ASYMMETRIC

TACTICAL TRAINING
Richard J. Campbell

ASYMMETRIC TACTICAL TRAINING

Richard J. Campbell

Copyright 2010 by Richard J. Campbell. 79410-CAMP Library of Congress Control Number: 2010907628 ISBN: Softcover 978-1-4535-1035-3 Hardcover 978-1-4535-1036-0 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the copyright owner. This book was printed in the United States of America. To order additional copies of this book, contact: Xlibris Corporation 1-888-795-4274 www.Xlibris.com Orders@Xlibris.com

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I CHAPTER ONE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 US ARMY TRAINING CHAPTER TWO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 US CAPABILITIES CHAPTER THREE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 ARMY TRAINING RIGHT NOW Ethical Guidelines, 50 Needed Improvements,57 CHAPTER FOUR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 ASYMMETRIC TACTICAL-LEVEL TRAINING RESEARCH DESIGN AND ANALYZE, 62 Principles of Training Development, 62 Fundamentals, Principles, Tenets, Imperatives, 65 Determine the Presentation Concept, 69 CHAPTER FIVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 DEVELOP AND ANALYZE Fundamentals of Instruction, 89 CHAPTER SIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 IMPLEMENT AND ANALYZE INTERNET RESOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure # 1, Civilians on the battleeld. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Figure # 2, Realistic training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Figure # 3, Role-players. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Figure # 4, Role-players. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Figure # 5, Ramadan call to prayer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Figure # 6, Woman praying in separate area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Figure # 7, QDR 2001 Transformational change. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Figure # 8, Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Figure # 9, USAF Predator armed with Hellre missile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Figure # 10, RQ-1A/B Predator UAV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Figure # 11, RQ-1A/B Predator UAV.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Figure # 12, Shadow RQ-7A TUAV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Figure # 13, HIIDE TM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Figure # 14, Panasonic Toughbook w/ Biometric Automated Tool-set (BAT). . . . . . . . . . 24 Figure # 15, Marines using BAT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Figure # 16, BAT Iris Scanner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Figure # 17, Robot operator and console. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Figure # 18, Talon robot. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Figure # 19, Operator and console. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Figure # 20, Robot.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Figure # 21, Category I MRAP w/ ballistic plates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Figure # 22, Category II MRAP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Figure # 23, Blast protected shape of the MRAP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Figure # 24, MRAP with CREW devices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Figure # 25, Buffalo used for route clearance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Figure # 26, SAT Training Development Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Figure # 27, Task prociency matrix. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Figure # 28, Training camp on the Kuwait Iraq border.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Figure # 29, Camp in Afghanistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Figure # 30, Terrain in Afghanistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 Figure # 31, Airbase in Afghanistan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 Figure # 32, Principles of ethical conduct. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Figure # 33, Phases of development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Figure # 34, Principles of training development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Figure # 35, Categories or levels of training.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 Figure # 36, Echelons of training. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Figure # 37, Categorization and classication matrix. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 Figure # 38, Design and the teaching and learning goal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Figure # 39, Teaching and learning environment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 Figure # 40, Fundamentals of instruction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 Figure # 41, Capabilities template. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 Figure # 42, Mission chart. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Figure # 43, Mission chart II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Figure # 44, Mission diagram, (Phase I).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Figure # 45, Mission diagram, (Phase Il). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Figure # 46, Floor plan of target house. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Figure # 47, Learning goals and corresponding basis model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 Figure # 48, Decision Tree for IED and EFPs in a units AO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 Figure # 49, Task training or advanced training?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 Figure # 50, Task training or advanced training?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

Introduction
Hard men have hard ways. Louis L Amour This book is dedicated to the men and women who are serving in the US military. I hope the information helps you with your dangerous job.

Chapter 1 of this book explores the many reasons why the US Army should improve military training. One of the primary reasons why training needs to be improved is the worldwide increase in asymmetric warfare. Along with this increase in irregular tactics, the world has also seen a signicant and deadly increase in the manufacturing, distribution, and use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). IEDs have been the weapon of choice in unconventional conicts for some time now. With these facts in mind, the book focuses on and discusses, in detail, a procedure for the design, development, analysis, and presentation of asymmetric tactical training. The term asymmetric tactical training includes all facets of IED and counter-IED (C-IED) training, as well as other insurgency-counterinsurgency-, or unconventional warfare-related classes, curriculum, or courses designed for training at the tactical level. The capabilities-based defense strategy and the military transformation are also explained in chapter 1. Some of the newest capabilities of the military are discussed in chapter 2. Chapter 3 of the book looks at how the US Army is training today. The task, conditions, and standards format and the crawl, walk, and run model are explored. Chapters 4, 5, and 6 of the book present a recommended training development (TD) process for asymmetric tactical training. These same chapters also provide a set of usable fundamentals and principles for trainers and curriculum developers. There is much valuable insight about military training in these chapters too. Plus, in chapters 4, 5, and 6, a number of teaching and learning models are explained. The book then illustrates how teaching models are combined with learning models; the end result is a very manageable and extremely effective instructional model. The glossary and reference sections within the book provide a list of military acronyms, some useful references, and many Internet resources. The TD process in this book was designed specically for the US Army and is intended for asymmetric tactical training. It can be used by both military and civilians in each of the training domains. The content of the book can also be used to create a certication course for military trainers. The term military trainer includes all active duty and civilian personnel that are acting as teachers, instructors, observer controllers (O/C), trainers, mentors, curriculum developers, and program managers. The term also describes certain individuals that work in S-3, G3, J3, or US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) positions since development is a part of those jobs too. The difference between a program manager, curriculum/training developer, instructor and/or O/C is an academic degree. Program managers should have a masters degree or PhD. and successful experiences in the eld he or she was hired to manage. An advanced degree in business, teaching, sociology, or psychology is an example
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of this. Training developers should have a masters degree and successful experiences, or a 4-year college degree and more successful experiences in the area he or she was hired to instruct in and manage. The TD process provides a standardized way to design, develop, analyze, and present asymmetric tactical training. The TD process also establishes a way to enhance quality control (QC) and quality assurance (QA) across all three training domains. However, the content of the book should not be considered stand-alone information, because the observations, insights, and recommendations in this book are not ofcial policy. The research for this book was conducted by the author as he performed the duties of an instructor, curriculum developer, and independent researcher, both in and out of the military. A portion of the material is therefore phenomenographic. That is, the observations, insights, and recommendations are from a real instructor, who developed real courses and taught real people in a number of real training environments. As dened, phenomenographic observations look for a description, analysis, and understanding of . . .experiences (Marton 1981, 180) In this case, the experiences of soldiers being trained and the experiences of the instructor who trained them were examined from an empirically based qualitative and, when possible, quantitative stance. For instance, training experiences were examined, and then meta-analysis was used to compare and select appropriate scientically substantiated teaching and learning models for integration into training. The opinions, views, recommendations, and suggestions in this book are the authors and the authors alone. They do not represent the views, opinions, suggestions, or recommendations of the US government, the Department of Defense (DOD), or the US Army. Nor does the content of this book represent the views or opinions of any civilian company or organization.

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CHAPTER ONE

Figure # 1, Civilians on the battleeld. (Picture by the author)

US ARMY TRAINING There are many reasons why the US Army needs to improve training. One of the primary reasons is the global increase in asymmetric wars. Conventional wars are still a major concern; but more and more we see unstable, transient, or semiautonomous governments being intimidated, coerced, bullied, and manipulated by terrorists. The antisocial groups that use unconventional tactics dont follow any rules and dont care if they injure or kill civilians. Government and civilian targets alike are bombed and attacked with little or no concern. In fact, most attacks are against easy targets, and more often than not, that means civilians. These soft targets usually have little or no security, so theyre easy to attack and its easy to get away after the attack. Sometimes the goal of these groups is nothing more than publicity. Other times, they have a religious or political cause. In a few cases, irregular tactics have resulted in the actual overthrow of established sovereign governments. Combating loosely organized and sometimes well-funded terrorist groups is a difcult, dangerous, and fast-paced job. History shows us that terrorism has been dealt with in many ways; some of these ways worked and some didnt. This book looks at training for counter-insurgency operations. The training for a small war can be viewed from two perspectives. The rst perceptive is from the soldier whos on the ground trying to deal with insurgency tactics. A soldier in the middle of an asymmetric war would agree increased survivability would be a good thing. Right now US soldiers are in several places in the world where nontraditional tactics are
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being used, so any training designed for asymmetric wars that improves survivability would be welcomed. The tactics on the battleeld have changed, so too has the role and duties of the soldier. In asymmetric conicts, soldiers are required to interact more with the indigenous population, civilian police, and foreign military personnel. Interaction with others, in these circumstances, requires advanced training. One way to increase soldier survivability in these situations is with knowledge of the cultural, economic, political, social, and religious norms. From the soldiers point of view, soldiers are required to have more individual initiative in unconventional wars. This is another reason for better training. Consider the following. The new counterinsurgency (COIN) manual tells commanders to communicate an understanding of the problem, purpose, and context to subordinates, because this allows them to exercise initiative (Field Manual [FM] 3-24, 2006 4-4 and 4-16). A subordinates initiative is dened as an assumption of responsibility for deciding and initiating independent actions (FM 6-0 2003, 2-832-92). Being told the commanders intent and realizing the commanders expected goals enables subordinates to work-through the gray areas of a situation. The commanders intent provides soldiers with guidance and direction. Knowing the desired end result and the established boundaries gives subordinates limits and freedom at the same time. Tactical commanders expect soldiers to have more initiative, so they plan for it and actually depend upon it. Another section of the same FM lists empowering the lowest levels as an important contemporary imperative or principle of a modern COIN campaign (FM 3-24 2006, 1-26). The same manual also says that a successful mission is the result of subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the commanders intent to accomplish the mission (FM 3-24, 2006, 1-26, 1-145). Individuals and small unit leaders are therefore expected to show initiative. If soldiers and small unit leaders are required to use more initiative, then it makes sense to develop initiative during training. Soldiers are also expected, like never than before, to deal with adversity. They are told to assess the situation, adapt, and bounce-back. So resiliency is yet another reason for improved training. More so today, soldiers have to possess a set of skillsnot just one way to deal with a problem, but several ways. Some call these coping skills, others call it combat wisdom, and still more call it resiliency. A better understanding of any subject can come from schooling and a learning environment. An improved education can also come from making mistakes. Book-learning is one thing and practical experience is another. Together they make a seasoned, well-trained, and knowledgeable veteran. Right now, a soldiers kit-bag has to be full of usable tools, skills, and ideas, from both schooling and personal experiences. DOD documents use terms like intellectual interoperability, critical thinking, higher-order cognitive skills, changing behavior, cognitive domain, socio-cognitive activity, cognitive agility, and a focus on human behavior to describe resiliency. One reference talks about the adaptive level, of a soldier which focuses on unforeseen events and problems. The reference says the adaptive level is aligned with the cognitive agility and innovative abilities of individuals and units (Ofce of the Under Sec. Def., Personnel and Readiness Director 2003, 16). To improve this adaptive level another document concludes the following;

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The most signicant difference will be how we apply advanced and dynamic technology to create . . .a fully integrated, relevant training environment that seamlessly merges training across the institution, unit, home station, Combat Training Center, and deployed theaters (TRADOC Pam 52597 2006, 19). Task training is the main form of training the US Army uses today. Task training was created for conventional forms of war, not for counter-insurgency operations. Task training was designed specically for repetitive tasks that do not require much thought after the task is learned. Task training and/or skills training were not designed to develop individual initiative, higher-order cognitive skills, cognitive agility, or adaptability. Today soldiers are required think. They are faced with complex situations, and then have to remember information they were taught, and then have to act or react accordingly. Escalation of force (EOF), rules of engagement (ROE), personnel and vehicle search, clearing a house, searching a house for IEDs or homemade made-explosives (HME), and tactical questioning (TQ) are some of the jobs soldiers are doing today. These jobs require assessment skills, analytical reasoning, and the ability to make collaborative decisions in a timely manner. As a result, task training does not fully prepare soldiers for asymmetric conicts. Again from the soldiers view, another reason for better training is the amount of information a soldier has to know. The information is somewhat technical, covers a wide variety of topics, and comes from a wide array of sources. For example, a soldier should know general knowledge about trafc control point (TCP) operations (Ops). If a soldier does some research on the topic, he or she will nd; the CALL Handbook No. 06-15, titled Trafc Control Point Operations, dated 2006; the CALL Escalation of Force Conference Packet, dated 26-27 March 2007, and the CALL Escalation of Force Handbook, dated July 2007. The unpublished initial draft for Reconnaissance, FM 3-20.971, dated July 2007, also addresses the subject. Additionally, there is the Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons, dated October 2007, and the Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations that covers blocking positions. Historically speaking, there are also Ranger Playbooks from the early 80s that talk about blocking positions too. The new Counterinsurgency FM 3-24 also discusses TCP tactics. This list does not include unit standard operating procedures (SOPs) or unit tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). This list is more than 1,500 pages of information. It would take an average soldier several days just to sort through the material and weeks, if not months, to read the documents. The same soldier is also required to know an ever-increasing amount of specic knowledge, depending upon his or her rank. There is specic information from Skill Level 1 Common Task List and Skill Levels, 2, 3, and 4. Skill Level 1 alone has 734 pages. This page count does not include the military occupational specialty (MOS)-specic material for various MOSs and grades. For training purposes, there is doctrinal material, non-doctrinal information like CALL, ad-hoc training sites like the Intermediate Search course in Baghdad, and of course unit SOPs, warrior tasks (WTs), and battle drills (BTDs). Right now, our soldiers are dealing with an information glut.

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Figure # 2, Realistic training. (Picture by the author)

DOD has to provide our men and women with training that actually helps them to learn more of the right material in a succinct and timely manner. Training should support soldiers in their quest for traditional knowledge and assist them with the dissemination of newly developed knowledge. Today like never before, our service members are confronted with a vast amount and wide array of educational and real-world information from a multitude of competing sources. First they have to be taught it, then they have to remember it, and then they have to be able to use it. It would be wise to have an information lter incorporated into the system, so training is made more effective, efcient, worthy, and worthwhile. A soldiers life could depend upon what he or she is told, and it could depend upon what he or she isnt told. Looking at it from the soldiers angle, new developments in the eld of educational psychology could be leveraged to provide advance training for the individual. Especially since the task, conditions, and standards model hasnt been up-dated for some time now. The idea of using advanced psychological concepts from the private sector is not a new idea. In fact, during both World War I (WWI) and II (WWII), early versions of intelligence tests were used to screen out incapable and undesirable draftees. We also know that as early as WWII, candidates for the US Air Corps were put through extensive psychological assessments that included perception tests, psychomotor skills tests, and simulations tests (Hunt 1993, 325). The intent of the aptitude testing was to screen individuals for pilot, navigator, bombardiers, and aerial gunner training. In 1941, Douglas Bray from AT&T was one of the individuals who helped to create these easily administered paper-and-pencil assessment measures (Hunt 1993, 612). These measures were some of the rst attempts by psychologists to use formal assessments, at the individual level, for military purposes. In the 1940s, Henry Murray, along with other psychologists, created an assessment test that was used along with a selection trial for candidates of the Ofce of Strategic Services (OSS). The OSS was the earlier version of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The OSS
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assessments utilized personality tests or proles, and observations of the candidates in unusual and ambiguous situations (Hunt 1993, 611). The intelligence agent recruits were taken to an isolated estate and put through a three-day interview and questioning process. They faced challenging and difcult tasks and were provided no rules or guidance on how to accomplish them. Their behavior was then observed. During this phase, they were even questioned under the inuence of alcohol. Leadership ability, stress and frustration thresholds, interpersonal relationships, and initiative and ingenuity were some of the specic areas that were rated by psychologists. Later on in 1984, still more joint civilian military research took place. The Army Research Institute along with a few psychologists attempted to explore several individual performanceenhancing techniques for the US military. They looked at training regiments like massed practice, spacing of practice, and mental practice of motor skills. The results of the studies were published in 1988 and 1991 (Hunt 1993, 607). Today, CIA candidates and some military personnel in high-risk assignments still undergo a thorough assessment and selection process. The tests being used for such assessments and psychological proling include forensic measures like the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), California Personality Inventory (CPI), and the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). For a soldier, the reasons why training needs to be improved are: Worldwide increase in asymmetric warfare. To enhance survivability in unconventional conicts. Adaptability, initiative, and resiliency are now expected behaviors. Task-based training does not fully prepare soldiers for irregular warfare. Soldiers have to know more, think more, and remember more information. Advancements in educational/psychology can be leveraged to improve training.

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Figure # 3, Role-players. (Picture by the author)

Figure # 4, Role-players. (Picture by the author)

The second way to look at asymmetric warfare is from the perspective of political and military leaders. The Washington D.C. crowd sees the increase in small wars from a much larger management, organizational, and strategic point of view. For instance, in early 2001 a new strategy for the defense of the United States was announced, but the details of the strategy werent given until after the attack on the Pentagon and twin towers. The objective of

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the new strategy was to shift the basis of defense planning from a threat-based model . . . to a capabilities-based model (Quadrennial Defense Review 2001 [QDR 2001], iv). The QDR 2001 said the primary reasons for the shift were based on the growing concerns about the worldwide increase in asymmetric warfare and our nations asymmetric vulnerabilities. Asymmetric warfare is not new, but the use of asymmetric warfare on a large scale is. The incidents that occurred on 9/11 in New York underscored the importance of the capabilitiesbased model and supported the idea of a complete military transformation. The capabilities based strategy was built around four specic defense goals. They were: Assuring allies and friends of the United States steadiness of purpose and its capability to fulll its security commitments, dissuading adversaries from undertaking programs or operations that could threaten US interests or those of our allies and friends, deterring aggression and coercion by deploying forward the capacity to swiftly defeat attacks and impose severe penalties for aggression on an adversarys military capacity and supporting infrastructure, and decisively defeating any adversary if deterrence fails.

These four goals were central to what was called a shift in the basis of defense planning. The objective was to change defense planning from a threat-based model to a more advanced, realistic, and more accurate capabilities-based model (QDR 2001, V). This new strategy also took into-account the highly unpredictable, erratic, mercurial, and antisocial nature of some political and nonpolitical elements in the world. It was felt that a capabilities-based model was more accurate in respect to the identication of how adversaries of the U.S. and its allies might wage a war or ght a conict, instead of whom the adversary might be, or where the conict may occur. So a shift in defense strategy was one way to deal with the increase in asymmetric tactics and a transformation of the military was a-part of the larger strategy shift. A shift in the defense strategy and a military transformation both require improved training. According to the Washington crowd, these are the rst two reasons why training should be enhanced. Lets look at the rest of the reasons.

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Figure # 5, Ramadan call to prayer. (picture by the author)

Figure # 6, Woman praying in separate area. (Picture by the author)

The shift from a threat-based to a capabilities-based approach is exactly why global intelligence plays such a critical role in defense planning and execution. Human intelligence (HUMINT); emerging technologies; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), which include sensors such as imagery intelligence (IMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT); along with collaborative operations and tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination are all vital elements of the approach (FM 2-22.3, 2006, 45). Individual soldiers should take note of this fact and military leaders
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should realize soldiers need to be taught how to gather intelligence correctly before they will be able to do it effectively. With the current task-based training guidelines it would be rather difcult, if not impossible, to design a set of task, conditions, and standards for such intellectual and abstract operations. In fact, how are these topics being taught right now? Increased ISR capabilities is yet another reason for improved training. A capabilities based approach also looks at the capabilities of US forces in a critical manner. In the QDR 2001, under the subtitle Developing Transformational Capabilities, the following quote can be found: A fundamental challenge confronting DOD is ensuring that US forces have the capabilities they need to carry out the new defense strategy (QDR 2001, 40). The enhanced US military capabilities should include information operations; access to distant theaters; defending against threats to the US; protecting US assets; allies; interests in space; and the capabilities to exploit US advantages in technology, space, and intelligence. Additionally, exploitation of the militarys sophisticated training and its ability to integrate highly distributed military forces in combinations for complex operations will also be required. The document continues to say, DOD must maintain a strong science and technology (S&T) program that sponsors evolving military needs and ensures technological superiority over potential adversaries (ibid., 41). The decisions presented in the QDR 2001 and the shift in defense planning was our nations reaction to the evolving unpredictable global violence that we see today. The attack on the twin towers in New York in which thousands of innocent people were killed was an unprecedented wake-up call for many and a primary reason for the change in strategy. However, the 2001 QDR also pointed out a number of other reasons for the shift which included our degrading readiness of non-deployed carrier air-wings; our shortfalls in strategic transport aircraft, like ongoing low-readiness of the C-5 airlifter; the neglected readiness of our non-divisional and reserve components and institutional army; and the eroded training and training-related instrumentation and infrastructure (QDR 2001, 50). Plus, the report cited ten years of decaying infrastructure neglect, which includes military housing, runways, piers, training ranges and spaces, hangars, and buildings where DOD personnel worked and lived. Consequently, a transformation of the military was also needed. The military transformation was explained like this: fundamental changes in the conceptualization of war, as well as organizational cultural and behavior dimensions are needed (ibid., 29). A change in the concept of warfare is a change from a conventional mind-set to a more uid unconventional mind-set. A change in organizational culture can be described as a pattern of generally shared basic beliefs and assumptions that members of an organization learn together and then share together. These beliefs and assumptions come about as the group solves problems related to changes they face. The internalization of those changes and how the problems were solved also creates assumptions and beliefs within the group. The term organizational transformation can be described as a change in many aspects of an organization, including its culture, or meaning system, and at all levels of the organization (Lowman 2002, 57). An organizational transformation, the conceptualizations that dene it, and the psychological premises that accompany it were originally developed in the private sector. And more often than not, private sector companies and rms used these concepts for
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the purpose of improved productivity. But a government agency can use the same concepts for similar purposes. When it comes to accomplishing the transformation, another document suggests the use of psychological concepts. The document describes a cognitive domain as an area within a person that holds the intangibles of leadership (Ofce of Force Transformation 2005, 20). The document continues to list those intangibles as morale, unit cohesion, level of training and experience, and situational awareness (ibid.). In the same document, we see that shared sense-making is a socio-cognitive activity because the individuals cognitive activity are directly impacted by the social nature of the exchange (ibid.) and because of this, our focus should be on human behavior (ibid., 1). It all seems rather complicated and abstract. According to published guidance, the scope of the current US military transformation addresses three major areas of concern. The three areas are how we do business inside the Department, how we work with our interagency and multinational partners, and how we ght (Military Transformation: A Strategic Approach 2003, 9). Some of these areas are having more impact, than others, on certain departments within DOD, like how we ght having more impact on the armed service, as compared to how we do business inside the Department. The how we ght portion also has a tremendous impact on training programs and the individual service members. The how we work with (others) portion impacts training and units in a number of ways.
TRANSFORMATIONAL CHANGE Capabilities Paradigm Shift in Operations Force Planning Technical Experimenting With New Approaches Reorienting the US Military Global Posture Change in Concept of War Organizational Cultural Behavior Dimensions Exploiting US Intelligence Science & Technical Procurement Innovations Intellectual Social Institutions Strengthening Joint

Figure # 7, QDR 2001 Transformational change.

Terms like organizational adaptation, learning organization, (O/L) and organizational structures were also used to explain, dene, and describe the transformation. These terms are being mentioned because they are from the eld of organizational psychology. However, the QDR 2001 and the other documents that discussed the transformation did not explain any of the psychological concepts. In fact, when the QDR and the other documents were reviewed in detail, it was very apparent that there were little, if any, details about the psychological aspects
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of the plan. Most if not all of the psychology-based terms were not explained or referenced. Noticeably, the whys and how were missing. With such a complicated and abstract subject, one would think that a brief explanation of the theoretical constructs would be provided. If concepts from organizational psychology were going to be used for such a large undertaking, one would also hope that the various foundational steps would be explained too. The lack of information about organizational psychology is being highlighted because it illustrates the importance of knowing and understanding the commanders intent. Service men and women at all levels of the military should know and understand the commanders intent, especially in this case. If a complete transformation of the US military is directed then, what does DOD want to accomplish with the transformation? Service members involved in an organizational transformation should know what that is, and understand why they are doing it, and understand why the US military is doing what it is doing. Commanders at every echelon should also comprehend the transformation. It should be stressed that many, if not all, practitioners and researchers in the eld of organizational psychology agree with the statement that it is important to know the whys. This is worth repeating; the whys of an organizational transformation are paramount. Experts in the eld of adult education and O/L believe that understanding the underlying philosophy helps to develop an awareness of the basic assumptions and values, and that in turn provides guidelines for making decisions and creating policy (Merriam and Brocket 1997, 16). So each person involved in an organizational transformation should know the whys and they must realize that learning during a transformation has important implications. One author points out that a key process in bridging the theory-to-practice gap is to understand the whys (Gilley, Dean, and Bierema, 16, 2001). Essentially, an understanding of the basic foundational material will enable commanders and NCOs to communicate more effectively with each other and with their subordinates. Clear communication helps maximize understanding and minimizes confusion. Comprehension of the core material will also allow individuals to add to the study and overall subject material. Familiarity with the underpinning of key concepts further provides a valuable resource of research materials. Utilizing published information on the subject will help individuals to answer the whys, but one has to know where to begin and what they are looking for. Being able to explain and discuss the theoretical constructs, basic philosophy, and the whys of an organizational transformation with host-nation counterparts will also enhance their understanding and provide reassurance and condence. When host-nation counterparts understand the assumptions and values and the whys, then they too, in turn, can promote condence and understanding in others and participate more productively. None of this can be accomplished without the whys. In the military, one generally encounters individuals who are goal-oriented and conscience. High achievers typically have good work ethics. Some of the descriptive terms used to describe this type of person are salt of the earth, boy scout, and hard charging. Personality studies show that this type of person likes to have clear guidance, written regulations, and dened rules, so they know exactly what is expected of them. For his type of person, rules make their job or position easier because there are no gray areas and no un-answered questions. The
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rules are apparent and understandable, so their actions are justied and supported by welldened guidelines and boundaries. At this point one might ask, why organizational psychology? Why organizational learning? And more importantly, what are they? And from whence did it all come? The thought behind the answers can be found in the previously mentioned 2001 QDR. The report itself was started before the September 11 attack on the United States, but the attack was so horrendous and unexpected that it dramatically intensied certain areas of concern and modications were made to the report. Prior to the attack, senior leaders had decided, to be effective abroad, America must be safe at home (QDR 2001, III). After the attack the defense goals said: the defense of the US homeland is the highest priority for the US military (Sec. VII, 69). Donald Rumsfeld had his own way to sum up the goals. He said, Adapting to surpriseadapting quickly and decisivelymust therefore be a condition of planning (ibid.). Homeland defense was the number one priority, and being prepared for unpredictable threats was second. And so the capabilities based strategy and the military transformation were initiated. From the Washington D.C. perspective the reasons for improved training are: Training and training sites were neglected for too many years. An increase in asymmetric warfare worldwide prompted policy changes. Enhanced ISR capabilities are an important part of the new defense strategy. The military is undergoing an organizational transformation based on learning.

By denition there are actually a number of things that can cause an organizational transformation. For example, a transformation change can be the result of alterations to an organizations processes and approaches to productivity. A transformational change can also occur because of simultaneous changes in many aspects of an organization. The third cause is the accumulation of many small incremental modications to units or subsystems. This happens when separate units within an organization redesign themselves. Fourth, a transformation can result from planned alterations to the formal conguration of larger elements in an organization. A system redesign or modications to an organizations mission, work climate, and overall strategy can result in transformational change too. Organizational consulting psychology and the use of that eld for the development of organizations, teams, or groups is by far one of the more straightforward areas of psychology that a social, organizational, or counseling psychologist can be involved in. The reason is, primarily the psychologist will be working with functional individuals as compared to dysfunctional individuals that have mental disorders. Dysfunctional individuals, groups, and teams are encountered in an organization, but typically the observed psychopathology is at sub threshold levels. Consulting organizational psychologists are typically used for organizational transitions. Organizational psychologists are properly trained and have the ability to perform organizational assessments, provide guidance, and advice to individuals and groups within organizations. To someone with a degree in psychology, the steps that an organizational psychologist uses are clear-cut and deliberate. But to others that dont
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have a degree in psychology; an organizational transformation can be a complicated and confusing process. Organizational psychologists use organizational theories and well-founded techniques to help organizations and employees with workplace issues. Company mergers, breakups, expansions, downsizing, and other technology-driven changes can be some of these issues. Plus, employee selection, development, training, and advancements could be some of the tasks. An organizational psychologist could also be involved with the leadership and help to guide change. The study of organizational psychology is generally understood as having three domains: O/L or organizational learning, organizational performance (O/P), and organizational change (O/C). Others dene organizational psychology as a combination of two of these domains or describe it as having parts and pieces of all three domains, as in an organizational culture. It depends upon whose book you are reading. The three human resource management domains do overlap, they have similar characteristics, and all three are used for the purposes of organizational development. Each of the domains has strengths and weaknesses. The eld is changing rapidly because of continued development, so it takes a constant effort to keep up with new research techniques. With multiple causes or reasons for an organizational transformation, we see rst-order and second-order changes that are the result of these modications to organizations. Firstorder changes occur within individuals and within organizations. These include changes in routines, activities, issues, and specic circumstances, as well as problems and problemsolving techniques. First-order changes and their assimilation are monitored and checked through assumption testing (Gilley, Dean, and Bierema 2001, 4). Second-order changes are more complex and involve the integration of new practices, processes, procedures, and values. Second-order changes or new elements of philosophy are also checked through assumption testing, but in a more rigorous manner. The intent of second-order changes is to transform the focus, quality, and results of certain activities (Gilley, Dean, and Bierema 2001, 4). Second-order changes are the behavioral components of a transitional change, since second-order changes are what people do. This notable distinction allows us to examine an organizational transformation for progress using quantitative and qualitative measures that address rst- and second-order changes. Thus, assumption testing should be directed toward one of the two areas, or both areas, depending upon what is being tested. Both rst-order and second-order changes are required for the US military transformation. First-order changes are new or different problem-solving strategies and techniques. Secondorder changes are procedures, processes, and behavior. Just thinking about a new way to solve a problem does not mean the problem is xed. An individual or a group has to act on the new idea physically, with their own behavior to rectify the problem. As a result, for purposes of the military transformation, new problem-solving strategies and techniques have to be introduced, and individuals have to be convinced, motivated, and inspired to actually use those techniques. Then the results need to be tested. To test an assumption, you have to rst know what an assumption is. Brookeld dened an assumption as something taken for granted or beliefs one has about the world around them and about reality (1992, 13). Assumptions have also been described as the rules that one uses to guide ones actions and a common set of beliefs and convictions, or wisdom that one relies on when making decisions. Another meaning for an assumption is the conscious
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decision to behave in a certain manner because it is proper. Other authors like Schwinn C. and Schwinn D. believe assumptions are an explicit set of conditions, principles, ethics, and expectations taken to be true about the basis for choosing actions and studying the consequences that follow (1996, 610). Schein said in his book that assumptions are deeper espoused beliefs, values, norms, and rules of behavior that members of the culture use as a way of depicting the culture to themselves and others (2004, 25). Additionally, he stated they are unconscious and taken-for-granted perceptions, thoughts, and feelings. With basic underlying assumptions, he points out that when a particular solution to a given problem works repeatedly, it is used over and over again and is eventually taken for granted. He cites Argyris, who identied this phenomenon as theories-in-practice (Argis 1976, Argis and Schon 1974). Thus, to test any rst- or second-order changes during an organizational transformation, perhaps we would be wise to establish a set of basic assumptions or operational denitions to work with. No matter what the cause, during an organizational transformation, redesign and extensive organizational learning have to occur at all levels. O/L and organizational transformations are integral parts of the same process. The two mechanisms go hand in hand, and a transition cant be accomplished without some type of learning. It should be pointed out that learning is the result of the redesign, and redesign is the result of a transformation. During organizational transformations, certain aspects of the organizations makeup can be examined for efciency. For example, an organizations work process, structure, management, rewards system, training model, and people processes can be analyzed and redesigned to induce behavioral changes. The success of the transformational change is dependent upon the quality of learning, education, and training provided, and not the quantity and the inherent abilities of the individuals and leaders involved in the process. Of course, the receptiveness of the individuals involved in the transition plays an important role too. Studies have shown that some subsystems in organizations can be more effective in establishing learning processes. These subsystems can sometimes change and adapt faster than other subsystems within the same organization. Good and effective leadership in subsystems usually creates a better work environment for learning, and in turn creates a more functional unit. Many consultants in the eld of organizational psychology believe leadership, or the lack thereof, is a key element that will differentiate the effectiveness of any organizational transformation. One can examine an O/L theory better by using a model. To illustrate, an organization, or how an organization learns can be examined and broken down into identiable segments. The changes that are desired are analyzed too. With a model, these discrete parts and pieces provide an improved and more complete understanding of the learning and adaptation process. One particular model theorizes that organizations learn through a four-part process (Jackson et al. 2005). Or basically, organizations learn through acquisition, interpretation, distribution, and then storage of information. The process begins with the acquisition of information that is relevant to the groups goals. Once the information is acquired, it is then interpreted and adopted by the group. The adaptation phase may require some experimentation and/or trial and error to make the information t the specic needs of the group. Next, the information is distributed to other members of the organization in a format or form that is understandable at each members
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level, and that is in line with the intended goals. The information is used for the intended purpose, and the results are examined by the group. An examination of the results can be accomplished in a number of ways. The last process is one of storage of the information and knowledge and the end result of its use. This same four-part model can be used to explain the current system in the US Army. First, individual service members and units acquire information and knowledge through their own experience and experiences. The information is discussed and interpreted through after-action reviews (AARs) and tactical debriefs. Some trial and error or experimentation may be required to make the information t the situation and make the information useful and understandable to all. The information and experiences are then documented in written form and submitted to the US Armys Center for Lessons Learned (CALL). Next, the material is edited, published, and released for dissemination and distribution. Other service members now have access to the information and can use it to their advantage. The information is stored and made easily available in the form of a document within the CALL system. The same four-part O/L theory and model can be applied toward a terrorist organization. The model would show how a terrorist organization would acquire information about a new tactic or weapon system. Books, formal training, or informal instruction from others could be used to gain the information. A recent tactic that has been used in Iraq is a complex attack on a forward operating base (FOB). The FOB is attacked with small arms re and RPGs. The deliberate attack draws the attention of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and other forces in the FOB. Next, a vehicle is used to breach the Entry Control Point (ECP). Finally, a second vehicle loaded with chlorine gas follows the rst vehicle and then detonates. The results of the attack are observed, recorded, stored, and then disseminated to other terrorist groups. Applying this same model would show that the information about a deliberate attack was rst acquired, then planned, after details about the FOB were gathered by members of the group. The basic plan was modied and adapted for the groups intended goals. A specic plan was devised or modied for the particular FOB they wanted to attack. The information or plan was then distributed to other members of the terrorist group for coordination or modication. The results from the attack were recorded and passed on to other terrorist groups, so they too could adapt the success or failures from the attack to their own plans or goals. Taking this O/L theory and model one step further, we can now apply a counterterrorist strategy to deter, disrupt, and interdict the learning process. A wider integration of this approach and a clearer understanding of O/L theories, along with model-building and analysis, could provide an improved method to detect learning signals, learning implicates, and the learning goals of terrorist organizations (Jackson et al. 2005). An organizational transformations based on learning can have a tremendous impact on the organization using it. The defense changes that were announced in 2001 have developed and matured. Since the enactment of the new policies, there has also been time for critical analysis and evaluation. The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR 2006) stated that both civilian and military used 2005 to test, measure, and critique three areas of the new defense strategy and military restructuring. The analysis attempted to test the conclusions of the 2001 QDR, apply important lessons learned from the more than four years of war on terror, and reassess the assumptions about our continuously changing world (QDR 2006, 4). The four years have
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also been used to inform our military and incorporate into DOD a new theory of war. A theory based on technology, speed, innovation, and intelligence (Director, Force Transformation 2005). Network-centric warfare (NCW), as it is called, is an emerging theory of war based on the concepts of nonlinearity, complexity, and chaos (Moffat 2003, 45).

