Escape From The State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics

Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics Author(s): David A.
Lake Reviewed work(s): Source: International Security, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Summer, 2007), pp. 47-79 Published by: The MIT Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30129801 . Accessed: 15/03/2013 15:36
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The MIT Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Security.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded on Fri, 15 Mar 2013 15:36:51 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Escape
State
from of
Nature
the
David A. Lake
in Authorityand Hierarchy WorldPolitics

International relations that the modern international has assumed systemis a stateof natheory long This of is a turedevoidof political anarchy authority. assumption international of realistthoughtand is believedto lead to the securitydilemma foundation It is equallycentralto neoliberal betweenall states.1 that pervadesrelations whicharguesthatinstitutions constrain statebehavior andfainstitutionalism, the absence of cilitatecooperation international despite politicalauthority.2 that "anarchy Even constructivism, is what states make of it," maintaining as a basicconditionof worldpolitics.3 nonetheless acceptssystemicanarchy
David A. Lakeis Professorof Political Science at the University of California, San Diego.
havebeenpresented at several universities andconferences. Earlier drafts of thisarticle Theauin theseminars thoris grateful andpanels andto other fortheir to theparticipants criticolleagues reviewers forhelpful He cismsandsuggestions, as wellas to thejournal's comments. anonymous Susan Keister forresearch andto Neal is indebted to Mark assistance Farrales, Hyde,andJennifer A dataappendix withdefinitions Beck andLangche advice. andsources forall Zengforstatistical data set are available at http://dss.ucsd.edu/ additional results,and a replication variables, -dlake/data.html. in Kenneth N. Waltz, A Theo1.Theroleof anarchy is mostfullydeveloped theState, andWar: Man, N. Waltz, retical Columbia andKenneth (NewYork: Press, 1959); University Theory ofInAnalysis ternational Politics Mass.: On the security see Robert 1979). dilemma, (Reading, Addison-Wesley, World underthe Security Vol.30, No. 2 (January Dilemma," Politics, 1978), Jervis, "Cooperation pp. 167-214. 0. Keohane, 2. Onneoliberal andDiscord see Robert institutionalism, After Hegemony: Cooperation in theWorld Political Princeton Ontheambition of 1984). (Princeton, Press, N.J.: Economy University to explain neoliberal on thebasisof realist institutionalism seeRobert 0. cooperation assumptions, Structural of World Politics: Realism andBeyond," in AdaW.Finifter, Keohane, ed.,Polit"Theory icalScience: TheState D.C.: American Political Science Association, of theDiscipline (Washington, A. Oye,ed., Cooperation less focused on institutions, Kenneth under 1983), pp. 503-540. Although Princeton shares thissameambition. Press,1985) (Princeton, N.J.: Anarchy University 3. Thephrase is fromAlexander IsWhat States Make of It:TheSocial ConstrucWendt, "Anarchy tion of PowerPolitics," International Vol.46, No. 2 (Spring On 1992), Organization, pp. 391-425. andthemeaning of anarchy, see HedleyBull,The A Study constructivism Anarchical Society: ofOrderin World Politics Columbia The Christian Moral (NewYork: Press, 1977); Reus-Smit, University
Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations
National Security:Norms and Identity in WorldPolitics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996) Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders:Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell turing WorldPolitics: TransnationalSocial Movements, Networks, and Norms (Minneapolis: University
Princeton andAlexander Social (Princeton, Press,1999); Wendt, N.J.: University Theory ofInternational Politics Notall constructivists theim(NewYork: 1999). Press, Cambridge University accept of systemic in PeterJ. Katzenstein, ed., TheCulture portance anarchy. Manyof the authors of Theorists of globalcivilsocietylargely its relevance. ignorethistraitandfocuson the challenge diffusionof ideas and normsacrossnational boundaries. See Margaret E. Keckand Kathryn
A. Riker, andSanjeev andKathryn Press, 1998); Sikkink, eds.,RestrucJames Khagram, University

International Vol. 32, No. 1 (Summer2007),pp. 47-79 Security, (c)2007 by the Presidentand Fellows of HarvardCollege and the Massachusetts Instituteof Technology.
47
International 32:1 48 Security
within Yet,therehasalwaysbeena wide varietyof hierarchical relationships the international system,includingempires,protectorates, spheresof influin which and other the of the ence, dependencies, relationships sovereignty Withthe state.4 subordinate polityis cededin whole or in partto a dominant and the emergence of the UnitedStatesas the "indisadventof unipolarity, in international is onceagainin thenews.5 nation," hierarchy Writing pensable May 2003, shortlyafter the start of the IraqWar,No Daalderand James whichhadvirtually disobserved thatthephrase"American empire," Lindsay in more than times news stofrom common 1,000 parlance, appeared appeared In the absenceof a globalgovernment or ries in the previoussix months.6 the remains truism for the contemfact of a universal anarchy single, empire, a fallacyto infer systemas a whole.But,it is nonetheless poraryinternational withinthis systemareanarchic.7 thatall relationships The nature, meaning, and consequencesof international hierarchyare alike.Thisis most evident, and scholars by policymakers poorlyunderstood the in over whether United States the debates todayis a new empire. perhaps, if the administration of When asked by the Arabnews networkal-Jazeera then Defense DonW. was bent on of Bush Secretary empirebuilding, George don'tseekempires. "We ald Rumsfeld declaring: simplydeniedthepossibility, Weneverhave been.I can'timaginewhy you'd even not imperialistic. We're
underAnarchy: Wendt and DanielFriedheim, Alexander of Minnesota Press,2002). "Hierarchy International Vol.49, No. 4 (Autumn Informal and the EastGerman State," Organization, Empire in international relations. view of hierarchy 1995), developa constructivist pp. 689-721,
4. See Ian Clark, The Hierarchyof States: Reformand Resistance in the InternationalOrder (New York: gling Relations: American Foreign Policy in Its Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999); Katja Weber, Hierarchy amidst Anarchy: TransactionCosts and Institutional Choice (Albany:
BaW.Tucker, The andRobert (NewYork: 1989); Press, Inequality ofNations Cambridge University in worldpolitics, Entanof hierarchy see DavidA. Lake, theories Oncontractual sic Books, 1977). Federal andInternational Federations: ChadRector, StateUniversity of New York Press, 2000); Ap-
proachesto Cooperation(forthcoming); and Kathleen J. Hancock, Delegated Sovereigntyand Economic Integration:Lessonsfrom Eurasia, SouthernAfrica, and Prussia (forthcoming). See also the large litera-
W.Doyle,Empires N.Y.: Cornell Michael tureon empire, (Ithaca, Press, 1986); University including Histories and KevinW.Moore, Frederick eds.,Lessons Imperial of Empire: Cooper, CraigCalhoun, Contested andHendrik New Press, Power andAmerican (NewYork: 2006); Ending Empire: Spruyt, N.Y.: Cornell Partition andTerritorial 2005). (Ithaca, Press, University Sovereignty BillClinton in to havebeenfirstusedby President nation" 5. Thephrase appears "indispensable William Address William address. his secondinaugural J. Clinton J.Clinton, Inaugural ofPresident D.C.:WhiteHouse,January /1997-0120, 1997), http://clinton6.nara.gov/1997/01 (Washington, 20-presidents-inaugural-address.html. NewYork M.Lindsay, Not 'If'but'What "American andJames 6. No H. Daalder Kind,'" Empire, Times, May10,2003. relations canof international thatscholars 7. Waltz of composition, focused on thefallacy arguing theState, andWar; andWaltz, SeeWaltz, from itsparts. a system nottheorize Man, Theory ofInternatheopposite of to havecommitted thispoint,manyappear Butin accepting tional Politics. fallacy aboutthe partsfromthe whole. divisionin reasoning
Escape fromthe Stateof Nature 49
On the same day in a speechat the Councilon Foreign. ask the question."8 tooka diametriNiallFerguson historian British economic however, Relations, empireis that so cally opposedview: "Thegreatthing aboutthe American . . . think in its existence. disbelieve Americans they'reso different They many Whenthey not an it's in thatwhen theyhavebases foreignterritories, empire. statements Thesecontrasting it's not an empire."9 invadesovereign territory, nature of inover the confusion and the today embody widespread profound form. extreme of whichempireis merelyan ternational hierarchy, of interof theinternational the on system,extanttheories anarchy Focusing This nationalrelationsoffer few guides to these hierarchical relationships. for underto fill this gap by providinga generalframework articleattempts I to endeavor world. in the international contemporary hierarchy standing of international the makethreepoints.First,I arguethat discipline relations, of a formal-legal of the state,imported theories via juristic conception authorbetweenpolitical of the that by definition, possibility hierarchy precludes, ity hithatuncovers of authority relational units.I posean alternative, conception erarchicalrelationshipsbetween states now hidden by the formal-legal approach. in auas variations of international I outlinea conception Second, hierarchy I then over a subordinate state a dominant exerted identifysaparty. by thority and economic lient forms of hierarchyacross the dimensionsof security is difficult andreinternational relations. hierarchy operationalizing Although in that the construct to measure it is mains tentative, appear ways possible valid. conceptually on defensespendingin all countries I examine the effectof hierarchy Third, in detailbelow,in a relational As 1950 to 2000. from concepexplained greater staterestson the provisionof a of a dominant tion, the legitimate authority Thisexchange of socialorderfor comstablesocialorderfor its subordinates. stateshouldspend to a dominant subordinate countries that plianceimplies of grossdomesticproduct(GDP)than as a proportion less on theirmilitaries hierarall else constant. not in suchauthority countries Security relationships, substanand exerts a not economic but statistically hierarchy chy,as predicted, on effect military spending. tively significant Each argumentis developedin a separatesectionbelow. Together, they into the coreof international thatintegrates builda new foundation hierarchy
in Rumsfeld "Aftereffects: in Eric 8. Quoted Presence; Schmitt, SaysU.S.WillCutForces Military
Times, Gulf,"New York April 29, 2003.
9. Quoted in Maureen Dowd, "Hypocrisy and Apple Pie," New YorkTimes, April 30, 2003.
As developedin the conclusion, relations a focuson hierarchy further theory. erodesthe distinction betweendomesticand international politicsand sugIt sheds on the new for research. also role of the United avenues light gests 'imStatesin the worldtodayandthe growingbacklash againstthe country's In a unilateral of policy preventive regimechange perialist'policies. pursuing in Iraq, theboundsof whatits subordinates the UnitedStateshas overstepped Thisthreatens to undermine the and othersregardas its legitimate authority. nurtured successive U.S. over the last presidents hierarchy by fragile century.
Politics PoliticalAuthorityin World

