2005nr19 24 - Cons2poli Doublejeopardy

Narratives
Constitutional Law II
Michael Vernon Guerrero Mendiola 2005 Shared under Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 Philippines license.
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Table of Contents
People vs. Obsania [GR L-24447, 29 June 1968] 1 Melo vs. People [GR L-3580, 22 March 1950] 2 People vs. Yorac [GR L-29270, 23 November 1971] 3 People vs. Bocar [GR L-27935, 16 August 1985] 3 Galman vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 72670, 12 September 1986] 4 Flores vs. Ponce Enrile [GR L-38440, 20 July 1982] 6 Heirs of Tito Rillorta vs. Firme [GR L-54904, 29 January 1988] 7 People vs. Relova [GR L-45129, 6 March 1987] 8 Perez vs. Court of Appeals [GR 80838, 29 November 1988] 10 People vs. City Court of Manila [GR L-36528, 24 Septembe 1987] 11 Cruz vs. Ponce-Enrile [GR L-75983, 15 April 1988] 12 Tan vs. Barrios [GRs 85481-82, 18 October 1990] 13 People vs. Grospe [GRs L-74053-54, 20 January 1988] 15 People vs. Santiago [GR 80778, 20 June 1989] 16 Que vs. Cosico [GR 81861, 8 September 1989] 17 Caes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [GRs 74989-90, 6 November 1989] 18 Nierras vs. Dacuycuy [GRs 59568-76, 11 January 1990] 19 Icasiano vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 95642, 28 May 1992] 20 People vs. Milflores [GRs L-32144-45, 30 July 1982] 21 People vs. Vergara [GR 101557-5, 28 April 1993] 22 People vs. Tiozon [GR 89823, 19 June 1991] 23 People vs. Villarama [GR 99287, 23 June 1992] 24 Tupaz vs. Ulep [GR 127777, 1 October 1999] ... 26 People vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 140633, 4 February 2002] 27
This collection contains twenty four (24) cases summarized in this format by Michael Vernon M. Guerrero (as a senior law student) during the First Semester, school year 2005-2006 in the Political Law Review class under Dean Mariano Magsalin Jr. at the Arellano University School of Law (AUSL). Compiled as PDF, September 2012. Berne Guerrero entered AUSL in June 2002 and eventually graduated from AUSL in 2006. He passed the Philippine bar examinations immediately after (April 2007).
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Narratives (Berne Guerrero)
374 People vs. Obsania [GR L-24447, 29 June 1968] En Banc, Castro (J): 8 concur Facts: On 22 November 1964, barely a day after the occurrence of the alleged crime, Erlinda Dollente, the 14-year old victim, and her parents, Ciriaco Dollente and Carmelita Lureta, filed in the municipal court of Balungao, Pangasinan a complaint for rape with robbery, alleging "That on or about 21st day of November 1964, at around 2:00 to 3:00 in the afternoon, particularly in sitio Cawakalan, barrio of Capulaan municipality of Balungao, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused Willy Obsania, armed with a dagger, by means of violence and intimidation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did then and there have carnal knowledge of the complainant Erlinda Dollente, against her will and on the roadside in the ricefields at the abovementioned place while she was alone on her way to barrio San Raymundo." After the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for further proceedings, the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for rape against the accused, embodying the allegations of the complaint, with an additional averment that the offense was committed "with lewd designs". Obsania pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith with his counsel moved for the dismissal of the case contending that the complaint was fatally defective for failure to allege "lewd designs" and that the subsequent information filed by the fiscal which averred "lewd designs" did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity. On 8 January 1965, the trial court granted the motion and ordered dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure of the complaint filed by the offended party to allege that the acts committed by the accused were with 'lewd designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the case." From this order, the fiscal appealed. Issue: Whether the appeal of the Government constitutes double jeopardy. Held: An appeal by the prosecution in a criminal case is not available if the defendant would thereby be placed in double jeopardy. Correlatively, Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that "When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information." In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. The complaint filed with the municipal court in the present case was valid; the trial court was a competent tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the case; the record shows that the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. The particular aspect of double jeopardy, i.e. dismissal or termination of the original case without the express consent of the defendant, has evoked varied and apparently conflicting rulings from the Supreme Court. In People vs. Salico (1949), the Court held that "When the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; because, his action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him." The Salico doctrine was adhered to and affirmed in People vs. Marapao (85 Phil 832, 30 March 1950), Gandicela vs. Lutero (88 Phil 299, 5 March 1951), People vs. Pinuela, et al. (91 Phil 53, 28 March 1952), Co Te Hue vs. Encarnacion (94 Phil 258, 26 January 1954), and People vs. Desalisa (GR L-15516, 17 December 1966). On the other hand, the doctrine of estoppel in relation to the plea of double jeopardy was first enunciated in Acierto which held that when the trial court dismisses a case on a disclaimer of jurisdiction, upon the instigation of the accused, the latter is estopped on appeal from asserting the jurisdiction of the lower court in support of his plea of second jeopardy. The doctrine of estoppel is in quintessence the same as the doctrine of waiver: the thrust of both is that a dismissal, other than on the merits,
Constitutional Law II, 2005 ( 1 )
sought by the accused in a motion to dismiss, is deemed to be with his express consent and bars him from subsequently interposing the defense of double jeopardy on appeal or in a new prosecution for the same offense. The Acierto ruling was reiterated in People vs. Amada Reyes, et al., (96 Phil 927, 30 April 1955); People vs. Reyes, et al., (98 Phil 646, 23 March 1956); People vs. Casiano (GR L-15309, 16 February 1961), and People vs. Archilla (GR L-15632, 28 February 1961). The case of Bangalao, Ferrer, and Labatete, did not actually abandon the doctrine of waiver in Salico (and not one of the said cases even implied the slightest departure from the doctrine of estoppel established in Acierto). In Diaz, Abao, Tacneng and Robles, like in Cloribel, the dismissals therein, all sought by the defendants, were considered acquittals because they were all predicated on the right of a defendant to a speedy trial and on the failure of the Government to prosecute. Therefore, even if such dismissals were induced by the accused, the doctrines of waiver and estoppel were obviously inapplicable for these doctrines presuppose a dismissal not amounting to an acquittal. Here, the controverted dismissal was predicated on the erroneous contention of the accused that the complaint was defective and such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the trial court, and not on the right of the accused to a speedy trial and the failure of the Government to prosecute. The appealed order of dismissal in the present case did not terminate the action on the merits. The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine qua non conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the defendant personally or through his counsel; and second, such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal. Indubitably, the present case falls squarely within the periphery of the said doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of our jurisprudence. The case was remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law. 375 Melo vs. People [GR L-3580, 22 March 1950] Second Division, Moran (CJ): 6 concur Facts: Conrado Melo was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, on 27 December 1949, with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different parts of the body, requiring medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the same period of time. On 29 December 1949, at 8:00 a.m., Melo pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, and at 10:15 p.m. of the same day Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds. Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only on 3 January 1950, and on the following day, 4 January 1950, an amended information was filed charging Melo with consummated homicide. Melo filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy, motion that was denied by the court. Melo filed the petition for prohibition to enjoin the court from further entertaining the amended information. Issue: Whether the second information, filed after the death of the victim, violates the accuseds right against double jeopardy. Held: Rule 106, section 13, 2d paragraph, provides that "If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial." Under this provision, it was proper for the court to dismiss the first information and order the filing of a new one for the reason that the proper offense was not charged in the former and the latter did not place the accused in a second jeopardy for the same or identical offense. There is identity between two offenses not only when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information. This rule of identity does not apply, however, when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Further, when a person who has already suffered his penalty for an offense, is charged with a new
and greater offense, said penalty may be credited to him in case of conviction for the second offense. 376 People vs. Yorac [GR L-29270, 23 November 1971] En Banc, Fernando (J): 8 concur, 1 took no part Facts: Rodrigo Yorac was charged with slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod, the offended party being a certain Lam Hock who, according to the medical certificate issued in 10 April 1968 by a Dr. Rogelio Zulueta, a resident physician of the Occidental Negros Provincial Hospital, was confined "since 8 April 1968 up to the present time for head injury." Then came a plea of guilty by Yorac on 16 April 1968 resulting in his being penalized to suffer 10 days of arresto menor. He started serving his sentence forthwith. On 18 April 1968, the provincial fiscal filed an information, this time in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, charging Yorac with frustrated murder arising from the same act against Lam Hock upon another medical certificate dated 17 April 1968 issued by the same Dr. Zulueta. The later information for frustrated murder was based on a second medical certificate after the lapse of one week from the former previously given by the same physician who, apparently, was much more thorough the second time, to the effect that the victim did suffer a greater injury than was at first ascertained. The lower court, presided by the Honorable Judge Nestor B. Alampay, considering that there was no supervening fact that would negate the defense of double jeopardy, sustained the motion to quash (filed on 10 June 1968) in an order of 21 June 1968. The People appealed. Issue: Whether the new medical findings warrant the filing of the new information against the accused, without violating the rule against double jeopardy. Held: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." A defendant in a criminal case should be adjudged either guilty or not guilty and thereafter left alone in peace, in the latter case the State being precluded from taking an appeal. It is in that sense that the right against being twice put in jeopardy is considered as possessing many features in common with the rule of finality in civil cases. For the accused is given assurance that the matter is closed, enabling him to plan his future accordingly, protecting him from continued distress, not to mention saving both him and the state from the expenses incident to redundant litigation. There is likewise the observation that this constitutional guarantee helps to equalize the adversary capabilities of two grossly mismatched litigants, a poor and impecunious defendant hardly in a position to keep on shouldering the costs of a suit. As ruled in Melo vs. People, the rule of identity does not apply "when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent." Stated differently, if after the first prosecution "a new fact supervenes" on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, "the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense." There is then the indispensable requirement of the existence of "a new fact [which] supervenes for which the defendant is responsible" changing the character of the crime imputed to him and together with the facts existing previously constituting a new and distinct offense. Herein, if the X-ray examination discloses the existence of a fracture on 17 January 1957, that fracture must have existed when the first examination was made on 10 December 1956. There is, therefore, no new or supervening fact that could be said to have developed or arisen since the filing of the original action. The new finding of fracture, which evidently lengthened the period of healing of the wound, to the very superficial and inconclusive examination made on 10 December 1956. Had an X-ray examination been taken at the time, the fracture would have certainly been disclosed. The wound causing the delay in healing was already in existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay was caused by the very superficial examination then made. No supervening fact had occurred which justifies the application of the rule in the case of Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong, for which reason the general rule of double jeopardy should be applied. 377 People vs. Bocar [GR L-27935, 16 August 1985]
