PIR06.

9 1

Politics of Islamic Resurgence - Iran (2)

I. Was the revolution in Iran in 1978-79 inevitably Islamic?

No!

l.The grievances that mobilized many people against the regime were not
solely religious or cultural. Many were mobilized by economic and
by political grievances that did not necessarily call for an Islamic-styled
solution

2. Many of the most important forces who mobilized behind the revolution
had no desire for the creation of an Islamic republic in Iran (e.g. the
educated
middle class, the modem working class, the vast majority of university
students)

II. Why did the revolution take on an Islamic cast?

The answer lies in the problem of mobilizing collective action

For revolution to happen, aggrieved people must be mobilized into collective

action

Successful mobilization of collective action requires three things:

leadership

organization

a mobilizing ideology

Who had these three things in Iran?

Not the modem middle class

- incapable of generating powerful political leaders due to the direct

repression and interference by the Shah (e.g. Mossadeq; Bazargan)

- incapable of generating a mobilizing ideology (because the modem

middle class was to a large degree culturally distant from the masses of
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Iranian)

- incapable of building organizational capacity (because the Shah's

repression prevented the modem middle class from developing
organizations and associations of real national proportion and reach

The Shah made every effort to atomize the middle class,keep it divided,
disorganized, and leaderless; he created a political vacuum and an
organizational vacuum in civil society.

But one group managed to escape the Shah's disorganizing intentions: the
Shia clerics

The Shia clerics managed to get together the three factors necessary
for the mobilization of collective action

and so were best positioned to lead the revolution against the Shah and
shape the character of the revolution.

III. Strengths of the Shia clerics:

1. Leadership

A. The quasi-hierarchical structure of Shia Islam established clear

religious leaders of national and international scope that the Shia
masses were enjoined to obey

B. Shia clerics also happened to be blessed with a man who projected

real leadership: Khomeini (a galvanizing, charismatic speaker)

2. Mobilizational Ideology

B. Shia clerics possessed an ideological message that clearly resonated

with the people

Could call on symbols and themes of Shia theology (martyrdom, call

Islamic justice) that served as an effective vehicle to express and
mobilize popular outrage at the Shah
3. Organizational Base

A. The huge network of religious associations (clubs, charities, etc)

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vilayet e-faqih
translated into social power for the ulema and guaranteed them a broad and
loyal mass base

(Shah himself was responsible for Islamic character of the revolution that
overthrew him: By disorganizing civil society and repressing potential leaders
in secular society, the Shah left the political game open to be seized by
the clerics

IV. Other factors that explain Shia clerics' capacity to commandeer the revolution:

1. Abdication of leadership by secular forces, both left and right

They chose to support Khomeini due to:

mesmerization and self-deception

Like the masses, they were mesmerized by Khomeini's message of

defiance and revolution,

Also mesmerized by Khomeini's capacity to mobilize the masses

Beyond this, they deceived themselves into thinking that Khomeini

would never ultimately take power

2. Khomeini's own caginess about his ultimate political ambitions

He did not emphasize his theory of vila yet e-faqih (his theory that the
clerics should rule) in order to lull the secular forces into
believing that after the revolution he would cede power to them

V. Is the Iranian revolution exceptional or generalizable?

Were there conditions peculiar to the Iranian case or perhaps exceptional

to Shia Islam that made Iran uniquely susceptible to Islamic
revolution?

A. Shia Exceptionalism ?

1. Ideologically? Is Shi'ism exceptionally predisposed to revolution

given the nature of its themes and symbols and philosophy?
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E.g. Did Shi'ism tradition of martyrologylglorification of martyrdom

make the Iranian masses more willing to face down the state's
coercive apparatus despite impossible odds?

Did Shism's traditional distrust of politics and the powers that be

make the Iranian masses uniquely receptive to the idea of
revolution?

Did the Shia doctrine ofthe vilayet e-faqih (the rule ofthe jurisconsults)
provide religious justification for the overthrow of a state not
ruled by clerics ( doctrine that is absent from Sunni thought)

Problem with this analysis:

Shia traditions of martyrdom and the illegitimacy of the non­

Imamate state were the same traditions that analysts said
predisposed the Shia community to quietism and passivity prior
to the revolution

(The fact that these same themes and symbols can be used to such vastly
different ends, to explain both quietism and activism, points out the
plasticity of ideology and culture)

Similarly: the theory ofvilayet-e-faqih was a revolutionary interpretation of

Shia
thought (and not all the leading Ayatollahs embraced it)

(Again, this reflects the plasticity of ideology ant the role that factors such
as leadership, coercion, and the balance of power play in determinign
which interpretation of an ideology wins out)

2. Organizationally? (Is Shia Islam organizationally "exceptional?" in

a way that made Iran uniquely susceptible to Islamic revolution?

Two key ways Shia Islam is different organizationally from Sunni

Islam (in ways that facilitated the revolution):
i. Shia clerics enjoy significantly more autonomy from the state than do
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most Sunni clerics

(Financially, due to the "khums" tax)

(Geographically, because their major religious center was outside

the borders of the Shah's control)

ii. Shia clerics enjoy a much more coherent and extensive

organizational base than most Sunni clerics

(Due to the more hierarchical nature ofShia Islam and its embrace ofthe
notion of" marja e taqlid")

Other factors (besides "Shia Exceptionalism" that made Iran uniquely susceptible to
revolution:

B. Weakness of Regime Leadership (the Shah) in 77-78.

(Due to illness)

(Due to mixed messages from his backer, the US)

C. Strength of Leader of the Opposition

Opposition was endowed with a highly charismatic, forceful leader:

Khomeini

D. Military in Iran was headless and ineffective

(Due to the Shah's fear of a coup by the military and his consequent
practice of divide and of top army brass)

E. Regime was culturally alienated from the people and totally lacking in
legitimacy

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VI. Policy Lessons:

What lessons might we draw from the Iranian case if we wanted to try to
prevent similar revolutions elsewhere?

1. Regime should, at the very least make cosmetic cultural concessions to

popular sentiment to avoid total alienation

2. Space the burdens of economic austerity ...try not to hit all social classes at
once in order to to prevent a society-wide, cross-class coalition from forming
to challenge the regime

3. Ifrepression is necessary, make firm and early use of it

4. Open up political space for non-Islamic groups to organize in society

5. Employ a mixed strategy of inclusion (of moderates) and exclusion (of

radicals)