if the units-in thiscase,states-possess no A political is anarchic relationship It is when one unit,the dominant over one another. hierarchic state, authority To this disover a subordinate state. understand second, possessesauthority and the roleit has assumedin international relations tinction, requires theory, of how the a and,then,examining authority revisiting concept political particinto the discipline. becameenshrined ularconception
THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY
is mostsimplydefinedas rightful rule.10 Political Whenpolitical auauthority alter a subordinate state to is the dominant state commands exercised, thority hastherightto orderthe its behavior, wherecommand impliesthattheformer actions. Thisright,in turn,impliesa correlative latterto takecertain obligation state to comply,if possible,with the dominant or duty by the subordinate 'If A has authority As Richard Flathman state'sorder. observes, X, thoseperY.' or obligations therefore havean obligation sons who arein A'sjurisdiction the 'surrenders and the force of In short,the subordinate accepts judgment' Thesubordinate state'scommand.11 state'sobligation dominant impliesa further correlative rightby the dominantstate to enforceits commandin the As JohnDay notes,'Thosewho possessauthority in eventof noncompliance. not only to makelaws and takedecipoliticallife, the rulers,are authorized to those when to ensureobedience sionsbut to use coercive power necessary In in those decisions.'12 an the laws and acquiescence authority relationship, boththatthe dominant staterecognizes statehastherightto issue subordinate
10. The literature on authority is substantial. For a useful guide to the various approaches and debates, see John A. Simmons, 'Political Obligation and Authority,' in Robert L. Simon, ed., Blackwell Guide to Social and Political Philosophy (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 17-37. 11. Richard E. Flathman, The Practice of Political Authority:Authority and the Authoritative (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 35 and chap. 5. 12. John Day, 'Authority,' Political Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 (October 1963), p. 260.
follow certaincommands and thatit should,withinthe limitsof its abilities, In thosecommands the or sufferappropriate subordinate consequences. short, as legitimate. state'scommands acceptsthe dominant Twoimplications of thissimpledefinition of political deserveelabauthority oration.First,authority is a formof power.FollowingRobert Dahl'sfamous of one to to it is the state another do definition, power ability get something In the caseof authority, the subordinate would otherwise not do.13 state'sbenot force.Theoperative is havioris drivenby obligation, condition, however, the same: of thedominant state'swill,thesubordinate doessomething because it would otherwise not do. Thecommonly asserted betweenpower opposition and authority is, thus,ill founded. as is analytically distinct Second, legitimate domination, politicalauthority fromcoercion, but it is intimately boundup with this secondformof power. when coercive a muggerdemands'your moneyor Purely relationships-as Allife"-are are characterized your by power,but they are not authoritative. in the faceof superior forcemaybe wise, no obligation exthoughcomplying is to manipulate ists to do so. Indeed,the purposeof coercion incentivesso interests to comply, butagainthisimpliesno obligation. thatit is in thetarget's It is the duty to complywith the dominantstate'scommands-or, alternaof thosecommands-thatrenders andcoercion tively,thelegitimacy authority distinct. conceptually Thedifference betweenpolitical andcoercion in is nicelycaptured authority of politicalstructure. Kenneth Waltz's firstand thirddimensions Thefirstdior the in mensionis the ordering which in relathe units stand way principle, to In one Waltz's the another. this refers to tionship conception, authority in thedifference betweentheunits,embodied in betweenanarchy, relationship which'none is entitledto command; noneis required to obey,'andhierarchy, in whichsomeareso entitledand othersso required.14 Thethirddimension is the distribution of capabilities, whichis oftenmistaken for the distribution of matter Waltz for because create for copower.Capabilities they opportunities ercion: morecapablestatescanimposetheirwill on others,up to and includstates as independent entities;less capablestates sufferthe ing eliminating wills of others.15 trueto his realism in emphasizing Waltzremains power.But in a way thatis not widely appreciated, his dimensions of politicalstructure formsof power. are definedby different and coercionare intimately distinct, related, politicalauthority Although
13. RobertA. Dahl, 'The Conceptof Power,' Behavioral Vol. 2, No. 3 (July 1957),p. 202. Science,
15. Ibid., p. 118.
14. Waltz, Theoryof InternationalPolitics, p. 88.
a necessary of the former. with the latterconstituting Thecapacity component if not actualcoercion, is necessary to buttress or sustainauthority forcoercion, in thefaceof incentives to floutrulesdesignedto constrain behavior. Evenas it thatit shouldcomplywiththedominant state'sedicts,anysubordirecognizes creates natestatemaychooseto violateanyrule.An obligation only an expecbut this does not requireperfectobedience.One can tationof compliance, withoutcallinginto questionthe governexceedthe speed limit,for instance, to imposesuchlimits.Theobligatory nature of the dominant ment'sauthority for nonstate'scommand, however,also permitsit to punisha subordinate in to violate a a is that subordinate command, choosing compliance, implying also choosingto acceptthe sanctionthat the dominantstate may impose. not to complyin specific thedomiGivenincentives instances, by subordinates to enforce edictsand,by example, to deterdefecnantstatemustuse coercion in large groupswhere free riding is tion by other subordinates. Especially to preventwidespread violationof commay be necessary possible,coercion mandsand, thus,the erosionof authority. and coercionare complements over some Yet,even as politicalauthority in be as well the short run or when the ruler can substitutes has exrange,they of when their is sources coercive authority capability. Domestically, ogenous contested,rulersmay increasetheiruse of coercionin an attemptto stay in in on everycorner andinformant the proverbial policeman power,employing When that to rulers have access to resources deter challengers. every group forcoercion fromthoseoverwhomthey rulecanbe mobilized independent or othernatural landsin feudaltimesand oil, diamonds, suchas monarchical maintain coercion be able to even resources powerthrough today-they may thatrelyon coercion in the absenceof authority. insteadof authority Regimes 'authoritarian' areoftencalled(ironically) or,moregraphically, 'tyrannies.'16 in rather thanauthority In international statesthatrely on coercion relations, to as 'imperialist.'17 In theirrelationships with otherstatesareoftenreferred to one state tries dominate another force. This an imperialist through strategy, is tempting because statestypically havesources of power-their own strategy In thisway, fromthosetheyseekto subordinate. domestic resources-separate to the is international analog tyranny. imperialism
16. Day, 'Authority,' p. 265. 17. Stephen Howe, Empire:A Very Short Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 22-28. The common root of the terms 'empire' and 'imperialism' produces confusion. Imperialism was originally a term of opprobrium coined to describe Napoleon's ambitions in Europe. It implies illegitimate coercion. Empire first described Rome, which was largely authoritative in the sense used here. Today, many who criticize the new American empire are more accurately criticizing the imperialism inherent in the strategy of preventive regime change.
and coercion are politicalauthority Despitetheirclearanalyticdifferences, in practice. are it difficult hardto distinguish They deeplyintertwined, making in anygiveninstance, a subordinate statefolforanalysts to conclude whether, lowed a dominantstate'scommandout of obligationor force.Thereis no thesetwo analytic andI offernonehere.Beconcepts, 'brightline' separating the and that this variable, low, I operationalize hierarchy, authority underlies in ways thataimto capture of an authority thelegitimacy between relationship andsubordinate states.Butevenin thesemeasures, dominant is butauthority tressedby thecapacity forcoercion. Thisis not a failure or meaof theanalysis of the intimateconnection betweenpoliticalauthority sures,but a reflection and coercion.
FORMAL-LEGAL TO RELATIONAL AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
of political reModernconceptions thosein international authority, including in work in fullest the of Max Weber are describwho, lations, given expression an ideal the modern bureaucratic state, developed ing type of formal-legal else the For and ruler'sabilityto since, authority.18 Weber, nearlyeveryone command andthewillingness of thesubordinates to comply, folsubordinates, lows fromthe lawfulpositionor officethatthe rulerholds.In thisconception, the rulerpossessesthe rightto issue laws due to the officethatshe occupies, not to anypersonal thatshe maypossess.19 doesnot inhere qualities Authority in the ruleras a person,but in the ruleras an officer. is By analogy, authority and vice versa. law, on juristic theoriesof the state,popularat the turnof the last cenBuilding relations scholars this formal-legal international of imported tury, conception into the discipline's theoretical foundation.20 It immediately follows authority fromthis conception thatinternational lack Because thereis politics authority. no lawful positionor institution above the state, therecan be no authority abovethe state.International are a realmof anarchy, and relations, therefore, all relations betweenduly constituted statesarealso anarchic. As notedin the this line of reasoning has been accepted introduction, by theorists workingin all of the discipline's major paradigms. useful for analyzingestablished domestichierarchies, a Althoughperhaps is of of dubious of the interfor conception authority formal-legal utility study nationalrelations.Despite its debt to ThomasHobbes,formal-legal theory
18. Max Weber,Economy and Society,2 vols. (Berkeley:University of CaliforniaPress, 1978), pp. 215-226.
19. Flathman, The Practice of Political Authority, p. 17. 20. Brian C. Schmidt, The Political Discourse of Anarchy:A Disciplinary History of InternationalRelations (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), especially chap. 3.
founderson how authority emergesfromthe state of nature,which it obviously did at some distantpointin timeto createthe statesthatnow makeup the international derivesfromlawfuloffice,law system.If politicalauthority But if politicalauthority must precedeauthority. createslaw, then authority must precedelawful office.In buildingthe preconditions necessaryto trancannot conceiveof law scend the state of nature,the formal-legal approach withoutlaw.Theoriginsof authority mustrest withoutauthority or authority order.21 It cannot otherthana formal-legal that on something follow,therefore, structure therecan be no authority. must absenta formal-legal be Authority of any formal-legal structure. Thishas important ableto existindependent refor the view of international relations as a state of prevailing percussions nature. of authority Rather thanconceiving as a productof formal-legal structures, on social structures and the literatures emergent contractual theoriesof the of authority.22 In this aprelational state containan alternative, conception the the rests on a between ruler and ruled premised authority bargain proach, of a socialorderof valuesufficient to offsetthe laton the former's provision a measure of security for individuSocialorderrequires ter'sloss of freedom. an that of and the als, expectation promises protection propertyrights, will be kept.23 thenbecomesa contingent relabetweenindividuals Authority order demanded in which the ruler the subordinates, provides by tionship of the rulerto imposetaxesor otherexand they in turnacceptthe authority on theirbehavior to providethat andto exerttherestraints tractions necessary both sides are social order.In this exchangeof social orderfor compliance, otherwise with to the state of nature that would at least madebetteroff, regard andcoercive thesocostsof providing exist.Therulerbearstheadministrative to her rules and exactions. cial order,but gains the consentof subordinates of autonof socialorderandgive up a measure Subordinates gainthebenefits In this conception, is not authority omy or, in the case of states,sovereignty. but a contract. law, Bothrulerandruledareintegral is inherently Relational strategic. authority
Given that cha21. For Weber, formal-legalauthoritytypicallygrew out of charismatic authority. risma is one possible source of relationalauthority,this is not inconsistentwith the argumentdeveloped below. theoriesof the state,but sev22. Thereis a long philosophicaltraditionunderpinningcontractual andChange works include Douglass C. North, Structure eral of the most importantcontemporary W.W. in Economic Norton, 1981);Margaret Levi, OfRuleandRevenue (Berkeley: History(New York: CommuandProsperity: Press,1988);and MancurOlson, Power Outgrowing Universityof California nist and Capitalist (New York:BasicBooks, 2000). Dictatorships 23. Bull, TheAnarchical Society, pp. 4-6.
