Citizenship Studies, Vol. 11, No.

3, 301328, July 2007

Global Citizenship and Empire

BARBARA ARNEIL
Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada

ABSTRACT Global citizenship is a concept that has been both propounded and critiqued on a number of grounds in recent scholarship, but little attention has been paid to what it might mean in an age of empire. Beginning with an analysis of American empire, the author argues that there has been an important shift in the meaning of imperial rule from what was initially a realpolitik version of empire in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 to what has become a more liberal form of imperial power since late 2003. Whereas the former sought national security in a seemingly anarchical and hostile world, the latter has sought to spread a particular kind of globalized citizenship to the world, particularly in the Middle East. The author argues that the ideological grounding for such an imperial civilizing mission needs to be challenged through an alternative theorization of global citizenship. Thus, the second half of the article suggests a new theory of global citizenship rooted in two basic principles: social rights (in order to address the least well off) and shared fate (in order to draw the links between the north/south and east/west). Taken together, they provide a starting point for an alternative theory of global citizenship that speaks not simply against empire but to it.

In recent years a number of leading political theorists1 have made the case for a cosmopolitan or transnational citizenship. Critics of global citizenship (Miller, 1998) have responded by asking whether citizenship at the global level is even possible, let alone desirable. If, for example, citizenship is dened in terms of shared norms, ideas or values, there seems little basis for a common citizenry at the international level (even less than the already deeply contested meaning of citizenship as shared values within multicultural nation-states); if citizenship is dened in terms of constitutional rights and responsibilities, international law, for all its strengths, is simply incapable of guaranteeing rights and enforcing responsibilities in the way that domestic courts can with respect to national citizens; if citizenship is dened as membership within a bounded political community in relation to a particular set of governing institutions, in what meaningful sense can it be said that human beings are common members of a world community? Or to put it in more pointedly political terms, if modern citizenship requires state institutions, how can global citizenship have any real meaning if there is no world government? Thus, some scholars have concluded that global citizenship is either impossible or (at best) largely rhetorical in nature.
Correspondence Address: Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC V6T 1Z4, Canada. Email: arneil@interchange.ubc.ca 1362-1025 Print/1469-3593 Online/07/030301-28 q 2007 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/13621020701381840

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Other critics (Neff, 1998) argue global citizenship is not so much impossible as undesirable since any meaningful theory of global citizenship would necessarily infringe upon the foundational principles of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and may even move the international system towards what Immanuel Kant once called the soulless despotism of world government. Others (Pagden, 1998; Hindess, 2002; La Torre, 2005) have argued that despite the lofty language, globalized citizenship is largely a vehicle for a new kind of western imperialism, a colonial present (Gregory, 2004) in which the west uses the rubric of citizenship to impose its own values and political and economic systems on non-western peoples. Global citizenship is undesirable therefore if it is the means through which the more powerful west is able to shape the world in its own image (be that the nuanced cosmopolitan citizenship of Martha Nussbaum or the neo-liberal global citizenship envisioned by either the IMF or American foreign policy). In this article, I want to advance the argument that a theory of global citizenship is not only possible and desirable but may actually be required in response to the current international context that we are living in, shaped as it is by the dual forces of economic globalization on the one hand and the rise of American empire on the other. With respect to economic globalization and regional economies, Jurgen Habermas (2001) and Seyla Benhabib (2004) have made the case that we already live in a post-national constellation of transnational citizenship in which the conventional model of a world of nation states regarded as independent actors and bounded forms of national citizenry is less and less appropriate to the current situation (Habermas, 2001, p. 69). For Habermas and Benhabib, citizenship must be addressed through an expanded theory of transnational discursive democracy exactly because transnational economics are already an empirical reality. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri take this argument one step further to suggest that not only national citizenship but national sovereignty is obsolete. In Empire, they claim there is a new global order . . . a new form of sovereignty . . . a decentered and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open expanding frontiers (2000, pp. xi xii). Barry Hindess argues that citizenship is still critical to the globalization project for it provides a language through which a neo-liberal global ideology can both be advanced and masked, particularly with respect to non-western peoples. Where the liberal government of non-Western populations was once predicated on a denial of citizenship it is now channeled through the promotion of citizenship in states that are themselves increasingly subject to the rigours of the market (2002, p. 127). Put simply, all of these authors argue that economic globalization has moved us beyond the question of whether global citizenship is either possible or desirable to ask instead whether its denition is to be left to the purveyors of a globalized market. As important as this economic dimension is to global citizenship, the focus of my own analysis will be on another dimension of empire, namely, the peculiarly political face of liberal empire that I shall argue currently characterizes American foreign policy in the socalled war on terror. The civilizing mission of this new imperial power involves globalizing a national form of citizenship rooted in particular understandings (that are assumed to be universal) of democracy and freedom. Thus liberal empire, like economic globalization, I will argue, forces the hands of those who do not want to leave the denition of a global citizen exclusively in the hands of either international capital or George Bush. While both faces of [neo]-liberal empire (economic globalization as promoted by international nancial institutions and globalized citizenship as promoted

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by American foreign policy) overlap (for example, in defending a denition of freedom rooted in rights of property and a liberalized international market), the rise of American imperial power also counters in very important ways, the overly decentered and deterritorialized vision of power in Negri and Hardts theory of empire as well the largely post-national vision of Habermas and Benhabib. American liberal empire reminds us of the importance of nation-states in general and one (very powerful) nation-state in particular. If nothing else, the aftermath of 9/11 and how it has evolved through the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan reassert against those who envisioned in the dying days of the twentieth century a borderless future world of intersecting networks, the continuing signicance of borders, states, and constitutions as well as the disproportionate military power America has to force its own political agenda on the world stage. The Meanings of American Empire The recent spate of commentary on American imperial power has tended to see it as a realpolitik phenomenon in which a belligerent but reluctant American empire justies its reach in terms of narrowly dened national security interests.2 A realpolitik empire is thus rooted in defending national interests in a deeply territorial but anarchical world of selfinterested actors. The objective is to secure order and stability and to defend the nations citizens from any potential threats, even before they arise. Because there is no guarantor of order and security other than military force, the realpolitik version of empire requires disproportionate military power to back up its imperial ambitions. The historical model for this version of empire is the Roman empire which, as Martin Walker describes it, was the classical empire; centralized, authoritarian . . . and so rooted in military power (2002, p. 19). While America has disproportionate military strength,3 in a realpolitik world it is the purposes toward which that power is directed that matter; namely, the trumping of common good by national self-interest. Being an imperial power . . . is more than being the most powerful nation or just the most hated one. It means enforcing such order as there is in the world and doing so in the American interest (Ignatieff, 2003, emphasis added). Martin Walker states: the Bush administration [seems] careless of any idea of the common good, when this might appear distinct from American interests (2002, p. 17). Johnson states: The United States was . . . a military juggernaut intent on world domination (2004, p. 4). The realpolitik justication of contemporary American foreign policy is most clearly articulated in the September 2002 National Security Statement, where for the rst time in modern history, a democratic state claims the right to engage in a pre-emptive strike against sovereign nations because of potential rather than imminent threats to its security: We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends . . . Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threatmost often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of todays adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. (USA, 2002, p. 15)

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This document marks a fundamental shift in American foreign policy from superpower to imperial power. As Massimo La Torre comments: One might recall that the distinctive feature of an Empire that has been singled out by more than one scholar is the assumed prerogative of preventative war (2005, p. 237).4 There is little room in realpolitik imperial power for international law and institutions5 as they are perceived to be either ineffective or dangerous. Thus, Robert Kagan argues that international law is a tool used by the militarily weak (Europe) to try and constrain the US and must simply be ignored: Rather than viewing the United States as a Gulliver tied down by Lilliputian threads, American leaders should realize that they are hardly constrained at all, that Europe is not really capable of constraining the United States (2002). The Pentagon accepts this point of view to some degree, as reected in the March 2005 National Defense Strategy document: Our strength as a nation state will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism. In a single sentence the Pentagon includes terrorism with international law and institutions as comparable examples of how international actors can challenge and undermine American power and security. At the Defense Department Brieng on this document, Admiral Bill Sullivan, vice director of the J-5 (Strategy Plans and Policy Ofce of the Joint Staff), added by way of clarication: If there are countries that dont share our goals, they may try to use established international fora to inhibit . . . us doing what we need to do in our own national interest.6 Indeed, the Bush administration seems, at times, to see itself as operating above international law, as evidenced by the 2005 Amnesty International Report. In this report, illustrated with cases throughout, Amnesty International concludes that hypocrisy, an overarching war mentality, and a disregard for basic human rights principles and international legal obligations continue to mark the USAs war on terror. Serious human rights violations, affecting thousands of detainees and their families, have been the result. The rule of law, and therefore, ultimately, security, is being undermined, as is any moral credibility the USA claims to have in seeking to advance human rights in the world. (Amnesty International, 2005, p. 8) Ultimately to the extent that America is a realpolitik imperial power described in the paragraphs above, it stands in stark contrast to any theory of global citizenship for an imperial power needs to keep subordinate peoples in line, as empires invariably discover they do (Johnson, 2004, p. 285) by turning citizens of other countries, when required, into the subjects of imperial rule. I want to argue in the remainder of this paper (and in opposition to those who have constituted America as a fundamentally realpolitik but reluctant imperial power) that there was a critical shift towards the end of 2003, as the war on terror, particularly in Iraq, evolved. Increasingly, the Bush administration has dened its mandate in liberal terms as a kind of imperial civilizing mission in the Middle East. This change is critical in relation to the idea of global citizenship, for what George Bush ultimately wants Americas military to do is not to make Iraqis into subjects of American imperial rule (as Johnson claims) but, rather, to transform them into free and democratic citizens of their own newly constituted nation-state, but one shaped in Americas own image. Any reluctance American leaders may have felt towards a realpolitik empire has been replaced by an explicit passion for this new global mission, particularly in the Middle East.

