Tunnel Failure

CatalogueofNotable TunnelFailureCaseHistories (uptoOctober (up October2012)
Prepared by Mainland East Division Geotechnical Engineering Office Civil Engineering and Development Department
Civil Engineering and Development Department The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Foreword
This catalogue of notable tunnel failures is primarily based on published information. Both overseas and local cases involving collapse or excessive deformation of the ground are included. For contractual and other reasons, there are relatively few cases reported in technical publications, and those reported are usually of such scale or seriousness that they have received public attention. Even for the cases reported, public reported, usually usually only only limited information is available. Apart from the cases included, readers can find other information on tunnel failure in the list of General References given at the end of this catalogue. This catalogue is a live document that will be updated from time to time as further information becomes available.
Foreword

The main purpose of the catalogue is to disseminate information and promote awareness on tunnel failures which could pose a danger to life and property. The possible causes of the failures, the geotechnical problems and the lessons learnt, where these are known, are outlined in the catalogue. Readers should refer to the source reference documents quoted for details. Clients and works agents agents are advised to implement implement effective geotechnical risk management measures in the planning, investigation, design and construction of their tunnel projects.
Foreword

The first edition of the catalogue was issued in February 2007 and was put together by Mr W Lee, supervised by Mr K J Roberts. The second edition issued in March 2009 was prepared by Ms L Y Pau, supervised by Mr L P Ho. This third edition was prepared by Ms L Y Pau, supervised by Mr K S Chau. GEO staff, members of the Hong Kong Institution of Engineers Geotechnical Division Working Working Group Group on Cavern and Tunnel Engineering Engineering and other individuals have contributed to this Catalogue. All contributions are gratefully acknowledged.
Foreword

If any information in this catalogue is found to be inaccurate or out-of-date, please contact the Chief Geotechnical Engineer/Mainland East of the Geotechnical Engineering Office, Civil Engineering and Development Department, 101 Princess Margaret Road, Ho Man Tin, Kowloon, Hong Kong.
N F Chan
Chief Geotechnical Engineer/Mainland East
Geotechnical Engineering Office
Civil Engineering and Development Department
October 2012
TunnelFailures ListofOverseasCases
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
6. 6.
Green Park, London, UK, 1964

Victoria Line Underground, London, UK, 1965
Southend-on-sea Sewage Tunnel, UK, 1966
Rrvikskaret Road Tunnel on Highway 19, Norway, 18 March 1970 Orange-fish Tunnel, South Africa, 1970
Munich U Munich Underground, nderground, G Germany, ermany, 1980

1980
7. 8. 9.
Holmestrand Road Tunnel, Norway, 16 Dec. 1981 Gibei Railway Tunnel, Romania, 1985
Moda Collector Tunnel, Istanbul Sewerage Scheme, Turkey, 1989
10. Seoul Metro Line 5 - Phase 2, Korea, 17 Nov. 1991 11. Seoul Metro Line 5 - Phase 2, Korea, 27 Nov. 1991
TunnelFailures Listof OverseasCases
12. Seoul Metro Line 5 - Phase 2, Korea, 11 Feb. 1992 13. Seoul Metro Line 5 - Phase 2, Korea, 7 Jan. 1993 14. Seoul Metro Line 5 - Phase 2, Korea, 1 Feb. 1993 15. Munich Underground, Germany, 27 Sept. 1994 16. Heathrow Express, UK, 21 Oct. 1994 17. Los Angeles Metro, USA, 22 June 1995 18. Motorway Tunnels, Austria, 1993 - 1995 19. Docklands Light Rail, UK, 23 Feb. 1998 20. Athens Metro, Greece, 1991-1998
21. Lrdal Road Tunnel on European Highway E 16, Norway, 15 June
1999
22. Sewage Tunnel, Hull, UK, 1999

23. Taegu Metro, South Korea, 1 Jan. 2000 24. Channel Tunnel Rail Link, UK, Feb. 2003 25. Mtor Metro Tunnel, France, 14 Feb. 2003 26. Oslofjord Subsea Tunnel, Norway, 28 Dec. 2003
27. Shanghai Metro, China, 2003
2003
28. Tunnel Failure, Japan, 2003

29. Guangzhou Metro Line 3, China, 1 April 2004 30. Singapore MRT, 20 April 2004 31. Kaoshiung Rapid Transit, Taiwan, 29 May 2004 32. Oslo Metro Tunnel, Norway, 17 June 2004
33. Kaoshiung Rapid Transit, Taiwan, 10 Aug. 2004 34. Hsuehshan Tunnel, Taiwan, 1991-2004 35. Barcelona Metro, Spain, 27 Jan. 2005 36. Lausanne M2 Metro, Switzerland, 22 Feb. 2005 37. Lane Cove Tunnel, Australia, 2 Nov. 2005
38. Kaoshiung 38. Kaoshiung R Rapid apid T Transit, ransit, T Taiwan, aiwan, 4 D Dec. ec. 2005
39. Nedre Romerike Water Treatment Plant Crude Water and Potable Water Tunnels, Norway, 2005 40. Hanekleiv Road Tunnel, Norway, 25 Dec. 2006 41. Stormwater Management and Road Tunnel (SMART), Malaysia, 2003 2006 42. Sao Paulo Metro Station, Brazil, 15 Jan. 2007
43. Guangzhou Metro Line 5, China, 17 Jan. 2008 44. Langstaff Road Trunk Sewer, Canada, 2 May 2008 45. Circle Line 4 Tunnel, Singapore, 23 May 2008 46. Hangzhou Metro Tunnel, China, 15 Nov. 2008 47. Cologne North-South Metro Tram Line, German, 3 March 2009 48. Brightwater Tunnel, USA, 8 March 2009 49. Seattles Beacon Hill Light Rail, USA, July 2009 50. Cairo Metro Tunnel, Egypt, 3 Sept. 2009 51. Shenzhen Express Rail Link, 27 March 2011, 4 May 2011 and 10 May 2011 52. Hengqin Tunnel, Macau, 19 July 2012
TunnelFailures ListofHongKongCases
1. MTR Modified Initial System, Prince Edward Station, Nathan Road, 12 Sept. 1977 2. MTR Island Line, 22 Hennessy Road, 1 Jan. 1983 3. MTR Island Line, Shing On Street, Shau Kei Wan, 23 July 1983 4. MTR Island Line, 140-168 Shau Kei Wan Road, 16 Dec. 1983
5. Kowloon Southern Link Contract KDB 200, Canton Road, 21 Oct. 5. 2006
6. Kowloon Southern Link Contract KDB 200, Salisbury Road, 3

June 2007
OverseasCases
GreenPark,London,UK,1964
Background
Tunnel (Green Park to Victoria) driven through London Clay using drum-digger shield
The failure
Inflow of sand and gravel, burying most of the shield
Clay & Takacs (1997)
The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
GreenPark,London,UK,1964
Possible cause of failure
The crown of the shield penetrated through the London Clay layer into sand and gravel
Source
VictoriaLineUnderground,London,UK,1965
Background
Tunnel (300m long and 3.7m internal diameter) driven through London Clay using hand-shield and lined with cast-iron segments under a disused railway marshalling yard
The failure
Inflow nflow of of sand sand an and d grave gravel l
VictoriaLineUnderground,London,UK,1965
The shield was ineffective in supporting the overlying ground
Source
SouthendonSeaSewageTunnel,UK,1966
Background
Tunnel driven through London Clay (40m long and 1.35m in diameter)
The failure
Water inflow into the tunnel
SouthendonSeaSewageTunnel,UK,1966
The tunnel intersected the bottom of an abandoned 600mm diameter well
Source
Background Road tunnel 726m long and 8m wide constructed by the drill-and-blast method The failure Tunnel face collapsed and a 100m high cave-in shaft from the tunnel up to the ground surface was created The top top of the shaft on the ground ground surface had a dimension of about 25m x 50m Although soft material was hauled out from the tunnel during the spring in 1971, cave-in continued from the shaft until autumn 1972. The cave-in zone extended 30m along the tunnel and the total volume of material hauled out from the tunnel was Karlsrud (2010)
about 75,000m3
RrvikskaretRoadTunnelonHighway19,
Norway,18March1970
RrvikskaretRoadTunnelonHighway19,
Norway,18March1970
Possible cause of failure Preliminary investigation carried out without any drilling Probe drilling was not performed during tunnelling No stabilization measures to support a large swelling clay section before blasting Consequences Programme Programme delayed delayed for more than 3 years years Double the cost of the tunnel compared to the estimated cost Emergency and remedial measures Installation of corrugated steel vault, steel tubes and 500mm thick concrete lining was not successful The cave-in ceased after filling of about 3,000m3 concrete into the shaft to form a plug from the tunnel up to 10m above the crown and another 4,000m3 of sand and stone from the top of the shaft above the concrete plug
RrvikskaretRoadTunnelonHighway19, Norway,18March1970
Lessons learnt The importance of the adequate ground investigation to identify if weak ground is present and to provide measures to support the weak ground before tunnel excavation Source Karlsrud Karlsrud (2010)
OrangefishTunnel,SouthAfrica,1970
Background
Tunnel designed to carry irrigation water from the Orange River (80km long and 5.3m in diameter, 1,200m above sea level) Tunnelling using the rail-mounted drill and blast method and lined with insitu concrete
First failure Heavy water inflow