mustproducean acceptable to the contract: the former socialorder; the latter In a relational the must consentto the former's authority. approach, focusof flows not fromthe comanalysissubtlyshiftsfromrulerto ruled.Obligation but fromthe consentof the ruled;a rulerdoes not possess mandsof the ruler, to complywith an obligation unlessher subordinates acknowledge authority andherabilityto use coercion herwill. Importantly, theruler'sauthority legitsatisfaction with the socialorderso proimatelyfollowfromthe subordinate's duced. Obligationsprings not from coercion.Rather,authorityand the derivefromthe interestof the ruledin social capacityto coercelegitimately order.24 and consistent Thisrelational account conception providesa morecomplete from the formation of of the originsof politicalauthority. Although authority in the mists of time,a relawithinthe stateof natureis, of course,shrouded with what consistent scholars know aboutthe protionalconception appears In literature on contact-era to cite one cess. the anthropological Melanesia, one prominent form on earlyauthority structures, examplefromthe literature in who uses his comparative is the local"bigman,"an individual advantage wealthand,in turn,to earnauthority to generate over material accumulation In a related thosewho becomehis followers. drawn from the same conception Godelier man"modelin whichinpositsa "great regionandperiod,Maurice in huntingandfighting, dividuals use theircomparative advantage gardening, or ritual knowledge to attain authorityover others. Productiveabilities, thatpotential leaders and fightingskillall appearto be resources knowledge, can use to producea localsocialorderand, in turn,authority.25 Importantly, to the extenttheyexistat all,followrather thandrive institutions, formal-legal In this example, this process. as in others,authority restson the ruler'sability to deliverthe "goods" the ruled and the latter'swillingnessto demanded by the the as status of former. recognize legitimate If authority can emergeas partof an equilibrium betweenrulerand ruled in relations fromthe stateof nature, then it cannotbe excludedby definition of betweenstateswithinthe globalsystem.A relational conception authority, based on the exchangeof socialorderfor compliance, opens the possibility
24. Flathman, and PeterAlexisGourevitch, "TheGovernance ThePractice Authority; of Political in DavidA. Lake andRobert Choice and Problem in International Powell, eds.,Strategic Relations," Princeton International Relations (Princeton, Press,1999), N.J.: University pp. 137-164. in Practice: 25. Marshall Culture Selected ZoneBooks, Maurice (NewYork: 2000); Sahlins, Essays
Godelier and Marilyn Strathern, eds., Big Men and GreatMen: Personificationsof Power in Melanesia
and PaulRoscoe, "NewGuinea as (New York: Press,1991); Leadership Cambridge University A Critical Method andTheory, Vol.7, No. 2 Review," Journal ofArchaeological Ethnographic Analogy: 2000), (June pp. 79-126.
International Security32:1 56
thatpoliticalauthority can exist at the international level, at least for certain empireis a case in point,but so is the dyads.The long historyof European in the UnitedStates'protecEastern SovietUnion'sinformal Europe; empire thePhilippines, andMicronesia afterWorld War torates overJapan, II;andthe formedby the UnitedStatesand SaudiArabiaduringthe weak protectorate GulfWar-none of whichhad prior'legal' standing.26 States 1990-91Persian can escape the state of nature,at least in part, by building relationships in relafoundedon relational rather thanformal-legal Understood authority. in international tionalterms,the natureand degreeof politicalauthority refor empirical lationstogether becomea variable investigation. Hierarchy in InternationalRelations the dominant existswhen one actor, over state,possessesauthority Hierarchy is never total,of course,but state.Authority anotheractor,the subordinate over a subordinate statemay possessauthority variesin extent.A dominant and issue commands regulating possibleactions1-5 but not on actions6-n, In otherwords,the subto its whichremain beyond ability expectcompliance. thelegitimacy of the dominant ordinate statemayrecognize state'scommands it mayissue on otherpossiactions1-5, but not thatof commands regulating In thiscase,a partial the statepossesses ble actions. exists; dominant hierarchy state.In turn,hierarchy increases overthe subordinate somelimitedauthority actionsthe dominantstate can legitiwith the numberof the subordinate's If the dominant stateexpandsits authority fromissues 1-5 to matelyregulate. is a is morehierarchical. So defined,hierarchy include6-8, the relationship variable definedby the numberof actionsover which the domicontinuous issue commands.27 nantstatecan legitimately
26. These cases and others are discussed in Lake, Entangling Relations, chaps. 5, 6. 27. At least threeanalyticapproachesof long standingin the field have employed the termhierarchy in ways very similarto one anotherbut differentfrom that developed here. Power transition theory posits global and regionalhierarchiesof power that produce struggles for system leaderPolitics(New York:Alfred A. ship and periods of intense warfare.See A.F.K.Organski, World Knopf, 1958);A.F.K.Organskiand JacekKugler,TheWarLedger (Chicago:Universityof Chicago Press, 1980);and Douglas Lemke, Regionsof Warand Peace(New York:CambridgeUniversity Press, 2002). Hegemonic stability theory predicts that a single, dominant country will produce higher levels of internationalpublic goods and economic openness. See CharlesP. Kindleberger, 1929-1939(Berkeley: in Depression, TheWorld Universityof CaliforniaPress, 1973);RobertGilpin, DirectInvestment ThePolitical andtheMultinational U.S.Power (New Economy of Foreign Corporation: York:BasicBooks, 1975);and StephenD. Krasner, 'State Power and the Structure of International Vol.28, No. 3 (April1976),pp. 317-347.Althoughfocused on hegemony,this Politics, Trade,' World in World Politics See RobertGilpin, Warand Change theory is at least implicitly about hierarchy. (New York:Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 27-34. Dependency theory, in its various
Althoughsovereigntyis often assumedto be indivisible,recentresearch demonstrates it is frequently that,in practice, divided,withonestateacquiring moreor less authority over the actionsof another.28 In a prominent set of exthe United an 'international under the States, amples, asserting policepower' so-called Roosevelt to the Monroe in intervened Caribbean Doctrine, corollary statesmorethanthirtytimesbetween1898and 1934to regulate theirforeign and domesticpolicies.In the case of the Dominican in Republic 1904,for instance,loomingdebt and fearof European intervention-European warships had entered Dominican watersin 1900and 1903,andFrance was againthreattariffrevenues-led the local government to requestthat ening to confiscate the UnitedStatestakeover management of its customshouses. Thisarrangement was latercodifiedin an executiveagreement underwhich the United Statesappointed a customscollector and providedmilitary for the protection and the Dominican not to increase debts or lower republic, government agreed taxeswithoutthe consentof Washington.29
within the international guises, also posits a hierarchy economy defined by levels of development. See Andre GunderFrank,'The Developmentof Underdevelopment,'Monthly Vol. 18, No. Review, 4 (September or 1966),pp. 17-31;G. Palma,'Dependency:A FormalTheoryof Underdevelopment a Methodologyfor the Analysis of ConcreteSituationsof Dependency,' World Vol.6, Development, Nos. 7-8 (July-August1978),pp. 881-924;and FernandoHenriqueCardosoand Enzo Faletto,DeandDevelopment in Latin America Press,1979).All three pendency (Berkeley: Universityof California theoriestreathierarchyas a structural with eithera global or regionalsystem orgacharacteristic, nized into a single pyramid for all relevantstates. Eachdefines hierarchyas a function of power and, in turn,as materialor economiccapabilities.'Systemic' in Waltz'suse of thatterm,hierarchy is thus most typicallyused as a synonym for the distributionof capabilitiesand, especially,for a highly skewed or unipolardistribution.On the concept of a system, see Waltz,Theory of InternationalPolitics,especially chap. 5. Hierarchyas stratifiedcapabilitiesis entirely consistentwith a view of international politics as a self-helpsystem. See Clark,TheHierarchy of States, p. 3. The conis conceivedas a dyadic recept of hierarchy developed here differson two counts.First,hierarchy lationshipbetween two polities that varies acrosspairs within any system from completeanarchy to full dominance.A single state may possess varyingdegrees of hierarchyacrossmany dyads, as does the UnitedStatestoday.Nonhegemonicstateshave certainlyexercisedmore or less authority over other neighboringstates and even over distantcolonies.Second,as I define and use the construct,hierarchyrests on authority,not just on coercivecapabilities. 28. See StephenD. Krasner, (Princeton, N.J.:PrincetonUniversity Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy Press, 1999);AndreasOsiander,'Sovereignty,International Relations,and the Westphalian Myth,' International Vol. 55, No. 2 (June2001),pp. 251-287;John Agnew, 'Sovereignty ReOrganization, and StateAuthorityin Contemporary WorldPolitics,' Annalsof theAssociation gimes:Territoriality Vol.95, No. 2 (June2005),pp. 437-461;and EdwardKeene,Beyond theAnof American Geographers,
archical Society: Grotius, Colonialism,and Order in WorldPolitics (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2002). For a normativedefense of divisible sovereignty,see Robert0. Keohane,'Political in Sovereignty,'in J.L.Holzgrefeand Robert0. Keohane, Gradations AuthorityafterIntervention: versity Press,2003),pp. 275-298.
eds., Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (New York: Cambridge Uni29. Walter LaFeber, TheAmericanAge: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad,1750 to the Present, 2d
ed. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994),p. 247;and PeterH. Smith,Talons of theEagle: Dynamics of U.S.LatinAmerican Relations (New York:OxfordUniversity Press, 1996),pp. 52-62.
a partial theUnitedStates overSaudiArabia acquired protectorate Similarly, Facedwith a possiblethreatof invasionfrom duringthe 1990-91GulfWar. followed Saudi Arabia Iraq, plansfirstformulated nearlytwo decadesearlier more than U.S. invited to deand reluctantly 500,000 troopsonto its territory fend the kingdomand expel IraqfromKuwait.AlthoughSaudiArabiaselfthe trappingsof sovereigntyduringthe crisis and consciouslymaintained and His RoyalHighnessGen. eventualwar-U.S. Gen.NormanSchwarzkopf bin Sultanof SaudiArabia wereformally who symboliKhaled equalpartners in callyheld theirdailymeetings the latter'soffice-therewas littledoubtthat with Iraq(if any),the planning the negotiations the UnitedStatescontrolled and fightingof the war,and the termsof the peace.Forall practical purposes, Gulfregion,the UnitedStates andat leastregarding policytowardthe Persian overSaudiArabia's assumedsubstantial authority foreign policywith the full of the Even with the of U.S. and consent king.30 redeployment knowledge of the dependence troopsto nearbystatesor offshorein 2003,the continued creates a residual subordination.31 These and other on U.S. protection kingdom as casesof dividedsovereignty similarinstancesarebest classified or, in my As the exampleof SaudiArabiamakes clear, termshere, partialhierarchy. these relationships day. persistinto the current
DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HIERARCHY
A relational to authority expectsthatstateswithinthe international approach Somestateswill have few systemwill possess varyingdegreesof hierarchy. to other constraints on theirsovereignty. Otherswill yield authority external Stillotherswill forfeit theirauthorstatesoversomeissuesforsomepurposes. Inshort,therewill be intoanother stateor empire. beingsubsumed ity entirely, few of which conform a varietyof authority relationships, fullywith the prinof Althoughgeneralprinciples may serve as sovereignty. ciples Westphalian no two authority are relationships guidelinesor focalpointsfor negotiations, the two states is the The contract reached between to be same. likelyto likely
of thisrelationship, see 30. SeeLake, Relations, chap.6. On thecontracting challenges Entangling in International as Informative Power: Alexander Agents," "Screening Organizations Thompson, L.Nielson, andMichael and DavidA. Lake, Daniel Darren G.Hawkins, eds.,Delegation J.Tierney, inInternational (NewYork: Press, 2006), Cambridge University pp.229-254. Organizations Agency of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced thatU.S.troops would 31. OnApril29,2003,Secretary Sultan airbasereturned to Saudicontrol andPrince fromSaudiArabia be withdrawn by August in Saudi 500military trainers weretransferred to Qatar, 2003. 4,500 leaving Approximately troops in linkedthemoveto thetermination of the"nofly"zonerestrictions Rumsfeld Arabia. Secretary intactand Air Operations at Prince Sultan remains Center base,however, Iraq.TheCombined andSaudiArabia deemit necessary. readyto use shouldthe UnitedStates
Escape fromtheState of Nature 59
Figure 1. Two Dimensions Economic Hierarchy
of International Hierarchy
Dependency
empire
informal empire Economic Zone
Market Exchange Anarchy Diplomacy Security Hierarchy Sphere of Influence Protectorate
reflecta hostof internal considerations as well as external conditions. Whatit meansto be "sovereign" in any particular case is likelyto varysubstantially. Theserelationships of varyingauthority constitute international hierarchies. can be and in constructed of Authority disaggregated hierarchy anynumber in common I firstdistinguish relations, ways. Following practice international betweenthe broadissue areasof securityand economics,acrosswhich the samestatesoftenconstruct with different relations I then degreesof hierarchy. these broad issues into the nearinfinitenumberof actionsthat disaggregate statesmightperformthat constitute securityor economicpolicy to produce two continua. axisin Figure1) varyfromdiplomacy, (thehorizontal Security relationships at the anarchic end of the continuum, to protectorates, at the hierarchic end.32 In diplomacy, while retaining over their politiesinteract completeauthority
32. See Lake, Entangling Relations, pp. 24-41; and Weber, Hierarchyamidst Anarchy, p. 4.
