Mirror to the World: Ethics as Excrescence of Metaphysics Empirical Basis of Ethics Simmel catches this Doppelcharakter of the Will

(operari): wirZuschauer u. Akteure, Geschaffene u. Schaffende sind, p31, foreshadowing Nietzsches expression die geschaffene Menschen (in HATH1 rePoets). There are pantheisticand monistic and mystic tones (Simmel, p28, p38, p62-3) as well as Freudian ones (the fragmentation of the Subject/Self [p54], sublimation) and Darwinian/vitalist (adaptation of the will in its con-ditioned aspect, p57) that lead to insoluble antinomies (undifferentiated unity of will against its multiple manifestations, self-lessness of will against awareness both of its being and of its mechanical aspect as Verstand, the volitional unity of will and polarity of the strife [Kampf] for Life, posed by what obstacle or opposition? pp58 ff; hence, the purpose-lessness of the Will [Zwecklosigkeit p68] which, on the other hand, supports the Wertlosigkeit of the world and the preponderance of Leid over Lust because the attainment of pleasure/wish nullifies its object and defeats the purpose). This is not to deny the merits of philosophical speculation. But it is as foolish as it is futile to believe that we can ab-stract or asport ourselves from the materiality of life, from its immanence, and transcend it so as to com-prehend it: - because the comprehension oozes out of the trans-scension (as Kierkegaard admonished Hegel existence oozes out through the meshes of his philosophical net). Schopenhauer returns to the identification of metaphysics and ethics in the introduction to The Basis, and in so doing he absorbs the latter into the former precisely by taking that neutral standpoint, by seeking to stand outside morality and therefore outside the corpor-reality of being, of life. Nietzsche will flagellate him not for this, but for re-smuggling the ethical concepts back into the immoralist conception of the Will (cf TotI, part on untimely thinker); because instead of accepting Life, Schop the pessimist, the decadent, the nihilist recants his nihilism for the comfort of sympathy (Mitleid with-pain or cosuffering), an ethics akin to that of Christianity. What Nietzsche denies is mostly this renegade, apostatic flight from nihilism, not pursuing it to the end, not so much the notion of the Will, which returns as Will to Power, which is the acceptance of the World, the affirmation of Life, not its rejection and Entsagung, renunciation. Schop. intimates from the outset that ethics must be derived from metaphysics, as Kant prescribed (Grndl.d.Met.d.Sittens).
His own Basis of Morality contains a vigorous attack upon the fundamental principles of Kant's ethical theory. According to him, Kant "founds . . . his moral principle not on any provable fact of consciousness, such as an inner natural disposition, nor yet upon any objective relation of things in the external world, . . . but on pure Reason, which ... is taken, not as it really and exclusively is,an intellectual faculty of man, but as a self-existent hypostatic essence, yet without the smallest authority."^ The second

Critique inconsistently retains what was declared untenable in the 'Transcendental Dialectic', by the obvious subterfuge of raising the speculative reason into a genus, and then deducing from it a second species, practical reason,a procedure similar to that accounting for the origin of immaterial substance, and as inconsistent as it is useless in the solution of the ethical problem.^ Through the road of knowledge, through understanding and reason, we can arrive at perception and conception respectively; but cognition is always restricted to phenomena, the thing-in-itself is unknowable. G., Ill, pp. 510, 511; Basis of Morality, tr. by A. B. Bullock, London, 1903. pp. 44, 45. For a fuller discussion of this problem, cf. the writer's article on "Schopenhauer's Criticism of Kant's Theory of Ethics," The Philosophical Review, Vol. XIX, No. 5, Sept., 1910, pp. 512-5342G.. Ill, pp. SI I ff.; Bullock, pp. 45 ff. 'C/. R. Behm, Vergleichung der kantischen und schopenhauerischen Lehre in Ansehung der Kausalitdt, Heidelberg, 1892, p. 39.

The Grundprobleme der Ethik opens with the Machiavelli-Hobbesian distinction between what men ought to do and what they actually (wirklich) do. The inability of Kant to bridge the gap between the Ding an sich and Pure Reason, indeed the very formal purity of that Reason that could found its essence only upon the postulate of an all-encompassing transcendental Freedom at the end of the causal chain immanent to human intuition and the Verstand subject to rules this very gap or distinction (Unterschied) that Schop. recognized as Kants greatest contribution to metaphysics can be bridged only by the force (a fortiori) of human experience - the principle of sufficient reason, according to which the fact that something exists is the very ground or reason for its existence.
It is at this point that Schopenhauer makes what he regards as his own great contribution to philosophical thought; here it is that Schopenhauer's philosophy joins onto the Kantian, or rather springs from it as from its parent stem.^ "Upon the path of the idea one can never get beyond the idea; it is a rounded-off whole, and has in its own resources no clue leading to the nature of the thing in itself, which is toto genere different G., Ill, pp. 510, 511; Basis of Morality, tr. by A. B. Bullock, London, 1903. pp. 44, 45. For a fuller discussion of this problem, cf. the writer's article on "Schopenhauer's Criticism of Kant's Theory of Ethics," The Philosophical Review, Vol. XIX, No. 5, Sept., 1910, pp. 512-5342G.. Ill, pp. SI I ff.; Bullock, pp. 45 ff. 'C/. R. Behm, Vergleichung der kantischen und schopenhauerischen Lehre in Ansehung der Kausalitdt, Heidelberg, 1892, p. 39. EXPERIENCE AND REALITY. 65 from it. If we were merely perceiving beings, the way to the thing in itself would be absolutely cut off from us. Only the other side of our own being can disclose to us the other side of the inner being of things. This path I have followed."^ Kant is correct in holding that we are unable to arrive at the ultimate reality of things by the road of knowledge; but he then proceeds to deny the possibility of all metaphysics, thus ignoring,

in his Critique of Pure Reason, the paramount ontological significance of non-cognitive experience. iG., I. p. 638; H.K., II. p. 118. Cf. G., IV, p. lis-

The chain of causality, therefore, cannot be abstracted from a false infinity at the end of which there must be a transcendental substance or category that can com-prehend it as its toto genere op-posite (ob-ject or Gegen-stand) the freedom and reason upon which Kant wishes to erect or found both Pure Reason as the rational entity and Practical Reason as the ethical moment of Pure Reason whereby the free will is governed by rational rules that lead to the Categorical Imperative. To indulge in such abstraction is to posit unjustifiably the very conclusion that we are seeking to prove. Not only is the Categorical Imperative nowhere to be seen empirically, in reality; but also nowhere is it written: it is a delusion both empirically in terms of observable human nature and formally in terms of the internal consistency of its ethical content or Diktats. Furthermore, Kant presumes to extend the a priori synthetic from the world of physical events (where also it can be challenged as inapplicable) to that of morality. Schop has easy play of this argument a simple non sequitur. For there is no causal relation whatsoever between an action and a rule of action: one cannot be inferred apodictically from the other except as a tautology devoid of content or as vacuous exhortation (wishful thinking). Indeed, if the rule of action is defined in pure terms, it then lacks all practical content whatsoever in other words, pure reason voids practical reason of its raison detre. Pure ethics is a mirage. (See Basis, p99 to 103.)
We shall therefore with all the greater interest and curiosity await the solution of the problem he [Kant] has set himself, namely, how something is to arise out of nothing, that is,' how out of purely a priori conceptions, which contain nothing empirical or material, the laws of material human action are to grow up. (Basis, p56.) Now, had it been wished to use Reason, instead of deifying it, such assertions as these must long ago have been met by the simple remark that, if man, by virtue of a special organ, furnished by his Reason, for solving the riddle of the world, possessed an innate metaphysics that only required development ; in that 76 THE BASIS OF MORALITY. case there would have to be just as complete agreement on metaphysical matters as on the truths of arithmetic and geometry ; and this would make it totally impossible that there should exist on the earth a large number of radically different religions, and a still larger number of radically different systems of philosophy.