Water inflow of about 55,000 litres/min into the tunnel at 14 bars Entire 1.6km tunnel section flooded within 24 hours

The tunnel passed through a shallow anticline and intersected a fissure, about 75mm wide, almost perpendicularly
OrangefishTunnel,SouthAfrica,1970
Second failure Fire
Methane gas ignited by a blast No explosion occurred as the gas did not reach the explosive concentration The fire burnt for about 6 month

Methane gas from a methane bearing fissure entered the tunnel during excavation
Source
MunichUnderground,Germany,1980
Construction Today (1994b)

Background
New Austrian Tunnelling Method (NATM) construction of twin 6m diameter tunnels
The failure
10m wide, 14m deep sinkhole
Possible causes of failure

Local variation in geology with reduction in marl cover to 1-1.5m and led to overstressing of the sprayed concrete temporary lining
Consequences
Delay to works
Remedial Measures
Void was backfilled with crushed rock and cement and pressure grouted
Source
Construction Today (1994b)
HolmestrandRoadTunnel,Norway,16Dec.1981
Background Road tunnel 1.78km long and 10m wide tunnel constructed by the drill and-blast method The failure A minor cave-in from the face and partly from the crown occurred during the process of moving the steel formwork for cast concrete lining forward to the face Possible cause of failure A weak fault zone was encountered No spiling bolts ahead of the face to support the weak ground
Karlsrud (2010)
HolmestrandRoadTunnel,Norway,16Dec.1981
Consequences More time (5 hours extended to 25 hours) required for hauling out and concreting the foundation for the mould Lessons learnt Spiling bolts ahead of the face in combination with fibre reinforced sprayed concrete, rock bolts, and reinforced ribs of sprayed concrete are required at the fault zones with extremely poor rock mass quality Source Karlsrud (2010)
Karlsrud (2010)
GibeiRailwayTunnel,Romania,1985
Background
Railway tunnel 2.21km long and 9m in diameter
The failure
Compact fissured clay layer failed suddenly, allowing water inflow >600 litres/min into the tunnel
GibeiRailwayTunnel,Romania,1985
The tunnel penetrated a lens of waterlogged fine-grained sand just above the crown
Source
ModaCollectorTunnel, IstanbulSewerageScheme,Turkey,1989
Background
Tunnel constructed by Tunnel Boring Machine (TBM)
The failure
Fine soil flowed into the tunnel forming a hole in the road as the TBM went through the rock into the soft ground
ModaCollectorTunnel, IstanbulSewerageScheme,Turkey,1989
The tunnel intersected a hidden area of soft clay
Source
SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea, 17Nov.1991
Lee & Cho (2008)


Background
Construction of Seoul Metro tunnel near Majang by drill and blast method
The failure
After blasting : daylight collapse up to ground surface, surface, involving the embankment of a river 20m x 15m and 4m deep crater at the ground surface Water from river flowed into the tunnel

Thin weathered rock cover Inflow of soil and groundwater

Consequences
Roads collapse and gas mains fractured
Remedial measures
Backfilling the crater with soil followed by cement grouting and chemical grouting
Lessons learnt
Insufficient ground investigation Unexpected groundwater inflow No tunnel face stability analysis No consideration of blasting effects closed to weathered zone with shallow cover
Lee & Cho (2008)

Source
Lee & Cho (2008) Madrid (1996) Shin et al (2006)
Lee & Cho (2008)


Background
Construction of Seoul Metro tunnel near Dangsan by drill and blast method
The failure
27 November 1991
10:40am : bl 10:40am blasting
asting 4:00pm : rock falls at the tunnel face 10:00pm : soil and groundwater inflow into the tunnel 28 November 1991 3:20am : substantial daylight collapse up to ground surface forming a 25m diameter crater

Weathered granite at the face and high permeability soil
Consequences
Three buildings collapsed Several water mains, mains, gas pipes and sewerage were broken
Remedial measures
Lee & Cho (2008)
SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea,
27Nov.1991
Lessons learnt
Insufficient ground investigation Unexpected groundwater inflow No tunnel face stability analysis No consideration of blasting effects closed to weathered zone with with s shallow hallow cover
Source
SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea, 11Feb.1992
Lee & Cho (2008)


Background
Construction of Seoul Metro tunnel near Youido by road header
The failure
Significant inflow of groundwater About 4.5 tonnes of soil flowed into tunnel 38m wide x 6m deep crater at the ground surface

Weathered granite at the tunnel
face and high permeability soil
Remedial measures
Backfilling the crater with soil
followed by followed by cement grout grouting ing an and
d
chemical grouting
Lessons learnt
Insufficient ground investigation Unexpected groundwater inflow No tunnel face stability analysis
Lee & Cho (2008)

Source
SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea, 7Jan.1993
Lee & Cho (2008)


Background
Construction of Seoul Metro tunnel near Yongdungpo by drill and blast method
The failure
Tunnel collapsed after removing spoil Tunnel collapsed starting from the left side of the crown 900m3 of loose material flowed into the tunnel and water inflow of up to 300 litres/min recorded

Weathered granite at the tunnel face High groundwater pressure
Remedial Remedial measures

Lee & Cho (2008)
SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea,
7Jan.1993
Lessons learnt
Insufficient ground investigation Unexpected groundwater inflow No tunnel face stability analysis No consideration of blasting effects closed to weathered zone with shallow cover
Source
Lee & Cho (2008)


Background
Construction of Seoul Metro tunnel near Anyangcheon by road header
The failure
Daylight collapse when weathered granite found at the tunnel face Groundwater flowed into the tunnel 60m wide oval shaped area subsided

Weathered granite and alluvium at the tunnel face High groundwater pressure
Consequences Consequences
Six heavy plants buried
Remedial measures
Lee & Cho (2008)

Lessons learnt
Insufficient ground investigation Unexpected groundwater inflow No tunnel face stability analysis
Source
MunichUnderground,Germany,27Sept.1994
Background
7m diameter tunnel supported by sprayed concrete lining The tunnel was assumed to be beneath a clay layer overlying water-bearing gravel and groundwater would not be drawn down down
The failure
Quick inflow of water and ground materials Large subsidence crater quickly filled with groundwater 20m wide, 18.5m deep crater
Construction Today (1994a)


Layer of marl separating groundwater bearing layers was much thinner than originally assumed Sand-infilled cracks in the marl layer acted as preferential pathways for water
Consequences
Bus fell into the crater Three passengers killed 30 people injured
Construction Today (1994a)
Remedial measures
Bored-pile wall to form a shaft Excavation inside the shaft for rescue Tunnel driven again using compressed air
Sources
Boos et al (2004) Construction Today (1994a) Ground Engineering (1994)
HeathrowExpressTunnel,UK,21Oct.1994
Ground Engineering (2008)
ICE (1998b)
Background
NATM in London Clay
The failure
10m diameter crater formed
ICE (1998b)

A series of design and management errors combined with poor workmanship and quality control
Consequences
Differential settlement induced at ad adjacent jacent buildings buildings Services Terminal 4 halted for one month Remedial measures caused chaos at Heathrow Airport Recovery cost 150M (3 times original contract sum)
GROUND SURFACE CONTOURS LEGENDS 0 to +0.5m 0 to -1m -1 to -2m -2 to -3m > -3m
Central Terminal Area Settlement Contours
Remedial measures
Backfilled with 13,000m3 concrete
Lessons learnt
Measures to ensure safety must be planned Do not lose sight of critical technical issues in the pursuit of time and cost reduction Whilst a number of factors contributed to the collapse, half of them were matters of management However much engineers engineers are p pressured ressured to build q quickly uickly
and cheaply, the industry will be judged by its own failures
Sources
Ground Engineering (2000) HSE (1996, 2000) ICE (1998b, 1999)
1996 report 2000 report
LosAngelesMetro,USA,22June1995
Background
Re-mining/remedial works to realign an existing TBM tunnel (6.7m diameter, 25m deep), which had been bored off line Hard siltstone overlain by alluvium with groundwater level 10-12m below sur below surface face
The failure
25m deep sinkhole caused by collapse of south bore Serious cracking observed in temporary lining of north bore
Civil Engineer International (1995)