Global Citizenship and Empire The [Re-] Emergence of Liberal Empire

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Thus, liberal imperial power, in general, seeks to create a different kind of empire, one governed by a single set of universal laws. Its proponents see their mandate on a higher moral plane than its realpolitik counterpart since they their goal is not only to create security in their nations own interests but to promote universal values, such as democracy and freedom to all. Liberal empire is not new in the history of American ideas but can be traced back to the mid-nineteenth century doctrine of manifest destiny within the western hemisphere. The other historical model for such liberal imperial power is the nineteenth century British empire which combined, according to Walker, a civilizing liberal mission with commercialized empire (2002, p. 20). The civilizing mission at the heart of liberal empire becomes for the imperial power as much a burden as goal, since it depends on the notion that some backward or rogue states can only progress towards becoming civilized or democratic with the help of other external actors. The shift in current American foreign policy towards a liberal empire can be traced in more immediate terms to the autumn of 2003 when the Iraq Survey Group (which took over the search for Weapons of Mass Destruction in June 2003) presented its Interim Report to Congress. This report made clear that no WMDs were likely to be found on Iraqi soil. With this new information, the fundamental realpolitik premise for invading Iraq evaporated overnight, along with the moral and political basis upon which America continued its occupation.7 The White House realized that they needed a new emphasis in their justication of Americas continued occupation of Iraq, a language that would have to shoulder an enormous burden: the weight of thousands of civilian deaths in Iraq as well as hundreds, now thousands, of body bags returning home to American families. The language was not wholly new but the emphasis changed. A new communications campaign was born steeped in the higher moral principles of spreading freedom and democracy to the Middle East rather than simply securing American interests or regional stability. To say that this was part of a new communications strategy does not mean that it was a cynical exercise in camouaging the realpolitik motivations continuing to underpin American foreign policy, as some have argued, at least not from the point of the view of the President and many of his neo-conservative colleagues. A better way of understanding this shift from realpolitik to liberal empire is to see it as a denitive development in the ongoing debate, within the Republican Party since 2000, between realist pragmatists and neo-conservative ideologues. What happens in November 2003 is that the President comes down denitively on the side of the moral crusaders who have been agitating since the launch of the now famous Project for a New American Century (PNAC) in 1997 for a foreign policy of greater moral clarity.8 The defense of liberal empire begins with President Bushs speech at the 20th anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy on 6 November 2003 (a month after the Interim Report was tabled) in which he not only shifts the groundwork for justifying the invasion of Iraq from one of national security to the defense of freedom and democracy but makes the case this is a global revolution. The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution.9 Key to this new emphasis is the change in American foreign policy from the goal of stability to that of democracy.10 Bush introduces this change with a mea culpe in his NED speech:

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Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safebecause in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty . . . Therefore, the United States has adopted a new policy, a forward strategy of freedom in the Middle East. This strategy requires the same persistence and energy and idealism we have shown before. And it will yield the same results . . . The advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is the calling of our country.11 The NED speech was followed by another major speech at Whitehall on 19 November 2003 before the Queen and Prime Minster Tony Blair, in which Bush invoked two great British liberal philosophers (John Locke and Adam Smith) to frame his own governments foreign policy, appealing directly to the connections between Britain and America in their common defense of liberty and democracy.12 At every major speech since, the President has continued this moral defense of his foreign policy as one that seeks to spread democracy and freedom around the world.13 At the heart of George Bushs liberal empire is a particular version of global citizenship,14 particularly if one accepts that citizenship is dened by shared values. Global citizenship, for Bush, does not mean political institutions or civil society should transcend nation-states (as transnational or cosmopolitan theorists might argue) but rather universal values (democracy and freedom) can and should. Liberal empire is rooted in the belief that the world would be better off if all people, but particularly those living in the Middle East, were citizens of their own states governed by a specic set of universal (neo-)liberal-democratic values rather than subjects of their authoritarian governments or a realpolitik empire seeking security at the expense of all other values. To see Bush as a defender of global citizenship is to underscore the difference between citizen and subject in a particular way. Mahmood Mamdani (1996), in his book Citizen and Subject, argues that empire can either seek to freeze subjects in their customary ways (as was done in rural Africa) and then rule over them despotically or it can try to make citizens out of non-western peoples by transcending custom through western political values. Thus, unlike Africa, according to Mamdani, British rule in India was an example of the latter kind of colonial policy where Britain sought to make citizens rather than subjects out of Indians as part of their civilizing mission. It is the making citizens rather than subjects out of others that lies at the heart of liberal imperial power. Ultimately, Bush does not want to occupy Iraq or Afghanistan forever and make them wholly subject to American power in perpetuity. Rather he wants to globalize the values of American citizenship, by recreating Iraqi national institutions in Americas own image. Like other forms of global citizenship, the universal values underpinning this vision lead inevitably to undermining those national cultures deemed to be inconsistent with the principles of freedom and democracy as dened by the Bush administration. This is why we can say that Bushs view of citizenship is globalhe believes that we all ultimately share the same political and economic values regardless of culture and America is not only justied but in some sense morally obligated to spread these values. Thus, in the same way that J. S. Mill once argued on behalf of British empire, that universal individual freedom must transcend traditional cultures or customs and a despotic rule may be used until such a shift occurs, Bush seeks to transcend custom or culture in the Middle East in the name of a globalized [neo] liberal-democratic citizenship and will use the military

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to enforce this transition. The critical question of course is, what does democracy or freedom mean in Bushs globalized theory of citizenship? Bush answers this question in his address in June 2005 to the Organization of American States (gathered together in Florida under the theme: Delivering the Benets of Democracy),15 where he characterizes the values underpinning his universal political vision as: representative government, integration into the world markets, and a faith in the transformative power of freedom in individual lives. He goes on to argue that the progress of democracy should be measured in relation to the number of free elections.16 Bush brings together Joseph Schumpters denition of democracy (that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the peoples vote; 1976, p. 269) with a classical liberal defense of negative freedoms (the right to property (Locke) and free markets (Smith)) and a neo-liberal defense of globalized markets. On the neo-liberal characteristic of globalization, Barry Hindess argues (2002) that the negative side of citizenship, which in earlier forms of imperial rule meant that nonwestern subjects were excluded from citizenship (as Mamdani argued), has given way in contemporary times to the idea of full inclusion to a globalized idea of neo-liberal citizenship. The west, in other words, continues to exert its power, but now rather than exclude or create subject peoples, a globalized theory of neo-liberal citizenship encourages non-western peoples to be incorporated into a global market. Hindess helps to explain the nature of American imperial rule, for while liberal empire seeks to make people democratic (freely electing their one government in according with constitutional rules), the neo-liberal dimension of Bushs globalized citizenship seeks to make them into consumers within an international marketplace. The core rights therefore are to vote and to consume. Hindess does not acknowledge the degree to which Bush values the political dimensions of global citizenship. Ultimately American empire does not want a borderless world of transnational citizens governed by international capital alone (as Negri and Hardt and to a lesser extend Hindess have argued) but national citizens governed by Schumpterian democratic principles and the classical negative rights of Locke and Smith. Citizenship is thus a vehicle that is used in the service of the imperial ends of both economic neo-liberal and political liberal imperial rule. What is critical to recognize in Bushs vision of liberal/neo-liberal global citizenship is that it is generally achieved through negative rights at the expense of positive rights. Thus, in his speech before the National Endowment for Democracy, Bush constructed his vision of global citizenship in direct opposition to social and economic rights. Successful societies privatize their economies, and secure the rights of property.17 Similarly in his speech to the Organization of American States, Bush describes two possible economic visions of the Americas, adding that his administration will be looking for new ways to prime the real engines of hope in the Americas: its small businesses and private enterprises and entrepreneurs.18 Barry Hindess comments of the neo-liberal vision of global citizenship: the social rights of citizenship (where they exist) are pared back as provision through the market replaces provision directly or indirectly through the state (p. 140). While one might think that that liberal empire has a short shelf life and will end when Bush and the neo-conservatives leave ofce; it is clear that both the denitions of freedom (limited to negative rights) and democracy (limited to elections) provided by Bush are shared by leading members of the Democratic Party in America; and liberal

