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Turkey
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This information was last updated on 20 JUL 2012, 1:20 PM EDT (17:20 GMT)
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Unrest from radical Kurdish groups does not negatively affect the economy as a whole.
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In the medium term, annual growth rates will remain elevated vis--vis the rest of Europe, although annual gains will remain much lower than they were in both the 200207 stretch and again in 201011. Rates were restrained by structural damage to the economy from the 200809 crisis and the current sovereign risk threats, but also because of the need to deleverage public debt, which will add a headwind through the medium term. In particular, continued European problems are constraining growth projections for 201314, although growth of around 4% will be quite substantial compared with the rest of Europe. Thereafter, assuming Europe begins to grow again, growth should push closer to 5% annually for Turkey throughout the medium term as exports receive a boost and investment activity improves.
Economic Growth Indicators 2009 Real GDP (% change) Real Consumer Spending (% change) Real Government Consumption (% change) Real Fixed Capital Formation (% change) Real Exports of Goods and Services (% change) Real Imports of Goods and Services (% change) Nominal GDP (US$ bil.) Nominal GDP Per Capita (US$) -4.8 -2.0 7.8 -19.0 -5.0 -14.3 614.6 2010 9.2 5.9 2.0 30.5 3.4 20.7 731.1 2011 8.5 7.2 4.5 18.3 6.5 10.6 773.1 2012 2.9 1.6 2.2 3.3 7.6 -0.8 802.2 2013 4.2 4.1 2.3 5.9 4.0 4.8 806.1 2014 4.1 3.5 3.1 5.4 4.9 4.8 2015 5.0 4.2 3.3 5.0 5.0 4.2 2016 5.3 4.6 3.6 5.6 4.7 4.3
Source: Historical data from selected national and international data sources. All forecasts provided by IHS Global Insight. Table updated on the 15th of each month from monthly forecast update bank (GIIF). Written analysis may include references to data made available after the release of the GIIF bank. Download this table in Microsoft Excel format
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2011 9.2 5.9 2.0 30.5 3.4 20.7 8.5 7.2 4.5 18.3 6.5 10.6
The economic recovery in 2010 was the strongest in Europe. In 2010, GDP soared 9.2%, more than recovering what had been lost due to the global economic crisis in 200809. With the 2010 recovery surpassing the 2009 downturn, the economy was the largest it has ever been, both in real and nominal terms. As in 2011, the economic recovery in 2010 was domestically driven. The Turkish banking and financial system survived the 200809 crisis in much better shape than many of its counterparts in Europe, thus allowing for a vigorous expansion of credit. This strong revival bolstered both household consumption and fixed capital formation. Strong domestic demand, however, did have a negative knockdown effect on the economy, as imports grew much more rapidly than did exports, leading to a negative contribution of net exports on headline GDP.
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again generally strong in 2010. In 2011, the index reached a recent peak in June, at 96.4, the highest it had been in four years. It deteriorated throughout the bulk of the second half of the year before finally turning back upwards in the fourth quarter of the year and spilling over into early 2012. Stronger consumer confidence has paralleled the revival of household consumption activity. At the peak of the global crisis, Turkish household consumption was plunging by double digits. The CBRT's aggressive actions to restore consumer confidence, however, and the general strength of the Turkish financial sector helped limit the period during which Turkish consumer activity contracted. As a result, as early as fourth-quarter 2009, household consumption was reviving strongly, up by nearly 5% year-on-year (y/y). In 2010, with domestic credit expanding rapidly, household consumption also continued to grow, up by 6.0% for the year as a whole. By the first quarter of 2011, the strength of the recovery of household consumption was actually becoming a concern, up 12.0% y/y, raising worries of overheating. CBRT actions to temper domestic demand decreased growth, eventually to only 3.2% y/y as of the fourth quarter of 2011 and even further, to just 0.3% y/y in the first quarter of 2012.
