DUE PROCESS Arsenio Lumiqued vs Apolonio Exevea et al Due Process Assistance by Counsel Lumiqued was the Regional Director

r of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued. ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry? HELD: The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS HON. RALPH LANTION Mark Jimenez was charged of multiple crimes ranging from tax evasion to wire tapping to conspiracy to defraud the USA. Jimenez was then wanted in the US. The US government, pursuant to the RP-US extradition treaty requested to have Jimenez be extradited there. Jimenez requested for a copy of the complaint against him as well as the extradition request by the USA. The DOJ sec refused to provide him copy thereof advising that it is still premature to give him so and that it is not a preliminary investigation hence he is not entitled to receive such copies. Jimenez sued the DOJ Sec and the lower court ruled in favor of Jimenez. ISSUE: Whether or not Jimenez is deprived of due process. HELD: The SC affirmed the ruling of the lower court. The case against Jimenez refer to an impending threat of deprivation of ones property or property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us, involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense. GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Morales, and Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN CRESPO, respondents. PANGANIBAN, J.: In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to notice and hearing before warrants for their arrest can be issued? Equally important, are they entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending? In general, the answer to these two novel questions is No. The explanation of and the reasons for, as well as the exceptions to, this rule are laid out in this Decision. The Case Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to void and set aside the Orders dated May 23, 2001i[1] and July 3, 2001ii[2] issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42.iii[3] The first

assailed Order set for hearing petitioners application for the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of Respondent Mark B. Jimenez. The second challenged Order, on the other hand, directed the issuance of a warrant, but at the same time granted bail to Jimenez. The dispositive portion of the Order reads as follows: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the [Court] finds probable cause against respondent Mark Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest of the respondent be issued. Consequently and taking into consideration Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, this Court fixes the reasonable amount of bail for respondents temporary liberty at ONE MILLION PESOS (Php 1,000,000.00), the same to be paid in cash. Furthermore respondent is directed to immediately surrender to this Court his passport and the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation is likewise directed to include the name of the respondent in its Hold Departure List. iv[4] Essentially, the Petition prays for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the taking of Jimenez into legal custody. The Facts This Petition is really a sequel to GR No. 139465 entitled Secretary of Justice v. Ralph C. Lantion.v Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,vi[6] the United States Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law. Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25.vii[7] The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.viii[8] Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution.ix[9] By an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution has become final and executory. Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069. Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex -Parte Motion,x[10] which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash.xi[11] After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.xii[12] Hence, this Petition Issues In sum, the substantive questions that this Court will address are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued, and (2) whether he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we shall take up the alleged prematurity of the Petition for Certiorari arising from petitioners failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek relief in the Court of Appeals (CA), instead of in this Court.xiii[15] We shall also preliminarily discuss five extradition postulates that will guide us in disposing of the substantive issues. The Courts Ruling The Petition is meritorious. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust, each others legal system and judicial process.xiv[34] More pointedly, our duly authorized representatives signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person sought to be extradited.xv[35] That signature signifies our full faith that the accused will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and basic rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the treaty would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked for its unconstitutionality. 3. The Proceedings Are Sui Generis Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,xvi[36] extradition proceedings are not criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generis -- in a class by itself -- they are not. An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards. In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case. Finally, unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the demands of the nations foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite. Given the foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited.xvii[37] Such determination during the extradition proceedings will only result in needless duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of the function

of the assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction.xviii[38] The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.xix[39] Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith. Fourth, our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the national interest. Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comityxx[40]with the requesting state. On the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world community. Such failure would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us, particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity.xxi[41] Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Treaty.xxii[42] This principle requires that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, [t]h e demanding government, when it has done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is under obligation to make the surrender. xxiii[43] Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused, should it be found proper. 2. On the Basis of the Constitution Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. It provides: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination -under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest. In Ho v. Peoplexxiv[54] and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the extent of conducting a hearing just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we required was that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment, or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. xxv[55] In Webb v. De Leon,xxvi[56] the Court categorically stated that a judge was not supposed to conduct a hearing before issuing a warrant of arrest: Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. At most, in cases of clear insufficiency of evidence on record, judges merely further examine complainants and their witnesses.xxvii[57] In the present case, validating the act of respondent judge and instituting the practice of hearing the accused and his witnesses at this early stage would be discordant with the rationale for the entire system. If the accused were allowed to be heard and necessarily to present evidence during the prima facie determination for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, what would stop him from presenting his entire plethora of defenses at this stage -- if he so desires -- in his effort to negate a prima facie finding? Such a procedure could convert the determination of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial of the entire proceedings and possibly make trial of the main case superfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the summary nature of extraditions.

That the case under consideration is an extradition and not a criminal action is not sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of procedures more protective of the accused. If a different procedure were called for at all, a more restrictive one -- not the opposite -- would be justified in view of respondents demonstrated predisposition to flee. Since this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper procedure: Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie findingxxviii[58] is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will best serve the ends of justice in extradition cases. WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23, 2001 is hereby declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July 3, 2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United States as well as our Extradition Law. No costs. JANE CARAS y SOLITARIO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. QUISUMBING, J.: This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appealsxxix[1] which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92, finding petitioner Jane Caras y Solitario guilty of 15 counts of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) violations. The facts of the case as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows: JANE S. CARAS has appealed from the judgment of conviction in fifteen (15) related cases of Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. The first Information (docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-93-44420) against her reads as follows: That on or about the 5 day of January 1992 in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Chu Yang T. Atienza to apply on account or for value PCI Bank, Commonwealth Ave. Branch Check No. 017744 dated March 18, 1992 payable to the order of CASH in the amount of P14,125.00 Philippine Currency, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment which check when presented for payment was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Chu Yang T. Atienza the amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice. In Criminal Case Nos. Q-93-44421 to Q-93-44434, the informations were similarly worded as above, except for the respective amounts involved, dates, numbers of checks and dates of commission. When arraigned on August 16, 1993, accused Caras pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial proceeded. The evidence for the prosecution tends to show that on or about February 18, 1992, up to May 31, 1992 at Quezon City, accused Jane Caras obtained from complainant Chu Yang T. Atienza on installment various gift checks and purchase orders from Uniwide Sales and in payment thereof, the accused issued to the complainant the following checks drawn against Philippine Commercial Bank: (15 checks)
th