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empire, unlike a more realpolitik justication of empire, enjoys considerable bi-partisan support. It is likely, therefore, that a similar foreign policy rooted in liberal empire will succeed the Bush administrations term in ofce and become the central plank of any new administrations foreign policy, whether it is Republican or Democratic. Thus, former Democratic House Leader Richard Gephardt, in a speech entitled Spreading Freedom: A Mission for the American People to the NED on 22 March 2005, uses the same electoral denition of democracy to underpin his own notion of an American mission in the world; documenting the progress of global democracy by listing the countries that have held elections over the course of the twentieth century.19 He argues that Americas goal should be spreading freedom to the world including the right to choose their leader in competitive elections.20 Ultimately, like Bush, Gephardt argues that the idea of America can be globalized and claimed by every human being in the world. Thus, the reality of American empire, backed by both realpolitik and liberal justications, throws a whole new light on the development of a global theory of citizenship in a number of different ways. To the extent that those defending a realpolitik version see America as above international law and want to turn citizens of other countries into subjects of American imperial rule, almost any theory of global citizenship, by denition, would counter such a world order. But, as I hope to have shown, the shift to a liberal defense of imperial power (including the mission to deliver or spread Americas own particular model of neo-liberal, electoral citizenship to the world) and its bi-partisan support makes it even more important that the normative ground the Bush administration takes up to serve its own imperial ends can and must be contested by an alternative theory of what it means to be a global citizen. Given Americas power to decide the fate of so many people around the world, any alternative theory of citizenship, however, must speak to empire and not simply against it. The Meanings of Citizenship While theories of modern citizenship initially developed in direct opposition to empire (the citizens of states replaced the subjects of imperial rule), I hope to have demonstrated that the relationship between current American imperial power and citizenship, particularly when it is projected to a global level of analysis, is much more complicated than this earlier oppositional relationship might suggest. The emergence of liberal empire in American foreign policy, articulated in terms of a global defense of freedom and democracy, does not so much oppose the principles of modern liberaldemocratic citizenship as co-opt them (in particular ways) for its own purposes. Ultimately, unless we want to cede the important discursive space represented by words such as rights, freedom or even democracy internationally to the neo-liberal rhetoric of economic transnational citizenship or the political rhetoric of Americas war or terror, it is crucial that those scholars who have a different vision of world order develop alternative theories. It is important to recognize that there are many threads within western political thought that could be used to weave together such a theory and so I shall begin my own search for an alternative theory of global citizenship with an examination of both liberal and democratic theory to see what they might be.

Global Citizenship and Empire Democratic Citizenship: The Principle of Participation

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The democratic thread of citizenship in western political theory is rooted in Ancient Greece and marked by a number of different meanings as it has developed over two millennia. For Aristotle a democratic constitution meant direct rule by the people by which he generally meant the poor: Wherever the poor rule, that is a democracy.21 A second, modern, denition of democracy that I already discussed in relation to George Bush and Richard Gephardt is freely contested elections. Thus, as Joseph Schumpeter denes democracy: that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the peoples vote (p. 269). It is this model of democracy that underpins liberal empire, as described above. The strength of this denition of democracy when applied to the global context is its relative clarity; either one holds free elections or one does not. The Schumpeterian denition of democracy is also problematic. First, it speaks almost entirely of democracy in institutional terms with little concern for civic society or peoples participation in between elections. Second, in dening democratic citizenship as elections, Schumpeterian democracy has a limited capacity to speak to the problems of many people, most particularly the least well off. The American Commission on Capital Flows to Africa observes of the impact elections have on the real needs of Africa: Since 1990 . . . 42 of the 48 countries in sub-Saharan Africa have held multi-party elections, and most Africans today have the right to choose their leaders at the ballot box. On the other hand, Africa has fallen behind the rest of the developing world in many dimensions of development. Life expectancy has decreased with the rise of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. The average African is poorer today than he or she was two decades ago, and the number of people living in poverty has increased steadily during the past 20 years.22 Thus, even though the vast majority of people in the poorest part of the world have democracy, meaning elections, it has done little improve their lives in any meaningful way. The key problem for sub-Saharan Africans is not a Schumpterian lack of electoral democracy (which is why the Bush/Gephardt civilizing mission rings so hollow in these parts of the world) but the relentless effects of disease and poverty. Indeed, this reality raises the possibility that if Africa (which constitutes 12% of the worlds population) were to have a full voice in the theorization of global citizenship, it might prefer an Aristotelian denition of democracy as the rule of the poor with poverty alleviation being the primary democratic goal.23 Another thread of democratic citizenship, rooted in a more Continental tradition, sees democracy as not just a matter of having a vote in the choice of ones representatives who make the laws but rather participation in directly shaping the laws themselves. The leading thinker in this tradition, Jurgen Habermas, argues that democracy must go well beyond the franchise, elections or representation to a much broader theory of accountability and voice. The focus of discursive democratic theory is, therefore, the expansion and multiplication of spaces within which citizens may shape the rules, policies and decisions that govern their lives at the local, national and supra-national levels. In a very real sense, this shifts the locus of democracy from institutions (parliament or national assembly) to civil society

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and, by redening the principle of popular sovereignty, delinks citizenship from its singular association with bounded communities and national institutions to form a postnational constellation (2001). This broadening of the meaning of democracy opens up some possibilities for countering both a realpolitik and neo-liberal form of empire in a way that can speak to the reality of a globalized world. Seyla Benhabib argues that between international law and the national democratic legislature, multiple democratic iterations are possible and desirable (2004, p. 176) but depend upon the delinking of citizenship from one exclusively determined by national community. As such, she concludes this new conguration of democratic voices gives rise to sub-national as well as transnational modes of citizenship (p. 217). Habermas also makes the case that if the democratic process is to secure a basis for legitimacy beyond the nation-state, then . . . popular process of collective will formation alone will have to provide it . . . subsisting in transnational networks of communication . . . the proliferation of interconnected public spheres . . . cooperative non-governmental organizations and popular political movements with a global outlook (2001, p. xiv). In both cases, the key is not to just include civil society in existing institutions and bodies but to begin to imagine new ways of doing politics (citizens assemblies to take one example from British Columbia24) in which citizens would have real decision-making power in the laws by which they are governed. I am very sympathetic to this thread of democratic theory given that the push to democratize the World Trade Organization, International Financial Institutions and various regional political and economic decision-making bodies will serve to challenge the neo-liberal orthodoxy of economic globalization through the facilitation of an international democratic voice. However, discursive democratic transnational citizenship has some very real limitations often skirted by its leading advocates. First, transnational citizenship as it is articulated in these theories has a heavy European slant (Habermas, 2001, and Benhabib, 2004, both use Europe as their case study); as such it raises questions as to whether such a focus on democratic participation can or should be the primary consideration in contexts beyond Europe or whether other threads of citizenship theory speak more directly to their needs. In the case of Africa, for example, does discursive democratic theory address directly the immediate problems of poverty or disease they face? In the case of the Middle East or Asia, is this European focus problematic from a cultural point of view? The second and more serious limitation involves the issue of power. Can such discursive democratic theory and practice create real change in light of American imperial power? Can it speak to empire in any meaningful way or will it be seen as nothing more than a rather pesky moral gady to be swatted away if inconsistent with what is perceived to be American/global values? Ultimately I tend to agree with Richard Falks diagnosis of such democratic aspirations that while it may be fashionable in certain circles to talk grandly these days of being a global citizen, it seems presently to reect exceedingly thin sentiments [that are] either supercial or utopian (2000, p. 6). Imperial power will not yield to supercial or utopian sentiments nor will it allow democratic innovation to challenge its own power in any meaningful way. It is all too easy to see how such democratic spaces are allowed to exist at the edges of empire to rail against it while very few real changes are made as a result of democratic deliberation. The key question, therefore, is how one advances an alternative theory of global citizenship with real bite given the current imperial context.

Global Citizenship and Empire Liberal Citizenship: The Principle of Individual Rights

