Question No. Ill CONSPIRACY "F" and "G" quarreled.

"F" attacked "G" with a club two or three times, b u t "G" was able to parry the attack. "G" did not move backward? but struck back hitting "F" on his head with a lead pipe which he picked up from the ground, causing "F's" death. "G" was charged with Homicide. If you were the Judge, would you find "G" guilty as charged? Answer If the term "quarreled" implies an agreement to a fight, G would be guilty of the crime charged. He cannot Invoke Self-defense because if there is an agreement to fight there would be no unlawful aggression. Any attack is considered as a mere consequence of the agreement to fight. On the other hand, if the word "quarreled" involves only a verbal altercation, G would not be guilty because F committed unlawful aggression when he attacked G three times with a club. When G struck back hitting F on his head with a lead pipe which he picked up on the ground, he acted in selfdefense because the aggression of F was still present and the pipe was the only means available to him in defending his person as he was acting under the instinct of self-preservation. The assumption is that G did not give any sufficient provocation which immediately preceded the attack made by F. Question No. IV Conspiracy "H" made a bet of P10.00 with "I" in a game of "beto-beto". "H" won but "I" refused to pay the amount. A dispute arose between them, which culminated in a fist fight. "J", the father of "H", and "K", the brother of "H", intervened. When the fight began. "H" held the hand of "I", "J" seized the front part of "I's" shirt, and while they were dealing blows on one another, "K" came with a "balisong" and stabbed "I" inflicting upon him a mortal wound. "H", "J", and "K" were charged with Homicide. Is it proper to hold all the accused responsible for the fatal wound inflicted upon the victim by "K"? Answer It is not proper to hold H and J liable for the fatal wound inflicted upon the victim by K because of the absence of conspiracy. He and J are not co-principals of K in the killing of the victim. The liability of H, J and K is not collective but individual. They have not acted concertedly for the realization of a common criminal objective. H and J who dealt blows on the victim without causing any physical injury could be liable for iil-treatment. (Art. 266, par. 3, R.P.C.)

Question # 6 Article 29 "L" pointed a .45. caliber revolver at "M" without good reason. There ensued a struggle between the two for 1 the weapon. "N", a female companion of "L" approached the combatants a nd quickly wounded "M' in the chest with a knife, as a consequence of which "M" died almost instantly. Can "L" be convicted as an accomplice? Answer L is not liable as an accomplice. An accomplice must be aware of the criminal design of the principal and must perform acts, whether previous or simultaneous, showing his approval or concurrence to said criminal design. The facts of the problem clearly show that while L .and M were struggling for the possession of the revolver, N, the female companion of L, approached the combatants and wounded M in the chest with a k nife which caused his death. L had no knowledge of what N would do, and he did not perform any act subsequent to the stabbing to show that he approved of what N did. (People vs. Cajandab, 52 SCRA 161).

Question No. VI Art. 70 a) Under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, offenders who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment. An accused was sentenced to "destierro" for having killed his wife under exceptional circumstances. He had been preventively detained for a period of almost twelve years. Would he be entitled to the benefits of Art. 29 in so far as his preventive imprisonment is concerned? b) An accused was found guilty of double murder and was meted out two sentences of reclusion perpetua.. How would the accused serve the sentences? ANSWER: (a) Article 29 as amended by R.A. No. 6127 provides that an offender who has undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the f u l l time of the period of his preventive imprisonment if he has agreed in writing to observe the rules of discipline applied to convicted prisoners and four-fifth if there is no written commitment. The penalty of destierro involves also deprivation of liberty (People vs. Abilong, 82 Phil. 172). The problem does not show whether there is a written commitment. So, the deduction of the f u l l period of preventive imprisonment cannot technically be applied. However, the period of preventive imprisonment is almost 12 years. Hence, even if four-fifth thereof of 12 years is applied, the result w i l l be more than 8 years. The duration of destierro is from 6 months 1 day to 6 years. The accused therefore is entitled to be released because the period of his preventive imprisonment exceeds the penalty of destierro imposed upon him. (b) The rule is if two or more penalties in view of the ir nature cannot be served simultaneously, such must be served successively in the order of severity in accordant w i t h the scale of the severity of penalties provided in Art. 70 K.P.C., b u t in no case is he to serve more than three times the most severe penalty, and which is not to exceed 40 years. If the penalties are the same, such is to be considered as the most severe penalty. (Aspr'a vs. Director of Prisons, 85 Phil. 737). In the problem, two penalties of reclusion perpetua were imposed upon the accused. In view of their nature, these penalties cannot be served simultaneously. Reclusion perpetua has a duration of thirty years. Multiplied by 3 (three times the most severe penalty) The result is 90 years. The accused should serve however imprisonment not exceeding 40 years. (Art. 70 R.P.C.) Question No VII mitigating circumstances Convicted of the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide, an accused was sentenced to death. On automatic review to the Supreme Court, his counsel pleaded the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender which were not offset by any aggravating circumstance and prayed that the penalty be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The existence of said modifying circumstances was, in fact, established. Is the contention legally tenable? Answer: The intention is not legally tenable. Death is a single and indivisible penalty. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, it could be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances which attended the commission of the crime. (People vs. Amit , 32 SCRA 95). The mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender cannot have the affect of reducing the death penalty to reclusion perpetua. Question No. VIII Art. 39 P" was sentenced from six (6) years and one ( 1 ) day to twelve (12) years and one (1) day, and ordered to pay a fine of P2,000.00. May "P" be compelled to serve subsidiary imprisonment in case of fa il ure to pay the fine? Answer P cannot be compelled to serve subsidiary imprisonment. Art. 39 par. 3 (R.P.C.) provides that there is no subsidiary imprisonment if the principal penalty is higher than prision