Second Division, Makasiar (J): 5 concur, 1 on leave Facts: On 28 March 1967, the assistant fiscal (Carlos Galman Cruz) for Manila filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila (now Regional Trial Court) an information against Cesar S. Urbino, Jose Gigante and Serapion Claudio of the crime of theft, committed as "That on or about October 1, 1965, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together with three others whose true names, identities and whereabouts are still unknown, and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away the following property, to wit: Six (6) pieces of dao Veneer 1 Grade Exportable round logs, valued at P7,104.62 all valued at P7,104.62 belonging to one JUAN B. BAEZ, JR. to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid sum of P7,104.62, Philippine currency. Contrary to law." On 3 May 1967, the three accused, upon arraignment, pleaded "not guilty." Proceedings were had on 7 July 1967. On said date, Judge Juan L. Bocar (Branch XVI) conducted a "summary investigation" directing questions to the complainant as well as to the accused. At the end of the "investigation, " the Judge issued the order dismissing the case, holding that the case is more civil than criminal. On 12 July 1967, the City Fiscal's Office received a copy of the lower court's order dated 7 July 1967. On 18 July 1967, the private prosecutors in the case filed a "motion for reconsideration"; and on 8 August 1967, the City Fiscal's Office joined the private prosecutors in their motion for reconsideration. On 9 August 1967, the Court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration. A copy of said order was received by the City Fiscal's Office on 11 August 1967. Hence, the special civil action for certiorari seeking the annulment of the CFI order of 7 July 1967. Issue: Whether the Judge's dismissal order dated 7 July 1967 constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. Held: The parties were not placed under oath before they answered the queries of the the Judge. Verily, no evidence in law had as yet been entered into the records of the case before the Court. The Court's issuance of the questioned dismissal order was arbitrary, whimsical and capricious, a veritable abuse of discretion which the Supreme Court cannot permit. Thus, the Judge's dismissal order dated 7 July 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction, the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy. The constitutional guarantee is that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The Rules of Court clarifies the guarantee as "Former conviction or acquittal or former jeopardy. When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information." Thus, apparently, to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy. 378 Galman vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 72670, 12 September 1986] Resolution En Banc, Teehankee (CJ): 4 concur, 3 took no part, 1 concurs in separate opinion to which 1 joined
Facts: On 21 August 1983, Benigno S. Aquino Jr. was killed while being escorted by soldiers from his plane at the Manila International Airport. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman, although he was the personal friend of Col. Arturo Custodio who picked him up from his house on 17 August 1983) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. The military later filmed a re-enactment of the killing scripted according to this version and continuously replayed it on all TV channels as if it were taken live on the spot. President Marcos instantly accepted the military version and repeated it in a nationally televised press conference that he gave late in the evening of 22 August 1983. President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate the killing of Aquino. After two false starts, he finally constituted the Board on 22 October 1983 which held 125 hearing days commencing 3 November 1983 (including 3 hearings in Tokyo and 8 hearings in Los Angeles, California) and heard the testimonies of 194 witnesses recorded in 20,377 pages of transcripts, until the submission of their minority and majority reports to the President on October 23 and 24, 1984. Both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version as propounded by the chief investigator, Maj. Gen. Prospero A. Olivas, that Rolando Galman was the NPA-hired assassin. It opines that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. The only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the 26 respondents headed by then AFP Chief General Fabian C. Ver involved in the military conspiracy and therefore "indictable for the premeditated killing of Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at the MIA on August 21, 1983;" while the chairman's minority report would exclude 19 of them and limit as plotters "the 6 persons who were on the service stairs while Senator Aquino was descending" and "General Luther Custodio because the criminal plot could not have been planned and implemented without his intervention." On 11 November 1985 Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman, mother and son, respectively, of the late Rolando Galman, and 29 other petitioners, composed of 3 former Justices of the Supreme Court, 5 incumbent and former university presidents, a former AFP Chief of Staff, outstanding members of the Philippine Bar and solid citizens of the community, filed the present action alleging that Tanodbayan and Sandiganbayan committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. They prayed for the immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) restraining the Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision on the merits in the pending criminal cases which it had scheduled on 20 November 1985 and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial and nullifying the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor. At the hearing on 18 November 1985 of Galman, et. al.'s prayer for issuance of a TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by 9-to-2 votes to issue the restraining order prayed for. But 10 days later on 28 November 1985, the Court by the same 9-to-2-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the temporary restraining order issued 10 days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. On 29 November 1985, Galman, et. al. filed a motion for reconsideration. On 20 March 1986, Galman, et. al. filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration attached therewith. The thrust of the second motion for reconsideration was the startling and therefore unknown revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera that President Marcos had ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez and the prosecution panel headed by Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 accused and produce a verdict of acquittal. On 3 April 1986, the Court granted the motion to admit the second motion for reconsideration and ordered the respondents to comment thereon. The accused opposed the second motion for reconsideration and prayed for its denial. As a whole, all the other respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, and invoked that the issues had become moot and academic because of the rendition of the Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all accused on 2 December 1985, with counsels for Ver and Tigas, as well as Olivas, further arguing that assuming that the judgment of acquittal is void for any reason, the remedy is a direct action to annul the judgment where the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff to establish by clear, competent and convincing evidence the cause of the nullity. Issue: Whether the acquittal of the 26 accused during Marcos time bars subsequent prosecution, on account
of new evidence that the proceedings leading to said acquittal was rigged. Held: President Marcos misused the overwhelming resources of the government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. As graphically depicted in the Report, and borne out by the happenings (res ipsa loquitura), since the resolution prepared by his "Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his Presidential Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases against all accused was unpalatable (it would summon the demonstrators back to the streets) and at any rate was not acceptable to the Herrera prosecution panel, the unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused after the rigged trial as ordered at the Malacaang conference, would accomplish the two principal objectives of satisfaction of the public clamor for the suspected killers to be charged in court and of giving them through their acquittal the legal shield of double jeopardy.The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified; and declared the sham trial a mock trial and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal was unlawful and void ab initio. It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due process. The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. Any judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it exhibits its head. Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. More so does the rule against the invoking of double jeopardy hold in the present cases where the sham trial was but a mock trial where the authoritarian president ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan to rig the trial and closely monitored the entire proceedings to assure the predetermined final outcome of acquittal and total absolution as innocent of all the accused. Manifestly, the prosecution and the sovereign people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the present case is a void judgment. Therefore, no double jeopardy attaches. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. 379 Flores vs. Ponce Enrile [GR L-38440, 20 July 1982] En Banc, Concepcion Jr. (J): 9 concur, 2 concur in result, 2 reserve votes, 1 took no part Facts: On 19 October 1973, Capt. Rodolfo Magpantay alias "Honorato D. Castro", alias "Rolando Moreno", alias "Norberto de Ramos"; Corazon R. Serrano, and Atty/ Domingo V. Flores, Jr., and two other "John Does" were charged before the Military Commission No. 13 with estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and falsification of commercial documents (Criminal Case MC 13-2). Flores and his co-accused were arraigned on 25 October 1973 and all pleaded not guilty. The case was thereafter set for trial. The presentation of evidence for the prosecution which started on 25 October 1973 was concluded on 24 January 1974, and the reception of the evidence for the defendants was set for March 26 and 27, 1974. On 25 March 1974, however, the Secretary of National Defense, in a memorandum to the Judge Advocate General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, directed the withdrawal of the charges against Capt. Rodolfo V. Magpantay, et al., from Military Commission No. 13. The next day, the day scheduled for the reception of the evidence for the defendants, counsel for Magpantay handed to the Commission the memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense and the letter of the Judge Advocate General, directing the withdrawal of the case from the Commission. The prosecution deplored the withdrawal of the case, claiming that they have proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but the Military Commission held itself to be without discretion on the
matter. On 28 March 1974, however, the Secretary of National Defense, after a full consideration of all the aspects of the case, withdrew his previous order and directed the Commission forthwith to proceed with the trial of the accused. Pursuant thereto, the Military Commission scheduled the continuation of the trial and reception of the evidence for the defendants to 1 April 1974. Pleading double jeopardy, in that the "Withdrawal Order of the Honorable Secretary of the Department of National Defense dated 25 March 1974 operates as an acquittal of the accused Flores and a revocation and reinstatement of the case against the Domingo V. Flores, Jr. constitutes 'double jeopardy", Flores moved to quash the case against him, but the Military Commission denied his petition to quash. Flores filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. The other accused, Capt. Rodolfo Magpantay, upon the other hand, started presenting his evidence on 2 April 1974. But, the proceedings were suspended upon the filing of the instant petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the constitutional mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense was violated when the Secretary of National Defense withdrew his previous memorandum and directed that further proceedings be had in the case. Held: The rule on double jeopardy is contained in Article IV, Section 22 of the 1973 Constitution which provides that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." It is restated in Article 39 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as "No person shall, without his consent, be tried a second time for the same offense; but no proceeding in which an accused has been found guilty by a court-martial upon any charge or specification shall be held to be a trial in the sense of this article until the reviewing and, if there be one, the confirming authority shall have taken final action upon the case"; and in Section 70-C of the Manual on Courts Martial which reads "One who in a competent court has been convicted, acquitted or put in jeopardy in respect to a real or supposed crime, cannot be further or again pursued for it, unless he waives his right to rely on this immunity." For double jeopardy to exist, it is essential that the first judgment of conviction or acquittal or dismissal is final; otherwise, there is no judgment of conviction or acquittal to speak of, and, therefore, the accused can not claim double jeopardy. Herein, Flores cannot invoke double jeopardy because the order of the Military Commission 13, terminating the hearing on 26 March 1974 pursuant to the Memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense to the Judge Advocate General and of the letter of the latter to the Commission, is not a final order of acquittal or dismissal. Under military law, a decision of a military tribunal, be it of acquittal or conviction, or dismissal, is merely recommendatory and subject to review by the convening authority, the review boards, and the reviewing authority. It is apparent that in the administration of justice by the military, a military commission acts merely as a commissioner who takes the evidence and reports thereon to the convening and reviewing authorities with his recommendation. While the Military Commission 13 may have ordered the termination of the hearing of Criminal Case MC 13-2, pursuant to the Memorandum of the Secretary of National Defense to the Judge Advocate General, and the letter of the latter to the Military Commission 13, directing the withdrawal of the charges against Capt. Rodolfo Magpantay and his co-accused, the order has none of the attributes of a final judgment since it was not passed upon by the convening and reviewing authorities and confirmed by the President. Although jeopardy had attached, it has not yet terminated. Being so, the constitutional mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense was not violated when the Secretary of National Defense withdrew his previous memorandum and directed that further proceedings be had in the case, as the action of the Secretary of National Defense is but a continuation of the proceedings. The constitutional mandate against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense is to protect the accused from going through a trial a second time. But, since the first proceedings has not yet been terminated, there is no second proceeding to speak of, and, therefore, no double jeopardy. 380 Heirs of Tito Rillorta vs. Firme [GR L-54904, 29 January 1988] First Division, Cruz (J): 4 concur Facts: Accused of killing Tito Rillorta, Andrew Costales, was held guilty only of less serious physical injuries