It is on this ground that Schop attacks the transcendental idealism of Kant (Basis, ch4). And this is where one can see the similarity with Heideggers notion of transcendental imagination as a bridge between pure intuition and understanding where the latter remains, unequivocally, a purely mechanical function that cannot be elevated to Pure Reason (see my Heideggers Kantbuch). These criticisms had already appeared in the Essay on Freedom of the Will. Kantian Practical Reason is initially the offspring of the freedom of the will, but soon under the regulative principle of Pure Reason becomes subordinated to a Logic that Schop shows is only instrumental and phenomenic that is belongs only to the Verstand/Vernunft as a mechanical application of formal reasoning (conception) to the world as Vorstellung (perception). (See Basis, ch4, c. p73, with reference to intuition and causality or sufficient reason.) Thus, pure reason pretends to arrogate to itself the right to dictate categorical imperatives that rule the conduct of the will! The dichotomy of lower heteronomous perceptive intuition and higher autonomous pure reason Schop correctly traces back to Descartess influence on Kant, a transcendental distinction rejected by Spinoza (see Note at end of Ch4 of Basis). For Schop., this is the height of imposture, the sublime Ohnmacht of the RatioOrdo the impotent pretence of moral Theology. (Heidegger makes an identical criticism without even acknowledging Schop! See my Hs Kbuch.)
NOTE. If we wish to reach the real origin of this hypothesis of Practical Reason, we must trace its descent a little further back. We shall find that it is derived ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 77 from a doctrine, which Kant totally confuted, but which nevertheless, in this connection, lies secretly (indeed he himself is not aware of it) at the root of his assumption of a Practical Reason with its Imperatives and its Autonomya reminiscence of a former mode of thought. I mean the so-called Rational Psychology, according to which man is composed of two entirely heterogeneous substances the material body, and the immaterial soul. Plato was the first to formulate this dogma, and he endeavoured to prove it as an objective truth. But it was Descartes who, by working it out with scientific exactness, perfectly developed and completed it. And this is just what brought its fallacy to light, as demonstrated by Spinoza, Locke, and Kant successively. It was demonstrated by Spinoza ; because his philosophy consists chiefly in the refutation of his master's twofold dualism, and because he entirely and expressly denied the two Substances of Descartes, and took as his main principle the following proposition : " Substantia cogitans et substantia extensa una eademque est substantia, quae jam sub hoc, jam sub illo attributo comprehenditur.''^ ^ It was demonstrated by Locke ; for he combated the theory of innate ideas, derived all knowledge from the sensuous,

and taught that it is not impossible that Matter should think. And lastly, it was demonstrated by * The thinking substance, and substance in extension are one and the self-same substance, which is contained now under the latter attribute {i.e., extension), now under the former {i.e., the attribute of thinking). Ethica, Part II.,Prop. 7. Corollary. 78 THE BASIS OF MORALITY. Kant, in his Kritik der Rationalen Psychologies as given in the first edition. Leibnitz and Wolff were the champions on the bad side ; and this brought Leibnitz the undeserved honour of being compared to the great Plato, who was really so unlike him.

Tsanoff at p65:
Nevertheless, Kant's theory of freedom, untenable though it is in its technical form, serves to indicate his realization of the inadequate and incomplete character of his epistemology and its implications. The doctrine of the transcendental freedom of man's will recognizes implicitly, Schopenhauer maintains, that in man necessity is phenomenal only, and that in him the thing-initself manifests its inner nature in the form of Will. "What, then, Kant teaches of the phenomenon of man and his action my teaching extends to all phenomena in nature, in that it makes the will as a thing-in-itself their foundation. "^ For man is not toto genere different from the rest of experience, but differs only in degree. The World as Idea is, as Kant says, purely phenomenal; but it does not exhaust reality. "As the world is in one aspect entirely idea, so in another it is entirely will. A reality which is neither of these two, but an object in itself (into which the thing in itself has unfortunately dwindled in the hands of Kant), is the phantom of a dream, and its acceptance is an ignis fatuus in philosophy."^ The path of objective knowledge does not lead us to the real nature of things, and so far Schopenhauer is in thorough agreement with Kant. But "the thing in itself can, as such, only come into consciousness quite directly, in this way, that it is itself conscious of itself; to wish to know it objectively is to desire something contradictory."* The thing-in-itself is unknowable, precisely because it is not a matter of knowledge but is in its inmost essence Will. iG., I. p. 638; H.K., II. p. 118. Cf. G., IV, p. 115 2G.. II, pp. 201-202; H.K., II, p. 377. 'G., I, p. 3S; H.K.. I, p. 5 *G., II, p. 227; H.K.. II, p. 405.

It follows quite obviously that when Schop is asking Kant for the e-vidence, the observability of his Moral Law, he is already placing Kants Ethics fuori giuoco, off-side, by asking the impossible: the scientific demonstration of a deontological rule. Kant, for his part, had made the opposite error: the petitio principii of do what is moral because it is moral, whence Schops objection rifled from the outset: Who tells you? (ch2, Basis), or where is it inscribed? (P52, ch4, Basis) But from this point morality can only be understood as praxis, because we too can ask Schop why must

morality be written somewhere or be a physical or natural observable and e-vident reality? We cannot turn Kants Freedom (the will) into Necessity (the Categorical Imperative, which is another version of reciprocity or lex commutativa, as Schop shows on p85): but the will must be applied and there is a judgement we must make on how to do this whereby we do not turn the freedom of the will (poter volere) into another necessity (volere potere). An obligation that is absolute is a contradictio in adjecto (Basis, pp32-3) because it turns heteronomy (obligation, something external and constraining the will) into autonomy (a free decision of the will), whereby the free will constrains itself! And so goes the circulus vitiosus.
The ancients, then, equally with the moderns, Plato being the single exception, agree in making virtue only a means to an end. Indeed, strictly speaking, even Kant banished Eudaemonism from Ethics more in appearance than in reality, for between virtue and happiness he still leaves a certain mysterious connection; there is an obscure and difficult passage in his doctrine of the Highest Good, where they occur together ; while it is a patent fact that the course of virtue runs entirely counter to that of happiness. But, passing over this, we may say that with Kant the ethical principle appears as something quite independent of experience and its teaching ; it is transcendental, or metaphysical. He recognises that human conduct possesses a significance that oversteps all possibility of experience, and is therefore actually the bridge leading to that which he calls the "intelligible " ^ world, the mundus noumenon^ the world of Things in themselves. The fame, which the Kantian Ethics has won, is due not only to this higher level, which it reached, Vorstellung, that is, The World as Will and Idea ; " Idea" being used much as eibaXov sometimes is (cf. Xen. Sym., 4, 21), in the sense of "an image in the mind," " a mental picture." {Translator.)] ' It seems better to keep this technical word than to attempt a cumbrous periphrasis. The meaning is perfectly clear. The sensibilia {phaenomena) are opposed to the intelligibilia (noumena), which compose the transcendental world. So the individual, in so far as he is a phaenomenon, has an empirical character ; in so far as he is a noumenon, his character is intelligible {intelligibilis). The mundus intelligibilis, or mundus noumenon is the Kocrfxos noetos of New Platonism.(Translator.) PRELIMINAKY REMARKS. 25 but also to the moral purity and loftiness of its conclusions. Kant's proton pseudos (first false step) lies in his conception of Ethics itself, and this is found very

clearly expressed on page 62 (R., p. 54) : " In a system of practical philosophy we are not concerned with adducing reasons for that which takes place, but with formulating laws regarding that which ought to take place, even if it never does take place." This is at once a distinct petitio principii. Who tells you that there are laws to which our conduct ought to be subject ? Who tells you that that ought to take place, which in fact never does take place ? What justification have you for making this assumption at the outset, and consequently for forcing upon us, as the only possible one, a system of Ethics couched in the imperative terms of legislation ? I say, in contradistinction to Kant, that the student of Ethics, and no less the philosopher in general, must content himself with explaining and interpreting that which is given, in other words, that which really is, or takes place, so as to obtain an understanding of it, and I maintain furthermore that there is plenty to do in this direction, much more than has hitherto been done, after the lapse 28THE IMPERATIVE FORM OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 29 of thousands of years. Every obligation derives all sense and meaning simply and solely from its relation to threatened punishment or promised reward. Hence, long before Kant was thought of, Locke says : " For since it would be utterly in vain, to suppose a rule set to the free actions of man, without annexing to it some enforcement of good and evil to determine his will ; we must, wherever we suppose a law, suppose also some reward or punishment annexed to that law {Essay on the Human Understanding, Bk. II., ch. 33, 6). What ought to be done is therefore necessarily conditioned by punishment or reward ; consequently, to use Kant's language, it is essentially and inevitably THE IMPERATIVE FORM OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS. 33 hypothetical, and never, as he maintains, categorical. If we think away these conditions, the conception of obligation becomes void of sense ; hence absolute obligation is most certainly a contradictio in adjecto. A commanding voice, whether it come from within, or from without, cannot possibly be imagined except as threatening or promising. Consequently obedience to it, which may be wise or foolish according to circumstances, is yet always actuated by selfishness, and therefore morally worthless. The complete unthinkableness and nonsense of this conception of an unconditioned obligation, which lies at the root of the Kantian Ethics, appears later in the system itself, namely in the Kritik der Praktiscken Vernunft: just as some concealed poison

in an organism cannot remain hid, but sooner or later must come out and show itself. For this obligation, said to be so unconditioned, nevertheless postulates more than one condition in the background ; it assumes a rewarder, a reward, and the immortality of the person to be rewarded. This is of course unavoidable, if one really makes Duty and Obligation the fundamental conception of Ethics ; for these ideas are essentially relative, and depend for their significance on the threatened penalty or the promised reward. The guerdon which is assumed to be in store for virtue shows clearly enough that only in appearance she works for nothing. It is, however, put forward modestly veiled, under the name of the Highest Good, which is the union of Virtue and Happiness. But this is at bottom nothing else but a morality that derives its origin from 34 THE BASIS OF MORALITY, Happiness, which means, a morality resting on selfishness. In other words, it is Eudaemonism, which Kant had solemnly thrust out of the front door of his system as an intruder, only to let it creep in again by the postern under the name of the Highest Good. This is how the assumption of unconditioned absolute obligation, concealing as it does a contradiction, avenges itself. Conditioned obligation, on the other hand, cannot of course be any first principle for Ethics, since everything done out of regard for reward or punishment is necessarily an egoistic transaction, and as such is without any real moral value. All this makes it clear that a nobler and wider view of Ethics is needed, if we are in earnest about our endeavour to truly account for the significance of human conducta significance which extends beyond phaenomena and is eternal.

