RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR, vs. VICENTE D. CHING BAR MATTER No.

914, October 1, 1999 Facts: Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of a chinese citizen and Filipino mother, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Vicente has resided in the Philippines. Vicente, after completing his LLB course from St. Louis University in Baguio, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship. Ching submitted the following documents: 1. CPA License issued by the PRC; 2. Voter Certification he is a registered voter of the said place; and 3. Certification that he was elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 1992 elections. The results Bar Examinations were released and Vicente was one of the successful Bar examinees. Because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. The Court required him to submit further proof of his citizenship and the required the OSG to file a comment on the petition and the documents submitted. The OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar. Vicente filed a manifestation that he has already elected Philippine citizenship. Issue: Whether or not a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This is the question sought to be resolved in the present case involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar Ruling: The Court held Vincente was already 35 years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 or over 14 years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Vicente's election was clearly beyond the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. The special circumstances invoked by Vicente cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election. Vicente failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of 14 years that lapsed is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the age of majority." The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest civil registry. Vicente's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over. Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, Vicente slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

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RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997 Facts: Al Argosino passed the bar examinations of 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The criminal case arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites. Argosino and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges but later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment imposing on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years. The trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation. The trial court issued an order approving a report submitted by the Probation Officer recommending Argosino's discharge from probation. Argosino filed before the SC a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation. The Court then issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar. In compliance, Argosino submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by 2 senators, 5 trial court judges, and 6 members of religious orders. He likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of the hazing victim. The SC required the attorney-father of the victim to comment on Argosino's prayer but the latter submitted the matter to the sound discretion of the Court. Issue: Whether or not a Bar-passer convict be allowed to take his lawyers oath after release? Ruling: In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service. The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating. We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned. The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of society.

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SOPHIA ALAWI vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997 Facts: Sophia Alawi and Ashary Alauya were classmates, and used to be friends. The former was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company and the latter the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. Alauya executed a contract with Villarosa & Co for the purchase on installments of one of the housing units belonging to the firm. She then availed of a housing loan from the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation. Alauya addressed a letter to the President of the firm advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He stated that his consent was acquired by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by Alawi which made said contract void ab initio. Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC insisting on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof. He also wrote to Ms. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Finance Division Chief, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary. The NHMFC wrote to the SC requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's loan and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. for the buyback of the mortgage and the refund of payments." Sophia Alawi filed with the SC a verified complaint accusing Alauya of: 1. Imputation of malicious and libelous charges 2. Causing undue injury to her honor and established reputation 3. Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage 4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use. The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Averring that his acts were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint. The Court noted that his 2 letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan and his 2 earlier letters all were signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya. In his Comment, he refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA." The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. Issue: Whether or not a person, who is not a member of the Bar, may use the title of attorney? Ruling: The Court held that persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction. Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law" because in his region it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney. WHEREFORE, Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of language unbecoming a judicial officer and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