When the checks were presented for deposit or encashment, they were all dishonored for the reason Account Closed. Despite repeated verbal and written demands made on her to replace the dishonored checks with cash, she failed and refused to do so. The accused admitted that she issued the fifteen (15) checks. She claimed, however, that they were given to Marivic Nakpil,xxx[2] alleged sister of the complainant, as guarantee deposit, that is, for every gift check and purchase order given to the accused, she issued personal checks to guarantee its payment. The checks are not to be encashed nor deposited with any bank. With regard to Check No. 017769 in the amount of P540,316.35 (Exh. O), accused claimed that she entrusted the said check to Marivic Nakpil in blank, with her signature but without any amount or numerical figures on the face of the check. On May 13, 1994, the Court a quo rendered its judgment GUILTY on 15 alleged crimes On June 13, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court in an Order dated September 22, 1994. Petitioner then filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals which rendered judgment affirming court a quo decision. On April 11, 1997, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated July 15, 1997. Hence, this petition, in which petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred: I II IN NOT RESOLVING THE ISSUES BROUGHT OUT IN THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; IN COMPLETELY IGNORING THE PURPOSE OF THE ISSUANCE OF THE CHECKS;

III IN COMPLETELY IGNORING THE LACK OF PERSONALITY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TO INITIATE AND PROSECUTE THESE CASES; IV IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION (AS TO PCIB CHECK NO 017769 FOR P540,318.35) AND FOR LACK OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE INSUFFICIENCY OF HER FUNDS; V IN COMPLETELY IGNORING THAT THE COURT A QUO HAD NO TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE. Petitioner admits having issued the checks subject of this case, save for one, but insists that she issued them merely to guarantee payment of her obligation to a certain Marivic Nakpil; they were not supposed to have been deposited in a bank. Petitioner also denies having transacted with private complainant Chu Yang T. Atienza, and asserts that the latter did not have personality to prosecute this case. Petitioner argues that one of the checks, PCIB check no. 017769, was issued in blank. She claims that this check was issued without consideration and that the element of the crime that the check must be issued for value is lacking as regards this particular check. Also in relation to her fourth assignment of error, petitioner asserts that she was not properly notified of the dishonor of her checks. She maintains that the prosecution failed to show that she received the notices of dishonor purportedly sent to her. She points out that no return card nor acknowledgment receipt for the first demand letter was presented in evidence. While there was a return card attached to the second demand letter, this was not marked nor offered in evidence, and hence must be ignored. Petitioner also assails the jurisdiction of the Quezon City RTC over the case, maintaining that there is no evidence showing that the checks were issued and delivered in Quezon City. Neither is there evidence as to where the private complainant received the checks, and whether or not she received them from the accused herself. For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that B.P. 22 does not make any distinction regarding the purpose for which the checks were issued. Thus, it is of no moment even if it were true that, as claimed by accused, the checks she issued were meant only to guarantee payment of her obligation. Criminal liability attaches whether the checks were issued in payment of an obligation or to guarantee payment of that obligation.xxxi[7] There is violation of B.P. 22 when a worthless check is issued and is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank. The OSG also points out that accused did not deny having issued the subject checks.

After a careful consideration of the records and the submissions of the parties, we find that the resolution of this petition hinges on the issue of whether the prosecution evidence suffices to convict the accused, herein petitioner Jane Caras. The elements of the offense under Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 are: (1) drawing and issuance of any check to apply on account or for value; (2) knowledge by the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon presentment; and (3) said check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.xxxii[8] What the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which the check was issued, nor the terms and conditions of its issuance. There are matters we need to pursue, because, as said in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, xxxiii[9] to determine the reasons for which checks are issued, or the terms a nd conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the faith the public reposes in the stability and commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking communities. Thus, petitioners contention that she iss ued the checks subject of this case merely to guarantee payment of her obligation is hardly a defense. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum and is punishable under B.P. 22, provided the other elements of the offense are properly proved. In particular, we note that the law provides for a prima facie rule of evidence. Knowledge of insufficiency of funds in or credit with the bank is presumed from the act of making, drawing, and issuing a check payment of which is refused by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds when presented within 90 days from the date of issue. However, this presumption may be rebutted by the accused-petitioner. Such presumption does not hold when the maker or drawer pays or makes arrangements for the payment of the check within five banking days after receiving notice that such check had been dishonored.xxxiv[10] Thus, it is essential for the maker or drawer to be notified of the dishonor of her check, so she could pay the value thereof or make arrangements for its payment within the period prescribed by law. Petitioner denies having received any notice that the checks she issued had been dishonored by the drawee bank. After carefully going over the records of this case, we find that indeed no clear evidence is shown on whether petitioner was informed that her checks had been dishonored. The notice of dishonor, as held in Lao v. Court of Appeals,xxxv[11] may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. Complainant testified that she hired lawyers to prepare and send the demand letters.xxxvi[12] The prosecution presented and marked in evidence two letters demanding payment which were purportedly sent to petitioner. However, the prosecution presented no evidence that would establish petitioners actual receipt of any demand letter which could have served as notice to petitioner. None of the letters contained an indication that they were actually received by petitioner. No acknowledgement receipt nor return card for the first and second demand letters were offered in evidence. Such omission and neglect on the part of the prosecution is fatal to its cause. There is testimony on record that private complainant asked petitioner to pay the value of the checks. However, there is no mention of when the demand to pay was made, whether before or after the checks were dishonored by the drawee bank.xxxvii[13] It is possible that payment was requested before the checks were deposited, since, as testified to by petitioner, the usual arrangement was that she issues checks and then she replaces them with cash. The checks were not deposited but were, instead, returned to her.xxxviii[14] However, according to the prosecution, petitioner started having problems with her cash flow resulting to her inability to replace the checks she issued with cash. But such problems leading to illiquidity of petitioner are not material elements of the crime. What is pertinent here is prior notice to the drawer that her checks have been dishonored, so that within five banking days from receipt of such notice she could pay the check fully or make arrangements for such payment. Even the testimony of Manuel Panuelos, branch manager of PCI Bank where petitioner maintained her checking account, indicates that the bank also failed to send notice to petitioner for her to pay the value of the checks or make arrangements for their payment within five days from the dishonor of the said checks. Note his testimony on cross-examination: Q: Did you give the accused notice within five (5) banking days within which to make arrangement with the bank within ninety (90) days regarding the bounced checks? Atty. Palaa: Your Honor, that is already answered by the witness.