Failure occurred during removal of segmental lining in tunnel roof and relining of tunnel to correct the horizontal alignment Unexpected ground conditions in the alluvium Fractured water mains (unconfirmed)
Consequences Consequences
30m length of a four lane road (Hollywood Boulevard) affected leading to road closure Collapsed 250mm water main possibly contributing to failure Broken gas pipe Evacuation of local residents
Remedial measures
Steel rings installed in tunnel either side of the collapse 3,300m3 of grout to fill void and stabilise area Road resurfacing
Source
Civil Engineer International (1995)
MotorwayTunnels,Austria,1993 1995
Background
Tunnel constructed in sandstone and shale with fault zones by the drill & blast method Tunnel divided into 4 sections, namely T1 T4 T1 - 376m long; T2 - 562m; T3 2,760m and T4 1,230m
Failures at T4 in 1993
About 130 overbreak incidents with total volume of 1,461m3, maximum deformation of 120mm measured in the tunnel 200m3 of loose material collapsed after a blast, resulting in water inflow of up to 450 litres/min
MotorwayTunnels,Austria,1993 1995
Two failures at T3 in 1995

650m3 of loose material flowed into the tunnel, water inflow of up to 1,500 litres/min recorded Radial movement of rib of about 300mm occurred and water inflow of up to 1,500 litres/min recorded
Source
DocklandsLightRail,UK,23Feb.1998
ICE (2004)
ICE (1998a)
Background
Tunnel constructed for Docklands Light Rail (diameter 5.2m) by earth pressure balance TBM
The failure
22m wide and 7m deep crater formed in the grounds of George Green School
ICE (1998a)

Insufficient overburden above the tunnel High pressure within tunnel causing blow out failure
Consequence
Windows Windows up t to o 100 100m m away b broken roken b by y th the es shower hower o of f mu mud d an and d stones released
Lesson learnt
To require specific assessments / calculations to demonstrate the adequacy of factor of safety against blow out failure
Sources
ICE (1998a) ICE (2004)
AthensMetro,Greece,19911998
IMS
IMIA
Background
Construction of the Olympic Metro under a turnkey contract (estimated cost about 2 billion ECUs) Construction started in November 1991 and operation in 1998 TBM (by Mitsubishi) used for construction of 11.7km long, 9.5m diameter tunnels located at a depth of 15-20m (with penetration rate ranging ranging from 1.6m to 18m per per da day y based on 18 18-hour-hour-per per-da -day y shift, depending on the ground conditions) Cut and cover, supported by soldier piles, struts and prestressed anchor tiebacks for 6.3km long tunnels and stations NATM for other short auxiliary tunnels and oval-shaped stations where existence of buried antiquities precluded open excavation
The failures
Roof collapses of appreciable size often occurred Large and occasionally uncontrollable overbreaks for TBM

Ravelling of the ground seems to be due to insufficient strength in the intensely the intensely wea weathered thered an and d hi highly ghly t tectonised ectonised zones o of f Ath Athenian enian schist (which is a flysch-type sediment consisting of thinly bedded clayey and calcareous sandstones with alterations and subjected to intense folding, thrusting, faulting and fracturing) Large muck openings of the TBM cutterhead which cannot adequately control muck-flow (the cutterhead operates in the open air, i.e. under atmospheric pressure)
Consequence
Major delay in TBM tunnelling
Remedial measures
Cavities caused by the TBM overbreaks was backfilled by grout (which sometimes reached the ground surface)
Source
IMIA IMS Kavvadas et al (1996) Mihalis & Kavvadas (1999)
Lrdal RoadTunnelonEuropeanHighwayE16, Norway,15June1999

Background Road tunnel at 1,100m depth, 24.5km long and 9m wide constructed by the drill-and-blast method The failure A cave-in involving 17m length of tunnel and extending up to about 11-12m above the crown The volume of the failed rock mass was estimated to be 1,200 1,500m3
The Lrdal Tunnel
CAVE IN
DEBRIS 1200-1500m3
Ch.11080
Karlsrud (2010)

Possible cause of failure Poor communication : the driller did not inform the engineer about abnormal drilling rate encountered Expansion of the swelling clay under high stress to water during drilling of the rock bolts The combination of the swelling of the clay and high stress produced a squeezing effect, which resulted in gradual weakening of the rock mass in the tunnel Consequences The crew was evacuated in time and no one was hurt About 10 days delay in the excavation works and cost increased for the remedial works

Emergency and remedial measures Reinforced ribs of sprayed concrete in The Lrdal Tunnel addition to layers of sprayed concrete Cave in and rock bolts were installed just zone behind the cave-in zone
700 m3 concrete
Rock material was hauled into the tunnel building up a barrier up to 2m below the crown and concrete was pumped through a steel pipe to fill the void above the debris Debris was gradually hauled out with step wise installation of rock anchors and sprayed fibre reinforced concrete
Face before cave in
Concrete
11070
Debris Debris hauled out 1200-1500 m3

11080 11087
Karlsrud (2010)
Ch.no

Lessons learnt The importance of good communication between the driller and the engineer Importance of having good understanding of the geological conditions and their influence on the stability Swelling of clay in condition of high stress could provide a squeezing effect and result in weaking of the rock mass in a tunnel Source Karlsrud (2010)
SewageTunnel,Hull,UK,1999
Boos et al (2004)
Background
Construction of a 10.5km long underground sewer by earth pressure balance TBM (diameter 3.85m) supported by reinforced concrete segmental lining
The failure
Water and sand ingress Tunnel subsided by 1.2m causing serious subsidence at surface

Fluctuation of groundwater level caused by tidal effects resulting in vertical movement of the tunnel tube causing opening of joints
Consequences
Damage to buildings, roads and utility lines TBM had to be abandoned
Emergency and remedial measures

Ground freezing Reconstruction of tunnel using sprayed concrete
Source
Boos et al (2004)
TaeguMetro,SouthKorea,1Jan.2000
Boos et al (2004)
Background
Construction of underground Taegu Metro
The failure
Failure of diaphragm wall Excavation pit caved in

Rapid fluctuation of groundwater level caused movement of
unidentified gravel and sand strata
Additional loading on diaphragm wall was not considered in design
Consequences
Bus buried and bus driver seriously injured Three passengers killed Neighbouring buildings suffered considerable damage
Remedial measures
Excavation Excavation p pit it b backfilled ackfilled Subsoil grouted and diaphragm wall strengthened
Source
Boos et al (2004)
ChannelTunnelRailLink,UK,Feb.2003
ICE (2003)
Background
Tunnelling using TBM (diameter 8.2m) Boring at a depth of 21m
The failure
10m diameter and 20m deep void formed i formed in nt the he ground ground b behind ehind a row o of f houses

The vibration from the TBM may have caused the nearby wells (30m deep and 1.8m diameter) to collapse
ICE (2003)
Consequence
Three uncharted wells collapsed
Remedial measures
The voids were backfilled with grout
Source
ICE (2003)
MtorMetroTunnel,France,14Feb.2003
Dubois & Rat (2003)

Mtor MetroTunnel,France,14Feb.2003
Background
Construction of Mtor Metro Tunnel in Paris
The failure
About 3,000m3 of sedimentary deposits collapsed underneath a school, occupying an area of 400m2 on plan
Dubois & Rat (2003)
MtorMetroTunnel,France,14Feb.2003

Not known
Consequences
No casualty The school had to be closed for a y year ear affectin affecting g 900 students
Source
Dubois & Rat (2003)
OslofjordSubseaTunnel,Norway,28Dec.2003
Background Three major failures and many minor failures occurred at a road tunnel during in service The failure First failure occurred on 28 December 2003: about 20m3 of crushed and weathered rock involving with clay, which came down from the crown went through the frost insulated water shielding vault and down to the carriageway Second failure involved about 3m3 of heavily weathered rock, which came down from the springline and fell down to the invert Third failure involved 2-3m3 of completely weathered rock, which fell down from the crown and rested on top of the water shielding vault Civil Engineering and Development Department
Oslofjord Subsea Tunnel, Norway, 28 Dec. 2003
First failure
Third failure
Karlsrud (2010)

Possible cause of failure The humidity behind the vault constructed for frost insulated water shielding was high and the high content of swelling clay in the weathered rock started sucking water and expanded gradually over a long period of time
Consequences Closure of the tunnel for more than 3 months for extensive repairs and upgrading of the tunnel support
Emergency and remedial measures Complete removal of the vault before installing additional rock support including fiber reinforced shotcrete, rock bolts and reinforced ribs of sprayed concrete

Lessons learnt The importance of proper geological mapping and rock mass classification The need to identify swelling minerals and the potential of deterioration of strength in weathered rock The importance of adequate support design for long-term stability in weathered rock Source Karlsrud (2010)
Shanghai Metro, China, 2003
Boos et al (2004)