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CHAPTER TWO

US CAPABILITIES

Figure # 8, Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS). (Picture by author)

Persistent Threat Detection System The Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS) is a low-cost, long-endurance, unmanned, and tethered aerostat, sensor system. It is self-contained, self-sufcient, highly mobile and transportable. The current conguration became operational in October of 2004 in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and is still in use there today. The Armys program executive ofce for Intelligence, Electronic Warfare, and Sensors; the project manager for Night Vision, Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition; and the project manager for Robotic and Unmanned Sensors share joint acquisition responsibility for the PTDS. The systems mission is to provide detection for indirect and direct re threats and detection for any other threats in the vicinity of aireld, xed encampments, forward-operating bases, and other vulnerable areas or facilities. The PTDS is a helium-lled, lighter-than-air vehicle that is attached to a mooring system, by way of a high-strength tether. With full-sensor payloads, the PTDS can loft and loiter at altitudes of, or greater than, 2,500 feet above ground level (AGL). The eyes on target capabilities and stand-alone mission of the PTDS is accomplished with day/night, inclement weather, 360-degree detection, surveillance; and/or nd, x, track, and mark target capabilities. The surveillance, communication, and dissemination capabilities
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of the PTDS provide accurate target descriptions in most cases and real-time location of insurgency threats, thereby increasing response time for coalition forces to counter recognized threats. The system is capable of detecting hostile re and can mark ground targets with a laser-illuminating designator for follow-on attack missions. The PTDS can interoperate with a number of other systems. A typical sensor payload may include high-resolution multispectral electro-optic, infrared, and image-intensied modalities integrated through Interim Distributed Common Ground System Army (I-DCGS-A). Plus, there could be a variety of cuing sensors such as Firender Radar (AN/TPQ-36 and 37) and Weapons Surveillance System (WSS) and the unattended Transient Acoustic MASINT System (UTAMS). In a few months, an electro-optical wide area camera system will be available for the PTDS. This newer camera system will produce up to an 864-megapixel direct geo-referenced image in real time. The system will provide an expanded eld of view to cover a much larger area, or it can be used to cover a metropolitan-sized city in a single series of captures. This is accomplished with three side-by-side integrated cameras that provide a high resolution panoramic eld of vision. Ground-sampled distance is below one meter from above 15,000 AGL. Real-time tactical downloading is provided by an onboard JPEG2000 hardware compression from the air platform, and it has full onboard storage for forensic analysis (www. Fbodaily.com; www.spacewar.com; www.geospatialsystems.com). Predator, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) The RQ-1 Predator is a medium-altitude, long-endurance, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that was rst introduced in May 1995. The aircraft has been continually improved ever since. Missions of the Predator include reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition through the use of multisensory imagery and intelligence and direct target engagement. The Predator has a single wing that is centrally mounted low on the body of the fuselage and is maintained and operated just like a full-size aircraft. The single four-cylinder Rotax 912 engine provides 81 hp and can produce up to 104 mph with a cruising speed of 84mph. The craft carries enough aviation grade fuel for approximately 20 hours of ight. The operating ceiling is around 25,000 feet, and the range of the UAV is about 400 miles. All systems on the Predator have backup systems in case of electronic or computer problems. Empty, the aircraft weights about 950 pounds. Its gross weight limit is over 2,200 pounds.

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Figure # 9, USAF Predator armed with Hellre missile. (USAF photo)

During peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Predators performed over 600 missions. In Kosovo, many lessons were learned about the capabilities of the Predator. For instance, since the Predator was unarmed, many targets got away because of the reaction time between target acquisition and the arrival of attack aircrafts. Today, the UAV is armed with the AGM-114 Hellre laser-guided missiles and is now an unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV). During Operation Desert Storm, RQ-2A ew 533 sorties. In October 2001, Hellrearmed Predators were deployed to Afghanistan for intelligence, target acquisition, tracking, and attack missions. Other payloads could include air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles and rockets, GPS satelliteguided bombs, Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM), and air launched cruise missiles (ALCM). Each Predator costs approximately $3 million US, depending upon the actual payload of the craft. The newer RQ-1A/B Predator is a larger, more complete, fully operational system that consists of four air vehicles, a ground control station (GCS), primary satellite linkup, and 55 people to monitor and maintain the system. The UAV is controlled by way of a C-band line-of-sight (LOS) data link or Ku-band satellite data link for beyond line-of-sight operations. A three-person ight crew in the GCS operates the craft along with the help of the ground crew who are responsible for maintenance and movement of the system. The Predator has a nose-mounted color camera that is generally used by the primary operate for takeoffs, landings, and ight control. The instrument ight rated (IFR) pilot ies the craft with a main display console, joystick, keyboard, and rudder pedals. The sensor operator controls the sensors and surveillance cameras to acquire mission information and to acquire, identify, and engage targets. The third operators control station is set up for communication and data manager. This operator also inputs ight plans, global positioning data, and computer-menu data into the vehicles system (www.jetplanes.com; www.modelplanesnews.com).

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Figure # 10, RQ-1A/B Predator UAV. (USAF photo reprinted by www.modelairplanenews.com)

Mission capabilities include a daylight-variable aperture IV camera, a variable aperture infrared camera for low-light and night operations, and synthetic aperture radar for looking through smoke, clouds, and/or haze. The cameras provide full motion video, and the synthetic aperture radar produces still-frame radar images. On the newer RQ-1B, systems like the daylight-variable aperture or infrared electro-optical sensor can be operated simultaneously with the synthetic aperture radar. More technical capabilities of the aircraft include a variable zoom, from 16mm to 160mm, and spotter capabilities of 955mm for the electro-optical daylight sensor. Lens focal lengths are 280mm, 70mm, 19mm/11mm for the infrared day/night sensors. Doppler capabilities are; 560mm, 140mm, and 38/22mm. It also has a one-foot resolution and 4.4km10.8km slant range/1217,000 feet for the synthetic aperture radar day/night sensor with a 600m to 1,100m swath. Limitations of the aircraft include icing conditions, rain, snow, freezing precipitation, high winds at operational altitudes, winds greater than 30 knots on the ground, crosswinds greater than 16 knots, tailwind on T/O greater than 5 knots, and moderate or greater turbulence. The aircraft is also vulnerable to ground re and currently has no stealth technology. Its likely to be targeted at low level altitudes (www.tech.military. com).

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Figure # 11, RQ-1A/B Predator UAV. (USAF photo)

Shadow, Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) The RQ-7A tactical UAV, pictured below, has a double-boom pusher layout and is powered by a UEL AR-741 rotary engine. The short-range lightweight TUAV was developed by the AAI Corporation in the 1990s and was approved for full production by the US Army in 2002. The RQ-7A has non-retractable tricycle-like landing gear for conventional takeoff and landing. It can also be launched from a catapult when runways are not available. The craft also has a tail-hook for short runway arrests. Similar to the Predator, ight operators man the TUAV through a GCS using LOS or nonLOS data links. The Shadow 200 system includes four RQ-7As, 2 mobile GCS, modular mission payloads, launch and recovery equipment, and the required communication gear. The RQ-7A is also equipped with a GPS navigation system. The entire system and the soldiers that operate the system can be transported in four HMMWVs, two of which require trailers. The Shadow was designed as a ground commanders primary day/night reconnaissance, surveillance, target acquisition, and battle damage assessment (BDA) system. A single RQ7A TUAV can provide coverage of a brigade-size area for periods of up to 4 hours, at a distance of 50 kilometers from the launch and recovery site. The Shadow 200 system can provide 12 hours of continuous operations in a 24-hour period, and is capable of surging up to 18 hours within a 24-hour period, for up to 3 days. The aircraft itself is constructed of composite material and has a wingspan of 12.3 feet. It is 11.2 feet long and is powered by a commercially procured 38-hp rotary engine that uses mogas. The three different modular payloads are a commercially bought electro-optic and infrared camera mounted in a sensor turret, an improved Wescam EO/IR sensor, and a synthetic aperture radar/moving target indicator unit (SAR/MTI). The estimated range at loiter speed is about 130 km an hour. The TUAV weighs 328 pounds loaded, 165 pounds empty (www.defenselink.mil; www.globalsecurity.org).
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Figure # 12, Shadow RQ-7A TUAV. (US Army photo)

Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). By far the best source of up-to-date and real-time intelligence for commanders in the eld is the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). The initial setup of the SIPRNET went online 3 March 1994 and has been improved upon ever since. Initially, the SIPRNET WAN (May 1995) was a collection of 31 backbone routers interconnected by high-speed serial links to serve long-haul data transport of secret-level data by DOD subscribers. Initially the secure wireless backbone communications and networking were provided by the InterBrigade Communication System (IBCS). Later the system was called the Secure Mobile Router (SMR). In the future, the plan is to have a completed architecture of worldwide router systems. The SIPRNET replaced the older X.25-based packet switched network Defense Secure Network One (DSNET1), of the Defense Data Network (DDN), as the secret portion of the DISN. The newer updated SIPRNET is now the primary means for secret level connectivity. Connections to the system are achieved by way of base-level networks that provide base router connectivity to the SIPRNET. Transmission services are using smart multiplexer and 51 kbps (kilobit per second) channels. In the future, it should progress to the T1 circuit data rate of 1.544 megabits per second (Mbps) and has the potential for T3 data rates of 45 Mbps. High-speed packet switched service is provided through the use of IP routers. The SIPRNET or router layer of the DISN also supports a national defense C31 requirement, which includes the ability to issue COMSEC keys for the STU-III. This provides secure dialup SIPRNET communication server connections. The SIPRNET supports the DOD-standard Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) service. Approved subscribers within DOD and other approved agencies can send data-grams classied at the Secret-Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals classication level (SECRET-NONFORN).

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Contractor participation in the National Industrial Security Program (NISP) is monitored and controlled by the DSS, which is the Cognizant Security Authority (CSA). The CSA is the Designated Approving Authority (DAA) for the industry-based classied information systems connecting to the SIPRNET. The DSS certies and accredits classied industrial information systems. To gain access, the Government Contracting Authority (GCA) has to sponsor a contractor or contracting agency and then the joint staff validates the GCA sponsorship and forwards the request letter to OSD. They either approve or reject the request. Contractors access is ltered and tracked, and contractors are not allowed unltered access to the SIPRNET. Use is restricted to the contractors role for DOD. The SIPRNET is preferred over the NIPRNET because of its capabilities. Prior to any deployment, leaders and/or staff can utilize an up-to-date, virtual landscape to examine, study, and analyze information from a unit they are replacing in any area of operation (AO). The SIPRNET also has SERE application that relates directly to Safe Areas for Evasion (SAFE). The SIPRNET is also a viable and reliable source of information for MUMINT collectors that need to enhance their knowledgeable about an AOIR (www.fas.org; Intelligence Resource Program, Pentagon). Handheld Interagency Identication Detection Equipment (HIIDE, TM) The HIIDE is a portable, lightweight multimodal device that allows users to collect, match, and store facial photos, ngerprints, biographical data, and iris images of individuals in a eld environment. In stand-alone mode, the collection, enrollment, and recognition device can enroll and store up to 10,000 complete biometric portfolios. A portfolio includes two iris templates, ten ngerprints, and a facial image, and the device can identify any one person from the stored data. The HIIDE was designed for access control; force protection; and tactical, detainee, intelligence, and special operations missions. In the future, there will be 6,664 devices integrated into Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), USMC, ISAF, and SOF units. The capabilities of the HIIDE can be expanded by way of USB cable to include a passport or card reader and external keyboard and mouse.

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Figure # 13, HIIDE TM, (Photo from Securimetrics Incorporated, Biometrics.dod) (Intelligence Resource Program; www.securimetrics.com; www.biometrics.dod.mil)

Panasonic Toughbook w/ Biometric Automated Tool-set (BAT)

Figure # 14, Panasonic Toughbook w/ Biometric Automated Tool-set (BAT). (Photo by author)

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Figure # 15, Marines using BAT. (Dept. of Defense photo) (www.fas.org)

The Biometric Automated Tool-set (BAT) also collects ngerprints, iris scans, facial photos, and biographical data for the purposes of force protection, detainee operations, population control, base access, and IED forensic operations, as well as local-hire screening and intelligence. The BAT was designed to work along with the HIIDE as a docking station. The BAT enrollment station consists of a portable laptop computer or a CF-73-74 Toughbook, digital camera, ngerprint reader, iris scanner, 500GB hard drive, badge printer, and barcode scanner. It can work as a stand-alone unit, or the BAT can be connected to the SIPERNET via hard wire. A secure hard-wire connection to the SIPERNET allows the BAT to access partitioned FBI, CIA, Homeland Security, and INTERPOL databases, and other DOD database resources. Currently there are over 2,000 units deployed worldwide. As of March 2007, biometric success stories include 1.5 million automated biometric identication system entries, 240,764 matches, 167 latent matches, and 193 non-IED-related latent matches. Signicant intelligence statistics are as follows: 9,527 terrorists on DOD biometric watch list, 1,153 tier 1 watch-list individuals (detain if encountered), 18,036 latent prints developed in Iraq, 4,169 in Afghanistan, 9,001 biometric intelligence reports produced, and 1,070 insurgents placed on security hold.

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Figure # 16, BAT Iris Scanner. (Photo from Biometric Task Force, Dept. of the Army)

Talon Robot, Auxiliary Vehicle The Talon Robot, developed by Foster-Miller, a subsidiary of QinetiQ, has been in use by the US military since 2000. It was rst utilized in Bosnia as a means to recover, remove, and dispose of live grenades. Later in 2001, the Talon was employed in search-and-recovery efforts in and around the World Trade Center and other ground zero sites. Talon Robots were later used in Afghanistan by Special Forces units against the Taliban. The remote-controlled vehicle is still being used in Afghanistan and Iraq by military units. In October of 2002, the manufacturer received a ten-year contract from the US Navy to supply Talons for remote reconnaissance and EOD missions. In September of 2005, the manufacturers of the Talon announced that it had a six-year, $257 million indenite delivery/indenite quantity (IDIQ) contract with the US government. The characteristics of the Talon modular system include a double-jointed 64-inch retractable arm with gripper, two-way RF or ber-optic control link, an array of cameras for controller situational awareness, and a portable attach casesized Operator Control Unit (OCU). The battery-powered vehicle can travel at a speed of 4 mph, or it can be slowed down to a creep. The Talon has a four-hour operational life and can be equipped with seven different cameras. It operates at night with infrared and night-vision devices, and can carry more than 200 pounds. It has 60 different congurations. Today, the Talon has been adopted by the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Apprentice program and is being used to recognize and blow in place 105 mm rounds and below. The EODA program trains and certifies individuals as EOD apprentices because of the overall shortages of MOS-trained personnel (www.army-guide.com; www. technologynewsdaily.com).

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Figure # 17, Robot operator and console. (Photo by author)

Figure # 18, Talon robot. (Photo by author)

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The newer next-generation robots are more specialized, more adaptable, more agile, and have more rened optic sensors. They were designed to examine, identify, excavate, and carry IEDs or suspicious objects as big as 155 mm shells. The adjustable lift system can dig under and lift and carry ordnance weighing up to 100 pounds or 45.3 kilograms. The newer vehicles are more rugged, have advanced chassis, are more powerful, and have an improved manipulator arm. The newer robot also has four more sophisticated cameras. There are two arm cameras, one surveillance camera, and a camera to monitor the robot while driving. There are also white lights and IR LED for night operations or limited visibility conditions. The robot system in the next pictures can be used for route clearance, EOD identication and disposal, and checkpoint inspections and checkpoint IED work.

Figure # 19, Operator and console. (Photo by author)

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Figure # 20, Robot. (Photo by author)

Advanced Soldier Sensor Information System and Technology (ASSIST) The goal of the ASSIST program is to improve battleeld awareness and/or situational awareness by exploiting soldier-collected data. Data is dened as topography, human terrain, events, activities, and key observations and experiences. The task will be accomplished with new technologies that support and improve information processing, digitizing, and dissemination. The collection and communication of the data, the accuracy and quality of the data, and the ease of reporting the data all fall within the scope of the program. The task includes improving the ease of reporting and sharing of intelligence. Blue Force Tracker The Blue Force Tracker (BFT) is a system of software and hardened computer hardware that links satellites, sensors, communications devices, vehicles, aircraft, and weapon systems in what is called a seamless digital network. The Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) provides commanders with a secure radio network, beyond-line-of sight friendly-force tracking capabilities, and instant messaging. The rst real-world combat test of the BFT system was during OIF. Northrop Grumman installed the BFT in over 1,200 ground and aviation platforms prior to OIF and installed another 200 platforms for OEF in Afghanistan. During the preceding two years, each division was issued a total of 1,000 units. Before
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the BFT system, a line-of-sight commendation system was used. The BFT utilizes L-Band satellite communications, which can only process small amounts of classied messages. Therefore, the US Army established three operations centers as mission management centers to process and coordinate trafc on the L-Band communications system. The military has been looking at commercial mobile satellite networks to improve the system. Recently, the BFT was patched with a separate system that is used for combat logistic missions. The logistics Movement Tracking System uses the same L-Band communication pathways. So now commanders can see the positions and movements of logistic assets on the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade-and-Below (FBCB2) satellite links (www.military-informationtechnology.com). SOCRATES SOCRATES is very similar to the SIPRNET, but SOCRATES was specically designed with the Special Operations Command in mind. The mission of SOCRATES is to provide unprecedented access to both national and specially focused intelligence products for USSOCOM and its component commands (Marshell 2003, 4). SOCRATES does this by providing C2, planning, collection, collaboration, and data processing abilities through a secure Web-based architecture. It also provides video mapping, a wide range of automated intelligence, analysis, intelligence dissemination, imagery tools and applications, and secondary imagery dissemination as well as open news and trafc sources. Secure information access includes SOF, DOD, national, counterterrorism, and counternarcotics databases and direct access to all unied commands. The program is a secure intelligence automation architecture that directly supports USSOCOMs global mission with a seamless and interoperable communication network. Command Post of the Future (CPOF) CPOF is a second-generation software environment and networked distributed architecture that was developed for ground commanders and a need for increased situational awareness. In its current conguration, CPOF provides a Division (DIV) commander direct access to each of his various brigade combat team (BCT) commanders, via live feed. While sitting at an individual PC-based workstation, a DIV commander can instantaneously and simultaneously brief his BCT commanders even though they are miles away at different locations. He can also view real-time Blue and Red Force locations, receive visual updates on a situational map that all the commanders can see, and view personnel and logistical data and planning schedules. The DIV commander can utilize a time slider or snail-trail tool to show troop movements over time, too. The Command Sight module has an interactive, three-dimensional map display that displays actual force structure and location. The BCT commanders will of course hear and see the Div commander during the brieng and can consult with the Div or other BCT commanders in real time. Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), advanced intuitive graphic interface (GUI), and the resulting liquid information and thought visualization processes are some of the more radical and innovative characteristics of the system. Data becomes module or liquid since
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each commander can shift or move data and input the data into various viewing spaces, or keep data in a separate viewing area. With the combined voice, visual, data, and graphic representations, CPOF was designed to provoke thought visualization. For instance, CPOF allows the sender to transfer information, knowledge, and understanding to a receiver without the traditional need for an expanded explanation. As soon as the data is posted on the system, it is available to others. Each workstation has visual tools and palettes that can be used to draw, highlight, and access an individual workspace or pasteboard that can be viewed by others. The software has a shared workspace that others can access as well. The shared workspace is organized by tabs and has a master schedule, sitrep table, and salute table. The end result is improved course of action development, increased situational awareness, and a mission-focused collaborative command environment. The CPOF effort was started in 1999 by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) as a spiral model of development project. DARP selected and funded the IT team and managed the consultants from IDA research. They also selected the active duty and retired command and staff ofcers for the collaborative effort. In late 2003, CPOF underwent a nal test using active duty units at Fort Hood, Texas, for the elding evaluations. After that, CPOF was deployed with the 1st Calvary DIV to Baghdad in March of 2004, and then with the 3rd ID in 2005. In August of 2004, DOD and the Army awarded a $33-million, 20-month contract to expand and develop the CPOF software and overall system. Lessons learned from using the system in Baghdad were the basis of that development contract. In February 2005, the subsequent operational assessment and evaluation determined that CPOF did improve situational awareness, increased clarity of information, and decreased the time required for the decision-making process. The system also reduced the need for a large staff section and almost done away with the idea of a tactical command center (TOC) since commanders can operate on the move without a xed TOC. Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) The MRAP is a story of US Marine Corps ingenuity and know-how, with a development system thrown in for good measure. During both the Iraqi Freedom and Afghanistan Enduring Freedom operations, many injuries and deaths were caused by unconventional warfare and the use of IEDs and explosively formed projectiles (EFPs). Some estimates indicated that 70% of all US casualties were caused by IEDs and EFPs. In response to this threat, as early as 2004, Marines started using whatever steel they could nd to improve the armor protection on their vehicles. Eventually, these efforts lead to the design and acquisition of Marine Armor Kits (MAKs) for HWWMVs, and Marine Armor Systems (MASs) for their larger tactical vehicles. This was followed by the up-armored HWWMV, which was enclosed in heavy steel, reinforced EFP plates, and ballistic windows. However, the up-armor HWWMVs were still vulnerable to under-belly IEDs and underbelly burns. Plus, the added armor increased the overall weight of the vehicle, reduced driver and crew visibility, and made them harder to maneuver. Plus, the added weight required modications to the shock absorber system, which increased rollover incidents. With these considerations in mind, by 2006 the US Navy was evaluating nine different suppliers for a much-needed rapid contract acquisition of three classes of armored vehicles. Main features of the armored vehicles or MRAP include advanced armor protection,
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increased maneuverability and visibility, a V-shaped hull for improved underbelly protection, and a mechanical platform and power plant that was built to carry and propel heavyweights. The Category I MRAP is a seven-ton 4x4 vehicle intended for urban operations with a six passenger capacity. The Category II MRAP is a 19-ton 6x6 vehicle intended for convoy escort, troop movement, and medical evacuation missions, with a ten-passenger capacity. The Category III MRAP is a 22-ton 6x6 vehicle designed for mine, IED, and EFP route clearance missions, with the ability to carry up to 12 passengers.

Figure # 21, Category I MRAP w/ ballistic plates. (Photo by author)

Figure # 22, Category II MRAP. (Photo by author)

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Figure # 23, Blast protected shape of the MRAP. (Photo by author)

Figure # 24, MRAP with CREW devices. (Photo by author)

Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) The JIEDDO Task Force was created in 2005. On February 14, 2006, the deputy secretary of defense upgraded the units status and changed it from a task force to the Joint IED Defeat Organization. The term organization indicated that JIEDDO was now permanent. The change also gave it more duties, responsibilities, oversight, and power in the ght against the use of IEDs on the world stage. The mission of JIEDDO is to focus (lead, advocate,
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coordinate) all DOD actions in support of the Combatant Commanders and their respective Joint Task Forces efforts to defeat the strategic signicance of the IED as a weapon (https:// www.jieddo.dod.mil). Along with being permanent, other improvements to JIEDDO were the establishment of a Senior Resource Steering Group (SRSG), a JIEDDO Resource and Acquisition Board (JRAB), a JIEDDO Lab, JIEDDO Test Board, and a JIEDDO Integration Process Team (JIPT). All the these elements are part of a streamlined integration mechanism because JIEDDO is authorized to rapidly requisition, acquire, test, integrate, and implement IED initiatives. The next few pages describe some of the accomplishments of JIEDDO. In 2007, JIEDDO created the C-IED Operations Integration Center, which became fully operational the same year. The mission of the COIC, you might say, was to unclog the ow of intelligence-based information from important sources at the national level and DOD level, and then get the data to the warghters in a timely manner. The data is analyzed along the way so the warghters actually receive fused data, so they can more condently use the information to better attack IED networks. The COICs architecture is based on the collaboration of more than 20 intelligence agencies and other federal agencies that share and compare intelligence data and other intelligence-related information. To further improve this mechanism, a Technology Insertion Process was developed, installed, and integrated into the SIPR Network along with other COIC tools, data sets, and algorithms. In 2008, JIEDDO saw the number of requests for direct IED training and training support more than double. In 2007, there were 805 requests for JIEDDO support, and in 2008, there were 1,746. As a result of these requests, members of the JIEDDO C-IED Operations Integration Center (COIC) and other interagency team members provided forward deployed units with a lot of useful support. The support included IED network analysis, fused analysis products, and training for those products. Units were also taught how to gain access to collected data and other analytical tools. The result was that units could conduct IED network analyses and targeting missions on their own. In 2008, there was also a ve-time increase in requests from brigade and lower level commands for COIC analysis support and training. In 2007, there were 137 requests, and in 2008, there were 696. The COICs secure Web site portal also had a signicant increase in visits. The numbers went from 1604 in 2007 to 182,000 in 2008. During 2008, JIEDDO-sponsored and funded initiatives were utilized by top-tier, midlevel, and tactical level units. The outcome of the effort was a noteworthy increase in the awareness of the capabilities of the COIC and an awareness of the support that was available. In 2008, C-IED Mobile Assistance Training Teams (C-MATT) were established and deployed to provide pre-deployment C-IED training to units that did not receive training at one of the Combat Training Centers. C-MATTs provide coaching, teaching, mentoring, information access, training support, and training to unit leaders and battle staff. During FY 2008, JIEDDO approved $8.11 million on C-MATTs. In FY 2008, JIEDDO spent over $454 million to provide training to US forces. All of the training and training support items were substantiated with scientic and technical data and/or tactical insights provided by units returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. Plus, JIEDDO itself had personnel deployed in each theater to gather information and provide training recommendations and insights of their own. The pre-deployment C-IED training that was provided to units had an emphasis on current enemy IED technical capabilities and
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emerging enemy TTPs. In effective C-IED, training across all the services was made more comprehensive. Another way training was improved was directly through the Joint Center of Excellence. The Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE) is located at Fort Irwin, California, and has been in operation since April 2006. The JCOE is a direct training arm of JIEDDOs C-IED training program. JCOE and the other four service-specic centers of excellence (COEs), provide units that are scheduled to deploy with training on rapidly elded C-IED equipment and information on enemy TTPs. The JCOE and the service COEs facilitate individual, collective, and unit C-IED training; develop and publish IED defeat TTPs; and provide deploying units with C-IED lessons learned from units returning from theater. JCOE spent more than $180 million in FY 2008 across the different services for programs and equipment to ensure military personal were adequately trained and competent in C-IED procedures before their deployment. JCOE introduced 16 new C-IED training initiatives and 11 different types of C-IED equipment in FY 2008 to ll tactical C-IED training gaps. JIEDDO additionally spent $29.3 million in C-IED nonmaterial training in FY 2008. Two of the training initiatives Insurgents on the Battleeld and Company Intelligence Support Teamswere initially hosted at the national training center (NTC). A portion of the money JIEDDO spent in 2008, $51.4 million, was used to enhance C-IED training for deploying units. One of the initiatives was for added realism. For example, the C-IED Interactive Set Design initiative provided a more realistic look to the training site and existing buildings, giving the entire area a more authentic Iraqi look. The Insurgents on the Battleeld initiative added a genuine insurgent network to track and neutralize and added civilians on the battle (COBs) to make training more legitimate. The High Order Effects initiative provided realistic IED detonation shock and blast effects there were safe enough to use around troops without causing injuries. The C-IED Search Props initiative provided items needed for the search of structures and buildings such as local documents for exploitation, electronic components, and authentic Iraqi furniture and household goods. Another $1.9 million was spent at the JCOE to expand the Opposing Forces (OPFOR) Command and Control (C2) Network, and $1 million went for a Mobile Training Team (MTT) initiative to provide an Independent Cell Phone Network. These initiatives added realistic intelligence scenarios to training. Other additions or expansions to JCOE training include: Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE) training, which takes place at a JCOE site within NTC. This capability was added in FY 2008 and consists of a small Iraqi village complex that is used for search-and-site exploitation missions. The training site has four Iraqi style houses that allow units and unit personnel to plan for and conduct formal IED and related search missions. JCOE also started certifying TSE instructors at this location with a team led by search advisors from the United Kingdom. Certication was implemented due to guidance from the CENTCOM Commander that directed each maneuver battalion to have a squad-sized element trained in search. Later in 2008, JCOE expanded its TSE capability to seven additional locations, which included Camp Shelby, Camp Atterbury, Ft. Hood, and Ft. Bliss for the army; and Marine Corps Base Kaneohe Bay, Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune for the marines. JCOE spent more than $7 million on these TSE initiatives in 2008. One more JIEDDO initiative was for training that related to the recognition and detection of HME. In early 2008, JIEDDOs Joint Task Force Paladin, which is located in Afghanistan,
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identied a training deciency connected to an emerging enemy TTP. The enemy had started using homemade explosives or HMEs and unknown bulk explosives (UBE) to make IEDs. In response to this training gap, the JCOE put together a training assistance team that consisted of joint military representatives; coalition experts; a representative from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF); and trained contractors. This team trained members of deploying units to recognize, test, and report HME/UBE. In early 2008, $270,000 was approved for this initiative, and by June 2008, the Training Assistance Team had started training Combat Training Center staff in the basic identication of HME and UBE. By the end of FY 2008, 14 different HME labs had been constructed and training scenarios had been developed to train service members on HME/UBE-related situations. All totaled, there were more than 150 observer/controllers trained and successfully utilized to train deploying unit personnel. In 2008, JIEDDO also had some successes in theater too, such as efforts directed at developing technologies, analytical tools, and training support to effectively attack and disable IED networks in Iraq. For example, one joint military and multinational investigation into the sources of supply for IED electronic parts and pieces resulted in the apprehension, detention, and questioning of several members of an Iraq-based company. The investigation revealed that the Sea Sun Company was in reality a front company and major supplier and source of IED electronic components in Iraq. This particular attack of the IED supply chain network at the tactical level effectively shut down a rather elaborate al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) supply chain. Afterward, there was a signicant decrease in the use of IEDs that utilized electronic components. Other efforts to attack the IED network in 2008 include the use of C-IED intelligence, persistent surveillance devices, reconnaissance missions, information operations, counter-bomber targeting, IED technical and forensic exploitation, and the disposal of tons of unexploded and captured ordnance. An emphasis was also placed on disrupting the enemys innovation and training cycles by attacking their ability to fund, train, transport, develop, deliver, emplace, and initiate IEDs. The improvement of C-IED strategic planning was yet another major goal for JIEDDO during 2008. The idea was to develop C-IED strategic planning within the COCOMs. This meant that planning, information sharing, information dissemination, and the relationships between military, interagency, and international partners all had to be improved. This goal was given to the Plans, Policies and Interagency Division (J5) of JIEDDO. By the end of FY 2008, the J5 division had started to improve these areas by formalizing C-IED planning. The J5 also formalized the relationships between COCOMs, DOD, and other government agencies and international partners. In September of 2008, the JIEDDO Director visited US European Command (EUCOM) and US Africa Command (AFRICOM) in an effort to solidify this plan. In 2008, JIEDDO delivered the rst RECCE I (Self Contained Reconnaissance Vehicle) to the battleeld. The Joint Explosive Ordnance Disposal Rapid Response Vehicle, or Cougar RECCE I vehicle, was the rst vehicle to combine IED detection and neutralization capabilities into a single vehicle. This was done by outtting the vehicle with an integrated optics sensor system that the crew could use as the primary IED detection device. The vehicles IED neutralization capabilities include the Kongsberg Remote Weapon Station and the Talon III B robot. The Talon II B can be deployed without the handler having to exit the
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vehicle. This of course keeps the EOD team safe in the vehicle until an assessment of the situation can be made by the robot and handler. Other technological devices on the RECCE I vehicle include the full suite of Blue Force Tracker, the most recent communications gear, and the latest Counter Radio-Controlled IED Electronic Warfare (CREW) technology. The initial success of the vehicle in IED defeat situations prompted a request from the US Central Commands (CENTCOM) for 100 more vehicles. Identity InstaCheck was another JIEDDO initiative. Identity InstaCheck is a Web-based application that helps a user locate and conrm a persons identity in Iraq. A person of interest can be located in the system with a simple search of criteria such as a name, address, or civil affairs card number. The system also has facial photos in the database that can be used to verify a persons identity, or the photos can be used for intelligence and targeting missions in Iraq. Well over 8,000 searches have been conducted with the system since it was rst introduced in Iraq in April 2008. Palantir was still another JIEDDO initiative that was funded and implemented in 2008. Palantir was developed to provide C-IED network analysts with a collaborative link analysis tool. It is used by analysts to identify patterns and relationships between entities and events, and assists with advanced document analysis and information discovery. Palantir helps to facilitate C-IED network analytical workow, such as collaboration between remote analysts, and it provides a dictionary of terms that enables analysts to share data and collected information between teams and other linked applications. Palantir portrays linked nodal networks, histogram data, and timeline views of events. During FY 2008, the Palantir system was accessed by over 160 people and used to investigate over 600 different IED networks. The system helped to identify and connect multiple investigations into IED networks that were being investigated across multiple agencies. Palantir was also extended to include COIC personnel deployed to the National Media Exploitation Center, US SOCOM, and AFRICOM. This allowed more remote users to access in real time the analytic tools and products of the system. JIEDDO also had a hand in a number of CREW improvements. In the past few years, the United States and joint forces have come to rely upon the Rhino systems due to their simplicity and effectiveness. The Rhino II and III systems are passive & counter passive infrared tools that can be mounted on the front of any tactical vehicle. The device uses a boom-mounted glow plug that rides out in front of the vehicle at different lengths. The system causes passive infrared (PIR)-initiated IEDs to detonate early, thereby missing the intended target. The Rhino device is in the kill zone, but the vehicle isnt. Rhinos are the result of a JIEDDO-funded expedient solution that was developed in the eld to specically defeat PIRtriggered IEDs. The rst systems were developed and used in Iraq in May 2006. Because of the success of the devices by the end of FY 2008, more than 16,000 Rhino II systems were being used in Iraq. An upgrade kit was developed next to provide a way to monitor the heat produced by the system and to improve performance of the heating element and to increase safety. JIEDDO also funded, developed, and delivered the Rhino III system, which was created especially for the rugged terrain requirements of Afghanistan.