and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500.00. The trial court said the defendant could not be held liable for homicide because the wound inflicted on the victim was only superficial. The certified cause of death was pneumonia, and this was obviously induced by the exploratory surgery which was needlessly performed upon him. In short, the victim had succumbed not to the skin-deep wound that did not affect any vital organ but as a result of the attending physician's gross incompetence. The heirs of the deceased did not agree. Through their counsel acting under the direct control and supervision of the provincial fiscal," they filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision notified to them on 23 January 1980. This motion was sent by registered mail on 2 February 1980. It was denied on 28 February 1980, in an order that was communicated to the private prosecutor on 18 March 1980. On 20 March 1980, a notice of appeal was filed with the trial court under the signatures of the prosecuting fiscal and the private prosecutor.After considering the opposition to the notice and the reply thereto, Judge Romeo N. Firme (Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch IV, Bauang, La Union) dismissed the appeal on 14 April 1980, for tardiness. Both the fiscal and the private prosecutor filed separate motions for reconsideration, but these were denied on 12 May 1980. The heirs of Tito Rillorta filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether double jeopardy will attach to a judgment which is allegedly tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Held: Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "the People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy." This provision is based on the old case of Kepner v. United States, where the U.S. Supreme Court, reviewing a decision of the Philippine Supreme Court in 1904, declared by a 5-4 vote that appeal of the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal (or for the purpose of increasing the penalty imposed upon the convict) would place him in double jeopardy. It has been consistently applied since then in this jurisdiction. It need only be stressed that if the government itself cannot appeal, much less then can the offended party or his heirs, who are mainly concerned only with the civil indemnity. The prohibition operates as a "bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information." There is no question that the crime of less serious physical injuries, of which the accused in this case was convicted, is necessarily included in the offense of homicide. The petitioners argue that double jeopardy will not attach because the judgment convicting the accused of less serious physical injuries is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore null and void. This argument is flawed because whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution no matter how obvious the error may be. Infine, thus, however erroneous the order of the respondent court is, and although a miscarriage of justice resulted from said order, such error cannot now be righted because of the timely plea of double jeopardy. 381 People vs. Relova [GR L-45129, 6 March 1987] First Division, Feliciano (J): 5 concur, 1 took no part Facts: On 1 February 1975, members of the Batangas City Police together with personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City, searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by Manuel Opulencia. The police discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had been installed, without the necessary authority from the city government, and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building" owned by Opulencia. These electric devices and contraptions wereallegedly "designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter of the said electric [ice and cold storage] plant." During the subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia admitted in a written statement that he had caused the installation of the electrical devices "in order to lower or decrease the readings of his
electric meter." On 24 November 1975, an Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the City Court of Batangas City an information against Manuel Opulencia for violation of Ordinance 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. A violation of this ordinance was, under its terms, punishable by a fine "ranging from P5.00 to P50.00 or imprisonment, which shall not exceed 30 days, or both, at the discretion of the court." Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the information filed. On 2 February 1976, he filed a motion to dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there charged had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the Batangas City Court to award. In an order dated 6 April 1976, the Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged was a light felony which prescribes 2 months from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing further that the information was filed by the fiscal more than 9 months after discovery of the offense charged in February 1975. 14 days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch II, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Case 266) before the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch II. Before he could be arraigned thereon, Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, dated 5 May 1976, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. By Order dated 16 August 1976, Judge Benjamin Relova granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered the case dismissed. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but was denied by the Judge in an Order dated 18 November 1976. On 1 December 1976, the petition for Certiorari and Mandamus was filed in the Supreme Court by the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City on behalf of the People. Issue: Whether under the information in case 16443, Opulencia could if he failed to plead double jeopardy be convicted of the same act charged in case 16054, in which he has already been acquitted. Held: The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. The Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, section 1, Article III of the Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." The second sentence of said clause provides that "if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." Thus, the first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are based on one and the same act conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under one of the informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case. Thus, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given
rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute. It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be understood with absolute literalness. The identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute identity: the first and second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof. Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harassment of an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical elements. Acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are infused by a common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should not be segmented and sliced, as it were, to produce as many different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find. It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas City Court of the information for violation of the Batangas City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court, an order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. 382 Perez vs. Court of Appeals [GR 80838, 29 November 1988] Third Division, Cortes (J): 4 concur Facts: On 21 October 1974 Yolanda Mendoza filed a criminal complaint against Eleuterio Perez for Consented Abduction (Criminal Case 618) with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch VI. The accused pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued. On 28 June 1980 a judgment of conviction was rendered against Perez. On appeal, and on 29 October 1982, the Court of Appeals reversed, and acquitted Perez of the crime of Consented Abduction. Subsequent to Perez's acquittal, Yolanda Mendoza filed another criminal complaint against Perez on 22 July 1983, this time for Qualified Seduction (as was intimated by the Court of Appeals in Criminal Case 618) with the Municipal Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch VI (Criminal Case 83-8228). Perez filed a motion to quash invoking double jeopardy and waiver and/or estoppel on the part of Mendoza. However, this motion and Perez's motion for reconsideration were denied. Perez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition (GR 68122) questioning the denial of his motions to quash and for reconsideration filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Criminal Case 83-8228. In a resolution of the Second Division dated 8 August 1984, the Supreme Court referred the case to the Intermediate Appellate Court. On 16 December 1985 the Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed the petition, without prejudice to its refiling in the proper Regional Trial Court. Complying with this, Perez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga (Special Civil Case 7623). Upon evaluation of the case, the court dismissed the petition and Perez' motion for reconsideration. Perez filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the filing of an information for Qualified Seduction against Perez after he was acquitted for Consented Abduction constitutes double jeopardy. Held: The rule on double jeopardy is that, "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense" [Article IV, Sec. 22 of the 1973 Constitution, Article III, Sec 21 of the 1987 Constitution.] The term "same offense" means identical offense or any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof or any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. The rule on double jeopardy under the Rules of Court is explicit, i.e. "When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent
by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information." Herein, there is no question that Perez was validly charged with the crime of Consented Abduction before a court of competent jurisdiction. That he had been arraigned and had pleaded not guilty to the charge for which he was subsequently acquitted is likewise undisputed. Although it is true that the two offenses for which Perez was charged arose from the same facts, this does not preclude the filing of another information against him if from those facts, two distinct offenses, each requiring different elements, arose. The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever closely they may appear to be connected in fact. It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offense. A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. Consented Abduction and Qualified Seduction are not identical offenses as would make applicable the rule on double jeopardy. Moreover, the very nature of these two offenses would negate any identity between them. 383 People vs. City Court of Manila [GR L-36528, 24 Septembe 1987] En Banc, Padilla (J): 10 concur, 1 concur with reservation, 1 concurs in separate opinion, 1 on leave Facts: Agapito Gonzales, together with Roberto Pangilinan, was accused of violating Section 7, in relation to Section 11, Republic Act No. 3060 and Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, in two (2) separate informations filed with the City Court of Manila on 4 April 1972. On 7 April 1972, before arraignment in the 2 cases, the City Fiscal amended the information in Criminal Case F-147347 (for violation of Section 7 in relation to Section 11, RA 3060), by alleging that the accused, "conspiring, and confederating together, and mutually helping each other did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously publicly exhibit and cause to he publicly exhibited completed composite prints of motion film, of the 8 mm. size, in color forming visual moving images on the projection screen through the mechanical application of the projection equipment, which motion pictures have never been previously submitted to the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures for preview, examination and censorship, nor duly passed by said Board, in a public place, to wit: at Room 309, De Leon Building, Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue, [Manila]." On the other hand, the information in Criminal Case F-147348 (for violation of Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code) was amended to allege that, on the same date, 16 July 1971, the same accused, "conspiring and confederating together and actually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and publicly exhibit, through the mechanical application of movie projection equipment and the use of projection screen, indecent and immoral motion picture scenes, to wit: motion pictures of the 8 mm. size, in color, depicting and showing scenes of totally naked female and male persons with exposed private parts doing the sex act in various lewd and lascivious positions, among other similarly and equally obscene and morally offensive scenes, in a place open to public view, to wit: at Room 309, De Leon Building Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue, [Manila]." On 31 May 1972, upon arraignment, Gonzales pleaded not guilty to both charges. The other accused Pangilinan, was not arraigned as he was (and he still is) at large. On 26 June 1972, Gonzales filed a motion to quash the informations in the 2 cases, on the ground that said informations did not charge an offense. The motion was denied on 17 July 1972 and the cases were set for trial on 7 August 1972. No hearing was held on 7 August 1972, however, as Gonzales moved for postponement of the trial set on said date and the trial set on 2 other dates. On 15 November 1972, Gonzales moved for permission to withdraw his plea of "not guilty" in Criminal Case F-147348, without however,