Background
Expansion of the Shanghai Metro () Line 4 crossing beneath the Huangpu River () Two parallel tunnel tubes constructed by earth pressure balance TBM
The failure
Failure occurred during construction of a cross passage Massive ingress of water and material at the face at a depth of 35m Several metres ground subsidence

Failure of ground freezing unit
Consequences
High rise office buildings seriously damaged Flood protection dyke on the river badly damaged
Source
Boos et al (2004)
Tunnel Failure in Japan, 2003
Takahashi (2010)

The failure Ground collapse of an avalanche type containing cobbles, gravels and water took place at the point 900m away from the tunnel portal A large crater was observed at the ground surface about 130m above the tunnel
Takahashi (2010)

Possible cause of failure Existence of high groundwater pressure Decrease in cover of the mudstone layer Water path created by the investigation drillhole Consequence Programme delayed for about 2 years Emergency and remedial measures Filling the cave-in area by foam concrete Grouting under the collapse area Boring for drainage from the tunnel
Filling with foam concrete
Grout
Takahashi (2010)

Lessons learnt The importance of adequate ground investigation before tunnelling The importance of investigations and observations during construction for adopting appropriate support measures
Source Takahashi (2010)
Guangzhou Metro Line 3, China, 1 April 2004
ChinaDaily (2004)

Background
Construction of a 58.5km long underground metro in which 45.6km is a single-tube shield TBM
The failure
Failure of a diaphragm wall

Rapid fluctuation of groundwater level due to the heavy rainfall Complicated geology including a layer of swelling soil

Consequences
A three-storey building collapsed and sunk into the ground Collapse of nearby underground water mains
Remedial measures
Backfilled with crushed rock and cement
Source
ChinaDaily (2004) Soufun (2004) Longhoo (2004)
Singapore MRT, 20 April 2004
Government of Singapore (2005)


Background
An open cut tunnel excavated for Singapore MRTs new Circle Line Design and build Excavated trench of 15m wide and 33m deep mainly in marine clay with some fluvial clay supported by 0.8-1.0m thick diaphragm wall which is 35-45m deep without rock socket Steel struts: 4-5m horizontal and 3m vertical spacing Bottom-up construction Jet grouted base slabs Layer 1-1.5m thick at 28.5m below ground Layer 2-3m thick at 33.5m below ground (Layer 2 not yet constructed when collapse occurred)

The failure
9th level of struts being installed when collapse took place Unusual cracking and groaning noises heard early in the morning (6 hours) Loud cracking noise heard in the afternoon, 15 minutes before collapse Collapse plan area was 100m by 130m Settlement up to 15m Diaphragm walls displaced Steel struts mangled


Under-design of the strut-waler connection in the strutting system Incorrect use of Finite Element Method No proper design reviews Disregard of different warnings, for example, excessive wall deflections and surging inclinometer readings Poor construction quality Ineffective instrumentation and monitoring system Failure to implement risk management
Consequences
Part of Nicoll Highway, Singapores major east-west harbour-front road, destroyed Four workers killed Several others injured 15,000 people and 700 businesses affected Three offices and retail towers at risk from further ground movement Damage of a gas service line, resulting in an explosion and fire A storm drain damaged

Remedial measures
Rescue and backfilling Structurally disconnected the Merdeka Bridge All contracts of the Circle Line put on hold All contracts to carry out checks and review of design and construction of temporary works All Professional Engineers to confirm in writing the adequacy of their designs All designs to be independently checked by the Building & Construction Authority

Lessons learnt
This is a need for robust design, risk management, design review and independent checking, purposeful back analysis, an effective instrumentation, monitoring and interpretation regime, an effective system of management of uncertainties and quality during construction, corporate competencies and safety management The safety of temporary works is as important as that of permanent works and should be designed according to established codes and checked by competent persons
Main Source
Kaohsiung Rapid Transit , Taiwan, 29 May 2004
Lee & Ishihara (2010)


Background Chemical Churning Piles (CCP) of 350mm diameter installed as guide walls for the diaphragm wall construction Soil improvement works by the use of Super Jet Grouting (SJG) method at the reception area for break-out operations The diaphragm wall panels were first cored through by chain saw according to the face-shape of the shield tunnel machine and manual power tool was used to disassemble the reinforced concrete residual inside the coring holes EPB Tunnel Boring Machine 500mm away from the wall face awaiting for break-out and invert leakage started

The failure Sinkhole of about 10m in diameter formed at the ground surface Ground settlement influence zone ranging from 40m to 50m in diameter with maximum settlement from 500mm to 1,500mm. Several rings of tunnel segmental linings were damaged
Settled Area of Ground Surface
Chemical Churning Pile (CCP) Soil Improvement Zone
CCP Possible Collapse Zone
Tunnel Boring Machine
Leakage spot
Diaphragm Wall Soil Improvement Zone Path of Leakage

Possible causes of failure Progressive development of unexpected cracks inside the soil improvement zone resulting in groundwater leakages in the reception area as a result of piping and/or hydraulic fracturing Leakage paths at the interfaces between Chemical Churning Pile (CCP) and the diaphragm wall, CCP and Super Jet Grout (JSG) materials, or inside the lower portion of the JSG body Chloride assault and deterioration of CCP, which were installed two years before the wall breaking process, had significant effects on the integrity and water tightness at the interfaces The highly sensitive and erodible soil dispersed around the SJG might have been disturbed due to the application of highly pressured water jet in the grouting process

Possible causes of failure Mechanical and/or vibration disturbances occurred during the wall breaking process leading to serious cracks and fissure development inside the deteriorated CCP and defective SJG blocks Unfavourable sub-surface conditions which consisted of silty sands and sandy silts with water contents almost reaching their liquid limits
Consequences Adjacent buildings were damaged

Emergency and remedial measures Stabilizing the ground by piling-up sand bags in front of the tunnel face to reduce leakage, backfilling the sinkhole and grouting the tunnel crown and invert Advancing the TBM further to reduce the gap between the D-wall and the tunnel Installation of steel frames to the damaged ring reinforce segments Source Lee & Ishihara (2010)
Oslo Metro Tunnel, Norway, 17 June 2004

Background Metro line tunnel 1.3km long and 7m wide connecting with an old tunnel
Planned concrete wall Cave in area

Karlsrud (2010)

The failure At the junction where the two tunnels met in an acute angle, tunnel cave-in after removal of most part of the rock pillar between the tunnels
New tunnel
Old tunnel Removed pillar
Span 18-20m after cave-in

m iljo\d iv\20 00\ah -1.pp t
Karlsrud (2010)

Possible cause of failure Unfavourable direction of the bedding planes in relation to the geometry and span of the tunnels Over excavation of the rock pillar and the removal of the remaining rock pillar and old concrete wall before the planned concrete pillar was constructed Consequence Programme delayed for about 3 months Cost implication: extra cost of the remedial works Emergency and remedial measures Filling up the whole opening by concrete above the fallen debris Installation of 10m long cable anchors together with permanent support of 200mm thick lining of reinforced sprayed concrete, reinforced ribs of sprayed concrete and additional 6m long rock bolts

Lessons learnt The importance of adequate ground investigation The need to follow the sequence of rock support installation in accordance with the design plans during construction
Source Karlsrud (2010)
Kaohsiung Rapid Transit, Taiwan, 10 Aug. 2004

Background
Construction of the Kaohsiung Rapid Transit Blue & Orange Lines in Kaohsiung City
The failures
First collapse on 29 May 2004 underneath a street Second collapse in mid June 2004 Third collapse on 13 July 2004 with formation of a large sinkhole Fourth collapse on 10 Aug 2004
Taiwan Info (2004)
Kaohsiung Rapid Transit, Taiwan, 10 Aug. 2004

Possible adverse ground and groundwater conditions
Consequences
First collapse - Several buildings affected and 100 people evacuated Third collapse - Three residential buildings evacuated and significant disruption to water/electricity supply Fourth collapse - No casualty, one building affected and part of the works suspended
Source
Taiwan Info (2004)
Hsuehshan Tunnel, Taiwan, 1991-2004
TANEEB (2005)
TANEEB (2005)

Background
Construction of 12.9km long and 4.8m diameter Hsuehshan Tunnel in Taiwan () Works commenced in 1991 and completed in 2004 Comprised 2 main tunnels (East & Westbound) and a pilot tunnel Eastbound by TBM method (July 1993 to Sept. 2004) Westbound by TBM method (July 1993 to April 2004) Pilot tunnel by drill & blast method (July 1991 to Oct. 2003)
Westbound Eastbound
Pilot Tunnel
TANEEB (2005)