Atty. Dela Torre: No, that is not the answer, what I want is that..... Court: Reform Atty. Dela Torre: Is it not your procedure that when a check bounced, you give notice to the .... A: Q: A: It is not our procedure. It is not your procedure? No. In fact we do it verbally....

Q: Is it not standard operating procedure in your bank to give customers notice within five (5) banking days to make arrangement with the bank within ninety (90) days regarding the bounced check? A: Q: A: No, that is not our procedure. You do not follow that procedure? We do not. That is not our standard procedure.xxxix[15]

Petitioner on the witness stand denied receiving any notice from the bank. Q: Madam Witness, all these checks were deposited with the bank in one day. Will you please tell this Honorable Court when the first check bounced by the reason of DAIF, were you notified by your depositary bank which is PCIB within five (5) banking days to make arrangement within...days regarding that bouncing checks? A: No, sir, I did not receive any notice.xl[16]

The absence of proof that petitioner received any notice informing her of the fact that her checks were dishonored and giving her five banking days within which to make arrangements for payment of the said checks prevents the application of the disputable presumption that she had knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds at the time she issued the checks. Absent such presumption, the burden shifts to the prosecution to prove that petitioner had knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds when she issued the said checks, otherwise, she cannot be held liable under the law.xli[17] Even more crucial, the absence of any notice of dishonor personally sent to and received by the accused is a violation of the petitioners right to due process. This is in effect our ruling in Lao vs. Court of Appeals,xlii[18] where we held: It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator a compromise by allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform it the action is abated. This was also compared to certain laws(citing E.O. 107, 83 O.G. No. 7, p. 576 (February 16, 1987), and E.O. 122, 89 O.G. No. 44, p. 6349 (November 1, 1993) allowing illegal possessors of firearms a certain period of time to surrender the illegally possessed firearms to the Government, without incurring any criminal liability (citing Nitafan, David G., Notes an d Comments on the Bouncing Checks Law (BP Blg. 22), pp. 121-122). In this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five banking days from notice of dishonor is a complete defense (citing Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 639). The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner. Petitioner has a right to demand - and the basic postulates of fairness require - that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22. (Underscoring and emphasis supplied.)

Absent a clear showing that petitioner actually knew of the dishonor of her checks and was given the opportunity to make arrangements for payment as provided for under the law, we cannot with moral certainty convict her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was given the requisite notice of dishonor is a clear ground for her acquittal.xliii[19] Discussion of the other assigned errors need no longer detain us. However, it should be stressed that this decision in no way prejudices the civil obligations, if any, that she might have incurred by reason of her transactions with private complainant. For we note that petitioner does not deny having issued the subject checks.xliv[20] And while no criminal liability could be imposed in this case for lack of sufficient proof of the offense charged, a fair distinction should be made as to civil aspects of the transaction between the parties. WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Jane Caras is ACQUITTED on the ground that her guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. This decision is without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate civil case, if warranted, to determine the civil aspects of petitioners transactions. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. MARY HELEN ESTRADA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Respondents. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: This resolves the petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on October 28, 2003, and the CA Resolution dated February 23, 2004, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration; together with the letter of petitioner dated January 18, 2005 which was treated by the Court as a petition for habeas corpus alleging that the Decision dated July 2, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City, Branch 275, imposed upon petitioner an erroneous and excessive penalty. The present case has its origin in a criminal case filed against petitioner. An Information charging petitioner with estafa was filed with the RTC of Las Pias City. In view of the fact that petitioner jumped bail, the RTC issued an Order dated May 14, 1997, considering petitioner to have waived her right to present evidence. Thus, the RTC rendered judgment based only on prosecution evidence and made the following conclusions: Junimar Bermundo applied for employment in Japan with the accused. Accused collected money from Junimar and his wife in the total amount of P68,700.00. These payments were all evidenced by various receipts bearing different dates. ' Junimar and his wife were able to pay the accused by using the money they obtained from a loan with the Luzon Development Bank using their parcel of land located at Pangao, Lipa City as collateral (Exh. 'L'). After making the necessary payments, the accused told Junimar to proceed to the Japanese Embassy to claim the plane tickets in December 1993, but when they went to the Japanese Embassy, they were told that nothing was filed with their office. Junimar then informed the accused what happened and the latter accompanied him the second time to the Japanese Embassy. It was only at that time that accused filed the necessary documents. 'Accused told them that if they would use the name of her daughter, the processing of their papers would be faster because her daughter performs outside the country. However, in the early part of 1994, the Japanese Embassy wrote a letter to Junimar requiring them to submit documents but the accused failed to produce these documents. Junimar then decided to abandon his plan of going to Japan and just get the money from the accused. Accused, however, failed to return the money despite receipt of a demand letter the witness made (Exh. 'I & 'J', tsn, Sept. 5, 1995, pp. 2-9). Under the established facts, accused indeed deceived Junimar Bermundo and Rosalie Bermundo by means of false pretenses and fraudulent misrepresentations which induced the Bermundos to deliver to the accused their (sic) amount of P68,700.00 which amount accused applied and used for her own benefit to the damage and prejudice of Junimar and Rosalie Bermundo.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered finding accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged which is punished under Article 315, par. 2 (a), and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused MARY HELEN ESTRADA is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor maximum as minimum to TWENTY-FOUR (24) YEARS as maximum; to pay back the sum of P68,700.00 to Junimar Bermundo and Rosalie Bermundo; and to pay the costs. [2] In a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus filed with the CA, petitioner assailed the decision of the RTC, alleging the same to be null and void for having been rendered in violation of petitioner's constitutional rights. The proceedings that transpired in the trial court are accurately set forth in the Decision of the CA dated October 28, 2003, as follows: On October 24, 1994, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Danilo Uy filed an Information for estafa against petitioner Mary Helen B. Estrada docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-6230 On January 23, 1995, petitioner signed an undertaking that in case of her failure to appear during the trial despite due notice, her absence would constitute as an express waiver of her right to be present during trial and promulgation of judgment and the lower court would then proceed with the hearing in absentia. During the hearing on May 30, 1996, Atty. Ma. Nenette Quicho, counsel for petitioner, failed to appear. On motion of the private prosecutor, the lower court directed Atty. Ma. Nenette Quicho to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice why she should not be cited for contempt. After the presentation of evidence for the prosecution on March 31, 1997, the lower court scheduled the reception of evidence for the petitioner on May 14, 1997. Counsel for petitioner failed to explain her absence in the previous hearing. She was found guilty of contempt of court and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of one (1) day imprisonment. On May 14, 1997, in view of the fact that petitioner jumped bail, the lower court considered her to have waived the presentation of her evidence and declared the case submitted for decision. On June 13, 1997, a Notice of Appearance with Motion for Presentation of Evidence for the Defense was filed by Atty. Herenio E. Martinez, as collaborating counsel for petitioner. He argued among others, that the fact that despite trial in absentia and accused's (petitioner) failure to surrender, still petitioner could present her evidence in support of her defense because there were other witnesses who would testify for her. Hence, she prayed that the scheduled date for promulgation of decision (June 18, 1997) be cancelled and she be allowed to present her evidence. However, the subject decision was promulgated on July 2, 1997, convicting petitioner of the crime charged. The Decision was entered in the Docket Book on September 3, 1997. On December 1, 1999, petitioner moved for reconsideration and/or new trial stating that her constitutional rights to be heard and to counsel were violated for the following reasons: (1) counsel for petitioner was not served a copy of the Order dated March 31, 1997 citing her for contempt of court; (2) counsel for petitioner was not served any copy of the Order dated May 14, 1997 declaring petitioner to have waived her right to present evidence and set the date of promulgation of decision on June 18, 1994 (sic) at 2:00 p.m.; (3) the order dated July 18, 1997 denying the motion for reception of petitioner's evidence was not furnished counsel for petitioner and it came after the judgment of conviction; and (4) the penalty imposed was beyond that allowed by law. On March 6, 2000 the motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. On April 5, 2000 petitioner filed her notice of appeal but was denied due course in an Order dated April 5, 2000. [3]