Metaphysical Foundation of Ethics Ch7: Schops discussion of the link between ethics and metaphysics, before he undertakes the foundations of ethics in Part 3, are described so tersely in Ch7 as to make this possibly the best summary of his philosophy I have encountered; thus, it is important to sift through it carefully.
The strict and absolute necessity of the acts of Will, determined by motives as they arise, was first shown by Hobbes, then by Spinoza, and Hume, and also by Dietrich von Holbach in his Systeme de la Nature ; and lastly by Priestley it was most completely and precisely demonstrated. This point, indeed, has been so clearly proved, and placed beyond ' V. Note on " intelligible " in Chapter I. of this Part. {Translator.)

115 116 THE BASIS OF MORALITY, all doubt, that it must be reckoned among the number of perfectly established truths, and only crass ignorance could continue to speak of a freedom, of a liberum arbitrium indifferentiae (a free and indifferent choice) in the individual acts of men. Nor did Kant, owing to the irrefutable reasoning of his predecessors, hesitate to consider the Will as fast bound in the chains of Necessity, the matter admitting, as he thought, of no further dispute or doubt. This is proved by all the passages in which he speaks of freedom only from the theoretical standpoint. Nevertheless, it is true that our actions are attended with a consciousness of independence and original initiative, which makes us recognise them as our own work, and every one with ineradicable certainty feels that he is the real author of his conduct, and morally responsible for it. But since responsibility implies the possibility of having acted otherwise, which possibility means freedom in some sort or manner; therefore in the consciousness of responsibility is indirectly involved also the consciousness of freedom. The key to resolve the contradiction, that thus arises out of the nature of the case, was at last found by Kant through the distinction he drew with profound acumen, between phaenomena and the Thing in itself (das Ding an sich). This distinction is the very core of his whole philosophy, and its greatest merit.

Schop sees a contradiction: man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains. Again we find here Hobbess in foro interno and externo distinction the Cartesian inheritance. But, as we will see, it is Schops trans-mutation of Kants distinction that will enable him to dis-card the Cartesian ego (oops!). Objectively, human actions can be described casuistically, either in mechanical manner or else in terms of conditioning. The operari can be described objectively, behaviouristically or positively (Comte) so that the principle of sufficient reason applies. The motives behind the operari are knowable, discernible even manipulable, if so wished. And yet we know that at the source of this operari must lie an ultimate cause that is impossible to identify, either empirically or even (contra Kant) a priori. The reason is that this ultimate cause must be toto genere, toto caelo different from the causal chain of events, the sufficient reason. This is what lies behind the Scholastic operari sequitur esse in other words, actions follow being. This is so because the totality of the causal chain cannot be comprehended through yet another link in the chain (an elephant or camel on the back of which the world rests) or what Heidegger would style as an intra-mundane or intratemporal, therefore spatial, cause. There is an antinomy (here comes Lukacs)

between Freedom and Necessity, which Schop incorrectly calls a contradiction almost in a Hegelian sense. If everything is determined, what determines the determined? For Schop, the greatness of Kant, the greatest merit of his entire philosophy [consists in drawing] the distinction between phaenomena and the Ding an sich. Kant does not, like Aristotle, nominate a causa causans, because that would be to pose as meta-taphysika an original source (a pleonasm), a primus inter pares of beings, which is a bad infinite. We need not (!) a Fichtean projectio per hiatus irrationalem, but rather a veritable force or spring, the esse, of this causal chain a source that is the causal chain (Heideggers pure now-sequence) but intuited ec-statically, as beingoutside-itself. And this is precisely how that esse is to be under-stood, comprehended. The esse is the nature of the operari but it is not another being, it is not another link. Rather, it is the being of being, the dimension of being, its horizon.
The individual, with his immutable, innate character, strictly determined in all his modes of expression by the law of Causality, which, as acting through the medium of the intellect, is here called by the THE INTELLIGIBLE AND EMPIRICAL CHARACTER. 117 name of Motivation,the individual so constituted is only the phaenomenon (Erscheinung). The Thing in itself which underlies this phaenomenon is outside of Time and Space, consequently free from all succession and plurality, one, and changeless. Its constitution in itself is the intelligible character, which is equally present in all the acts of the individual, and stamped on every one of them, like the impress of a signet on a thousand seals. The empirical character of the phaenomenonthe character which manifests itself in time, and in succession of actsis thus determined by the intelligible character ; and consequently, the individual, as phaenomenon, in all his modes of expression, which are called forth by motives, must show the invariableness of a natural law. Whence it results that all his actions are governed by strict necessity.

Not Motivation, then, explains human behaviour, but character, which is as inscrutable and impenetrable as nay, it is the Thing in itself! Whereas Kant identified the Ding an sich with the Ob-ject, Schop has turned it into a transcendental Sub-ject with a special character. Kant had derived the Subject from the need for Freedom to comprehend Necessity, because Necessity in-vokes Freedom. And this Freedom is the very Ratio, the Pure Reason, that makes possible the a priori synthetic judgements derived from our pure intuition and are filtered through the understanding. Pure Reason is the rule-making faculty that is conscious of its ability to make rules, and that is therefore auto-nomous because subject only to its own rules, to Logic. The Ding an sich therefore is the Ob-ject that is perceptible only as phenomena that are regulated ultimately by rules emanating from Pure Reason.

It is here that Schop departs from this antinomic triumvirate, this unholy trinity (all good things come in threes, he quipped in WWR) the Subject, the Object, and the Phenomena.
The theory itself, and the whole question regarding the nature of Freedom, can be better understood if we view them in connection with a general truth, which I think, is most concisely expressed by a formula frequently occurring in the scholastic writings : Operari sequitur esse. In other words, everything in the world operates in accordance with what it is, in accordance with its inherent nature, in which, consequently, all its modes of expression are already contained potentially, while actually they are manifested when elicited by external causes ; so that external causes are the means whereby the essential constitution of the thing is * I.e., What is done is a consequence of that which is. THE INTELLIGIBLE AND EMPIRICAL CHARACTER. 119 revealed. And the modes of expression so resulting form the empirical character ; whereas its hidden, ultimate basis, which is inaccessible to experience, is the intelligible character, that is, the real nature 'per se of the particular thing in question. Man forms no exception to the rest of nature ; he too has a changeless character, which, however, is strictly individual and different in each case. This character is of course empirical as far as we can grasp it, and therefore only phaenomenal ; while the intelligible character is whatever may be the real nature in itself of the person. His actions one and all, being, as regards their external constitution, determined by motives, can never be shaped otherwise than in accordance with the unchangeable individual character. As a man is, so he his bound to act. Hence for a given person in every single case, there is absolutely only one way of acting possible : Operari sequitur esse.

The Kantian Ding an sich, then, is not the Ob-ject. It is the intelligible character of the empirical objectification, of the operari and of the World, so that now the Ding an sich is no longer a Thing: it is an entity a force that comes from within ex-perience, that ob-jectifies and extrinsic-ates itself in the world; it is something outside Time and Space because it originates with them! This would be the equivalent of Kants transcendental subject were it not for the fact that it is not a Subject, not an entelechy or an essent or even a faculty: it is a force, a Welt-prinzip; it is Life as a force; it is the Will. It follows that there is no hiatus or chasm or lacuna between Subject and Object and that therefore Phenomena or Representations are not images or aspects of the Object as perceived by the Subject but are instead objectifications of the Will itself they

are a subject-object unity. No Object or Reality stands behind the phenomena. Instead, the phenomena are the actuality (Wirklichkeit), the manifestation of the Will. That is how human activity can be both free and responsible and necessary and motivated at one and the same time. (Again, no contradiction, in the Kantian conception; it was merely an antinomy.)
Freedom belongs only to the intelligible character, not to the empirical. The operari (conduct) of a given individual is necessarily determined externally by motives, internally by his character ; therefore everything that he does necessarily takes place. But in his esse (i.e., in what he is), there, we find Freedom. He might have been something different ; and guilt or merit attaches to that which he is. All that he does follows from what he is, as a mere corollary. Through Kant's doctrine we are freed from the primary error of connecting Necessity with esse (what one is), and Freedom with operari (what one does) ; we ' I.e., his acts are a consequence of what he is. 120 THE BASIS OF MORALITY. become aware that this is a misplacement of terms, and that exactly the inverse arrangement is the true one. Hence it is clear that the moral responsibility of a man, while it first of all, and obviously, of course, touches what he does, yet at bottom touches what he is ; because, what he is being the original datum, his conduct, as motives arise, could never take any other course than that which it actually does take.