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6.2% contraction already recorded in 2008. The downturn in 200809, triggered primarily by the shock of the global economic downturn, was an anomaly to recent trends. From 2002 through 2006, fixed capital formation grew by double digits annually, before finally slowing in 2007, when a peak of domestic political uncertainty and elevated interest rates curtailed further gains. Investment growth had actually been accelerating once again in 2008 before the onset of the global economic recession. However, by the end of 2010, investment had regained what had been lost, and any further expansion in 2011 represented new capital investment highs.
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Labor-force participation remains below the EU average, particularly among women, of whom less than one-quarter are employed outside of the house. Unemployment rates would be significantly higher than currently noted if labor-force participation was at the EU levelthose that are now out of the labor force would instead be listed as officially unemployed. According to a 2010 National Employment Strategy, an emphasis through the medium term is being placed upon an increase of women in the workforce, although as 2012 began, little progress was yet noted. As that participation rate increases with more women entering the labor force, pressure might build for emigration to the EU if job creation is not significantly accelerated in Turkey.
Inflation: Outlook
Monetary policy is working more effectively than we had anticipated, although we believe a further deceleration will be difficult. The lowering of global energy price forecasts has helped to reduce the upward pressure on Turkish inflation in the near term, but we believe that low interest rates will fuel greater domestic demand, undermining the countrys ability to further reduce annual inflation rates. Additionally, potentially new hikes to excise duties will further confound efforts to drive annual inflation rates down further. In the third quarter of 2012, annual inflation is projected to remain in the high single digits. By the fourth quarter, in large part because of favorable base effects, annual inflation could come down much more rapidly, likely reaching or even surpassing the central banks end-year inflation forecast of 6.5%. The central bank, in fact, has indicated it would downwardly revise this figure soon, potentially to around IHS Global Insights own end-year forecast of 5.7%. Despite the drop-off of inflation at the end of the year, annual average consumer price inflation will remain up from 2011, thanks to strong expansion in the first part of the year. In 2013, annual inflation could trend upwards as domestic demand returns.
Inflation Indicators 2009 Consumer Price Index (% change) Wholesale-Producer Price Index (% change) 6.3 1.2 2010 8.6 8.5 2011 6.5 11.1 2012 8.8 6.6 2013 6.5 6.3 2014 5.7 6.4 2015 4.9 5.5 2016 4.5 4.7
Source: Historical data from selected national and international data sources. All forecasts provided by IHS Global Insight. Table updated on the 15th of each month from monthly forecast update bank (GIIF). Written analysis may include references to data made available after the release of the GIIF bank. Download this table in Microsoft Excel format
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central banks monetary policy, there will be no shift to a more orthodox policy. The continued improvement of the current-account deficit will help to buoy the lira nonetheless. In the longer term, the lira will be stable and strong. Assuming that the CBRT and the government succeed in taming domestic demand and eventually begin to reduce the countrys external obligations, we anticipate that the Turkish lira will once again resume gaining value in the longer term. Previous worries that the lira might be overvalued have been dissipated due to the sharp losses noted since 2008. Gains in productivity from increasing capital inflows and the general push towards greater EU integration should bolster the strength of the lira.