own actions-includingthe right to interpret the termsof agreements into whichthey may enter.Thisis the idealof Westphalian sovereignty, again,but limitedto the areaof securitypolicyand,in extanttheory, undercommonly stood to constitute At the otherextreme, one nearlyall security relationships. statecedescomplete to another over its Such extreme authority security policy. I use the however,seldomexist.Followingtradition, authority relationships, term "protectorate" for securityhierarchies in which a dominantstate exercises authority over many (butnot necessarily state's all) of the subordinate In addition to in numerous possiblesecurity policies. examples the nineteenth Great Britain's with in the Persian century, including relationships monarchies Gulfand SouthAsia,the Federated Statesof Micronesia and Republic of the Marshall Islandstodayarecloseto full protectorates of the UnitedStates.FolWorld the War Federal of was alsoa protectorate II, lowing Republic Germany of the UnitedStates, but it hasbeensteadilyasserting a moreindependent sein 1954.33 Betweenthese ideal curitypolicy since the end of the occupation of increasing types lie a rangeof securityrelationships hierarchy. Economic betweenpolitiesvaryfrommarket at the relationships exchange, anarchic end of the continuum, to dependency, at the hierarchic end (thevertical axis in Figure1).34 Undermarketexchange, in a mannersimilarto diplomacy,parties choose to trade, invest, or otherwiseengage in economic interactions while retaining full authority over theiractions.Likediplomacy, marketexchangeapproximates the ideal of Westphalian Examsovereignty. U.S. economicrelationships with many statesin ples includecontemporary Africa.At the oppositeend of the continuum, one politycedes completeauthorityoverall of its economic policiesto another polity.Again,suchextreme casesare rare,and I use the term"dependency" to covera rangeof relationwith but near not total transfers of authority over economic ships necessarily Relations between the United in States and the policy. Nicaragua earlydecades of the twentieth camecloseto full dependency, in thatthe former concentury trolledall customsrevenues-the primary formof government financing-in in which the subordinate the latter."Dollarization," adopts the dominant as its own and importsits monetary country's currency policy,also createsa The most cases of fullydollarized econodependency relationship. prominent
33. Lake,Entangling Relations, pp. 176-180.
34. Kathleen J. Hancock, "Surrendering Sovereignty: Hierarchy in the International System and the Former Soviet Union," Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 2001, was the first to develop such a continuum of economic hierarchy in these terms. For a more complete discussion, see David A. Lake, "The New Sovereignty in International Relations," InternationalStudies Review, Vol. 5, No. 3 (September 2003), pp. 303-323.
on the U.S.dollar whichrelyexclusively andPanama, miestodayareEcuador is a there As withsecurity as theirlegaltender. rangeof intermerelationships, diateforms. existbetweentwo polities,the hierarchies andeconomic Whenbothsecurity known as eitheran informal becomeswhatis commonly empire relationship moderate combines Informal 1). (see or,at an extreme, empire Figure empire with the subordinate levels of both securityand economichierarchy, polity Restatein botharenas. to a dominant but not all authority cedingsubstantial esof Latin the countries and United States the between America, lationships the form of often take on the in or Caribbean, bordering peciallythe states of Eastern TheSovietUnion'sdomination informal duringthe Europe empire. Cold Waris a second example.Empireunites high levels of securityand with the subordinate economichierarchy, polity retaininglittle or no indewerethe The classiccases,of course, area. over either policy pendentauthority was revealed The Soviet overseas onlywhen clearly empire empires. European to breakfreeand in 1991allowedthe constituent internal republics instability in at least which remain of formindependent partlyhierarchical states-many to a new references the frequent Despite relationshipswith Moscow.35 few U.S. relationAmerican empireafter2003and the startof the IraqWar, this ships today approximate extreme-found, perhaps,only in the United of new 'sovereign' andIraqpriorto the creation ruleoverAfghanistan States' governments.
OPERATIONALIZING HIERARCHY
of authority areextremely and,even moreso, measuring patterns Identifying difference becentral to the is thatobligation, difficult tasks.Thecoreproblem evenin andotherformsof power,is inherently tweenauthority unobservable, In rehierarchic. international as domesticpolitical regarded systemstypically and of been has lations,wherehierarchy long problems identifying neglected, and to assessthe importance loom Yet, large. particularly authority measuring indicross-national some effectsof international requires systematic hierarchy to providesuchmeasures.36 thefirstattempt Thisis, to my knowledge, cators. akinto seeingshadaremeasured All theoretical constructs only indirectly,
and KarenDawishaand BruceParrott, andEconomic 35. Hancock,Delegated Integration; Sovereignty M.E. Sharpe,1997). 36. Hancock,'SurrenderingSovereignty,'originallydeveloped many of the measuresused here, but was limited to Russia and the post-Sovietstates. I am deeply indebted to this work. See also
Hancock, Delegated Sovereignty and EconomicIntegration. eds., The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in ComparativePerspective (Armonk, N.Y.:
ows caston a wall rather thanobjects themselves. Theunobservable natureof authoritydoes not separatethis conceptfrom others.Even the conceptof or coercive in international central to the field,is relations, "power" capability suchmeasures as population, captured onlyby proxythrough military personof War nel, GDP,majorpowerstatus,or the CINCscorefromthe Correlates NationalMaterial data set. Indicators are never direct measures, Capabilities of the underlying theoretical constructs. only moreor less valid reflections betweenhierarEquallydifficultis developingmeasuresthatdiscriminate in authority, and coercive the nextmost chy,definedas variations capabilities, related form of To test for the effects of on statebeclosely power. hierarchy such measures must the construct of but not correlate havior, capture authority of material associated with cohighlywith the indicators capabilities normally ercivecapability; thatis, theindicators shouldconverge on the construct of hiand discriminate between and Themeasures here, erarchy authority coercion. as a result,aimto capture the legitimacy of the unequalrelationships between in coercion. states,not just differential capabilities All measures arecompiledfor the UnitedStatesand all othercountries for whichdataareavailable from1950to 2000.Similar dataarenot available for otherpotentially dominant here for states,limitinganalysis practical purposes to patterns of U.S.hierarchy in the worldsystem. is measured The firstis the deploySecurityhierarchy by two indicators. mentof military forcesfromthe dominant the UnitedStates,on the country, of eachsubordinate state.Military enable a dominant stateto territory troops influencethe securitypoliciesof its subordinate. The dominant countrycan embroil in foreignconflicts the subordinate if it chooses; attacks by launching fromthe subordinate's forinstance, the dominant stateautomatically territory, the otherin the conflictand makesit a targetfor retaliation implicates by its in as the case of the United States and Saudi in Arabia the 1990-91 antagonist, Gulf War.In turn,the presenceof militarypersonnelenablesthe dominant state to restrainpossibleforeignpolicy initiativesof the subordinate. U.S. forcesin bothGermany andJapan after1945,for example, not only protected thosecountries a Soviet invasion but also servedto reassure against possible theirneighbors the revival of militarism. Thus,military against personnel give a dominantstatepositiveand negativecontrolover a subordinate's security of forcesin the subordinate, the moreconpolicy.Thelargerthe deployment trolthe dominant stateis likelyto exert.Tothe extentthatthe subordinate acstate'spersonnel, thiscontrol canbe regarded as legitimate ceptsthedominant authoritative. and, therefore, Overseas troopdeployments by the UnitedStatesarereported annually by
fromthe Stateof Nature 63 Escape
used here,thesedeof hierarchy of Defense.In the measures the Department in to national divided are population, adjustfor differences by ployments to one by its highestvalue in is then normalized countrysize. The indicator timeand with the othersexboth over 1995to makethe measure comparable to popularelative of U.S. level troopdeployments plainedbelow.Theaverage tion has beenfallingeachdecadesincethe 1950s. alof independent is the number of security Thesecondindicator hierarchy state.Two statesmay sharemany alliliancespossessedby the subordinate in a commonsecuritysystem. embedded are that ances,indicating they only but this within them a securityhierarchy, contain Suchsharedalliancesmay If the cannotbe discernedsimplyby observingthe patternof relationships. statespossess an alliancebut also enterinto allidominantand subordinate anceswith otherstatesthatarenot shared-what I referto hereas "independent alliances"-this is prima facie evidence of foreign policy autonomy. on the aid of the other.Mostimportant, Neitheris thenobviouslydependent has an "outside member subordinate the potentially option"thatreducesthe if all of a subordidominantstate'sabilityto exercisecontrol.Alternatively, a security this withthedominant areshared nate'salliances state, mayindicate is then dependenton the dominantstate or that The subordinate hierarchy. Thelargerthe numberof such independent for assistance. allies state'sother the securityrelathe less hierarchical alliances possessedby the subordinate, be. to is tionship likely is definedas one dividedby the number alliances Theindexof independent of the thatarenot also alliance of the subordinate of alliance partners partners alliances fewerindependent state.Highervaluesrepresent dominant and,by Incaseswherethetwo statesarenot themselves hierarchy. greater implication, hieris treated as zero(nosecurity alliances of independent allied,thenumber alliance in the is that fact A era, patternsare contemporary archy). striking it if a stateis alliedwith one greatpower, possessesno other exclusive; strictly held by thatgreatpower.37 alliancesoutsidethe web of alliances of himeasure is an evenmoreindirect alliances of independent Thenumber thanis military polforeign troopsis a conscious Accepting personnel. erarchy the subordinate of the least tacit at and decision by acceptance implies icy alliof the absence dominantcountry'sauthority. independent By contrast, A in its own subordination. ancesneed not imply thatthe state is complicit
network has threegreatpowermemwhichthoughan exclusive areNATO, 37. Theexceptions NATO butis also to Britain andis connected whichhostsBritish bers,andCanada, through troops the UnitedStates. set of alliances to a distinct connected through
subordinate with counmayhavemanyreasons why it doesnot formalliances triesotherthanthe dominant the absence of significant exterstate,including nalsecurity threats. stateandits otherallies Yet,to be alliedwiththedominant but not otherstatescreatesa dependence of whichthe subordinate is surely aware.Thatthe subordinate choosesnot to alterthis situation impliesthatit influence as the dominant state's like and, legitimate regards military personThissuggeststhatsmaller of independent numbers alliances nel,authoritative. with increasing are,on average,associated securityhierarchy. I combine thesetwo measures intoan aggregate indicator of U.S.security hias thesumof themilitary constructed andindependent allierarchy, personnel anceindicesand itselfnormalized to one for the highestvaluein 1995.Given betweenthe indicators, the correlation thisfacilitates statistical testing(seebeindexalso appears to havebetterpredictive low). Theaggregate validity, sugmore'accurate'thantheindividual gestingthatit is somewhat components. Thesemeasuresof securityhierarchy possess some degreeof substantive or face are arrayedalong validity.Mirroring plausibility Figure1, countries in Figure2 for 1965and Figure3 both dimensionsof international hierarchy indexof securityhierarchy for 1995.Theaggregate is arrayed alongthe horiin zontal axis. Panamais the most subordinate country 1995,creatingthe baselineof one againstwhich othercountries are arrayed.38 Othercountries with nearlyall LatinAmerican fall into an intuitivepattern, and European in theirabsenceof any indea degreeof securityhierarchy statesreflecting Thosestatescommonly as U.S.'clients,' such as regarded pendentalliances. or 'supporters,'such as Japan, takeon highervalthe Philippines, generally to the UnitedStatesin securityinclude ues. Otherstateshighly subordinate SouthKorea(1951-53), and the Federal of SouthVietnam (1966-70), Republic 2 and As can be seen levels of se(1955-89). 3, by comparing Figures Germany curityhierarchy changeover time. is similarly Economic First,economic hierarchy captured by two indicators. with a which varies inversely country's monetary hierarchy policyautonomy, in turn,by its exchangerateregime.39 is determined, Key to any economy's how the its is of national and is set relstability price prices monetary currency Thereare threebasictypes of currency ative to othercurrencies. regimes.At
38. With no military forces of its own, a significant deployment of approximately 2,000 U.S. soldiers, and a small national population, Iceland would be the most subordinate country by this measure (but comparable to South Vietnam in 1968). Data for Iceland, however, are spotty and it drops out of most statistical analyses. For this reason, I calibrate the measure to Panama in 1995. 39. On exchange rate regimes as hierarchies, see Benjamin J. Cohen, The Geography of Money (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), especially chap. 5.
Figure 2. Economic and Security Hierarchy, 1965