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A second thread of citizenship theory that may be more promising for a global theory of citizenship is liberal thought. With foundations in the natural rights doctrine of John Lockes Two Treatises in the seventeenth century, the individual rights/freedoms that underpin liberal theories of citizenship have been conceived from their inception as universal (at least in theory) rather than bound to membership in a particular territorial community. By the nineteenth century, natural rights were transformed into the idea of negative liberties or freedoms, most notably in the works of J. S. Mill and Adam Smith. Like Lockes theory, freedoms are theoretically conceived as universal. The practical manifestation of this universal character is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights signed in the aftermath of World War II. The universality of liberal theory stands in stark contrast to the citizenship that characterizes most democratic theories in which one is a citizen by virtue of being a member of the demos. Despite its universal pretensions, the reality is that for most of the modern period, the majority of people in liberal states were not citizens and did not exercise the rights of citizenship (based on gender, class, ethnicity, race, indigeneity or religious beliefs). It was only in the rst half of the twentieth century that these various forms of exclusion give way to a universal franchise. Liberal theories of citizenship are now largely inclusive in terms of the formal rights of citizenship, but in the last half of the twentieth century, an important set of critical analyses have begun to examine whether the classical liberal norms themselves construct the political world in such a way as to disadvantage the other. As liberal multicultural and feminist theorists such as Will Kymlicka (1995) and Carole Pateman (1988) have shown, liberal theory in its classical form used citizenship to assimilate others into a certain set of supposedly universal norms that in reality reected Euro/Anglo-centrism and fraternalism, respectively. Thus, what emerges in late twentieth century citizenship theory, under the auspices of feminism, multiculturalism and post-colonial theories is not so much a call for universal inclusion under an existing set of political principles, but a rearticulation of the principles themselves in a way that speaks to gender differences and cultural diversity. It follows that a global theory of citizenship rooted in the idea of rights should be attuned to the same problem of norms or values being used to assimilate others into an existing political order. Because liberal theory from the outset anchored itself in the principle of universality (even if in practice it was far from universal) some might argue that it is more promising for extrapolation to a global theory than democratic citizenship. I would agree with this conclusion but will make the case that, given the reality of the liberal empire described above, the success of such a theory depends very much on how one denes rights. American liberal empire and neo-liberal economic globalization, as discussed, emphasizes the negative rights of classical liberalism. Bush explicitly uses Locke and Smith to frame his own foreign policy while defending neo-liberal citizenship in terms of integration into the world market. But it is important to remind ourselves that the legacy of Locke, Smith and Mill is not only the property rights of a global marketplace but also protection from an arbitrary or abusive power through the civil and political rights of international law. As such, liberal citizenship provides an important theoretical basis by which to protect the worlds most vulnerable (to varying degrees) from either a realpolitik version of imperial rule or abuse by their own nation-states. This principle of global citizenship has made signicant

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progress in recent years through various legal mechanisms that have allowed the international community to try former tyrants for crimes against humanity, the development of an International Criminal Court and an emerging UN consensus around the Responsibility to Protect. As James Bohman (2004) has argued, legal rights in the international context only have meaning to the extent there is an addressee of human rights claims, which is why both the ICC and the spelling out of global institutional responsibilities to protect those subject to gross human rights violations are so critical. This aspect of liberal citizenship (international entrenchment of civil and political rights) is a powerful tool and must be incorporated into any new theory of global citizenship. In the next section I want to argue that we cannot stop there. What is needed at the global level is to broaden the understanding of rights from the classical civil and political rights to incorporate, as a rst principle, social rights. This shift will begin to counter and redene the prevailing vision of citizenship endorsed by both economic globalization and American empire. I will argue, however, that a second principle of global citizenshipwhat I shall call shared fateis also required if our alternative theory is to speak not only against empire but to it. Through the idea of shared fate I hope to convert Falks concerns with the thin supercial or utopian sentiments of global citizenship into the recognition of thicker and more robust common interests. A New Theory of Global Citizenship: Social Rights and Shared Fate An alternative theory of globalization can (and should) begin by weaving together some of the threads of democratic and liberal citizenship described above (including continued international support and monitoring of national elections, expansion, multiplication and creation of new transnational discursive spaces and the defense and expansion of international human rights instruments to protect individuals from abuse by their own governments or more powerful nation-states). However, if it is to speak directly to the needs of a globalized humanity in a way that respects the multicultural diversity of humanity in an imperial age it must go beyond classical liberal or democratic theory. My alternative theory of global citizenship is rooted in two principles. The rst is the principle of social rights rst articulated by T. H. Marshall. I hope to demonstrate that social rights provide a better starting point for our common responsibilities to each other as human beings than either John Rawlss duty of assistance or Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitzs redistributive theory rooted in a global original position. The second principle, shared fate, will allow us to respect deep cultural differences of various peoples around the world, by arguing that what ties us together is not a set of common values (as Bush has argued) but interdependence. Moreover, the principle of shared fate, as I hope to show through the lens of both north/south and east/west, addresses global deprivation and security simultaneously. Global citizenship as shared fate, therefore, may provide a way to speak to empire while addressing the needs of the least well off. The First Principle of Global Citizenship: Social Rights If, at the end of the day, a theory of global citizenship does not address the deep poverty and suffering experienced by millions of our fellow human beings as a rst priority and actually measure the degree to which it is alleviated, I do not see how it can really be said to be either successful or real. Every year eight million people die in the world simply

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because they are too poor to stay alive (Sachs, 2005, p. 1) and this is where the call for political rights, civil rights or even democratic voice seems to ring so hollow. As Jeffrey Sachs has argued, you can be too poor for these political goals to have any meaning. A theory of global citizenship rooted in social rights would begin by dening the Millenium Development Goals25 not as targets in relation to development or aid (and hence a matter of charity) but as social rights (and hence a matter of justice) bestowed by this principle of global citizenship. As Marshall concludes with respect to national citizenship in Britain, the full exercise of citizenship requires social rights (to a decent standard of living and well-being including education and welfare). By extrapolating this theory of citizenship to the global level, poverty alleviation generally and the MDGs specically are transformed from an imperfect moral duty of the north to an inalienable right of citizenship for those living in poverty in the south. Thus, citizenship understood as social rights that shifts the balance of power in favor of the worlds least well off. Marshalls theory of citizenship is an alternative to two other famous theories of global justice and development advanced in recent years. The rst is John Rawls duty of assistance to burdened societies (1999, p. 106); the second is the redistributive theory (rooted in a global original position) articulated by Thomas Pogge (1992, 2002) and Charles Beitz (1999a, 2000). Rawls makes the case that richer countries have an imperfect moral duty to assist poorer countries without any denite obligation to do so (thus he distinguishes between his famous theory of justice and the redistributive principle that applies domestically with the lesser duty of charity that applies in the international realm). Rawls justies his stance because he argues that a countrys wealth is the result of endogenous rather than exogenous factors (1999, p. 109). Rawls fails to recognize, however, the degree to which the souths poverty has, at least in part, been a creation of the north. Benhabib comments: There is remarkably little social-scientic evidence which Rawls adduces to support this assertion [of the endogenous causes of poverty] . . . in this remarkably Victorian account of the wealth of nations the plunder of Africa by all western societies is not mentioned even once, the global character of the African slave trade and its contributions to the accumulation of capitalist wealth in the US . . . are barely recalled (2004, pp. 99 100). Ultimately, the duty to assist erases the interdependence of wealth and poverty historically, and puts the entire control over redistribution in the hands of the rich by leaving it as nothing more than a moral duty of charity to the poor. Charles Beitz (1999a, 1999b, 2000), Thomas Pogge (1992, 2002) and Wilfried Hinsch (2001) nd Rawlss duty to assist unsatisfactory as a theory of global justice and argue instead for a redistributive theory rooted in Rawls notion of an original position but expanded to a global level. Hinsch concludes that principles of distributive justice apply irrespective of national borders directly and primarily to the global community of world citizens at large, the aim being that each citizen receives his or her due share of global wealth as determined by a global conception of justice (2001, p. 59). Beitz concurs: Conning principles of justice to domestic societies has the effect of taxing poor nations so that others may benet from living in just regimes (Beitz, 1999a, p. 150). Beitz concludes that international justice is fundamentally one of fairness to persons rather than fairness to societies (1999b, p. 515). These theories of global redistribution are certainly an improvement on Rawlss Laws of Peoples to the extent that they make poverty an issue of justice rather than charity, but they are problematic for a number of other reasons.

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First, in assuming the priority of individuals (in an original position) over social relations, a global original position runs roughshod over the diversity of values amongst the worlds peoples (which is why Rawls opted for peoples rather than individuals in his own global theory)the same problem I articulated above in relation to liberal theory as analyzed in the work of Will Kymlicka and other multicultural theorists. Second, a redistributive scheme expanded to global proportions seems infeasible in the current international context (where most citizens in wealthier countries are unwilling to support redistribution to their own poor in the interests of justice as fairness let alone millions of poor people in the world beyond). To put it more bluntly, why would American citizens or their governments be convinced that they should redistribute wealth based on a global original position, particularly in an age of imperial power? Finally, the original position is rooted in a contract between independent and equal parties who have reciprocal obligations. Such contractual arrangements, however, slip all too easily into the idea that the poor must shoulder responsibilities if they are to receive the reciprocal obligations from the rich of this relationship. As Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon have argued, in the domestic realm, it is the idea of a social contract between the rich and poor that has allowed for the introduction of workfare in the US (1994). At the international level, this same idea of reciprocity and mutual responsibilities is likewise translated into the notion that poor governments meet certain obligations (as articulated in the IMF Structural Adjustment Programs or Bushs Millenium Challenge Account) before they are deemed worthy of reciprocity, that is, debt relief or nancial redistribution from the west. Finally, Fraser and Gordon conclude that liberal contract theories tend to constitute human relationships as either discrete contractual exchanges between autonomous individuals with mutual obligations or unreciprocated, unilateral charity for dependents: one is either autonomous or dependent with little recognition of either inequality or interdependence between the parties. Fraser and Gordons analysis provides an important insight into the two theories of poverty alleviation that we have been discussing because Rawls duty to assist falls into the category of charity for dependents; while Beitzs and Pogges redistributive justice is a contract between autonomous individuals. The alternative to both principles, as Fraser and Gordon suggest, is interdependency where people are neither fully autonomous individuals, nor dependents but rather interdependent beings embedded in a particular set of (unequal) social relations. In order to address the principles of interdependence and inequality, I turn to Marshalls theory of social rights. For Marshall, citizenship begins with human beings embedded in social relations marked by inequality. Citizenship is not the either/or proposition of liberal theory (either one is a citizen or not) but a process that evolves towards equality. Thus Marshalls theory rests on the perception that citizenship may be present . . . without yet being fully developed among its inhabitants (Hindess, 2002, p. 138). Marshall calls for the image of an ideal citizenship against which achievement can be measured and towards which aspirations can be directed. The urge forward along the path thus plotted is an urge towards a fuller measure of equality (1964, p. 84). If you think of global social citizenship in this manner (a process by which to measure the movement of the least well off towards an aspired level of equality); the MDGs are now seen as tools by which to measure global citizenship rather than development targets by which the rich might assist the poor, if they have the will to do so; nor the goals of a redistributive scheme rooted in contract. They are, instead, a kind of yardstick by which achievement towards full citizenship amongst the least well off is to be measured by virtue of the degree to which