Exchange Rate Indicators 2009 Exchange Rate (LCU/US$, end of period) Exchange Rate (LCU/US$, period avg) Exchange Rate (LCU/Euro, end of period) Exchange Rate (LCU/Euro, period avg) 1.49 1.55 2.15 2.15 2010 1.54 1.50 2.06 1.99 2011 1.91 1.67 2.47 2.33 2012 1.82 1.80 2.28 2.30 2013 2.00 1.97 2.30 2.30 2014 1.77 1.85 2.32 2.31 2015 1.72 1.75 2.36 2.34 2016 1.70 1.71 2.43 2.39
Source: Historical data from selected national and international data sources. All forecasts provided by IHS Global Insight. Table updated on the 15th of each month from monthly forecast update bank (GIIF). Written analysis may include references to data made available after the release of the GIIF bank. Download this table in Microsoft Excel format
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By 30 December 2011, the Turkish lira had dipped to a historical low, falling below 1.911 per US dollar. This fall triggered an aggressive reaction from the CBRT, which flooded the foreign-exchange market with more than USD3 billion of dollar sales in the final trading day of 2011 and another USD650 million of sales in the first trading day of 2012. In all, this helped push the lira back to 1.881 per US dollar at the close of 3 January. In the month and one-half that followed, the lira continued to steadily rally, so by late February, the lira was up to 1.738 per US dollar. Since then, the lira has been generally strong in spite of some temporary setbacks, showing particular resiliency in recent weeks and months as the CBRTs monetary policy has begun to find more and more success in reducing the current-account deficit. By mid-July, the lira was trading at 1.806 per US dollar, 5.5% stronger in nominal terms than it had been at the close of 2011. The turn-of-the-year defense drew down official reserve levels, but since that initial foray, the bank has had to be less active, stemming the sharp drawdown. The lira was generally weaker in the latter portion of 2011. At the outset of 2011, the CBRT had intended to weaken the currency by pushing interest rates downward to reduce the inflow of foreign capital. By the end of the first half, the lira exchange rate was down to TRY2.350/EUR1.000, nearly 20% weaker than when the CBRT initiated its policy in December 2010. In the second half, however, the lira depreciated more rapidly than the CBRT would like because of mounting worries of overheating and the CBRTs poor policy responses to those concerns. In general, from July until the meltdown in late December, the lira went through periods of sharp depreciation followed by a stabilizing of the exchange rate in response to CBRT actions.
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external imbalances and the fact that at least inflation is now in high single digits instead of low double digits. The CBRT would only acquiesce to a shift away from the current approach if the countrys financial markets and foreign investment inflows are indeed eventually threatened by shifting sentiment.
Monetary Policy Indicators 2009 Policy Interest Rate (%, end of period) Short-term Interest Rate (%, end of period) Long-term Interest Rate (%, end of period) 6.50 17.65 17.20 2010 6.50 15.27 14.99 2011 5.75 14.22 14.19 2012 5.75 15.40 15.50 2013 5.75 13.41 14.43 2014 5.50 11.01 13.08 2015 4.75 9.17 11.86 2016 5.25 8.00 9.30
Source: Historical data from selected national and international data sources. All forecasts provided by IHS Global Insight. Table updated on the 15th of each month from monthly forecast update bank (GIIF). Written analysis may include references to data made available after the release of the GIIF bank. Download this table in Microsoft Excel format
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Normal days see the CBRT releasing funds at the countrys main policy rate. Exceptional days have the CBRT releasing funds at a rate of around 11%. The CBRT also regularly changes the value of its repo auctions to also attempt to stabilize the currency. Unfortunately by pursuing this strategy, interest-rate planning is sacrificed, a negative impact on potential investors in the country. This policy approach previously garnered criticism for not being effective enough in addressing the countrys massive external deficits, although in more recent months, much of that critique has been counteracted by the surprising success in driving down the current-account imbalance and a downward drift of inflation. More emboldened than ever, the CBRT shows little signs of retreat from its current position and held all policy rates unchanged at its July meeting. The Monetary Council even began showing signs of relaxing monetary policy somewhat, although it remains restrictive overall. Although perhaps equally controversial, the CBRT's policy position is nonetheless evolving from its approach in the first half of 2011. Beginning late in 2010, the CBRT launched a policy mix of low interest rates and tighter reserve requirement rates (and other administrative measures). The CBRT had hoped that by maintaining low interest rates, the influx of "hot" portfolio investment that had previously driven great financial sector instability would be limited. These inflows had also boosted the Turkish lira, limiting Turkish export competitiveness and boosting import demand. Meanwhile, to counter the expansionary nature of low interest rates, tighter restrictions on lira holdings would help drain the domestic economy of excess liquidity, encouraging a sharp slowdown of credit and monetary growth. Through the first half of 2011, the policy mix had little impact on credit growth or stemming the rapid deterioration of the current-account deficit. In the third quarter, however, progress was noted. The annual rate of growth of domestic credit, persistently running at around 35% through the first half of the year, finally dropped below the CBRT's unofficial 25% target in September, where it has remained below since. Meanwhile, the deterioration of the current account eased significantly in the third and fourth quarters, just as the CBRT had anticipated.