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IN RE: SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE TERRITORY OF GUAM OF ATTY. LEON G. MAQUERA. B.M. No. 793, July 30, 2004 Facts: The District Court of Guam wrote the SC of the suspension of Atty. Leon G. Maquera from the practice of law in Guam for 2 years pursuant to the Decision rendered by the Superior Court of Guam. The Court referred the matter to the Bar Confidant for comment. The Bar Confidant recommended that the Court obtain copies of the record the case in order to determine whether Maquera's acts or omissions are likewise violative of his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar. The Bar Confidant sent a letter to the District Court of Guam requesting for certified copies of the record of the disciplinary case and of the rules violated. The Court then received said records from the District Court of Guam. Thereafter, the case was referred to the IBP for investigation report and recommendation. The IBP sent Maquera a Notice of Hearing requiring him to appear before the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline. However, the notice was returned unserved because Maquera had already moved from his last known address in Agana, Guam and did not leave any forwarding address. The IBP submitted its report recommended for the indefinite suspension of Maquera from the practice of law within the Philippines until and unless he updates and pays his IBP membership dues in full. The IBP found that Maquera was suspended from the practice of law in Guam for misconduct, as he acquired his client's property for $525.00 as payment for his legal services, then sold it for $320,000, which he then obtained an unreasonably high fee for handling his clients case. The Guam Bar Ethic Committee prayed that Maquera be sanctioned for violating Guams Model Rules of Professional Conduct . The Committee recommended, among others, that Maquera be suspended from the practice of law in Guam for a period of 2 years. The Superior Court of Guam rendered its Decision suspending Maquera from the practice of law in Guam for a period of 2 years and ordering him to take the Multi-State Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) within that period. The IBP concluded that although the said court found Maquera liable for misconduct that "there is no evidence to establish that Maquera committed a breach of ethics in the Philippines." However, the IBP still resolved to suspend him indefinitely for his failure to pay his annual dues as a member of the IBP since 1977, which failure is a ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys the Revised Rules of Court. Issue: Whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction be meted the same sanction in the Philippines? Ruling: The Court held that Maquera's acts in Guam, which resulted in his 2-year suspension, are also valid grounds for his suspension from the practice of law in the Philippines. Such acts are violative of a lawyer's sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his clients. They are also violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17 which states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful the trust and confidence reposed in him" and Rule 1.01 which prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It bears stressing that the Guam Superior Court's judgment ordering Maquera's suspension from the practice of law in Guam does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines. Under the Revised Rules of Court, the acts which led to his suspension in Guam are mere grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction, only if the basis of the foreign court's action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. The Court agrees with the IBP that Maquera should be suspended from the practice of law for non-payment of his IBP membership dues from 1977 up to the present. In the Revised Rules of Court, non-payment of membership dues for six (6) months shall warrant suspension of membership in the IBP, and default in such payment for one year shall be ground for removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. In the meantime, Atty. Maquera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR or until he shall have paid his membership dues, whichever comes later.

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IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO B. MUNESES B.M. No. 2112, July 24, 2012 Facts: A petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. He alleged that he became a member of the IPB in 1966 and that he lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the USA. On September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 and that he intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law. The OBC required Muneses to submit copies of pertinent documents in support of his petition, of which the latter all complied. The OBC further required Muneses to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the requirements were complied with the OBC recommended that the he be allowed to resume his practice of law. Issue: Whether or not a member of the IBP, who has lost his citizenship and then re-acquires it, may be allowed to practice law? Ruling: The Court held that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the Muneses membership in the bar; and by operation of law the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship are deemed to have reacquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. The right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit. Upon the recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and sees no bar to Muneses's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines. WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.

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RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, et. al. G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991 Facts: Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC. Cayetano opposed the nomination and prayed that the nomination be declared null and voild because allegedly, Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC and thereafter assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC. Issue: Whether or not Monsods qualification falls within the requirement of practice of law as embodied in the constitution? Ruling: The Court held that Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar and has been a dues paying member of the IBP since its inception. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. The appointing process in a regular appointment consists of 4 stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the CA; (3) issuance of a commission; and (4) acceptance. The power of the CA to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and in this case, there is no showing of such. We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life. Ratio: The Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."

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RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO vs. ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO A.C. No. 6705, March 31, 2006 Facts: Ruthie Lim-Santiago is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his estate. Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc. until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. 21 employees of Taggat filed a criminal complaint alleging that Lim-Santiago withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause. Sagucio, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations for violation of the Labor Code of the Philippines. Lim-Santiago charges Sagucio for violating Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor thus seeks the disbarment of Sagucio. Sagucio refutes said allegation that Lim-Santiago was merely aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal complaint. He furthered then the criminal complaint was filed, he had resigned from Taggat for more than 5 years and that he no longer owed his undivided loyalty to Taggat. Lim-Santiago instituted disbarment of Sagucio. While the disbarment case was pending, the Order issued by Sagucio was reversed and set aside by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan. Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed. The IPBs Investigating Commissioner heard the case. The IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution finding Sagucio guilty of conflict of interests, failure to safeguard a former clients interest, and violating the prohibition against the private pra ctice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from the practice of law. Issue: Whether or not Sagucio is guilty of conflict of interest and engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor? Ruling: The Court held that there was no conflict of interests when Sagucio handled the preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages. Clearly, he was no longer connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992. In order to charge Sagucio for representing conflicting interests, evidence must be presented to prove that he used against Taggat any confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only established participation he had with respect to the criminal complaint is that he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential information from his previous employment with Lim-Santiago or Taggat in resolving the criminal complaint. Violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Sagucios violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, which mandates that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging in unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for 6 months and 1 day to 1 year. We find this penalty appropriate for respondents violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

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THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA G.R. No. L-19450, May 27, 1965 Facts: The Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The Prosecution was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City. The condition of his appearance was that every time he would appear at the trial, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused. The Justice of the Peace issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney. The counsel for Villanuena presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," invoking Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and further stating that Fule was not actually engaged in private law practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, which held that Atty. Fule may appear as private prosecutor in the case. Decision was appealed before the SC.