substituting or entering another plea. The Court granted the motion and reset the hearing of the cases for 27 December 1972. On 27 December 1972, Gonzales moved to quash the information in Criminal Case F147348 on the ground of double jeopardy, as there was according to him, also pending against him Criminal Case F-147347, for violation of RA 3060, where the information allegedly contains the same allegations as the information in Criminal Case F-147348. In an order dated 20 January 1973, the City Court dismissed the case (Criminal Case F-147348). After the dismissal of Criminal Case F-147348, or on 7 February 1973, in Criminal Case F-147347, Gonzales changed his plea of "not guilty" and entered a plea of "guilty" for violation of RA 3060. He was accordingly sentenced to pay a fine of P600.00. On 10 February 1973, the People filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of 20 January 1973, dismissing Criminal Case F147348. This was however denied by the court in its order dated 16 March 1973, and in its amended order dated 16 March 1973. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari. Issue: Whether the prosecution under RA 3060, and a similar prosecution under Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, constitutes double jeopardy. Held: It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. All these requisites do not exist in this case. The two (2) informations with which the accused was charged, do not make out only one offense. In other words, the offense defined in section 7 of RA 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures does not include or is not included in the offense defined in Article 201(3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing the exhibition of indecent and immoral motion pictures. The two (2) offenses do not constitute a jeopardy to each other. A scrutiny of the 2 laws involved would show that the 2 offenses are different and distinct from each other. The nature of both offenses also shows their essential difference. The crime punished in RA 3060 is a malum prohibitum in which criminal intent need not be proved because it is presumed, while the offense punished in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code is malum in se, in which criminal intent is an indispensable ingredient. Considering these differences in elements and nature, there is no identity of the offenses here involved for which legal jeopardy in one may be invoked in the other. Evidence required to prove one offense is not the same evidence required to prove the other. The defense of double jeopardy cannot prosper. 384 Cruz vs. Ponce-Enrile [GR L-75983, 15 April 1988]; also In RE Habeas Corpus of Usman, et. al. Usman vs. Secretary of National Defense [GR L-79077]; Gloria vs. Chief of Staff (AFP) [GRs L79599-79600]; In RE Habeas Corpus of de la Cruz, de la Cruz vs. Gen. Goyena [GR L-79862]; and Jose vs. Director of Prisons [GR L-80565] First Division, Narvasa (J): 13 concur, 1 filed separate opinion Facts: Habeas corpus proceedings were commenced in the Supreme Court on 1 October 1986 to test the legality of the continued detention of some 217 so-called "political detainees" arrested in the nine-year span of official martial rule and committed to the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa. All had been made to stand trial for common crimes before various courts martial; if any of these offenses had any political color, this had neither been pleaded nor proved. Of the 217 prisoners, 157 are civilians, and only 26 confirmed as military personnel. 115 accused had been condemned to die, 46 were sentenced to life imprisonment, 9 others were meted prison terms of from 20 to 30 years; 41 were given prison terms of 10 to 20 years; and 3 were meted prison terms of less than 10 years. As of the date of filing of the petitions, the sentences of 68 had become final upon their approval by the Office of the President, 75 cases were pending review in either that Office or before the Board of Military Review, while the appeal or review of the remaining 73 cases either had been expressly suspended pending the outcome of these petitions, or are simply not dealt with in the records. Presidential amnesty was granted to Virgilio Alejandrino, yet to this date he remains a prisoner at the
Penitentiary, as do Domingo Reyes, Antonio Pumar, Teodoro Patano, Andres Parado and Daniel Campus, although they were acquitted of the charges against them, and Reynaldo C. Reyes and Rosalino de los Santos, who appear to have fully served the sentences imposed on them by the military commissions which convicted them. The petitioners urge the Court to declare unconstitutional the establishment of all military tribunals as well as General Order 8 ordaining their creation, and the nullity of all the proceedings had against them before these bodies as a result of which they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. Issue: Whether the petitioners cases may be retried without subjecting said accused to double jeopardy. Held: No breach of the constitutional prohibition against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense would result from the retrial of the petitioners' cases, for the simple reason that the absence of jurisdiction of the courts martial to try and convict the petitioners prevented the first jeopardy from attaching. Valid previous proceedings are required in order that the defense of double jeopardy can be raised by the accused in the second prosecution. In fine, the Court holds that the merits of the indictments against all these civilians are solely for the civil courts to weigh and decide upon after due proceedings. Otherwise stated, they are entitled to the retrial they have explicitly requested of their respective cases in the civil courts. 385 Tan vs. Barrios [GRs 85481-82, 18 October 1990] En Banc, Grino-Aquino (J): 12 concur, 1 concurs in separate opinion, 1 took no part Facts: On the basis of Proclamation 1081 dated 21 September 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, thru General Order 8 dated 27 September 1972, authorized the AFP Chief of Staff to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them." In General Order 21 dated 30 September 1972, the military tribunals, "exclusive of the civil courts," were vested with jurisdiction among others, over violations of the law on firearms, and other crimes which were directly related to the quelling of rebellion and the preservation of the safety and security of the Republic. In General Order 12-b dated 7 November 1972, "crimes against persons as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code" were added to the jurisdiction of military tribunals/commissions. Subsequently, General Order 49, dated 11 October 1974, redefined the jurisdiction of the Military Tribunals. The enumeration of offenses cognizable by such tribunals excluded crimes against persons as defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code. However, although civil courts should have exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses not mentioned in Section 1 of GO 49, Section 2 of the same general order provided that "the President may, in the public interest, refer to a Military Tribunal a case falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts" and vice versa. On 17 April 1975, William Tan (@ Go Bon Ho), Joaquin Tan Leh (@ Go Bon Huat, @ Taowie) and Vicente Tan (@ Go Bon Beng, @ Donge), with 12 others (Luis Tan [@ Tata, @ Go Bon Hoc], Ang Tiat Chuan [@ Chuana], Mariano Velez, Jr., Antonio Occaciones, Leopoldo Nicolas, Enrique Labita, Oscar Yaun, Eusebio Tan [@ Go Bon Ping], Alfonso Tan [@ Go Bon Tiak], Go E Kuan [@ Kunga], Marciano Benemerito [@ Marcing, @ Dodong], Manuel Beleta, and John Doe), were arrested and charged in Criminal Case MC-1-67 before the Military Commission 1, for the crimes of: (1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally-possessed firearm, penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section 1, par. 6 of General Order 49, for the killing on 25 August 1973 of Florentino Lim of the wealthy Lim Ket Kai family of Cagayan de Oro City; and (2) unlawful possession, control, and custody of a pistol, caliber .45 SN-1283521 with ammunition, in violation of General Orders 6 and 7 in relation to Presidential Decree 9. Because the case was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan de Oro City, President Marcos, pursuant to the recommendation of Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, withdrew his earlier order to transfer the case to the civil courts. Hence, the case was retained in the military court. All the accused were detained without bail in the PC Stockade in Camp Crame. Upon arraignment on 6 May 1975, all the accused pleaded "not guilty." Manuel Beleta was discharged to be used as a state witness. He was released from detention on 5 May 1975. Almost daily trials were held for more than 13 months. The testimonies of 45 prosecution witnesses and 35 defense witnesses filled up 21 volumes of transcripts consisting of over 10,000 pages. On 10 June 1976, a decision entitled "Findings and Sentence," was promulgated by the Military Commission finding 5 of the accused namely: Luis Tan, Ang Tiat
Chuan, Mariano Velez, Jr., Antonio Occaciones, and Leopoldo Nicolas guilty of murder, where each of them was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from 17 years, 4 months, and 21 days, to 20 years. A sixth accused, Marciano Benemerito, was found guilty of both murder and illegal possession of firearm, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by electrocution. 8 of the accused, namely: Oscar Yaun, Enrique Labita, Eusebio Tan, Alfonso Tan, Go E Kuan, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh, and Vicente Tan were acquitted of the charges, and released on 11 June 1976. On 17 January 1981, Proclamation 2045 ended martial rule and abolished the military tribunals and commissions. On 22 May 1987, the Supreme Court promulgated a decision in Olaguer vs. Military Commission 34, et al. (150 SCRA 144), vacating the sentence rendered on 4 December 1984 by Military Commission 34 against Olaguer, et al. and declaring that military commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians charged with criminal offenses properly cognizable by civil courts, as long as those courts are open and functioning as they did during the period of martial law. In October 1986, 6 habeas corpus petitions were filed in the Supreme Court by some 217 prisoners in the national penitentiary, who had been tried for common crimes and convicted by the military commissions during the 9-year span of official martial rule (G.R. Nos. 75983, 79077,79599-79600, 79862 and 80565 consolidated and entitled Manuel R. Cruz, et al. vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 160 SCRA 700). Conformably with the ruling in Olaguer, the Supreme Court in Cruz vs. Enrile (160 SCRA 700), nullified the proceedings leading to the conviction of non-political detainees who should have been brought before the courts of justice as their offenses were totally unrelated to the insurgency sought to be controlled by martial rule. On 15 September 1988, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoez issued Department Order 226 designating State Prosecutor Hernani Barrios "to collaborate with the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in the investigation/reinvestigation of Criminal Case MC-1-67 and, if the evidence warrants, to prosecute the case in the court of competent jurisdiction." On 15 November 1988, State Prosecutor Hernani T. Barrios was designated Acting City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in lieu of the regular fiscal who inhibited himself. Without conducting an investigation/reinvestigation, Fiscal Barrios filed on 9 December 1988, in the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City two (2) informations for (1) Illegal Possession of Firearm [Criminal Case 88-824]; and (2) Murder [Criminal Case 88-825] against all the 15 original defendants in Criminal Case MC1-67 including those who had already died. Criminal Cases 88-824 and 88-825 of the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City, were assigned by raffle to the sala of RTC Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo. Before issuing warrants for the arrest of the accused, Judge Demecillo issued an order on 26 October 1988, requiring State Prosecutor Barrios to submit certified copies of "the supporting affidavits of the previous cases wherever they are now," and of the Supreme Court order "which is the basis of filing the cases, within 5 days from receipt" of his said order. The State Prosecutor has not complied with that order. On 7 November 1988, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the informations in Criminal Cases 88-824 and 88-825, and the order of Judge dated 26 October 1988 be annulled, among others. Issue: Whether the reprosecution of Tan, et. al. would violate their right to protection against double jeopardy. Held: The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before military tribunals and commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers, is an operative fact that may not be justly ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences which occurred long before the Court's decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against Tan, et. al. and their co-accused before the Military Commission. The principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular case of Tan, et. al., the proceedings were fair, that there were no serious violations of their constitutional right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of the military