correctional. The penalty of 6 years 1 day to 12 years and 1 day is higher than prision correctional which has a maximum of 6 years only. The mere addition of 1 day to 6 years is already higher than prision correctional and in such a case there can be no subsidiary imprisonment for fa ilure to pay the fine. (Rosario vs. Director of Prisons, L-03463, March 6, 1950) Question No. IX complex crime Art. 48 "Q", a postmaster, stole a treasury warrant payable to "R" valued at P30.00, increased the amount to P230.00 by adding the figure "2" before "3", and forged "R's" name as well as that of "S", making it appear that "R" had endorsed the warrant to "S" and then later cashed it. "Q" thereafter misappropriates the amount represented by the altered warrant. Of what complex crime would you hold "Q" liable? Which crime would control the penalty to be imposed on him, assuming that he is found guilty? Answer The facts of the problem are similar to those in the case of People vs. Silvallana, 61 Phil. 636 although in this case the postmaster Q was the one who stole the treasury warrant payable to R and who raised the amount stated therein from P30.00 to P230.00 and forged R's name as well as that of K making it appear that R had endorsed the warrant to S. In the problem, the fact is stated that the postmaster cashed the forged treasury" warrant and misappropriated, the amount represented in the altered warrant. Falsification of a public document (treasury warrant) is committed because of the alteration of the amount appearing in the treasury' warrant, a genuine document and by causing it to appear that "R", the payee, endorsed the document to "S" and "S" encashed it which is false. ( A r t . 171 pars. 2 and 6, R.P.C.) The falsification was committed to facilitate the misappropriation by Q of the proceeds of the treasury warrant, which are public funds. Q. therefore, committed the complex crime of malversation thru falsification of public document. The more serious crime, which in this case is the falsification, will control the penalty, w h i c h is to be imposed in its maximum period. In a complex crime, the penalty is for the more serious crime, to be imposed in its m a x i m u m period. (Art. 48 R.P.C.) Question No. X Art. 90 "T" was charged in Information with the complex crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting in Damage to Property in the sum of P700.00 and Slight Physical Injuries, both resulting from a single act of imprudence. The incident which gave rise to the quasi-offense occurred on November 14, 1979. The accused was charged on March 14, 1980. Should the resulting offenses be considered a complex crime subject to one penalty? Answer The resulting offenses cannot be considered as a complex crime. The slight physical injuries which resulted from a single act of imprudence which occurred on Nov. 14, 1979, prescribed already when the accused was charged on March 14, 1980. A slight physical injury, being a light felony, prescribes in two months. (Art. 90, R.P.C.). Another reason is that a complex crime exists if a single act results in two grave or less grave felonies. If one of the resulting felonies is light, like slight physical injuries. AS stated in the problem there can be no complex crime. (Lontok vs. Gorgonio, L37396 April 30, 1979) Question No. XI Patrolman Cruz, acting under orders of the Municipal Mayor, who wanted to put a stop to the frequent occurrence of robbery in sitio Masukal, patrolled the place. At about midnight, seeing three persons acting suspiciously in front of an uninhabited house and entering the same, he arrested them without warrant and took them to the municipal building where they were detained in jail for about five hours before they were released. Patrolman Cruz was accused of arbitrary detention, If you were the Judge, would you convict him of the crime charged?