Issue: Whether or not City Attorney Fule, appearing as private prosecutor, is engaged in private practice? Ruling: The Court held that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. It has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

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BUSILAC BUILDERS, INC. and ROMEO M. CAMARILLO vs. JUDGE CHARLES A. AGUILAR A.M. No. RTJ-03-1809, October 17, 2006 Facts: Romeo Camarillo, president of Busilac Builders, Inc., entered into an agreement with spouses Anatalio and Pacita Ramos for the sale of 3 parcels of land situated at Laoag City to him. Titles to Lot 2 and Lot 3 were immediately transferred in his name. With respect to Lot 1 only its physical possession was transferred because the spouses Ramos failed to execute the necessary deed of conveyance therefor despite Camarillo's repeated demands. Camarillo instituted an action against the spouses Ramos before the RTC of Laoag City. He discovered that out of the total area of 426 square meters comprising the entirety of Lot 1, the spouses Ramos sold 300 square meters thereof to: Esperanza Tumaneng, 100 square meters; Victoria Balcanao, 100 square meters; and to Aguilar, who was then a prosecutor, another 100 square meters. Prosecutor Aguilar was appointed presiding judge of RTC of Laoag City where said civil case was then pending. He proceeded to hear the case and issued an Order dismissing the same. The Register of Deeds of Laoag issued Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of Judge Aguilar covering the 100-square meter portion of Lot 1 earlier sold to him. Judge Aguilar, together with the other co-owners of Lot 1, removed the concrete posts and barbed wires installed thereat by Camarillo. Camarillo filed a complaint against Judge Aguilar and the other co-owners of Lot 1. As among the defendants in that case, Judge Aguilar appeared in at least 2 hearings and therein manifested that "for purposes of pleadings he is represented by counsel but for purposes of appearing in court, he appears for himself." In a related development, Judge Aguilar issued a search warrant against Camarillo upon application of the CIDG Laoag City. Pursuant to the search warrant, several firearms and ammunitions were seized by police operatives from the custody and possession of Camarillo. Upon the foregoing, Busilac Builders, Inc. and its president Romeo Camarillo filed an administrative complaint against the Judge Aguilar. The Court referred the administrative case to the CA. The Investigating Justice recommended that Aguilar be fined in the amount of P4,000.00 and warned that a repetition of the same acts will be dealt with more severely. Issue: Whether or not Judge Aguilars act of appearing as counsel for himself is a form of private practice? Ruling: The Court held that Aguilar's appearances as counsel for himself in the previous hearings constitutes an isolated court appearance. It must be noted that Aguilar also appeared in that case as one of the defendants therein, and that another counsel prepared and represented him in the pleadings. Aguilar's act of asking permission from the Supreme Court to appear as counsel for himself shows no trace of malice and bad faith on his part. Aguilars appearance on two occasions is not conclusive and determinative of engagement in the private practice of law. Essentially, the term "private practice of law" implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of said services. Clearly, then, the isolated instances when the respondent judge appeared as counsel for himself in do not constitute the "private practice" of the legal profession as contemplated by law.

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WILFREDO M. CATU vs. ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA A.C. No. 5738, February 19, 2008 Facts: Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and building located at Malate, Manila. His mother and brother, Regina and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was filed in the Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila. Rellosa, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, Rellosa issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court. Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the MTC of Manila. Rellosa entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, Wilfredo filed an administrative complaint, claiming that Rellosa committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay. The complaint was referred to the IBP for investigation. As there was no factual issue to thresh out, the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline required the parties to submit their respective position papers. After evaluation, the IBP-CBD recommended for Rellosas suspension from the practice of law for one month. This was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors. Issue: Whether or not Rellosa, as punong barangay, is also permitted to exercise his profession as a lawyer? Ruling: The Court held that under RA7160 members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod or bayan may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for any of these purposes. Accordingly, as punong barangay, Rellosa was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations. As punong barangay, Rellosa should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do. The failure of Rellosa to comply with the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, Rellosa not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules, which is a breach of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. WHEREFORE, Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

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