1 Canada Honduras Venezuela
Panamd
0.8
Guatemala Nicaragua Liberia Mexico Peru Saudi Arabia Greece Italy Portugal
Federal Republic of Germany
Hierarchy 0.6
Philippines Burundi
Economic 0.4 of Index

0.2 Lebanon El Salvador Paraguay
Costa Rica. Ecuador Japan Dominican Republic Jamaica Pakistan. Colombia South Korea '06ntriark0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2
0 0
tibya-
0.2
Indexof Security Hierarchy NOTE: Each dot in Figures 2 and 3 represents a different country. Due to space constraints, not every country is labeled. Figure 3. Economic and Security Hierarchy, 1995
1 St Kitts& Nevis Canada Antigua & Barbuda 0.8 Singapore St Vincent &the Grenadines Grenada Argentina Dominica Jamaica El Salvador Costa Rica Panama
Hierarchy 0.6
Saudi Arabia Egypt Malaysia Economic 0.4 of South Korea
Honduras ..Suriname Mexico Nicaragua Dominican Republic Brazil Peru Paraguay Venezuela Ecuador
Index
0.2
India
Kuwait
2gpan
0 0 Nigeria New Zealand Macedonia' 0.2
Haiti
Colombia Philippines Chile Japan Australia: Germany Italy 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Indexof Security Hierarchy
one extreme, a country canallowits currency to floatagainstothercurrencies, with its exchangeratebeingdetermined markets. (moreor less) by financial Underfloatingexchangerates,domesticmonetary is freed from conpolicy cernsaboutthe current account balance hierarand,thus,impliesno economic fix a can its to a or rate 'anchor' Second, chy. country exchange singleforeign most commonly the dollaror now the euro.By fixingits exchange currency, the subordinate stateindirectly rateto an anchorcurrency, importsor adopts dominant the monetary of the a Third, country. countrycan adoptthe policy a state as a of its known as dollarization. Even own, process currency foreign in circulation, the currency mayremain thoughsmallamountsof the national uses the as its tender. Withcurrency foreigncountry's primary legal country out variableforeignreservesto cushionthe impactof external shocks,howthe dominant ever,the country directly imports monetary policy.At country's eachstep here,the tie betweenthe country's and its anchor currency currency becomestighterand morecostlyto break,givingthe dominant countrymore control overthe subordinate monetary country's policy.Thedecisionto adopt as one'sown has enormous another symbolic currency significance, country's to adopting another Debates over fixed similar rates country's flag.40 exchange on of dollarization focus issues economic and, especially, typically independToeitherfix its exchange ence and foreigncontrol. rateor dollarize is to conin part, that the is at least itself, country subordinating sciouslyacknowledge Because are to thedecisions of another. rate chosen exchange regimes typically fromthe dominant conwith only minimal state,but arenonetheless pressure that state have at least some measure of the control must by straining, acquired legitimacy. rateregimeshavebeenstudiedin some detailand codedin stanExchange scalerangingfromvariousfloating dardizedform.' I firstcode a four-point to rate a exchange mechanisms, crawling peg tied to the dollar(a mixedsysandfixedrates), an exchange ratefixedto the dollar, and tembetweenfloating in the form a of either a board or dollarcurrency finally 'merged' currency
40. Ibid., pp. 119-122. 41. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff, 'The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Reinterpretation,' QuarterlyJournalof Economics,Vol. 119, No. 1 (February 2004), pp. 148, differentiate between the formal or announced exchange rate regime reported by the IMF and the de facto exchange rate regime actually followed by countries, which is preferred because it is closer to the relational conception of authority used here. Christopher M. Meissner and Nienke Oomes extend Reinhart and Rogoff's data to identify the 'anchor' currency (if any), or the currency to which another fixes its currency. Meissner and Oomes, 'Why Do Countries Peg the Way They Peg? The Determinants of Anchor Currency Choice,' paper presented at the Political Economy of Finance conference, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California, February 2004.
fromthe Stateof Nature 67 Escape
to one for the highestvalue in 1995. ization.This scale is then normalized of the and thus U.S.monetary the role dollar, Overall, hierarchy, slippedover the 1970sand 1980sas morecountries ratesafter adoptedfloatingexchange the collapseof the Bretton Woodsmonetary resystem.Monetary hierarchy boundedin the 1990s, as more countries outside of either rehowever, Europe turnedto an exchangeratefixedto the dollaror adoptedthe dollaras their primary currency. is relativetradedependence. The secondindicatorof economichierarchy to create thepotential forpolitical Trade haslongbeenunderstood influence.42 in security Thekey insighthereparallels thaton independent alliances hierarit is likelyto havegreater chies.If a statehas manytrading partners, political to and trade for autonomy; any attempt manipulate political purposeswill be If a countryis highlytradedependenton another, ineffective. however,it is vulnerable to the influenceof that state.Relativetradedependence is measuredas eachcountry's totaltradewith the UnitedStatesdividedby its own minussimilar of theUnitedNaratiosforthe otherpermanent members GDP, Great tionsSecurity Council(China, and Russia). Theindexis France, Britain, at zero(nohierarchy) andnormalized to one forthehighestvaluein truncated 1995.Theaverage level of relative tradedependence has fluctuated overtime, the in 1980s and 1990s as U.S. led the the world intoa highs economy reaching new era of globalization. Countries tradefor many reasons.In most cases, governments only indithe of trade influence as firms and make rectly dyadicpattern entrepreneurs the microlevel decisionson importsand exportsthataggregate into tradedeandexchange Unlikemilitary rateregimes, andmorelike pendence. personnel trade well arise without alliances, independent patterns may explicitgovernmentdecisions the failureof governments overthe beingmade.Nonetheless, term their to indicates a tacit of the long diversify trading partners acceptance dominant influence andtherefore state'spotential its legitimacy andauthority. As withthe security an aggregate measure of economic measures, hierarchy is formedby summingthe exchange rateand relativetradedependence indices and, again,normalizing the value to one in 1995.According to the aggreis the most Canada to the subordinate index, gate country economically UnitedStates in 1995, witha highlevelof relative tradedependence anda cur42. Albert0. Hirschman,National andtheStructure Power Trade of Foreign (Berkeley: Universityof
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985).
Robert andJoseph S. Nye Jr., andInterdependence: California 0. Keohane Power World Press, 1980); and DavidA. Baldwin, Politics in Transition Economic (Boston: Little,Brown,1977); Statecraft
is disThisaggregate measure of economic hierarchy rencyfixedto the dollar. 2 for1965andFigure 3 for 1995. axisof Figure Again, playedalongthevertical into intuitive countries fall measure of face a validity, mostly categoproviding America clientsof the and widely regarded ries,with manystatesin Central UnitedStatessuch as SaudiArabiatakingrelatively high values. of security and economic areintendedto capture Thesemeasures hierarchy betweenstatesbut, rather, the authority, not purelycoerciverelations obligacoercion that are central to hierarchical The and tion, relationships.43 legitimate of the tiesbetween reflect the moreor less discretionary nature fourindicators if dominant and subordinate states,and thusat leastthe passiveacquiescence of As the dominant state's not the activeembrace subordinates authority. by of capabilities is beyondthe abilityof any one Waltzargues,the distribution in capabilities that allow one countryto change,and it is these inequalities a The measures stateto coerce another.44 here,conversely, imply degreeof volan abilityto alteroutof capabilities, untarismand, unlikethe distribution of As noted,statesconsentmoreor less to the authority comesunilaterally. stateswhen they acceptforeigntroopson theirsoil or fix theirexdominant theirconsentwhen they rates. statesareindirectly Likewise, signaling change Without detheiralliances or trading fail to makeeffortsto diversify partners. states and information, tailed, case-specific knowing whether subordinate is imposas these hierarchical theirpopulations relationships legitimate accept in and nature these their sible.Butthe discretion clearlyseppolicies enduring morepurely fromthoseintendedto capture aratethesemeasures analytically betweenstates. coerciverelationships andall meaareinherently constructs all theoretical As noted, unobservable, orfacevalidity, Inaddition to theirsubstantive suresareimperfect. plausibility if the severalmeasures of eachdimension validated the indicators arefurther correlate of hierarchy relatively highly(convergent validity)and eachset fails to correlatehighly with the next most closely related analyticconstruct (discriminant validity),whichI have suggestedaboveis coercivecapabilities conceivedin international relations or 'power' as it is traditionally theory.45
43. These measures of security and economic hierarchy are clearly tailored to the modern international system. Although I believe that they may be generalizable and appropriate for other historical periods-the British Empire rested as well on overseas troops, the special role of the pound, and trade dependence-they likely reflect a contemporary conception of international authority and hierarchy. Premodern hierarchies most likely rested on other sources and markers of authority. Future hierarchies may well take different forms and manifest themselves in different ways. The indicators are not intended to be universally valid. 44. Waltz, Theoryof InternationalPolitics, pp. 97-99. 45. William M.K. Trochim, The Research Methods Knowledge Base, 2d ed. (Cincinnati, Ohio: atomicdogpublishing.com, 2001), pp. 71-73.
betweenthe measures of security Table1 presents correlations ecohierarchy, nomichierarchy, and coercivecapabilities for 1995only.The correlations for otheryearsarevery similar. Thecoercive of a statearetraditionally measured recapabilities by material number of sources,especially GDP,major by population, military personnel, score. As and overall CINC and as a baseline for furstatus, power expected, of coercivecapabilities ther comparison, the variousindicators all correlate at 0.59.Although notperfectly thiscorrelahighlywithone another congruent, tion impliesthatthesewidely used indicators are all capturing the sameunof coercive the indicators of security Likewise, capabilities. derlyingconstruct with one in are related 0.56 as are another, 1995, hierarchy closely averaging 0.53. Like the indicators of economic the indicators of cohierarchy, averaging of securityand economichierarchy ercivecapabilities, the measures possess relatively strongconvergent validity.46 nor economic moreimportant, neithersecurity is closely Perhaps hierarchy relatedto measures of coercivecapability. Thecorrelations betweenthe measuresof securityhierarchy and coercivecapabilities are quitelow, averaging is sometimes only 0.07in 1995.Surprisingly, securityhierarchy positivelyreGDP lated to the measuresof coercivecapability, and CINC.This especially that the countries considered to be positive relationship implies normally coercion in international amongthe most capableof exerting politicsarealso be most subordinate to the in security to those United States aflikely among and of economic coercive fairs.Indicators are virtually hierarchy capabilities in to one another, -0.02 unrelated 1995. the indicaThus, averaging hierarchy torspossessnot only convergent but also discriminant validity strong validity. Thisfactdoes not necessarily thatthese indicators arecapturing the "prove" of but it unobservable construct does show that these inherently hierarchy, measuresare capturingsomethingdistinct from traditionalmeasuresof in international relations. "power" An Exchange That Matters: Hierarchyand Defense Effort In contrast of international to extanttheories whichexpectall states relations, of the to respond to a similar logic anarchy, arguments developedaboveimply
is thattheaverage correlations areinflated 46. Onepossible boththecomobjection by including measures of security andeconomic measures andtheaggregate CINC, however, ponent hierarchy. of measures of energy is alsoan aggregate indicator ironandsteelprocomposed consumption, duction(bothhighlycorrelated with realGDP),military total expenditures, military personnel, andurban Not surprisingly, thehighest correlations between thevarious population, population. of coercive arethosebetween CINC andits components. measures capacity
11. and 10.
1.0
1.0 0.78
Hierarchy, 9.
1.0 0.14 0.54
8. Economic 7. Hierarchy, 1.0 0.01 6. Security of 5.
1.0 0.72 0.57 0.93
1.0 0.59 0.11 0.71 0.79 0.07 0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.06 -0.02