To the extent that the awareness of the autonomy of esse is recognized, the Kantian perspective applies: whereas before it was in the realm of action, in the operari, that freedom was located, whilst the nature or character or essence (esse, Wesen) was interpreted as necessity, as determinant, now instead it is the former that is necessary or conditioned and the latter that is free or unconditioned, not even regulated a priori.
So that it is the esse (what one is) which in reality is accused by conscience, while the operari (what one does) supplies the incriminating evidence. Since we are only conscious of Freedom through the sense of responsibility; therefore where the latter lies the former must THEORY OF FREEDOM. 121 also be ; in the esse (in one's being). It is the operari (what one does) that is subject to necessity. But we can only get to know ourselves, as well as others empirically ; we have no a priori knowledge of our character.

But this is where the analogy with Kant ends because Kant never distinguishes between the transcendental subject and mechanical action: the one is the subject of the

other. In Schop, on the contrary, there is no Subject to take this responsibility: there is only a sense of responsibility, but no actual identification of an authorial entity that assumes it. So when Schop claims that it is through Kants doctrine that we reach this inversion, he is really saying that Kants doctrine (the distinction between Ding an sich and phenomenon) has allowed him to reach this inversion but only by radically redirecting Kants distinction inwards toward the sentient organs, past pure intuition and into the Will! In a Note on The Theory of Freedom, Schop elucidates the scope of his inversion and, in the process, gives us an insight in his thinking process and a delightful link with Heidegger:
He who is capable of recognising the essential part of a thought, though clothed in a dress very different from what he is familiar with, will see, as I do, that this Kantian doctrine of the intelligible and empirical character is a piece of insight already possessed by Plato. The difference is, that with Kant it is sublimated to an abstract clearness ; with Plato it is treated mythically, and connected with metempsychosis [in that the soul chooses which body to inhabit], because, as he did not perceive the ideality of Time, he could only represent it under a temporal form.

This is extremely interesting: for we can see how Heidegger had simply to stand outside this temporal form and hypostatize time as the horizon of the Will or the Platonic soul, so that now these are transmuted into Da-sein, that is, pure intuition in the horizon of time, being understood not as temporal form intra-temporally but as outside itself, as ec-static being, as ec-sistence, being there. But by confining himself strictly to this horizon of time, Heidegger avoids all the problems that entangle Schop immediately. First and foremost, how can the Will objectify itself? Second, what differentiates the Will in its worldly objectifications? Third, how can the Will lack identity or agency and stil be active? Fourth, is the Will then not yet another qualitas occulta? Egoism as manifestation of the Will If indeed the empirical or observable side of human action can form the basis [Grundwerke] of morality, if the Will is unobservable yet knowable intuitively as the qualitas occulta, the life-force or impetus behind its objectification as the world, it follows that our theory of ethics cannot start from quod homines facere debeant, but rather from quod facere solent. The Kantian Sollen and the Moral Theology to which it gives rise disappear from view we are led back to the perspective of Machiavelli and Hobbes.
The objection will perhaps be raised that Ethics is not concerned with what men actually do, but

that it is the science which treats of what their conduct ought to be. Now this is exactly the position 148 THE BASIS OF MORALITY. which I deny. In the critical part of the present treatise I have sufficiently demonstrated that the conception of ought, in other words, the imperative form of Ethics, is valid only in theological morals, outside of which it loses all sense and meaning. The end which I place before Ethical Science is to point out all the varied moral lines of human conduct ; to explain them ; and to trace them to their ultimate source. Consequently there remains no way of discovering the basis of Ethics except the empirical.

Now, the objective historical observation of human beings leads us to the conclusion that what keeps human beings from harming one another is the overwhelming force of the State: take away the State and all the moral rules and ethical standards quickly fall apart, revealing a desolate landscape of aggression, the Hobbesian bellum omnium contra omnes: In describing Egoism as the overriding motivation empirically observable as inducing human action, Schop offers us at the same time the most dramatic description of the operari of the Will:
The chief and fundamental incentive in man, as in animals, is Egoism, that is, the urgent impulse to exist, and exist under the best circumstances. Now this Egoism is, both in animals and men, connected in the closest way with their very essence and being ; indeed, it is one and the same thing. For this reason all human actions, as a rule, have their origin in Egoism, and to it, accordingly, we must always first turn, when we try to find the explanation of any given line of conduct ; just as, when the endeavour is made to guide a man in any direction, the means to this end are universally calculated with reference to the same all-powerful motive. Egoism is, from its nature, limitless. The individual is filled with the unqualified desire of preserving his life, and of keeping it free from all pain, under which is included all want and privation. He wishes to have the greatest possible amount of pleasurable existence, and every gratification that he is capable of appreciating ; indeed, he attempts, if possible, to evolve fresh capacities for enjoyment. Everything that opposes the strivings of his Egoism awakens his dislike, his anger, his hate : this is the mortal enemy, which he tries to annihilate.

It appears from this that Schop is no longer basing himself on empirical observation, but rather is extrapolating from his original metaphysical intuition of the Ding an sich as the Will to live. It is the introspectivity of this intuition and its temporal form that makes it solipsistic. Because the Will is inscrutable and unobservable, only intelligible, it follows that its objectification is boundless, unlimited that its lan can be checked only by other Wills to live manifesting themselves as the world. It follows that the only limit to the objectification of the Will is posed by contrary Wills.
... The ultimate reason of this lies in the fact that every one is directly conscious of himself, but of others only indirectly, through his mind's eye ; and the direct impression asserts its right. In other words, it is in consequence of the subjectivity which is essential to our consciousness that each person is himself the whole world ; for all that is objective exists only indirectly, as simply the mental picture of the subject ; whence it comes about that everything is invariably expressed in terms of self-consciousness.

There is a certain looseness in Schops terminology. We must distinguish between the mental or intellectual ability of individuals as a manifestation of the Will and the Will itself. They are two different things in that the Will is a force, an impetus, an lan it must not be confused with a subject or an ego or with self-consciousness. These objectifications may induce in the body a sense of identity, but in fact this identity is only a by-product of the objectification, of the phenomenality of the Will in the world constituted by other Wills which pose a limit to its objectification.
The only world which the individual really grasps, and of which he has certain knowledge, he carries in himself, as a mirrored image fashioned by his brain ; and he is, therefore, its centre. Consequently he is all in all to himself ; and since he ANTIMORAL INCENTIVES. 153 feels that he contains within his ego all that is real, nothing can be of greater importance to him than his own self.^ Moreover this supremely important self, this microcosm, to which the macrocosm stands in relation as its mere modification or accident,this, which is the individual's whole world, he knows perfectly well must be destroyed by death ; which is therefore for him equivalent to the destruction of all things. Such, then, are the elements out of which, on the basis of the Will to live, Egoism grows up, and like a broad trench it forms a perennial separation between man and man.

The necessary outcome is that each individual (body) must be restrained by an external force from the threat of mutual annihilation:
Now, unless 154 THE BASIS OF MORALITY.

external force (under which must be included every source of fear whether of human or superhuman powers), or else the real moral incentive is in effective operation, it is certain that Egoism always pursues its purposes with unqualified directness ; hence without these checks, considering the countless number of egoistic individuals, the bellum omnium contra omnes ^ would be the order of the day, and prove the ruin of all. Thus is explained the early construction by reflecting reason of state government, which, arising, as it does, from a mutual fear of reciprocal violence, obviates the disastrous consequences of the general Egoism, as far as it is possible to do by negative procedure.

Of course, Schop fails to explain how this reflecting reason can manage the early construction of state government. In this we see the inferiority of Schops theoretical construct to Hobbess, superior for its theorization of the alienation of individual freedom, its subtler empiricist theory of the self, and more scientific mechanicism, and the historical antecedent of civil war in the status naturae prior to the status civilis. Schops negative procedure (part of the negatives Denken) still serves to highlight the hypothetical status of the bellum civium and the conventional early construction of the State. But whereas his construction is exclusively conventional, Hobbes manages to present his Commonwealth as a historical state by acquisition precisely by combining the Necessity of self-interest with the forum internum of reason in the willful alienation of Freedom in the ultima ratio of self-preservation. This is something Schops Will and his critique of Freedom cannot do (cf Cacciari, DCP, p64). Now, the early construction involves two elements: reflecting reason, which represents Egoism guided into self-interest, and the assumption of possession into this early construction of state government, which is the status civilis.
The term Eigennutz (self-interest) denotes Egoism, so far as the latter is guided by reason, which enables it, by means of reflection, to prosecute its purposes system150ANTIMORAL INCENTIVES. 151 atically; so that animals may be called egoistic, but not self-interested (eigennutzig). I shall therefore retain the word Egoism for the general idea.