commission that heard and decided the charges against them during the period of martial law, had been affirmed by the Supreme Court (Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546) years before the Olaguer case arose and came before the Supreme Court. Because of these established operative facts, the refiling of the information against Tan, et. al. would place them in double jeopardy, in hard fact if not in constitutional logic. The doctrine of double jeopardy protects the accused from harassment by the strong arm of the State: "The constitutional mandate is (thus) a rule of finality. A single prosecution for any offense is all the law allows. It protects an accused from harassment, enables him to treat what had transpired as a closed chapter in his life, either to exult in his freedom or to be resigned to whatever penalty is imposed, and is a bar to unnecessary litigation, in itself time-consuming and expense-producing for the state as well. It has been referred to as 'res judicata in prison grey.' The ordeal of a criminal prosecution is inflicted only once, not whenever it pleases the state to do so." 386 People vs. Grospe [GRs L-74053-54, 20 January 1988] Second Division, Melencio-Herrera (J): 4 concur Facts: Manuel Parulan is an authorized wholesale dealer of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) in Bulacan. On 13 June 1983, Parulan issued Planters Development Bank (Santa Maria, Bulacan Branch) [PDB] Check 19040865 in the sum of P86,071.20 in favor of SMC, which was received by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan. The check was forwarded to the SMC Regional Office at San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was delivered to and received by the SMC Finance Officer, who then deposited the check with the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), San Fernando Branch, which is the SMC depository bank. On 8 July 1983, the SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor of the said check for "insufficiency of funds" from the PDB, the drawee bank in Santa Maria, Bulacan. On 18 June 1983, Parulan likewise issued PDB Check 19040872 in the amount of P11,918.80 in favor of SMC, which was received also by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan, as direct payment for the spot sale of beer. That check was similarly forwarded by the SMC Supervisor to the SMC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was delivered to the Finance Officer thereat and who, in turn, deposited the check with the SMC depository bank in San Fernando, Pampanga. On 8 July 1983, the SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor for "insufficiency of funds" from the drawee bank, the PDB, in Santa Maria, Bulacan. In Criminal Case 2800 of the RTC Pampanga, he was charged with Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22) for having issued a check on 13 June 1983 for P86,071.20 in favor of SMC ([PDB] Check 19040865) but which was dishonored for having been drawn against "insufficient funds" and, in spite of repeated demands, for having failed and refused to make good said check to the damage and prejudice of SMC. In Criminal Case 2813 of the same Court, Parulan was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code for having made out a check on 18 June 1983 in the sum of P11,918.80 in favor of SMC (PDB Check 19040872) in payment of beer he had purchased, but which check was refused payment for "insufficient funds" and, in spite of repeated demands, for having failed and refused to redeem said check to the damage and prejudice of SMC. The two cases were tried jointly, the witnesses for both prosecution and defense being the same for the two suits. The trial court, through the Hon Nathaniel M. Grospe (Presiding Judge, Branch 44, RTC Pampanga) rendered judgment dismissing the cases for lack of jurisdiction, and ordered the cancellation of the bail bond posted by the accused. Hence, the special civil action for certiorari. Issue: Whether the present petition for certiorari places the accused in double jeopardy for the same offense. Held: The dismissal of the subject criminal cases by the Judge, predicated on his lack of jurisdiction, is correctible by Certiorari. The error committed is one of jurisdiction and not an error of judgment on the merits. Well-settled is the rule that questions covering jurisdictional matters may be averred in a petition for certiorari, inclusive of matters of grave abuse of discretion, which are equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction renders whatever order of the Trial Court null and void. The present petition for Certiorari seeking to set aside the void Decision of the Judge does not place the accused in double jeopardy for the same offense. It will be recalled that the questioned judgment was not an adjudication on the merits. It was a
dismissal upon the Judge's erroneous conclusion that his Court had no "territorial jurisdiction" over the cases. Where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the merits, it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case based on the same offense. The dismissal being null and void the proceedings before the Trial Court may not be said to have been lawfully terminated. There is therefore, no second proceeding which would subject the accused to double jeopardy. 387 People vs. Santiago [GR 80778, 20 June 1989] First Division, Gancayco (J): 4 concur Facts: On 2 June 1987 an information for violation of PD 772 was filed by the Assistant City Fiscal of Quezon City, with the approval of the city fiscal, in the RTC of the same city against Segundina Rosario y Sembrano, which reads, among others, "That on or about 16th day of December, 1986, and for sometime prior thereto and persisting up to the present, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the University of the Philippines, the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9462 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in occupying and/or possessing a portion of the said property, by then and there constructing his/her house therein for residential purposes, without the consent and against the will of the said offended party." Upon arraignment, Rosario pleaded not guilty and a pretrial conference was held on 14 August 1987 wherein Rosario informed the court that she has a title, a building permit and survey plan covering the subject land. On 27 October 1978, the decision was rendered by Judge Pedro T. Santiago (Presiding Judge of Branch 101 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City) acquitting the accused of the offense charged with costs de oficio. Hence, the counsel for the private offended party, the University of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari, in behalf of the People of the Philippines. The petition seeks to render null and void the decision for want of due process as the acquittal of the accused was rendered without a trial on the merits. Issue: Whether double jeopardy has set in in this case. Held: The judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering the decision without affording the prosecution the opportunity to have its day in court. The issue before the Court is whether or not the accused built the structure on the land belonging to U.P. At the pretrial, U.P. presented its title and plan showing that the accused built a structure within its property. The accused by her proffer of exhibits and manifestation pretended to have a title to the questioned land. However, as stressed by U.P., the titled property of accused is located in Marikina and not in Quezon City and said title could not cover the very lot in question which is at Pook Amorsolo, U.P. Campus where the structure of accused was built. This issue cannot be determined by a mere examination of the titles and documents submitted by the parties. A trial on the merits should be undertaken to determine once and for all whether the place where the structure was built by the accused belongs to U.P. or to the accused. The conclusion of the trial court that the accused did not build her structure illegally as she has a title to the property in question is without any factual or legal basis. Indeed, the observation of respondent judge in the questioned decision as to "the inadequacy in details of the state's evidence" simply demonstrates that a trial on the merits should have been held to enable the prosecution to establish its case. No doubt, the acquittal of the accused is a nullity for want of due process. The prosecution was not given the opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the representations of the accused. The prosecution is as much entitled to due process as the accused in a criminal case. Hence, double jeopardy cannot be invoked as a bar to another prosecution in this case. There is double jeopardy only when: 1) there is a valid complaint or information; 2) filed before a competent court; 3) to which defendant had pleaded; and 4) of which he has previously been convicted or acquitted or which was dismissed or terminated without his express consent. In fine, the prosecution was deprived of an opportunity to prosecute and prove its case. The decision that was rendered in disregard of such imperative is void for lack of jurisdiction. It was not a court of competent jurisdiction when it precipitately rendered a decision of acquittal after a pre-trial. A trial should follow a pre-trial. That is the mandate of the rules. Obviously, double jeopardy has not set in in this case.
388 Que vs. Cosico [GR 81861, 8 September 1989]; also People vs. Martelino [GR 83114] Third Division, Gutierrez Jr. (J): 3 concur Facts: The information for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents involving the amount of P2,120,511.24 was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch XVI, on 29 November 1985. The case was set for arraignment and pre-trial on 31 March 1986. In a motion for postponement dated 24 March 1986, which was received by the court on 1 April 1986, Atty. Lorenzo E. Coloso, counsel for Bernabe Que and Amelia Que, filed a motion to postpone the arraignment and pre-trial, and prayed that the date be reset to 8 May 1986. On 31 March 1986, Gualberto Devera, Bernabe Que, Amelia Que, Warren Machado and Paz L. Martelino were arraigned while the other accused, namely, Antonio Blancaflor, Wilfredo Azarco, Renato Elauria and Amelita Tutica could not be arraigned because they were still at-large. The court then set a separate trial for some of the accused on 8 May 1986. On that date, Judge Enrique Suplico directed the prosecution to file its written stipulation of facts with respect to the US checks with machine copies of the said documents attached thereto, copy furnished all the defense counsel, within 30 days from 8 May 1986. In turn, the defense counsel were given 10 days from receipt of the stipulation of facts to file their counter proposal or answer. Upon motion of the City Fiscal, the pre-trial was then reset to 26 June 1986. The setting for 26 June 1986 was, however, postponed to 22 July 1986 due to the motion for postponement filed by Atty. Lorenzo Coloso. On 22 July 1986, the City Fiscal submitted his proposals for admission of facts, which was duly received on the same date by the defense counsel. On the same date, the court again directed the prosecution to furnish machine copies of the 489 US treasury warrants to the accused through counsel within 15 days from the said date, after which the defense counsel shall make their counter proposal within 10 days from receipt thereof. In the meantime, the date was reset to September 17 and 18, 1986. On 17 September 1986, the prosecution submitted supplemental proposals for admission of facts. The hearing of September 18, 1986 was reset to November 10, and 11, 1986 upon request of the prosecution and without objection on the part of the defense counsel as the prosecution witnesses were in Manila. On 10 November 1986, Judge Enrique P. Suplico issued the order dismissing the case, in light of the accused's constitutional rights to speedy trial. On 21 November 1986, the prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration from the order of dismissal. In the meantime, the case was re-raffled to Judge Rodrigo Cosico, as the former judge was not reappointed after the reorganization of the judiciary. Judge Cosico in an order dated 22 May 1987, granted the prosecution's motion for reconsideration and caused the case to be reopened. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by the defense was denied in an order dated 27 November 1987. On 17 December 1987, Paz Martelino filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari praying that the order of Judge Cosico reinstating the case be declared null and void on the ground of double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals, in its decision dated 22 April 1988, found merit in the petition and set aside Judge Cosico's order. The People of the Philippines filed the petition to review on certiorari (GR 83114) the decision of the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, Bernabe Que and Amelia Que filed a petition for certiorari directly with the Supreme Court seeking to declare Judge Cosico's orders dated 22 May 1987 and 27 November 1987 as null and void and to prohibit the judge from further proceeding with Criminal Case C-2152. Issue: Whether the reinstatement of the criminal case placed the accused in double jeopardy. Held: Criminal Case C-2152 may be reinstated as no double jeopardy has attached. The rule on double jeopardy is found in sec. 21, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." This is complemented by the Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended which provides that "When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information." Thus, the requisites that must concur for legal jeopardy to attach are, to wit: 1) a valid complaint or information; 2) a court of competent jurisdiction; 3) the accused has pleaded to the charge and 4) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. The fourth requisite is lacking in the instant case. The case was dismissed upon motion and with the express consent of the accused. The accused Bernabe Que, Amelia Que and Paz Martelino invoked their constitutional right to a speedy trial when the prosecution refused to present evidence until the court had ruled on the motion for inhibition. It was on their oral motion that the lower court ordered the case to be dismissed. For double jeopardy to attach, the general rule is that the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of the accused. Moreover, as held in Bermisa v. Court of Appeals (92 SCRA 136, 141-143 [1979]), "the consent of petitioner to the dismissal constituted a waiver of the constitutional right not to be prosecuted for the same offense. where a defendant expressly consents to or moves for the dismissal of the case against him, even if the court or judge states in the order that the dismissal is definite or does not say that the dismissal is without prejudice to the filing of another information, the dismissal will not be a bar to a subsequent prosecution of the defendant for the same offense." 389 Caes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court [GRs 74989-90, 6 November 1989] First Division, Cruz (J): 4 concur Facts: On 21 November 1981, Joel Caes was charged in two separate informations with illegal possession of firearms and illegal possession of marijuana before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The cases were consolidated on 10 December 1981. Arraignment was originally scheduled on 11 January 1982, but was for some reason postponed. On 31 August 1982, Caes was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Trial was scheduled for 13 October 1982, but this was reset upon agreement of the parties. On 15 November 1982, the trial was again postponed for reasons that do not appear in the record. On 20 December 1982, the trial was again postponed because the prosecution witnesses were absent. On 19 January 1983, the third resetting of the case was also canceled, no reason appearing in the record. On 21 February 1983, 21 March 1983, and 19 April 1983, no trial could be held as the prosecution witnesses were absent. On 3 June 1983, a sheriffs return informed the trial court that the prosecution witnesses, namely, Capt. Carlos Dacanay and Sgt. Bonifacio Lustado, had been personally served with subpoena to appear and testify at the hearing scheduled on 6 June 1983. On said day, the trial was again postponed, this time because there was no trial fiscal. On 12 July 1983, trial was reset for lack of material time. On 6 September 1983, the trial was once more reset by agreement of the parties. On 19 October 1983, the trial was reset to 14 November 1983. On 14 November 1983, the prosecution moved for the provisional dismissal of the case because its witnesses had not appeared. On the same date, Judge Alfredo M. Gorgonio issued the order provisionally dismissing the case. On 9 January 1984, a motion to revive the cases was filed by Maj. Dacanay (he had been promoted in the meantime) and Sgt. Lustado, who alleged that they could not attend the hearing scheduled on 14 November 1983, for lack of notice. Copy of the motion was furnished the City Fiscal of Caloocan City but not Caes. On 18 May 1984, the judge issued the order granting the "Motion for the Revival of the Case." A motion for reconsideration filed by Caes dated 7 June 1984, was denied on 9 October 1984, and the revived cases were set for hearing on 19 November 1984. Caes filed the petition for certiorari with th Supreme Court, which was referred to the appellate court. The petition there was dismissed for lack of merit on 20 May 1986, and reconsideration was denied on 17 June 1986. Caes filed the present petition. Issue: Whether the revival of the cases would place Caes in double jeopardy in violation of the Bill of Rights. Held: Fittingly described as "res judicata in prison grey," the right against double jeopardy prohibits the prosecution of a person for a crime of which he has been previously acquitted or convicted. The purpose is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the danger and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense. It has been held in a long line of cases that to constitute double jeopardy, there must be: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b)