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Today, there are CREW systems that are vehicle-mounted, man-portable, and xed-site C-IED jamming systems. CREW systems basically jam radio signals and are designed to prevent radio-controlled IEDs from detonating. The current CREW systems were developed and tested during 2008 to enhance warghter capabilities. JIEDDO funded over 5,000 CREW jammers for forces deployed in theater in FY 2008, bringing the number of IED jammers purchased to over 47,000. A new and improved CREW system is the Combined Vehicle Radio Jammer (CVRJ). By the end of FY 2008, over 8,000 CVRJs were built and 5,602 were installed on MRAP vehicles and other legacy vehicles headed for Iraq and Afghanistan. So far, JIEDDO funded, developed, tested, and implemented three separate JCREW initiatives, all of which will increase coverage of the RCIED frequency spectrum. These new versions include the next man-portable system (3.1), the next vehicle-mounted system (3.2), and family of JCREW systems (3.3). Forensic Exploitation Team (FOX) and Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI) teams were other JIEDDO initiatives. FOX teams were rst deployed to Baghdad in 2008 to provide units with enhanced weapons intelligence, forensic exploitation of documents, and information fusion. These multidisciplinary teams supported U.S. Forces with targeting, suppression and the interdiction of high-threat IED networks. FOX support was integral to dismantling a number of EFP networks in Baghdad. Their work helped end improvised rocket assisted mortar (IRAM) attacks in and around Baghdad. Operational assessments of FOX demonstrated that it was capable enough to enable and assist units to conduct offensive operations against IED networks. WTI teams were deployed along with forensic teams and provided forensic and technical assistance that exploited IEDs, their components, and physical characteristics of their emplacement and detonation. Using these forensic and technical analysis tools, WTI worked to identify trends in locations where IEDs were being discovered, identied manufacturing trends from analyses of devices and components, and develop IED-maker signature proles from evidence. By applying pattern analyses to these results, geographical areas of interest and specic human targets could be recommended for follow-on operations. The intelligence products derived from the WTI process directly support force protection planning, targeting, and tracking of bomb makers. Route Clearance Teams in the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps combat engineers and Joint Service EOD personnel are used to minimize and thwart IED ambushes and defeat IEDs. They use mechanical devices and specialized tools and robotics to do their job. Robots in particular increase their standoff range from an IED threat and help place them outside of the blast radius. JIEDDO-funds provided route clearance teams with new vehicle-mounted Interrogation Arms to increase this standoff. The new vehicle-mounted assemblies provide half of the length of the highly successful arm on the Buffalo Mine Protected Clearance Vehicle. The arm on a Buffalo is 26 feet. The new Interrogation Arm is equipped with a claw for digging, a metal detector for probing, and a camera was added to the RG-31 and Husky vehicles for better optics. Twenty Interrogation Arms were mounted on RG-31s in Afghanistan for route clearance missions in terrain that was too rugged for the 23-ton Buffalo.

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Figure # 25, Buffalo used for route clearance. (Photo by author)

Since 2008, JIEDDO has had several eld teams stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their job is to inuence the C-IED ght in both theaters. During 2008, they did this by supporting the development and elding of a wide array of technology-based, C-IED initiatives, such as mine rollers, CREW systems, pre-detonation systems, and route clearance equipment. They also supported corps, division, and Marine Expeditionary Forces with support teams that were integrated into the C-IED cells at the various levels of the different commands (www. jieddo.dod.mil).

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CHAPTER THREE

ARMY TRAINING RIGHT NOW The use of a systems-based approach for the design and development of army training is a rather new idea. When it was rst adopted in 1999, it was called the Systems Approach to Training Evaluation, Analysis & Testing. Now its called the Systems Approach to Training Management, Processes, and Products (SAT). TRADOC is overall responsible for SAT and uses it for the development and management of most training products and processes. The Army also uses SAT to ensure the quality of training products and processes. The SAT process uses a spiral model of development for collective, individual, and self-development training decisions. The process determines whether or not training is needed; what topic is trained; who needs training; how, how well, and where training takes place; and what training support and resource requirements are needed to produce, distribute, implement and evaluate the required education/training products (TRADOC Reg. 35070 Exec. Sum., 4). The stated goal of SAT is to support the military mission by providing task-based training. Thus training must be realistic, rigorous, and relevant to individual soldiers, units, and the leaders in the units being trained. Training must also promote safety and be conscious of environmental concerns (TRADOC reg. 35070 Exec. Sum, 1). QA, QC, and evaluation have long been engineered into SAT and are applied throughout the process. QA, QC, and evaluation are very important aspects of SAT, especially since the US Army spends hundreds of millions of dollars on training annually. If a mechanism to monitor this large expenditure wasnt incorporated into the SAT process, it would be considered gross mismanagement. By denition, QA is the function that involves evaluation. Therefore QA is a continual process. QA checks make sure the Army receives cost-efcient, state-of-the art products that are delivered on time. When QA processes are done correctly, it assures that training is efcient and effective, and meets the current combat training needs of the operational force. The stated objective of QA is to: 1. Provide the Army with the maximum return on investment; 2. Ensure and maintain quality up-to-date products to fulll the needs of the operational army; 3. Ensure and maintain training and training products are delivered in a timely manner and comply with Department of the Army and TRADOC policy. QC is an evaluative action conducted to affect QA. QC ensures that all education/ training and implementation procedures, processes, and products met or exceed prescribed
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standards. QC should occur all along the training development pathway. The most important part of QC is the guarantee of quality at the point where training is actually delivered to the soldier, unit, and unit chain of command. But unfortunately, this is by far the most ignored piece of SAT today, since QC at the tactical level is almost nonexistent. The SAT process has ve distinct yet interrelated phases of development. The phases are evaluation, analysis, design, development, and implementation phase. Each of the ve phases has minimum essential requirements to meet or exceed (TRADOC Reg. 35070 Exec. Sum., 3). The evaluation phase determines how the training will take place. The analysis phase identies the need for training, who gets trained, and what wartime individual and collective tasks are critical for that training. The design phase is used to decide when, where, and how the training takes place. The development phase produces and procures valid training products. During the implementation phase, the training actually starts, training times and dates are established, and training schedules are published.

Figure # 26, SAT Training Development Process.

The army training units that use SAT are training BNs and all subordinate organizations responsible for managing or performing TD or other related TD functions. This includes units that evaluate training for quality assurance and personnel, products, and institutions that present the training/education. SAT also applies to non-TRADOC agencies/organizations that have memorandums of understanding, memorandums of agreement, and contracts with TRADOC (TRADOC Reg. 35070 Exec. Sum., 7). The US Army uses the spiral model of development as a part of SAT for most training needs. The spiral model of development was originally designed for large expensive
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software development projects. Basically, the spiral model uses a combination of several different models of development. It uses elements of design, elements of prototyping in stages, and elements of the waterfall model. Each phase of the spiral model begins with a specic goal in mind, and the phase is completed when the client reviews and critiques the phase in progress. After the client reviews that phase and approves it, the next phase begins. Usually each of these phases has a time limit. With this model of development in its pure form, we could see a civilian company developing a combat vehicle and then providing the training for that vehicle too. The company will assess and manage the development of the vehicle from design to concept through R&D and then through the delivery and training phase, or start to end. In this case, company trainers are supposed to be in a key position to receive feedback and then act upon that feedback. For example, if the driver says the seat is too small or the steering wheel is too big, then the trainers are supposed to pass on that information to the designers. Suggestions for improvements or complaints about deciencies will go directly to the designers and developers of the vehicle. In this manner, if there are problems with the vehicle, immediate steps can then be taken. There are three types of training environments within the US Army. They are live, virtual, and constructive. The rst, or live environment, includes all live re ranges, Combined Arms Collective Training Facilities (CACTF), and Combat Training Centers (CTC). The trainers, operators, and managers at these live training facilities are typically assigned military personnel and/or civilian or both. Sometimes personnel from the unit being trained act as instructors on live re ranges and manage ranges at home stations with a range certication course. The second type of training environment is the virtual environment, which includes all simulator-related training. Again, this could be civilian or military personnel working at these facilities, or both. Today, Close Combat Tactical Trainer (CCTT), Engagement Skills Trainer (EST), driver safety, vehicle rollover training, and combat lifesaving skills are all taught with the aid of simulators. The third environment is the constructive environment, which consists of battle command training or Warghters Simulation (WARSIM) Warghting Simulation at the Div or Corps level, and staff exercise training (STAFFEX), joint training exercise (JTX), and joint conict and tactical simulation (JCATS) training. Military and civilian technicians, trainers, and evaluators are seen at these facilities too. The US Army also has three training phases that are seen as building blocks. The three phases are initial, intermediate, and the culminating phase. The initial phase includes individual and collective tasks that support the units mission-essential task list (METL). This initial phase of training provides a foundation for the intermediate and culminating phase to build upon. Soldiers are trained on basic marksmanship skills, individual and crew-served skills and other tasks that support tactical operations. Training during the initial phase can include training in live and virtual environments. Training in the intermediate phase includes collective task training that is conducted under a variety of situations and circumstances. This could include limited visibility, multiple integrated laser engagement system (MILES),
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opposing forces (OPFOR), combatants and/or noncombatants. The culminating phase of training includes multi-echelon, combined arms, branch-specic situation training exercises (STX) training, and joint training missions. These are not the only phases of military training. The military also has an educational phase of training that can occur prior to actual training events that would occur in the live, virtual, or constructive environments. This would be a preparatory phase and might include research of TTPs; studying FMs, reading training circulars (TCs), and publications; and perhaps watching related training videos. Servicemen may also receive additional training on specialty items such as equipment, vehicles, and munitions during an educational phase of training. The planning and execution phase of training is where fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) and operations orders (OPORDs) are prepared and disseminated; warghting functionrelated products are inventoried and checked during this phase of training. This phase could include tactical exercise without troops (TEWT) too. When it comes to the actual presentation of training, for some time now the Army has used a crawl, walk, and run approach. This method is progressive and goes step-by-step. The crawl, walk, and run approach is typically paired with a task, conditions, and standards format. During the crawl portion of training, the instructor explains the overall training objectives; discusses the performance standard; and explains, demonstrates, and talks the students through the task step-by-step. Each individual or unit is told and then shown what is expected of them. Next, the soldiers practice the task during the walk portion of training. The instructor acts as a coach and answers questions, corrects mistakes, and provides feedback about performance steps and the standards. Information that was presented earlier will be repeated and the demonstration might be repeated. During the run portion of training, soldiers will perform the entire task to the best of their ability at full speed, or as if they were performing the task in combat. The instructor will monitor, evaluate, and grade the performance of the task and look to see if the task was an accomplishment according to the prescribed standards. The run portion of training is usually repeated until the student accomplishes the task to standards. When the training event is complete, the leaders or instructor will then conduct an AAR. These AAR sessions help enhance the learning and memorization process because of the immediate analysis, feedback, and discussion. From an instructors perspective; the crawl, walk, run, and AAR approach and the task, conditions, and standards format provide an instructor with a step-by-step, standardized, and systematic approach to task training. These methods can be utilized for a variety of military tasks and training courses. The training approach and format are also straightforward, so others can learn how to present training material. From the students perspective, these two techniques provide a well-dened explanation, a demonstration of the task and task steps, and clear standards. Achievement of the prescribed standards in the prescribed manner demonstrates competency of the task. The end result of the crawl, walk, run, and AAR approach and task, conditions, and standards format is a way and means to check the students competency in task training and their short-term memory (TRADOC Pam 35070-6 September 2004; TRADOC Pam 350-70-1 May 2004; TRADOC Pam 350-70-4 January 2004; TRADOC Pam 350-70-5 August 2004).

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Soldiers may have to perform these tasks in combat, which include danger, ambiguous circumstances, absence of command, and unfamiliar surroundings; so familiarity with various tasks and competency in those tasks is essential. Each of these separate items cause stress and can therefore affect performance. Task training has to be presented in its entirety. Task training should never be presented only to the crawl or walk phase. Incomplete training adversely affects learning. The diagram on the next page is an illustration of a basic prociency formula; time and effort are the main components of the formula.

Figure # 27, Task prociency matrix.

In traditional army training, a POI or program of instruction is created and used by instructors to develop and learn class material. This document helps instructors to learn and memorize the training material, teach the training material, and to document the development of the class content. POIs are broken down into sections and help instructors to standardize the presentation of the various tasks. The task, conditions, and standards approach and the crawl, walk, run, and AAR format are typically integrated into POIs. In this manner, training material is standardized, and each instructor presents the same material in the same way. The performance section of the POI describes the task, task steps if needed, and training outcome. When a POI is developed correctly, the task is researched thoroughly, and QC, QA, and an evaluation process or procedure, plus standardization are all a part of the process.

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Figure # 28, Training camp on the Kuwait Iraq border.

The introduction of the POI provides the student with a brief overview and explanation of what is going to happen and tells the student what is expected of them. The body of the POI contains details of the task, the conditions under which the task will be completed, and the standards to which it will be accomplished. In the body of the POI, the instructor tells the main information about the task and the step-by-step instructions on how to accomplish the task. The last part of the POI is the conclusion or summation. Basically, the instructor tells the student what he or she is going to tell them. Then the instructor explains the main ideas and, in the conclusion, tells the student what he or she was told. Tell them what you are going to tell them; tell them; then tell them what you told them. The main topic is a reoccurring theme throughout the POI. Repetition of the main ideas helps with the learning process and memorization. Just after they enter the army, soldiers receive initial entry training (IET). This brings soldiers to a certain level of competency on a number of specied tasks. After several months in an assigned military unitthat is, after Basic and Advanced-Level Traininga soldier should be trained to a higher level of competency. He or she should have been trained to standards on several more MOS-related specic tasks. Once assigned to a unit, individual soldiers are also responsible for knowing how to perform certain tasks listed in the Soldiers Manual of Common Tasks (SMCT). SMCT Level 1 is for lower-ranking persons and Levels 2, 3, and 4 are for higher ranks. A higher-ranking NCO has to know his or her specic level2, 3, or 4and every level below that level. Each service member should also know the MOS tasks from their Soldiers Training Publication (STP). These publications are MOS-specic, so individuals should be trained on the appropriate tasks for their MOS and specic level. Furthermore, the individual soldiers should understand his or her units mission training plan (MTP) and know required WT/BDs. They should also be properly trained on the individual tasks deemed critical on their units METL.

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To recap, TRADOC is responsible for the SAT process which is a TD process that is systematic and iterative, and uses a spiral model of development. SAT is specically for task training. QA, QC, and an evaluative process were engineered into SAT. There are ve phases of development in the SAT training process: evaluation, analysis, design, development, and implementation; and each phase have minimum essential requirements. In the US Army, only certain units, agencies, and organizations use SAT. Army training has three distinct environments. They are the live, virtual, and constructive environments. The Army has three phases of training, which are the initial, intermediate, and culminating phases. In some circumstances, the army also uses an educational phase of training. Normally, training is developed and presented at the tactical levels with a crawl, walk, run, and AAR approach, and a task, conditions, and standards format. The SAT process does exactly what it was designed to do. It provides an effective and thorough way to assess a learners ability to follow a step-by-step procedure to complete a task. The current training platform also provides guidelines for instructors and training developers so they can design, develop, and present task training consistently. It is an established mechanism that ensures QC and QA, and has an evaluation process. Of course, the procedures and processes have to be followed for them to work. TSBs and POIs have been used on a large scale, in various training settings, for some time now too. As part of the learning transformation, the US Army decided to implement the Total Army Distributed Learning Program (TADLP). Its purpose is to improve and increase learning opportunities for service members. To do this, by 2010 the army plans to convert 525 training courses into digitized distributed learning (DL) programs. DL programs allow units and individual soldiers to participate in collective or self-development training through digital training facilities, learning management systems, coursework, and other supporting mechanisms. The plan is to invest about $850 million in DL by 2015. The US Army already has the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), the Army Training Support Center Individual Training Support Directorate DL conference, The Army DL Publication bulletin, and the TRADOC Knowledge Net. The benets of DL learning include self-paced courses, automated tracking, faster training, less travel time and cost, fewer days away from home, and fewer staff required since the coursework is presented by computers. The problem with DL as stated by the Rand Corporation is there is little existing empirical research on DL (Arroyo Center 2006, 35). In other words, there is not a lot of scientic evidence that shows it is better than traditional learning approaches. The report further said, The lack of an adequate body of research on DL is of increasing concern, particularly because of the rapid evolution of the Armys technological capabilities for DL, which are being deployed without an empirical foundation to inform decisions about their use (ibid.). Recently, one army unit did in fact implement a rather new training approach above and beyond task training. The Asymmetric Warfare Groups (AWG) approach is based on Blooms levels of learning for cognitive development, affective domain learning and a similar taxonomy for psychomotor skills (3). The approach has been implemented at the Captains Career Course. However, there seems to be a problem. The problem stems from the fact that the AWG did not specify which version of Blooms ideas were being used. There are three
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commonly accepted versions of Blooms concepts: the original version, the revised edition, and then the newer work. Even Wikipedia will tell you there are changes, addendums, and several versions of Blooms ideas (www.wikipedia.com). For instance, Bloom edited a book titled The Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, The Classication of Educational Goals, Handbook I: Cognitive Domain (1956). The authors were M. D. Englehart, E. J. Furst, W. H. Hill, and David Krathwohl. About the same time, Bloom was a coauthor of a book titled Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Book 2: Affective Domain. More recently, Bloom edited another work titled Developing Talent In Young People (1985). In this newer book, Bloom admitted that the new research raised questions about earlier views of special gifts and innate aptitudes (4). About 40 years after Blooms initial book, another book, titled; A Taxonomy for Learning, Teaching, and Assessing: A Revision of Blooms Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, was published. It listed Lori Anderson and David R. Krathwohl as coauthors (2000). These two individuals worked with Bloom for many years, and this book is considered an authorized revision of his work. So one has to ask the AWG, which version of Blooms work was implemented? The new stuff, the old stuff, or were Blooms concepts and taxonomy revised for military use? Another problem with the AWG approach is utility. There are three documents that explain the AWG approach. The training draft has 40 pages, the second document has 6 pages, and the last has 5 pages, for a total of 51 pages. After reading the documents, one is left wondering just how the approach will be implemented. The details about standardization, QC, QA, and evaluation are missing, unlike the SAT process. Plus, all three documents are very complicated and difcult to understand because of the abstract topic. The AWG approach, as is, has not been translated down to the user level. If the approach is adopted army wide, then the written material will be handed to a group of NCOs and civilian instructors. These individuals will have to use that written material to develop curriculum and to teach. These same individuals will also be required to explain the teaching and training approach to privates, other lower enlisted, and their chain of command. The AWG approach is unclear, complicated, dense, and at this point in time, extremely difcult to explain to others. Bloom was an educational psychologist at the University of Chicago and documented his original ideas in a work titled Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Classication of Educational Goals (Bloom, Englehart, Furst, Hill, and Krathwohl 1956). His contributions to the advancement of educational programs include a classication system or taxonomy. His taxonomy was designed to motivate instructors to use more improved or holistic approaches for education. The enhancement of cognitive skills and the improvement of a students ability to think after they left the classroom was the intended goal of his approach. He believed that learning or the outcome of learning could be divided into three psychologically founded domains. He also felt that educational tasks corresponded with one of these three domains. The domains helped educators with the analysis and classication of the actual learning objectives. So through analysis and classication of the learning objective and through association of that objective to a domain, the learning and cognitive abilities of the student were improved. The domains Bloom used were the cognitive, affective, and psychomotor domains. The cognitive domain relates to a persons individual ability to process information and utilize it
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in a measurable and signicant manner. The affective domain relates to a persons attitudes and opinions and how they felt about learning and their personal preferences toward the learning process. The psychomotor domain involves the manipulation of items or the physical skill or skills a person has to have to operate a tool, piece of equipment, or machinery. Since its inception in 1956, Blooms taxonomy has been the foundation that a number of other theorists have built upon. An example of this is the conditions of learning as theorized by Robert Gagne (1965). For the past several years, the US Armys Program Executive Ofce for Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation (PEO STRI) ofce has also been working on a way to improve training. The goal was to merge the live, virtual, and constructive training domains so the emphasis would be shifted to the delivery of whatever training support was needed, in whatever manner worked the best. Of course, training has to be cost-effective and appropriate. In 2007, the Warghter Field Operations Customer Support (Warghter FOCUS) contract was signed. The contract consolidated operations, maintenance, systems integration, and engineering support services for the armys three training domains. The ten-year, $11$12 billion contract is an indenite deliveryindenite quantity contract that applies to each of the training domains and to every combat training center worldwide. The Warrior Training Alliance (WTA) team, as it is called, includes Raytheon Technical Services Co. LLC, General Dynamics Information Technology, the Computer Sciences Corporation, MPRI, and Cubic in addition to 63 other companies. As stated by Raytheon, the lead company, the contract will deliver integrated, turnkey, life-cycle training services and support worldwide for a wide range of activities. Support for training exercises and operations, maintenance for all training and range systems, curriculum development and instruction, management oversight and administrative support for contractor activities, and supply support for all government-owned property and material are some examples.

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Figure # 29, Camp in Afghanistan. (Photo by Matthew Kessler)

Figure # 30, Terrain in Afghanistan. (Photo by Matthew Kessler)

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Figure # 31, Airbase in Afghanistan. (Photo by Matthew Kessler)

ETHICAL GUIDELINES We know the US government has contracted out for services since its inception. An example of this is the original Springeld Armory rie contract for intlock ries. Consequently through the years, plenty of federal laws and DOD rules, regulations, and guidelines pertaining to contracting have been created to protect government funds. Along with the laws and rules and regulations, there are ethical guidelines and a reporting system. The ethical guidelines provide guidance, and the reporting system is an avenue for exposing problems. The ethical guidelines are for all US government employees, all army personnel, and all independent and semi-independent contractors.

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Figure # 32, Principles of ethical conduct (www.dodig.mil).

The above ethical principles were provided by the US Army Audit Agency (AAA). The AAA chief counsel also pointed out that Increasingly, contractors and subcontractors are becoming subject to the same principles (November 2009). The AAA Chief Counsel further referenced the United States Ofce of Inspector General hotline for reporting purposes. The following information was taken directly from the Ofce of Inspector General Web page (http:// www.dodig.mil). Besides the principles of ethical conduct, the US government has a Defense Hotline. The purpose of the Defense Hotline Program is to provide a system for the reporting of signicant instances of fraud, waste, abuse of authority, and gross mismanagement. It is DOD policy to combat fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement in all DOD programs and operations. The Defense Hotline Program strives to ensure that allegations are properly evaluated and examined, and that appropriate remedial, corrective, and judicial actions are taken. The Defense Hotline has received more than 228,000 calls and letters and recovered or saved the government more than $425 million. If money is not recovered, then the end result of
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their efforts is safer products, procedures, and equipment for our servicemen and women and DOD personnel. The Defense Hotline is staffed by professional investigators that are knowledgeable of military, criminal, and civil laws and procedures; Defense Department and military services regulations; defense contracting procedures; and provisions of agency ethics regulations. Their primary responsibility is to receive and evaluate concerns and complaints, and to determine the agencies responsible as to whether or not they should conduct an inquiry or investigation. Every DOD civilian, military personnel and independent or semi-independent contractor that works for the US government should know about the US DOD Ofce of Inspector General Defense Hotline and its capabilities. The Defense Hotline can be described as a system that receives complaints and then evaluates, investigates, and takes corrective measures as needed. They also refer complaints to the appropriate inspector general, defense agency or organization, or investigative agency for inquiry or investigation. They additionally review all completed investigations to assure the independence and thoroughness of their own work. The hotline staff works closely with points of contact at the military services and defense agencies inspectors general to ensure that complaints are efciently and effectively investigated and reported. The following is a glossary of terms that the United States Ofce of Inspector General utilizes on a day-to-day basis. Contractors in particular should know their individual duties and responsibilities and the laws that relate to those duties and responsibilities. They should also understand the duties and responsibilities of the Ofce of Inspector General. The abuse of authority is described as an intentional or improper use of government resources. Examples include the misuse of rank, position, or authority, or misuse of resources such as tools, vehicles, or copying machines. A report to the hotline could initiate an audit, an inquiry, an investigation, or preliminary analysis. An audit is an independent objective analysis, review, or evaluation of nancial, records, procedures, and activities to report conditions found, and to recommend changes or other actions for management and operating ofcials to consider. The term audit includes, in addition to the auditors examinations of nancial statements, work performed in reviewing compliance with applicable laws and regulations, economy and efciency of operations, and effectiveness in achieving program results. All audit work is accomplished in accordance with audit standards set forth in Standards for Audit in Governmental Organizations, Programs, Activities, and Functions, issued by the comptroller general of the United States. An inquiry is an informal administrative investigation or gathering of information through interview or interrogation rather than by inspection or study of available evidence. An inquiry does not preclude the gathering of available documentary evidence, whereas an investigation is a systematic, minute, and thorough attempt to ascertain the facts about something complex or hidden. It is often formal and ofcial. An audit, inquiry, and investigation will often begin with a preliminary analysis. A preliminary analysis is the activity necessary to determine if the allegation or information received
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warrants further examination or lacks the credibility to merit additional action. The preliminary inquiry effort may be limited to an interview of the source of the complaint and/or a witness or reference provided in the allegation, or review of any readily available documentation or records relative to the complaint. The term independence is dened as the state or quality of being free from subjection or from the inuence, control, or guidance of individuals, things, or situations. As applied to examining ofcials and their respective organizations, there is a responsibility for maintaining neutrality and exercising objectivity so that opinions, judgments, conclusions, and recommendations on examined allegations are impartial and shall be viewed as impartial by disinterested third parties. Mismanagement is a collective term covering acts of waste and abuse. Those terms include but are not limited to the following: extravagant, careless, or needless expenditure of government funds or the consumption or misuse of government property or resources, resulting from decient practices, systems, controls, or decisions. Mismanagement also includes the abuse of authority or similar actions that do not involve criminal fraud. Mismanagement can cause the waste of government funds or resources. Waste is dened as the extravagant careless, or needless, expenditure of government funds, or the consumption of government property that results from decient practices, systems, controls, or decisions. The term also includes improper practices not involving prosecutable fraud. Conicts of interest should also be reported immediately. This includes the problem of both bribes and gratuities. Bribes are dened as the giving, offering, promising, soliciting, demanding, receiving, or accepting, directly or indirectly, with wrongful or dishonest intent, anything of value, to or by a public ofcial, to inuence an ofcial act or public ofcial to commit fraud or to violate the law or testimony as a public ofcial, in return for being inuenced, to perform such actions. Bribery is a violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 201. Administratively, 5 CFR 2635 prohibits the acceptance of gratuities, or gifts from outside sources. An employee shall not, directly or indirectly, solicit or accept a gift from a prohibited source, nor will gifts be given because of the employees ofcial position. In addition, an employee shall not, directly or indirectly, accept a gift in return for being inuenced in the performance of an ofcial act. Employees shall not solicit or coerce the offering of a gift, accept gifts from the same or different sources on a basis so frequent that a reasonable person would be led to believe the employee is using his public ofce for private gain. Employees shall not accept a gift in violation of any statute (relevant statutes applicable to all employees include 18 U.S.C. Section 201(b), Bribes; 18 U.S.C. Section 209, Supplementation of Salary Prohibition; 41 U.S.C. Section 423, Procurement Integrity Act) or accept vendor promotional training contrary to applicable regulations, policies, or guidance relative to the procurement of supplies and services for the government, except pursuant to Section 2635.204(1). Gifts from or to superiors are covered administratively in section 2635.302(a). Gifts to superiors provide elements of prohibitions against an employee: directly or indirectly giving a gift to or making a donation toward a gift for an ofcial superior, or soliciting a contribution from another employee for a gift to either his own or the other employees ofcial superior.
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Prohibited nancial interests are another area of concern. There are two areas of prohibited nancial activities or nancial interests that are limited, unless the employee has received a waiver. One is a disqualication requirement, directed at avoiding compromise in the performance of duties as a result of outside interest. The other is a prohibition on acquiring or continuing to hold specic nancial interests, such as use of public ofce for private gain, outside activities, or impartiality in performing ofcial duties. Typically, the theft and abuse of government property should be reported to the law enforcement authorities at the particular installation in question. The military police, defense police, and military criminal investigative organizations are responsible to investigate thefts and misappropriation of government property. We will, however, accept certain reports of government property theft dependent on the circumstances surrounding the knowledge of the person reporting the offense in question. When it comes to spare parts overpricing, the Defense Hotline will either accept a complaint of overpriced spare parts, or we will refer the complaint to the appropriate point of contact at the cognizant Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) supply center, dependent on the spare part in question. At a minimum, they will need the NSN in order to assist with the overpricing problem. The DLA uses codes established in the Defense Logistics Management Standards (DLMS). Each item in the Federal Supply System is assigned to a specic Source of Supply (SOS) for management. Federal Stock Codes (FSC) will show that either DLA or GSA has been designated as the integrated material manager at the wholesale level for one or more consumable items of supply in the FSC. The SOS must be determined for individual National Stock Numbers (NSN) to obtain specic information on that specic item. One of the most commonly asked questions about the hotline is Do I have to identify myself? The answer is no, only if you want to. You can remain anonymous, or you may identify yourself. If you identify yourself to a hotline investigator, your identity will be kept condential. They will ask if you are willing to be interviewed by an investigator assigned to your case. If so, we will only release your identity to that investigator. The Defense Hotline relies on concerned Defense Department civilian employees, service members, and citizens to provide us with information regarding alleged fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement within the DOD. We understand the value of complaints provided by individuals who desire to maintain their anonymity. We also understand the value of being able to contact complainants to ask for additional information or clarication of their complaint. If you choose to identify yourself, we will not divulge your identity to outside agencies without your consent or a determination of the director of the Defense Hotline that such disclosure is otherwise unavoidable in order to address the matters in your complaint. Such circumstances may include a matter involving a specic danger to health or safety, or a national security issue. How can I contact the hotline? Before you call or write, if you have not already, please review What should be reported? Afterward, you may call the hotline using our toll-free number, (800) 424-9098, or you may submit your report in writing by mail, to: DEFENSE HOTLINE, THE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON DC 20301-1900. Persons who are hearingimpaired or have speech disabilities may also contact us through the Federal Relay Service at (800) 877-8339 (additional information regarding the Federal Relay Service may be
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obtained through the www.gsa.gov/frs Web site.) You may submit your written complaint by fax at telephone number (703) 604-8567 or DSN number 664-8567, or via e-mail by using the FWA complaint form. You can also submit your complaint via e-mail from your own Internet browser to: hotline@dodig.mil. If you submit attachments with your e-mail complaint, please ensure they are in either ASCII text or Microsoft Word version 6.0 or higher formats only. When should you call? Immediately! Disclosure should be made as soon as information is available. Telephone lines are open from 8:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. (EST), Monday through Friday. During nonwork hours you may contact the Defense Hotline Answering Machine. The message will advise you that you have reached the Defense Hotline and that you should call back between 8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. (EST), Monday through Friday. We do not receive complaints via recorded message. All complaints are taken by hotline investigators. What should be reported? Violations of law, rule, or regulation, and substantial and specic danger to public health or safety should be reported. Additionally, contract and procurement irregularities such as cost/labor mischarging, defective pricing, defective parts, bid rigging, product substitution, spare parts overpricing, bribery and acceptance of gratuities, signicant cases of mismanagement, and conicts of interest should be reported. Plus, travel (TDY/TAD) fraud, abuse of authority, the theft and abuse of government property, military reprisal (Violations of the Whistleblower Protection Act involving service members), violations of the Whistleblower Protection Act involving defense contractor employees and non-appropriated fund employees, improper referrals of military personnel for mental health evaluations, and gross waste of funds should be reported too. We recommend that you read the following information about what to include in your complaint before you submit your hotline complaint: When calling or sending in a complaint, please be as specic as possible. Your complaint should provide:

the service members or employees full name rank or pay grade duty station specically what wrongdoing you are reporting specic dates and times specic location where wrongdoing occurred how the individual completed the alleged wrongdoing why the individual perpetrated the offense why you believe the alleged activity was misconduct

Minor incidents of offenses listed above (e.g., minor time and attendance abuse, or misuse of government vehicles) should be reported to your local inspector general, military investigative
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service, or military police unit. We encourage you to register complaints and grievances through appropriate management and grievance channels, and submit suggestions for management improvements through the proper DOD Incentive Awards Program. Personnel matters involving requests for individual relief should be handled through the appropriate grievance channels. What can you expect when you call the hotline? You should rst of all expect a thorough interview by the hotline investigator. You will be asked to provide information that will help the investigator piece together the facts of the situation (who, what, when, where, why, and how) and assess the estimated dollar loss to the government. An evaluation of your complaint will be made to determine if an investigation is warranted or if you need to refer the matter to other authorities. Your call will be handled with complete condentiality, and you may remain anonymous. Anyone making a report to the hotline will be protected from reprisal. You may call back the hotline to learn how your report was handled. The hotline is congured into teams who are available Monday through Friday between the hours of 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. (EST). When should I submit a written report to the hotline? If your report is complex and documentation is available to support your complaint, you should submit your complaint in writing. Written complaints should contain sufcient information, including who, what, when, where, how, and why. If you believe you are the victim of reprisal or an improper referral for a mental health evaluation, you must submit a written complaint to the hotline. Conrmation Letters in Response to Hotline Complaints: If you submit a written complaint via mail, fax, or e-mail, in which you identify yourself and provide your home or mailing address we will conrm receipt of your complaint by sending you a letter. We will tell you what action was taken regarding your complaint. If a hotline investigation was initiated, we tell you the hotline case number and how you can check on the status of your complaint. We will not correspond with you at a unit or defense agency address to preclude compromising your identity, even if you did not want condentiality. We do not send conrmation letters in response to telephonic complaints. How can I determine the status of my case? Call us at (800) 424-9098. An investigator will determine your case number (if you dont know the case number) and tell you the status of your case. You should record the case number so that you can periodically check on your case. The investigator can only tell you if your case is open or closed. If your case has been closed, because of the Privacy Act of 1974, we are precluded from advising you of specic case details. We can only tell you whether or not the allegations were substantiated. To obtain more specic information about your case, you must submit a Freedom of Information Act/Privacy Act request to our FOIA/PA) Ofce. How long does it take to resolve a hotline complaint? Normally, inquiries are completed within 180 days. However, the time required to complete the inquiry may vary depending on the complexity or amount of additional material or allegations received.
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How can I get a copy of a hotline completion report? You must submit a written request to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) / Privacy Act (PA) Ofce. Can the defense hotline assist with pay problems? No, the Defense Hotline is not equipped to assist with routine pay and allowance problems. Our toll-free number was listed on your statement of leave and earnings to assist you in reporting suspected fraud, waste, and abuse. For routine pay matters, please contact the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) for assistance. We may assist with extraordinary pay and allowance problems on a case-by-case basis. NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS The rst characteristic of army training that needs to be improved is the passive nature of the existing approach. For example, rst, the soldier is required to memorize a task. Then the soldier takes a test or quiz to prove he or she actually memorized the task. In some cases, the soldier memorizes task steps and then is evaluated on the steps. This is supposed to show that the soldier memorized the material, understands it, and can perform the task. The soldiers short-term memory is tested, not his long-term memory. The approach is linear from the top down and does not teach, encourage, or promote problem solving. The soldier is not given a problem and is not expected to think through a problem. Innovation is discouraged. This type of training is comparable to most forms of vocational training. Vocational schools teach the student a step-by-step process. They do not teach the underlying reasons why the process is used, how the concept was developed, or why the process works. Theories and concepts are left out. In comparison, liberal arts colleges and universities teach students not only the step-by-step process, but the basic underlying concept of why and how the steps work and who developed them. Then the students understanding of the concept is checked with a problem-solving test. The best example of this approach is an algebra or geometry class. The student has to know the formula and the application of the formula or he or she cannot solve the problem. Another example is medical school. Here the student is required to know and understand biological functions of the body. Vocational schools teach a trade, fouryear colleges usually make a person a paraprofessional, and advanced degrees are geared toward a profession such as law, medicine, or engineering. Because of its passive nature, the SAT process does not properly prepare our soldiers for asymmetric conicts, nor does it properly train soldiers to understand and use the underlying concepts that counterinsurgency tactics are built upon. Unconventional warfare uses social theories, combined arms, and joint interagency missions along with a host of advanced technological devices to counter nontraditional tactics. ISR and the rapid analysis, assimilation, and integration of that ISR make this a very fast-paced form or war. ISR also provides data about emerging enemy activities, so friendly TTPs can be developed to counter those actions. At present, army training does not properly support our soldiers, company and eld grade ofcers, and senior noncommissioned ofcers. In addition to traditional task training, the army training needs to incorporate an active training approach, one that encourages and promotes thinking and problem solving. Some would advocate a systems approach. When a systems approach is contrasted and compared with a task-based approach, one sees that a systems approach is more in line with
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a traditional liberal arts approach. A systems approach usually includes reading, research, lectures, studying, writing, and of course, tests. In contrast, a vocational or occupational approach typically uses a four-part teaching method and teaches separate or combined tasks. For instance, with a task-based approach, rst the teacher would discuss and explain the preparations and planning required for the task being taught. Second, the teacher would explain and demonstrate the task steps to the student in detail. Third, the student would mimic the task steps, with supervision, and explain back to the instructor the task steps. Then nally, the student would do the task steps and work on the task on his or her own, at his or her own pace. A systems approach teaches the conceptual understanding of the job itself, whereas a task-based approach teaches a discrete job, specic skill, or undertaking. A systems approach is more concerned with the process, procedure, and other higher-order dimensions of the job. A skills approach teaches the step-by-step tasks required to complete the job. The skills instruction may focus on manipulative skills and the specic but limited knowledge that is necessary to nish the well-dened task being taught. A systems approach will use whole-topart instruction that relies on mental models and problem-solving techniques, and it will provide information on how a system works. In this manner, a student can identify what works in a system and why, and what doesnt work and why something might fail to work in a system. The two different approaches to educational instruction also have two different goals or expected educational outcomes. As explained by Achtenhagen and Grubb (2001): A skills approach may be adequate for routine production under supervision, but for expert and nonroutine performance-the work expected in exible and high-skilled workplaces-the conceptual knowledge and mental models of the systems approach are crucial (Evens and Butler 1992, 620). A systems approach utilizes mental models and problem-solving strategies in an attempt to teach students the foundational core material and the underlying workings of the mechanism. The interrelatedness of subsystems within the larger system will also be explored. In this manner, the learner receives a deeper understanding of the processes and procedures at work within the system. Within the eld of computer science, a task-based or occupational approach will teach the step-by-step procedures to make the computer work. A systems approach will show the student the inner workings of the computer that are required to make the device accomplish those same tasks. The importance of the key concepts, basic philosophies, underlying assumptions and values, and limits and boundaries has already been explored. As proven, they help to ll the theory to practice gap. A systems perspective would stress higher-order functioning, whole-to-part instruction, and the conceptual knowledge of the system. So should the army modify the task based approach? Should the army use a liberal arts approach or systems approach? Or should the army create its own instructional model? Weil and Joyce describe an instructional model in the following manner.

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A model of teaching consists of guidelines for designing educational activities and environments. It species ways of teaching and learning that are intended to achieve certain goals. A model includes a rationale, a theory that justies it and describes what it is good for and why; the rationale may be accompanied by empirical evidence that works (1978, 2). The second aspect of army training that needs to be looked at closely and improved is QC, QA, and evaluation, primarily at the tactical level. This is where evaluation, QC, and QA are neglected the most. When a training team is improperly trained, poorly managed, badly informed, and/or inadequately monitored, a lot of serious problems can be observed. It doesnt matter what the training approach iswhen QC is absent, problems occur. For instance: 1. The learner receives insufcient training when instructors only teach information from their own personal experiences. More often than not, this information is outdated too. 2. The learner receives incorrect information when instructors make things up as they teach. This is usually the result of little or no research, poor management, or insufcient monitoring of classes. 3. The learner is taught in a disorganized and haphazard manner when instructors are told, Teach however you want after you certify as an instructor. 4. Some learners are provided more and better information than others when instructors hold on to new information. This happens when there isnt an information dissemination plan. Inconsistent training is the result. 5. Learners are taught outdated and inaccurate information when instructors are told to teach the class in the same way the supervisor does. Supervisors will often certify a new instructor using the parrot method. This occurs when managers and training developers are not adequately trained. 6. The learner is taught misleading information when instructors present non-doctrinal material such as CALL documents as doctrine. Non-doctrinal material should never be presented as doctrine. 7. Along this same line, the learner is provided false information when doctrinal material is ignored or not followed, and replaced by homemade training solutions. 8. During tactical training, learners receive inadequate training when instructors or observer/controllers take charge of the unit. This is usually done to speed up training, or to articially increase throughput. Perhaps the US Army would be wise to reexamine its QC, QA, and evaluation procedures, and then consider an outside independent source for QA, QC, and training evaluation. Right now, civilian companies working for the army certify their own instructors, O/Cs, and curriculum developers; and more or less ensure QA, QC, and an evaluation process. Right now, there isnt an established mechanism to check for standardization at the various instructor certication courses.
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Then third, the US Army needs to explain army training needs in a clearer manner. In the explanation, there has to be a differentiation between traditional task training and training intended for asymmetric conicts. The delineation would, rst of all, help to minimize problems like the ones listed above. The dened separation would secondly provide soldiers with a better understanding of army training. The clearer guidance would further ensure that training sites around the world were training soldiers in a consistent manner, instead of one training site outperforming others, or one site underperforming others. Besides an active training approach, improved QC, QA, and enhanced collaboration between the three training domains, a new trainers certication course should be implemented. Better instructors mean better training. This fourth improvement to army training can increase our soldiers cognitive performance in areas like adaptive thinking, problem solving, individual initiative, exibility, and condence. It should be pointed out that an updated instructional program is not a new idea. In 2001, Rand concluded that efciency within USAR and ARNG training units could be improved if the Army could more efciently use available training spaces and better manage its instructors (2001, 4). At the Ofce of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, they believe providing the right training and education to the right audience at the right time is vital to the success and safety of individuals, units, and staffs engaged in operations (Deputy Secretary of Defense 2006, 4). In other words, a more focused approach might improve education and training outcomes. In a later study in 2007, Rand staff further advised DOD about the need to improve training. They said, Needed is a method for aligning the operational and institutional portions of the Army for transformational purposes (Rand 2007, 20). The training platform the US Army is using today should be closely examined and updated. The capabilities-based defense strategy, the US military transformation, networkcentric environments, and asymmetrical conditions all require soldiers to play a more active role. A more active and enhanced training approach is therefore mandated. The Army should not only manage its instructors more efciently, but manage all of its trainers more efciently. In this book, the term trainer includes all US Army and civilian personnel that are acting as instructors, observer/controllers (O/Cs), training developers, program managers, or other training support personnel. The term can also be applied to some individuals that are working in S-3, G3, or J3 ofces since training development is a part of that job. The difference between a program manager, training developer, instructor, and/or O/C is an academic degree. Program managers should have a masters degree or PhD. and successful experience in the eld he or she was hired to manage and oversee. An advanced degree in business, adult education, sociology, or psychology is an example of this. Training developers should have a masters degree and successful experience, or a four-year college degree and more successful experience in the area he or she was hired to work in. In a teaching or training position a four-year degree, MA, or MS in education, psychology, or sociology would be an example. The training team is dened as a group of individuals, whether civilian or military, who are responsible for the support, design, development, presentation or staging, and evaluation of training for US Army soldiers. Every US Army trainer should be required to attend and complete an approved trainers certication course within 90 days of being hired or being assigned to a trainers position and should attend and complete a recertication course every two years thereafter.

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CHAPTER FOUR

ASYMMETRIC TACTICAL-LEVEL TRAINING The instructional approach set forth in the next few chapters was designed specically for the US Army and explicitly for asymmetric tactical training. This chapter presents a TD process along with an analysis and classication system. The analysis and classication system are used to better understand, dene, and develop asymmetric tactical-level training. The analysis and classication system are based on concepts from Blooms published works. After that, the integration of advanced teaching and learning techniques are presented. The enhanced learning and teaching techniques were selected by meta-analysis. The approach does not replace SAT; it supplements the SAT process. The recommendations improve SAT and improve the manner in which military and civilian trainers design, develop, and present training for unconventional conicts. The recommended TD approach in this chapter uses three distinct phases of development for training intended for asymmetric conicts. They are (1) the research, design, and analyze phase; (2) develop and analyze phase; and (3) implement and analyze phase. Each of the three phases overlaps with each of the other phases and the development process is similar to the SAT spiral model of design. Each of the three phases will be discussed separately for clarity. The three phases of TD are illustrated next.

Figure # 33, Phases of development.

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From a management perspective, the overall TD process should be a team effort. This can be accomplished with a working group and regular meetings. Instead of just a single training developer, other team members should be involved in the TD process. Others may have important insights, worthwhile experiences, and other valuable sources of information. In fact, the working group should include instructors, O/Cs, training developers, training supervisors, and if possible the program manager. Depending upon the circumstances, army training representatives and even commanders from the unit being trained should be involved. However, the duties and responsibilities of the military personnel being trained may not allow this or may limit their participation. The idea is to look at as many suggestions and ideas as time will allow. Even ideas that would typically not be considered should be considered. TD is a team effort, but the training developer is overall responsible. The duties and responsibilities of a training developer are research, development, oversight, documentation, dissemination, and administrative duties. In certain situations, there may not be a training developer position, so instructors and/or O/Cs may have to do the work. Whoever ends up doing the jobs should know the principles of TD. The principles provide guidance, establish a procedure, and provide standardization, QC, and QA. The recommended TD principles are;

Figure # 32, Principles of training development.

With the principles of TD in mind, the working group has to accomplish a number of steps during the rst phase of development. The purpose of an established procedure is not to make every class exactly the same in a step-by-step manner. The intent is to guarantee consistency between training sites and to make sure there is continuity between training developers, instructors, and working groups. A standardized TD process will do this. Standardization in itself does not take precedence over the intended goal of quality training. Therefore, the following steps are suggested steps. The steps are:
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Generate a clear training statement and document it. Categorize the training and classify the target audience. Develop fundamentals, principles, tenets, and/or imperatives. Do the research, document and disseminate, and use proper terminology. Determine the presentation concept. a. Sequencing of instruction b. Conditions of learning c. Nine events of instruction d. Mnemonics e. Information processing: chunks and metaprocessing f. Levels of processing framework g. Realism

Make a list of logistical and support requirements. Create an estimated timeline.

The TD process begins with a written training statement. Training has to be based on the direct guidance from the appropriate commander and/or agency or element thats responsible for the training. The statement needs to be referenced and then signed by the right person. An ofcial document with a clear statement is preferred, but this doesnt always happen. Sometimes the TD team has to develop the statement because the topic is new, but the end result is a brief concise statement. If possible, the training statement needs to be paired down into a single sentence. The TD team should continue to review the statement throughout the TD process to make sure it explains exactly what is being taught. When the statement is approved, it is posted in a le folder. This is the beginning of a working folder. This statement is comparable to the task statement within a military training POI. The documentation packet is similar to the working le of a traditional military POI. The emphasis here is not on the paperwork. The emphasis is on the production of a quality training product. Next, training is categorized by the complexity of the content or the difculty of the training event. There are three levels of training: fundamental, intermediate, and advanced. The analysis will enhance the training teams understanding and knowledge of the training. Plus, this step makes certain that the soldiers receive the right type and amount of training. The classication system also provides the TD team and others with a set of usable terms. The three categories of training are depicted below.

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Figure # 35, Categories or levels of training.

To better understand the categorical system, gure # 35 shows the three categories of training and shows the relative position of several training topics. The topics are Initial Entry Training (IET), Close Quarter Marksmanship (CQM), Weapons Training (WPNs), Close Quarter Battle (CQB), Convoy Operations (Convoy), Entry Control Point (ECP), Trafc Check Point (TCP), Urban Operations (UO), Personal Security Detachment (PSD), Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE), Counterinsurgency (COIN), Cordon and Search (Cordon), Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE), and Joint Mission Operations (joint). The fundamental level of training is the simplest. The intermediate level is more difcult. The advanced level is even more difcult and is usually intended for combined arms, joint, or interagency missions. The levels are based on complexity, not the dangerousness of the mission that the training is intended for. Please note that the positions of the different training topics on the graph are not exact points. The positions should be looked at as a range on a continuum because the category of training can change, depending upon intent. Remember? The category of training is determined by the complexity of the training. So when an organic platoon receives training on TCP operations, the training is usually considered intermediate-level training. But when the same platoon receives training on TCP operations as a part of a combined arms inner and outer cordon and search mission, then the training is considered advanced-level training. The two training events are different. In fact, the references, the design, the presentation concept, the training goal, and the evaluation of the training are all different. One is much more complicated than the other. The training team has to recognize the difference and then design and develop the training accordingly, so it ts the training unit needs more appropriately. Another step in the TD process is a clarication of who is being trained. The classication is based on echelon. The echelon is either individual, small unit-to-larger unit, or combined
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arms-to-joint interagency. The classication and categorization system helps to alleviate mistakes. Heres how. A clear identication of the echelon enables training developers to identify and match the traditional task or tasks with the training being taught. The classication also provides a list of corresponding references that are available to the TD team. In most cases, the references will match the echelon being trained. The US Army has individual tasks, collective tasks, and tasks for joint operations. Figure # 36 lists the echelons across the bottom of the chart and shows the three levels of training on the left side. The diagram also shows the proper task or tasks that are associated with the echelons (the same training topics are used).

Figure # 36, Echelons of training.

The tasks listed above are Soldiers Manual of Common Tasks (SMCT), Soldiers Training Publication (STP- or MOS-specic tasks), Mission Training Plan (MTP), Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills (WT/BD), and a units Mission Essential Task List (METL). With this categorization and classication system, there should be no misunderstanding about the training and the intended audience. Training needs are identied more correctly. Plus, the expected competency level of the target audience is revealed. The anticipated prociency level of the soldiers being trained provides the team with a point of reference for evaluation purposes. FUNDAMENTALS, PRINCIPLES, TENENTS, IMPERATIVES So far the training has been categorized, and the echelon has been classied. The next step in the TD process requires the team to develop fundamentals, principles, and tenets or imperatives. In several of the FMs that have been published recently, fundamentals, principles, tenets, and imperatives are used to explain the topic better. Yet there are no
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rules or guidance for their use. For asymmetric tactical training, it is recommended that fundamentals are designed for the fundamental level of training. Furthermore, its suggested that principles are only created for the intermediate level of training and tenets and imperatives are designed only for the advanced level. Fundamentals, principles, tenets, and imperatives clarify, condense, and consolidate training material into essential key components. General guidance and decision-making aids can be presented in this manner. Fundamentals, principles, tenets, and imperatives are teaching aids for the instructor and learning aids for the student. They provide a set of essential elements or core beliefs. They are developed concepts. They can also be described as problem-solving strategies or algorithms. The next gure shows the categories of training, the echelons, and fundamentals, principles, tenets, and imperatives. The multilayered classication system provides the TD team with a practical procedure for TD.

Figure # 37, Categorization and classication matrix.

With this procedure, the extended denition for a new, complex, and perhaps abstract training topic can now be broken down into a more concise usable form. Fundamentals and principles provide clarity. The method also provides trainers with a logical sequence to follow while teaching. The procedure further helps to ensure that the important information is consistent between instructors and from training site to training site. From the soldiers perspective, the technique helps them to understand the material better and helps them to memorize the material more prociently. Fundamentals, principles, and tenets make the material easier to recall too. A soldiers ability to recall information is not the same as their short-term memory or long-term memory. Improved recall is especially useful in stressful conditions like little or no sleep, extreme weather, lack of food and water, and dangerous combat conditions. The TD process further provides a comprehensive illustration of the layers of leadership. At the fundamental to intermediate level, junior and
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midlevel NCOs are directly involved in the training. At the advanced level, senior NCOs and ofcers will manage, plan, and monitor training. The completed analysis gives the training team and the training chain of command a better, more in-depth and complete picture of the training needs. Lets review the TD process. The rst phase of development uses three different categories to describe the complexity or difculty of the training. Then the TD process identies the echelon being trained and examines the corresponding task, or tasks, and related training for that echelon. After that, fundamentals, principles, tenets, and imperatives are created. In this manner, asymmetric training and traditional training can be differentiated more clearly. Training needs can then be matched more appropriately with the proper type and amount of training. Categorization and classication of the training is a methodical way to conduct a thorough analysis of the training requirements. Here is an example. Use gure # 37 to follow along. Weapons disassembly, maintenance, and assembly and zeroing a weapon are all within the same range. The different training events are designed for individual soldiers, or the training is for the individual echelon. CQM was designed for individuals, so it too is fundamental-level training. At the individual echelon, a soldier can also receive intermediate-level training. An example is CQB. At the individual echelon, a soldier can also attend a breaching class, which is advanced-level training. Breaching is more complex and specialized. So weapons training and CQM are fundamentallevel training at the individual echelon, CQB is typically considered intermediate-level training at the individual echelon, and breeching is advanced-level training at the individual echelon. The categories and classications of training build upon each other and support the small unit, larger unit, combined arms, joint, and interagency missions. Once this is done, the TD process continues. Extended and in-depth research is the next step. Typically, there is a lot of material that has to be reviewed, prioritized, referenced, and cited, so the effort must be managed. The training developer should be responsible for the research. But the training developer may need help because of the sheer volume of material. TCP training is a good example of this since there is so much information about TCPs. During the initial RDA phase, only ofcial references will be sought out and reviewed. The research at this phase will not include intelligence briefs, classied AARs, or decision papers. During the second phase of development, intelligence briefs will be incorporated into the training product. For now, the training team just needs current information and some historical data about the training subject. This will give them a foundation to build on. The research will include a reference examination of the general topic and query of other related or relevant subtopics. During this step, the chain of command may decide that a certain publication is more informative than others and decide to make it the primary reference. No matter what the approved reference is, the team will read, study, and research all of it. Primary documents could include DOD publications and memorandums, army regulations (ARs); FMs; technical manuals (TMs); CALL documents; Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL); Navy Lessons Learned (NLL); Air, Land, Sea Application Center (ALSA); and STBs. Other primary documents or supporting material could be STPs, SMCTs, WTBDs, METLs, and published information from the AWG, JCOE, JIEDDO, CEXE, WTI teams, and other stand-alone or joint
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agencies. Ofcial references are preferred and unofcial open sources of information should be avoided. When it comes to research, attention to detail is paramount. The TD team should carefully securitize each and every selected training reference for the documents stated purpose, scope, and applicability or handling instructions. This check will help determine the utility of each document and help with the presentation concept, which will be discussed in the next section. Non-doctrinal material being presented as doctrine is one of the problems that can be seen at some training sites today. Presenting non-doctrinal material, like CALL documents, as doctrine misleads students; discredits the training program; and causes friction between instructors, students, and units. This is the result of poor research, mismanagement or lack of management, and inadequately or improperly trained staff. In essence, it shows a lack of standardization, QC, and QA. Proper research can help alleviate the problem. To ensure the research was adequate, a test could be constructed to check the teams effort. During the RDA phase, it would be wise for the training developer to establish some sort of information dissemination plan. A mechanism for both unclassied and classied material will be needed. Both types of material should be disseminated in a systematic manner to make sure the entire team is adequately briefed about the training subject and the TD process. If several people are involved in the research effort, then direct face-to-face coordination with the individuals may be the best way to distribute information. A working group and a regular meeting is one technique. General research about the topic should be done during the rst phase of development, but the second phase includes the review of classied documents and reports. Because of the classied nature of the material hand-to-hand signatures, cover sheets, and a secure safe with team access may be required. For the most sensitive material, other security measures and procedures may be required. Obviously, security clearances would be required for the TD team. Access to the classied documents must be managed, monitored, and controlled, and the proper security measures taken. The training developer should be responsible for these tasks. As the references are reviewed and information is gathered, it is important to utilize the proper nomenclature, terminology, acronyms, and brevity codes from the various resources. The reason for this is most professions have an extensive and well-documented technical language. The study of medicine, mathematics, law, engineering, and computer science all have unique means of formal communication. For each of these elds, the language or specic lexicology developed as the eld developed. Specic terms, words, and phrases all have particular denitions and meanings. A doctor or a nurse would not change or alter the meaning of a medical term. If they did, there could be potential life-threatening consequences. The ofcial language of air trafc controllers and airplane pilots worldwide is English. Universal distress codes, landing and takeoff instructions, and ground-to-air control procedures were all established for clarity and safety reasons. The US military also has a large body of ofcial terminology, nomenclature, and brevity codes. This means of communication was developed over time, and some tactical terms and their denitions date back hundreds of years. In the military, each word, term, and phrase has a specic signicance and a particular meaning. Training developers and instructors must know the correct meaning and usage of keywords, and teach and reinforce the proper
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use by others. The proper use of military terminology, nomenclature, and acronyms will show the overall prociency of the instructor, instill condence in students, and set an example for others to follow. Slang, Ebonics, and unofcial jargon could cause problems because of the potential for misunderstandings.

Figure # 38, Design and the teaching and learning goal.

DETERMINE THE PRESENTATION CONCEPT The presentation concept is how the class is arranged and the manner in which the material is taught. Sometimes a task, conditions, and standards format and crawl, walk, and run approach will do. Other times, training will have to be presented in a particular manner because of the content, so the analysis, design, and the presentation will have to be well thought out. An example of this is the disassembly and reassembly of a weapon. The sequence of a weapon maintenance class would not be disassembly, reassembly, clearing the weapon, and then maintenance. In this case, the sequence conicts with the learning process. The design of the class should complement the learning process, not clash with the content. If training is based on a military task, then more often than not, the task and task performance steps are listed in an approved reference. Task performance steps are always in the right sequence. If the training is being designed for a nondoctrinal or asymmetric topic, then other forms of sequencing may have to be used. The design of the class and the presentation concept are chosen for the benet of the students, not for the convenience of the instructors.

