OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, vs. HON. GENARO C. GINES, as Presiding Judge, Branch 26; MA.

GORGONIA L. FLORES, Court Interpreter and Officer-in-Charge, Branch 26; ROSIE M. MUNAR, Stenographic Reporter, Branch 26, PACITA B. DIAZ, Staff Assistant IV, Office of the Clerk of Court; MA. CONCEPCION B. DIAZ, Staff Assistant I, Branch 26, and ALFREDO V. LACSAMANA, JR., Staff Assistant II, Branch 26, all of the RTC, San Fernando, La Union, Respondents Facts: Pursuant to the Resolution of the Court En Banc, dated July 30, 1991, the undersigned hereby institutes this administrative complaint against Judge Genaro C. Gines, Presiding Judge, Branch 26; Ma. Gorgonia L. Flores, Court Interpreter and Officer-in- Charge, Branch 26; Rosie M. Munar, Stenographic Reporter, Branch 26; Pacita B. Diaz, Staff Assistant IV, Office of the Clerk of Court; Ma. Concepcion B. Diaz, Staff Assistant I, Branch 26; and Mr. Alfredo V. Lacsamana, Jr., Staff II, Branch 26, all of the RTC, San Fernando, La Union, for Dishonesty; Violation of par. (e), Sec. 3 of R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) as amended; and Violation of Administrative Order No. 6, dated June 30, 1975, Circular No. 7, dated September 23, 1974, and Administrative Order No. 1, dated January 28, 1988, by virtue of their collective illegal acts involving deliberate and surreptitious assignment of cases at the Docketing and Receiving Section, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, San Fernando, La Union.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 1. This complaint is substantially anchored on the Report submitted by Atty. Aurora P. Sanglay, Clerk of Court, RTC, San Fernando, La Union, relative to her investigation of the alleged anomaly in the nonraffling of cases in the said Court, and the Affidavit-complaint of Ma. Concepcion B. Diaz dated September 19, 1991, implicating other court personnel involved in the aforestated irregularity; chanrobles virtual law library 2. Atty. Sanglay, in her Report, averred that: 2.1. From April 3, 1989 to April, 1991, there were forty-four (44) Special Proceedings cases, twenty-seven (27) Land Registration cases, six (6) Civil Cases, and three (3) Criminal Cases which were directly assigned to the RTC, Branch 26, San Fernando, La Union, without passing through the mandatory, raffling procedure, of cases except for three (3) special proceedings cases which were assigned to Branch 27, which anomaly had been going on since 1986; 2.2. Pacita Diaz, Ma. Concepcion Diaz and Alfredo Lacsamana, Jr. were the court employees incharge in (sic) the receiving and docketing of the Land Registration Cases, Special Proceedings cases and Civil Cases, respectively; and chanrobles virtual law library 2.3. There is a probability that the aforesaid clerks, who were in-charge of receiving the cases, did not submit deliberately to the Officer-in-Charge, some of the cases received from mandatory raffling in compliance with the Administrative Orders/Circulars of the Supreme Court. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MAXIMO WONG, Respondents. 1. filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname. 2. As earlier stated, on July 2, 1986, the matter was resolved in favor of private respondent, the trial court decreeing that, the jurisdictional requirements having been fully complied with, petitioner's prayer to change his name from Maximo Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr. was

granted. 5 On appeal to respondent court, and over the opposition of petitioner Republic through the Solicitor General, the decision of the court below was affirmed in full, hence, this petition for review on certiorari.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 3. The lone issue to be settled is whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for change of name are valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of said petition.chanroblesvirtuala 4. A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is absolute, intended to protect the individual from being confused with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and, therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible. 11 chanrob 5. itle XIII, Book I of the Civil Code, in Articles 364 to 380, provides the substantive rules which regulate the use of surnames. Considering the subject and personalities involved in this present review, particular attention must be called to Article 365 which mandates that "(a)n adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter," in correlation with Article 341 on the effects of adoption, among which is to"(e)ntitle the adopted person to use the adopter's surname." This same entitlement of an adopted child is maintained in Article 39(3), Title II of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code. More recently, Executive Order No. 209, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, or the Family Code, echoes the same statutory right of an adopted child to use the surname of the adopter. 12 Clearly, from the very wordings of the law, it may be inferred that this use of the surname of the adopter by the adopted child is both an obligation and a right.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library 6. Under Article 376 by the Civil Code, "(n)o person can change his name or surname without judicial authority." The application for change of name thereunder involves a special proceeding governed by and conducted under the strictures of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court and one which involves substantial changes, with the declared objective of such judicial proceedings being the prevention of fraud. The purpose of the statutory procedure authorizing a change of personal name is simply to have, wherever possible, a record of the change, and in keeping with the object of the statute, court to which application is made should normally make its decree recording such change of name. 13 chan 7. This is incontrovertible proof that she never entertained any misgivings or reservations with respect to her consent to his petition. This likewise dispels any possible confusion as to private respondent's legal status or adoptive paternity and his successional rights. Concordantly, we have heretofore held that a change of name does not define or effect a change in one's existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship; what is altered is only the name. 41 chanrobles virtual law library 8. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.chanroblesvi IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA HONORATO B. CATINDIG, Petitioner. May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case. 1. wHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner's legitimate child and legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.

2. On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration[5] praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name. 3. On May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. 4. Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name 'Garcia (her mother's surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of 'Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families. 5. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons: 6. First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie's filiation with her natural mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained. 7. Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows. 8. Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that 'the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother. [7] 9. We find merit in the petition. 10. Liberal Construction of 11. Adoption Statutes In Favor Of 12. Adoption 13. It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption.[25] The interests and welfare of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration,[26] hence, every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.[27] 14. Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that: 15. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. 16. This provision, according to the Code Commission, 'is necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law.[28] 17. Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother's surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so. 18. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother's surname 'GARCIA as her middle name. 19. Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of adoption. 20. SO ORDERED.

ISABELITA S. LAHOM, Petitioner, v. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO (previously referred to as DR. MELVIN S. LAHOM), Respondent. 1. That in view of respondents insensible attitude resulting in a strained and uncomfortable relationship between him and petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that after all respondents only motive to his adoption is his expectancy of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No. 99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her love and affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no more basis for its existence, hence this petition for revocation.[1 Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March 1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption. Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads: SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental obligations. 2. It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1975. By then, the new law,22 had already abrogated and repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could be pursued. Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the fiveyear bar rule under Rule 10023 of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person has no vested right in statutory privileges.24 While adoption has often been referred to in the context of a right, the privilege to adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute.[25 It is a privilege that is governed by the states determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the child.26 Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State. 27 Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.28 While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.