Schop next tackles the question of property rights, and he seems to follow Hobbes once again:
In point of fact, the general correctness of conduct which is adopted in human intercourse, and insisted on as a rule no less immovable than the hills, depends principally on two external necessities ; first, on legal ordinance, by virtue of which the rights of every man are protected by public authority ; and secondly,

on the recognised need of possessing civil honour, -in other words, a good name, in order to advance in the world. Such are the two custodians that keep guard on the correct conduct of people, without which, to speak frankly, we should be in a sad case, especially with reference to property, this central point in human life, around which the chief part of its energy and 138 THE BASIS OF MORALITY. activity revolves. For the purely ethical motives to integrity, assuming that they exist, cannot as a rule be applied, except very indirectly, to the question of ownership as guaranteed by the state. These motives, in fact, have a direct and essential bearing only on natural right ; with positive right their connection is merely indirect, in so far as the latter is based on the former. Natural right, however, attaches to no other property than that which has been gained by one's own exertion ; because, when this is seized, the owner is at the same time robbed of all the efforts he expended in acquiring it. The theory of preoccupancy I reject absolutely, but cannot here set forth its refutation.^ Now of course all estate based on positive right ought ultimately and in the last instance (it matters not how many intermediate links are involved) to rest on the natural right of possession. But what a distance there is, in most cases, between the title deeds, that belong to our civil life, and this natural righttheir original source !

But then, how can altruistic or compassionate behaviour be explained? For this also is observable:
But, for this to be possible, I must in some way or other be identified with him ; that is, the difference between myself and him, which is the precise raison d'etre of my Egoism, must be removed, at least to a certain 170 THE BASIS OF MORALITY. extent. Now, since I do not live in his skin, there remains only the knowledge, that is, the mental picture, I have of him, as the possible means whereby I can so far identify myself with him, that my action declares the difference to be practically effaced. The process here analysed is not a dream, a fancy floating in the air ; it is perfectly real, and by no means infrequent. It is, what we see every day,the phaenomenon of Compassion ; in other words, the direct participation, independent of all ulterior considerations, in the sufferings of another, leading to sympathetic assistance in the effort to prevent or remove them ; whereon in the last resort all satisfaction and all

well-being and happiness depend. It is this Compassion alone which is the real basis of all voluntary justice and all genuine loving-kindness. Only so far as an action springs therefrom, has it moral value ; and all conduct that proceeds from any other motive whatever has none.

So the question now turns on how this difference or wall between persons that is constituted by Egoism can be removed.
No doubt this operation is astonishing, indeed hardly comprehensible. It is, in fact, the great mystery of Ethics, its original phaenomenon, and the boundary stone, past which only transcendental speculation may dare to take a step. Herein we see the wall of partition, which, according to the light of nature (as reason is called by old theologians), entirely separates being from being, broken down, and the non-ego to THE ONLY TRUE MORAL INCENTIVE. 171 a certain extent identified with the ego. I wish for the moment to leave the metaphysical explanation of this enigma untouched, and first to inquire whether all acts of voluntary justice and true loving kindness really arise from it. If so, our problem will be solved, for we shall have found the ultimate basis of morality, and shown that it lies in human nature itself. This foundation, however, in its turn cannot form a problem of Ethics, but rather, like every other ultimate fact as such, of Metaphysics. Only the solution, that the latter offers of the primary ethical phaenomenon, lies outside the limits of the question put by the Danish Royal Society, which is concerned solely with the basis ; so that the transcendental explanation can be given merely as a voluntary and unessential appendix.

Thus, the breaching of the wall of partition separating ego from non-ego is possible: but the possibility can be accounted for only by metaphysics, not by ethics. The scope of ethics starts from its basis, and the basis lies in human nature. All that matters for ethics is that the source of certain ethical behaviour can be established empirically. But the foundation of that source is to be found in metaphysics. Negatives Denken to Political Economy
173 Whereas the nature of satisfaction, of enjoyment, of happiness, and the like, consists solely in the fact that a hardship is done away with, a pain lulled : whence their effect is negative. We thus see why need or desire is the condition of every pleasure.

This is the core of the negatives Denken. If the Weltprinzip is indeed the Will, the WeltSchmerz, and the ultimate and limitless force behind human operari is represented by its esse, the Will, then it follows that the objectification or manifestation of this Will, its operari can only be a manifestation of Egoism. Therefore, the wall of partition separating ego from non-ego must entail the non-creativeness of the operari, its inability to serve as a dialectic of human need leading to the trans-formation of the world in a constructive ethical and pro-ductive sense. Not only is the Summum Bonum, the Good, the Kantian Practical Reason why, even the Divinity, God! not only are these impossible, but also the very positive content of Value is negated in that Value, the Arbeit, becomes pure Negative, sheer Egoism that at best can be equaled consciously with the identification or sympathy of the ego with the non-ego through the common (Mit) feeling of Pain (Leid) namely, through Compassion (Mit-Leid). This is the true meaning of negatives Denken. All Values become negative because they must start from the Egoistic satisfaction of individual needs and desires that cannot in any way give rise to comm-union, to com-unitas, to species-conscious being or to dialectical self-consciousness that extrinsicates the Idea (Reason) in the world. Foolish to insist on the Subject. Senseless to invoke the Ratio and Logic except as instrumental reason. Ir-rational Irr-tum, Error to insist on a Ratio-Ordo for the world a telos, a conatus, a humanity that goes beyond the mere feeling of Co-Pain (play on Fr. co-pain, friend) intended as Mit-Leid, Com-passion (Lt. patire, suffer). The biggest victim of this over-turning of the traditional Ethics and Metaphysics of the philosophia perennis from prima philosophia to Scholastic theology has to be their historical institutional expression Christianity. Nietzsches invective begins here. (We will see that Schop ultimately falls back on this Idea as a Platonic notion in the Entsagung of the Will and its sublimation in Nirvana which evoked Nietzsches derision of decadent pessimism. But the force of Schops inversion and upsetting and bouleversement, sconvolgimento of all hitherto known philosophia perennis is as devastatingly thoroughgoing as it is thoroughly dis-concerting.) The operari of the Will is the mechanical, empirical and therefore necessary objectification of a force, an impetus that cannot be quelled or extinguished. Consequently, its activity or actuality, its Wirk-lichkeit, its objectification as operari, its actus is end-less in that its every attain-ment is necessarily only momentary and by no means final: it is merely negative because it is inexhaustible. In its pure unalloyed and undifferentiated Egoism, the Will has neither a purpose nor a finality its only aim it to satisfy its being or nature as desire. But this force or impetus is the Will as Ding an sich, as the other side, the beyond of consciousness and the Self: therefore it is the qualitas occulta that is unknowable though detectable, unquenchable though intelligible. Its every act then is the out-come of an unfathomable drive: and as a result it must be experienced by consciousness as privation, as negation, as need, as suffering, as pain (Leid). Every operari, the Arbeit, is not the creation of positive wealth therefore, but rather the negation, the extinction of a need, of a desire, of a drive. The Arbeit, because it is an operari, is not in the realm of Freedom but in that of Necessity, its Motivation is

dictated by its character. What is positive is not the operari, but the world that it works, that it utilizes, that it annihilates, that it consumes. The Arbeit does not pro-duce, because it utilizes the world as it finds it. Instead, it merely transforms so as to satisfy a desire, a need. Therefore, the Arbeit is a consumption of existing values: it is folly to believe that it creates or pro-duces value. Value is in the thing that Arbeit uses, that it ad-operates (ad-operari), and in the out-come or pro-duct of this consumption or use or ad-operation, not in the operari itself, not in the Arbeit! It is the thing, the tools and the matter that the Will works to quench its desire and quell its need it is these that have utility. Labour does not have utility but it is an operari that consumes matter: in return, it is rewarded with the utility of the pro-duct. The exchange is between the utility of the materials that labour consumes and the marginal product that results from this consumption paid as wages to compensate for the dis-utility of labour. Those who possess utility can exchange it with labour so as to satisfy their Will; those who do not possess utility need to apply, to ex-ercise, to ad-operate the Arbeit so as to obtain the utility of its marginal product to satisfy their desires or their needs. It follows that labour has dis-utility, it is the negative of utility, just as utility is the positive gratification of negative need, desire objectified in the body by the Will. Capital represents the deferral of gratification; it is a saving of utility as deferred consumption; it is a sacrifice, a renunciation. Its marginal product repays its owner with interest, that is, the utility that equals the deferred consumption of the utility of capital. Labour, the operari, is by contrast the immediate gratification of need. It is absurd to speak of the marginal utility of labour: at most one could speak of the marginal product of labour! What is meant instead is the utility of the marginal product of the capital consumed by labour (otherwise known as wages) that rewards and extinguishes its dis-utility, its effort, its Leid. Where utility and need meet, where they equate each other, there is an extinguishment of both: the two nullify each other. That point is Nirvana, the extinguishment of need, the satisfaction of all needs (Robbins) - in other words, equi-librium.
From the foregoing considerations we see that in the single acts of the just man Compassion works only indirectly through his formulated principles, and not so much actu as potentia ; much in the same way as in statics the greater length of one of the scale beams, owing to its greater power of motion, balances the smaller weight attached to it with the larger on the other side, and works, while at rest, only potentia, not actu ; yet with the same efficiency.