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Under no circumstances should quality be sacriced to increase throughput. Throughput is not the goal. The TD team should know there are a number of ways to structure a class. Some of the forms of instructional sequencing include a small-to-large approach, a storybook approach, or a chronological format. For the more abstract and complex topics, a general-to-morespecic theme or a general overview of the abstract concept moving to the more specic material can be used. In the latter technique, an abstract topic is explored and explained, and then the discussion moves to the more specic subject in a logical progression, connecting all the dots. This book uses a general-to-more-specic format. Designing a class in a logical sequence helps soldiers to learn and helps them to remember the content longer. While determining the presentation concept, the TD team has to remember that soldiers have preferred learning styles. The most common learning modalities are visual learning based on what is seen, auditory learning based on what is heard, and kinesthetic learning based on physical tasks. An educational psychologist would break these three learning models down further into behavioral, cognitive, social, and constructivist perspectives of learning because of the inuence of cognition on any educational scheme or design. The idea of using a logical progression in a teaching setting is well documented. Generally speaking, the term sequencing of instruction refers to the order, staging, arrangement, and organization of a learning activity. There are many studies that have shown that this technique has a direct affect on the way information is processed, learned, and memorized (Glynn and DiVesta 1977; Lorch and Lorch 1985; Van Patten and Chao 1886; Reigeluth 1983a). Some of the more notable behaviorists like Thorndike, Hull, and Skinner support a linear approach to sequencing that would include shaping, mastering, and pairing. Theoretically, these connected steps result in the development of a behavioral chain. Other sequencing theories and supporting research advocate a simple-to-complex sequencing of instruction (Bruner 1970; Reigeluth 1983a, 1983b; Scandura 1983). Landa suggests a cumulative or snowball approach (1974). Sequencing has been used in the military for some time. The research of Robert M. Gagne, early 60s, focused primarily on military training and the outcome of that training (1962). Initially, he developed training for US Air Force pilots during World War II. In his book, Conditions of Learning (1965, 1985), Gagne described eight kinds of learning and nine events of instruction. As an educational psychologist and behaviorist, his work was directed toward the end result of training, or as Bloom put it, the outcome of training. With his research, he felt he had identied ve levels of learning, all of which required a different approach. The ve categories of learning he recognized were attitudes, cognitive strategies, intellectual skills, motor skills, and verbal information. He further felt that certain prerequisite skills, or as he called them, mental conditions, had to be identied at each level to facilitate the learning at that level. For instance, with cognitive strategies, the student must be given the opportunity to develop, apply, and test new problem-solving solutions instead of just being taught the strategysort of learn by doing. With learned attitudes, a student had to be exposed to individuals that had appropriate
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and credible attributions such as a moral and ethical role model. This could be called a setthe-example approach. Moreover, he felt intellectual skills could be improved through a hierarchal organization or sequencing of learning tasks based on complexity. His nine-step instructional process described nine events during instruction that corresponded to nine internal processes that occurred in the student while being taught (Gagne 1992). His nine events of instruction begin with gaining the students attention. This is done by starting the class with thought-provoking questions, interesting facts, controversial statements, or a multimedia presentation. The questions, facts, and statements are designed to capture the students attention and create curiosity. The sound and visual effects of a multimedia presentation are believed to stimulate neural processes. In this way, the students concentration is focused on the training material. The second event is to create a certain level of expectation. This is accomplished with an explanation of the training or learning objective. The second event is presented to the students in the form of a statement. The stated objective is always the foundation of any assessment for the class. The stated goal also gives students something to work toward. The third event in Gagnes training program is the retrieval of past events, knowledge, and experiences through mental recall. The activation of stored information is seen as a key element of learning, since new material is stored more prociently in long-term memory when it is linked to past events and already-learned information. In this step, past memories are retrieved and stimulated through a questioning process. The comments about past experiences are designed to evoke recall, stimulate concentration, and motivate learning with associations. In the fourth step of instruction, the new training material is presented to the students in an organized, well-thought-out, and meaningful manner. The explanation of the material is then followed with a demonstration. The primary material is explained, demonstrated, and provided to the student in multiple modalities such as written text, visual graphics, and/or video. Reinforcement and reiteration of the new material is conducted during the fth step of the training program. This is called the learning guidance step. Variations of the original demonstration, expanded graphics, parallel material, and corresponding case studies are presented and discussed at this time. Performance, practice, conrmation, and rehearsal make up the sixth step, or the elicit performance step. Feedback, guidance, coaching, hints, and answers to questions make up the seventh step of the process. This is not the grading or scoring step. The eighth step is used for formal assessment. No feedback or coaching is provided during the nal step. The training program is completed with the retrieval and use of the new information in new situations. Today, Gagne is considered to be one of the most inuential researchers and developers of a systematic approach to instructional design.

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Another teaching and learning enhancement technique is a mnemonic. The word mnemonic is derived from ancient Greek mythology and refers to an ancient Greek goddess called Mnemosyne. A mnemonic can be a poem, song, phrase, or word designed to evoke a memory. The word essentially means remembrance. If it is designed correctly, a mnemonic can improve the memorization of military training topics. A mnemonic can be seen as a key that unlocks larger pieces of data or information. Usually a mnemonic relates to information that has been condensed, compacted, or arranged into a smaller form for the purpose of memorization. Mnemonics have been used for quite some time now as memory aids. In a military application, mnemonics are very similar to acronyms. An example of a military mnemonic is the term SALUTE. The word is used for the organization, memorization, and reporting of enemy activities. SALUTE stands for: size, activity, location, uniform, time, and equipment. In asymmetric conicts like we see in Iraq and Afghanistan, another example of a mnemonic is the ve Cs. One more technique that can improve learning and memorization is the theory of information processing (Miller 1956). Since its inception, information processing theory has developed into a generally accepted theory of human cognitive functioning and a framework for information processing. Information processing theory provides us with two concepts that help to explain mental functions and that can be used to enhance training. The rst principle relates to our short-term memory and tells us we can temporarily hold only ve-to-nine pieces or chunks of information. A chunk of information in our short-term memory is a meaningful unit of data. It can be numbers, words, faces, or positions of game pieces on a board. The ve-to-nine chunks of information are described as seven pieces of information, plus or minus two pieces (ibid.). This human characteristic and the benets of chunking have been veried time and time again at a number of different levels. Chucking information can enhance training. When used properly, mnemonics and chunking together can help soldiers to remember detailed information more efciently for longer periods of time. The chunking of information and the use of a mnemonic can also be used together to standardize information and the dissemination of that information. The second principle of the levels of processing framework is that information processing is seen as automatic until the individual focuses his or her attention on a particular level of that process. When this happens, its called metaprocessing. Applications of the concept include the memorization and recital of word lists; the rehearsal of a new language; and reading, writing, and studying assignments. Therefore, additional reading and writing assignments, recitals, and tests should be incorporated into training so the benets of metaprocessing can further promote learning. In fact, it should actually be mandatory to include one or more of these techniques into classes that are nothing more than a PowerPoint presentation and speech. A slideshow and talk have very little, if any, teaching/training value, especially if the person doing the talking is not a real lecturer and untrained. Usually, a masters degree is required before a person can call themselves an associate or assistant professor and a PhD is required before a person is a full professor or senior lecturer. Tests, reading and writing assignments, class debates, and rehearsals do in fact prompt soldiers to learn. The

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memorization and use of fundamentals, principles, and tenets in a training setting also falls within the metaprocessing framework. Another theory of memory suggests that there are stages of processing for sensory, working, and long-term memory. The levels of processing framework theory (Craik and Lockhart 1972) suggests that stimulus information is processed at multiple levels all at the same time. One of the main concepts of the theory is that information retention is based on the depth of the cognitive processing. For instance, if a person processes information deeper then the individual is more likely to know the information better and retain the information longer. So from a cognitive/learning perspective, showing soldiers how and why the information is personally important to them is yet another way to stimulate deeper processing. Students will typically key in on material that is personally relevant to them and pay more attention to the material. To summarize, soldiers are more interested in information, comprehend it quicker, and remember it longer when the information is personally relevant. An example is information about a combat area that a soldier is deploying to. This would include emerging enemy TTPs and new friendly TTPs. The end result of this technique is improved learning and increased memorization. Realism is another way to improve training. An increased sense of realism makes the teaching points more vivid and makes mistakes more dramatic and more undeniable. Some individuals learn a lot from their mistakes, especially conscience individuals. Conscience individuals like to know the rules and like to follow the rules. Mistakes are quickly corrected and then remembered. Conscience individuals do not like to make the same mistakes twice. In certain training settings, role-players can help to induce a more intense feeling of realism. When role-players are trained properly and incorporated correctly, along with complex training scenarios, the techniques together tap into the effective learning components. This technique has been used very successfully in a number of military training settings. Two very successful and long-standing examples are Robin Sage, the culminating SF qualication exercise, and the DOD SERE course. Some of the techniques that can be used for this are intense interpersonal relationships, ambiguous situations, anxiety-provoking events, and severe crises. Role-players can add another, more complex layer to training. Role-players can be used to train and then test soldiers on specic tasks, such as the use of an interpreter, individual search, escalation of force, and the use of deadly force. Sequencing instruction, conditions of learning, Ganges nine events of instruction, mnemonics, chucking and metaprocessing, or information processing theory, levels of processing, and realism are proven techniques that can in fact improve army training. But for any of these techniques to work correctly, someone has to incorporate them into the design and then implement and supervise. There are many things that can go wrong during the TD process and then many more things that can happen during training. In an organization that was designed to keep up with complex emerging enemy TTPs in an asymmetric environment, someone has to manage and supervise, or things dont happen. Allowing instructors and O/Cs to make their own decisions about training does not work. This means the training developer has to attend meetings, verify data and organizing, manage, and control instructors and O/ Cs. The research effort, the analysis, the documentation and dissemination process, and the rehearsals all have to be supervised. The training developer also has to get out of the ofce
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and actually watch training too. Training cannot be monitored from an ofce by phone. A responsible training developer establishes another layer of QA, QC, and helps to guarantee standardization. Therefore, the most important things a training developer can do during the entire TD process is to provide guidance and expertise. CQM is considered fundamental-level training. CQM is also for the individual or individual echelon of training. The fundamentals of CQM are stance and grip, sight picture and sight alignment, breathing and trigger squeeze, and recovery and follow-through. The fundamentals are chunked. The fundamentals compress and highlight the essential elements of individual marksmanship. The CQM fundamentals emphasize the importance of individual control, self-monitoring, and self-correction. The soldier is responsible for his or her own accuracy with these fundamentals. The fundamentals provide well-thought-out strategies that can be used to improve individual marksmanship. CQM training is standardized across the various training domains with fundamentals like this. The CQM fundamentals are also a memory aid. They make the core training elements easier to recall, as compared to a longer, more drawn-out form of instruction. Under stressful conditions like little or no sleep, extreme weather conditions, lack of food and water, and dangerous combat conditions, concise guidance like this becomes extremely helpful and very practical. Since the CQM fundamentals are chucked, they can be taught more efciently and memorized more effectively. Chunking enhances the memorization process, making the fundamentals less forgettable and easier to recall and use. The CQM fundamentals are paired during training with cognitive and physical associations. Stance and grip are gross motor skills, but thought is still involved. Sight picture and sight alignment are more rened cognitive functions. Eyesight and tracking, and the coordination of these skills are ne motor skills. Breathing and trigger squeeze require the soldier to sequence his or her basic body functions along with ne motor skills. Recovery and followthrough involve a transition from gross motor skills to ne motor skills and a timely repetition of the entire sequence. Pairing similar items in this manner increases the likelihood of memorization through association. During CQM training, the fundamentals of CQM should be explained, discussed, demonstrated, practiced, repeated, and critiqued. Repetition of the chunked and associated training material further intensies individual cognitive processing and memorization. If the individual soldier is not hitting the target correctly then the student has to be critiqued by the trainer. The critique needs to be made personally relevant. The fundamentals can also be presented in the form of a mnemonic. The fundamentals are problem-solving strategies that improve marksmanship. In your working group, answer the following questions: 1. Where on the front hand guard should the soldiers hand be placed? Why? 2. How far apart should the soldiers feet be in a good CQM stance? Why? 3. What realistic method can the trainer use to critique the soldier? 4. Is there training that should accompany CQM training? Why? 5. In your group, create a mnemonic for the CQM fundamentals.
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LOGISTICAL AND OTHER SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS A list of training aids and logistical support requirements have to be prepared as soon as possible, so the supply chain has time to react. The budgeting process for material and supply purchases also has to be started well in advance for it to work correctly. Plus, instructors will need time to train and rehearse with new equipment, so these items have to be obtained as soon as possible. If the training is centered on a specialized piece of equipment or device, then the instructor has to know the operation, maintenance, troubleshooting, and safety procedures associated with that equipment. If ranges are required, then range scheduling and equipment requirements have to be fullled. Scheduling, range safety certication, medical requirements, vehicles, and causality evacuation procedures are just some of these requirements that have to be planned for. An examination of Class I through Class V items should also be conducted at this point. With most Class V items, there are specic handling, transportation, and storage requirements that will have to be considered and planned for. This may include armed guards, placards, re extinguishers, class dispersion considerations, vehicles, and ammunition-holding areas. ESTABLISH A TIMELINE This can be done using a backward-planning scheme. The timeline has to list every important event and show every scheduled threshold that has to be met for the proper development and delivery of the training product. Then the timeline has to be monitored and followed. Each phase of development has to be listed, along with the available timeframe that is allotted to accomplish that develop phase. The TD team must have access to the timeline and understand the timeline. Reading and studying the references, rehearsals of the class, arrival of training aids, or other logistical support items have to be factored into the equation. Time should be allotted for unforeseen obstacles such as changes in presentation concept, loss of personnel, and presentation of the training sooner than was originally planned. If the RDA steps are followed, then the training development phases will progress in a systematic and smooth manner. A well-thought-out plan that uses insight and good judgment will help to save valuable resources. In the training realm, one of the most wasted an abused asset is man hours. An individuals time, whether its a soldiers time or a trainers time, should not be wasted. Useless irrelevant endeavors have to be cut out of the schedule. Trainers and soldiers should never be required to go through the motions or act busy in a training setting. The responsibility of acting as a steward for government resources means each and every individual should be accountable for the tax dollars and government funds they are receiving. Salaries should be earned, and funding for training should be utilized correctly and not abused. Trainers need to make sure that money intended for training should not be wasted. The policing of our own profession and our own resources starts at the lowest level. The day-to-day actions of each trainer should set the example for others, like lower-enlisted soldiers, to follow. Trainers are being paid not only teach and train, but to be role models for the younger soldiers. Apathy and indifference are the result of gross mismanagement. Lackadaisical attitudes, laziness, wastefulness, and careless actions have to be addressed and dealt with. Mismanagement, fraud, waste, and abuse should be reported to the proper authorities, so someone can do

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something about it. Soldiers depend upon military trainers to provide them with up-to-date and accurate information. A soldiers life may depend upon what you do or do not tell them. The following are blocks of topic-specic references for the development of asymmetric training. Trafc Control Procedures Reference List 1. Trafc Control Point Operations. CALL Handbook NO. 06-15. March 2006. 2. Detainee Operations at the Point of Capture. CALL Handbook NO.06-17. May 2006. 3. Reconnaissance Troops. FM 3-20.971. July 2009. Headquarters Department of the Army. 4. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations. FM 3-06.20. April 25, 2006. 5. Escalation of Force Handbook. CALL Handbook No. 07-21. July 2007. 6. NLW Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons. FM 3-22.40; MCWP 3-15.8; NTTP 3-07.3.2; AFTTRP (1) 3-2.45. October 2007. Air Land Sea Application Center. 7. Trafc Control Point Operations. Carr Center for Human Rights and PKSOI Workshop. March 2627 2007. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Escalation of Force (EOF) Conference Packet. 8. Tactics In Counterinsurgency. FM 3-24.2 (FM 90-8, FM 7-98). April 2009. Headquarters Department of the Army. 9. Electronic Warfare In Operations. FM 3-36. February 2009. Headquarters Department of the Army. 10. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Synchronization. FMI 2-01, November 11, 2008. 11. Risk Management. FM 3-100.12; MCRP 5-12.1C; NTTP 5-03.5; AFTTP (1) 3-2.34. February 2001. Air Land Sea Application Center. 12. Combined Arms Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Operations. FM 3-90.119/ MCIP 3-17.01 (FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01). September 21, 2007. Headquarters Department of the Army. 13. Weapons Intelligence Team Bulletins (WIT). 14. Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell (CEXC) Green and Red Hash Mark sheets

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Inner and Outer Cordon Reference List 1. Trafc Control Point Operations. CALL Handbook NO. 06-15. March 2006. 2. Cordon and Search. CALL Handbook NO. 04-16. July 2004. 3. Reconnaissance. FM 3-20.971. July 2007. Headquarters Department of the Army. 4. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations. FM 3-06.20. April 2006. 5. Escalation of Force Handbook. CALL Handbook NO. 07-21. July 2007. 6. NLW Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Nonlethal Weapons. FM 3-22.40; MCWP 3-15.8; NTTP 3-07.3.2; AFTTRP (1) 3-2.45. October 2007. Air Land Sea Application Center. 7. Trafc Control Point Operations. Carr Center for Human Rights and PKSOI Workshop, March 2627, 2007. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Escalation of Force (EOF) Conference Packet. 8. Tactics In Counterinsurgency. FM 3-24.2 (FM 90-8, FM 7-98). April 2009. Headquarters Department of the Army. 9. Electronic Warfare In Operations. FM 3-36. February 2009. Headquarters Department of the Army. 10. Risk Management. FM 3-100.12; MCRP 5-12.1C; NTTP 5-03.5; AFTTP (1) 3-2.34. February 2001. Air Land Sea Application Center. 11. Combined Arms Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Operations. FM 3-90.119/ MCIP 3-17.01 (FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01), September 21, 2007. Headquarters Department of the Army. 12. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Synchronization. FMI 2-01, November 11, 2008. 13. Joint Intelligence. JP 2-0. June 22, 2007. 14. Weapons Intelligence Team Bulletins (WIT). 15. Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell (CEXC) Green and Red Hash Mark sheets. Intro to Counter IED-Defeat Reference List 1. Combined Arms Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Operations. FM 3-90.119/ MCIP 3-17.01 (FMI 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01), September 21, 2007. Headquarters Department of the Army.

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2. Explosive Hazards Operations. FM 3-34.210, March 27, 2007. 3. Modular Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations (Expires 31 July 2008). FMI 4-30.50, July 31, 2006. 4. Intelligence. FM 2-0, May 17, 2004. 5. Operations. FM 3-0, February 27, 2008. 6. Tactics In Counterinsurgency. FM 3-24.2 (FM 90-8, FM 7-98). April 2009. Headquarters Department of the Army. 7. Electronic Warfare In Operations. FM 3-36. February 2009. Headquarters Department of the Army. 8. Risk Management. FM 3-100.12; MCRP 5-12.1C; NTTP 5-03.5; AFTTP (1) 3-2.34. February 2001. Air Land Sea Application Center. 9. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Synchronization. FMI 2-01. November 11, 2008. 10. Operation Enduring Freedom, Improvised Explosive Device Handbook. CJTF-7. May 2004. 11. Operation Enduring Freedom Smart Card 4, The Improvised Explosive Device and Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device Threat. CJTF-7. January 10, 2004. 12. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Procedures. FM 4-30.51/MCRP 3-17.2A. July 13, 2006. 13. Weapons Intelligence Team Bulletins (WIT). 14. Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell (CEXC) Green and Red Hash Mark sheets. Advanced Counter IED-Defeat Reference List 1. Combined Arms Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Operations. FM 3-90.119/ MCIP 3-17.01 (FM 3-34.119/MCIP 3-17.01). September 21, 2007. Headquarters Department of the Army. 2. Explosive Hazards Operations. FM 3-34.210. March 27, 2007. 3. Route Clearance. CALL Handbook NO. 03-31. November 2003. 4. Engineering Operations. FM 3-34. January 2, 2004. 5. Intelligence. FM 2-0. May 17, 2004. 6. Operations. FM 3-0. February 27, 2008.
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7. Army Planning and Orders Production. FM 5-0. January 20, 2005. 8. Tactics In Counterinsurgency. FM 3-24.2 (FM 90-8, FM 7-98). April 2009. Headquarters Department of the Army. 9. Southern Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Operations. CALL Handbook NO. 07-06. November 2006. 10. Electronic Warfare In Operations. FM 3-36. February 2009. Headquarters Department of the Army. 11. Risk Management. FM 3-100.12; MCRP 5-12.1C; NTTP 5-03.5; AFTTP (1) 3-2.34. February 2001. Air Land Sea Application Center. 12. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Synchronization. FMI 2-01. November 11, 2008. 13. Joint Intelligence. JP 2-0. June 22, 2007. 14. Electronic Warfare. JP 3-13.1. January 25, 2007. 15. MNC-I Counter IED Smart Book. GTA 90-10-046. September 2008. 16. Operation Enduring Freedom, Improvised Explosive Device Handbook. CJTF-7. May 2004. 17. Operation Enduring Freedom Smart Card 4, The Improvised Explosive Device and Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device Threat. CJTF-7. January 10, 2004. 18. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Procedures. FM 4-30.51/MCRP 3-17.2A. July 13, 2006. 19. Targeting. AFDD 2-1.9. June 8, 2006. 20. Modular Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations (Expires 31 July 2008). FMI 4-30.50. July 31, 2006. 21. Weapons Intelligence Team Bulletins (WIT). 22. Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell (CEXC) Green and Red Hash Mark sheets.

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Search or Tactical Site Exploitation Reference List 1. Cordon and Search Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Cordon and Search Operations. FM 3-06.20; MCRP 3-31.4B; NTTP 3-05.8; AFTTP (1) 3-2.62. April 2006. Air Land Sea Application Center. 2. Tactical Site Exploitation and Cache Search Operations Handbook. CALL Handbook No. 07-26. May 2007. 3. Sensitive Site Operations. FM 3-90.15. April 7, 2007 4. Tactics In Counterinsurgency. FM 3-24.2 (FM 90-8, FM 7-98). April 2009. Headquarters Department of the Army. 5. Electronic Warfare In Operations. FM 3-36. February 2009. Headquarters Department of the Army. 6. Reconnaissance Troop. FM 3-20.971. July 2007. Headquarters Department of the Army. Section VIII-Cordon and Search, and Appendix F Tactical Site Exploitation and Tactical Questioning. 7. Risk Management. FM 3-100.12; MCRP 5-12.1C; NTTP 5-03.5; AFTTP (1) 3-2.34. February 2001. Air Land Sea Application Center. 8. Site Exploitation Smart Card. Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned. 9. Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Operations Involving Sensitive Sites. ST 3-90.15. December 2002. Futures Development and Integration Center U.S. Army Combined Arms Center Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 10. TECHINT Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Technical Intelligence Operations. FM 2-22.401; NTTP 2-01.4; AFTTP (1) 3-2.63. June 2006. Air Land Sea Application Center. 11. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Synchronization. FMI 2-01. November 11, 2008. 12. Intelligence. FM 2-0. May 17, 2004. 13. Operations. FM 3-0. February 27, 2008. 14. Army Special Operations Forces Intelligence. FM 3-05.120. July 15, 2007. 10. Weapons Intelligence Team Bulletins (WIT). 11. Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell (CEXC) Green and Red Hash Mark sheets.

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Intelligence Assets Reference List 1. Intelligence. FM 2-0. May 17, 2004. 2. Operations. FM 3-0. February 27, 2008. 3. Army Special Operations Forces Intelligence. FM 3-05.120. July 15, 2007. 4. Human Intelligence Collector Operations. FM 2-22.3. September 6, 2006. 5. Joint Intelligence. JP 2-0. June 22, 2007. 6. TECHINT Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Technical Intelligence Operations. FM 2-22.401; NTTP 2-01.4; AFTTP (1) 3-2.63. June 2006. Air Land Sea Application Center. 7. Technical Intelligence. FM 34-54. January 30, 1998. 8. Intelligence Analytical Support to Counter Improvised Explosive Device Operations. TC 2-91.701. March 30, 2007. 9. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Synchronization. FMI 2-01. November 11, 2008. 10. Electronic Warfare In Operations. FM 3-36. February 2009. Headquarters Department of the Army. 11. Electronic Warfare. JP 3-13.1. January 25, 2007. 12. Information Operations. JP 3-13. February 13, 2006. 13. Weapons Intelligence Team Bulletins (WIT). 14. Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell (CEXC) Green and Red Hash Mark sheets. Electronic Warfare Reference List 1. Electronic Warfare In Operations. FM 3-36. February 2009. Headquarters Department of the Army. 2. Electronic Warfare. JP 3-13.1. January 25, 2007. 3. Joint Spectrum Interference Resolution (JSIR). CJCSI 3320.02C. January 27, 2006, with change 1 as of 25 February 2008. 4. Joint Counter Radio-Controlled IED Electronic-Warfare Handbook. GTA 90-10-047. March 15, 2007.

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5. Combined Arms Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Operations. FM 3-90.119. September 21, 2007. 6. Explosive Hazards Operations. FM 3-34.210. March 27, 2007. 3. Tactics In Counterinsurgency. FM 3-24.2 (FM 90-8, FM 7-98). April 2009. Headquarters Department of the Army. 4. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Synchronization. FMI 2-01. November 11, 2008. 5. Intelligence. FM 2-0. 17 May 2004. 6. Operations. FM 3-0. 27 February 2008. 7. Army Special Operations Forces Intelligence. FM 3-05.120. July 15, 2007. 8. Joint Intelligence. JP 2-0. 22 June 2007. 9. Weapons Intelligence Team Bulletins (WIT). 10. Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell (CEXC) Green and Red Hash Mark sheets. Route Clearance Reference List 1. Route Clearance. CALL Handbook NO. 03-31. November 2003. 2. Route Clearance. CALL Handbook NO. 06-32. September 2006. 3. Engineer Operations. FM 3-34. January 2, 2004. 4. Explosive Hazards Operations. FM 3-34.210. March 27, 2007. 5. Tactics In Counterinsurgency. FM 3-24.2 (FM 90-8, FM 7-98). April 2009. Headquarters Department of the Army. 6. Electronic Warfare In Operations. FM 3-36. February 2009. Headquarters Department of the Army. 7. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Synchronization. FMI 2-01. November 11, 2008. 8. Intelligence. FM 2-0. May 17, 2004. 9. Operations. FM 3-0. February 27, 2008. 10. Army Special Operations Forces Intelligence. FM 3-05.120. July 15, 2007. 11. Intelligence. FM 2-0. May 17, 2004.
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12. Operations. FM 3-0. February 27, 2008. 13. Army Special Operations Forces Intelligence. FM 3-05.120. July 15, 2007. 14. Joint Intelligence. JP 2-0. June 22, 2007. 15. Weapons Intelligence Team Bulletins (WIT). 16. Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell (CEXC) Green and Red Hash Mark sheets. Counterinsurgency Reference List 1. Tactics In Counterinsurgency. FM 3-24.2 (FM 90-8, FM 7-98). April 2009. Headquarters Department of the Army. 2. Intelligence. FM 2-0. May 17, 2004. 3. Operations. FM 3-0. February 27, 2008. 4. Army Special Operations Forces Intelligence. FM 3-05.120. July 15, 2007. 5. Joint Intelligence. JP 2-0. June 22, 2007. 6. Southern Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Operations. CALL Handbook NO. 07-06. November 2006. 7. Antiterrorism. JP 3-07.2. April 14, 2006.-Iraq 1st edition. Camp Taji, Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence, May 2006. 8. Counterinsurgency Operations Southern & Western Afghanistan. Task Force 31, January 2007. 9. Petraeus, David. Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq. Military Review 86. January-February 2006, 212. 10. Rabasa, Angel et al. Beyond al-Qaeda part 1, The Global Jihadist Movement. 2006. RAND Project Air Force. 11. Counterinsurgency. FM 3-24; MCWP 3-33.5. December 2006. Headquarters Department of the Army. 12. Electronic Warfare In Operations. FM 3-36. February 2009. Headquarters Department of the Army. 13. Human Intelligence Operations. FM 2-22.3. September 2006. Headquarters Department of the Army. 14. Long, Austin. On Other War Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research. 2006. RAND National Defense Research Institute.
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15. Hoffman, Bruce. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq.2004, RAND National Security Research Division. 16. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Synchronization. FMI 2-01. November 11, 2008. 17. Weapons Intelligence Team Bulletins (WIT). 18. Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell (CEXC) Green and Red Hash Mark sheets. Survival, Evasion, and Recovery Reference List 1. Survival, Evasion, and Recovery. FM 21-76-1, MCRP 3-02H, NWP 3-50.3, AFTTP (1) 3-2.26. June 1999, Air Land Sea Application Center. 2. Basic Cold Weather Manual. FM 31-70. 3. Map Reading and Land Navigation. FM 3-25-26. 4. Survival. FM 3-05.70 (FM 21-76). Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 2002 5. First Aid. FM 4-25-11. 6. TC 21-24. 7. AFTTP 3-2.26. 8. Part ISurvival Elements, Psychological Aspects, and Survival Medicine. US Army Subcourse, AVO661, US Army Aviation Center. 5. Part IIProtection from the Environment. US Army Subcourse, AVO662, US Army Aviation Center. 6. Part III-Sustenance. US Army Subcourse, AVO663, US Army Aviation Center. 7. Part IV-Direction Finding, Signaling, and Recovery. US Army Subcourse, AVO664, US Aviation Center. Composite Risk Management Publications
1. FM 5-19Establishes CRM as the armys primary decision-making process for

identifying hazards and controlling risks across the full spectrum of army missions, functions, operations, and activities. FM 5-19 standardizes the application of CRM and integrates CRM into the military decision-making process and troop-leading procedures as a holistic approach to making sound risk decisions at all levels of leadership.

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2. FM 3-0Denes the role of CRM in planning and executing army operations. During

planning, CRM inuences commander guidance, end state, task organization, and COA development. During execution, CRM helps commanders reduce risks associated with changing conditions and shifting priorities. During assessment, CRM helps to shape future operations.
3. FM 5-0Demonstrates how the CRM process is synchronized in army planning

by the military decision-making process, helping commanders reduce uncertainty and risk. Commanders express acceptable levels of risk in their planning guidance, and staff apply this guidance to developing control measures to reduce risk and for developing branches.
4. FMI 5-0.1Establishes CRM and safety as critical tasks supporting the protection

warghting function and protection element of combat power. Based on lessons learned in the War on Terror, FMI 5-0.1 seeks to better integrate CRM, targeting, intelligence preparation of the battleeld, and intelligence synchronization. CRM and safety, along with fratricide avoidance, survivability, air and missile defense, antiterrorism, force health protection, defense information operations, and counterproliferation/CBRNE consequence management, are essential to preserving the force.
5. FM 7-0Directs integration of CRM into training plans at all levels of leadership

and integrates CRM into the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment of training. The upcoming revision of FM 7-0 integrates CRM and safety into the principles of army training.
4. AR 385-10Establishes risk management denitions and policy, requiring leaders

and managers to integrate CRM into all army processes and operations.
5. DA Pam 385-10army safety program 6. DA Pam 385-30 mishap risk management

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CHAPTER FIVE

DEVELOP AND ANALYZE The phases of development, TD process, TD principles, instructional techniques, and the fundamentals of instruction (in this chapter), are based on two assumptions. The rst assumption is that the US Army wants an up-to-date instructional model that meets certain requirements. The requirements are considered essential elements and vital features of an instructional model for asymmetric tactical training. They are: a) Reasonable cost. b) Effective. c) Flexible and adaptable. d) Scientically substantiated. e) and must take into account the following characteristics: 1) characteristics of the soldiers being taught 2) characteristics of the trainers 3) training context and location 4) training content or material being taught 5) the environment where the teaching-learning takes place Lets look closer. Requirements: (a) reasonable cost (b) effective; and (c) exible and adaptive are all self-evident and shouldnt require much clarication. However, requirements (d) scientically substantiated and (e) must take into account the following characteristics, do require more explanation. Consider the following extended denitions. The term scientically substantiated refers to the generally accepted interpretations and summations of past research, recent and relevant research, and research from other countries that describe, dene, and explain the best possible instructional practices in the eld of higher education. It is admitted that generally accepted interpretations and summations can change in time and can be advanced with newer research. The term scientically substantiated also includes generally accepted denitions and commonly agreed upon explanations of abstract words, terms, phrases, and concepts. From this body of literature, the following denition will
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be used to explain teaching as the intentional arrangement of situations in which appropriate learning will occur (Menges 1981, 556). A denition for learning is not that simple. Instead, more descriptive research-based explanations of how people learn will be used, thereby making a clear distinction between teaching and learning. Teaching is the actions of teachers, and learning is the mental processes and behaviors of students. They are not the same. Requirement (d), scientically substantiated, is being pointed out because Lowther and Stark (1990) found that when teachers have a preferred discipline, it highly inuences the design of their courses. Cashin and Downey (1995) discovered a teachers preferred discipline also constrains their beliefs about what was and wasnt taught in the classroom and constrains their beliefs about student weaknesses and strengths. Stark and Laattuca discovered that methods for instruction are more often selected because of personal preferences and sometimes selected through trial and error. Typically, the nature of the expected learning, the nature of the student group or audience, and many varied practical constraints, such as the size of the class were not considered in the selection of instructional models (1997, 288). As reported by other researchers, student goals, cognition, and motivation were not typically taken into account while planning and designing classes (Pintrich 1989; McKeache et al 1990; Hagan and Weinstein 1995). In comparison, the recommended techniques, procedures, and models set forth in this book were not chosen through trial and error, or because of personal preferences or discipline constraints. They were selected because of their scientic value. The next illustration shows the characteristics that were considered.

Figure # 39, Teaching and learning environment.