1.0 0.54
0.06 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.08
0.22 underlined): underlined): font font):
Indicators 4.
1.0 0.15 0.91 0.03
0.03 0.03 -0.04 -0.07 -
(italics (regular (regular 0.53
between 3.
1.0 0.22 0.32 0.32
0.21 0.18 0.11 -0.03 -0.03
2. Correlations 1. Validity:
indicators indicators indicators italics): 0.24 0.18 0.13 0.56 1.0 0.91 0.24 0.39 0.37 0.59 -0.02 -0.03 capabilities hierarchy capabilities (italics): 0.03 0.09 0.01 (boldface -0.02 -0.01 (boldface): coercive economic coercive indicators indicators and indicators and and
1.0 0.20 0.58 0.05 0.00 0.04
135) = (n regime dependence Discriminant alliances personnel 1995 hierarchy hierarchy hierarchy rate and capabilities hierarchy hierarchy hierarchy hierarchy personnel trade dollars) (dummy) military (1996 of military security economic coercive security economic independent relative security exchange security economic Capabilities, power score of of of of of of of of of of of of Convergent GDP 1. Number CINC Index Index Index Index Index Index Population RealMajor 1. 10. 11. Average 4. Coercive 2. 5. 3. 6. 7. 8. 9. Table Average Average Average Average Average
thata variety existand,furthermore, thatthesereof hierarchical relationships In will have a relational policyconsequences. authority lationships approach, and subis understood to reston an exchange betweendominant relationship in order for ordinate a social return states,in whichtheformer provide complifromthe latter. Protected ance and legitimacy state,it follows by a dominant countries thatsubordinate should,all else constant, spendfewerof theirown This relationship, will be continuous. resourceson security. The moreover, will expendon its thehierarchy, the less effortthe subordinate country greater own defense.47 Lowerdefenseexpenditures areone of the benefits thatsubordinatestatesreceivefromgivingup a measureof theirsovereignty.48 of the Anecdotalevidencesupportsthis hypothesis. Japan,a protectorate low UnitedStatesafter1945,enjoyed levels of defense Even effort. legendarily to in the 1990s, werereluctant acknowledge thattheywere politicians Japanese 1 on defense of of a andenbreaking self-imposed cap spending percent GDP, in to some maintain the fiction creative methods (standard gaged accounting
47. Defense effort has attractedrelativelylittle attentionin the scholarlyliterature.For work by economists using this same definition,see MarcAufrant,'France and Its Allies: A Comparative andPeaceEconomics, Vol. 10, No. 1 (FebruStudy of Defense SpendingTrendssince 1985,' Defense ary 1999),pp. 79-102;Ron Smith, 'The Demand for MilitaryExpenditure,'in KeithHartleyand ToddSandler,eds., Handbook Economics (New York: Elsevier,1995),pp. 69-88;and Keith of Defense Pastand Future,'Journal Vol. Research, Hartleyand ToddSandler,'NATO Burden-Sharing: ofPeace that focus on burdensharingin alli36, No. 6 (November1999),pp. 665-680.Forrelatedliteratures ances, see JohnR. Oneal and Hugh CarterWhatley,'The Effectof Alliance Membershipon National Defense Burdens, 1953-88: A Test of Mancur Olson's Theory of Collective Action,' International Vol. 22, No. 2 (1996),pp. 105-122.In an extension of the democracyand Interactions, victory literature,political scientists have begun to look at defense effort and regime type. See 0. Fordhamand ThomasC. Walker, 'KantianLiberalism, Benjamin RegimeType,and MilitaryResource Allocation:Do DemocraciesSpend Less?' International StudiesQuarterly, Vol. 49, No. 1 E. Goldsmith,'Bearingthe Defense Burden,1886-1989: (March2005),pp. 141-157;Benjamin Why Vol. 47, No. 5 (October 2003), pp. 551-573; and Spend More?' Journalof ConflictResolution, BenjaminE. Goldsmith,'Defense Effortand InstitutionalTheoriesof DemocraticPeace and Victory:Why TryHarder?'NationalUniversityof Singapore,Singapore,2004.Thishypothesisis similar to that in Michael F. Altfeld, 'The Decision to Ally: A Theory and Test,' Western Political Vol.37, No. 4 ( December1984),pp. 523-544;JamesD. Morrow,'Alliances and AsymQuarterly, Journal metry:An Alternativeto the CapabilityAggregationModel of Alliances,' American ofPolitical Science, Vol. 35, No. 4 (November 1991),pp. 904-933;and James D. Morrow,'Arms versus in the Search for Security,' International Allies: Trade-Offs Vol. 47, No. 2 (Spring Organization, 1993),pp. 207-233.These works, however,limit the range of variationin externalties to alliances, which are a relativelyanarchictype of securityrelationshipin which states give up comparatively little sovereigntyfor little protection.Morrow,'Alliances and Asymmetry,'also adopts a different definitionof autonomyas the abilityto alterthe status quo. In the approachhere,statesare simply giving up theirabilityto set theirpolicies free fromexternalcontrolfor greatersecurity,regardless of their preferencesover the status quo. 48. For suggestive discussions of other possible benefits, see MichaelMandelbaum,TheCasefor America's Inadvertent (New Haven, Conn.: 2005);and WilliamE. Odom and RobertDujarric, Empire YaleUniversityPress, 2004),especially pp. 44-46.
Goliath:How America Acts as the World'sGovernmentin the 21st Century (New York: PublicAffairs,
defensespendingat about1.4percent of GDPduringthis period). put Japan's to the United states,also subordinate By comparison, many WestEuropean were on 1.8 of GDP on defense, and States, spending average percent In Central the UnitedStatesitselfwas spending4.0 percent. America and the which the UnitedStateshas long dominated, statesspend about Caribbean, In SouthAmerica, in a 26 percentof the globalaverageon theirmilitaries. by the UnitedStates,defensespendingis also sphereof influencedominated 47 of the globalaverage, low, only percent relatively averaging despitenumerand ous territorial actionsby historic rivalsand long pedisputes provocative to the United States riods of militaryrule. Statesand regionssubordinate less on defensethanothers. appearto spend significantly I undertook Totest this hypothesis moresystematically, a time-series crossin all states from 1950 to 2000. of defense Defense efsectional study spending a as as share of GDP and then fortwas operationalized military expenditures of and economic on the indicators U.S. described security regressed hierarchy above. it wouldbe naiveto In identifying on defenseeffort, the effectsof hierarchy If is entirely states chooseone assumethathierarchy exogenous. intentionally with of the United it is to control or another States, important type relationship of this decisionin orderto estimateaccurately for the possibledeterminants on defenseeffort. Thisarticle doesnotpresent a fullydetheeffectof hierarchy formation of Prior an eclectic set of the and hierarchy.49 theory velopedtheory of auxiliary arguments suggestthreesets of controlvariables. thataremorethreatened First,countries by othersaremorelikelyto suborfor protection dinatethemselvesto the will of a dominantstatein exchange Thecountries that and,thus,aremorelikelyto enterhierarchical relationships. in otherwords,aremostlikelyto be willingto yield the aremost threatened, entailsand,all else constant, to carrya higher thatsubordination sovereignty I than normaldefenseburden.To identifythe effectof hierarchy, therefore, for foreignthreatsand measuredthem in two ways. I createda controlled whetherthe country was involvedin a militarized indicating dummyvariable defined the of War MIDdataset. Inas Correlates interstate (MID), by dispute the of between the countryand in MID issues a indicates volvement presence more indiotherswith a strongpotentialto escalateto violence.Somewhat number of allies other than the United States I counted the also posrectly, is conceptually fromthe number Thismeasure different sessedby the country.
49. SeeLake, Relations, Entangling chap.2.
fromtheUnitedStates, one of the component thatareindependent of alliances A number of allies-whether or not they indicators of security hierarchy. large of the UnitedStates-suggests a strongneed for assistance, are independent of external threat.50 whichwould follow froma perception costsin defensespendsmaller richer countries Second, opportunity possess for external be less willingto tradeautonomy protecing. Theymaytherefore If is a normal tion and less likelyto enterhierarchical relationships. security withincome, thisimpliesthatricher counincreases good whoseconsumption GDPpercatrieswill bothspendmoreon defenseandenterfewerhierarchies. pita is enteredas a control. aremorelikelyto 'flocktogether,' to theextentthatdemocracies Third, they into hierarchical with the United to enter be more relationships may willing in theiruse of military If democracies States.51 arealso moreefficacious force, on To the effects defense bear a smaller burden, average.52 separate they may I includedas another of hierarchy on defenseeffortfromthatof democracy, measured controlthe level of democracy, by the Polity2scalefromthe Polity IV dataset. The resultsare presentedin Table2.53 is, as predicted, Securityhierarchy Countries thatare subordisignificant. negativeand statistically consistently dimension do spendproportionately nateto the UnitedStateson the security hiless of theirnational incomeon defense.Thesubstantive impactof security in Within the of countries this the is substantial. used estimate, sample erarchy 2.57percent of its GDPon defenseeach spendsapproximately average country = deviation 4.74 percent; maximumvalue = 106 percentfor year (standard
50. The correlation between the numberof independentalliancesand total alliancesis a relatively Nonetheless,both varihigh 0.78 (for 1995),potentiallyintroducingproblemsof multicolinearity. ables are consistentlysignificantin the regressionsbelow. Dropping'number of otherallies' from model 3 in Table2 does not change the sign or significancelevel of the index for independent alliances. 51. RandolphM. Siversonand JuliannEmmons,'Birds of a Feather: DemocraticPoliticalSystems and Alliance Choicesin the TwentiethCentury,'journalof Conflict Vol. 35, No. 2 (June Resolution, 1991),pp. 285-306. 52. David A. Lake,'Power Pacifists: Statesand War,'American Democratic Political Science Review, at War Vol. 86, No. 1 (March1992), pp. 24-37; and Dan Reiterand Allan C. Stam, Democracies (Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress, 2002). model for time-seriescross-section 53. Thereis no consensuson the appropriate data.Thisis espeis a significantproblem,as it is in this study even afterincluding cially truewhen serialcorrelation a lagged dependentvariable.Given this lack of consensus,the model is estimatedin two ways in STATA(version 8.0). Models 1, 3, and 4 are estimated with panel corrected standard errors N. Katz,'What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series (xtpcse).See NathanielBeckand Jonathan Political Science Vol.89, No. 3 (September Cross-Section Review, Data,' American 1995),pp. 634-664. Model 2 is estimatedwith countryfixed effects (using xtregar).Withthe exceptionof two control variables,the results are robust to these alternativespecifications.
Table 2. Defense Effort and Security and Economic Hierarchy, 1950-2000 Time-Series Cross-Sectional Regression (with correction for first-order autoregression [AR1] and panel corrected standard errors [PCSE] or country fixed effects. All independent variables lagged one year.) Dependent variable: Defense Expenditures/ GDP Index of security hierarchy Index of military personnel Index of independent alliances Index of economic hierarchy Index of exchange rate regime Index of relative trade dependence Lagged defense effort MID involvement (dummy) Number of other allies Real GDP per capita (in 1996 dollars) Democracy (Polity2) CINC score Constant Number of observations Number of groups R-squared 0.0023 (0.0016) 4522 126 0.4603 0.0064 (0.0013) 4396 125 0.4630 (within) 0.9736 (between) 0.6790 (overall) -0.0003 (0.0017) 4522 126 0.4441 Model 1 (PCSE) -0.0109*" (0.0030) Model 2 (fixed effects) -0.0084** (0.0034) -0.0018 (0.0027) -0.0090*** (0.0027) 0.0015 (0.0013) 0.0011 (0.0015) -0.0000 (0.0012) 0.0077 (0.0074) 0.6441*** (0.0728) 0.0033*** (0.0010) 0.0003** (0.0001) 7.24e-07* (3.47e-07) -0.0003* (0.0001) 0.0015 (0.0012) Model 3 (PCSE) Model 4 (PSCE) -0.0110*** (0.0030)
0.6653*** (0.0700) 0.0033*** (0.0010) 0.0002** (0.0001) 6.64e-07* (3.28-07) -0.0003* (0.0001)
0.6856*** (0.0115) 0.0015 (0.0008) 0.0002* (0.0001) -9.64e-08 (1.32e-07) -0.0002* (0.0001)
0.6663"* (0.0699) 0.0032*** (0.0010) 0.0002*** (0.0001) 6.60e-07* (3.23e-07) -0.0003* (0.0001) 0.0154 (0.0294) 0.0028 (0.0015) 4522 126 0.4619
*p - 0.05 **p - 0.01
***p 5_0.001
A one-unit Kuwaitin 1992). in security increase to alone,equivalent hierarchy to the level of Panama in 1995,reducesdefenseefmovingfromno hierarchy fortby 1.1percent of GDP, or by about43 percent of the meanlevel (basedon model 1). A maximalincrease in securityhierarchy, fromzero to the highest level observedin the samplefor SouthVietnam in 1968,reducesdefenseex5.6 of GDP. Model 3 breaks the aggregate indicator into penditures by percent