It is the potentia that belongs to the sphere of freedom, and the actus that stands in that of necessity: just as capital or saving is the potential the utility that will then be acted upon, operated and worked by the (needy) Arbeit that is the Leid or pain or need to be satisfied by consuming capital! Continuing the analogy, it is in Nirvana or at equi-librium that the potentia is at its full and the actus is therefore imperceptible there is no movement, no Dynamik, merely Statik, and therefore

stagnation. (On stagnation in Schump and Keynes, see one of the essays in MarxKeynes-Schump collection.)
It will now be seen that injustice or wrong always consists in working harm on another. Therefore the conception of wrong is positive, and antecedent to the conception of right, which is negative, and simply denotes the actions performable without injury to others ; in other words, without wrong being done. That to this class belongs also whatever is effected with no other object than that of warding off from oneself meditated mischief is an easy inference. For no participation in another's interests, and no sympathy for him, can require me to let myself be harmed by him, that is, to undergo wrong.(P183) The theory that right is negative, in contradistinction to wrong as positive, we find supported by Hugo Grotius, the father of philosophical jurisprndence. The definition of justice which he gives at the beginning of his work, De Jure Belli et Pads (Bk. I., chap. 1., 3), runs as follows : Jus hie nihil aliud^ quam quod justum est, significat, idque negante magis sensu, quam aiente, utjus sit, quod injustum non est} The negative character of justice is also established, little as it may appear, even by the familiar formula : "Give to each one his own." Now, there is no need to give a man his own, if he has it. The real meaning is therefore : " Take from none his own." Since the requirements of justice are only negative, they may be effected by coercion ; for the Neminem ' Justice here denotes nothing else than that which is just, and this, rather in a negative than in a positive sense ; so that what is not unjust is to be regarded as justice. 184 THE BASIS OF MORALITY. laede can be practised by all alike. The coercive apparatus is the state, whose sole raison d'etre is to protect its subjects, individually from each other, and collectively from external foes. It is true that a fewGerman would-be philosophers of this venal age wish to distort the state into an institution for the spread of morality, education, and edifying instruction. But such a view contains, lurking in the background, the Jesuitical aim of doing away with personal freedom and individual development, and of making men mere wheels in a huge Chinese governmental and religious machine. And this is the road that once led to Inquisitions, to Autos-da-fe, and religious wars. Frederick the Great showed that he at least never wished to tread it, when he said : " In my land every one shall care for his own salvation, as he himself thinks best." Nevertheless, we still see everywhere

(with the more apparent than real exception of North America) that the state undertakes to provide for the metaphysical needs of its members.

In the passage above we can virtually encapsulate the entirety of liberal thought. This is indeed the summit of Political Economy, the balance of the Political (the liberal State of Law) and the Economic, the equilibrium of demand and supply in the selfregulating market governed by the private egoistic self-interest of personal freedom and individual development! Here is the civil society, the burgerliche Gesellschaft, that reconciles the positive rights of citizens with the protection of the negative do-no-harm sphere of bourgeois self-interest.
We have seen that " wrong " and " right " are convertible synonyms of " to do harm " and " to ' There is no more efficient instrument in ruling the masses than superstition. Without this they have no self-control; they are brutish ; they are changeable ; but once they are caught by some vain form of religion, they lend a more willing ear to its soothsayers than to their own leaders. THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE. 185 refrain from doing it," and that under " right " is included the warding off of injury from oneself. It will be obvious that these conceptions are independent of, and antecedent to, all positive legislation. There is, therefore, a pure ethical right, or natural right, and a pure doctrine of right, detached from all positive statutes. The first principles of this doctrine have no doubt an empirical origin, so far as they arise from the idea of harm done, but per se they rest on the pure understanding, which a priori furnishes ready to hand the axiom : causa causae est causa effectus. (The cause of a cause is the cause of the effect.) Taken in this connection the words mean : if any one desires to injure me, it is not I, but he, that is the cause of whatever I am obliged to do in self-defence ; and I can consequently oppose all encroachments on his part, without wronging him. The Doctrine of Right is a branch of Ethics, whose function is to determine those actions which may not be performed, unless one wishes to injure others, that is, to be guilty of wrong-doing ; and here the active part played is kept in view. But legislation applies this chapter of moral science conversely, that is, with reference to the passive side of the question, and declares that the same actions need not be endured, since no one ought to have wrong inflicted on him. To frustrate such conduct the state constructs the complete edifice of the law, as positive Right. Its intention is that no one shall suffer wrong ; the intention of the Doctrine of Moral Right is that no one shall do

wrong.^(P186)

The empirical, observable basis of Ethics is therefore self-defence or self-preservation. Whereas Kant teaches do what is moral because it is moral, and Hegel teaches do what is moral because it reconciles (Versohnung) conflicting interests, Schop teaches do whatever preserves your self-interest. But the question arises, how do I determine where my self-interest ends and those of others begins? How can the State, by positive law, mediate individual self-interest? Obviously, the task is impossible unless we can impose a limit to egoisms by means of reflective reason: Schop requires an almost selfevident approach to the de-finition of self-interest or enlightened egoism, which only Political Economy can give and on which the State of positive law can be erected.
It is asserted that beasts have no rights ; the illusion is harboured that our conduct, so far as they are concerned, has no moral significance, or, as it is put in the language of these codes, that " there are no duties to be fulfilled towards animals." Such a view is one of revolting coarseness, a barbarism of the West, whose source is Judaism. In philosophy, however, it rests on the assumption, despite all evidence to the contrary, of the radical difference between man and beast, a doctrine which, as is well known, was proclaimed with more trenchant emphasis by Descartes than by any one else : it was indeed the necessary consequence of his mistakes. When Leibnitz and Wolff, following out the Cartesian view, built up out of abstract ideas their Rational Psychology, and constructed a deathless anima rationalis (rational soul) ; then the natural claims of the animal kingdom visibly rose up against this exclusive privilege, this human patent of immortality, and Nature, as always in such circumstances, entered her silent protest.(P218) Those persons must indeed be totally blind, or else completely chloroformed by the foetor Judaicus (Jewish stench), who do not discern that the truly essential and fundamental part in man and beast is identically the same thing. That which distinguishes the one from the other does not lie in the primary and original principle, in the inner nature, in the kernel of the two phaenomena (this kernel being in both alike the Will of the individual) ; it is found in what is secondary, in the intellect, in the degree of perceptive capacity. It is true that the latter is incomparably higher in man, by reason of his added faculty of abstract knowledge, called Reason ; nevertheless this superiority is traceable solely to a greater cerebral development, in other words, to the corporeal difference, which is quantitative, not qualitative, of a single part, the brain. In all other respects the similarity between men and animals, both psychical and bodily, is sufficiently striking. So that we must remind

our judaised friends in the West, who despise animals, and idolise Reason, that if they were suckled by their mothers, so also was the dog by Ms. Even Kant fell 222 THE BASIS OF MORALITY. into this common mistake of his age, and of his country, and I have already administered the censure ^ which it is impossible to withhold. The fact that Christian morality takes no thought for beasts is a defect in the system which is better admitted than perpetuated. (8) It is perhaps not impossible to investigate and explain metaphysically the ultimate cause of that Compassion in which alone all non-egoistic conduct can have its source ; but let us for the moment put aside such inquiries, and consider the phaenomenon in question, from the empirical point of view, simply as a natural arrangement. But it was Kant who first completely cleared up this important point through his profound doctrine of the empirical and intelligible ^ character. He ' Are we to believe it true that we can only be thoroughly good by virtue of a certain occult, natural, and universal faculty, without law, without reason, without precedent? ^ The good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good ; and the evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is evil. ' V. Note on "intelligible," Part. II, Chapter I {Translator.) ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER. 241 showed that the empirical character, which manifests itself in time and in multiplicity of action, is a phaenomenon ; while the reality behind it is the intelligible character, which, being the essential constitution of the Thing in itself underlying the phaenomenon, is independent of time, space, plurality, and change. In this way alone can be explained what is so astonishing, and yet so well known to all who have learnt life's lessons,the fixed unchangeableness of human character. Du bist am EndeWAS du bist. Setz' dir Perrucken auf von Millionen Locken, Setz' deinen Fuss auf ellenhohe Socken:
DU BLEIBST DOCH IMMER WAS DU BIST}