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When it comes to learning, specically, Vermunt (1996) discovered a wide range of preferred learning styles. Each of the identied styles had different cognitive strategies, mental models of learning, learning goals, and views of teaching models. The learningstyle variations were categorized as undirected, reproduction-directed, meaning-directed, or applied-directed. Another researcher, M. King (1996), found that some students used surface strategies that met minimum learning requirements through rote learning, while other students had deep strategies and tried to achieve competence, interest, and greater knowledge in the subject. Still other students had achieving strategies, the last being attempts at high test scores and grades and activities of good students, even if the student wasnt interested in the subject. The categorization and classication system, teachinglearning enhancement techniques, and the models presented in chapter 6 were selected because of their association with deep learning. The second assumption that was considered while writing this book was that the army wants a training development process and instructional model or models that are operationally relevant and technically feasible. In other words, the model has to be practical in nature, pertinent to what is going on, and certain organizational factors must be considered. Operationally relevant means it: (a) can be used for most asymmetric-related content that needs to be taught, (b) can be used for material that needs to be taught in a certain manner, (c) can initially be implemented in a short amount of time, (d) can realistically be implemented by small groups and by the larger organization, (e) can be understood and used by a diverse group of moderately educated adults, (f) can be implemented anywhere in the world and can function appropriately. The term technically feasible also has to include usable, clear, and well-dened criteria and extended denitions for abstract concepts and terms related to teaching, learning, and instruction. Under this same topic, it is believed that operational relevancy can only be accomplished if the model has the capacity to bend or ex when minor modications are needed. Plus, the model has to have the ability to adapt to changing events, locations, audiences, training topics, and other unforeseen constraints. An instructional model that is phenomenological in nature can provide exibility and adaptability. It should be pointed out that phenomenographic observations were used for much of this work. The signicance of these studies is derived from the fact that they were empirically based observations and studies about real teachers, using real instructional models, with real students, in real classrooms or training settings. These two assumptions are being mentioned during the second phase of development because analysis is constant. Analysis guarantees that the teaching and learning are in line with the instructional goals. Other reasons for the persistent analysis include QC, QA, standardization, and nonstop monitoring for improvement. It is imperative that the teaching[ 88 ]

learning environment is kept at a high standard. The instructional model has to have the ability to change and adapt. New material should constantly be sought out and continually integrated even during and after the class; if not, the content will quickly become outdated. Relevant material and new topics should be examined regularly and routinely incorporated. Other key areas of interest that have to be meticulously and repeatedly analyzed are the characteristics of the soldiers, trainers, content, context, and the overlap or the teachinglearning environment, the most important being the teaching-learning environment. In the second phase of development, the emphasis will shift from design to development and then to implementation. In this phase, the teaching-learning environment is shaped further. So far, the training developer has been responsible for most of the TD process, either directly or indirectly. So now its time for the instructors that are going to be presenting the class to begin their preparations. The instructors will be responsible for what occurs in the class and for what doesnt occur. The instructors will also be responsible for the quality of the class and managing the milieu. Therefore, it would be wise to establish a set of fundamentals for the job. The principles of TD are for training developers and the fundamentals are intended for teachers, instructors, mentors, and O/Cs. Because of the nature of fundamentals, they are also recommended. The fundamentals of TD are:

Figure # 40, Fundamentals of instruction.

The fundamentals are a set of basic assumptions that can be used to guide behavior and solve problems. They can be considered beliefs or a way of thinking about military instruction. When an instructor is stuck with a training dilemma, he or she should consider the
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fundamentals and the guidance they provide. If that doesnt work, then the instructor should seek directions from the chain of command. At the tactical level, the person presenting the training is directly responsible for QC, QA, and standardization. The fundamentals will help that person to do their job better and keep them on the right path. The fundamentals of TD also provide a systematic way to think about the TD development process since they help to establish a procedure. Lets look at the fundamentals a bit closer. 1. Know your job. Understand your class and the training content. A good instructor is knowledgeable about the US Army in general, and understands the capabilities-based defense strategy, the military transformation, and the FCS integration plan. These policies explain the whys. A competent instructor is also familiar with and even trained on certain tasks from the SMCT-1, 2, 3, and 4; relevant STP tasks; some units MTPs; most WT and BDs; and they are aware of the units METLs too. A procient instructor understands the SAT process and the spiral model of development. That is, a competent trainer can talk about SAT and explain it to younger soldiers who may not know about it or understand it. The prociency level of an instructor shows in the instruction he or she presents. A well-rounded instructor comprehends and should have experience with conventional, unconventional, combined, joint, and interagency missions. An excellent instructor is skillful, capable, competent, and versatile. A rst-rate trainer tries to be outstanding and follows ethical guidelines. All of us have met that instructor that likes to brag about his experiences and his vast knowledge. The real skill of a trainer shows in his knowledge of the day-to-day. The day-to-day of a soldier is the SMCT, STP, MTP, WT, BD, and the units METL. Today, trainers must also be training domain experts and not just subject matter experts. A training domain expert understands the entire army training system. An SME only knows the single topic or subject they teach. So on top of a thorough understanding of the army training system, a good instructor will know his assigned training topic inside and out. This would include the historical development of the topic, weapon systems and equipment associated with the topic, and the latest information from the proponent. Sorting through information to make certain it is theater-specic may be another step. This ensures the trainer is an SME and a domain expect. A domain expert understands the Armys entire training domain and keeps up on any changes that are relevant to that domain. Most training facilities publish a trainers handbook with the duties and responsibilities of trainers and usually theres a company ethics handbook and policy book. All of these documents should be read and studied. The military references, topic specic material, and company information may require additional hours of work. This is where the reading and studying after hours comes in. The work that has been done so far in the TD process includes the training statement, analysis and research, a categorization and classication of the training, and a tentative presentation concept. Plus, a timeline has been established, and requests for logistics and support have been submitted. To continue the TD process, the team should next look at intelligence briefs from the AO and newer data like CALL documents to see if any relevant material should be added. WIT Bulletins and CEXC Green and Red Hash Mark sheets have to be reviewed too. Then changes will be made if needed. After the new or classied information has been added, a class outline has to be developed. As the outline is being worked on, certain learning enhancements techniques may be incorporated to further
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develop and improve the class. Dont let anyone fool you. A lot of work goes into the class design. The enhancements techniques that will be discussed in this chapter are graphic representations and models, information processing theory, contrast and comparisons, questions and answers, and lateral thinking. These techniques permit the instructor to tailor the class even more to the learning styles and needs of the audience. Learning for some is hard work, so the instructor has to help. If a class is lled with ash and pizzazz, and the instructor says teaching and learning are easy, then theres something wrong. When a class is designed well, it makes a bad instructor look good. When a class is designed poorly, it makes that same bad instructor look terrible. After the class outline has been drafted and approved, rehearsals will be conducted. The class should be rehearsed as many times as possible by as many instructors on the team as possible. Time may determine how many instructors get to rehearse the class and how many full-blown rehearsals there are. The training developer and all of the instructors should be present for all the rehearsals. During rehearsal the length, timing and the time spent on the particular topics during the class should be monitored. This will show whether or not time adjustments will have to be made. Certain topics and particular subtopics may require more time than others, so rehearsals have to be complete and not abbreviated. The entire content has to be checked from start to nish. The established time schedule for the class also has to be followed. Instructors have to remember that pertinent information must be put out in a certain amount of time and personal information about them shouldnt distract from, overshadow, or take the place of the content. After the rst few rehearsals, the training content and presentation concept should be critiqued and modied as needed. One technique is to draw up a list of priority topics and subtopics and then divide the time up. The timing and critique of the class provides the TD team with a framework. Alterations to the content and the priority and placement of important material will help with the overall staging of the event. Information may have to be changed, rearranged, added, or deleted at this point. 2. Be familiar with teaching, learning, and instructional techniques. I am sure everyone has heard the expression A picture is worth a thousand words. During a class, a picture, diagram, chart, and/or three-dimensional model can improve the quality of a class in many ways. Visual learning aids are different from auditory or cognitive learning aids. During class, they can help clarify complex and abstract topics, thereby saving valuable training time. With some classes, charts, diagrams, and other graphic representations can give a soldier a better idea of the learning goal, or provide more detailed information about the topic. Visual stimulus initiates more complex neural learning processes in the brain. Fundamentals, principles, tenets, and imperatives can be listed and displayed in this manner, or a three-dimensional model can very easily show soldiers what an objective looks like from multiple points of view and illustrate sizes, distances, obstacles, approaches, and egress routes. Visual learning aids, such as pictures from in theater, that show enemy activities always draw a lot of attention from soldiers because the information is up-to-date and personally relevant. Therefore, during the TD process, visual aids for the class should be considered and incorporated. Usually, military bases and camps have training support facilities that can enhance, print, and produce pictures, graphs, models, and charts. Even a sample chart or diagram made by an instructor can be turned into a professional product

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at these facilities. Now this does not mean that every class should turn into a PowerPoint picture slide show. Slides, diagrams, graphs, and other visual aids can also be overdone. There are many examples of visual training aids that can be shown here. For our purposes, we will examine a capabilities template that can be used to help organize and manage a large, complicated, multilayered military operations or unit. A visual aid that simply shows information is one thing. A visual aid that can be utilized for a useful purpose is another. A capabilities template is in fact useful and can act as a memory aid by simply listing a lot of information in a systematic manner. With a little bit of thought, it can also illustrate the diverse associations between different but interconnected layers. For instance, a capabilities template can provide a simple, but concise illustration of the assets that are available to a commander and can be the rst layer of a decision tree that will be covered in chapter 6. Capabilities templates can list, categorize, classify, and show relationships between discrete multiple entities. The template can be undated as situations change and as events occur. The following diagram is an example of a military-related capabilities template.

Figure # 41, Capabilities template.

The capabilities template above was prepared for the 1st platoon of an INF company. The template helps the platoon leader and company commander see what assets are available for a combat mission, and it lists the appropriate lines of communication for the assets. The BN has the support assets listed to the right of the BN block, so the BN is the point of contact for that specic asset. The company has the support assets listed to the right of the company block. The assets on the bottom of the template are coordinated through the company and can be coordinated on the logistic net. A capabilities template like this could help ofcers to make some sense out of a complex situation. The template can also help the subordinates
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under that platoon leader or company to better understand the larger picture as it relates to the combat mission. This template in particular could assist different commanders at different levels in a Brigade Combat Team (BCT). Usually, a BCT has a variety of different elements, such as infantry, armor, artillery, engineers, MPs, and support sections. A similar capabilities template is used on the Command Post of the Future software. A few well-thought-out visual aids can also show an entire mission. The mission can be broken down into understandable phases and areas of responsibilities. The following is an example of a mission depicted graphically.

Figure # 42, Mission chart.

The diagram above and the next four diagrams represent the execution of an inner and outer cordon in support of a site exploitation mission. The diagram above, gure # 42, shows the breakdown of Aco and lists the assignments of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th platoons. The assets that are available from the BCT and BN and from the company are also listed. Next, gure # 43 shows the responsibilities that the platoons have to the BN and BDE. For example, Aco will conduct the tactical site exploitation and all aspects of that search mission. This will include the coordination, management, and use of all available enablers. The fourth plt from Aco is responsible for providing BN and BDE with intelligence and surveillance from the mission. Bco fourth platoon is responsible for MEDEVAC, CASEVAC, FSE, combat air support (CAS), and UAV support.
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Figure # 43, Mission chart II.

The next diagram shows the rst phase and shows the assault teams approach and initial staging area. The assault team is utilizing a hot wall in case deadly force is used. There is one entry point, and all of the assault team members will ensure all rounds are red in the same direction, against the back wall or hot wall. This reduces the chance of injuries outside the house. All of the other elements including the inner and outer cordon are emplaced away from the impact area. Figure # 45 shows the approach of the inner and outer cordon elements and where blocking positions will be setup. The search team approach and staging area are marked and a tentative evidence collection point is planned for and incorporated into the diagram. Additionally, there will be a tactical questioning area, holding area for personnel, and a transport area for detained individuals too.

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Figure # 44, Mission diagram, (Phase I).

Figure # 45, Mission diagram, (Phase Il).

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Figure # 46, Floor plan of target house.

Still in line with the second fundamental, Be familiar with instructional techniques and know how soldiers learn, lets examine several learning enhancements techniques. The following techniques can be considered during the second phase of development. One cognitive learning technique that can be used by instructors to enhance problem-solving is based on the work of Landa and his algo-heuristic theory (1974). His learning method was based on the idea that it is more important to teach students cognitive operations in a practical sense. How could students solve problems if they werent given real problems and then allowed to solve them? From this premise, he gured out how to teach problemsolving strategies in a rather unique way. First, he presented students with a structured welldened algorithmic problem or heuristic problem, and then gave them the solution to the dilemma. Then he had the students analyze the problem and encouraged them to uncover the problem-solving strategy or strategies that others used to solve the problem. The goal of his method was for the students to uncover expert problem-solving techniques, expert learning methods, and expert performance procedures. He used well-known problem-solving stratagems for his classes. As the techniques were discovered by the students, the instructor guided them to the next step. The next step was for the students to analyze the methods they used to examine the strategies of others. When these unconscious and conscious processes were discovered and identied, they were then analyzed and broken down into elementary components and disseminated back to the all the students in the class. The students basically examined the way others examined problems and solved them, and then examined they way they examined and solved problems. This approach assisted students with their own efforts and helped them to learn new methods of thinking and learning. Yet another cognitive learning enhancement technique is the information processing theory (Miller, Galanter, and Pribram 1960), which used a Test-Operate-Test-Exit concept (TOTE). It should be pointed out that research has shown the TOTE principle is a fundamental cognitive process that many individuals in many cultures use for planning purposes and problem solving. Simply put, the TOTE process is used by individuals to see if a task has been accomplished. If we nd, through testing, that a task has not been accomplished, then
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we attempt to complete the task again and again until we succeed. This task completion reassurance cycle is ongoing, and modications are made for task completion if the task hasnt been completed. Modications of course depend upon the task. This is a try-and-tryagain approach. For example, if a person tries to put a peg in a hole and it doesnt t, then he may rotate it left and try again, then move it right and try again, or ip it upside down and try again. The attempts are made until the peg ts. The task can be a cognitive task and doesnt always have to be a physical or kinetics-related task. With this testing method, a person may also abandon the task if they determine through trial and error that the task cannot be completed or that they cannot succeed at the task. An instructors encouragement may provide a soldier with just the right amount of motivation for that one more attempt at the task or cognitive problem. The next cognitive learning enhancement technique is found in the work of DeBono (1967, 1971). Lateral thinking, as it is called, has received much attention recently and the phrase Think outside the box has been used over and over again on television, in magazines, and in the newspapers. The phrase is a pop-psychology or layperson term that actually refers to the theory of lateral thinking. The process of lateral thinking was extensively researched from the late 1960s to the early 1990s by DeBono, and he wrote and published several books on the subject. It too is a problem-solving technique. The theory suggests that sometimes a problem that seems hopelessly unsolvable can be easily solved from another perspective. This means that in some cases, low-probability ideas and improbable solutions might be used to solve difcult problems that seem unsolvable. Lateral thinking requires the use of innovative, novel, and creative means to solve a problem. The range of ideas is not limited, so even experimental ideas from other areas of study are considered. With lateral thinking, solutions that would usually not be considered are in fact considered and even tested as problem-solving strategies. There is another aspect of DeBonos work that should be mentioned. In his work, DeBono identied four signicant factors that he felt were associated with the process of lateral thinking. First, individuals have to recognize that individual, group, social, and even cultural views sometimes dominate the thought process and polarize an individuals perception. What has been called group think or group perception can therefore hinder the thought process and in some cases even stop it. Desire to solve a problem and the hope to continue trying can be affected by the group or social setting. Desire and hope to solve a problem may even be abandoned. Individuals simply give up, since the group believes the problem cannot be solved. To solve this problem, DeBono believed individuals had to see the individual, group, and cultural narrow mindedness for what it was and actively seek, search, and research for new ways to analyze and review the so-called unsolvable problem. He concluded that often, relaxation of inexible and controlled thought process would help the problem-solving process. His fourth conjecture was that actual change in strict rules and structured processes would help and encourage more lateral thinking and problem solving. One of his particular principles of lateral thinking is that problems should be broken up or divided into elements, and then one should try to reassemble them in a random manner. The next teaching-learning technique that will be discussed is contrast and comparison. This method can be used to evoke deeper mental processes during learning. It is often used by counselors to induce a simple yet effective thought process for problem solving.
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The teaching method can be better explained with an example. The topic well use for the example is breaching. While teaching breaching, an instructor can talk about of the various methods of breaching such as mechanical, ballistic, ammable, and explosive. The instructor can continue the talk by breaking down the four methods into more discrete elements. For instance, a mechanical breach can be accomplished with a variety of different tools. A metal or wood battering ram, crowbar, hooligan tool, rescue saw, or even a vehicle could be used to perform a breach. Each of these tools would require specic training and rehearsal. Plus, each of these tools would have a certain benet in some circumstances and a drawback in others. When saws or vehicles are used, surprise is lost due to the noise; they are also clumsy. However, if used correctly, they can be quick and effective. In the same manner, with a ballistic breach, a large-caliber weapon is preferred to ensure the hinges of the door are severed, but a shotgun requires a certain type of round. If not, then a shotgun is going to have either minimum penetration or over-penetration and could possible cause a civilian on the battleeld to be injured. Continuing the contrast and comparison, the good things about a shotgun are that they are easy to use, they are cheap, they are effective, and shotguns provide surprise and speed. The bad things about a shotgun are the possibility of hidden hinges or locks, accessibility of the weapon, thick doors; they require many rounds to complete the breach, and the prociency of the breach man. The breach man also has to transition from one weapon to another after the breach. Next, the good points and bad points of an explosive breach would be discussed. When utilizing an explosive breach, training, knowledge, and the proper explosive change are important factors. With explosive breaches, exact cutting charges like jet-ax are the best, because they were designed as a cutting changeminimum material but maximum effect. A jet-ax is extremely effective and minimizes collateral damage. But this type of shielded explosive charge is hard to get in a combat situation. Plus, it requires a standoff distance and other considerations during prep. Some special operations units order it and use it on a regular basis and have the time to make standoff blocks. In other situations, the breach man may have to create his own breaching charge with detonation cord, C-4, and blasting cap, so experience is needed. The pros and cons of each method are presented and discussed in detail, and the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of each method would be stressed. The contrast-and-comparison technique requires the trainer to discuss each technique in detail and explore the pros and cons of each method, giving the soldier the knowledge so he or she can make an informed decision. Another technique is letting the soldiers debate the good things and bad things about the topic. In the end, this learning approach shows that there are many ways to breach a door, and versatility may be the key to a successful operation. A contrast and comparison approach provides soldiers with the information and reasons why one method is better than others. When a soldier asks a question, is it always wise to answer the question? Some instructors will say yes, and answer each and every question in every situation. But the truth is, the answer is no. In some cases, the question shouldnt be answered. During class, a trainer should present the training content in the proper manner and then inspire, motivate, and persuade soldiers to think and learn. The instructor also provides encouragement, assistance, and guidance during this stage. When soldiers are taught problem-solving strategies and then
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given problems, they should be allowed to solve the problem. The trainer should not solve the problem for them. Class design deals with the structure, sequence, and presentation of the training material. Teaching and learning enrichment techniques are used to induce and stimulate cognitive processes. If the trainer does not let this process take place, then learning on the part of the soldier doesnt take place. If a trainer gures out the problem for the soldier, where is the learning value? At some point, the instructor should stop answering questions and ask the soldier, What do you think? Or how would you solve that problem? and then let the soldier gure it out. Sometimes a soldier will ask a question just to get out of work. When the question is handed back to them with no answer, some of them dont know what to do. Sometimes reading and research assignments can be given to kindle more thought on the subject. With a working group, a class exercise and group competition can fuel the learning ame even more. Sometimes a formal debate can help solve the problem. This is where the ingenuity of the trainer comes in and problem-solving methods are discussed and used. The quality of a class and the learning involved in that class depend greatly upon the skills of the trainer. So remember how soldiers learn and use that knowledge to enrich their learning experiences. 3. Support every soldier with your time and have patience. One of the best things a trainer can do to support soldiers is to manage the training time effectively. Far too many trainers want to just hang out and talk about anything, other than training. Ex-wives, shing, cars, motorcycles, religion, andthe big onesports are some of the topics that consume way too much training time. There are also some instructors that think soldiers, especially female soldiers, need to know as much personal information about the trainer as possible. Other trainers will even hang out with the soldiers during training, when they should actually be observing, and disturb and distract the soldiers that are supposed to be learning. Talking with soldiers about training is one thing; talking with soldiers informally about their personal life is yet another. These misguided trainers need to be confronted about their actions and redirected toward more goal-directed, mission-oriented behavior. Training time should be considered as a valuable commodity and treated and managed as such. Unfortunately, some trainers are not properly trained or monitored adequately by supervisors, so these problems go unchecked and uncorrected. In some cases, supervisors may even know about the behaviors but simply ignore them. Training time should be used for training, and any trainer that distracts from training or wastes training time should be counseled in writing. If that doesnt work, then they should be reported to the chain of command. Some trainers dont know it, but there are actually times when they should stop talking and listen. One of these times is when a member of the training unit chain of command makes a pertinent comment about training. The trainer should draw attention to the conversation, so all can hear it. Another time is when a soldier has a signicant question about training or a unit TTP. In this case, the trainer should stop all the other discussions, draw attention to the question, and refer it to the unit chain of command instead of answering the question himself and ignoring unit input. At certain times, a trainer should do more listening than talking. One of these times is during a well-run AAR too. If the chain of command from the unit is doing
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the AAR and doing a good job, then the trainer should listen and not distract. A good trainer will even provide pertinent observations and comments to the chain of command before the AAR and then listen closely during the AAR to make sure everything was covered. There is a difference between providing support and creating a disturbance and some trainers have never been taught that difference. A smart trainer also knows when it is time to move on during training. Sometimes training can stall or seem to stop. A number of things can cause this. A delay in training could be created by a transition in the class, failed logistical support, severe weather, or broken or ineffective equipment. Sometimes the unit training needs time for administrative reasons. In rare cases, the trainer could have made a mistake and needs time to regroup and shift focus. If a trainer has established a close working relationship with the training unit chain of command, a simple suggestion may work to get things moving again. At other times, more direct recommendations may be needed. This is where the trainer has to rely on his or her interpersonal relationship skills and communication skills. To lessen communication problems, a sharp trainer will brief the chain of command thoroughly upon arrival and keep that chain of command up-to-speed on the phases of training and on each aspect of the training. If a decision needs to be made about training, the trainer will inform the chain of command, make suggestions and explain the whys behind the recommendations. That way, if a soldier asks the chain of command a question about training, the chain of command will already have the answer and the answer will be a correct one. The trainer has to be able to make an assessment of the situation and know when to listen, when to talk, when to move on, and when to refer to the chain of command. These decisions are based on the situation at hand, experience, and time management. A lot of trainers will drive on with training no matter what, so they dont get behind and stay on schedule, or so they can get done early. Others will either ignore a situation or walk away at an important time and not capitalize on the event and use it to reinforce an important teaching point. A focused trainer will keep in mind the intent of the class and not get sidetracked by personal interests, nor will he get distracted by events or situations. The aim is to provide soldiers with the proper type and amount of training in the proper manner and in the time allotted. 4. Support the training unit chain of command. Dont tear it down. When a unit deploys for training or receives training in-route on a real-world deployment, its very easy to sit back and nd fault with the unit and the units chain of command. During any deployment, theres plenty of stress and confusion to go around. If its a real-world combat mission, then the tension, uncertainty, and individual anxiety are multiplied by ten. Ofcers are preoccupied with planning, timetables, and intelligence. NCOs are worried about feeding and housing their troops, and accountability and equipment, among other things. On occasion, younger soldiers are left unsupervised during training, or they are supervised by inexperienced personnel, because the chain of command is busy. Putting the junior leaders in charge and sending them off with the soldiers for training allows the chain-of-command time to get things done. On a real-world mission, the younger soldiers are apprehensive and tense, so they either stop talking or start complaining. A few will even act out. This challenges the junior leaders abilities. Everyones composure is tested at one time or another. Trainers that used to be in the military should know how the younger soldiers feel; they should be
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able to relate. A seasoned trainer will support soldiers with clear guidance and reassurance, and use a sense of humor to ease the tension. A good trainer will see the situation the junior leaders are in and help in a positive pro-social manner. A supportive stance will set the tone. In these situations, the experience of a veteran trainer goes a long way. In comparison, if a poorly trained instructor talks badly about the army, criticizes ofcers, and makes condescending remarks about training performance, then that will be the training tone. Negative comments, an arrogant attitude, and demeaning remarks will do nothing but cause bad feelings. A poor working relationship with the soldiers that are training and bad rapport with the unit chain of command distract from training. Therefore, even unofcial comments and off-the-record remarks should not be made to anyone. Everything a trainer says in a training environment is ofcial whether or not the trainer wants it to be ofcial. A supportive trainer will pass observations and comments about training performance, good or bad, directly to the chain of command, in private. Plus, a training critique will be done in a professional manner with supporting observations, notes, and cited references. There are productive ways to critique poor performance and unproductive ways. If a trainer supports the chain of command with positive pro-social behavior and acts professional and condent, then that will be the training atmosphere. Stressful and confusing situations bring out the best in some individuals and bring out the worst in others. Trainers should support the chain of command with information, their knowledge, and their expertise. Trainers should also understand and empathize with the chain of command and realize the complex and stressful situation theyre in. 5. Report discrepancies and bigger problems to the proper authorities. As all of us know, problems come in different sizes and shapes, and appear at different places and at different times. Simple problems can usually be handled at the local level, whereas large dilemmas might require help from others. More severe crises need assistance from the chain of command and perhaps from other agencies. But if the chain of command doesnt know about a problem, how can they x it or help with it? Silence never seems to solve a large mess, and trouble seems to get worse when its ignored. Keeping the boss informed is everyones job. Of course, common sense and logic should be used to determine the severity of the dilemma and the level of the chain of command that should be informed. A trainers loyalty to the army, his or her ethical beliefs, and his or her individual courage are tested when they see or know about illegal activities, unethical behaviors, and the immoral acts of others. This type of behavior is extremely detrimental to a work environment and typically creates many other work-related problems. Offenders usually have little or no insight into their own behavior and believe no one else knows what they are doing. But there are telltale signs. Some of the negative effects of these behaviors are dysfunctional alliances, inappropriate relationships, inconsistent and poor work ethics, and disloyal attitudes toward the offender, offenders, and/or company. If the quality of training is being affected, then the problem is bad enough to report. If a trainer is unsure of what to do, then refer back to the US army ethical principles, and seek professional guidance from the appropriate military agency or element.