The failures
Eastbound 28 collapses occurred Westbound TBM badly damaged due to tunnel collapse and groundwater inflow of 45,000 litres/min into the tunnel Pilot Tunnel 8 collapses occurred

Unexpected difficult geology with fractured rock and massive inflows of water 6 major faults found along the tunnel alignment

Consequences
Eastbound Failure in May 1993 affected 56 buildings and 73 families Westbound 11 men died Pilot Tunnel 13 stoppages
Source
TANEEB (2005)
Barcelona Metro, Spain, 27 Jan. 2005
European Foundations (2005)


Background
Tunnel for Barcelona Line Five Metro Extension Tunnelling using NATM
The failure
30m wide and 32m deep crater formed

A hidden vertical fault located 1m behind the sprayed concrete lining

Consequences
2 five-storey buildings and a smaller one demolished More than 50 families made homeless
Remedial measures
The void was backfilled with grout of about 2,000m3
Source
European Foundations (2005)
Lausanne M2 Metro, Switzerland, 22 Feb. 2005
Tunnels & Tunnelling (2005)


Background
Tunnel (6km long, approximately 10m wide x 7m high) for Lausanne Metro M2 Project (cost US$472M) in Switzerland Tunnelling using an Eickhoff ET 380-L roadheader
The failure
Collapse in area of soft ground (lake deposits) 50m3 of material displaced into the tunnel at a depth of 12m, leading to a crater at the surface

Tunnel driven through a pocket in the glacial moraine, causing sudden inflow of groundwater

Consequences
People in two buildings, a supermarket and a food outlet in commercial district evacuated when their cellars collapsed No injuries reported
Remedial measures
A curtain of 11 piles constructed ahead of the collapsed face with grouting to strengthen the ground and limit further flow of material into the tunnel The void was backfilled with 800m3 of glass-sand (recycled glass)
Source
Tunnels & Tunnelling (2005)
Lane Cove Tunnel, Australia, 2 Nov. 2005

Background
Twin NATM tunnels (7m high, 8.1 wide and 3.6km long) constructed under Lane Cove Tunnel Project in Sydney
The failure
Collapse occurred during breakout for a ventilation tunnel from the running tunnel A 10m by 10m, 25m deep crater formed in the ground between a 3-storey high residential building and a highway exit ramp

Possible rock slippage Ground investigation did not identify dyke at the tunnel intersection Under designed rock bolts due to increased effective span at intersection of adit and tunnel
Consequences
A 3-storey building partially collapsed and 47 residents evacuated A water main burst Citybound road closed

Remedial measures
The void was backfilled with 1,400m3 of concrete Continual monitoring
Sources
Golder (2005) Ground Engineering (2005) Ground Engineering (2006a) Ground Engineering (2006b) ICE (2006) NNN (2005) SMH (2005)
ICE (2006)
Kaohsiung Rapid Transit, Taiwan, 4 Dec. 2005
TT (2005)

Background
Construction of Kaohsiung Rapid Transit (KRT) Orange Line at the junction of Chungcheng Road and Tashun Road in Kaohsiung City
The failure
Failure occurred during excavation of an underground sump pit at a cross passage (33m below ground) underneath an existing reservoir A 30m by 20m, 4m deep trench initially formed on 4 Dec. 2005 and was collapsed to form a 50m by 30m, 10m deep crater at the road surface This was the 10th reported failure of the KRT project Another crater (10m diameter, 7m deep) formed at another location on 10 Dec. 2005

Massive water seepage from a reservoir

Consequences
Chungcheng Road (a major trunk road) closed for a week The nearby Linkang railway line temporarily suspended A 100m long section of tunnels and utilities damaged Cracks found at 20 nearby residential buildings
Remedial measures
The crater was backfilled with about 2,800m3 of soil/rock and concrete 20 hours after the accident The damaged sections of the KRT tunnels needed to be reconstructed Cost of the remedial measures estimated to be up to NT$500M (US$15M) excluding reconstruction of the damaged sections of the KRT tunnels

Sources
TVB News (2005) TT (2005) SP (2005) ST (2005) Sun (2005) WWP (2005) OD (2005) TKP (2005) MP (2005)
TVB News (2005)
Nedre Romerike Water Treatment Plant, Crude Water and Potable Water Tunnels, Norway, 2005
Background The tunnel works were completed in 1980. Two tunnels of 3m width for crude water and potable water supply were constructed in Precambrian highly metamorphic gneisses In some areas, the gneiss is highly weathered and is partly transformed to clay
Karlsrud (2010)
The failure The failure was progressive for more than 25 years resulting in blockage of the crude water tunnel A major failure occurred in the crude water tunnel in winter 2005 and the weathered rock failed Two major progressive failures occurred in 2007 and about 200m3 and 30-40m3 rocks fell each time
Open joint which released a large block
Section A-A
Karlsrud (2010)
Possible cause of failure Lack of mapping of weakness zones containing swelling clay resulting in insufficient rock support The humidity in the water tunnel probably causing a gradual expansion of the swelling clay which resulted in detachment of the rock Consequences About 150, 000 people affected by disruption in water supply
Emergency and remedial measures Due to the limited access in the crude water tunnel, only manually replacement and redistribution of the debris downstream from the cave-in areas could be carried out by divers when the water level was lowered Lessons learnt The importance of proper rock mass classification, detailed mapping of weakness zones and weathered rock, and implementation of adequate rock support Source Karlsrud (2010)
Hanekleiv Road Tunnel, Norway, 25 December 2006

Background The tunnel was supported with a combination of rock bolts and steel fiber reinforced concrete The failure A section of tunnel caved in10-11 years after excavation Possible cause of failure Unfavourable geometry with joints almost parallel to the tunnel axis. The rock bolts installed mainly parallel to the rock joints and with limited influence on the stability Karlsrud (2010)
Hanekleiv Road Tunnel, Norway, 25 December 2006

Consequences About 200m3 of debris fell down from the crown and the tunnel was closed for about 6.5 months Emergency and remedial measures Casting concrete lining and installing about 4,000 rock bolts Lessons learnt Lack of qualified engineering geologist at the site to carry out mapping and design during the tunnel construction Source Karlsrud (2010)
Stormwater Management and Road Tunnel (SMART), Malaysia, 2003 - 2006
Limestone
SMART
Siow, M. T. (2006)

Background
9.7km long and 13.26m diameter tunnel driven through karst formation by slurry shield TBM
The failure
37 incidents within 8 km of tunnel excavation

Adverse geology and karst conditions
Siow, M. T. (2006)
McFeat-Smith (2008)

Source
Siow, M. T. (2006) McFeat-Smith (2008)
Sao Paulo Metro Station, Brazil, 15 Jan. 2007
Gulp (2007)

Background
New Austrian Tunnelling Method (NATM) was used to excavate a 18.5m diameter 45m long section station tunnel The tunnel failure occurred close to a junction with a 40m diameter, 40m deep access shaft
The failure
Collapse of the station tunnel and partial damage to the access shaft The rate of settlement at the tunnel crown increased rapidly and reached 15mm to 20mm two to three days before the failure

Failed to account for the geology of the site; fractured rock located over the excavation The lack of sufficient supports in the roof and side walls of the excavation
Consequences
Several vehicles dropped into the 30m-deep hole Seven persons killed
Remedial measures
Stabilized the section of tunnel with extensive reinforcement A system of anchors extending 32m into the soil was put in place and the excavation through the section was performed after pregrouting

Source
ICE (2008) Gulp (2007)
Guangzhou Metro Line 5, China, 17 Jan. 2008
Sina (2008a)
AD (2008)

Background
Construction of a cross passage between two tunnel boring machine tunnels
The failure
Collapse of the cross passage tunnel

Groundwater flowed into the tunnel
Consequences
Cave-in at the road, about 100m2 on plan No injury

Remedial measures
Crater backfilled with concrete
Source
AD (2008a) Sina (2008a, 2008b)
Langstaff Road Trunk Sewer, Toronto, Canada 2 May 2008
Discharge through the screw conveyor of the EPBM

Wallis, P (2009)

Background Tunnelling by EPBM for the construction of the sewer tunnel The failure About 1,800 m3 of liquefied mud flowed into the tunnel over a 48hour period through the tail brushes causing the tunnel and the TBM to sink by more than 3m and collapse A deep sinkhole formed at the ground surface Possible causes of failure Damaged wire brushes of the tailseal of the EPBM were the catalyst for initiating the whole sequence of the failure events Highly saturated very fine sands and silts under 1.5 bars of groundwater pressure

Consequences The road above the excavated area closed Major delay to the project The TBM was buried Emergency and remedial measures Filling the sinkhole with unshrinkable fill (low strength concrete) Areas of continuing subsidence were stabilized with sand infill Bulkhead was built about 300m behind the TBM to control the infow Water main repaired and road repaved Source Wallis, P (2009) Wallis, S (2008)
Circle Line 4 Tunnel, Singapore, 23 May 2008
Property Highlights of Singapore (2008) Civil Engineering and Development Department