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current levels of inequality decrease. Social rights thus shift the onus for resolving poverty alleviation or inequality away from the poor (who no longer need to play their charitable card and be dependent nor prove themselves worthy of aid in line with the principle of contractual obligation). The onus is now on the rich who as fellow interdependent citizens have explicit obligations to ensure a basic level of subsistence for all and to move towards increasing levels of equality. Marshalls social rights directly target the issue of inequality, through the language of citizenship status. As Marshall concludes in his study of Britain: The preservation of economic inequalities [is] made more difcult by the enrichment of the status of citizenship (p. 117). To illustrate this through a hypothetical example, consider for a moment if an American political leader were to describe the progress of global citizenship not in terms of the number of elections held around the world as Richard Gephardt or George Bush have done, but in terms of the progress on the MDGs (an increase in the number of girls who have completed primary education, a growing percentage of women surviving child-birth, the shrinking distance between home and a clean water supply, the increase in the percapita income of the average household, a percentage reduction in the under-ve mortality rate, or the degree to which the spread of HIV/AIDS has been halted and reversed). While Marshalls theory arguably makes sense from the perspective of global justice and the least well off, the question remains in an imperial age, why would the west, and America more specically, want to embrace global social rights? To answer this question, we need to turn to the second principle of global citizenship, namely, shared fate. Global Citizenship as Shared Fate In the previous section I made the case for Marshalls idea of social rights as something to which we, as interdependent beings, might aspire but have not explained why imperial America would consider supporting a theory of social rights at the global level, given the idea of social citizenship is not only anathema to American political culture (as Fraser and Gordon argue) but in the current context, the issue of global inequality/poverty is dwarfed in the American consciousness by the overwhelming concern with their own security. Liberal empire is the answer Bush has given for making Americans feel more secure. Through the second principle of global citizenship, I hope to demonstrate that global citizens do indeed share something in common, namely, their fates, and when this principle is applied to the world around us, it provides a very sound basis upon which to convince Americans and their leaders that an alternative theory of global citizenship rooted in social rights will create a far more secure world than liberal empire has done. In the introductory paragraphs of this article, I suggested that global citizenship is often dened in terms of shared membership or values, but that the rst of these, without world government, has little meaning; and the second, shared values, while increasingly popular in recent years amongst both academics and politicians as the basis upon which to articulate a cosmopolitan citizenship, often involves imposing a particular set of values on all. Extrapolated to the global level, Martha Nussbaum (1996), Thomas Pogge and George Bush have all made the argument, in different ways, that we ultimately hold certain universal values in common. Thus the problem with anchoring citizenship at the global level in a set of shared values is the potential to do violence to cultural diversity at best or engage in western cultural imperialism at worst. Even the more scholarly and nuanced forms of cosmopolitan citizenship, articulated by Nussbaum and others, are problematic

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in this regard. As Anthony Pagden concludes in his critique of Nussbaums cosmopolitanism: In calling upon men to belong to a common deme or polis, Zeno was also, of course, making all men members of the deme or polis to which he belonged (Pagden, 1998, p. 7). Brett Bowden concurs in his critique of the cosmopolitan citizenship espoused by Nussbaum: When Nussbaum and like-minded cosmopolitans declare themselves to be a citizen of the world what they mean is that they are citizens of the cosmopolitan, globalised, liberal-democratic Western world that constitutes the centre (2003, p. 355). In order to avoid these problems implicit in many cosmopolitan theories of global citizenship rooted in shared values, I want to argue for a minimal basis for shared citizenship at the global level namely, shared fate. This theory of citizenship, rst articulated by Melissa Williams in relation to non-aboriginal and aboriginal peoples in Canada, allows us to nd something we share as interdependent citizens without forcing a set of (western) values on non-western peoples. Williams comments: An alternative [to shared values] lies in what we might call citizenship as shared fate. The core of this idea is that we nd ourselves in webs of relationships with other human beings that profoundly shape our lives, whether or not we consciously choose or voluntarily assent to be enmeshed in these webs. What connects us in a community of shared fate is that our actions have an impact on other identiable human beings and other human beings actions have an impact on us . . . Our futures are bound to each other whether we like it or not. (2004, p. 104) Global citizenship as shared fate means that the fate of any human being, even members of the most powerful nation in world, is deeply dependent on the fate of all others. Shared fate rather than shared values or membership is what ultimately makes us global citizens and, if taken seriously, allows us to answer the critical question of why America in an age of empire would embrace social rights even though the language of social citizenship and interdependence is so foreign to the American political lexicon. In many ways the idea of shared fate overlaps with but differs from both Ulrich Becks theory of shared world risk (2002) and Olena Hankivskys global ethic of care (2006). Beck argues that risk is a part of the modern narrative (2002, p. 41) but with the advent of a globalized terrorist network, the individualized risk of modern times has given way to systemic risk that requires new kinds of political responses which recognize the mutually interdependent nature of security. As Beck argues, Helping those who have been excluded is no longer a humanitarian task. It is in the Wests own interest: the key to its security. The west can no longer ignore the black holes of collapsed states and situations of despair (p. 48). While both theories point to the need to see human interests as interlinked, what distinguishes shared fate from shared risk is the word fate rather than risk. Shared fate replaces the idea that human beings should pool risk as, for example, common holders of an insurance policy do, with the idea that we are all citizens of a common humanity that need to recognize our own fate (whatever it might be) embedded in the fate of others. It makes the relationship both more political and necessary. The global ethic of care in an era of globalization also overlaps with shared fate to the extent that both see interdependence as a central feature of human life (and preferable to either autonomy or dependence as a theoretical underpinning for human ethics and politics). As Hankivsky argues: it is . . . clear how decisions by states, groups . . . in one

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part of the world can have profound consequences for so-called strangers in another (p. 105). But my social rights and shared fate arguments diverge from an ethic of care in terms of what the principle of interdependence means in the face of empire. The ethic of care is an ethical appeal, that we have responsibility to recognize how those around us both close and distant . . . [are] affected by our inactions (or actions) (Hankivsky, 2006, p. 106). As such, it depends on the expressed good will rooted in an ethical sense of responsibility of the powerful. I hope through my own alternative theory of global citizenship to give similar ethical insights regarding interdependence a greater political bite. As discussed, rights (a concept at the heart of the care critique) are thus important in my theory in two different ways in relation to empire: rst as a tool (through civil and political rights) of international law by which one can challenge realpolitik empire, including the treatment of illegal combatants, and second as a tool (understood as social rights) to shift the onus of responsibility for poverty from the poor in the south to the rich in the north as a requirement not of charity but citizenship. Second, the principle of shared fate also addresses imperial power in its own terms by linking insecurity in America (which fuels imperial power) with both deprivation and a loss of hope in the south and the militarized support for democracy in the East. In other words, shared fate does not expect the West or America to suddenly develop a caring capacity to recognize how others are affected by our actions but simply to recognize how Americas own fate is affected by its actions towards others. To this end, I will address in detail two empirical dimensions of citizenship as shared fate in an age of empire under the headings north/south and east/west to provide concrete evidence that the security concerns of the north are empirically correlated with poverty and inequality in the south on the one hand and that the threat of suicide bombers in the west are correlated with the promotion of democracy in the (Middle) East on the other. If these correlations are accurate empirically, than a theory of global citizenship as shared fate suggests that American citizens who wish to be more secure must seek a government that would redeploy their nations nancial, political and military resources away from its current civilizing mission (to promote Schumpterian democracy and neoliberal market integration) to focus instead on social rights and the alleviation of poverty and global economic inequalities as well as disengage from a militarized enforcement of democracy in the Middle East. The Shared Fate of North/South: Security and Poverty There are countless ways that one could analyzed the shared fate or risk between global citizens in the north and south, including environmental issues, nuclear weapons or nancial crises (Beck, 2002) but the key issue I would like to explore is the relationship between the impoverished south and the insecure north. In December 2004, a high level panel on global security submitted a report entitled A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility to the UN Secretary General Kof Annan. Annan comments in the preface: Particularly important is the reports insistence that todays threats to our security are all interconnected. We can no longer afford to see problems such as terrorism, or civil wars, or extreme poverty, in isolation . . . Development and security are inextricably linked. A more secure world is only possible if poor countries are given a real chance to develop. Extreme poverty and infectious diseases threaten many