Patrolman Cruz cannot be accused of arbitrary detention Since the three persons acted suspiciously in front of an uninhabited house at midnight, and entered the same, the policeman was justified to arrest them even without a warrant, considering the circumstances of the case, mainly, since he was patrolling the place upon orders of the Mayor to put a stop to frequent occurrences of robberies therein. The three persons were arrested in a suspicious place at midnight and under suspicious circumstances that they were about to commit a crime or breach of peace. Good people do not ordinarily lur k in uninhabited places at midnight. (U.S. vs. Santos, 36 Phil. 853) Question No. XII Child and Youth Welfare Code Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, what is the controlling criterion to determine whether or not an accused is a youthful offender so as to entitled him to suspension of sentence? Is there any difference between the Revised Penal Code and the Child and Youth Welfare Code in so far as suspension of the sentence of a juvenile offender is concerned? Answer: Under the Youth and Child Welfare Code, the youthful offender must be under eighteen years old not only at the time of the commission of the crime but also at the time of the trial so as to be entitled to suspension of sentences. (People vs. Casiguran, L-45387, Nov. 7, 1979) Under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, the youthful offender who is found guilty after trial, must file an application (for the suspension of the pronouncement of the sentence, which the Court may grant if the interest of the min o r and of the public so requires. Under Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code which covers a minor under 16 years of age at the time of the commission of a grave or less grave felony and at the time of the trial, which was expressly repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1179, the suspension of the pronouncement of the sentence upon the min o r where there is evidence of guilt is automatic. No. XIV Consummated fel At about 11:30 A.M., "W" noticed that the nipa roof of their house was on fire. He got up to get water with which to extinguish the fire. While putting out the fire "W" noticed "X" near the house carrying a pole to the end of which was attached a rug soaked with gasoline "W", shouted "fire! fire" and started to put out the fire. With the help of some neighbors, "W" succeeded in putting out the fire but only after a small portion of the roof had been burned. Is "X" liable for frustrated or consummated arson? Answer X will be liable for consummated arson. The mere burning of a portion of the house, which in the problem is the nipa roof, is consummated arson. "All the elements of the acts of execution and accomplishment are present (People vs. Hernandez, 54 Phil. 122). It cannot be frustrated arson because in frustrated arson the offender sets on fire gasoline soaked rags to burn a building but the fire is put out by a cause independent of the will of the offender before any portion of the building is burned. (U.S. vs. Valdez. 39 Phil. 240). Question No. XV Treachery In the course of a fight, the accused assaulted the victim with a knife inflicting upon the other a serious cut On his left arm prompting the said victim to run and flee. He was pursued by the accused. After having fled for a short distance, the victim fell on the ground, face downward, and before he could stand, the accused delivered a fatal stub with his k n i f e on the back of the victim. What crime did the accused commit? Answer: Since the accused assaulted the victim with a k n if e in the course of a fight, it cannot be said that the attack was treacherous because the victim would have been placed on h i s guard. (People vs. Gonzales, 76 Phil. 473) (People vs. Ardisa, 55 SC'RA 2 4 5 ) , besides, from the location of the wound of the victim, which was on his left arm, it can reasonably be inferred that she attack was frontal. Treachery cannot be presumed but must be proved conclusively as the crime itself. So, the inception of the attack was not attended by treachery. When the victim after having been seriously wounded ran and was pursued by the accused, fell on the ground, face downward, was fatally stabbed on the back,

the accused acted spontaneously. The stabbing at the back was a continuation of the fight, and if the fight is continuous, even if treachery is present at the latter stage of the fight, treachery cannot be appreciated as attendant. (People vs. Canete, 44 Phil. 478). Question No. XVI Five men, one of them armed with a carbine, entered the h u t of an octogenarian, who was living by himself, ransacked his things and took his carpentry tools and cash worth P100.00. "Y" saw them going towards the hut and sensing their evil intentions called some friends to act as a rescue party. As the five men were going out with their loot, the rescue party opened fire and there was an exchange of gunshot between the two groups. Killed were one in the five-man team, and another in the rescue party. The articles taken were recovered Four of the 5 men were charged with Robbery in Band with Homicide. Their common defenses were that they could not be convicted of the crime charged because (a) the killing occurred after the consummation of the robbery ; (b) the octogenarian victim of the robbery was not the victim of the homicide; and (c) the crime was committed by a band. Evaluate the different defenses of the accused. Answer 1) Although the killing was committed after the consummation of the robbery, robbery w i t h homicide is committed because the killing was committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery. If the killing is prior or subsequent to the robbery so long as it is directly related to the robbery, the crime committed is robbery with homicide. (People vs Hernandez, 48 Phil. 48). 2) Even if the victim of the robbery is not the victim of the homicide, robbery with homicide is committed because the law does not require that the person killed is the victim of the robbery. {People vs. Barut, 1^42666, March 13, 1979). As a matter of fact, even if the victim killed is a mere bystander robbery with homicide is committed. (People vs. Disimban, 88 Phil. 120). 3) There seems to be a typographical error in the question. That band is a defense does not make sense. Obviously, the question would refer to the defense that the accused did not constitute a band. This is tenable because of the five accused, only one was armed with a carbine. There is a band if more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of a robbery. (Art. 296, R.P.C.; People vs. Barut, supra). This is not, however, a defense because there is conspiracy among th e five accused as shown by the facts of the problem that ' a s the five men were going out with their loot, the rescue party opened fire and there was an exchange of gunshots between the two groups." When homicide takes place on the occasion. 1983 Bar Q2. Considering that the revised Penal Code provisions on justifying circumstances apply to anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, can there be self - defense when there is simply an aggression against ones property not coupled with an attack against his person? Explain. Answer: No, Self- defense will be incomplete. Under the Civil Code there is unlawful aggression on the property rights of another. But to constitute self-defense of property two other elements must be considered, namely reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending his property. People vs Apolinar (38 OG 2079) held that there is no self- defense of property if the attack on the property is not coupled with an attack on the person of the owner or possessor of the property. I for example, the owner shot the aggressor although his person was not attacked, self- defense of property will not be present, although there is unlawful aggression on his property right, because the means adopted to repel the aggression is not reasonable. ( People vs Navaez(1 1983) 121 SCRA 403)