its component indices.Boththe coefficients forthe indexof military personnel relative to population andthe indexof independent alliances arenegative; but forthe effectsof the other, controlling only the latteris statistically significant. Thissuggeststhatthe measure of independent alliances has greater explanatory power. Economic is neverstatistically and indeedcarries the hierarchy significant Countries that are to subordinate the United States wrongsign. economically do not enjoylowerdefenseexpenditures. Thismaybe becausemonetary and trade dependencedo not createa sufficiently crediblecommitment by the UnitedStatesfor subordinates to lowertheirdefenseeffortson thesegrounds alone.It may also reflecta reluctance thatare economically deby countries on the United States to become in as well. pendent dependent security policy the measuresmay not be adequately the theoretical Alternatively, capturing construct of economichierarchy. the two component indicesreInterestingly, in model 3 for that,controlling theother, ported carry oppositesigns,implying effectson defenseeffortwithinthe aggregate they areexerting countervailing indicator. Thisrequires further research and testing. In all themodels,the covariates the carry anticipated sign andaregenerally for levels of and economic hierarstatistically significant. Accounting security external and threats wealth lead to levels of defense effort, chy,greater higher and democracy leads to lowerlevels of effort. To checkfor robustness, I also includedcontrols for possiblyconfounding factors not predicted In results not here,dummyvariables by theory. reported forthe ColdWar location in theMiddleEast,and period(1950-91), geographic in the of the Petroleum in the Countries membership Organization Exporting Middle East were all positively relatedto defense effort and statistically In addition,a dummy variablefor membership in the Warsaw significant. a dummyvariable forthepresence of an ongoingcivilwar,anda measPact,54 ureof the similarity of a country's with thatof the UnitedStates votingrecord in the UnitedNationsGeneral wereall positivebut not significant. Assembly None of theseadditional effecton controls, however,exertedany substantial the size and significance of the securityhierarchy measures.
54. Giventhe availability of dataon hierarchy the testhereis biased onlyforthe UnitedStates, a significant effect of hierarchy on defense Itis likelythata number effort. of counagainst finding triescodedas whollyanarchic subordinate to someotherstate.If suchstatesenjoy are,rather, lowerlevelsof defenseeffort, as predicted, thenidentifying the effectof UnitedStates hierarchy willbe harder. Theunmeasured subordination of theseother countries in essence, anomitcreates, tedvariables biasthatis expected to reduce themagnitude of theestimated effects of United States Themostlikelyalternative set of hierarchical in theperiod examined here hierarchy. relationships
is the Soviet Union's informal empire over much of Eastern Europe, which I attempt to capture by including membership in the Warsaw Pact. This is, of course, a blunt measure.
A finalset of testsexamines the relationship betweenhierarchy and defense for alternative indicators of coercivecapabilities. effort,controlling Only the resultsfor overallCINCscoresarereported here(see model4), but thosefor are similar. othermeasuresof capabilities Theseresultsdemonstrate clearly measures of coercive are forlevelsof hierarchy, that,controlling capability not related to defense effort.55 Countries with systematically largerCINCscores do not spendsignificantly moreor less on defenseas a shareof GDPthanothwith largereconomies, or as measured ers,nor do major by powers countries do less GDP.Morepopulouscountries expend significantly defense effort, while states with largernumbersof personnelin the militaryspend sigtheseresultscontradict more.Interestingly, of collective nificantly expectations thatsmallerstateswill freerideon the effortsof actiontheory, whichpredicts should do not)beara disproportionately which (but states, apparently larger the collective defense burden.56 share of large for coercivecapabilities does not significantly Most important, controlling on defense effort. As seenin Table alterthe effectof security 1, there hierarchy betweenGDPand CINCscores,on the one is a smallbut positivecorrelation of security on the other. for Yet,controlling hand,and the measures hierarchy, not the effect of does central on coercive change hierarchy capabilities security on the indexof securityhierarchy in models1 defenseeffort.Thecoefficients of is that the effect and4 arenearlyidentical, demonstrating security hierarchy not spuriousor producedby some processrelatedto overallinternational as traditionally conceived. "power" the hypothesis thathierarchy Theseresultsgenerally leadsto lower support to the in security of effort. Countries subordinate United States levels defense as a proportion of nationalincome. affairsenjoylower defenseexpenditures not to lower defenseeffort. Economic though, appears produce Why hierarchy, effect of security hiso further the thisis requires Overall, strong investigation. erarchy implies that statesdo not rely on self-helpor balanceagainsttheir for protection, or at dominantprotectors. Rather, they trade subordination burdens and leasttakeadvantage of theirsubordination to lowertheirmilitary
55. Thismodelis, admittedly, notdesigned as a testof coercive on defense effort. Most capability forcoercive arenotlikelyto be the sameas forsecurity and the covariates important, capability thatcoercive Before haveno effecton defenseeffort, economic concluding capabilities hierarchy. forthosevariables withbothcoercive andcontrol thatcorrelate onewouldwantto identify capaanddefenseeffort. bilities "AnEconomic Review 56. Mancur of Alliances," Olsonand Richard Zeckhauser, of EcoTheory "NATO Burnomics andStatistics, Vol.48,No. 3 (August andSandler, 1966), pp. 266-279; Hartley "ATheoretical andEmpirical C. Murdoch andJames andToddSandler, Studyof den-Sharing"; Vol.26,No. 2 (June Resolution, 1982), NATO," Journal pp. 237-263. of Conflict
fortheirdefenseon the dominant state.Statesdo not give placeresponsibility of but the their material benefitsof subordinaup sovereignty lightly, course, tion canbe substantial. Conclusion Toacceptthathierarchy existswithinthe international systemis not to negate known aboutworld politics.As the empirical everything analysissuggests, statesmay still respondto and adjusttheirdefenseeffortsto the threats they confront. in theirmoreanarchic Greatpowersmay still engagein realpolitik witheachother. Butuncovering the international relations hierarchies now ignoredby international relationstheoryrevealsan alternate, more complex, worldthat,as the empirical andless thanuniquepolitical resultsdemonstrate, affectsnational behavior whetherscholars chooseto acknowledge it or not. into theories of will international relations Reintegrating hierarchy prompt A next step significant agendaof scholars. changesin the collectiveresearch should be to documentotherbehavioral of international hierimplications Defense effort is one of central to realist and other archy. key policy, course, of theories international relations.Furthertheorizingand security-oriented for thathierarchy empirical analysesmay suggest, instance, produceshigher ratesof economic is growth,as well as longertenuresfor leaders.Hierarchy also likely to affectthe policiesand behaviorof dominantstates.Futureresearchshouldfocus on if and how dominant statesproducesocialorderfor theirsubordinates, how theydiscipline subordinates thatdefectfromthe rules of thatsocialorder, commitnot to abusethe authority and how they credibly conferred on themby subordinates. to the extentthathierarchy exerts Finally, will need to consider effectson statebehavior, futureresearch how important the numberand extentof international hierarchies affectthe natureand dynamicsof the international systemas a whole. Moregenerally, haslongbeenunderstood as the distinguishing feaanarchy Eventhoughin recent tureof international relations. scholars have chalyears lenged the separationof domesticand international politics,anarchyhas in remainedcentralto the latter.57 international relationsfurther Hierarchy erodesthe supposeddifferences betweendomesticand international politics.
57. David A. Lake and Robert Powell, eds., Strategic Choiceand InternationalRelations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Helen V. Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations: A Critique," Review of InternationalStudies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (March 1991), pp. 6785.
institutions such as Justas scholarsnow acceptthatanarchic, self-governing the UnitedStatesCongress existin the domesticarena, so mayhierarchic, authoritative such as that between the United States and relationships Germany or Japanexistin the international realm.Rather thanseparating analysisinto autonomous would be betterservedby arraying spheres,our understanding different sets of political issue institutions, areas,and historical periodsalong of moreor less politicalhierarchy. continua A focuson hierarchy alsoraisesa hostof new questions forinternational relationsresearch. If it does not arisefromformal-legal wheredoes institutions, 'come from'? What makes a state's command in one authoritative authority but in coercive another? Both the dominant state's context, purely abilityto socialorderto its subordinates and the prevailing ideas providea beneficial and normson appropriate actionare likely to matter, but in different times, Thisarticlehas soughtto open up a rolefor authority in places,and ways.58 international relations without its ultimate sources. But to theory prejudging the extentthathierarchy in international matters it new atrelations, prompts tentionto the originsand natureof legitimate actionbetweenstates. Finally,a focus on hierarchy promisesnew insightsinto currentinternationalpoliticsand,especially, the roleof the UnitedStatesin the worldtoday. ThattheUnitedStates dominates theglobalsystemlikenonebefore is oftenrebut little understood. talk of various forms of soft peated Analysts powerbelieved to enhancethe abilityof the United Statesto accomplish its aims.59 Someevenspeakof theinternational the (or not) legitimacy enjoyed by United States,even thoughthis traitcanhavebut smallimportin the realisttheories thatofteninformtheseanalyses.60 Few recognize or acknowledge the authorconstructed and exercised ity self-consciously by the UnitedStates,first,over LatinAmerica in the earlytwentieth thenoverits Western alliesdurcentury, the Cold and now over broad areas of the War, ing globe.61 theworldis witnessing a backlash the of the United Today against authority
58. See Ian Hurd, 'Legitimacy and Authorityin International Relations,' International OrganizaandPowerPolition,Vol. 53, No. 2 (Spring1999),pp. 379-408;and Mlada Bukovansky, Legitimacy
tics: The American and French Revolutions in InternationalPolitical Culture (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 59. Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World'sOnly SuperpowerCan't Go It
University Press, 2002).
Alone(New York:Oxford University Press,2002).
W.W.Norton, 2005), pp. 229-232. 61. An importantexceptionis G. JohnIkenberry, and Institutions, Restraint, AfterVictory: Strategic theRebuilding (Princeton, N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,2001).See also of Order afterMajorWars RobertW. Tuckerand David C. Hendrickson,'The Sourcesof AmericanLegitimacy,'Foreign Affairs,Vol. 83, No. 6 (November/December2004),pp. 18-32.
60. See Stephen M. Walt, TamingAmerican Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy (New York:
the United the rightto changethe regimein Baghdad, States.In demanding in to the war forced and was its authority Statesoverstepped Iraqwithfight out the legitimacyprovidedby broadinternational support.In the Islamic andpossiblydenythe worldandbeyond,growingnumbers resent, challenge, to a relational of U.S.actionsin theMiddleEast.Central conception legitimacy is the insightthatrulerestson the consentof the ruled.If current of authority reacha criticalmass, the international resentments authorityof the United of theEastEuropean Statesmightevaporate overnight-muchas theauthority in 1989.At the same dissent in face of mass the dissolved simply governments of PresidentGeorge W. Bush, seeing the world time, the administration hasshiftedU.S.foreign Hobbesian lenses, policyawayfroma reliance through criesof a on to one increasingly on authority provoking dependent coercion, in the introducand a debateon a new empire,referenced new imperialism States over the last the United createdand nurtured tion. The hierarchies by forboth in and havebeena sourceof orderand, turn,peace prosperity century on the legitimacy states.Yet,dependent the UnitedStatesand its subordinate is a conferred easily abused. hierarchy fragilerelationship, by subordinates, in theinternational androleof authority thenature Wefailto recognize system at our peril.