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May 2012relying instead on increasing revenues. In fact, the government plans to increase state employment by 90,000 in an effort to ward off the potential deterioration of the labor markets as the negative ramifications of the Eurozone debt crisis hits Turkey. A more substantial effort to cut spending would help calm markets that remain jittery over the countrys dangerously large external imbalances. However, we expect that even with the fiscal problems, the countrys primary budget balance will remain firmly in surplus in 2012, with interest spending estimated to be around TRY50 billion.
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large enough to put immense strain on the countrys ability to find financing given the risk aversion that remains strong in the shadow of the Eurozone debt crisis.
Trade and External Accounts Indicators 2009 Exports of Goods (US$ bil.) Imports of Goods (US$ bil.) Trade Balance (US$ bil.) Trade Balance (% of GDP) Current Account Balance (US$ bil.) Current Account Balance (% of GDP) 109.6 134.5 -24.8 -4.0 -13.4 -2.2 2010 120.9 177.3 -56.4 -7.7 -46.6 -6.4 2011 143.5 232.9 -89.4 -11.6 -77.2 -10.0 2012 157.1 237.5 -80.5 -10.0 -66.6 -8.3 2013 168.3 251.2 -82.9 -10.3 -66.0 -8.2 2014 179.8 266.2 -86.4 -9.1 -68.2 -7.2 2015 191.7 280.2 -88.5 -8.0 -68.9 -6.2 2016 204.3 294.9 -90.6 -7.3 -73.8 -6.0
Source: Historical data from selected national and international data sources. All forecasts provided by IHS Global Insight. Table updated on the 15th of each month from monthly forecast update bank (GIIF). Written analysis may include references to data made available after the release of the GIIF bank. Download this table in Microsoft Excel format
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The current-account deficit reached 10% of GDP in 2011, a historically large shortfall for the country. The current-account gap had been rapidly widening vis--vis year-earlier levels throughout the first 10 months of 2011, with the countrys overall shortfall nearly doubling in nominal US dollar value. However, in the final two months of the year, the efforts of the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) to reduce the current-account deficit finally began to show dividends, the headline current-account deficit narrowing first by 8.5% y/y in November and then by 12.8% y/y in December. The USD77.089-billion current-account deficit for 2011 is equivalent to right at 10% of GDP. The shortfall is dangerously large and is the highest such gap ever recorded for Turkey. As the year came to a close, the deterioration of the merchandise trade deficit slowed, facilitating the turnaround in the headline current-account balance. Import growth slowed sharply in the final months of the year in response to an effort to stem domestic demand. This slowdown would have had an even greater impact if not for a similar deceleration of export growth due to the worsening of export conditions to the rest of Europe. Also contributing to the narrowing of the current-account deficit in the final months of the year, income outflows dropped off precipitously in the latter stages of 2011. While Turkeys current-account deficit worsened substantially in 2011, inflows of non-debt-creating financing improved to offset some of the increased danger. The net inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) and of portfolio investments both soared vis--vis their 2010 levels. Nevertheless, the improvement in non-debt-creating capital inflows was only enough to offset about one-third of the worsening in the current-account deficit. As such, the difference was made up by a rise in debt and a reduction in reserves (whereas in 2010, the country added significantly to its reserves). Additionally, the countrys errors and omissions line was much larger in 2011 than in the previous year, a reflection of greater inflows of previously foreign-sheltered capital back to the country.