filed before a competent court; (c) to which the defendant had pleaded; and (d) of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted or which was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. There is no question that the first three requisites are present in the present case. It is settled that a case may be dismissed if the dismissal is made on motion of the accused himself or on motion of the prosecution with the express consent of the accused. Such a dismissal is correctly denominated provisional. But a dismissal is not provisional even if so designated if it is shown that it was made without the express consent of the accused. This consent cannot be presumed nor may it be merely implied from the defendant's silence or his failure to object As held in a number of cases, such consent must be express, so as to leave no doubt as to the defendant's conformity. Otherwise, the dismissal will be regarded as final, i.e., with prejudice to the refiling of the case. There are instances in fact when the dismissal will be held to be final and to dispose of the case once and for all even if the dismissal was made on motion of the accused himself. The first is where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested. Such dismissal has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal. The other exception is where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial. This is in effect a failure to prosecute. The circumstance that the dismissal of the cases against Caes was described by the trial judge as "provisional" did not change the nature of that dismissal. As it was based on the "lack of interest" of the prosecutor and the consequent delay in the trial of the cases, it was final and operated as an acquittal of the accused on the merits. No less importantly, there is no proof that Caes expressly concurred in the provisional dismissal. Implied consent is not enough; neither may it be lightly inferred from the presumption of regularity, for we are dealing here with the alleged waiver of a constitutional right. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in favor of the accused. 390 Nierras vs. Dacuycuy [GRs 59568-76, 11 January 1990] En Banc, Paras (J): 13 concur, 1 took no part Facts: Peter Nierras, a customer of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, purchased oil products from it. Simultaneous with the delivery of the products, he issued 9 checks in payment thereof. Upon presentation to the Philippine National Bank at Naval, Leyte, said checks were dishonored for the reason that his account was already closed. Thereafter, Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation repeatedly demanded of Nierras either to deposit funds for his checks or pay for the oil products he had purchased but he failed and refused to do either. Nierras was charged for for estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code (Criminal Cases 4379, 4380, 4381, 4382, 4383, 4384, 4385, 4386 and 4387) and similarly for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law or Batas Pambansa 22 (Criminal Cases 3790, 3791, 3792, 3793, 4085, 4122, 4123, 4124, and 4125). In both sets of criminal cases, Nierras entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment before the lower court. However, immediately after his plea of not guilty in these estafa cases, petitioner moved in open court to be allowed to withdraw his plea of not guilty upon his filing of a motion to quash, which was denied by Judge Auxencio C. Dacuycuy in a resolution dated 17 September 1981. Nierras filed the petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. Issue: Whether Nierras may be held liable for the 9 criminal cases for violation of BP 22, and separately also be held liable for the crime of estafa under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code for the issuance of the same bouncing checks. Held: Nierras is charged with 2 distinct and separate offenses, first under Section 1 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 and, second, under Article 315, (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code. Deceit and damage are essential elements in Article 315 (2d) Revised Penal Code, but are not required in BP 22. Under the latter law, mere issuance of a check that is dishonored gives rise to the presumption of knowledge on the part of the drawer that he issued the same without sufficient funds and hence punishable which is not so under the Penal Code. Other differences between the two also include the following: (1) a drawer of a dishonored check may be convicted under BP 22 even if he had issued the same for a pre-existing obligation, while under Article 315 (2-d) of the Revised Penal Code, such circumstance negates criminal liability; (2) specific and different penalties are
imposed in each of the two offenses; (3) estafa is essentially a crime against property, while violation of BP 22 is principally a crime against public interest as it does injury to the entire banking system; (4) violations of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code are mala in se, while those of BP 22 are mala prohibita. Furthermore, Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 provides that "Prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code." While the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of BP 22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by Nierras, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense in one law and another law, there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the 2 offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Hence, the mere filing of the 2 sets of information does not itself give rise to double jeopardy. 391 Icasiano vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 95642, 28 May 1992] En Banc, Padilla (J): 13 concur, 1 on leave Facts: Acting Municipal Trial Court Judge of Naic, Cavite, Aurelio G. Icasiano, Jr. issed 2 orders of detention dated 18 and 27 November 1986 against Romana Magbago for contempt of court because of her continued refusal to comply with a fifth alias writ of execution. Magbago filed an administrative complaint dated 17 February 1987 with the Supreme Court against Judge Icasiano. After evaluating the allegations of the complaint, Icasiano's comment thereon and the Court Administrator's recommendation, the Supreme Court dismissed the administrative complaint for lack of merit in an en banc resolution dated 2 February 1988. Meanwhile, on 17 March 1987, Magbago also filed with the Office of the Ombudsman the same lettercomplaint earlier filed with the Supreme Court; this time, she claimed violation by Judge Icasiano, Jr. of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, sec. 3 par. [e]) in TBP-87-00924. After considering Judge Icasiano's answer, in a resolution dated April 1988 Special Prosecutor Evelyn Almogela-Baliton recommended dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. The recommendation was approved by then Special Prosecutor/Tanodbayan Raul M. Gonzales. It appears from the records of the Tanodbayan, which were forwarded to the Supreme Court, upon order of the Court in connection with this case, that the resolution dismissing the complaint was released on 14 April 1988. The office of the Tanodbayan received another complaint from the same Romana Magbago (TBP-87-01546). The exact date of filing of the second complaint is not stated but the records of the case were allegedly among those transmitted to the then newly created office of the Ombudsman; unfortunately, the transmitted records did not contain the earlier resolution of dismissal in TBP-87-00924. Special Prosecutor Nicanor Cruz, Jr. who was assigned to investigate the case (TBP-87-01546) appeared completely unaware of the earlier case, TBP-87-00924. The corresponding information against Icasiano was thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case 14563). After said information was filed on 21 March 1990, Icasiano (as accused) filed a motion for reinvestigation. Icasiano's motion for reinvestigation was denied in the 29 June 1990 resolution, of the Sandiganbayan. Icasiano then moved to quash the information on the grounds, among others, that the accused shall be placed in double jeopardy in so far as the resolution of the Hon. Supreme Court in Administrative Case RTJ-87-81. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Icasiano filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the resolution of the administrative proceeding in the Supreme Court bars the subsequent filing of a criminal case against the accused in the Sandiganbayan. Held: After a closer look at the records of the case, the Court is of the view that the distinction between administrative and criminal proceedings must be upheld, and that a prosecution in one is not a bar to the other. It is, therefore, correct for the Sandiganbayan to hold that double jeopardy does no apply in the present controversy because the Supreme Court case (against Judge Icasiano) was administrative in character while the Sandiganbayan case also against Judge Icasiano is criminal in nature. When the Supreme Court acts on
complaints against judges or any of the personnel under its supervision and control, it acts as personnel administrator, imposing discipline and not as a court judging justiciable controversies. Administrative procedure need not strictly adhere to technical rules. Substantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction. Criminal proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, on the other hand, while they may involve the same acts subject of the administrative case, require proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. To avail of the protection against double jeopardy, it is fundamental that the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court; c) a valid arraignment; (d) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (e) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. All these elements do not apply visa-vis the administrative case, which should take care of Judge Icasiano's contention that said administrative case against him before the Supreme Court, which was dismissed, entitled him to raise the defense of double jeopardy in the criminal case in the Sandiganbayan. The charge against Judge Icasiano before the Sandiganbayan is for grave abuse of authority, manifest partiality and incompetence in having issued 2 orders of detention against complaining witness Magbago. Ordinarily, complainant's available remedy was to appeal said orders of detention in accordance with the Rules. It is only when an appellate court reverses the lower court issuing the questioned orders can abuse, partiality or incompetence be imputed to the judge. Here no appeal from the questioned orders of the issuing judge (Icasiano) was taken: instead, administrative and criminal cases were filed against the judge for issuing the orders. It is precisely for this reason, among other, that the administrative case against Judge Icasiano was dismissed by the Supreme Court for lack of merit; and yet, it cannot be assumed at this point that Judge Icasiano is not criminally liable under RA 3019, par. 3(e) for issuing the questioned orders of detention. In fact, the Ombudsman has found a prima facie case which led to the filing of the information. In any case, the dismissal by the Tanodbayan of the first complaint cannot bar the present prosecution, since double jeopardy does not apply. As held in Cirilo Cinco, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines, a preliminary investigation (assuming one had been conducted in TBP-87-00924) is not a trial to which double jeopardy attaches. 392 People vs. Milflores [GRs L-32144-45, 30 July 1982] Second Division, Barredo (J): 7 concur Facts: Early in the morning of 27 November 1967, at about 7:45 a.m., an old man approached the house on 2233 Garrido Street, Sta. Ana, Manila, calling out the name of one of the occupants Mrs. Javier. Heeding such call, Florencia Tactay Javier came out of the door and met the caller. The old man handed to her a paper bag containing some vegetables pechay, upo and sigarillas and then left the place. Mrs. Florencia Javier brought the bag into the house and proceeded to empty the same of its contents. As she did so, however, something inside the paper bag began emitting smoke and whistling sound, followed moments later by a deafening bomb explosion which caused death of one, and multiple injuries and wounds to 7 other occupants of the house. Investigations thereafter conducted by various police agencies led to the arrest of Nao Milflores y Laksa. On 6 December 1967, he was charged with multiple frustrated murder (Criminal Case 88173) before the Court of First Instance of Manila. In a separate information filed with the same court on even date, he was likewise charged for murder (Criminal Case 88174). Milflores was arraigned on said two informations on 14 December 1967 and 23 January 1968, respectively, and entered pleas of "Not Guilty" to the charges. Later, he moved to quash the information for murder but the same was denied by the trial court. Thereafter, the two cases were tried jointly, at the conclusion of which the the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XI) rendered the decision of conviction and and sentenced Milflores to imprisonment of 4 Years, 2 Months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 Years of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law for the crime of multiple attempted murder; and to reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim in the sum of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, for the crime of murder. Milflores appealed. Issue: Whether the filing of Criminal Case 88174 placed Milflores under risk of double jeopardy.