Property Highlights of Singapore (2008)

Background
Construction of Circle Line 4 tunnel by 6m diameter slurry mixshield TBM
The failure
Cave-in at Holland Road approximately 8m diameter x 3m deep

Loose ground

Consequences
Temporary suspension of water supply
Remedial measures
Crater backfilled with concrete
Source
Hangzhou Metro Tunnel, China, 15 Nov. 2008
AD (2008b)

Background
Construction of Hangzhou Metro
The Failure
Failure of a series of continuous walls of 800mm thick constructed by cut-and-cover method forming a 21m wide x 16m deep excavated area
Consequences
A 75m long section of road collapsed and 11 vehicles fell into the 16m deep excavation A 600mm diameter water main was broken Water from the nearby river flowed into the collapsed area

Consequences
Three 3-storey buildings seriously damaged and needed to be demolished Two 110kV cables were damaged 8 persons died, 13 persons missing (as of 19 Nov. 2008) and 11 persons injured
CNS (2008)
CNS (2008)
CNS (2008)
XINHUANET (2008)
XINHUANET (2008)
XINHUANET (2008)
XINHUANET (2008)
XINHUANET (2008)
Source
AD (2008b) Beijing Review (2008) CNS (2008) NCE (2008) XINHUANET (2008)
Cologne North-South Metro Tram Line, Germany, 3 March 2009
Wallis, S (2009)

Background Construction of a shaft using diaphragm walls The failure Collapse of the diaphragm walls
Possible causes of failure Boiling of the shafts invert under high pressures, loss of ground due to inflow of groundwater, and creating a void outside the diaphragm walls into which the archive building collapsed Protective measures such as compensation grouting not carried out for protection of the buildings adjacent to the excavation

Consequences Collapse of the citys historical archive building Partial collapse of two apartment buildings Evacuation of local residents (80 families in 10 buildings) Two people killed
Source Wallis, S (2009)
Wallis, S (2009)
Brightwater Tunnel, Seattle, U. S. A., 8 March 2009
Wallis, P (2009a)

Background Tunnelling by Mixshield slurry TBM The Failure 4.5m x 9m sinkhole formed at a driveway of a house Possible cause of failure The inexperience TBM operator with the closed slurry system making it difficult to judge the amount of material being excavated during a shove The presence of a large boulder in the face that stalled penetration without slowing extraction of material and caused over excavation The high artesian water pressure and its influence on the excavation cycle

Consequences The driveway of a house damaged Emergency and remedial measures Filling the sinkhole with crushed rock and sand
Source Wallis, P (2009a)
Seattles Beacon Hill Light Rail, U. S. A., July 2009
Wallis, P (2009b)

Background Tunnelling by EPBM The failure A 6.4m deep sinkhole formed at the ground surface Six other large voids were found 6m to 18m below the ground surface and behind the segmental lining of the bored TBM running tunnels Possible cause of failure Over excavation when the EPBM hit pockets of sand in the stable clay stratum

Consequences Sinkhole in the front yard of a house near its foundation Remedial measures Filling the voids with 200 to 400 cubic yards of controlled density fill Compaction grouting beneath the voids and the top of the running tunnels Source Wallis, P (2009b)
Cairo Metro Tunnel, Egypt, 3 Sept. 2009
Wallis, S (2009a)

Background Tunnelling by 9.4m diameter Mixshield slurry TBM First failure A segment fallen out of a ring subsequently forming a sinkhole on the ground surface
Second failure Second ground collapse occurred after the pouring of concrete to attempt to arrest the first collapse
Possible cause of failure First failure - a segment of the recently installed ring just leaving the tail shield fell and allowed water and soil to flow to the tunnel, filling the interior of the TBM and the tunnel.

Possible cause of failure Second failure More than 1,000 m3 of concrete was used to fill the first sinkhole. The weight of the concrete acting on soft ground under a high groundwater table caused a second ground collapse Consequences TBM buried A parked car slid into the 15m-20m diameter x 20m deep sinkhole Evacuation of local residents (80 families in 10 buildings)
Remedial measures First failure Backfilled the sinkhole with concrete Second failure Injection of chemical grout, vertically and on inclines, to strengthen the soil around the TBM and the tunnel to support the recovery excavation to uncover the TBM
Source Wallis, S (2009a)
Shenzhen Express Rail Link, China, 27 March 2011, 4 May 2011 and 10 May 2011
Background Tunnelling by TBM at about 22m to 26m below ground Several ground failures occurred in Xiameilin, Futian District ()
OD (2011)
First failure (World Journal (2011)) A sinkhole of about 7m diameter and 10m deep was formed at a football pitch on 27 March 2011 The sinkhole was full of muddy water and air bubbles Consequence Evacuation of nearby residents Possible cause of failure Unexpected change in sub-surface materials encountered, from slight decomposed rock to completely decomposed rock Remedial Measures Backfill of the sinkhole with concrete
World Journal (2011)
Second failure (21CN (2011)) A sinkhole of about 10m in diameter was formed near the location of the first failure on 4 May 2011 Possible cause of failure Heavy rainfall and the ground at the location of the previous failure had not been fully stabilized
Third failure (TKP (2011)) A sinkhole of about 7m deep was formed at the ground surface during the changing of cutter discs on 10 May 2011 Possible cause of failure Loose fill layers with high water infiltration Existence of a sub-layer drainage channel
Fourth failure ((SD(2011)) A sinkhole of about 1.5m in diameter and 7m deep formed at football pitch where previous three ground collapses occurred on 18 May 2011
SD (2011)
Fifth failure (21CN (2011)) A sinkhole of about 5m deep in plan area of 100m2 was formed on a road on 30 October 2011 Possible causes of failure
Existence of soft and hard lens of soil above the tunnel
Leakage of compressed air
Remedial Measures Backfill of the sinkhole with soil
2home (2011)
Source 2home (2011) 21CN (2011) OD (2011) SD (2011) TKP (2011) World Journal (2011)
Hengqin Tunnel, Macau, 19 July 2012
MD (2012)

Background Four-lane 1.57km long road tunnel constructed by the cut-andcover method Failure The lateral support wall collapsed resulting in caving of the surrounding ground surface Possible cause of failure Existence of a weak geological structure in the sub-surface Rising of groundwater levels due to heavy rainfall causing the weak soil between the interlayer to slip Failure of the construction of support structures to keep pace with the excavation

Possible cause of failure Weak ground with high groundwater levels increasing pressure acting on the foundation pit pile Consequences Five heavy machines buried Programme delayed

Source MD (2012) MDT (2012) OD (2012)
Hong Kong Cases
MTR Modified Initial System, Prince Edward Station, Nathan Road, 12 Sept. 1977
Background
A running tunnel (5m in diameter) being constructed from Prince Edward Station by the drill and blast method Ground above the tunnel strengthened
The failure
A wall section of the running tunnel under Nathan Road collapsed The subsidence did not affect the road surface
Gap existed between the ground treatment above the station tunnel and that above the running tunnel allowing the soil to flow into the tunnel
Nathan Road
Water table
Annular Ground Treatment
Annular Ground Treatment
Station Tunnel
Running Tunnel
after Clay & Takas (1997) Civil Engineering and Development Department The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Consequences
Nathan Road between Argyle Street and Arran Street closed as a safety measure Three buildings (Nos. 745, 745A and 745B Nathan Road) involving 100 people evacuated Closure Order issued for nearby shops and a petrol station
Source
Clay & Takacs (1997) SCMP (1977)
MTR Island Line, 22 Hennessy Road, 1 Jan. 1983

Background
Tunnelling from Admiralty to Causeway Bay for MTR Island Line using the drill and blast method Tunnel formed by the drill and blast method
The failure
Water-bearing fill flowed into the tunnel, opening a hole at the road above 1,500m3 of material flowed into the tunnel creating a void of an area of 100m2 and 30m deep beneath the road surface

Misinterpretation of the geology by the Contractor Blasting went too far, resulting in the tunnel penetrating the rock into soft ground
Hennessy Road
Water table
Rock
Soft Ground
Shield Chamber
after Clay & Takas (1997) Civil Engineering and Development Department The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
Consequences
Cracks found in the granite masonry of the outside wall of a building at 22 Hennessy Road At least 21 timber piles beneath an adjacent building of 22 Hennessy Road exposed More than 150 people in 18-22 Hennessy Road evacuated The building at 18-20 Hennessy Road reopened 3 hours after the incident and the building at 22 Hennessy Road 6 days later