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combination of subsidization and public-sector banks triggered excessive bad debt and chronic government indebtedness, characterized by double-digit fiscal deficits. The economic system was further compromised by political instability within the country. Torn between conservative Islamists, the fiercely secular military, and economic reformers, no politician or political party had the unity to stand behind much-needed economic reforms until after the turn of the century. The economy was characterized by a spate of stop-and-go economic development. Recession was repeatedly experienced. Rising trade, current-account, and budget deficits, high foreign-currency borrowings by banks, and a government at its domestic borrowing limits all put pressure on the lira, which triggered several administrative devaluations. In 2001, the lira crisis delivered the government into the arms of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with a huge bailout package, accompanied by a raft of promises toward fiscal austerity and reforms, including the establishment of a free-floating lira. The Turkish government continued to receive IMF support until 2008, following the successful completion of a final stand-by agreement. Since the 2001 bailout, economic policy provided the foundation for much more sustainable economic recovery. Key to the success has been the measure of political stability afforded the country by the rise of a single-party government controlled by the moderate Islamic Justice and Development (AK) Party. The AK Party, for their part, embarked upon IMF-mandated reforms that have bolstered the independence of the financial sector and slowly have begun withdrawing the government from the economy. Investors slowly began returning to the economy as the lira crisis faded, leading to equity and bond price rises. Economic Strategy The coming to power of the AK Party solidified a reformist program aimed at breaking decades of corporate mismanagement and ingrained, inflationary expectations. Those policies activated by the AK Party include: A free float of the currency that redistributes stress on inflation control elsewhere among monetary authorities and provides an early warning to potential balance-of-payment crises. The central bank has been granted operating authority over interest-rate policy. The government has maintained a large primary fiscal surplus, even though it has waned somewhat in recent years. The interest costs of debt servicing exact a heavy burden, demanding ambitious surplus targets. Inflation has been falling, now generally running at its lowest levels in over 30 years. Widespread structural reforms have been undertaken, most particularly in the banking system. Economic reforms were conducted in close consultation, if not always in exact harmony, with the IMF. Even given the impressive progress made since 2001, the country remains vulnerable to international crises and relapses of its crisis-prone history. In fact, reforms initiated since 2001 have helped to limit the severity of economic disruption. In addition, with both a comfortable reserve base and flexibility within the currency, the authorities are much better equipped to defend against exogenous shocks than they had been previously. This level of advancement was demonstrated during the 200809 global economic crisis and the ongoing Eurozone debt crisis. While the country has been hurt by the weight of the international downturn, enacted reforms have helped avert a larger collapse of the type seen in many other countries of the region.
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people per square kilometer. We expect that the process of urbanization will continue at similar rates to those witnessed in the last several years. For comparison, the urban population reached 44 million people in 2000, or 65% of total population, up from 60% some 10 years earlier. The Turkish population is and will continue to be one of the youngest in Europe, with 58% of the population below 30 years of age. According to a 2000 census, 32.8% of the population was under 14 years and 62% was in the age group of 15-64 years. The number of elderlyrepresented by the population aged above 65 yearsgrew to 5.3% of the total population. The number of people below 30 years of age is projected to increase to 41.7 million by 2015, but their share of the total population will decrease to 51%. From 1999 to 2015, this represents a total fall of 14% in this age bracket. Official unemployment in the country is given at around 1015% of the workforce. There are those who believe the true level of unemployment within the country is underreported and the real level is actually five percentage points higher. On the other hand, extensive black market operations may make actual unemployment much lower that what is officially reported, with many workers operating outside of official measure. Another potential cause for the difference in unemployment rates is accounted for by differing estimates in the labor participation rate. At a little less than half the total population, Turkey has one of the lowest labor participation rates in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a figure that has actually been in decline over recent decades. This low participation rate is primarily due to the lack of female participation in the economy, a problem that is only slowly being addressed. As more women enter the labor force, demand for employment will rise, putting further stress on the countrys lack of job creation. Unemployment levels have been slow to fall with public-sector restructuring, particularly with reference to state and quasi-state concerns.