Held: The first information for frustrated murder, Criminal Case 88173, does not include among the victims or offended parties Felicidad Mique, the woman who died and is precisely named as the deceased in the murder case, Criminal Case 88174. In the sense, therefore, that Milflores was ever in jeopardy in that first case, it is plain to see that such was impossible or could not have happened. Counsel is thus off tangent in invoking double jeopardy. To be accurate, the legal error of the prosecution here consists of having filed two separate informations for a single offense. For there can be no doubt about the fact that since the injuries suffered by the offended parties in Criminal Case 88173 resulted from the same act allegedly of the accused that caused the death of Felicidad Mique, the victim in Criminal Case 88174, namely, the explosion of the bomb which according to the prosecution was handed by Milflores to Florencia Tactay-Javier, the crime for which Milflores could be made to answer is the virtually single complex offense of murder with frustrated murder pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. There is in law only one offense because there is only one penalty that can be imposed notwithstanding that the act may in fact involve a cluster of otherwise separate or distinct offenses. Still, the technical error of the fiscal in filing two separate informations did not cause Milflores any substantial prejudice at all. In effect, as the proceedings were actually conducted, it is as if Milflores had been prosecuted and tried under a single information. It would be giving premium to technicality and sacrificing substantial justice to yield to counsel's contention. Besides, to do so would result in duplicating what had already been done, the full-dressed trial of the case, with both prosecution and defense presenting all their respective evidence. But the more untenable aspect of the position of Milflores is that when he invoked the defense of double jeopardy, what could have been the first jeopardy had not yet been completed or even began. It is settled jurisprudence in the Court that the mere filing of two informations or complaints charging the same offense does not yet afford the accused in those cases the occasion to complain that he is being placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense, for the simple reason that the primary basis of the defense of double jeopardy is that the accused has already been convicted or acquitted in the first case or that the same has been terminated without his consent. 393 People vs. Vergara [GR 101557-5, 28 April 1993] First Division, Bellosillo (J): 3 concur Facts: On 7 April 1988, 3rd Asst. Provincial Fiscal Luis E. Estiller of Puerto Princesa City filed Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397 for frustrated murder against Leonardo Salde, Sr., Leonardo Salde, Jr., Floresita Salde, Gloria Salde-Panaguiton and Jojeta Panaguiton for allegedly conspiring together in attacking and taking turns in assaulting the spouses Teresa and Amado Rubite, by throwing stones at Amado Rubite and hacking him with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the left fronto-parietal area which would have caused his death in Crimianl Case 8572 (GR 101557), and by striking Teresa with wood and stones and hacking her with a bolo which would have caused her death in Criminal Case 8573 (GR 101558). On 3 June 1988, Leonardo Salde, Sr., Leonardo Salde, Jr., Floresita Salde and Gloria Salde-Panaguiton were arraigned. They all pleaded "not guilty." On 2 August 1988, Jojeta Panaguiton was also arraigned and likewise entered a plea of "not guilty." On 19 September 1988, when the cases were initially called for trial, the Prosecuting Fiscal together with counsel for accused jointly moved for the suspension of the hearing pending the outcome of the motion filed by the accused for reinvestigation of the cases against them, which Provincial Fiscal Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr., later resolved in their favor. On 12 December 1988, counsel for the offended parties gave, notice to the Provincial Fiscal of their intention to appeal the latter's resolution to the Department of Justice. On 2 February 1989, pending appeal to the Department of Justice, Provincial Fiscal Gacott, Jr., moved for the dismissal of the cases on the ground that the reinvestigation disclosed that spouses Amado and Teresa Rubite were the real aggressors and that the accused only acted in self-defense. On 9 February 1989, acting on the motion of the Provincial Fiscal, the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Br. 52, ordered the dismissal of Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397. Meanwhile, on 1 March 1990, the Secretary of Justice ordered the Provincial Prosecutor to refile the Informations. Hence, on 6 April 1990, 2 new Informations for frustrated murder against the same accused were filed by Acting Provincial Prosecutor Clarito A. Demaala (Criminal Cases 8572 and 8573). On 13 May 1991, after pleading "not guilty" to the new Informations, the accused moved to quash on the ground of double jeopardy, which was opposed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. On 10 July 1991, the trial
court granted the motion and dismissed Criminal Cases 8572 and 8573. The motion to reconsider the order of 10 July 1991 filed by Acting Provincial Prosecutor Demaala was denied on 16 August 1991. Amado and Teresa Rubite filed the petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether Salde, et. al. gave their express consent to the dismissal of the original Informations; and, whether the first jeopardy was invalidly terminated. Held: The right against double jeopardy prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted. The objective is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the peril and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense. It is undisputed that valid Informations for frustrated murder, i.e., Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397 were filed against Salde, et. al. before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, a court of competent jurisdiction. It is likewise admitted that Salde, et. al., after being properly arraigned, entered a plea of not guilty. The only question then remaining is whether the cases against them were dismissed with their express consent. This is hardly what Saldy, et. al. gave. What they did was merely to move for reinvestigation of the case before the prosecutor. To equate this with express consent of the accused to the dismissal of the case in the lower court is to strain the meaning of "express consent" too far. Simply, there was no express consent of the accused when the prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the original Informations. While it may be true that, as a general rule, all motions should contain a notice of hearing under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, these cases present an unusual situation where the motion to dismiss filed negates the necessity of a hearing. Here, it was the public prosecutor himself who after instituting Criminal Cases 7396 and 7397 filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that after a reinvestigation it was found that "the evidence in these cases clearly tilts in favor of both accused. The spouses Amado and Teresa Rubite were the aggressors and the accused Salde, Sr. and his co-accused merely defended themselves from the attack of the Rubites. Consequently, it would be unfair, arbitrary and unjustified to prosecute the accused in the above-entitled case." Since it was the prosecuting officer who instituted the cases, and who thereafter moved for their dismissal, a hearing on his motion to dismiss was not necessary at all. It is axiomatic that a hearing is necessary only in cases of contentious motions. The motion filed in this case has ceased to be contentious. Definitely, it would be to his best interest if the accused did not oppose the motion. the Rubites, on the other hand, are precluded from questioning the discretion of the fiscal in moving for the dismissal of the criminal action. Hence, a hearing on the motion to dismiss would be useless and futile. The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the complaint, or to appeal from the dismissal order, and not certiorari. Hence, the conditions for a valid defense of double jeopardy, i.e., (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and, (c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that of the first, all being present in these cases, the defense of double jeopardy must prevail. 394 People vs. Tiozon [GR 89823, 19 June 1991] Third Division, Davide Jr. (J): 4 concur Facts: At around 11:00 p.m. of 24 February 1989, Leonardo Bolima y Mesia and his wife were awakened by the loud knocks on their door. Leonardo opened the door and they saw that the person who was knocking was their "Pareng Troping", Eutropio Tiozon. Leonardo invited Tiozon, who appeared to be very drunk, to come inside their house. Once inside their house, Tiozon sat down and the two exchanged pleasantries. Tiozon showed a gun to her husband and the latter even toyed with it. The two left. 5 minutes later and or after Leonardo's wife heard two successive gunshots, and heard Tiozon knocking at their door and at the same time informing her that he accidentally shot Leonardo, "Mare, mare, nabaril ko si Pare, hindi ko sinasadya." Leonardo's wife sought help to carry Leonardo towards the main road. Some of the neighbors arrived bringing
with them lights. Thereafter, Kalookan policemen arrived and so she caused the arrest of Tiozon. In an information filed by the Asst. City Prosecutor of Caloocan City on 27 February 1989 with Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court (Caloocan City) of the National Capital Judicial Region, Eutropio Tiozon y Acid was charged for violation of Presidential Decree 1866, as amended. Tiozon pleaded not guilty when arraigned on 15 March 1989. Pre-trial was conducted and thereafter the trial court received the evidence for the parties. In a decision promulgated on 30 June 1989, the trial court found Tiozon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of P.D. 1866 and Murder qualified by treachery and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Leonardo Bolima the sum of P30,000.00; to reimburse the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as reasonable expenses for the wake and burial expenses and to pay the costs. According to the trial court, were it not for its abolition, "the death penalty, the sentence imposable under 2nd pa., Section 1 of PD 1866, as amended", should have been imposed. On 5 July 1989 Tiozon filed a motion to reconsider the decision which, however, was denied by the court in its order of 16 August 1989. On 17 August, Tiozon filed a Notice of Appeal. Issue: Whether prosecution for violation of PD 1866, which is qualified by murder or homicide, bars prosecution for murder or homicide, in light of the right against double jeopardy. Held: Section 1 of PD 1866 imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua "upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition." It goes further by providing that "if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed." It may be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense penalized in Section 1 of PD 1866 because it is a circumstance which increases the penalty. It does not, however, follow that the homicide or murder is absorbed in the offense; otherwise, an anomalous absurdity results whereby a more serious crime defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code is absorbed by a statutory offense, which is just a malum prohibitum. The rationale for the qualification is to effectively deter violations of the laws on firearms and to stop the "upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms." In fine then, the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a) violation of Section 1 of PD 1866 and (b) violation of either Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one as a bar to the other; or, stated otherwise, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first is punished by a special law while the second, homicide or murder, is punished by the Revised Penal Code. 395 People vs. Villarama [GR 99287, 23 June 1992] First Division, Medialdea (J): 3 concur Facts: On 24 August 1990, Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged with violation of Section 16, RA 6425, as amended. The penalty prescribed in the said section is imprisonment ranging from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years and a fine ranging from P6,000 to P12,000. The information against him reads: "That on or about the 21st day of August, 1990, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without the corresponding license or prescription did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control 0.08 grams of Methamphetamin Hydrocloride (Shabu) wrapped with an aluminum foil, which is a regulated drug. Contrary to law." During the arraignment, Manuel entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On 21 November 1990, the prosecution rested its case. On 9 January 1991, Manuel's counsel verbally manifested in open court that Manuel was willing to change his former plea of "not guilty" to that of "guilty" to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA 6425, as amended. The said section provides a penalty of imprisonment ranging from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and a fine ranging from P600 to P4,000 shall be imposed upon any pharmacist, physician, dentist, veterinarian, manufacturer, wholesaler who violates or fails to keep the records required under Section 25 of the Act; if the violation or failure involves a regulated drug.