It also appears from the records that on September 13, 1999, petitioner was arrested and detained at the Las Pias Police Station. [4] This was a little over two years after the judgment of conviction against her had been entered in the criminal docket book on September 3, 1997, and prior to the filing of a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial with the trial court on December 1, 1999. Petitioner's appeal was denied due course by the trial court in its Order dated April 5, 2000 for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. [5] She then filed the aforementioned petition for certiorari and/or mandamus with the CA, alleging that: the RTC judge violated petitioner's constitutional right to due process by depriving petitioner of the right to be assisted by counsel during the proceedings and failing to notify petitioner of the scheduled presentation of defense evidence; the RTC judge imposed upon petitioner a penalty which was not authorized under the law for which petitioner had been charged; the RTC judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the decision and/or motion for new trial; neither petitioner nor her counsel has officially received a copy of the RTC decision, hence, the same has not yet become final and executory at the time petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration and/or new trial; the RTC judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he denied due course to petitioner's appeal because petitioner filed her notice of appeal well within the fifteen-day period within which to appeal, thus, it was the mandatory duty of the RTC judge to approve the notice of appeal. On October 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision denying the petition for certiorari. 'The CA held that there was no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC judge as his actions were anchored on Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which states that 'after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable, and on Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court which provides that '[t]he absence of the accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. The CA further held that '[t]he deprivation of her right to present evidence in her defense shall be deemed to include the non-admission of the testimonies of the other witnesses other than the petitioner herself. This must be so because the deprivation of her opportunity to present evidence due to unreasonable absences on the scheduled hearings is primarily intended to safeguard the orderly administration of justice. Thus, the CA concluded that the trial court's action was well within its jurisdiction. The CA did not dwell on the propriety of the penalty imposed on petitioner although petitioner raised it as one of the issues in the petition. In her motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision, petitioner called the CA's attention to this fact, and also pointed out that although petitioner, by failing to appear at several trial dates, may be deemed to have waived her right to be present during the proceedings, such waiver does not include a waiver of her right to present evidence. On February 23, 2004, the CA issued a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari. Previously, however, petitioner had filed an administrative case (A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-1002-RTJ) against Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda of the RTC of Las Pias City, Branch 275 for gross ignorance of the law. In a Resolution dated August 13, 2001, the Court dismissed said administrative complaint but issued a stern reminder to respondent judge to be more cautious in computing the appropriate penalty in the future to avoid injustice. In connection with said administrative case, petitioner, who is presently detained at the Correctional Institution for Women, sent a letter dated January 18, 2005, wherein she emphasized that although the Court's Resolution of August 13, 2001 issued such stern warning to respondent judge, the same resolution did not give any relief for the injustice she is now suffering due to the erroneous penalty imposed on her. Thus, in said administrative case, the Court issued a Resolution dated March 9, 2005, resolving to treat petitioner's letter as a petition for habeas corpus and ordered the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on said letter-petition. Thereafter, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment where it was manifested that there is a pending petition for review on certiorari with the Court which turned out to be the herein petition under consideration, involving the issue of the penalty imposed on petitioner. Thus, in a Resolution dated July 5, 2005, the Court resolved to consolidate the letter/petition for habeas corpus with the instant petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner alleges that the CA erred in deciding the case in a way not in accord with law or jurisprudence and departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings. In support of said allegations, petitioner reiterated her arguments that the trial court denied her the constitutional right to be heard and to be assisted by counsel by failing to furnish her counsel copies of the order setting the date for reception of defense evidence on May 14, 1997, and the order considering petitioner to have waived her right to present evidence in her defense; that the decision of the trial court was null and void for imposing a penalty not authorized by law; that inasmuch as the decision was null and void, the trial court acted with

grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and/or new trial on the ground that the assailed decision had become final; and that the CA utterly failed to resolve petitioner's submission that the trial court's decision was null and void by virtue of the excessive penalty imposed. At the outset, the undisputed fact that petitioner jumped bail while trial was pending should be emphasized. In fact, it appears that from the beginning, the address she furnished the trial court was incorrect. The trial court's process server, Nap Manguserra, made a note on the subpoena he was trying to serve on petitioner, that 'per ocular inspection made, said address is a vacant lot subject person is unknown to her neighbors. [6] From such fact alone, petitioner's arguments regarding the validity of the proceedings and promulgation of judgment in absentia for being in violation of her constitutional right to due process are doomed to fail. The holding of trial in absentia is authorized under Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that 'after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. In fact, in People vs. Tabag, [7] the Court even admonished the trial court for failing to proceed with the trial of some accused who escaped from preventive detention, to wit: Finally, the trial court also erred in not proceeding with the case against Laureo Awod and Artemio Awod after their successful escape on 19 October 1989 while in preventive detention. They had already been arraigned. Therefore, pursuant to the last sentence of paragraph (2), Section 14, Article III of the Constitution, trial against them should continue and upon its termination, judgment should be rendered against them notwithstanding their absence unless, of course, both accused have died and the fact of such death is sufficiently established. Conformably with our decision in People v. Salas, their escape should have been considered a waiver of their right to be present at their trial, and the inability of the court to notify them of the subsequent hearings did not prevent it from continuing with their trial. They were to be deemed to have received notice. The same fact of their escape made their failure to appear unjustified because they have, by escaping, placed themselves beyond the pale and protection of the law. This being so, then pursuant to Gimenez v. Nazareno, the trial against the fugitives, just like those of the others, should have been brought to its ultimate conclusion. Thereafter, the trial court had the duty to rule on the evidence presented by the prosecution against all the accused and to render its judgment accordingly. It should not wait for the fugitives' re-appearance or re-arrest. They were deemed to have waived their right to present evidence on their own behalf and to confront and cross-examine the witnesses who testified against them. It is obvious that the trial court forgot our rulings in Salas and Nazareno. We thus take this opportunity to admonish trial judges to abandon any cavalier stance against accused who escaped after arraignment, thereby allowing the latter to make a mockery of our laws and the judicial process. Judges must always keep in mind Salas and Nazareno and apply without hesitation the principles therein laid down, otherwise they would court disciplinary action. [8] (Emphasis supplied) From the foregoing pronouncement, it is quite clear that all of petitioner's protestations that she was denied due process because neither she nor her counsel received notices of the trial court's orders are all to naught, as by the mere fact that she jumped bail and could no longer be found, petitioner is considered to have waived her right to be present at the trial, and she and her counsel were to be deemed to have received notice. Moreover, in the earlier case of People vs. Magpalao [9], the Court already ruled that: . . . once an accused escapes from prison or confinement or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court. [10] Nevertheless, in this case, records reveal that the trial court sent out notices to petitioner and her counsel. In a Resolution dated September 30, 2002, the CA required the Office of the Solicitor General to submit proof of service on petitioner and her counsel of the RTC's Order dated March 31, 1997 setting the date for reception of evidence on May 14, 1997; the Order dated May 14, 1997 considering petitioner to have waived her right to present evidence in her defense in view of the fact that she has jumped bail; and the RTC Decision dated July 2, 1997. On December 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General, submitted such proof of service. Thus, in its Decision promulgated on October 28, 2003, the CA made the factual finding that petitioner and her counsel were indeed duly served with copies of the assailed RTC orders and decision at the addresses they submitted to the trial court. Factual findings of the CA are conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court. [11] As held in Morandarte vs. Court of Appeals , [12] 'inquiry upon the veracity of the CA's factual findings and conclusion is not the function of the Supreme Court for the Court is not a trier of facts. With the finding that petitioner and her counsel were duly notified of the hearing dates for reception of defense evidence and the decision of the trial court, in addition to the undisputed fact that petitioner jumped bail when trial of her case was

pending, petitioner's argument that the RTC Decision was null and void for having been rendered in violation of petitioner's constitutional right to due process, i.e., the right to be heard and be assisted by counsel, must also fail. Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy. [13] In the present case, petitioner was afforded such opportunity. The trial court set a hearing on May 14, 1997 for reception of defense evidence, notice of which was duly sent to the addresses on record of petitioner and her counsel, respectively. When they failed to appear at the May 14, 1997 hearing, they later alleged that they were not notified of said setting. Petitioner's counsel never notified the court of any change in her address, while petitioner gave a wrong address from the very beginning, eventually jumped bail and evaded court processes. Clearly, therefore, petitioner and her counsel were given all the opportunities to be heard. They cannot now complain of alleged violation of petitioner's right to due process when it was by their own fault that they lost the opportunity to present evidence. The Court likewise upholds the validity of the promulgation in absentia of the RTC judgment and the RTC's Order dated April 5, 2000, denying due course to petitioner's notice of appeal for being filed beyond the reglementary period. Section 6, Rule 120 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the Rule applicable in this case since promulgation was held before the effectivity of The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides: Section 6. Promulgation of judgment --The judgment is promulgated by reading the same in the presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside of the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court. If the accused is confined or detained in another province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the executive judge of the Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement or detention upon request of the court that rendered the judgment. The court promulgating the judgment shall have authority to accept the notice of appeal and to approve the bail bond pending appeal. The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision . In case the accused fails to appear thereat the promulgation shall consist in the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket and a copy thereof shall be served upon the accused or counsel. If the judgment is for conviction and the accused's failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the court shall further order the arrest of the accused, who may appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision to him or his counsel. (Italics supplied) Clearly, promulgation of judgment in absentia is allowed under the Rules. Hence, in Pascua vs. Court of Appeals , [14] it was held that such promulgation is valid provided the following essential elements are present: (a) that the judgment be recorded in the criminal docket; and (b) that a copy thereof be served upon the accused or counsel. The factual circumstances in said case are analogous to the case at bar. In Pascua, the promulgation of judgment in said case was set on May 5, 1998. When the case was first called on that date, petitioner was not present although her counsel of record was in court. The case was set for second call. After the lapse of two hours, the accused still had not appeared, thus, the dispositive portion of the decision was read in open court. Afterwards, counsel for the accused received a copy of the decision, and upon motion of the prosecution, the trial court ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest and forfeiture of accused's cash bond. No motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal was filed by the accused within 15 days from May 5, 1998. On June 8, 1998, accused, without discharging her counsel of record, filed through another lawyer a notice of change of address, together with an omnibus motion to lift warrant of arrest and confiscation of bail bond, and also to set anew the promulgation of the decision, alleging that the accused failed to appear at the scheduled promulgation because notices for said schedule were sent to her former address, hence she was not able to receive any notice. Said motion was denied by the trial court. The matter was brought to this Court where the accused argued that there was no valid promulgation because she was not properly notified of the date thereof. The Court held thus: Let us examine the validity of the May 5, 1998 promulgation which took place in the case at bar. The dispositive portion of the decision convicting petitioner was read in open court, after which the public prosecutor, the defense counsel Atty. Marcelino Arias, and private complainant Lucita Lopez, acknowledged receipt of their respective copies of the decision by affixing their signatures at the back of the original of the decision on file with the record of the case. Atty. Arias failed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen days from receipt of the decision. Is it proper to rule that the period within which to file an appeal has lapsed?