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people directly, but they also provide a fertile breeding-ground for other threats, including civil conict. Even people in rich countries will be more secure if their Governments help poor countries to defeat poverty and disease by meeting the Millennium Development Goals. (UN, 2004, pp. vii viii, emphasis added) What evidence is there for making these kinds of connections between security of the north and poverty in the south? First, there is a considerable literature supporting a robust correlation between poverty and conict/violence within the borders of nation-states (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Econometric studies done by the World Bank conclude that the single most important factor for the absence of civil conict and violence is economic well-being: A country with GDP per person of just $250 has a predicted probability of war onset (at some point over the next ve years) of 15%, even if it is otherwise considered an average country. This probability of war reduces by half for a country with GDP of just $600 per person and is reduced by half again to below 4% for a country with income of $1250. Countries with income per person over $5000 have a less than 1% chance of experiencing civil conicts, all else being equal.26 Along with the rise in violence, it has also been shown that states are more likely to fail in the face of serious deprivation. Susan Rice, former US Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, comments: studies show that economic privation is . . . an important indicator of state failure. States in which human suffering is rampant (as measured by high infant mortality) are 2.3 times more likely to fail than others . . . State failure is also substantially correlated with uneven distribution of income within societies.27 Civil violence and failed states create the perfect breeding-ground for terrorist activity. In the age of globalization, when states fail, the consequences for citizens everywhere can be serious. As Afghanistan, Sudan and Somalia have demonstrated, failed states can provide convenient safe havens, training grounds and operational bases for international terrorists. Terrorist organizations take advantage of failed states porous borders, weak or non-existent law enforcement and security services and their ineffective governance institutions to sequester and move men, money and weapons. (Rice, 2003, p. 2) As the UN Report on global security puts it: Poverty increases the risks of conict through multiple paths. Poor countries are more likely to have weak governments making it easer for would-be rebels to grab land and vital resources . . . Without productive alternatives, young people may turn to violence for material gain, or feel a sense of hopelessness, despair and rage.28 Put simply the combination of violence at the individual or societal level and powerlessness at the state level is lethal to the security concerns of both the south and north. It is not only extreme poverty in the south that sows the seeds of violence, but relative deprivation in the north, particularly as experienced by inner city young males in certain racialized groups and poor neighborhoods. Thus, for example, three out of the four London suicide bombers involved in the 7 July 2005 (7/7) bombings in London lived in BeestonHolbeck, an inner city subdivision of Leeds, England marked by persistent economic

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deprivation and racial antagonism. A report prepared by the Leeds Initiative for the Leeds City Council in August 2003 concluded: There are whole areas of Leeds particularly in inner city wards and amongst ethnic minority communities where there are very high levels of social deprivation, high crime rates, high unemployment, large numbers of workless households, single parent families, poor or unt housing, households living in fuel poverty, social exclusion and a very poor local environment (Leeds Initiative, 2003, p. 79, emphasis added). Another report from the Leeds Health Authority concludes: Leeds was invariably described as a prosperous city but also as a two tier one which contained within it some of the most deprived wards in the countrypredominantly in the south and east of the city (Leeds Health Authority, 2002, p. 89, emphasis added).29 Beeston-Holbeck is one of those subdivisions marked by both a higher percent of people of color and economic deprivation relative to other parts of the city. The sense of hopelessness and despair amongst many young men of color in perennially deprived neighborhoods combined with racism has fuelled urban violence in northern English cities over the last two decades and made them fertile ground for certain forms of religion that provide, in Marxs famous words, an opiate. Max Farrar, a sociologist who has spent his career examining violence amongst young men of color in the inner cities of England, argues the Beeston bombers represent a new form of urban violence: They all come from inner-city areas with much in common with Beeston: a signicant proportion of non-white residents, much higher than average rates of unemployment, low educational attainment, and a housing stock that is the worst in the city . . . In my view, the Beeston bombers should be understood in the context of the past thirty years of alienation in inner-city Leeds. In this perspective, both riots and the terrifying new turn to bombing, may best be analysed as an extreme variant of violent urban protest.30 Speaking to the allure of Islamic fundamentalism in such circumstances, Farrar quotes Cornel West, the African-American scholar who describes the nihilism at the heart of American gang culture as the lived experience of coping with a life of horrifying meaninglessness, hopelessness, and (most important) lovelessness and concludes: Nihilism is the terrifying underbelly of the British inner city and for many, religious observance stems its invasion. The frustration felt by young men of color in Beeston, if extrapolated to a global level suggests that the anger fueling violence against the west must be understood, at least in part, in light of the enormous economic inequalities between the west and the rest of humanity,31 the sense of hopelessness or despair that young people feel when their own circumstances are unlikely to change, and the meaning that either gang culture or religion might give their lives. If the west, and America in particular, is rich not because of endogenous factors as Rawls suggested but because a set of global rules were created and upheld to serve the wests own economic interests, as Benhabib argues, the anger over a rigged game may also fuel violence. As Pogge, responding to Rawls, observes on the causes of global poverty: The moral debate is largely focused on the question to what extent afuent societies . . . have obligations to help others worse off. Some deny all such obligations, other claim them to be quite demanding. Both sides easily take for granted that it is as potential helpers that we are morally related to the starving abroad. But the debate

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ignores that we are also and much more signicantly related to them as supporters of, and beneciaries from, a global institutional order that substantially contributes to their destitution. (Pogge, 2002, p. 50) It is not a coincidence that the suicide missions of 9/11 and a previous terrorist attack on American soil targeted the great symbol of Americas economic as opposed to political power, namely, the Twin Towers of New York. In pointing to the problem of either extreme poverty or relative deprivation as a factor fueling terrorism, I am not in any way suggesting that terrorist acts are either justiable or fully explicable in these terms. What I am arguing is that if the American government truly want to get to the roots of the terrorist threats against its own people in order to make them more secure, they should begin by examining the global and domestic deprivation that creates, at home and abroad, a fertile soil within which, the seeds of violence and anti-Americanism can so easily ourish particularly amongst young men of color. Thus, the alleviation of poverty embedded within a theory of global social rights becomes, in an imperial age, a product of reciprocal justication in which the needs of those in the north (to be secure) and those in the south and inner cities of the north (to alleviate poverty and have hope) are joined in a theory of global citizenship that sees their fates as fundamentally interdependent or shared. Embracing the principle of social citizenship as shared fate will not end new threats to the security concerns of people in the west or north, nor will it fully alleviate poverty in the south in the foreseeable future. What it might do is begin to turn what is currently a vicious circle of international politics marked by insecurity and poverty into a more virtuous one marked by the amelioration of those who suffer from inequality and deprivation along with a decrease in antagonism an towards the west, and therefore greater security. Evidence that a shift from vicious to virtuous is possible and might be quicker than one might imagine is provided by a series of polls taken in Indonesia (the most populous Muslim nation) which examined the views of Indonesian citizens in light of the dramatic and tragic events of the tsunami of 2004 and its aftermath, as the west invested in both material and symbolic ways in the rebuilding of areas affected. In a survey done two months after the devastating Tsunami occurred in southern Asia, the percentage of Indonesians who reported unfavorable views of America dropped from 83% in 2003 to 54% in February 2005 and, perhaps even more surprisingly, condence in Osama bin Laden dropped from 58% to 23% in the same time period.32 Researchers discovered that the change was in large part due to Indonesians perception that America had deployed considerable nancial resources, military power and political inuence to alleviate the suffering of the victims of the Tsunami. Thus, 63% of those surveyed said their opinions had changed primarily due to American relief efforts. This would suggest that if America (and other western powers) used their enormous nancial, military and political power to address the issues of poverty alleviation and social justice in various parts of the world affected by disease and deprivation, they may well see a shift in the level of antiAmericanism as a result and a transition from a vicious circle to a virtuous one. The Shared Fate of East/West: Democracy Promotion and Suicide Bombers Critics of the argument that deprivation leads to terrorist violence point out that those involved in the attacks on 9/11 came from middle class rather than poor households and