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6. Look, act, and sound professional, and react in a professional manner. In a training environment the term look professional has two distinct meanings. The rst relates to the appearance of the trainer. It means the trainer is wearing serviceable and clean clothes or uniform, and it means the trainer has an appropriate haircut, is clean, and is neat-looking. These things do add up to a professional appearance. However, in a training environment, theres another meaning to the term look professional. It also means the trainer knows his or her job, acts qualied, and looks procient. I have seen many trainers that look fantastic on the job. They show up for class as if they spent hours in front of the mirror, starched uniform or new clothes, fresh haircut, and brand-new footwear. But when they are around soldiers or are instructing, they are anything but professional-looking. Swearing at soldiers, being unprepared for class, being late or missing a class, making passes at females, and gambling with other team members are not professional behavior. A trainer looks extremely unprofessional when he or she is involved in these activities. Swearing at soldiers is different from swearing around solders too, and neither should be tolerated. The other meaning of look professional means acting professional at all times. A starched uniform, haircut, and shined shoes do not mean a trainer is skilled or competent. A capable trainer also sounds professional when he or she is teaching and training soldiers. Sounding professional is dened as being able to talk about the training and training/teaching techniques in detail, and being able to cite training references and other supporting documents from memory. This shows the trainer is well-read and that he or she has done their homework. Sounding professional does not mean making things up, lying, or using terms, phrases, or nomenclature incorrectly. If a trainer is not certain about a piece of information, then he or she should not put it out to the soldiers. Keeping up on the latest information from the various sources is a part of the job and some topics do require an additional effort. Providing the latest information to a soldiers and the units training is yet another way a good trainer can sound professional. Trainers are not used car salesmen and shouldnt act like them. Sounding professional refers to making sure the training content is up-to-date and makes sense. An example of an unprofessional-sounding trainer is one that tells soldiers they should wash their uniforms and battle gear with Ivory soap before they go on patrols in Iraqi cities. The justication for this is so the enemy doesnt smell the soldiers while they are on patrol. First off, while on patrol in an Iraqi city, they are going to be seen as US soldiers before they smell. Then secondly, this is a friendly TTP, but it belongs to long-range reconnaissance patrols and the establishment of hide-sites. Out-of-place information does not support the idea of being professional. Swearing at soldiers and then telling them they are not tough because they confronted the trainer about his language is another example of an individual that should not be a trainer. Unfortunately, the conicts in the Middle East have confounded army training. Now to make things even more complicated, training and training support have been privatized. Because of these factors, along with todays economy, too many unqualied personnel have been hired as trainers by private for-prot contract companies. Some of these companies ll training positions with unqualied family members, close friends, and old military acquaintances. In addition, the 100 or more companies that provide training to the US Army are authorized to
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certify their own employees as teachers and trainers. Its sad to say, but the priority in some of these companies is throughput or more money and not quality training. As a result, there are far too many used car salesmen, security guards from Bass-Pro shop, and their buddies being paid rather large sums of money to train soldiers. Unfortunately, the lazy ones and greedy ones have given the profession a bad name. QC, QA, and standardization should mean each and every member of the TD team and especially the instructors are adequately trained and properly certied and competent enough to instruct. 7. Know and enforce safety standards in every training setting. You would think that in a training setting, there would be very few accidents because of the controlled, monitored, and relatively safe environment. Unfortunately, thats not the case. The number of military accidents reported each year during training is startling. The reports that describe how some of the accidents occurred, are even more amazing. Some accidents are caused by sheer stupidity. Others are caused by a lack of knowledge. It should go without saying that everyone is responsible for safety, but the statistics show that this is not true. Safety concerns while training, at the tactical level, seems to be yet another neglected area of responsibility. The explanation, to the unit, and the insurance of safety standards, rules, and regulations, and the monitoring and enforcement should be the responsibility of the on-site trainer. Yes, the trainer cannot be everywhere at once, but the trainer should do everything humanly possible to ensure accidents do not happen while training. A trainer that works on the same training lane day in and day out or that works on the same live-re range will know the accident prone areas. His or her experience on that training site should tell them the areas that are more dangerous than others. The trainer should know what injuries occur most often. This includes heat injuries and minor injuries too. Trainers have to pass these insights, recommended precautions, and their safety-related experiences on to the soldiers they are training. This shared knowledge environment is how soldiers learn. Safety, or composite risk management (CRM) as its referred to now, is one of those topics that some inexperienced and uneducated instructors like to talk about. You hear comments like We should be training to standards, and Safety just gets in the way. As you can see, these immature remarks are from amateurs. First of all, established tasks and formal conditions and standards for asymmetric tactical-level training in most cases do not exist. So if there are no standards, how can they be met? Enemy TTPs change too fast and too often for traditional training methods to keep pace and when doctrine tasks are created enemy TTPs change. Secondly, thats why ISR is so important. ISR is used to gather and report trends, activities, and emerging enemy TTPs. Recently, the undersecretary of defense (Personnel and Readiness) has considered the implementation of counter-IED mission-essential tasks at the individual, collective, unit, and staff levels (DOD Initial Draft 1322.XX, Implementing DOD Training 2009, 7). But its not implemented as of yet. In a training setting, you also hear remarks like We need to train like we ght, Safety rules and regulations slow us down. If accidents, injuries, and deaths are permitted and tolerated during training, then accidental deaths will be allowed in combat. It will be a sad day in the US Army when that mind-set comes around. An inexperienced trainer doesnt know how tough it is to tell a family member about a combat-related death. Nothing makes that task easy. Notication about a training-related death or injury is outright unacceptable. When
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it comes to soldier safety, know what is right and enforce it. Every training area and range on every US Army military base worldwide has a set of procedures, rules, and regulations that explain the requisition, use, and safety procedures for the ranges and training sites. Sometimes a range certication class and test are required. No problem. Take the class, pass the test, and then get back to work. If trainers or O/Cs are driving military vehicles, then drivers training, testing, and military licenses are required. The mission of the US Army Combat Readiness/Safety Center is to support the army by collecting, analyzing, and communicating actionable information to assist leaders, soldiers, families, and civilians in preserving/protecting our armys combat resources. US Army soldiers are one of those combat resources. TRADOC is responsible for the integration of CRM into all training environments. The integration of CRM is designed to achieve several goals. The rst goal is the standardization of CMR training. The second goal is to provide progressive and sequential training for CMR and the third intent is to establish a cultural mind-set for the Army. Fourth is to focus on the holistic aspect of risk and fth is to avoid an increase in course and contact hours, or save money when it comes to training and integration. The last goal is to leverage products and resources for CRM integration. Currently, there are four levels of CRM training; the individual level, technical/tactical, operational, and strategic level. It is recommended that all military trainers should attend the rst three levels of CMR training. With that said every military trainer should be responsible for nding out when and where the training takes place and then attend, complete, and enforce the CMR goals. And every PM and training developer should be responsible for making sure this happens. Soldiers Soldiers are one of the variables that make up the teaching-learning environment. One of the most diverse groups of individuals that an instructor will teach is a group of US military personnel. This is because the group will be both male and female and they will have a wide range of ages. Some will be eighteen years old; some will even be in their fties, but most will be somewhere in between. A group of military personnel will also be ethnically and culturally diverse. You will nd people from all over the United States and all over the world in the US military. A group of military personnel will have different levels of formal education too. Some will have high school diplomas while others may have earned a two-year or four-year college degree, or even higher degrees. Still others will have completed some form of vocational school. Some might even have completed high school and college in a foreign country and speak two or three different languages. Many will have completed different levels of formal military education and have attended various other military schools or training. When it comes to actual combat experience, today an instructor will encounter rather young individuals that have already been to Iraq and/or Afghanistan two, three, or even four times. Some of these individuals have noticeable scars and shrapnel wounds from combat- and/or IED-related events. Others will have entered the military during the Vietnam era and served in combat in Grenada, Panama, Somalia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, or Desert Storm. A group of military personnel may have many different experiences from a number of different combat areas, literally around the world. These individuals may have no questions at all about the training, while the younger individuals may have many questions. Even with different combat experiences these individuals will have different learning strategies, various
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information processing abilities, a host of cognitive styles, and different maturity levels. So a military instructor has to be aware of these differences, so the teaching-learning environment can more appropriately t the soldiers that are sitting in the class. Generalizations about the soldiers produces only generalized instruction instead of a complete teaching-learning environment. To do this the trainers will look for the answers to several questions during the analysis. For instance, what are the processes of learning? How do soldiers develop as learners? What learning-related characteristics do soldiers have? What other factors affect the way soldiers learn? Instructors The US military has a large number and wide variety of instructors. The military uses drill sergeants to train new recruits and platform instructors to present topic specic material in various institutional settings. Drill SSgts teach initial entry training tasks and basic Army Warrior Training (AWT) skills while most platform instructors usually work with individuals that have been in the military for a while. Typically instructors in service schools present course material in a dialectic manner and the students are given assignments to read and study before and after classes. Another type of military instructor is the skills instructor. These instructors are found in schools like the Army Basic Airborne course, US Marine Corps Scout Swimmer, and the US Navy Dive Master course. These instructors teach a specic skill and are typically seasoned veterans and masters of the topic they ate teaching. Another type of instructor is the US Army Ranger School Instructor (RI). These instructors teach patrolling tactics and troop leading procedures. One more type or of instructor is the Observer Controller (O/Cs). These instructors are usually found at the larger National Training Centers and Joint Readiness Training Centers. O/Cs can have a variety of jobs. They can be used to teach in classrooms, train at training sites, or evaluate individuals and units on tactical missions in eld training environments. The JFK Special Warfare Center (SWC) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, utilizes advanced skills Instructors which are different from regular skills instructors. Advanced skills instructors teach and train military personnel on some of the more technical skills being used in the military today. Advanced skills instructors teach High Altitude Low Opening (HALO) parachutes procedures, Survival, Evasion, Escape, and Resistance (SERE) techniques, and Individual Antiterrorist Awareness skills (INTAC) to High Risk individuals. Since the inception of the Advanced Skills Branch at the SWC Advanced O/I training was added. In some schools role players are utilized along with the instructors. The Robin Sage exercise is the nal Special Forces qualication mission were dozens of role players are used in mission-related scenarios. The military has instructors for rudimentary tasks, medium or moderate level skills, and instructors for the more complicated and sophisticated training. The role, dialogue, and instructional model of a platform instructor, and the role, dialogue and model of an O/Cs on a training lane will be different. The role, dialogue, and instructional model of a drill SSgt will be different too. The platform instructor in a classroom will act as a lecturer and use a dialectic approach or a back and forth interaction with conjectures, discussion, criticism, debates, and questions and answers. The goal will be the construction of knowledge. The trainer on the live-re range will use a task, conditions, and standards format, and a more direct instructional model with brief periods of dialogue. The O/C on the training
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lane will act as a facilitator and guide soldiers toward the discovery of an answer that was designed into the class. The capabilities, limits, and boundaries of individuals and units may also be discovered along the way, with other valuable insights. An O/C could also use social learning models in a setting with small to large units to enhance learning and problem solving. Advanced skills instructors like in SERE school may use more advanced teaching-learning models like the learned helpless theory, whereas a drill sergeant will use an authoritative approach and a crawl, walk, and run; and task, conditions, and standards approach. The role, dialogue, and instructional model of a drill sergeant would not be appropriate in most service schools, just as the role, dialogue, and instructional model of an O/C would not be appropriate for initial entry training, or foreign language schools. Language schools more often than not utilize a full-immersion or total-immersion approach to instruction. Content One study by Cochran and Jones (1998) found that, generally speaking, more experienced teachers had more complete content knowledge than inexperienced teachers. In their report, they also said, the connections between content knowledge and pedagogical knowledge become much more clear, sophisticated, and complex with teaching experience, with the term pedagogical knowledge referring to educational, academic, or tutorial knowledge. Shulman completed several research projects that looked at teachers subject matter knowledge. From those efforts, Shulman was responsible for categorizing and developing a knowledge base for teachers (1986, 414, 21). The categories he developed were: a) Content knowledge b) General pedagogical knowledge c) Curriculum knowledge d) Pedagogical content knowledge e) Knowledge of learners and their characteristics f) Knowledge of educational contexts g) Knowledge of educational ends, purposes, and values. Content knowledge refers to the quality, quantity, and overall extent of knowledge an instructor has about the subject or topic being taught. In the military this is called subject matter expert. A very basic understanding of tactical training is very different from a more sophisticated and extended familiarity of tactical training at the combined arms level. Teaching a soldier what a three-second rush is and how to use it is very different from teaching the tactics for an inner and outer cordon and search mission. An instructor can increase their content knowledge with additional experience, research, and studying. General pedagogical knowledge refers to what an instructor knows and understands about instructional principles and strategies or the design of a class. Pedagogical knowledge is used to guide instruction, and used to organize and manage a class or milieu. Pedagogical
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content knowledge as dened by Shulman means ways of representing and formulating the subject that makes it comprehensible to others (1986, 9). Grossman described pedagogical content knowledge as knowledge of curricular materials and curriculum in a particular eld, knowledge of students understanding and potential misunderstanding of a subject area, and knowledge of instructional strategies and representations for teaching particular topics (Grossman 1989, 25). As mentioned earlier this phrase can be used to describe a training domain expert. Curriculum knowledge is dened as the knowledge and ability to understand, choose, convert, convey, and then integrate and implement appropriate content into lesson plans and instructional programs. Together, these characteristics or attributes can be called competence or expertise. Recently, in the military, the term curriculum knowledge has been used to describe the job of a curriculum developer. When we look at content specically, an instructor should know that training in the military is very often similar to training that civilians would receive, but sometimes is completely different. Military personnel could receive training that enables them to operate or repair a Bradley ghting vehicle. These tasks are almost the exact same tasks that a civilian would learn if he or she was required to operate or repair a piece of heavy equipment. A civilian may receive ne motor skills training, so he or she can operate a computer, or some other type of delicate electronic equipment. Computer training could be presented as task training or with a more elaborate systems approach. It depends on the level of the class, data entry or net manager. Most military personnel will be trained to use ne motor skills for the operation of their individual weapon and receive training for their gross motor skills when they are taught to seek cover and concealment when being red upon. Other military personnel will be trained on crew-served weapons, larger weapon platforms, and the use and employment of munitions. These tasks might require both ne and gross motor skills. A service member may also receive medical training, which is taught in the manner inside and outside the military; evaluations and licensing maybe the only differences. Decision making, problem solving, ethical dilemmas, and reasoning are used in the private sector by most business managers. Employees of various companies receive training on these tasks in college and continuing education later on from the companies they work for. These skills are also utilized by military personnel and require initial training and subsequent training just like the private sector. Management positions in the civilian world require knowledge of interpersonal relationships, leadership skills, budgets, and organizational management. Again, this reects similar requirements and knowledge that a military person may need. The content of the class does have implications for the manner in which the content is presented and the way in which the student is evaluated for their learning of the content. Some of the longest coursework in the military is associated with service schools and career advancement courses. In the private sector, the only thing that compares to this is advanced degrees that relate to the career elds. These of course are completed through colleges and universities. Some educational material may only require task training while other content may require reading, studying, researching, and written tests or hands-on evaluations.

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Context Instead of a group, a military instructor may also nd themselves teaching only one student at a time. This could occur while training a soldier to signal a helicopter during a sling-load operation. Too many people would actually get in the way and could cause a safety problem. Signaling a helicopter is a one-person task. In contrast, with a class of students for handto-hand training, there could be possibly 100 students. In the civilian job market, there are many one-person tasks, as in nursing, and many tasks that are taught to many people at one time. The size of the class will have an effect on the overall design, the amount of information because of time, the actual instruction, and the evaluation of learning. Individual task training and collective task training for a squad, platoon, company, or joint operational training all require a slightly different approach because of the circumstances. The conditions have to be right for some tactical-level training because large areas are required for rehearsals and the execution of training missions. If these large areas are not available, then the setting or context distracts from the training. Training servicemen and women who are part of a coalition force is highly likely too, as we have seen recently in the Middle East and Africa. Some individuals from other countries do not speak English well or may not speak it at all, so an interpreter may be needed. An instructor may teach complex and more abstract topics such as code of conduct training, or simple tasks such as putting on a protective mask. Course material could also be presented with the aid of a simulations program such as close-quarter marksmanship. The training event may be scenario and dilemma-driven. So military learning might be broad in scope, and military training may require many varied approaches. Modications and accommodations might be required for the type and size of the class, the amount and complexity of the material, and the training scenarios required for the training. In as few words as possible, the US Army needs a complete model of instruction that can be used at different levels, in different contexts, for different content, controls, and types of learning. The model will also require different measures of performance and different checks for success. As a result, military training has to be designed properly and then presented in a manner that facilitates learning. Class design has to be for the benet of the soldier, not for increased numbers. Instructional models should not hinder, impair, or block the learning processes. Poorly designed and deceptive programs should be dealt with appropriately.

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CHAPTER SIX

IMPLEMENT AND ANALYZE To better deal with the increase in unconventional tactics one TRADOC reference says, Soldiers must excel at critical thinking and be able to adapt to a variety of situations . . .They must also possess higher-order cognitive skills that enable them to adjust and adapt to rapidly changing operational situations and conditions (TRADOC Pam 525-97 2006, 25). So the desired characteristics of a soldier include increased mental performance, adaptability, and versatility. Another reference says, Training must prepare the force to learn, improvise, and adapt (US Army Transformational Roadmap, 8-4 2003) and the training transformation begins by changing behavior (8-3). Then training should teach soldiers how to learn, analyze, and improvise, and soldiers should be able to learn from their own experiences. Thus, institutional training must be improved, so it can better prepare individual soldiers for asymmetric warfare. Lets see what we can do to improve institutional training for individual soldiers and small unit leaders. So far, we have talked about the preparation and planning that occurs before training can take place. That initial groundwork sets the stage and establishes a script for the trainer to follow. Sticking with our denition of teaching, the intentional arrangement of situations in which learning will occur (Menges 1981, 556), we now have to look at learning models. A learning model is different from a teaching model. A teaching model determines the noticeable structure of the class and the visible activities of the trainer and soldiers in the class. A learning model is concerned with what is going on in the minds of the soldiers as they are being taught. Storing a task briey in ones short- term memory and then repeating it, is not deep learning. With task training, the task can be forgotten shortly after the training. Deep learning involves meaningful thought processes such as the linkage of information to other information and events. It also means associations of knowledge through thought, reection, and introspection and then storage of the knowledge in ones long-term memory. Deep learning requires more than task training. Mental activities, thought processes, problem-solving strategies, and other cognitive operations, like metacognition, are what we are talking about now. When a teaching model is combined with a learning model, it helps create a comprehensive instructional model. A more scholarly denition of an instructional model can be found in the Handbook of Research and Teaching, Fourth Edition (Richardson V. 2001, 1,035). The four determinations of an instructional model - (a) a chain of stimulating acts for the purpose of learning, (b) types of goals, (c) inuence of contexts, and (d) the Menschenbild must be an interconnected web of elements, each contributing to the model (Oser and Baeriswyl 2001).
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These two authors believe all four items are required to make an instructional model. The term Menschenbild refers to the idea that a man builds his own personal identity by way of his or her own personal choices and that those choices are inuenced by his or her personality. In this sense, man is not considered a thoughtless machine that is simply reacting to events in a preprogrammed thoughtless manner, like a machine. Man employs thought to gure out problems and then selects answers that t his or her personal needs and rejects the ones that dont t. For the purpose of this book, we will use the same denition of an instructional model. Lets review. The recommended TD process for asymmetric tactical training rst identies, categorizes, and classies training needs. Fundamentals, principles, and/or imperatives for the specic training are also designed in the rst phase. Next, a teaching model is selected and the content, context, and characteristics of the trainer and soldiers are considered. The trainers goal is to stimulate learning, so the next step is to match the teaching model with the right learning model to create an instructional model. This is done during the third phase of development. During the entire TD process, the training team follows a set of the fundamentals and principles for training development. The fundamentals and principles provide guidance, direction, and a way to think about design, development, analysis, and the presentation of training. Analysis is ongoing throughout the TD process. Part of the analysis is looking at how soldiers in the army learn different content in different situations with different control measures, and how they learn at different levels in three different training domains. Another variable is the trainer or instructor. These variables should not be left up to chance. As reported by Janssen (1987, 14), novice teachers spend only 5% of their time in class thinking about the students learning process. The same teachers reported that 50% of their time is consumed thinking about the content being taught, and 45% of their time is used thinking about their own behavior and personal image. An instructional model is designed to enhance learning and is not selected because of familiarity, convenience, trial and error, or to make the instructor look good or to increase throughput. Before we can select a learning model, we rst have to look at what soldiers need to learn in the army. Next is a list of things soldiers are required to learn. Again we speak of learning goals here, not teaching goals. Review the list of goals, and afterward, each learning goal will be examined separately. In the US Army, soldiers have to: Learn tasks and subtasks to a point in which they become automatic. This includes MOS tasks, combat skills, and related survival skills. Learn how to learn better. This is required because of the amount of information soldiers are exposed to and because soldiers are required to know more. Learn how to solve complicated problems they are faced with. Learn new knowledge and new concepts such as the cultural, economic, religious, political, and societal differences and different languages. Learn through personal experiences. Learn from social situations and have a sense of camaraderie and unit pride.
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Recently, the term basis model was used to describe the process of selecting and combining teaching models with learning models. The phrase choreography of teaching has also been used (Oser and Baeriswyl 2001, 1,032). When examined closer, the matching of teaching models with learning models was mentioned by Gagne and Briggs (1974) as early as the mid-1970s. In fact, Gagnes work and theory of learning are notable for two reasons. Number one, he was the rst author who distinguishes different complex types of learning in his theory, and number two, he consequently, offers a model that has a general, heuristic value. (Oser and Baeriswyl 2001, 1,035). Other authors that discuss the difference between teaching and learning and the design of instructional models include Merril (1983), Shulman (1986), Dick (1994), Burns (1996), and Oser and Baeriswyl (2001). There is also literature available that describes more of the characteristics of basis models and explains how basis models are implemented. The following is a brief summation of some of those explanations. A basis model is a learning enhancement technique that is designed to get to the root of the learning experience. The sequence of a basis model is a progression of information and ideas that relate to the topic in a logical manner. For instance, a soldier cannot be taught how to engage a suspected threat with a weapon until he or she is taught how to hold, load, handle, and aim the weapon. After that, threat discrimination techniques can be taught. A basis model is a common-sense learning script that builds on existing knowledge, like scaffolding. A basis model is learning goal specic and looks for established patterns of logical thought and knowledge construction, both pedagogical and psychological. Expert teachers that fully understand a subject and a learning goal can anticipate, select, and plan the right activities that will make that learning goal more likely to occur. A good teacher is able to put themselves in the students place and can make learning logical. These pro-social abilities are two of the characteristics that differentiate an expert trainer from a non-expert. Yet many trainers that cannot do this, or are not willing to do this, are training soldiers today. The ability to use a basis model also requires knowledge of people and an understanding of how and why people learn. A basis model creates the conditions for the learning process itself. What teachers do and what happens to the learner are two different things, so the teacher has to know what actions lead to the construction of knowledge. We can use a search class or site exploitation class to show how information is chained in a common sense manner. Here is an example. If a trainer is teaching an E-3 and an E-4 how to enter a building and then how to search it, it would be wise to rst explain an inner and outer cordon, the role and use of enablers, CREW systems, search tools, and targeting. The search class could still be taught without any of this information using a task, conditions, and standards format and crawl, walk and run approach. Admittedly, the E-3 and E-4 will not be in a position to plan for, coordinate for, or manage any of the support, or enablers, but the support, enablers, and CREW system do have a direct impact on the E-3 and E-4, their job, their safety, and the way they will actually search. Therefore the two soldiers should know what conditions must be set before they start their search and they should know why and how these conditions are set. As a result, the two soldiers have to be taught what an inner and outer cordon is and what it does for them as searchers. They also have to be taught what enablers are and what enablers can do for them and how a CREW system can protect them during a search mission. They also have to understand targeting and why its needed.

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Demonstrating to these two soldiers how to stop, look, listen, and smell at the door can be considered a search class and they can be taught these steps to complete the search task. They will probably be able to mimic these steps too. However, teaching the two soldiers that the CREW system should be emplaced rst, then the electricity should be turned off, then a dog should be used in and around the site, and a robot should be employed for suspicious objects provides them with a more in-depth learning experience. Thus, teaching models should be paired with learning models to provide a more comprehensive learning experience. The chart below shows a number of military learning goals on the left side of the chart and then presents the correct basis model for that goal on the right side of the chart.

Figure # 47, Learning goals and corresponding basis model.

*** Lets look at each of the listed basis models separately. MOSrelated tasks and subtasks are usually recurring motor operations or mental routines. The best way for a soldier to learn physical or mental operations is with different repetitious motor techniques or recurrent mental drills. A soldier doesnt have to learn the conceptual background or mental model or any other higher-order mental processes that goes along with most tasks. When physical tasks or mental tasks are repeated over and over again they become automatic, like driving a car and talking on the phone, or operating a computer while watching television, or eating or drinking. Continuous repetition results in automatization. With automatization, the person doesnt have to focus all their mental energy on that one motor skill or metal task. Other mental or physical processes can be done at the same time. Military examples would include, a tanker driving an Abrams while talking on the radio, or a helicopter pilot checking his headsup display, while monitoring his eld of vision, and simultaneously talking on the radio. Welldesigned stepwise routines will ensure soldiers learn established tasks. Most combat skills
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and survival skills would fall into the category of mental routines and motor operations and require the same basis model. However, more complex and abstract survival topics like cross-cultural communication would not. The basis model to learn a task or routine is: 1. (a) Attempt a set of physical actions or (b) try out a set of text or (c) try to apply a set of rules. 2. Develop a mental representation of (a) the action; (b) the text; or (c) rules through organized deconstruction, a determination of limitations, or an understanding of the connections, denitions, and rules. 3. Achieve a mental grasp of the parts of (a) the action, (b) the text, or (c) rules with guided feedback and discussion. 4. Conduct a self-evaluation of (a) the action, (b) the text, or (c) rules and/or self evaluation of the comprehension of (a), (b), or (c). 5. (a), (b), or (c) is repeated over time for full automatization. Research has shown (Steiner 1988) that those individuals with highly developed automatization skills go on to be better learners as compared to those without these skills. Oser and Baeriswyl believe that two-thirds of all human activities fall into the same category, namely the establishment of routines (2001). However, teaching a person a task with repetitious activities does not guarantee the person will learn the task. The trainer has to be experienced enough to allow the student to achieve all of the basis model steps. Not providing enough time, doing the work for the student, skipping a step, or presenting steps out of sequence makes it more difcult to achieve the intended learning goal. Furthermore, putting information out in a class does not guarantee that the person will learn it and completely understand it. Other steps have to be taken to ensure the material is memorized and comprehended. In the army, repeating a task until automatization will sufce for many military skills. However, it should be emphasized that this learning model will not work for all military training topics and there are tasks that you would really not want to become automatic, like searching a building for explosives. You would hope that this job would never be taught as a task with automatization as the goal. A soldier should be fully aware of his surrounding and be thinking about his actions in a situation with suspected IEDs. Fortunately, there are other basis models for other learning goals. *** The next basis model is for a learning goal that cannot be achieved with the establishment of a routine or automatization. The goal is for soldiers to learn how to learn better. The justication for this learning goal is based on the large amount and different type of data that are sent, received, processed, analyzed, and shared today in the army. If the reader remembers back to chapter 1, right now there is an emphasis on ISR and rapidly disseminated information and intelligence. This vast amount of data has created a real need for soldiers to learn how to learn better. Learning better saves valuable training time and increases a soldiers awareness. Plus, there are many topics that soldiers are required to learn in formal and non-formal settings that
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cannot be learned or understood through repetition-based training. Asymmetric conicts are fast-paced and complicated, so the ability to learn information faster and remember it longer would be a real benet. Lets examine the basis model for learning new learning strategies. Again, the goal is not to look at how learning strategies are taught, but to look at the best way for soldiers to learn, understand, and comprehend learning strategies. There are two psychologically based aspects that apply to the learning of learning strategies. The rst is independent autonomous learning and the second is guided metacognition. Independent learning is just that. Various techniques and methods that an individual acquires and uses throughout his or her life that enables that person to learn. The other is guided metacognition, which includes investigative, organizational, monitoring, mnemonic, guided self-questioning, guided peer-questioning, heuristic, and trial-and-error strategies and strategies for reading comprehension. Social strategies like a counsel, board, group brainstorming or the creation of a think tank should also be mentioned as alternatives means of problem solving. The basis model that can be used to learn learning strategies is: Exposure to a learning strategy. Reection on how various students learned their own techniques to learn and then thought about those processes. 1. Seeing and hearing the parts, pieces, elements, steps, or chain of a new strategy. 2. Application of the parts, pieces, elements, steps, or chain of a new strategy with assistance from the instructor. 3. Self-evaluation and generalizations following different situational applications of the strategy with different content. Research reveals that learning strategies are actually quite benecial for students, but for some reason, learning strategies are typically not taught in schools. However, some learning strategies are mentioned in Psych 101 classes, then reviewed, and sometimes tested as part of that class. One report showed that when students used learning strategies, individual motivation was increased and the management of study time was more effective (Metzger 1996). Other reports revealed that when students were provided with learning strategies, their individual abilities were improved (Oser and Baeriswyl 2001, 1,055). Additional publications on the topic include Baumert (1993), Entwistle (1988), Weinstein and Mayer (1986). Learning strategies or learning how to learn better would in fact improve the abilities of our soldiers. *** The third basis model we will look at is for problem solving. As mentioned in the rst chapter, today like never before, soldiers are expected to excel at critical thinking (TRADOC Pam 525-97 2006). It is also essential for them to be able to learn, improvise, and adapt to diverse and changing operational situations (DOD, US Army Transformational Roadmap, 2003). They also have to show individual initiative and resiliency, so they can bounce back from problems and see the solution through to the end. They are expected to do this with tangible concrete actions. Unconventional warfare has truly perplexed the traditional concepts of war and traditional training schemes. Soldiers today have to know how to solve problems
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in a variety of different disciplines, in various situations, and on multiple complex levels. In this multifaceted environment, problems can be well structured or badly structured and can be simple or complex. The basis model for problem solving is always content-specic and content-bound in all disciplines and on all levels. Again, content refers to the substance or subject of the class. The following is the corresponding basis model for problem solving: 1. Acknowledgment of the problem and/or an understanding of the problem (e.g., clear statement, brief presentation, problem statement); 2. Develop several possible hypotheses about different ways to solve the problem; 3. Test out the hypotheses through trial and error, and look for direct or indirect solutions, and supporting indicators or data that show success or failure; 4. Reapply solution with observed indicators and data in mind and reevaluate and redesign element # 2. Reection about the solution and association of the solution to a wider knowledge of learning. There are many researchers like Dewey (1910); Kohler (1963); Steiner, I.D. (1966); Simon and Reed (1976); Greeno (1978); Simon, H. A. (1979); Mayer (1992), and Gabel, D. L. (1994) that have published literature about problem solving. The basis model for problem solving can be used to illustrate and stress that all of the activities of a basis model have to be completed in sequence before the basis model will have an effect. Here is an example. If a soldier recognizes a problem and develops possible hypotheses about ways to solve the problem but is not allowed to try these hypotheses out, then the learning process is derailed. If the trainer provides the soldier with the answer, to save time, the learning is minimized. The various activities or steps of a basis model are exactly what make the actions relevant to the student. When the steps of a basis model are not properly planned for, skipped, or sequenced incorrectly the learning process is hindered or completely missed, and students are left confused and disoriented. Bjorklund and Harnishfeger discussed this obstruction to learning and coined the term inefcient inhibition theory (1995). Reyna found similar problems and referred to them as the fuzzy trace theory (1995). If problems are expected, they can sometimes be planned for. One technique that can be used for this purpose is a decision tree. A decision tree can assist a decision maker or commander with a complex and difcult situation. The following decision tree was developed for military use and pertains to a combat mission. A unit has encountered an IED and is working through the problem. Looking at the following decision tree, one sees that it has different decision branches and each branch leads to a solution. The illustration shows four possible decision branches that can be used to solve the problem. The correct decision branch depends upon the METTL at that time and the assessment of the situation.

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Figure # 48, Decision Tree for IED and EFPs in a units AO.

The decision branch on the top of the diagram, or branch A, is the activities that will occur if an Iraqi EOD unit (I/EOD) and Iraqi Security Force (I/SF) deals with the IED. The unit that discovered the IED would assist I/EOD and I/SF with cordon support and contact the WTI. They might also request support from the CEXEC. The unit would have limited involvement. Branch B illustrates the actions that should occur if a US EOD element is called in to render the device safe. With branch B, the unit that discovered the IED has more responsibilities for the situation. This might be because the item that was discovered was an EFP instead of an IED, so a threshold has been met that directs the solution to the problem. The unit would therefore call in EOD and WIT and eventually get CEXEC involved in the forensic details associated with the EFP. Plus, the unit would want to collect as much intelligence, forensic evidence, and other data as possible about the EFP, so other enablers might be needed. In this case, support elements like Civil Affairs (Civ/AF), the unit Law Enforcement Professional (LEP), and Human Intelligence Collects (HUMINT) could assist. The evidence would all be submitted to CEXEC for analysis and exploitation because of the sophisticated nature of an EFP. With branch B, the graph also shows that the unit would be responsible for the inner and outer cordon, and an entry control point to control the enablers brought into play. Branch C illustrates the actions that should be taken if the unit utilizes its own Talon robot to recover/render safe a discovered IED. Of course, they would have to have an explosive ordnance technician in the unit. They could do this if the device was not an EFP and if the device was a 155mm round or below. Perhaps they want to bring WTI, the unit LEP, and CEXEC into play since an IED was discovered in a new area. The last option listed is decision branch D. This branch would be utilized if the IED was a typical IED and not something new
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or an EFP, and if the device was discovered in what could be considered a bad part of town. In this case, a 30-minute time limit has been set on the units activities. A brief cordon would be established and the device would most likely be detonated in place. A decision tree is an example of a problem-solving strategy that can be used to show several possible hypotheses about different ways to solve a problem. A decision tree could be used in the basis model above during step two. Individuals that are good at rapid planning often have the characteristics of an expert decision-maker. Expert decision makers create far-reaching plans, have outcome-oriented thoughts, are goal-directed, and focus on the end result and what needs to be achieved, not on how it should be achieved. If one pathway to the intended goal doesnt work, then another is used until the goal is obtained. Expert decision-makers are xated on the purpose of the mission, not the steps of the mission. Training/learning environments and curriculum can be designed to further develop this skill. *** Fourth is the basis model for learning new knowledge and for learning the meaning of new concepts. New words and terms fall into the category of new knowledge too. Concept and knowledge building can be described as the transference of knowledge, so its a very common form of learning. In traditional academic educational settings, about 70% of all lesson plans deal with this form of learning and knowledge transfer. A lot of asymmetric tactical-level, IED, and C-IED training would also fall into this category. There are many different explanations of how and why learning takes place, but most of these explanations or theories can be traced back to one of the three main theories of learning. The three main learning theories are behaviorism, cognitivism, and constructivism. The rst, behaviorism, is centered on the assumptions that (a) learning is a change in behavior, (b) the environment directs learning, and (c) contiguity and reinforcement are needed to explain learning (Skinner 1954, 1976, 1985, 2002). Behaviorists believe conditioning is the way people learn new behaviors. Other behaviorists include John B. Watson, Edward Thorndike, and Clark L. Hull. The second primary learning theory is cognitivism, which is based on cognitive theories that explain learning though the activities of the brain. Brain functions are seen as being based on chemical actions and reactions and the various regions of the brain are studied and mapped. Other topics like short-term memory, long-term memory, memory models, working memory, information processing, language processing, creativity, and cognitive loads are tested and studied as well. Some of the more notable cognitive theorists included Albert Ellis (1975), Aaron T. Beck, and A. Bandura (1976, 1985). The last main learning theory is that of constructivism, which explains learning as a process in which the learner builds and constructs new knowledge upon past or present knowledge. Descriptive explanations of cognitive knowledge structuring or cognitive building come in three forms. They include propositional knowledge (Collins and Quillian 1969; Kintsch 1974a, 1998b; Norman and Rumelhart 1975), schema-theoretical analysis (Anderson 1976; Minsky 1975; Schank and Abelson 1977), and production-oriented models (Anderson 1983; Newell and Simon 1972). Propositional knowledge, talks about how people connect an argument with another argument, or how they reject an argument. The second, schema-theoretical
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analysis looked at partially structured networks or knowledge built through trial and error, or scripts or frames of knowledge. The last, production-oriented model, examines the trialand-error strategies or procedures people use to build, remember, and recall information or knowledge chunks. The basis model for knowledge and concept building is next. The rst part (a) designates the basis model for learning new knowledge like word meanings, and the second part (b) is for concept building. 1. a) Mental stimulation of what the learner already knows about the meaning of the new word. This is called pre-knowledge. b) Mental stimulation of what the learner already knows about the new concept. 2. a) Receives the denition of the word and reads and/or hears example of how the word is used in a typical sentence. b) Receives an explanation and an example of the new concept by way of a prototype. 3. a) Further development of the characteristics of the new word and an analysis of its meaning and contrast of that meaning against similar words and there meaning. This can be done through sight, sound, discussion, or all of the above. b) Involved in an analysis, categorization, and classication of the principles, both positive and negative, that denes the new concept. 4. a) Use of the new word and its meaning in a written sentence, conversation, and discussion. b) Active involvement in the application, analysis, synthesis, and critique of the new concept. 5. a) Use of the new word and its meaning at other times in other settings and with another combination of similar words and their meanings. b) Involvement in the application of the new concept in different contexts and integration and incorporation of similar, but different, concepts into a category of complicated knowledge concepts. *** The fth basis model is intended for the enhancement of learning through direct experience, or learning through doing. Experiential learning or self-experienced knowledge, as it is called, is limited by context and, because of this, is context-bound and cannot be generalized. As you may recall, context pertains to the circumstance, environment, or milieu the training or teaching event takes place in. Experiential learning is unstructured, engages the student at a more personal level, and requires the learner to be actively involved in the learning process.
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Since this type of learning is more personal, it has a tendency to reveal some of the personal characteristics of the person during the narration of their story. For instance, areas and events that are important to the person will receive more emphasis, and unimportant areas will be neglected. A similar basis model was mentioned by Reigeluth (1983). That particular learning model had four elements, which were (a) the student is exposed to a concrete experience, (b) the student observes and reections upon their experience, (c) the student forms abstract concepts based on his or her reections, (d) student tests the new concepts, and (e) the process is repeated. Experiential learning can only be reconstructed in a narrative manner or after the fact, because if the learning episode is stopped during the experience, it would distract from the learning process. In the military, this basis model could be used very successfully on a TCP ops STX lane or other STX lanes. Other notable theorists that wrote about this type of learning are John Dewey, Jean Piaget, and Kurt Lewin. Next is the basis model for experiential learning. 1. Preparation and planning of possible actions (i.e., planning and rehearsal phase for TCP ops). Mental images and thoughts of the possible conditions, difculties, and constraints. 2. Performance of the various actions in or under the particular contexts. 3. Clarication and explanation of the actions that took place during the learning episode. The learner begins to tell his or her story and tries to construct personal meanings. 4. Different individual perceptions of the experience are used to provide a general overview of the shared common elements. This is done through structured analysis. 5. Mental thoughts and reections about similar episodes experienced by other individuals. Other stories can be obtained from other individuals or published literature. For this basis model to work, each student has to have initiative, be personally involved, and use self-evaluation. Plus, the activities have to be sequenced correctly and followed for this basis model to be effective. Different basis models are intended for different learning goals. A chained event in a basis model provides the student with the knowledge for the next step. Therefore, the chained event or step cannot be skipped, interchanged, or exchanged with a different chained event from a different basis model. Basis models can be combined, but each activity from each chained event has to be present in sequence. Research has shown that teachers have a tendency to leave out elements 4 and 5 of this particular basis model. The omission of course derails or obstructs the learning process. Other research has shown that some students found experiential learning to be much more fullling to them than dialectic teaching. They described it as more realistic or more intense. Research has also demonstrated that experiential knowledge is more meaningful to students, stays longer with students, is more active in their long-term memory, and is referred to more often than other forms of teaching.