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system under the country's credit package with the IMF is in a position of much better health. By 2005, non-performing loans (NPLs) as a percentage of total loan assets were down to below 10%well under the near-30% level that NPLs reached in 2001. To achieve such improvement, the government allowed a significant influx of foreign participation, although unlike many of the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the majority of banking assets remained in Turkish hands, limiting the country's exposure to the European banking debt problems of 2009 and 2010. In fact, the country's financial system came through the global crisis with flying colors, providing a source of potential growth for the near future. In 2011 and now into 2012, there are worries that the banking system is once again facing troubles, with asset quality rapidly deteriorating because of the sustained, rapid expansion of the system. However, compared with the banking systems of Europe, Turkeys remains relatively worry-free. The bourse is relatively young, with the Istanbul exchange being founded in 1985. Although it remains extremely small and of little impact on the economy as a whole, it is one of the livelier among emerging markets, with over half of stock traded being held by foreigners. Foreigners have been able to trade unrestricted on the exchange since 1989. Indeed, one of the weaknesses of the exchange has been a lack of domestic funds for investment, stifled by the heavy presence of banks within the economy. Thus, during times when global capital is averse to riskier economies, the bourse takes a heavy hit. In keeping with the nature of the rest of the economy, the exchange suffered from notable volatility in its beginning, although it has been much steadier in recent years. There is the belief in the country that as banking reform continues, deeper capital markets will provide a more solid financing base to further future growth.
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8. Public Admin. and Defense 9. Education 10. Land Transport Top-10 Total
Source: World Industry Service, IHS Global Insight, Inc. Updated: 17 Jul 2012
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United Kingdom Italy France Iraq Russia United States Spain United Arab Emirates Iran
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade
Germany China United States Italy France Iran Spain South Korea United Kingdom
Turkey: Major Trading Partners, 2000 EXPORTS Country Germany United States United Kingdom Italy France Netherlands Spain Israel Belgium Russia
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade
IMPORTS Billions of USD 5.2 3.1 2.0 1.8 1.7 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6 Percent Share 18.6 11.3 7.3 6.4 6.0 3.1 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.3 Country Germany Italy United States Russia France United Kingdom Spain Belgium Japan Netherlands Billions of USD 7.2 4.3 3.9 3.9 3.5 2.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 Percent Share 13.2 7.9 7.2 7.1 6.5 5.0 3.1 3.0 3.0 2.9
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credit penetration is still relatively low in the country, particularly the use of credit cards. The banking sector is stable and eager to expand consumer credit opportunities, so once the current regional malaise lifts, consumption growth could revive rapidly. This comparatively strong medium-term outlook for domestic demand has a rather large drawback in that it will prevent a rapid improvement in the dangerously large current-account deficit. The government will need to do a better job attracting more stable foreign direct investment inflows to help financing the sure-to-be large gap through the next several years. To address the current-account deficit, structural reforms are needed to make the country less import dependent, while a greater effort to contain domestic demand is needed. The government is promising such reforms, but much must be done before a meaningful change is noted. For now, financing the current-account deficit is a major risk for the country, particularly as incoming capital will be diverted in the short and medium term to finance still-large fiscal gaps and onerous debt-repayment obligations. Turkey's longer-term economic outlook remains clouded by continuing doubts regarding the country's prospects of membership in the EU. When the accession process formally began in October 2005, it was widely assumed that the path would be long and fraught with problems. Final accession was initially widely assumed to come no earlier than 2015. Nevertheless, even these relatively guarded assessments of the process have proven to be extremely optimistic, as rumors of potential derailment of the process have persisted in both Brussels and Ankara. Right now, it is unlikely that the country will actually achieve EU membership for the foreseeable future (certainly not any sooner than 10 years out). In recent annual reports regarding Turkish accession, the European Commission criticized a lack