-respective, and organized. If civil society is not democratic, how can it promote democratic institutions? If civil society is not rights-respective, how can it promote a rights-protective regime? Unfortunately, Cameroonian civil society is far from either demo-

99. 100. 101.

Hodgkinson, supra note 97. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 40, tbl. 21, at 314. For example, Special Rapporteur Nigel Rodley stated that he had no doubt that, torture is condoned if not encouraged at the level of the heads of the places of detention where it takes place and that if the top leadership of these forces and those politically responsible above them do not know what [his] delegation was able to discover in a few days, it can only be because of a lack of will to know. United National Press Release, UN Special Rapporteur Reports Widespread and Systematic Torture in Cameroon, U.N. Doc. HR/oo/19 (28 Feb. 2000).

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cratic or rights-respective. Traditional rulers are allowed (by the state and citizens) to abuse the human rights of others in the name of tradition; one group (the Francophones) is willing to marginalize another group (the Anglophones) economically, politically, and culturally, while the elite in power greedily engage in rampant eating and the poor struggle to put food on the table. As Bratton and Van de Walle argue, Cameroon has no forceful professional organizations, unions, bar associations or human rights movements.102 Overall, Cameroonians are cowed down as one human rights activist put it; they fear torture, they are afraid, and they are not prepared to sacrifice.103 Many fear losing their relative political and economic stability, and possible access to the spoils of patronage politics. More importantly, Cameroon society is divided: regionally, linguistically, ethnically, and religiously.

B. Civil Disobedience But Cameroonian civil society has not been without its activism. In response to the governments unwillingness to call a sovereign national conference, in June 1991, members of a newly formed opposition coalition, the National Co-ordination Committee of Opposition Parties (NCCOP), called for a general strike: Operation Villes Mortes (Operation Ghost Town). This general strike was supposed to shut down every city and town in the country from Monday through Friday until the government capitulated and called a sovereign national conference. The campaign was most effective in the South, with major cities and towns effectively shut down in the Littoral, West, Northwest, and Southwest Provinces.104 The campaign of civil disobedience ended in mid-October 1991 following government repression and detention of opposition members and protestors.105 Biya offered a trilateral meeting with opposition members to establish a ten-member committee to draft constitutional reforms. Forty of the registered forty-seven opposition parties agreed to sign the agreement.106 The Social Democratic Front (SDF), led by Fru Ndi, and several other parties within the NCCOP rejected the agreement, causing a severe fragmentation within the opposition coalition. As Gros suggests, once one group agreed to the trilateral meeting, they all fell in because they didnt want to lose out

102. 103. 104. 105. 106.

BRATTON & VAN DE WALLE, supra note 2, at 14749, 24955. Interview, Human Rights Defence Group Activist, Bamenda, Cameroon (June 2000). Gros, supra note 36, at 118. In April 1991, more than 100 people were killed in riots and demonstrations. Gros, supra note 36, at 119.

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on the national cake.107 The dissenting opposition parties that didnt accept the tripartite agreement formed a political coalition called the Allied Front for Change. But there was no sustained countrywide protest after the 1992 elections. Certainly the ability of the Biya regime (aided by French aid) to withstand the Villes Mortes campaigns deflated opposition hopes of peacefully unseating Biya. In 1997, the SDF, UNDP, and UDC boycotted all of the elections, including the presidential elections, because of a lack of an independent electoral commission. Yet the UNDP leader, Bello Bouba Maigari and a handful of other UNDP and UPC members were made ministers in Biyas new cabinet. This move helped to bring Biya greater support in the North and further divide the opposition.

C. Weak Opposition Most of the major political parties have experienced internal divisions and factions as well as external divisions. The UNDP has a predominant Northern and Muslim constituency, while the SDF has a predominant Anglophone and Northwest province constituency. The UNDP split in 1994 over a decision by the vice-chairman, Hamadou Moustapha, to accept a cabinet portfolio without obtaining the partys prior consent. The UPC also had a breakaway faction form in May 1996.108 The UNDP and the UDC also refused to join a new informal alliance of 16 opposition movements (Front des allis pour le changement) because it was dominated by the SDF and Fru Ndi. Even the SDF had a breakaway group, called the Social Democratic Movement (SDM), which formed under the leadership of the former secretary-general of the SDF, Siga Asanga. In 1998, ten of the forty-three SDF parliamentary deputies resigned from the party in protest because of perceived tribalism and authoritarianism of its leadership.109 The SDF even expelled its first national vice-president because of his criticism of Fru Ndis authoritarian style of leadership.110 Within the Anglophone movement there are also serious divisions. Anglophones in the Southwest Province fear domination by Northwest Province Anglophones. This division dates back to the colonial period when

107. 108. 109. 110.