In Florendo v. Court of Appeals (239 SCRA 325 [1994]), the facts are parallel to those of the instant case. We held ' In the case at bench, a copy of the judgment was served to the counsel of petitioner on June 15, 1992; therefore, he had only up to June 30, 1992 within which to appeal. The notice of appeal filed on July 6, 1992 was clearly out of time. It is presumed that official duties are regularly performed and that the proceedings are made of record. This serves as a substantial compliance with the procedural requirement of the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket of the court. At any rate, petitioner does not question non-compliance of the requirement of the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket. (At p. 329.) Petitioner's first argument is devoid of merit. In the first place, her non-receipt of the notice of promulgation was due to her own failure to immediately file a notice of change of address with the trial court, which she clearly admitted. Besides, promulgation could be properly done even in her absence, subject to the service of a copy of the decision upon her or her counsel and the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket. In the present case, therefore, since the records bear out the fact that copies of the decision were sent by registered mail to the given addresses of petitioner and her counsel, Atty. Herenio Martinez, and there is no question that the judgment was indeed recorded in the criminal docket of the court, the promulgation was valid. The significance of recording the decision in the criminal docket of the court was explained in Pascua, thus: What is the significance of the recording of the judgment with the criminal docket of the court? By analogy, let us apply the principles of civil law on registration. Simply stated, registration is made for the purpose of notification (Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1989 ed., p. 653, citing Bautista vs. Dy Bun Chin, 49 O.G. 179 [1952]). Its purpose is to give notice thereof to all persons. ' Applying the above-mentioned principles to the instant case, we are prompted to further examine the provisions on promulgation in absentia. As held in Florendo vs. Court of Appeals (supra), the rules allow promulgation of judgment in absentia to obviate the situation where juridical process could be subverted by the accused jumping bail. But the Rules also provide measures to make promulgation in absentia a formal and solemn act so that the absent accused, wherever he may be, can be notified of the judgment rendered against him. As discussed earlier, the sentence imposed by the trial court cannot be served in the absence of the accused. Hence, all means of notification must be done to let the absent accused know of the judgment of the court. And the means provided by the Rules are: (1) the act of giving notice to all persons or the act of recording or registering the judgment in the criminal docket (which Section 6 incidentally mentions first showing its importance); and (2) the act of serving a copy thereof upon the accused (at his last known address) or his counsel. In a scenario where the whereabouts of the accused are unknown (as when he is at large), the recording satisfies the requirement of notifying the accused of the decision wherever he may be. From the foregoing, petitioner is deemed notified of the decision upon its recording in the criminal docket on September 3, 1997 and she only had fifteen (15) days therefrom within which to file an appeal. Evidently, the notice of appeal filed only on April 5, 2000 was filed out of time. However, the Court cannot close its eyes to the fact that the penalty imposed by the trial court on petitioner was indeed erroneous. The dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision reads thus: WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered finding accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as charged which is punished under Article 315, par. 2 (a), and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused MARY HELEN ESTRADA is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor maximum as minimum to TWENTY-FOUR (24) YEARS as maximum; to pay back the sum of P68,700.00 to Junimar Bermundo and Rosalie Bermundo; and to pay the costs. Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but not over P22,000.00; if the

amount of fraud exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty provided for shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. Thus, in this case, since the amount of fraud, which is P68,700.00, exceeds P22,000.00, the penalty should be imposed in the maximum period. The range of the penalty provided for by law is composed of only two periods, thus, to get the maximum period of the imposable penalty, the total number of years included in the two periods should be divided into three. A computation produces the following results: the minimum period is 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 5 years, 5 months and 10 days; the medium period is 5 years, 5 months and 11 days to 6 years, 8 months and 20 days; and the maximum period is 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years. [15] The amount defrauded being in excess of P22,000.00, the penalty imposed should be the maximum period or 6 years, 8 months, and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. However, Art. 315 also provides that an additional one year shall be imposed for each additional P10,000.00 amount of the fraud. Since the total amount of the fraud in this case is P68,700.00 (P68,700.00 ' P22,000.00 = P46,700.00), an additional four (4) years of penalty should be imposed. Thus, the correct imposable maximum penalty is anywhere between 10 years, 8 months and 21 days and 12 years of prision mayor in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty that should have been imposed by the RTC should be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code for the crime committed. Thus, in this case, the minimum penalty should be anywhere between 6 months, and 1 day of prision correccional in its minimum period and 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional in its medium period. In Rigor vs. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison , [16] this Court found it to be in the interest of justice to correct the penalty imposed by the trial court so as to conform to the penalty prescribed by law despite the fact that the judgment had already become final and executory for therein petitioner's failure to take an appeal. Therein, the Court expounded thus: However, the Court noted a palpable error in the Joint Decision of the trial court that must be rectified in order to avoid its repetition. The trial court erroneously included an additional one day on the maximum period of arresto mayor imposed on petitioner, which is incorrect, as it is outside the range of said penalty. ' In line with the ruling of the Court in People vs. Barro, Sr., to wit: However, where the penalty imposed on the co-accused who did not appeal was a nullity because it was never authorized by law, that penalty imposed on the accused who did not appeal can be corrected to make it conform to the penalty prescribed by law, the reason being that, said penalty can never become final and executory and it is within the duty and inherent power of the Court to have it conformable with law. the error of the trial court in the present case can be corrected to make it conform to the penalty prescribed by law as it is within the Court's duty and inherent power. 'Thus, the correction to be made by this Court is meant only for the penalty imposed against petitioner to be in accordance with law and nothing else. ' [17] Thus, pursuant to the foregoing ruling, the Court likewise sees it befitting in this case to modify the penalty imposed on petitioner. It must be noted, though, that in the afore-quoted case, the Court also pointed out that the petition for habeas corpus cannot be granted if the accused has only served the minimum of his sentence because he must serve his sentence up to its maximum term. [18] WHEREFORE, the letter/petition for habeas corpus is DENIED. The petition for review on certiorari is PARTLY GRANTED insofar only as the penalty is concerned. In the interest of justice, the sentence of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 94-6230 is MODIFIED as follows: Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of two (2) years of prision correccional as MINIMUM to eleven (11) years of prision mayor as MAXIMUM. SO ORDERED. MANUEL C. ROXAS, et al. vs. CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, et al. [G.R. No. 114944, May 29, 2002] YNARES-SANTIAGO, J:

FACTS: Petitioner Roxas was the Chairman, while Nacpil was a Member, of the Bids and Awards Committee of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police (PC-INP). The PC-INP invited bids for the supply of sixty-five units of fire trucks. The Bids and Awards Committeevoted to award the contract to the Tahei Co., Ltd., manufacturer of Nikko-Hino. Accordingly, thecontract was executed between PC-INP and Tahei Co.The COA subsequently discovered that there was a discrepancy in the amounts indicatedon the disbursement voucher and the purchase order.Consequently, the DILG Secretary filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against therespondents.After preliminary investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military recommended theindictment of all respondents, except Ramirez. On review, the Office of the Special Prosecutor r e c o m m e n d e d t h e d i s m i s s a l o f the com plaints against Roxas, Nacpil, Codoy, Kairan andRam irez. Form al charges were f i l e d w i t h t h e S a n d i g a n b a y a n a g a i n s t N a z a r e n o , F l o r e s , Tanchanco, Custodio, Osia, Espea and Santos. Petitioners were not included in the criminal information.Flores and Tanchanco moved for a reinvestigation, which was granted. Thereafter, theOffice of the Special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges against Flores andTanchanco. In the same resolution, however, the Special Prosecutor made a sudden turnaboutas regards Roxas, Nacpil and Kairan, and ordered their inclusion as accused. ISSUE: W hether or not the inclusion of the petitioners as accused vi olated their right to dueprocess. HELD: YES. It appears that the charge against respondents was previously dismissed. For this reason, there being no motion or reconsideration filed by the complainant, said respondents ceased to be parties. Consequently, the mere filing of motions for reconsideration by those previously indicted, without questioning the dismissal of the charge against the said respondents, could not and should not be made the basis for impleading them as accused in this case without violating their right to due process. Furthermore, it appears that petitioners were deprived of due process when the Special Prosecutor reinstated the complaint against them without their knowledge. Due process of lawrequires that every litigant must be given an opportunity to be heard. He has the right to be present and defend himself in person at every stage of the proceedings. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

DE GUZMAN JR. VS COMELEC At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voters Registration Act of 1996". RA 8189 was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1996. Section 44 thereof provides: "SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new station outside the original congressional district." By virtue of the aforequoted provision of law, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated Resolution Nos. 97-00021[1] and 97-06102[2] for the implementation thereof. Thereafter, the COMELEC issued several directives3[3] reassigning the petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, to different stations.

Aggrieved by the issuance of the aforesaid directives and resolutions, petitioners found their way to this Court via the present petition assailing the validity of Section 44 of RA 8189, contending that: I SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION; II SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE ON SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVANTS; III SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 CONSTITUTES A DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW; IV SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 UNDERMINES THE CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF COMELEC AND COMELECS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO NAME, DESIGNATE AND APPOINT AND THEN REASSIGN AND TRANSFER ITS VERY OWN OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES; V SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 CONTRAVENES THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEPT [Article VI, SECTION 26(1), Phil. Constitution] THAT EVERY BILL PASSED BY CONGRESS SHALL EMBRACE ONLY ONE SUBJECT WHICH MUST BE EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE THEREOF; and VI SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT [ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26 (2)] OF THREE READINGS ON SEPARATE DAYS AND DISTRIBUTION OF PRINTED COPIES IN ITS FINAL FORM THREE DAYS BEFORE ITS PASSAGE. Petitioners contentions revolve on the pivotal issue, whether Section 44 of RA 8189 is valid and constitutional. The petition is barren of merit. Section 44 of RA 8189 enjoys the presumption of validity, and the Court discerns no ground to invalidate it. Petitioners theorize that Section 44 of RA 8189 is violative of the "equal protection clause" of the 1987 Constitution because it singles out the City and Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the same city or municipality for more than four (4) years. They maintain that there is no substantial distinction between them and other COMELEC officials, and therefore, there is no valid classification to justify the objective of the provision of law under attack. The Court is not persuaded by petitioners arguments. The "e qual protection clause" of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions: 1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions; 2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;