Remedial measures
The void was backfilled by grout The floor slab of the building at 22 Hennessy Road pushed up by the grouting works by 50-75mm
Sources
Clay & Takacs (1997) SCMP (1983)
SCMP (1983)
MTR Island Line, Shing On Street, Shau Kei Wan, 23 July 1983
MP (1983a)
Background
Tunnelling from Tai Koo Station to Sai Wan Ho Station for MTR Island Line
The failure
13m x 1m void formed
Consequences
Section of Shau Kei Wan Road closed Building at 122-124 Shau Kei Wan Road settled more than 100mm and tilting observed More than 80 families (400 people) evacuated & a woman injured Water main damaged due to the settlement Water and gas supplies stopped
Source
MP (1983a)
MTR Island Line, 140-168 Shau Kei Wan Road 16 Dec. 1983
MP (1983a)
Background
Construction of Sai Wan Ho Station for MTR Island Line
The failure
More than 40mm of ground settlement About 150m3 of soil flowed into the tunnel leaving a void between Shau Kei Wan Road and the tunnel
Consequences
Section of Shau Kei Wan Road closed Water supply stopped
Source
MP (1983b)
Kowloon Southern Link Contract KDB 200, Canton Road, 21 Oct. 2006
GEO File Information

Background
Twin railway tunnels between Jordan Road and East Tsim Sha Tsui Station constructed by a slurry TBM Incident of ground loss occurred at TBM launch area
The failure
3m(W) x 3.5m(L) x 3m(D) sinkhole formed reaching the ground surface

Slurry leakage and loss of slurry support pressure
Consequences
Crater formed at the ground surface closed to a busy road and a gas main
Remedial measures
Backfilling of the sinkhole with stockpile materials and sub-base materials
Source
Kowloon Southern Link Contract KDB 200, Salisbury Road, 3 June 2007
Background
Twin railway tunnels between Jordan Road and East Tsim Sha Tsui Station constructed by a slurry TBM
The failure
2m x 3m sinkhole reaching the ground surface

Sudden air pressure loss through the interface between CDG/HDG and overlying marine sand during a compressed air intervention, resulting in loss of face support and subsequent formation of sinkhole
Consequences
Crater formed at the ground surface, with associated settlement Temporary closure of a busy road lane A low pressure gas main and a 1200 mm stormwater drain were affected
Remedial measures
Backfilling of sinkhole with granular fill
Source
References
2home (2011). <www.2home.com.cn/article/article_4190.html> (31 October 2011). 21cn (2011). <http://house.21cn.com/collect/2011/10/31/9615710.shtml> (31 October 2011). AD (2008a). . Apple Daily Newspaper. 19 January 2008, Hong Kong, pp A22. AD (2008b). 219 <http://www.appleactionews.com/site/art_main.php?&iss_id=20081 116&sec_id=10793096&art_id=11853290&dis_type=ss&media_id= 1>. Beijing Review website (2008). Death Toll Could Reach 21 in Tunnel Collapse. <http://www.bjreview.com.cn/headline/txt/200811/19/content_165283.htm> (19 Nov 2008).
References
Boos, R., Braun, M., Hangen, P., Hoch, C., Popp, R., Reiner, H., Schmid, G., & Wannick, H. (2004). Underground Transportation Systems, Chances and Risks from the Re-insurers Point of View. Munich Re Group, Germany, pp 58-62. <http://www.munichre.com/> (31 Jan. 2007). China Daily (2004). 100 homeless after metro site collapse. <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/200404/02/content_320246.htm> (2 April 2004). Civil Engineer International (1995). Tunnel lining removal prompts LA Metro cave in. Institution of Civil Engineers, July Issue, p10. CNS (2008). <http://www.chinanews.com/>. Clay, R.B. & Takacs, A.P. (1997). Anticipating the unexpected Flood, fire overbreak, inrush, collapse. Proceedings of the International Conference on Tunnelling Under Difficult Ground and Rock Mass Conditions, Basel, Switzerland, pp 223-242.
References
Construction Today (1994a). Police probe repeat Munich tunnel breach. Construction Today, October Issue, pp 4-5. Construction Today (1994b). Unstable ground triggers Munich tunnel collapse. Construction Today, October Issue, p 5. Dubois, P. & Rat, M. (2003). Effondrement sur le chantier "Mtor. Conseil Gnral des Ponts et Chausses, France, 22p. <http://www2.equipement.gouv.fr/actualites/Rapports/Meteor.pdf> (31 Jan. 2007). European Foundations (2005). Tighter NATM rules follow Barcelona failure. European Foundations, Spring Issue, No. 26, p 3. GEO File Information. GEO File Reference: GCME 3/5/7989/05, KSL Southern Link C/No. KDB200, West Kln Station & Ancillary Bldg & Tunnel.
References
Golder (2005). Causes of Subsidence, 2 November 2005, Lane Cove Tunnel Project. Sydney NSW, 52p. Government of Singapore (2005). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Incident at the MRT Circle Line Worksite That Led to the Collapse of Nicoll Highway on 20 April 2004. Government of Singapore, Land Transport Authority. <http://www.lta.gov.sg/home/index_home_nicoll.htm> (31 Jan. 2007). Ground Engineering (1994). London NATM controversy. Ground Engineering, November Issue, p 6. Ground Engineering (2000). Catalogue of disaster. Ground Engineering, August Issue, pp 10-11. Ground Engineering (2005). Australian tunnel collapse raises doubts over NATM. Ground Engineering, December Issue, p 6.
References
Ground Engineering (2006a). Sydney tunnel collapse triggered by under-designed rock bolts. Ground Engineering, February Issue, p 4. Ground Engineering (2006b). Rock bolts used instead of steel girders may have contributed to Lane Cove collapse. Ground Engineering, May Issue, p 4. Gulp (2007). Desenvolvimento e diverso. <http://gulp.com.br/imagem/acidente-no-metro-de-sao-paulo> (17 January 2007). HSE (1996). Safety of New Austrian Tunnelling Method (NATM) Tunnels. Health & Safety Executive, UK, 86p. HSE (2000). The Collapse of NATM Tunnels at Heathrow Airport. Health & Safety Executive, UK, 116p. ICE (1998a). Bulkhead location blamed for DLR blast. New Civil Engineer, Institution of Civil Engineers, February Issue, pp 3-4.
References
ICE (1998b). HSE signs up QC Carlisle for HEX prosecution. New Civil Engineer, Institution of Civil Engineers, March Issue, pp 4-5. ICE (1999). Heathrow Express court cases kicks off. New Civil Engineer, Institution of Civil Engineers, January Issue, p 6. ICE (2003). Ground failure linked to well collapses. New Civil Engineer, Institution of Civil Engineers, February Issue, pp 6-7. ICE (2004). Docklands tunnel blowout down to elementary error, says judge. New Civil Engineer, Institution of Civil Engineers, January Issue, pp 8-9. ICE (2006). Australian tunnel collapse raises new NATM doubts. New Civil Engineer, Institution of Civil Engineers, January Issue, pp 6-7. ICE (2008). Heart of darkness, New Civil Engineer, Institution of Civil Engineers, September Issue, pp 14-15. IMIA. <http://www.imia.com>.
References
IMS. <http://www.imstunnel.com/index2.htm>. Karlsrud Kjell (2010). Technical Note : Experience with tunnel failures in Norwegian tunnels. The Government of the Hong Kong Civil Engineering and Development Department. (Unpublished). Kavvadas, M., Hewison, L.R., Laskaratos, P.G., Seferoglou, C. & Michalis, I. (1996). Experiences from the construction of the Athens Metro. Proceedings of International Symposium on the Geotechnical Aspects of Underground Construction in Soft Ground, City University, London, April. Lee, I. M. & Cho, G. C. (2008). Underground construction in decomposed residual soils (presentation slides). The 6th International Symposium on Geotechnical Aspects of Underground Construction in Soft Ground (IS-Shanghai 2008), Tongji University, Shanghai, April.
References
Lee, W. F. & Ishihara, K. (2011) Forensic diagnosis of a shield tunnel failure. Engineering Structures. Volume 32, Issue 7, July 2010, Pages 1830-1837. Longhoo (2004). 3. <http://www.longhoo.net/big5/longhoo/news/civil/node107/userobj ect1ai172577.html> (2 April 2004).
Madrid (1996). Informe sobre el NATM del Health & Safety Executive, de Inglaterra, 1996. <http://www.madrid.org/metro/infonatm.html> (1996).
McFeat-Smith, I. M. (2008). Personal communications. GEO File Reference: GCME 6/8/6-1, Newspaper Articles for Tunnels/Media Reports. MD (2012). . Macao Daily, 21 July 2012, Macau.
References
MDT (2012). Report : four causes account for Hengqin tunnel collapsed. Macau Daily Times. 14 August, 2012. Mihalis, I. & Kavvadas, M. (1999). Ground movements caused by TBM tunnelling in the Athens Metro Project. Proceedings of International Symposium on the Geotechnical Aspects of Underground Construction in Soft Ground, Japan, July, pp 229-234.
MP (1983a). . Ming Pao Newspaper. 24 July 1983, Hong Kong.
MP (1983b). . ing Pao Newspaper. 17 Dec. 1983, Hong Kong. NNN (2005). National Nine News. 2 Nov. 2005, Australia. OD (2011). . Oriental Daily, 29 March, 2011, Hong Kong.
References
OD (2005). . Oriental Daily. 7 Dec. 2005, Hong Kong. OD (2012). . Oriental Daily, 21 July, 2012, Hong Kong. Property Highlights of Singapore (2008). <http://propertyhighlights.blogspot.com/2008/05/circle-line-workcauses-cave-in-off.html> (25 May 2008). SCMP (1977). MTR tunnel collapses. South China Morning Post. 13 Sept. 1977, Hong Kong. SCMP (1983). MTR tunnelling may be to blame. South China Morning Post. 2 Jan. 1983, Hong Kong. SD (2011). Fourth land collapse in Xiameilin. Shenzhen Daily, 20 May 2011, Shenzhen.
References
Shin, J.H., Lee, I.K., Lee, Y.H. & Shin, H.S. (2006). Lessons from serial tunnel collapses during construction of the Seoul subway Line 5. Tunnel and Underground Space Techonology, Issue no. 21, pp 296297. Sina (2008a). <http://news.sina.com/ch/phoenixtv/102-101-101102/2008-01-17/15232606535.html> (17 Jan 2008).
Sina (2008b). <http://news.sina.com.hk/cgibin/nw/show.cgi/9/1/1/613096/> (18 Jan 2008).
Siow, M. T. (2006). Geotechnical aspects of the SMART tunnel. International Conference and Exhibition on Trenchless Technology and Tunnelling, 7-9 March 2006, Malaysia. SMH (2005). The Sydney Morning Herald. 2 Nov. 2005, Australia. Soufun (2004).: :3 3. <http://news.gz.soufun.com/2004-04-04/259585.htm> (4 April 2004).
References
SP (2005). Sing Pao Newspaper. 6 Dec. 2005, Hong Kong. ST (2005). Sing Tao Newspaper. 6 Dec. 2005, Hong Kong. Sun (2005). Sun Newspaper. 6 Dec. 2005, Hong Kong. TANEEB (2005). Hsuehshan Tunnel. Taiwan Area National Expressway Engineering Bureau (), Taiwan. <http://egip.taneeb.gov.tw> (31 Jan. 2007).
Taiwan Info (2004). Nouvel incident sur le chantier du mtro de Kaohsiung. Taiwan. <http://taiwaninfo.nat.gov.tw/Societe/1092119498.html> (31 Jan. 2007).
Takahashi, Hiroshi (2010). Huge collapse leading to ground surface caving in 130m earth thickness. TT (2005). Cave-in at KRTC site snarls up Kaohsiung traffic. Taipei Times. 5 Dec. 2005, Taiwan.
References
TKP (2005). Ta Kung Pao Newspaper. 7 Dec. 2005, Hong Kong. TKP (2011). . Ta Kung Pao Newspaper, 11 May 2011, Shenzhen . TVB News (2005). TVB News. 4 Dec. 2005, Taiwan. Tunnels & Tunnelling (2005). Lausanne Metro Tunnel collapse. Tunnels & Tunnelling International, April Issue, p 6. Wallis, P. (2009). EPBM recovery reveals the unexpected. TunnelTalk. <http://www.tunneltalk.com/YorkSewer-Aug-09-TBM-recoveryreveals-the-unexpected.php> (August 2009). Wallis, P. (2009a). Sinkhole bothers Brightwater. TunnelTalk. <http://www.tunneltalk.com/Brightwater-Mar09-Brightwatersinkhole.php> (March 2009).
References
Wallis, P. (2009b). Beacon Hill celebration and investigation. TunnelTalk. <http://www.tunneltalk.com/BeaconHill-Jul09-Celebration-andInvestigation.php> (July 2009). Wallis, S. (2008). Buried EPBM recovery in Toronto. TunnelTalk <http://www.tunneltalk.com/Buried-EPBM-recovery-in-Toronto.php> (August 2008). Wallis, S. (2009). Kln - speculation and anger in aftermath. TunnelTalk. <http://tunneltalk.com/Cologne-collapse-Mar09-Deadly-collapse-inCologne.php> (March 2009). Wallis, S. (2009a). Cairo Metro tunnel collapse. TunnelTalk. http://www.tunneltalk.com/Cairo-Metro-Sep09-tunnel-collapse.php> (September 2009).
References
World Journal (2011). 10 <http://www.worldjournal.com/view/full_news/12536326/article%E9%AB%98%E9%90%B5%E6%83%B9%E7%A6%8D%EF%BC% 9F-%E6%B7%B1%E5%9C%B3%E5%9C%B0%E9%99%B7%E9%A9%9A%E7%8F%BE10%E7%B1%B3%E6%B7%B1%E5%9 D%91?instance=news_pics> (29 March 2011). WWP (2005). Wen Wei Po Newspaper. 6 Dec. 2005, Hong Kong. XINHUANET. <http://www.xinhuanet.com/> (4 April 2004).
General References
Brand, E.W. (1996c). Bibliography on Settlements Caused by Tunnelling to March 1996 (GEO Report No. 51). Geotechnical Engineering Office, Hong Kong, 70 p. Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 1996. Safety of New Austrian Tunnelling Method (NATM) Tunnels, A review of sprayed concrete tunnels with particular reference to London Clay, (HSE) Books, Sudbury, 80 p. Jacobs J. D. (1975). Some tunnel failures and what they have taught. Hazards in Tunnelling and on Falsework, Institution of Civil Engineers, London, pp 37-46. Moh, Z.C. & Hwang, R.N. (2007). Lessons learned from recent MRT construction failures in Asia Pacific. Journal of the Southeast Asian Geotechnical Society, December 2009, pp 121-137. cases already included in the catalogue?
General References
Seidenfub, T. (2006). Masters Degree in Foundation Engineering and Tunnelling: Collapse in Tunnelling. Stuttgart University of Applied Sciences, Germany, 194 p. (Note: 109 numbers of failures of all types of tunnels). <http://www.itaaites.org/cms/fileadmin/filemounts/general/pdf/ItaAssociation/Produc tAndPublication/Thesis/ThesisSeidenfuss.pdf>some the failure cases already included in the catalogue?
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Tunnel Failure