Id. The Secretary-General of the UPC, Augustin Frederic Kodock, who held a ministerial portfolio of agriculture, was dismissed from the party and formed a breakaway faction. Pierre Englebert, Cameroon: Recent History, 29 AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA, 260, 265 (2000). Id.

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the Anglophones from the Northwest province were brought to work in the coastal plantations of the Southwest Province. Many of the forest zone Anglophones (Southwest province) view the grassfield Anglophones from Bamenda (Northwest province) as the stranger or settler population.111 There is even a deeper animosity between the Southwest and Northwest peoples, that some could call racist. Many in the Southwest refer to peoples from the Northwest as former slaves and say that they do not wish to have former slaves as their masters (in an independent Southern Cameroons).112 Thus, there is heated disagreement among the Anglophones on what needs to happen to secure Anglophone minority rights. The Anglophones from the Southwest province are less hesitant to adopt a position of secession from the rest of Francophone Cameroon because they fear Northwest Anglophone domination. A faction of Anglophones within the SDF prefer a return to a federal system in Cameroon, while more radical elements in the SCNC and the SCYL want outright secession.113 Opposition parties suffer from external divisions and lack of unity as well as internal fragmentation. As a result, they are easy prey for government co-optation and sell-outs as discussed earlier. The temptations for joining in on the eating tend to be too high, with many opposition members selling out to the CPDM and President Biya. Opposition parties and politicians thus represent a weak vanguard force for the promotion of democratic values and human rights.

C. The Role of Indigenous Human Rights NGOs Since the international community has failed to provide the impetus for change in Cameroon, and the opposition parties have been weakened by co-optation, internal divisions, and external bickering, what role have indigenous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) played in helping to develop a rights-respective society and rights-protective regime? There are several human rights NGOs operating in Cameroon, but the largest is the

111. 112. 113.

Ngoh, supra note 55, at 178; Krieger, supra note 37, at 618. Informal conversations with author and Southwest elites and intellectuals in Buea, Limbe, and Tiko, Cameroon (MayJune 2000). Even with the federal system option, there is division. Some advocate a return to the socalled two-state option, which would be a return to the pre-1972 federal arrangement. Others argue for the ten-state option, which would result in a radical decentralization of power to the current ten provincial administrative units. See Eyoh, supra note 46, at 261. For example, Fru Ndi advocates a four-state federation as a panacea for the Anglophone problem, creating a further divide between the SCNC and the SDF. See also Fru Ndi Dissociates SDF from Southern Cameroons Independence, POST, 12 May 2000; SCNC Youths Recommend Widespread Guerrilla Warfare, POST, 15 May 2000.

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Human Rights Defence Group (HRDG).114 Human rights NGOs tend to be weak, headquartered and focused in Yaounde (with the exceptions of the MDDHL and the HRDG), with little cooperation among them. Francophone human rights NGOs tend to be more subdued when criticizing government human rights abuses, not wanting to raise the ire of the government.115 Most indigenous human rights NGOs focus more on monitoring rather than education. They remain largely uncoordinated and under heavy attack from the government if they become too vocal and critical of the regime.116 There is a National Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms, but it lacks independence from the government.117 The committee is appointed by the government and led by a former minister of government.118 Although monitoring of human rights abuses is a very important watchdog role that human rights organizations play, there needs to be more human rights education at the grassroots level to ensure the development of a rights-respective society and a rights-protective regime. If individuals do not know their rights, then how can they demand them?119 In addition to human rights organizations, there are a plethora of associational organizations, Common Initiative Groups (CIGs), and secret society organizations throughout Cameroon. Because of space constraints,

114.

115. 116.

117. 118. 119.