That same day, Judge Martin S. Villarama Jr. issued an order directing Manuel to secure the consent of the prosecutor to the change of plea, and set the promulgation of decision on 30 January 1991. On said date, the Judge postponed the promulgation of the decision to 18 February 1991 to give Manuel another opportunity to secure the consent of the prosecutor. Also, on the said date, Manuel filed his Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense. On 18 February 1991, the Judge issued another order postponing the promulgation of decision to 25 February 1991 to give Manuel further opportunity to secure the consent of the prosecutor. On 20 February 1991, the prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense on the grounds that: (1) the prosecution already rested its case on 21 November 1990; (2) the possibility of conviction of Manuel of the crime originally charged was high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution; and (3) the valuable time which the court and the prosecutor had expended would be put to waste. On 21 February 1991, Manuel filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense, alleging therein, among other matters, that the Rules on Criminal Procedure does not fix a specific period within which an accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Subsequently, on 25 February 1991, the Judge rendered a decision granting Manuel's motion. Forthwith, the prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the same was denied in the order of 13 March 1991. The prosecutor filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rule of Court applies to the accused's change of plea in the preent case. Held: Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge. Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law still permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea thereafter, as provided by Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, Section 2 thereof, which provides that "The accused, with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. A conviction under this plea, shall be equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy." However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense under the rule is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court. Herein, Manuel moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution had already rested its case. In such situation, jurisprudence has provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which their discretion may be properly exercised. The trial court need not wait for a guideline from the Office of the Prosecutor before it could act on the accused's motion to change plea. As soon as the fiscal has submitted his comment whether for or against the said motion, it behooves the trial court to assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the public will be served. A reading of the disputed rulings in this case failed to disclose the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of the evidence in hand, the judge's acceptance of Manuel's change of plea is improper and irregular. Further, the provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The consent of both the Fiscal and the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The right against double jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rule of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the accused's change of plea. Since this is not the situation here, Manuel cannot claim this privilege. Instead, the more pertinent and applicable provision is that found in Section 7 (c), Rule 117 which states that "the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information under any of the following instances: xxx (c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the Fiscal and of the offended party." Under the rule, Manuel could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of Section 16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the
lack of consent of the Fiscal who also represents the offended party, i.e., the state. More importantly, the trial court's approval of his change of plea was irregular and improper. 396 Tupaz vs. Ulep [GR 127777, 1 October 1999] First Division, Pardo (J): 3 concur Facts: On 8 June 1990, State Prosecutor (SP) Esteban A. Molon, Jr. filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon City, Branch 33, an information against Petronila C. Tupaz and her husband Jose J. Tupaz, Jr., as corporate officers of El Oro Engravers Corporation, for nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979, amounting to P2,369,085.46, in violation of Section 51 (b) in relation to Section 73 of the Tax Code of 1977. On 11 September 1990, the MeTC dismissed the information for lack of jurisdiction. On 16 November 1990, the trial court denied the prosecutions motion for reconsideration. On 10 January 1991, SP Molon filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, 2 informations (Criminal Cases Q-91-17321 and Q-91-17322), against Jose and Petronila Tupaz for the same alleged nonpayment of deficiency corporate income tax for the year 1979. Criminal Case Q-91-17321 was raffled to Branch 105, presided over by Judge Benedicto B. Ulep; Q-91-17322 was raffled to Branch 86, then presided over by Judge Antonio P. Solano. On 25 September 991, both accused posted bail bond in the sum of P1,000.00 each, for their provisional liberty. On 6 November 1991, the Tupazes filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, a motion to dismiss/quash information (Q-91-17322) for the reason that it was exactly the same as the information against the Tupazes pending before RTC, Quezon City, Branch 105 (Q-91-17321). However, on 11 November 1991, Judge Solano denied the motion. In the meantime, on 25 July 1993, Jose J. Tupaz, Jr. died in Quezon City. Subsequently, Petronila C. Tupaz filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a petition for reinvestigation, which Judge Ulep granted in an order dated 30 August 1994. On 5 September 1994, Senior State Prosecutor Bernelito R. Fernandez stated that no new issues were raised in the request for reinvestigation, and no cogent reasons existed to alter, modify or reverse the findings of the investigating prosecutor. He considered the reinvestigation as terminated, and recommended the prompt arraignment and trial of the accused. On 20 September 1994, the trial court (Branch 105) arraigned Petronila Tupaz in Criminal Case Q-91-17321, and she pleaded not guilty to the information therein. On 17 October 1994, the prosecution filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a motion for leave to file amended information in Criminal Case Q91-17321 to allege expressly the date of the commission of the offense, to wit: on or about August 1984 or subsequently thereafter. Despite opposition of the accused, on 2 March 1995, the trial court granted the motion and admitted the amended information. Petronilia was not re-arraigned on the amended information, as the amendment was only on a matter of form. On 5 December 1995, Petronilia filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a motion for leave to file and admit motion for reinvestigation. The trial court granted the motion in its order dated 13 December 1995. On 15 May 1996, Prosecutor Agcaoili filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 86, a motion for consolidation of Criminal Case Q-91-17322 with Criminal Case Q-91-17321 pending before the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105. On the same date, the court granted the motion for consolidation. On 20 May 1996, Judge Ulep of Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, granted the motion for withdrawal of the information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321 and dismissed the case, as prayed for by the prosecution. On 28 May 1996, Prosecutor Agcaoili filed with the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, a motion to reinstate information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321, stating that the motion to withdraw information was made through palpable mistake, and was the result of excusable neglect. He thought that Criminal Case Q-9117321 was identical to Criminal Case Q-90-12896, wherein Petronilia was charged with nonpayment of deficiency contractors tax, amounting to P346,879.29. Over the objections of Petronilia, on 6 August 1996, the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105, granted the motion and ordered the information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321 reinstated. On 24 September 1996, Petronilia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration. On December 4, 1996, the trial court denied the motion. Petronilia filed the special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the reinstatement of the information in Criminal Case Q-91-17321 exposes Petronilia Tupaz
to double jeopardy. Held: The reinstatement of the information would expose Petronilia Tupaz to double jeopardy. An accused is placed in double jeopardy if he is again tried for an offense for which he has been convicted, acquitted or in another manner in which the indictment against him was dismissed without his consent. Herein, there was a valid complaint filed against her to which she pleaded not guilty. The court dismissed the case at the instance of the prosecution, without asking for Petronilias consent. This consent cannot be implied or presumed. Such consent must be expressed as to have no doubt as to the accuseds conformity. As Petronilias consent was not expressly given, the dismissal of the case must be regarded as final and with prejudice to the re-filing of the case. Consequently, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in reinstating the information against Petronilia in violation of her constitutionally protected right against double jeopardy. 397 People vs. Sandiganbayan [GR 140633, 4 February 2002] Third Division, Sandoval-Gutierrez (J): 3 concur, 1 abroad on official business Facts: The Information filed by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) against Geronimo Velasco, then Minister of Energy, for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act 3019 ("The AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act"), as amended, reads: "That on or about and during the period from 1977 to 1986, in Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the Minister of Energy and Chairman of the Board and President of the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), a government owned and controlled corporation, did then and there deliberately and unlawfully, in evident bad faith and shameless abuse of his administrative official function and power as such Minister of Energy and PNOC President and Chairman of the Board, spend funds and utilize equipment and personnel of PNOC and its subsidiaries at a total cost to PNOC of P3,032,993.00 in the construction and maintenance of his own Telin Beach Resort located at Bagac, Bataan, Philippines, managed by Telin Development Corporation and owned by Gervel, Inc., a corporation wholly owned by said accused, thereby giving himself unwarranted benefits and causing undue injury to PNOC, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount of P3,032,993.00, Philippine Currency. Contrary to law." Upon arraignment, Velasco pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution rested its case, the accused filed, with leave of court, a Demurrer to Evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, it was denied by the Sandiganbayan. Velasco filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated 11 October 1999. Consequently, the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Hence, the petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy. Held: Under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, the trial court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of court. Thus, in resolving the accused's demurrer to evidence, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or support a verdict of guilt. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. Significantly, once the court grants the demurrer, such order amounts to an acquittal; and any further prosecution of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. This constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion bars a plea of double jeopardy. On the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals is "part of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of the innocent against wrongful conviction." The interest in the finality-of acquittal rule, confined exclusively to verdicts of not guilty, is easy to
understand: it is a need for "repose," a desire to know the exact extent of one's liability. With this right of repose, the criminal justice system has built in a protection to insure that the innocent, even those whose innocence rests upon a jury's leniency, will not be found guilty in a subsequent proceeding. Such is the magnitude of the accused's right against double jeopardy that even an appeal based on an alleged misappreciation of evidence by the trial court will not lie. The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction due to a violation of due process, i.e., that the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case. However, while certiorari may be resorted to cure an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. Here, Velasco filed his demurrer to evidence after the prosecution adduced its evidence and rested its case. Obviously, the People was not deprived of its right to due process. Thus, Velasco's plea of double jeopardy must be upheld.

2005nr19 24 - Cons2poli Doublejeopardy

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