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Tunnel Failure

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CatalogueofNotable TunnelFailureCaseHistories (uptoOctober (up October2012)

Green Park, London, UK, 1964

Munich U Munich Underground, nderground, G Germany, ermany, 1980

TunnelFailures Listof OverseasCases

TunnelFailures Listof OverseasCases

22. Sewage Tunnel, Hull, UK, 1999

28. Tunnel Failure, Japan, 2003

TunnelFailures Listof OverseasCases

TunnelFailures Listof OverseasCases

6. Kowloon Southern Link Contract KDB 200, Salisbury Road, 3

Civil Engineering and Development Department

Clay & Takacs (1997)

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

Inflow nflow of of sand sand an and d grave gravel l

Clay & Takacs (1997)

Civil Engineering and Development Department

Clay & Takacs (1997)

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

First failure Heavy water inflow

Possible cause of failure

Possible cause of failure

Construction Today (1994b)

Possible causes of failure

Clay & Takacs (1997)

Clay & Takacs (1997)

SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea, 17Nov.1991

Lee & Cho (2008)

SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea, 17Nov.1991

Possible cause of failure

SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea, 17Nov.1991

SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea, 17Nov.1991

SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea, 27Nov.1991

Lee & Cho (2008)

SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea, 27Nov.1991

SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea, 27Nov.1991

Lee & Cho (2008)

SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea, 11Feb.1992

Lee & Cho (2008)

SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea, 11Feb.1992

SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea, 11Feb.1992

Lee & Cho (2008)

SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea, 11Feb.1992

SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea, 7Jan.1993

Lee & Cho (2008)

SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea, 7Jan.1993

SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea, 7Jan.1993

Remedial Remedial measures

Lee & Cho (2008)

SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea, 1Feb.1993

Lee & Cho (2008)

SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea, 1Feb.1993

SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea, 1Feb.1993

Lee & Cho (2008)

SeoulMetroLine5 Phase2,Korea, 1Feb.1993

Construction Today (1994a)

The Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region

Possible causes of failure

Construction Today (1994a)

Ground Engineering (2008)

Possible cause of failure

Central Terminal Area Settlement Contours

Possible causes of failure

Two failures at T3 in 1995