These include the National League for Human Rights, the Organization for Human Rights and Freedoms, the Association of Women Against Violence, The Cameroonian Association of Female Jurists, the Cameroonian Association for Childrens Rights, Conscience Africaine, the Movement for the Defense of Human Rights and Liberties (MDHRL), the Human Rights Defense Group, the National Association of Non-tribalists and Non-racists, the Committee of Action for Womens and Childrens Rights (CADEF), the Human Rights Clinic and Education Center, the Association of Women Against Violence, the Cameroonian Association for Childrens Rights, the Cameroon National Association for Family Welfare (CAMNAFAW), Tribes without Frontiers (TSF), the Association for the Promotion of Communal Initiatives, the League for Rights and Freedoms (LDL), and Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture (ACAT). These groups have also been very active in monitoring human rights abuses as well as holding seminars on human rights. Interview, Human Rights Defense Group Activist, Bamenda, Cameroon, June 2000. For example, members of the MDDHL (Mouvement pour la dfense des droits de lhomme et des liberts), a Marou-based NGO, who investigated extrajudicial killings by the brigade anti-gang in the North, received threats from the brigade anti-gang, while others were arrested by the gendarmerie. See AI CAMEROON REPORT, supra note 23. Id. The CNDHL was established by Presidential Decree and members are appointed in the same way. Their findings have never been published. Human rights organizations that focus their attention on urban, elite populations may play an important role in advocacy and monitoring. But more human rights organizations need to invest in grassroots, lower-cost, rural and urban poor level education campaigns. The HRDG has had to do this because of a large cut in international funding (due to an increasingly exclusive focus on the abuse of Anglophone rights and its alignment with the SCNC).

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this paper cannot deal with an adequate appraisal of the impact of these groups on the development of a rights-respective society and a rightsprotective regime.120 In short, it seems that autonomous civil society organizations tend to be weak vis--vis the Cameroonian state. Given the political climate of neo-patrimonialism121 and the economic climate of crisis, few individuals have the time or the desire to get involved in organizations that could jeopardize their physical well-being.

VI. CONCLUSIONS With the rise in general violent crime, significant human rights abuses, vigilante/mob justice, ubiquitous corruption, and Anglophone secessionist tendencies, it seems that Cameroon is well on its way to becoming one more African tragedy and certainly not a democratic success story. How can this be given Cameroons relative political and economic success in the first three decades of Independence? This article has examined the historical and structural factors that account for Cameroons failure, including the colonial legacies, the centralization and personalization of power, ubiquitous corruption, and external intervention. The structural and historical foundation of Cameroon encouraged the development of a rights-repressive regime and impeded the development of a rights-respective society and a strong civil society. If Sidney Tarrow is correct when he argues, leaders can only create a social movement when they tap more deep-rooted feelings of solidarity or identity,122 then Cameroon has a problem. Cameroonian civil society remains divided and fragmented, even within the Anglophone movement. One of the most important lessons is that international support to the Biya regime must end. Although the economic system may become worse and hardships may increase as a consequence, in the long run, only a change in the status quo will incite people to overthrow the illegitimate,

120.

121.

122.

One excellent study has already been conducted on the role of the Takumbeng women of the Northwest province in local and increasingly, national politics. See Catherine Russell, One Hand No Fit Tie Bundle: Women, Groups and Power in the Grassfields of Cameroon, Paper presented at the 43rd annual meeting of the African Studies Assn., Nashville, Tenn. (19 Nov. 2000). Neo-patrimonialism refers to the patron-clientage system that encourages ubiquitous corruption and is based on favorable relationships between the patron (state official) and the client (individual). As Richard Sandbrook suggests, Neo-patrimonial rule inhibits economic development by subordinating economic objectives to the short-run exigencies of political survival. RICHARD SANDBROOK, CLOSING THE CIRCLE: DEMOCRATIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 97 (2000). SIDNEY TARROW, THE POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, COLLECTIVE ACTION & POLITICS 5, n.85 (1996).

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rights-abusive regime of Paul Biya. In the end, only the Cameroonian people can bring about a rights-respective and rights-protective regime in Cameroon. Cameroonians need to unite to overthrow Biya and the neopatrimonial system. But they need to go beyond simply ousting Biya from power; they need to make sure that another Biya (Big man) does not simply take over the reigns of power. Even though Cameroon is technically a multiparty democracy, the reality is far from democratic. With growing economic crisis and ethnic and linguistic divisions, the current multi-party system will only serve to increase overall frustrations and promote chop politics and ubiquitous corruption. If people do not have confidence in the institutions of justice and government, they are more likely to resort to violence to settle disputes. Vigilante/mob justice will likely increase, as will secessionist tendencies among the Anglophones. As Monga argues,
The gulf between the political realm and the rest of society is so large that the concept of citizenship remains a slogan. The tendency to resort to violence in numerous countries is a simultaneous reflection of the peoples desire for revenge against illegitimate governments and of the governing elites inability to see what is really at stake.123

Until Cameroonian elites embrace the virtues of a rights-respective culture and wider Cameroonian society demands human rights protection, the Cameroonian reality will remain one of failed democratic transition.

123.

MONGA, supra note 89, at 188.