3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and 4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.4[4] After a careful study, the ineluctable conclusion is that the classification under Section 44 of RA 8189 satisfies the aforestated requirements. The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment" does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. In Lutz vs. Araneta,5[5] it was held that "the legislature is not required by the Constitution to adhere to a policy of all or none". This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against a valid classification. It may be true that all the other officers of COMELEC referred to by petitioners are exposed to the same evils sought to be addressed by the statute. However, in this case, it can be discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would be sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of corruption than by breaking up each and every link thereof. Verily, under Section 3(n) of RA 8189, election officers are the highest officials or authorized representatives of the COMELEC in a city or municipality. It is safe to say that without the complicity of such officials, large scale anomalies in the registration of voters can hardly be carried out. Moreover, to require the COMELEC to reassign all employees (connected with the registration of voters) who have served at least four years in a given city or municipality would entail a lot of administrative burden on the part of the COMELEC. Neither does Section 44 of RA 8189 infringe the security of tenure of petitioners nor unduly deprive them of due process of law. As held in Sta. Maria vs. Lopez.6[6] "xxx the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer who is appointed - not merely assigned - to a particular station. Such a rule does not pr[o]scribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency. xxx" (italics supplied) The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual employment. It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or transferred) from the service for causes other than those provided by law and after due process is accorded the employee. What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise of the power to dismiss. But, where it is the law-making authority itself which furnishes the ground for the transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so long as the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law. Untenable is petitioners contention that Section 44 of RA 8189 undermines the authority of COMELEC to appoint its own officials and employees. As stressed upon by the Solicitor General, Section 44 establishes a guideline for the COMELEC to follow. Said section provides the criterion or basis for the reassignment or transfer of an election officer and does not deprive the COMELEC of its power to appoint, and maintain its authority over its officials and employees. As a matter of fact, the questioned COMELEC resolutions and directives illustrate that it is still the COMELEC which has the power to reassign and transfer its officials and employees. But as a government agency

tasked with the implementation and enforcement of election laws, the COMELEC is duty bound to comply with the laws passed by Congress. The independence of the COMELEC is not at issue here. There is no impairment or emasculation of its power to appoint its own officials and employees. In fact, Section 44 even strengthens the COMELECs power of appointment, as the power to reassign or transfer is within its exclusive jurisdiction and domain. Petitioners contention that Section 44 has an isolated and different subject from that of RA 8189 and that the same is not expressed in the title of the law, is equally untenable. The objectives of Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof", are: 1. To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation; 2. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and 3. To fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire.7[7] Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is sufficiently complied with where, as in this case, the title is comprehensive enough to embrace the general objective it seeks to achieve, and if all the parts of the statute are related and germane to the subject matter embodied in the title or so long as the same are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.8[8] Section 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated considering that it is related and germane to the subject matter stated in the title of the law. The title of RA 8189 is "The Voters Registration Act of 1996" with a subject matter enunciated in the explanatory note as "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR." Section 44, which provides for the reassignment of election officers, is relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the registration process by providing a guideline for the COMELEC to follow in the reassignment of election officers. It is not an alien provision but one which is related to the conduct and procedure of continuing registration of voters. In this regard, it bears stressing that the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue, all the contents and the minute details therein.9[9] In determining the constitutionality of a statute dubbed as defectively titled, the presumption is in favor of its validity.10[10] As regards the issue raised by petitioners - whether Section 44 of RA 8189 was enacted in accordance with Section 26 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, petitioners have not convincingly shown grave abuse of

discretion on the part of Congress. Respect due to co-equal departments of the government in matters entrusted to them by the Constitution, and the absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion suffice to stay the judicial hand.11[11] WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED; and the constitutionality and validity of Section 44 of RA 8189 UPHELD. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. TELEBAP vs. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 132922, April 21, 1998 (289 SCRA 337) Facts: TELEBAP and GMA Network together filed a petition to challenge the validity of Comelec Time due to the fact that said provisions: (1) have taken properties without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) it denied the radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws; and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the Comelec to regulate the operation of media communication or information during election period. Held:

Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are 9 frequencies to assign. A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amended by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires." Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of the franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and, until the present case was brought, such provisions had not been thought of as taking property without just compensation. Art. XII, 11 of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of franchises for "the common good." What better measure can be conceived for the common good than one for free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed of the issues in an 11 election? "[I]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement that broadcast stations give free air time. Even in the United States, there are responsible scholars who believe that government controls on broadcast media can constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of views and attention to public affairs to further the system of free expression. For this purpose, broadcast stations may be required to give free air time to candidates in an election. In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service.

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE VS. QUISUMBING [333 SCRA 13; G.R. NO. 128845; 1 JUN 2000]

Facts: Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees. Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure.

Issue: Whether or Not the grants provided by the school to foreign hires and not to local hires discriminative of their constitutional right to the equal protection clause.

Held: The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding. The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires. The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.

While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," "to afford labor full protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations. In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. Wherefore, the petition is given due course. The petition is hereby granted in part. The orders of the secretary of labor and employment dated June 10, 1996 and march 19, 1997, are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent school of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires. PEOPLE VS JALOSJOS Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented.

Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives

Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations. The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system. Panfilo Lacson vs Sandiganbayan, Executive Secretary, et al Equal Protection KBG Cases Before the Sandiganbayan On 18 May 1995, alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were shot to death. The incident was later sensationalized as a rub out. This implicated Lacson among others as guilty for multiple murder. The case was raised before the Sandiganbayan. In 1996, Lacson et al filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Sec 2 (par a and c) of RA 7975 An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural Organization Of The

Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As Amended. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the principal accused are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27. In 1997, RA 8249 was passed which basically expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The law was authored by Lagman and Neptali Gonzales. Lacson assailed the law as it was introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioners cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioners vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975). ISSUE: Whether or not the right to equal protection by Lacson et al has been violated with the passage of RA 8249. HELD: The SC ruled that RA 8249 did not violate the right of Lacson et al to equal protection. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness. It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely: (1) it must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, Lacson et al cannot claim that Secs 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely, par A of Sec 4 provides that it sha ll apply to all cases involving certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Sec 7, to all cases pending in any court. Contrary to petitioner and intervenors arguments, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in any court. It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Sec 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249). PASEI VS. DRILON [163 SCRA 386; L-81958; 30 JUN 1988] Monday, February 02, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes Labels: Case Digests, Political Law Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines involving the

police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the Filipino workers.

Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in the challenged Department Order No. 1.

Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been valid classification, the Filipino female domestics working abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract workers but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality before the law under the constitution does not import a perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classification, provided that: 1. Such classification rests on substantial distinctions 2. That they are germane to the purpose of the law 3. They are not confined to existing conditions 4. They apply equally to al members of the same class In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on substantial distinctions. Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is subjects among other things, to the requirements of public safety as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power. Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.