of movement on several key reform areas. The 200809 global crisis and ongoing Eurozone crisis only served to derail needed reforms further, particularly privatization efforts. Moreover, continuing institutional crises within Turkeybetween the government and the military, between the government and the judiciaryfurther undermine forward momentum, suspending potential progress in reforms. Although EU-based reports have remained relatively optimistic about both the overall movement toward accession and the prospects, an impasse over Turkeys refusal to recognize Cyprus has created a significant stumbling block. Even without the Cyprus issue, doubts from within the EU, particularly France, are growing, potentially forcing an early ultimatum as to the accession process. It is now increasingly possible that the accession process might be terminated from either the EU or the Turkish side, as Turkish citizens are growing disaffected from the movement, largely as a reaction to EU hesitation. If the overall accession process is derailed, the medium-term economic forecast would be affected. Nevertheless, our baseline expectation is that these negotiations will indeed continue, although not necessarily to ultimate fruition. In any case, the general push of reforms that we assume will happen to facilitate EU accession will likely continue, regardless of the official EU prospects for Turkey. If accession is formally off the table, we expect that the Turkish economy will continue to become integrated with that of the EU. In fact, denial of full membership, which politically could be severely damaging, may free the Turkish economy somewhat, allowing the country to avoid some of the more restrictive or burdensome reforms demanded by the EU. As the economy evolves to become more integrated with the EU, the value-added contribution to GDP will shift significantly. Services are expected to grow the most rapidly over the medium and longer term, as the countrys tourism undergoes a radical transformation and evolution. The country is aggressively attempting to de-emphasize agricultural production, hoping to relocate agrarian workers into higher-technology and higher value-added manufacturing sectors. The 200809 economic downturn set this process back somewhat, with a loss of industrial employment once again pushing agricultural employment upwards. Nevertheless, we anticipate that the push towards higher technology will once again resume, driving down the influence of low-tech sectorsin particular textiles and clothing. Economic development will center on Istanbul but increasingly push to the east. The countrys position as an energy middleman will continue to develop, with investment flows heavy in developing new energy pipelines to bring in raw energy products from the East and to export refined energy products to the West. As such, Ankara has been aggressive in signing deals that deliver Central Asian gas to European markets. As discussed previously, the substantial current-account deficit will present severe downside risks to the country's sovereign debts throughout the short and medium term, only slowly easing in the longer term. Although the recovery in import demand in the short term will be sharply stronger than the subsequent revival in exportspartly due to the stronger lirawe nonetheless expect export growth to recover fully further out, contributing to a slow narrowing of the current-account deficit in the longer term. Nevertheless, given that the deficit will remain fairly large for quite some time
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at 3.0% of GDP or more until around 2025, financing will remain a major threat to Turkish stability. As such, external debt will remain a constant threat, potentially running up rapidly if investment inflows are ever compromised. Slowly, an influx of more substantial foreign direct investment inflows should help alleviate the country's reliance on debt financing. These foreign investment inflows will also help to buoy longer-term economic growth, bringing with them technology transfers that should help boost the country's productivity levels.
Andrew Birch
1. Surging Gold Exports to Iran Contribute to Sharp Reduction in Turkish Trade Deficit in H1 01 AUG 2012
Economic
2. Turkish Leading Production Indicators Support Soft Landing Expectation 26 JUL 2012
Economic
3. Turkish Central Bank Keeps Interest Rates Unchanged But Increases Domestic Liquidity 20 JUL 2012
Economic
4. Turkish Consumers Remain Wary Despite Modest Labour Market Gains 17 JUL 2012
5. Turkey's Current-Account Deficit Continues to Narrow Sharply, Buoying Domestic Markets 12 JUL 2012
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Economic
6. Turkish Growth Indicators Continue to Surprise on the Upside Although Budget Data Disappoints 10 JUL 2012
Economic - Country
Economic
Economic
9. Turkish Central Bank Keeps Interest Rates Steady Once Again in June 22 JUN 2012
10. Moody's Upgrades Turkish Sovereign Risk Rating to One Notch Below Investment Grade 21 JUN 2012
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