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ce always most were born in Saudi Arabia (not an impoverished country). The coup de gra advanced in this line of argument is that Osama bin Laden is an extremely rich man. Many commentators conclude, therefore, that what motivates suicide missions and creates insecurity can and should not be reduced to a question of economics. The real motivation, it has often been suggested, behind suicide missions in particular is a pre-modern form of Islamic fanaticism. Thus, an editorial in the National Post in Canada on 17 September 2001 speaks of the suicide bombers as fundamental enemies of western Enlightenment who wish to replace modern secular political authority with an Islamist utopian vision. The vision of an irrational or fanatical Middle East, as Edward Said (1979) argues in his book Orientalism, is part of a long tradition in western art, literature and politics of constructing an exoticized, mystical, and traditional east or Orient that reects back the opposite mirrored image of a modern, rational and secular west. How does this exoticized notion of an irrational Middle East explain the bombers of 7/7 who were not foreigners at all but second-generation British citizens who grew up amongst their families and communities in the UK, the so-called home grown terrorists? The idea that suicide bombings are products of a foreign religious culture existing in direct opposition to a more secular and tolerant west creates a kind of cognitive dissonance when, as in London, the culprits are found to be British born. The tendency of British ofcials to continue to see suicide bombers as fundamentally religious fanatics leads them to attribute home grown violence to the failure of the state to promote community cohesion and common values. The Blair government has increasingly repudiated multiculturalism along with anybody who suggests that either the anger of inner city youth described above or the colonial present in British and American foreign policy may be contributing factors.33 I shall argue that the arguments made by both Bush and Blair after 9/11 and 7/7 that their foreign policies in the Middle East are irrelevant to home grown suicide bombers are both dangerous and misguided if their overarching goal is to make their citizens more secure. A recent study has demonstrated that suicide bombers are largely motivated by political goals rather than religious beliefs. Robert Pape, after analyzing every suicide bomb attack from 1980 to 2004, concludes: Suicide-terrorist attacks are not so much driven by religion as by a clear strategic objective: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from the territory that the terrorists see as their homeland. From Lebanon to Sri Lanka to Chechnya to Kashmir to the West Bank, every major suicide campaign has had as its central objective to compel a democratic state to withdraw (2005, p. 2). If occupation is the target of most suicide missions, it follows that the current military operations in Iraq can only exacerbate Americas and the wests security concerns by increasing rather than reducing certain groups willingness to engage in suicide missions. Pape comments: The use of heavy military force to transform Muslim societies . . . is only likely to increase the number of suicide terrorists coming at us (p. 4). Bryan Bender, using reports commissioned by both the Saudi Arabian government and an Israeli think tank, concludes that the vast majority of . . . foreign ghters [in Iraq] are not former terrorists [but] became radicalized by the war itself (2005). He points out that interrogations of nearly 300 Saudis captured in Iraq conrm that most had never engaged in violence and were motivated by Americas occupation of Iraq, responding to the call by clerics to drive the indels out of Arab lands. These studies are critical to both the interpretation and response to suicide bombers in the west, for they suggest that the liberal imperial tendency to promote democracy in the Middle East, backed up by a militarized

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occupation, will increase rather than decrease the likelihood of attacks against civilians in the west. The National Intelligence Council in the US (tasked with providing long-term assessments on security) came to this same conclusion in April 2006, according to Karen DeYoung of the Washington Post: Iraq has become a primary recruitment vehicle for violent Islamic extremists.34 Thus Bushs tendency under the logic of liberal empires civilizing mission to link military sacrice to the defense of freedom and democracy (the United States and Great Britain share a mission in the world . . . to advance freedom . . . Together our nations are standing and sacricing for this high goal in a distant land at this very hour) creates the very conditions by which suicide bombers justify their acts of violence against the citizens of these very same countries. The distinction Bush makes between stability and democracy in the Middle East may be morally and politically signicant to American foreign policy makers but it is largely irrelevant for would be terrorists, as ultimately it is the presence of foreign forces in Arab or Muslim lands that is the problem. Liberal empire to the extent that it marries moral clarity with military might creates a vicious circle as the more America tries to make itself secure through liberal empire, the more vulnerable it becomes to another attack. Once again, it needs to be emphasized that in making these arguments with respect to the motivations of terrorists, it is not in any way to suggest that this either fully explains or justies their actions. What it does suggest is that the bluster of American and British leaders arguing that their foreign policy, either past or present, has nothing to do with these fanatical terrorists is ultimately counterproductive in serving the needs of their own people for security. In conclusion, if we consider the nancial implications of these two alternative theories of globalized citizenship (one rooted in liberal empire versus one rooted in social rights and shared fate) it is clear that there are some real scal tradeoffs between the two. The militarized promotion of democracy is an exceedingly expensive endeavor. In January 2001, when Bush rst came to power, the projected surplus was $5.6 trillion dollars. By March 2004 the United States was running a $2.9 trillion decit (Altman, 2004, p. 208). That is a staggering amount of money to shift from the black to the red in a little over three years. It is these numbers that reveal the gap between a neo-liberal policy of scal restraint that preceded Bush and a new liberal imperialism that is prepared to amass an ever larger national debt in the name of global security through the militarized promotion of democracy in the Middle East. As the British discovered over a century ago, imperial rule is extremely expensive. Such expenditures cannot be achieved without sacricing other international objectives, including the alleviation of poverty and suffering required by a global theory of social citizenship. As Sachs points out, the promotion of democracy in Iraq through military means has left very little money to address the poverty and insecurity of the vast majority of the worlds people. The United States is spending thirty times more on the military than on foreign assistance in 2004, $450 billion compared with $15 billion [on aid] (2005, p. 330). A theory of global citizenship rooted in the principles of social rights and shared fate ultimately allows us to speak both to the needs of the least well off and to empire, to the extent that I demonstrated the concerns amongst western citizenry over national and personal security35 are better addressed by policies to alleviate poverty, disease, inequality, failed states and lost hope in those parts of the globe where terrorism and suicide bombers have developed (including the inner cities of western nations) than the militarized promotion of neo-liberal freedom and democracy. As such, a theory

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of global citizenship rooted in social rights and shared fate has the potential to separate the imperial power (the Bush administration or a future administration that continues down the path of liberal empire) from that which gives it both legitimacy and force (the American electorate). The key is to convince American citizens that an alternative theory of global citizenship which addresses both the north/south and east/west dimensions of shared fate as described above will make them far more secure in the long run than either realpolitik or liberal imperial rule.

Acknowledgements
The author wants to thank the organizers, Michael Byers and Mark Zacher, and the Trudeau Foundation, for inviting her to present an earlier draft of this paper to the Meanings of Global Citizenship conference, held at the Liu Institute for Global Issues in September 2005; and for the feedback and suggestions received from a number of the participants, including Jim Tully, Charles Jones, Daniel Weinstock, Radhika Desai, Will Kymlicka, Jane Jenson and Jon Beasley-Murray.

Notes
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In recent years, several leading academics have argued for a version of global citizenship through such terms as cosmopolitan (Nussbaum, 1996; Beitz, 1999a) or transnational citizenship (Habermas, 2001; Benhabib, 2004) as well as global citizenship (Dower, 2000). Thus, Michael Igantieff (2003) describes September 11 as a moment of reckoning that ushered in an empire lite in which America seeks to defend its own interests globally but over which it is in deep denial; Martin Walker talks about a virtual but deeply reluctant empire serving its interest rather than the common good that is more powerful than any previous empire (2002, p. 15); Niall Fergusson speaks of an empire in denial (2003a, 2003b) and Chalmers Johnson (2004) refers to a nation bent towards world domination. The global military reach of American power is enormous and extends, through a network of bases throughout the entire world. The US Army Special Operations Command was deployed in sixty-ve countries (Kaplan, 2003, p. 66); [America] is the only nation that polices the world through ve global military commands; maintains more than a million men and women at arms on four continents (Ignatieff, 2003). For Martin Walker, comparisons between nineteenth century British empire and the current American empire in terms of military supremacy would leave the former far behind. 19th century Britain commanded nothing remotely akin to the current American military supremacy (2002, p. 13). Chalmers Johnson writes of the 725 American military bases that exist outside of the United States: Our militarized empire is a physical reality with a distinct way of life but it is also a network of economic and political interests tied in a thousand different ways to American corporations, universities, and communities (Johnson, 2004, p. 5). As LaTorre points out, Richard Tuck (2001, p. 20) observes of the Roman empire: It was this willingness to attach any potential danger which Rome sees itself as destined to be mistress of the entire orbis terrarum. Ignatieff concludes: Empires interest has a right to trump the sovereignty of a state. Neo-conservative Charles Krauthammer comments on the UN: The United Nations is guarantor of nothing. Except in a formal sense, it can hardly be said to exist (1990, p. 25). Tony Judt comments on the cynicism amongst neo-conservatives and the current White House about the UN: Neoconservatives have long since dismissed the UN as an irrelevance . . . The Bush administration has deliberately nominated as its next ambassador to the UN a man who holds the institution in contempt (Judt, 2005). http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2005/tr20050318-2282.html US, Department of Defense News Transcript, Special Defense Department Brieng on the New National Defense Strategy, 18 March 2005 with Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith and Vice Director, Strategy Plans and Policy, Rear Adm. William Sullivan. It is clear that different parts of the administration are more likely to defend empire in different terms (the Pentagon taking up the realpolitik defense, the State Department taking up the liberal defense) and the fact that the Pentagon and the Defense Staff continue