But the reader, I am sure, has long been wishing to put the question : Where, then, does blame and merit come in ? The answer is fully contained in Part II., (Chapter VIII., to which I therefore beg to call particular attention. It is there that the explanation,

which otherwise would now follow, found a natural place ; because the matter is closely connected with Kant's doctrine of the co-existence of Freedom and Necessity. Our investigation led to the conclusion that, once the motives are brought into play, the Operari (what is done) is a thing of absolute necessity ; consequently, Freedom, the existence of which is betokened solely by the sense of responsibility, cannot but belong to the Esse (what one is). No doubt the reproaches of conscience have to do, ' In spite of all, thou art stillwhat thou art. Though "wigs with countless curls thy head-gear be, Though shoes an ell in height adorn thy feet: Unchanged thou eer remainest what thou art. V. Goethe's Faust, Part I., Studirzimmer. (Translator.) ON THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTER. 249 in the first place, and ostensibly, with our acts, but through these they, in reality, reach down to what we are; for what we do is the only indisputable index of what we are, and reflects our character just as faithfully as symptoms betray the malady. Hence it is to this Esse, to what we are, that blame and merit must ultimately be attributed.

TRANSITION TO NEO-CLASSICS and Phenomenology Critique of Kant with Hegel in mind (essays rejected because of invective). Schop. does not conceive of the Will as self-consciousness. This Hegelian notion would at once remove Kants greatest discovery, the distinction of Dinge an sich and Vorstellungen, because the dialectic of self-consciousness removes the Will as Ding-an-sich, and the unity of Subject-Object that Schop is postulating. No dialectic is possible between consciousness, its awareness of its being-in-the-world and therefore self-consciousness through the positing of the Other (its self-alienation as the Other), and the operari through the annihilation of the world that leads to its independence from the Other as well as the extrinsication of the Idea in the world. In Hegel it is the interaction of the I with the world as negation, not as Object, that posits the emancipation of Self from the Other. The I and the Thou are mediated by labour; the interaction of Herr (wealth) and Knecht (servitude) is through labour and leads to the supersession of the relationship. The Will is sheer mechanical use of the world, of its objectification. Its operari is not mediation but a simple instrumental manifestation of subjectivity (Cacciari, PNeR, p31). No value can be created through the objectification of the Will: rather, it is the world itself that satisfies the Will. Schopenhauer still remains within the classical confines of the Puritanical and Protestant ascetic Entsagung of consumption. This is not so with Bohm-Bawerk and the neo-classics who unabashedly and shamelessly posit and assert it as Life (hence, the positive theory of capital a title that has perplexed many Cacciari, p30).

Kantian formalism rejected. Separation of noumena and phenomena already destroys the basis for formalist ethics. Benthamite utilitarianism also because it reconciles individual wills so that labour is seen as source of synthesis-osmosis-value through constructive character. Competition has only a distributive role in the market mechanism.
The Will is an operari, striving in the world of other manifestations of will, adapting to this world and therefore evolving. Labour therefore cannot amount to creation of utility but to its use: labour/operari (Arbeit) consumes the world in search of satisfaction. The evanescence of the world means that the drive (Trieb) of the Will toward satisfaction defeats itself. That is the source of pain (Leid) countering the search for Pleasure (Lust). This leads straight to Gossen, also in the re-ordering of the Gesellschaft away from the post-Hegelian emanationism of Historismus and toward its scientific, research- and result-oriented relativism in Dilthey (Gadamer, TaM, p223) and Schmoller that beyond the superficial Methodenstreit powerfully asserts the Individualitat of the market society and its competitive equilibrium. (Again, Cacciari, pp30ff.)

Entsagung is the intellectual awareness of the Verstand/Vernunft to refrain and restrain the Will from seeking Lust, the utility of the world. Hence dualism, or inter-face, the Janus-bifrons of satisfaction/Nirvana. For Robbins, Nirvana is satisfaction of all needs, which is identical with equilibrium, the extinction of all needs. Thus final satis-faction of a need is its extinction is its ful-fillment, or Vollendung, that is, com-pletion in its double sense of ful-fillment (com-pletion, full-ness) and extinction (completion, finish). It is of vital importance that Entsagung is the culmination of an intellectual effort to master the will. In this role, the intellect is a mechane a means for directing the otherwise blind drive of the will it is the equivalent both of the Kantian concepts emanating from Pure Reason even in its Practical moment, and of the Freudian superego or ego where the Will is the Es/Id (cf Freud, C&ID, ch7 re super-ego). [Note that for Freud there is no oceanic feeling (first page of CID Romain Rolland) similar to Schops sympathy; and that he equates this feeling more with religion. Note also the Arbeit as search for self-preservation, as Arbeit/operari which Freud does not sublimate because of his analytical stance which (like Nietzsche) sur-passes Schop in seeing the necessity of this (its non-transcendence a la Schop) but (unlike Nietzsche) he does not exalt as Wille zur Macht but treats as indistinguishable from Thanatos. Like Nietzsche, Freud wonders aloud in ch7 whether humans might not be better without the strictures of the super-ego (guilt, and Kultur as well!) and places conscience as fear of loss of the love of others (Nietzsche speaks of protection but so does Freud) ahead of instinctual repression until conscience is learned or interiorized (a garrison within a conquered citadel [p71] is his metaphor for the super-ego the citadel is the ego) through social institutions and the roles are reversed. He then briefly touches on communism and social equality, repeating verbatim Nietzsches position on equality is unjust. Again, as with Nietzsche, Freud takes an ontogenetic approach to psychoanalysis in that even the Arbeit is seen as an external constraint, as toil, as annihilation of the world in Hegelian fashion. This elision of Arbeit/operari from the

sphere of freedom of the will is something Nietzsche will eschew with his immanentistic opposition to the hidden transcendentalism of the nihilists. Similarly, Nietzsche will sub-tract art from the cultural repression of the instincts. Note that on pp86-87 Freud confronts the problem of distinguishing between individual and civilization in what is a crucial discussion to understand his perspective. But note the reference to immortal enemies on p92 with reference to Eros and Thanatos.] Phenomenology instead (from Dilthey to Husserl cf Gadamer in TaM) sought to return to Cartesian transcendence by decreeing apodictic rules of thought determined a priori. (And the Neo-Kantians sought to circumvent Kantian agnosticism through the autonomy and universality of logic and judgements, including ethical maxims.) In this attempt, they overlooked Kants desperation in the Ubergang his inability to extend logic and mathematics to causality in the physical world (PNeR, p61). Gadamer notes Husserls attempt to defend himself against charges of atavistic Kantian objectivism from Heidegger [p236] whose first major work was devoted to this critique. (Cf Palmer on KPM.) Both were attempts to rescue philosophy from the sciences, and the sciences form their Krisis. But the need to replace subjectivity as substance with experience or intentionality and, finally, with the Lebenswelt shows how deep-seated was the influence of Schopenhauer on Husserl in particular, whose Log.Unter. exercised in turn decisive influence on Dilthey (Gadamer, p236). In each of these cases the Ding-an-sich (much the same way in which it becomes qualitas occulta in Schop and therefore beyond our ken) replaces as Lebenswelt what were once appearances or phenomena (Vorstellungen) behind which once stood the inscrutable Object. Phenomenology seeks to transcend the universal equivalence of the Will to rescue the Sinn-gebende of the Ratio-Ordo, by categorizing experience (Erlebnis) as a horizon or historical consciousness (cf Gadamer, pp238-9 on Lebenswelt and, more explicitly Husserl on Hume, pp239-40. Note also historicist stress on research dating from Ranke). Gadamer is quite wrong, then, to seek to reconcile this Lebensphilosophie or even (Heidegger) Welt-anschauung with Hegels dialectic of Selbstbewusstsein because this last contains a radically different notion of the world from what is clearly the Schopenhauerian Kant-critical and Cartesian transcendental idealist genealogy of Diltheyan hermeneutics and Husserlian phenomenology.
(On all this, cf Nietzsche, TotI, Reason in Philosophy, par1 re body. Par3: Logic as symbolic convention. In the same part, see refs. to language and will. Also, How the true world and Konigsbergers things; Schop in par5 and The Four Errors, esp. par8 which owes much to Schop on whom see also Skirmishes of an untimely man. Cf. Lowith on Heideggers interpretation of Nietzsche on value, pp111ff, and political economy, p113; ref to Schop on p117 and p118 on Vollendung. The suit discusses also the notion of appearance, ref to Plato, which is almost inspired by Schop-Mach.)