Escape From The State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Escape From The State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics Author(s): David A.

in Authorityand Hierarchy WorldPolitics

A. Riker, andSanjeev andKathryn Press, 1998); Sikkink, eds.,RestrucJames Khagram, University

International 32:1 48 Security

Escape fromthe Stateof Nature 49

International 32:1 50 Security

Politics PoliticalAuthorityin World

Escape fromthe Stateof Nature 51

15. Ibid., p. 118.

14. Waltz, Theoryof InternationalPolitics, p. 88.

International 32:1 52 Security

Escape fromthe Stateof Nature 53

International 32:1 54 Security

Escape fromthe Stateof Nature 55

Escape fromthe Stateof Nature 57

International 32:1 58 Security

Escape fromtheState of Nature 59

Figure 1. Two Dimensions Economic Hierarchy

informal empire Economic Zone

Market Exchange Anarchy Diplomacy Security Hierarchy Sphere of Influence Protectorate

Escape fromthe Stateof Nature 61

International 32:1 62 Security

fromthe Stateof Nature 63 Escape

Escape fromthe Stateof Nature 65

Figure 2. Economic and Security Hierarchy, 1965

Federal Republic of Germany

Economic 0.4 of Index

Indexof Security Hierarchy

fromthe Stateof Nature 67 Escape

Escape fromthe Stateof Nature 69

International 32:1 70 Security

11. and 10.

1.0 0.14 0.54

8. Economic 7. Hierarchy, 1.0 0.01 6. Security of 5.

1.0 0.72 0.57 0.93

0.06 0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.08

0.22 underlined): underlined): font font):

1.0 0.15 0.91 0.03

0.03 0.03 -0.04 -0.07 -

(italics (regular (regular 0.53

1.0 0.22 0.32 0.32

0.21 0.18 0.11 -0.03 -0.03

1.0 0.20 0.58 0.05 0.00 0.04

Escape fromthe Stateof Nature 71

International 32:1 72 Security

Escape fromthe Stateof Nature 73

International 32:1 74 Security

*p - 0.05 **p - 0.01

Escape fromthe Stateof Nature 75

International 32:1 76 Security

Escape fromthe Stateof Nature 77

International 32:1 78 Security

University Press, 2002).

Alone(New York:Oxford University Press,2002).

Escape fromthe Stateof Nature 79

You might also like