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to view their role in realpolitik terms only speaks to the contradictions within the exercise of imperial rule. It is also true that the nal arbitrator in these disputes, the President is more clearly on the side of Condoleeza Rice and the State Department in the last two years in his defense of democracy as the cornerstone of the war in Iraq and American foreign policy more broadly. A week earlier, key journalists including Andrew Neil of BBC News were quoting White House sources on its content: The bottom line is that the team has found no weapons of mass destruction. No WMD in Iraq, source claims, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2hi/uk_news/politics/3135932. stm. It is worth nothing that Bushs initial response (on the day following the report being tabled) was to stick to a realpolitk justication of the invasion, using it to reiterate that America invaded Iraq because of the potential threat to regional stability and national security: [The report says] Saddam Hussein was a threat, a serious danger . . . the administration will deal with gathering dangers where we nd them . . . Ill make tough decisions based upon what I think is right, given the intelligence that I know, in order to do my job, which is to secure this country http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2003/10/20031003-2.html, Remarks by the President after a meeting with former New York City Police Commissioner Bernard Kerik, 3 October 2003. http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm. To put this decision in perspective, it is worth revisiting the 3 June 1997 founding document of the PNAC (signatories included Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz) that recommended American foreign policy in the twenty-rst century model itself on the Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity in order to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests. By referring to both principles and moral clarity the PNAC is laying the conceptual groundwork for a liberal as opposed to realpolitik empire. And one specic model they have in mind is Americas foreign policy in Central America under Ronald Reagan in the 1980s and more directly Elliot Abrams (also a signatory to the PNAC document). Francis Fukuyama, in a speech to the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), also uses Reagans foreign policy in the Americas as an example of the shift from a standard realist defense of stability in that region throughout the Cold War Era to Reagans morally robust defense of democracy. Francis Fukuyama, Do we really know how to promote democracy? Speech given at the National Endowment for Democracy, 24 May 2005, http://www.ned.org/. The links between Central America, circa 1980 and the Middle East circa 2005, as Noam Chomsky (2003) has shown in some detail, are profound (both in philosophy and personnel). It is worth noting, in this regard, that President Bush appointed Elliot Abrams to direct his new global democracy campaign within the National Security Council in February 2005. Elliot Abrams, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ news/releases/2005/02/20050202-10.html, was appointed 2 February 2005 as Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Global Democracy Strategy. Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, 6 November 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-3.html. Both Michael Ignatieff and Francis Fukuyama point to this tradeoff between stability and democracy as a key test of realism vs liberalism in Americas approach to global affairs. Ignatieff argues that American power has on balance worked in defense of the former (stability); Fukuyama suggests there are important periods, including the present one, in which the latter is dominant. He remains skeptical, however, as to whether it will be sustained if democracy challenges, for example, the stability of the Saudi Arabian Royal family. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-3.html. In June 2005 during a tour of the Middle East, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice reinforced this shift in American foreign policy: Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people. Rice calls for Mid-East Democracy, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4109902.stm, 20 June 2005, BBC News, UK Edition. The people of Great Britain also might see some familiar traits in Americans. Were sometimes faulted for a naive faith that liberty can change the world. If thats an error it began with reading too much John Locke and Adam Smith. Americans have, on occasion, been called moralists who often speak in terms of right and wrong . . . the United States and Great Britain share a mission in the world beyond the balance of power or the simple pursuit of interest. We seek the advance of freedom and the peace that freedom brings. Together our nations are standing and sacricing for this high goal in a distant land at this very hour. http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031119-1.html. In September 2004 at the UN General Assembly Bush called on the UN to establish a democracy fund that would help countries lay the foundations of democracy . . . Money from the fund would also help

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set up voter precincts and polling places, and support the work of election monitors. George W. Bush, Address to the UN General Assembly, Tuesday, 21 September 2004, http://www.un.int/usa/ 04print_165.htm. In his Inaugural Address in January 2005 Bush picks up the same themes: We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world. Americas vital interests and our deepest beliefs are now one. Consider, for a moment, this last phrase in light of the call to protect both principles and interests in American foreign policy in the original New American Century founding document. Bush also makes the case that America is the model for his theory of democratic global citizenship. Americans, of all people, should never be surprised by the power of our ideals. Eventually, the call of freedom comes to every mind and every soul (emphasis added), http://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural/. I want to thank the anonymous reviewer of this article for pointing out the difference between globalized citizenship and global citizenship. I have used it here to make the case that Bushs liberal empire is really about globalizing a particular version of American citizenship. http://www.oas.org/speeches/speech.asp?sCodigo 05-0113. The idea of delivery in the title Delivering the Benets of Democracy is an interesting one (as opposed to the more traditional spreading) and suggests a kind of just in time delivery mechanism of business management practices. Democracy is a deliverable it would seem and as such a product in the global marketplace of ideas. Product placement of course is key and this is part of what Bush is doing. In the new Americas of the 21st century, democracy is now the rule, rather than the exception. Think of the dramatic changes we have seen in our lifetime. In 1974, the last time the OAS General Assembly met in the United States, fewer than half its members had democratically elected governments. Today, all 34 countries participating in this General Assembly have democratic, constitutional governments. Only one country in this hemisphere sits outside this society of democratic nationsand one day the tide of freedom will reach Cubas shores, as well. http://www.oas.org/main/main. asp?sLang E&sLink http://www.oas.org/OASpage/press_releases/home_eng/press.asp. President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East, Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, 6 November 2003, http://www.whitehouse. gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html. http://www.oas.org/OASpage/press_releases/press_release.asp?sCodigo E-114/05. Thus, at the turn of the twentieth century, according to Gephardt, only 5% of the worlds people having the right to freely choose their leader at the beginning of that century to 58% having the right by its end. Sociologist William I. Robinson provides some important insights into the meaning of democracy in American foreign policy suggesting that rather than calling it democracy promotion in American foreign policy, it would be better to understand it as polyarchy, a term he borrows from Robert Dahl but modies in signicant ways. Polyarchy Robinson argues is a system in which a small group actually rules on behalf of transnational capital and mass participation in decision-making is limited to choosing among competing elites in tightly controlled electoral processes (Robinson, 2004, p. 442). Richard Gephardt, Spreading freedom: a mission for the American people, National Endowment for Democracy, 22 March 2005, www.ned.org. Aristotle, Politics (1980, 1279b: 20-1280a6, 1290a and b). A Ten Year Strategy for Increasing Capital Flows to Africa, Commission on Capital Flows to Africa, The Corporate Council on Africa, June 2003, http://www.africacncl.org. In challenging the idea that democracy can be reduced to free elections, it is not to say that on this account transparent elections are unimportant. As events in the Ukraine demonstrate, elections can lead to political gains in many circumstances. To the extent elections are constructed as not simply a domestic concern but one with global dimensions is enormously powerful force as the presence of international monitors can be pivotal in keeping the state accountable to its electorate. The key is that elections cannot be imposed from outside (Iraq is the obvious example) but must emerge from within the country itself. In 2002 2004, the BC Citizens Assembly was created to consider alternative electoral system and make a recommendation that would be put to the general public through a referendum question. http:// www.citizensassembly.bc.ca/public. For a list of the MDGs see Sachs (2005, pp. 211213). The World Bank page can be found at http://www.worldbank.org/research/conict/papers/incidence. htm. Also see Elbadawi (1991), Humphreys (2003), Collier & Hoefer (1998). Collier and Hoefer

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conclude Africas rising trend of conict is due to its atypically poor economic performance (p. 2). See also Fearon & Laitin (2003). Rice (2003, p. 2). See also the State Failure Task Force Reports, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/ stfail/. From 1994 until 2000, the State Failure Task Force, funded by the CIA, analyzed the reasons for state failure in three phases. Poverty breeds insecurity, Millenium Project, 15 January 2005, Yale Globe Online. See , http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/ . . I am very grateful to Doug Saunders of the Globe and Mail, both for insights into this question, through his column and subsequent emails, and sharing reports he had used in his own research. Max Farrar, Leeds footsoldiers and London bombs, Open Democracy.net, Online Magazine of Global Politics, 22 July 2005, http://www.opendemocracy.net/conict-terrorism/leeds_2696.jsp#. As Jeffrey Sachs, in his book The End of Poverty, points out, between 1820 and 1998, the United States living standard increased 25 fold (the average income, in 1990 dollars, increases from $1200 to $30,000) while Africas income increased only threefold ($400 per capita to roughly $1300). Terror Free Tomorrow Poll of Indonesia, www.terrorfreetomorrow.org. See also related news article, Muslim opinion of US improves by Jennifer Harper, The Washington Times, 5 March 2005. Tony Blair attributes some of the blame for these violent attacks by British born citizens on the failure to integrate ethnic minorities into the dominant culture during a period when multicultural policies were implemented and rejects any notion that the war in Iraq could be a contributing factor. When asked at an August 2005 press conference if there should be an end to multiculturalism Tony Blair responded: [We will] establish a commission that specically addresses the question of integration . . . I think that when people are isolated in their own communities . . . that worries me. It worries me because I think theres a separateness there that might be unhealthy, and I just think we need to look at that and look at it in an honest way and learn from the experience of other countries as well. http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page8041.asp. Spy agencies say Iraq war hurting U.S. terror ght, Karen deYoung, Washington Postk, 24 September 2006, p. A01. If we consult opinion polls over the last year in America, we will nd that the single most important problem (and the one in which Americans tend to trust Bush and the Republicans over Democratic challengers) is the question of preventing another terrorist attack on American soil and the war in Iraq. At the end of July 2005, the single most important issue was the war in Iraq at 19%, the economy at 15% and terrorism at 12%; the fourth most important issue was a whole range of issues all tied at 3%. CBS News Poll, 29 July2 August 2005, N 1222 adults nationwide, http://www.pollingreport.com/ prioriti.htm.

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