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There are still other basis models for social learning and learning through discourse, or more specically for learning social actions and learning conict resolution. There are other basis models for discovery learning, contemplative learning, learning to negotiate, and learning and constructing values and value identity. Certain basis models can be combined with other basis models, but the technique is more complicated and has to be monitored closely. Basis models are based on research that looked at cognition, memory, and perception and how conceptual change comes about. Some refer to this as psychologically founded concept-building or nomothetic knowledge. Nomothetic knowledge refers to group, cohort, or universal laws as compared to ideographic knowledge that deals with individual or single cases or laws. Research on basis models shows that when they are used, and used correctly, time in the classroom is distributed more evenly and that students benet from this (Oser and Baeriswyl, 2001). For instance, with basis models, the teacher spends more time in the classroom stimulating learning, and the student spends more time on the act of learning itself. Not as much time is spent by the teacher thinking about the content and how to teach it. As they looked closer, researchers found that basis models guide teaches into learning phases that support learning. Basis models draw the teachers attention and concentration away from their personal appearance and their own assumptions and personal preferences about how they think they should be teaching. Teachers spend time thinking about how they are lecturing, how they look, how they are explaining concepts, and how much time they have left to present the concept. Without a basis model, the class becomes a teacher-centered activity, and this distracts from the learning process. When a basis model is implemented, students have a greater awareness of the phases or steps of their own learning processes, as compared to students in classes were a basis model was not used. In other words, metacognition is greatly improved. In classes where basis models were used to stimulate cognition, about two-thirds of the students beneted. In one particular experiment, the students in the experimental group showed signicantly higher performances in a number of different subject areas as compared to the control group of students. In this same experiment, there was no difference in social climate of the classroom; it was the same. Then lastly, teachers that use basis models teach differently than those that dont use them. Teachers that do use them think more about the student cognition and are more responsive to the students thought processes. Basis models have been proven to work. (Oser and Baeriswyl 2001; Gabel 1994; Kolberg 1981a, 1984b; Reigeluth 1983; Weinstein and Mayer 1986). Teaching and learning models together increase a soldiers ability to think, discern, and act. The integration of appropriate learning models and the implementation of those models are accomplished during the third phase of the TD process. Once the training event has ended, the TD team will begin its own analysis and AAR. Improvement, the integration of new data, and the renement of the class are the goals of the analysis. External assessments of teaching and learning models can be conducted by TADOC Analysis Center (TRAC), or the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). DARPAs job is to research, develop, and maintain the technological superiority of the US military. The Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) could also be used to assess teaching and learning models, since its mission is to plan, conduct, and integrate developmental testing, independent operational tests, independent evaluations, assessments, and experiments.
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***

Vignette: An informer stops a US Army patrol and says two men were just unloading heavy boxes from a white car in the market and carrying them into a nearby building (gure # 49). He also explained that some of the boxes were lled with electronic components. The informer said he noticed the two men because the market is in a Sunni neighborhood and the two men were Shia. A two-man recon team was sent out to verify the information. When they returned, they reported a white car, parked by the same building, near the market (gure # 49). In the past on several occasions, the informer has provided reliable information to US patrols, so he is somewhat known by the interpreter and patrol leader. There are four individuals in the patrol that have been trained on tactical search.

Figure # 49, Task training or advanced training?

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Figure # 50, Task training or advanced training?

If you were a task force commander or company commander and the patrol members were under your command, or you were the patrol leader, a team leader, or a member of the patrol: 1) What type of training would you want the patrol members to have? 2) What type of training would you want to have? 3) If you were in charge of the patrol, what would you do next? 4) If you were a member of the patrol, what would you expect to happen next?

CONCLUSION This is the end of the book, but truly not the end of the story. Today, the United States military has almost 1.5 million personnel on active duty and another 848,000 individuals on reserve status. On any given day of the year, nearly one-third of these men and women are deployed to over 150 different countries around the globe. Hundreds of thousands of our servicemen and women are right now in some of the most chaotic, dangerous, remote, and poorest places on the planet. The majorities of the population they work with are typically uneducated, unemployed, and lack many vital services. But yet many of these places are also considered some of the richest countries in the world because of vast natural reserves like oil. Our military personnel endure austere living conditions, extreme environmental stressors, and they are typically not welcomed by the people they are supposed to be working with. The men and women who are deployed to these perilous places usually provide humanitarian assistance, stability, and security in the best way they can.

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In these hazardous circumstances, with broad guidance and wide-ranging mission statements, some of these individuals are faced with situations in which they have to make a life-or-death decision. Many of these decisions are made in a split second. When this happens, individual soldiers have to rely upon themselves (their personal attributes, military skills, physical strength, mental capacity, ethical values, moral character, and religious beliefs), and they have to rely on the servicemen and women they are with (combat effectiveness, group standards, social norms, societal attitudes, moral support, and shared beliefs). All of these things are a part of army culture. In the end, that soldiers behavior at the tactical level will depend on how well he or she was trained, individually and collectively.

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INTERNET RESOURCES
Air War College, Air University Lesson learned http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awcgate.htm Air Force Doctrine https://www.doctrine.af.mil/. Air Force Platforms and Systems http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=182 http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/#Unmanned_Aerial_Vehicles_(UAV_/_UCAV) Air Force Pubs http://afpubs.hq.af.mil/. Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) http://www.arcic.army.mil/ Army Doctrine and Training Publications http://www.army.mil/usapa/doctrine/index/.html Army Knowledge Online (AKO) https://www.us.army.mil Army Platforms and Systems http://www.sed.monmouth.army.mil/avionics/ http://www.sec.army.mil/secweb/fact_sheets/fact_sheets.php Army Technology, website for the defense industries http://www.army-technology.com/ Army Training and Support Command http://www.train.army.mil Army Training Development and Delivery Directorate (TDADD) http://www-dcst.monroe.army.mil/tdaa Army Training Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) https://www.atrrs.army.mil Assistant Secretary of Defense Networks & Information, DOD Chief Information Ofce http://cio-nii.defense.gov/ CALL data, Joint Center for lessons learned, CTC lessons learned and AARs http://call.leavenworth.army.mil

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Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) http://call.army.mil/ Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments http://www.csbaonline.org CFLCC Mine Info Center http://www.swa.arcent.army.smil.mil/sections/c7/mine_inforcenter.html CJTF-7 Antiterrorism/Force Protection http://148.35.250.12/sections/anti_terrorism/atfpweb/index.htm Combined Arms Training Center (CATC) http://www.catctraining.hqjmtc.army.mil Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell (CEXC) http://cexc.s-iraq.centcom.smil.mil/ Command and Research Control Program (CCRP) http://www.dodccrp.org/html4/about_main.html Countermine & Booby Trap Center http://148.124.179.178/cmcbtc/index.asp Convoy Planning Tool (CPT) http://TSC.jeodnet.smil.mil/cpt Defense News http://www.defensenews.com Digital Training Management System, (Individual and Collective) https://dtms.army.mil/DTMS Department of the Army-Intelligence Information Services http://dadpm.inscom.army.smil.mil/index.asp Department of Defense Washington Headquarters Services Web site http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives Department of Defense, Inspector General Hotline http://www.dodig.mil/ Electronics Attack Weapons School http://eaws.nmci.navy.smil.mil/eaws_web/index Future Systems Integration (FSC) http://www.fcs.army.mil
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General Dennis Reimer Training and Doctrine Digital Library http://www.train.army.mil Government Electronics & Information Technology Association (GEIA) http://www.geia.org HQ Army Joint Multinational Training Command (HQJMTC) http://www.hqjmtc.army.mil/ HQ Department of the Army IED Task Force http://iedtaskforce.army.smil.mil/ International Institute for Strategic Studies; The Military Balance http://www.iiss.org JCREW Web portal https://jcrew.jfcom.smil.mil https://jcrew.jfcom.mil Joint Electronic Library Web site http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine.htm Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) http://releasable.portal.inscom.army.smil.mil/jiedddo/default.aspx Joint Information Operations Center http://www.jioc.smil.mil/index.cfm?CFID=1022901&CFTOKEN=41801464 Joint Programs https://www.jieddo.dod.mil Knowledge and Information Fusion Exchange https://knife.jfcom.smil.mil Library of Congress Web site http://lcweb.loc.gov/ Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) http://www.mccll.usmc.mil http://www.mccll.usmc.smil.mil Marine Corps Platforms and Systems http://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/sites/cins/INTEL/USMC%20CREW/index.html Mine & Explosive Ordnance Info Coordination Center (MEOICC) http://148.35.250.12/sections.ENG/meoicc/

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National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) http://www.nasa.gov National Archives and Records Administration (access to Federal Register) http://www.archives.gov/federal_register/publicatioins/government_manual.html National Ground Intelligence Center-Energetic Materials http://www.ngic.army.smil.mil/ NATO On-line Digital Library http://nato.int/docu/standard.htm. Navy, Human Performance Centers for Training and Technology https://www.spider.hpc. navy.mil/ Navy lessons learned http://www.naidc.navy.smil.mil/NLLS/NLLWeb/default/ Navy Systems Platforms and Systems http://acquisition.navy.mil/programs http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/ http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact.asp Ofce of Force Transformation http://www.oft.osd.mil Ofce of Management & Budget (OMB) http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb Pentagon Library http://www.hqda.army.mil/library/ PM CREW and Warlock Training http://arat.army.smil.mil/SEPS_WARLOCK Space News http://www.space.com/spacenews Task Force Troy website http://sps.iraq.centcom.smil.mil/C1/IED/default.aspx The Military Education and Research Library Network (MERLN) http://merln.ndu.edu/ The Satellite Industry Association http://www.sia.org

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US Army Corp of Engineers http://www.usace.army.mil US Army Force Management Support Agencys Requirements Documentation Web site (TOEs, TDAs, and TOE narratives) https://www.usafmsardd.army.mil/home.cfm US Army Ofcial Homepage http://www.army.mil/ US ARMY Training and Doctrine Command homepage (TRADOC) http://www.tradoc.army.mil US Department of Defense (DOD) ofcial website http://www.defenselink.mil/ US Department of Defense; Report of the Quadrennial Defense review http://www.defenselink.mil/qdr Warlock and Channel Systems Training Site http://tsc.jeodnet.smil.mil/CREW/

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GLOSSARY
AAA Army Audit Agency AAR After-action review ABCS Army Battle Command System AC Active Component ACS Aerial Common Sensor ACT Analysis Control Team ADCON administrative control ADTS Army Digital Training Strategy AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System AFCS Automatic Fire Control System AFRICOM US African Command AGL actual ground level AKE Army Knowledge Enterprise AKEA Army Knowledge Enterprise Architecture AKM Army Knowledge Management AKO Army Knowledge Online ALCM air land cruise missile ALSA Air Land and Sea Application Center ANA Afghanistan National Army AO area of operation AOI area of interest AOIR area of intelligence Responsibility AOR area of responsibility AOT Assignment-Oriented Training AQI al Qaeda in Iraqi AR Army Regulation ARL Automotive Reconnaissance-Low ARFOR Army Forces ARNG Army National Guard ASAS All-Source Analysis System ASCC Army Services Component Command ASCOPE area, structures, capabilities, people, and events ASD(C3I) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intell) ASD-NII Assistant Secretary of Defense for Network and Information Integration ASI Additional skill identier Assn assassinations ATACMS Army Tactical Missile System AT-CDEP Army Transformation Concept Development Experimentation Campaign Plan ATCP Army Transformation Campaign Plan ATEC US Army Test and Evaluation Command ATF Bureau of Alcohol Firearms and Tobacco ATR Army Transformation Roadmap AWG Asymmetric Warfare Group AWT Army Warrior Training BA battle-space awareness

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BAFC Battle-space Awareness Functional Concept BAT Biometric Automated Toolset BCP Battle Command Post BCT Brigade combat team BCTP Battle Command Training Program BDA battle damage assessment BDE Brigade BFT Blue Force Tracker BLCSE Battle Lab Collaboration Simulation Environment BLOS beyond line of sight BM/C2 Battle Management/Command and Control BMC4I Battle Management Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence BN Battalion BOLC Basic Ofcer Leader Course BOS Battleeld Operating System BSC Behavioral Science Consultant BSX battle simulation exercise BTD battle drills C2 command and control C2I command, control, and intelligence C3 command, control, and communications C3I command, control, communications, and intelligence C4 command, control, communications, and computers C4/IM command, control, communications, and computers and information management C4I command, control, communications, and computers, and intelligence C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance CA Civil Affairs CACTF Combined Arms Collective Training Facility CALL Center for Army Lessoned Learned CAS close air support CASEVAC casualty evacuation CBRNE Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield explosives CBS corps battle simulation CBT cognitive behavioral therapies CCTT close combat tactical trainer CDE Concept Development and Experimentation CEXC Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell CFX command eld exercise CI counterintelligence CIA Central Intelligence Agency C-IED counter IED CIO Chief Information Ofcer CM countermines CMO civil-military operations CMOC civil-military operations center CMTC Combat Maneuver Training Center COBs civilians on the battleeld COE center of excellence COGs Critical Operational Goals
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COIN Counterinsurgency COMINT Communications intelligence COTS Commercial off-the-shelf CPI California Personality Inventory CPOF command post of the future software CPT convoy planning tool CPX command post exercise CQB close quarter battle CQM close quarter marksmanship CREW Counter Radio Controlled IED Electronic Warfare CRM Composite Risk Management CTC Combat Training Center CTF collective training facility CVRJ combined vehicle radio jammer CWIED Command wired improvised explosive device DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency DOCEX document exploitation DOD Department of Defense DODD Department of Defense Directive DOTMLPF doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities DT Development Testing DTI Doctrine Taxonomy Initiative EA Electronic attack EAC Echelon above corps EBO Effects-based Operations ECM Electronic countermeasures ECP entry control point EDU Early deploying units EFP explosively formed projectile eHRS electronic Human Resource System ELINT electronic intelligence EMD engineering and manufacturing development EMPR en route mission planning and rehearsal EO electro-optical EOD explosive ordnance disposal EOF escalation of force EP emergency preparedness EPLO Emergency Preparedness Liaison ERMP extended range multipurpose ESV Engineer Squad Vehicle EST Engagement Skills Training ETRAC Enhanced Target Range and Classication FAMSIM family of simulations FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia) FBCB2-BFT Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below-Blue Force Tracking FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FCP force capabilities packages FCS Future Combat Systems FID foreign internal defense
[ 139 ]

FM eld manual FMTV Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles FOB forward-operating base FOC full operational capabilities FORSCOM United States Army Forces Command FoS family of systems FOX forensic exploitation team FRAGO fragmentary order FSCATT re support combined arms tactical trainer FSOP eld standing operations procedures FSE Fire Support Element FSR eld service representative FSV Fire Support Vehicle FTX eld training exercise FY scal year G-4 Assistant Chief of Staff Logistics G&C Guidance and Control GBI Ground-based Intercept GBMC3 Battle Management Command, Control and Communication GCS ground control station GEOINT Geospatial Intelligence GIG Global Information Grid GMI general military intelligence GPS Global Positioning System GREM grenade rie entry munitions GSR ground surveillance radar HALO high altitude low opening HEAT high explosive antitank HIIDE Hand-held Interagency Identication Equipment HME homemade explosives HMMWV high-mobility, multipurpose, wheeled vehicle HN host nation HQ headquarters HUMINT human intelligence HZ Hertz IAW in accordance with ICE IED Countermeasure equipment ICP incident control point ICV Infantry Carrier Vehicle IED improvised explosive device I/EOD Iraqi Explosive Ordnance Disposal IET Initial Entry Training IFF identication, friend or foe IGO intergovernmental organization IMET international military education and training IMINT imagery intelligence INF infantry INSCOM Intelligence and Security Command INTAC Individual Terrorist Awareness Course IO information operations IP Iraqi police IPAT Integrated Process Action Team
[ 140 ]

IPB intelligence preparation of the battleeld IR infrared IRAM improvised rocket assist mortar IS information superiority I/SF Iraqi Security Forces ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance ISSP Information Systems Security Program IT information technology JBMC2 Joint Battle Management Command and Control JBSDS Joint Biological Standoff Detection System JC2 Joint command and control JCATS Joint Conict and Tactical Simulation JCDE Joint Concept Development and Experimentation JCIDS Joint Capabilities and Integration Development System JCOE joint center of excellence JCS Joint Chief of Staff JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition JE Joint Experimentation JEAC Joint Assessment and Enabling Capability JFC joint force commanders JFCOM Joint Forces Command JFLCC Joint Forces Land Component Command JFLCC Joint Forces Land Component Commander JIACG Joint Interagency Coordination Group JIEDDO Joint IED Defeat Organization JLC Joint logistics command JNTC Joint National Training Capability JOA Joint operations area JOC Joint operations concepts JOE Joint operational environment JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System JOpsC Joint Operations Concepts JP Joint publication JRTC Joint Readiness Training Exercise JTF Joint Task Force JTX joint training exercise LEP Law Enforcement Professional LLO logical lines of operation LOC lines of communication LOS line of sight MAC MOUT assault course MACOM major command MASINT Measurement and signature intelligence MCDP Marine Corps doctrinal publication MCIP Marine Corps interim publication MCO Marine Corps order MCCLL Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned MCRP Marine Corps reference publication MCWP Marine Corps warghting publication MEDEVAC medical evacuation MET mission essential task METL mission essential task list
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METT-TC

Mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations used in two contexts: (1) In the context of information management, the major subject categories into which relevant information is grouped for military operations (FM 60); (2) In the context of tactics, the factors considered during mission analysis (FM 3-90) METT-T mission, enemy, terrain, and weather, troops and support available, time available. (USMC) MI military intelligence MILES Multiple Integrated Laser-Engagement System MMPI Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory MNSTC-I Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq MOE Measure of effectiveness MOP Measure of performance MOPP mission-oriented protective posture MOS military occupational specialty MP Military Police MRAP mine resistant ambush protected MTP Mission Training Plan MTT mobile training team NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NCO noncommissioned ofcer NCW network centric warfare NEO noncombatant evacuation operations NGO nongovernmental organization NLL Navy Lessons Learned NSC National Security Council NTC National Training Center OB order of battle OBT&E Outcome-based Training and Education O/C observer controller OCONUS outside continental United States OCS Ofcer Candidate School OCU operator control unit OEF Operation Enduring Freedom OGA other government agency O/I operations/intelligence OIC ofcer in charge OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom O/L organizational learning OMT operational management team O/P organizational performance OPCON operational control OPFOR opposing forces OPLAN operations plan OPORD operations order OPs operations OPSEC operations security OPTEMPO operational tempo OSC operations support cell OSD Ofce of the Secretary of Defense OSINT open-source intelligence
[ 142 ]

OSS Ofce of Strategic Services OVOP overt operational proposal QDR Quadrennial Defense Review PDA personal digital assistant PIR priority intelligence requirement PLT platoon PME peacetime military engagement POI program of instruction POW prisoner of war PRC purchase request and committal PRETECHREP preliminary technical report PRT provincial reconstruction team PSD personal security detachment PTDS Persistent Threat Detection System QA quality assurance QC quality control QDR Quadrennial Defense Review QRF quick reaction force R&S reconnaissance and surveillance RC Reserve Component RDA research development and analysis RECCE self contained recon vehicle RFI request for Information RI Ranger Instructor ROE rules of engagement ROI rules of interaction S-1 personnel staff ofcer (adjutant) S-2 intelligence staff ofcer S-3 operations staff ofcer S-4 logistics staff ofcer S-5 civil affairs ofcer S-6 command, control, communications and computer operations (C4 operations) ofcer SAFE safe area for evasion SALUTE size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment SaaS soldier as a system SAT Systems Approach to Training SATCOM satellite communications SBCT Stryker brigade combat team SBI Special Background Investigation SCC Service Component Commands SCI sensitive compartmented information SDZ surface danger zone SE site exploitation SECDEF secretary of defense SERE survival, evasion, resistance, and escape SF Special Forces SIGINT signal intelligence SII Statement of Intelligence Interest SIO senior intelligence ofcer SIPRNET Secret Internet Protocol Router Network SIR specic information requirements
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SITMAP situation map SJA Staff Judge Advocate SMCT Soldiers Manual of Common Tasks SME subject matter expert SNA social network analysis SOF Special Operations Force SOFA Status of Forces Agreement SOI signal operating instruction SOP standing operating procedures SoS System of Systems SOSI Systems of a Systems Integration Sqd squad SROE standing rules of engagement SSC small-scale contingency SSE sensitive site exploitation S&T science and technology STAFFEX staff exercise STP Soldier Training Publication STX lane simulated training lane SWC Special Warfare Center TACON tactical control TADLP The Army Distance Learning Program TAREX target exploitation TC training circular TCP trafc checkpoint TD training development TDA table of distribution and allowances TDRC Theater Detainee Reporting Center TECHNINT technical intelligence TEWT tactical exercise without troops TM Training Manual TOE table of organization and equipment TOTE test, operate, test, exit strategy TQ tactical questioning TRAC Training and Doctrine Command Analysis Center TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command TS top secret TSC top secret compartmentalized TSE tactical site exploitation TTPs tactics, techniques, and procedures UAC urban assault course UAV unmanned aerial vehicle UAVS unmanned aerial vehicle systems UBE unknown bulk explosives UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice UEWR Upgraded Early Warning Radar UGV unmanned ground vehicle UO urban operations USAR United States Army Reserve USMC United States Marine Corps UW unconventional warfare WARSIM warghting simulation
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WFF warghting function WFX warghting exercise WIN-T Warghter Information Network-Tactical WMD weapons of mass destruction WME weapons of mass effect WO warrant ofcer WPN weapon WSR Weapons Status Report WT warrior tasks WTA Warrior Training Alliance WT/BD Warrior/Task Battle Drill WTI weapons technical intelligence team XBR X-Band Radar XO executive ofcer

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INDEX
Taxonomy for Learning, Teaching, and Assessing, A, 47 Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, 47 abuse of authority, 51-53, 55 Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Achtenhagen, F., 58 Book 2, 47 Advanced Soldier Sensor Information System Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, and Technology (ASSIST), 29 The Classification of Educational Goals, after-actions review (AAR), 43, 99-100 Handbook I, The, 47 Argyris, C., 14 Blue Force Tracker (BFT), 29-30 Army Research Institute, 5 Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC), Bray, Douglas, 4 bribes, 53 120 Briggs, L. J., 111, 132 assumptions, 13-14 ASYMMETRIC TACTICAL-LEVEL TRAINING, Brookfield, S. D., 13 61, 66, 110 reference list for, 76-78, 80, 82-83 C requirements needed for, 86-88, 89-108 asymmetric warfare, 5, 7 California Personality Inventory (CPI), 5, Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG), 46-47, 139 67 Cashin, W. E., 87 audit, 52 Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), automatization, 112-13 15, 46 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 4, 25, 138 changes B first-order, 13 second-order, 13-14 Baeriswyl, F. J., 111, 113 choreography of teaching, 111 Baeriswyl, F. J., 111, 113 C-IED Mobile Assistance Training Teams Bandura, A., 117 (C-MATT), 34 basis model, 111-12, 120 Cochran, K. F., 106 for enhancing learning through direct cognitivism, 117 experience, 118-19 Cognizant Security Authority (CSA), 23 for learning a goal, 113 Combined Vehicle Radio Jammer (CVRJ), for learning a task or routine, 113 38 for learning experientially, 119 Command Post of the Future (CPOF), 30-31 for learning new knowledge and concepts, composite risk management (CRM), 84-85, 117-18 103-4 for learning new strategies, 114 composite risk management publications for solving problems, 114-15 AR 385-10, 85 Beck, Aaron T., 117 DA Pam 385-10, 85 behaviorism, 117 DA Pam 385-30, 85 Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT), 24-26 FM 3-0, 85 Bjorklund, D. F., 115 FM 5-0, 85 Bloom, B., 46-48, 61, 70 FM 5-19, 84 Developing Talent in Young People, 47 FM 7-0, 85
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FMI 5-0.1, 85 Conflicts of interest, 53 constructivism, 117 Counter Improvised Explosive Device Operations Integration Center (COIC), 34 counterinsurgency (COIN), 2, 64 Counter Radio-Controlled Electronic Warfare (CREW), 37-39, 111-12 crawl, walk, and run approach, 43, 69

Grubb, W. N., 58, 129 guided metacognition, 114

H
Handheld Interagency Identity Detection Equipment (HIIDE), 23-25 Harnishfeger, K. K., 115, 129 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), 31 Hull, Clark L., 70, 117 human intelligence (HUMINT), 8, 116

D
DeBono, E., 97 deep learning, 88, 109 Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), 31, 120, 139 Defense Hotline, 51-52, 54-55, 57 frequently asked questions for, 57 Defense Security Service (DSS), 23 Department of Defense (DOD), 4, 9-10, 16, 22-23, 25, 31, 51-52, 54 Developing Talent in Young People (Bloom), 47 Distributed Common Ground System Army (DCGS-A), 18 distributed learning (DL), 46 Downey, R. G., 87, 130

I
imagery intelligence (IMINT), 8 improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 31 independence, 52-53 independent autonomous learning, 114 inefficient inhibition theory, 115 inquiry, 52-53, 56 InstaCheck, 37 instructional models, 58, 86-89, 105-6, 108-11 instructors advanced skills instructors, 105 drill sergeants, 105 observer controllers, 105 platform instructors, 105 skills instructors, 105 US Army Ranger School instructors, 76-84, 105 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), 8, 57, 103, 113 investigation, 52

E
Ellis, Albert, 117 Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS), 29 F Firefinder radar, 18 Forensic Exploitation Team (FOX), 38 Fundamentals of instruction, 89-108 Fuzzy-trace Theory, 115, 135

J
J5, 36 JFK Special Warfare Center, 105 John Dewey, 119 Joint Center of Excellence (JCOE), 35-36 Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), 33-39 Jones, L. L., 106, 130 Joyce, B., 58, 136

G
Gagne, Robert, 48, 70-71, 111 gifts from or to superiors, 53 gratuities, 53, 55

[ 147 ]

K
King, M., 88 knowledge base categories of content knowledge, 106-7 curriculum knowledge, 107 general pedagogical knowledge, 106 pedagogical content knowledge, 106-7 pedagogical knowledge, 106

organizational transformation, 9, 11-14 Oser, F. K., 111, 113

P
Palantir, 37 Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS), 17 Piaget, Jean, 119 Plans, Policies and Interagency Division. See J5 preknowledge, 118 preliminary analysis, 52 production-oriented models, 117 program of instruction (POI), 44-46, 63 Prohibited financial interests, 54 propositional knowledge, 117

L
Laattuca, L. R., 87, 136 Landa, L., 70, 96 learning model, 109-10, 113, 119 Lewin, Kurt, 119 Lowther, M. A., 87, 134

Q M
Marine Armor Kits (MAK), 31 Marine Armor Systems (MAS), 31 measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), 8 Menschenbild, 109-10 Mine Resistant Ambush Protection Vehicle (MRAP), 31-32, 38 Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), 5, 142 mismanagement, 53 Murray, Henry, 4 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 7, 9-10, 12, 15 quality assurance (QA), 40, 44, 46-47, 59-60, 62, 68, 74 quality control (QC), 40-41, 44, 46-47, 59-60, 62, 68, 74

R
Rand Corporation, 46, 60 Raytheon Technical Services Co. LLC, 48 Reyna, V. F., 115 Rhino, 37 Rhino 2, 37 Rhino 3, 37 RQ-1A/B Predator, 19 RQ-1 Predator, 18-21 RQ-7A TUAV, 21 Rumsfeld, Donald, 12

N
nomothetic knowledge, 120 Northrop Grumman Corporation, 29

O
Office of Strategic Services (OSS). See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) organizational change (O/C), 13 organizational culture, 9, 13 organizational learning (O/L), 14 organizational performance (O/P), 13 organizational psychology, 10-14

S
safety. See composite risk management (CRM) Schein, E. H., 14 schematheoretical analysis, 117 Schwinn, C., 14

[ 148 ]

Transient Acoustic MASINT Sensor (UTAMS), 18 unconventional warfare, 31, 57, 114 United States defense goals for, 7 defense strategies for, 6-7 shift in defense goals of, 9-10 US Army, 15, 21-22, 30, 40-41, 46, 59-60, 86, 90, 103-4, 108-10 current training of, 40, 48, 57 ethical guidelines followed by, 50-54 needed improvements in, 57-59 reasons for training improvement of, 1 recommended TD process for T designing the TD process, 61-65 Talon robot, 26, 116 determining the presentation concept, Taxonomy for Learning, Teaching, and 69-74 Assessing, A (Bloom), 47 developing the fundamentals, 65-68 Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Book 2 establishing a timeline, 75 (Bloom), 47 preparing logistical support requirements, 75 Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, The training environments in, 42 Classification of Educational Goals, training phases in, 42 Handbook I, The (Bloom), 47 Taxonomy of Educational Objectives (Bloom), US Army Audit Agency (AAA), 51 47 US Army Combat Readiness/Safety Center, teaching-learning techniques 104 algo-heuristic theory, 96 capabilities template, 92-93 V contrast and comparison, 91, 97-98 information processing theory, 72-73, 91, Vermunt, J. D., 88 96-97 lateral thinking, 91, 97 W teaching model, 109-10 Test-Operate-Test-Exit (TOTE) concept, 96 Warfighter Field Operations Customer Support theft and abuse of government property, 54 (Warfighter FOCUS), 48 Thorndike, Edward, 70, 117 waste, 53 Total Army Distributed Learning Program Watson, John B., 117 (TADLP), 46, 144 Weapons Surveillance System (WSS), 18

Schwinn, D., 14 Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), 22-23, 30 Shadow 200, 21 Shulman, L. S., 106-7, 111 signals intelligence (SIGINT), 8 skills approach, 58 Socrates system, 30 spare parts overpricing, 54 spiral model of development, 31, 40-41 Stark, J. S., 87, 134, 136 systems approach, 57-58, 107, 130-31, 143 Systems Approach to Training Evaluation, Analysis, and Testing. See Systems Approach to Training Management, Processes, and Products (SAT) Systems Approach to Training Management, Processes, and Products (SAT), 40-41, 46-47, 57, 61, 90, 143 phases of development in, 46

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 41, 46, 104 training development (TD) process, 41, 61-68, 70, 73-75, 86, 89-91, 103, 110, 120 transformational change, 10, 12, 14

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Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI), 38, 116 Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS), 5 Weil, M., 58

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