Machism and the neo-classics pivot instead on the equivalence of wills as the rationalization of the rules of the game that, if adhered to or enforced by its participants,

would be effective in ensuring the equilibrium of the wills in a liberal order understood as natural/spontaneous or logical constituting in fact, like Political Economy, the practical political survival/reproduction of capitalist social relations. The Ordoliberals are the best expression of the practical implementation of these ideas in the German Soziale Marktwirtschaft. These are readings of Schopenhauer that remain within the ambit of Nirvana as the culmination of Askesis, of the Entsagung as the renunciation of the operari. But Nirvana is Janus-faced (Janus bifrons): like equilibrium, it exits as it enters; once reached, the operari and the world, even in its mirrored form, return and become embodied, so that the Sollen of the Arbeit, its inter-esse, its inter-action or even the correlation of the I-Thou in the Husserlian Lebens-welt of Erlebnisse (Gadamer) all this returns as Freiheit, as Ohn-macht. As Cacciari shows, the Nietzschean supersession of Schopenhauer as Educator will lead far away from these toward Weber, toward Schumpeter and Heidegger. But Cacciari ably distinguishes between the initial phase of transformation of economic theory, from Gossen through Jevons and Bohm-Bawerk, when the inversion of value theory into the positive theory of capital takes place, when the will to power of the new theory is in full vehemence against the demands of the emerging working class, from the later equilibrium theory that constitutes both a socialist dream of a balanced economy (Walras) or of a consumerist heaven (Hayek/Mises/Robbins) that accomplishes the goals of Political Economy. Here the socialist utopia of the Law of Value meets the neoclassical liberal Nirvana of equilibrium in the foundation of anti-monopolistic free competition. (Cacciari, PNeR, pp29ff. But see W.Sombarts Socialism discussed in PhiloAnte ofSoE.) Cacciaris own account of the Ubergang from Schopenhauer to the later negatives Denken suffers from the fact that he hides the full significance of das Wille that replaces the Kantian Subjekt and Hegels Geist. Schopenhauer takes up fully Kants dichotomy and antinomy of Dinge an sich, or the Object, and the Vorstellungen or Erscheinungen the experience of which he tries to re-compose in a transcendental Subject. And this is dictated by the iron necessity and certainty of scientific laws, of hypothesis and deduction. Despite the doubts and perplexities of the Opus Postumum, Schopenhauer removes these certainties and laws from the sphere of rational reflection to that of pragmatic experience (Erlebnis) by invoking the principle of sufficient reason. (Dilthey does too in the Intro. to Geisteswissenschaften, without referring to Schop.) But as Tsanoff shows in the passage below, several aspects of the critique appear unfounded and capricious. They fail to respond to the quite apparent ability of human beings to lend meaning and order to the world, if only for practical purposes. Under cover of exploding the bourgeois allegiance to the Ratio-Ordo, Cacciari is engaging in a specious mystification of that historical process that can with all the reservations and provisos and distinguo and caveats admissible be placed under the rubric of progress.
Returning to Schopenhauer, it is hardly too much to say that his whole argument is specious. The fact that in Kant's admittedly confused way of treating perception and conception he sees

nothing but a solemn warning against undue adherence to an ideal of 'architectonic symmetry,' shows how hopelessly he misconceives both the aim and the fundamental trend of Kant's 'Critical' method.^ Kant's 'confusion' of the perceptual and
^Kr. d. r. V., p. 311; M., p. 253. Cf. the introductory sections of the 'Transcendental Dialectic' especially Kr. d. r. V., pp. 299 fif., 305 ff., 310 ff., 322 ff.; M., pp. 242 ff., 247 ff., 252 ff., 261 ff. 2 Kant regards speculative reason, however, as incapable of attaining knowledge of ultimate reality, and therefore he introduces the notion of practical reason. But this problem will more naturally come up for discussion in the sequel. 3 Mere textual criticism of Kant's Critiques is sure to lead one astray, unless the fundamental spirit of his philosophy is kept constantly in mind. As Richter

NATURE AND GENESIS OF EXPERIENCE. 21 the conceptual in experience is to be regarded, not as the failure to discriminate ultimate differences, but rather as the imperfect realization and the inadequate expression of the underlying essential unity of concrete experience, which cannot be reduced to merely perceptual or conceptual terms. Kant's confusion is the confusion of depths not yet clarified; Schopenhauer's lucidity manifests epistemological shallowness. Later idealism, of course, brought to light much that escaped Kant himself; but Kant was far more nearly right than Schopenhauer when he said: "Thoughts without contents are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. . . . The understanding cannot see, the senses cannot think. By their union only can knowledge be produced."^ The fundamental defect of Schopenhauer's epistemology is to be found in his constant endeavor to explain one abstract phase of experience in terms of another, supposedly prior, phase, really the vice of the older rationalism,instead of reading both into the organic unity which embraces both and derives its own meaning precisely from such systematization of aspects meaningless in abstract isolation. The relation between the organizing principles of experience is for Kant, not one of formal subsumption, but of organic interdependence. Experience involves both perception and conception, the one as much as the other; its progressive organization consists in the gradual evolution of the two, which unifies them in one concrete process. The perceptual content is essentially meaningful, and the application of the categories brings out what is implicit in it. Schopenhauer's universals are the universals of the old scholastic logic, abstractions which do not exist outside of its text-books and are alien to concrete experience. Conception, in the true Kantian sense, is no mere attenuated perception, but the significant aspect of experience. Conceptions, or, perhaps better,
puts it: "Es ist wirklich nicht so schwer, wenn man sich nur an den wortlichen Text der Kritiken halt, Rationalismus und Empirismus, Dogmatismus (im weitesten Sinne) und Scepticismus, Idealismus und Realismus aus ihnen herauszulesen" {op. cit., pp. 91-92). And again, with special reference to Schopenhauer's procedure: "Kantische Elemente hat Schopenhauer aufgenommen, Kantisch fortgebildet hat er sie nicht" {op. cit., p. 77). iKr. d. r. V., p. 51; M., p. 41.

22 SCHOPENHAUER'S CRITICISM OF KANT.

meanings, are involved in experience from the very beginning; they are not merely its abstract terminus ad quem, as Schopenhauer would have it.^ Universality means, not erasure of details and differences, but their gradual organization from a point of view ever growing in catholicity. The progress of knowledge is not from perception to conception, but from less concrete to more concrete organization of both. iG.. II. p. 55; H.K., II. p. 213.

Valiantly made, Tsanoffs objection is impeccable. What purpose does it serve to replace Kants critique with Schopenhauers? Is the latter not rather, by exasperating the formers categories (the Hegelian where is it written?), exasperating his own critique and by reflection adopting the Scholastic categories denounced by Tsanoff and of which Schopenhauers entire oeuvre is always redolent?
Phenomenalistic idealism and voluntaristic materialism, aesthetic quietism and ethical nihilism, are advocated one after another; and, while the criticism of Kant's principles often lays bare the concealed inconsistencies of the Critical system, the solutions offered are as often inadequate. Is not the real explanation of the situation to be found in the fact that Schopenhauer is not the true successor of Kant at all? Instead of being a neo-rationalist, as Kant, on the whole, remained, he is fundamentally an irrationalist, so far as his attitude towards ultimate reality is concerned. He is keen in perceiving and criticising Kant's confusion of various aspects and elements of experience; but, instead of tracing their immanent organic unity, which Kant imperfectly realizes and formulates, he goes so far, in almost every case, as to assert their actual separation. This was seen to be true of his treatment of perception and conception, understanding and reason. Instead of recognizing their unity in the concrete process of knowledge, Schopenhauer dogmatically separates them in a scholastic manner, thus substituting a lucidly wrong theory for Kant's confusedly right one. (P.75)

True enough, there is no Zerstorung der Vernunft in Heidegger or Schopenhauer or Nietzsche because the validity of scientific reason is left intact as the Vollendung of metaphysics -; but that is only because Lukacs has overdone and hypostatised the Vernunft, as did Adorno and Horkheimer! Schopenhauers Wille and its Nietzschean version are the forerunners of proto-fascist vitalism, of irrationalism, of Entwicklung as a law of nature. Simmel saw it first, but Arendt framed it politically. Cacciari has replaced one form of absolutism, the transcendental ragionevole ideologia that goes from Descartes to Hegels Geist, with another far more insidious form of no, not Historismus or historial being but rather facticity, rank and rampant late-Romantic (Lukacsian, hence the link with Schopenhauer [K, p67]) reification of Technik and hypostatization of Rationalisierung, itself a bleak but mirror-image version of the Ratio. All that part of PNeR (from p69) is nothing less than a paean to the repressive use of technologies (not Technology) disguised and glorified in its historicised guise as an

ineluctable destiny Technik! -, as the reification of Vorhandenheit and all the other bestialities spawned by Heideggers warped mind! Not surprising then, that Cacciari does not linger on the meaning of the Will, as did Simmel. Not surprising that he prefers to de-struct the philosophia perennis and the Lebensphilosophie and Weltanschauungen of the bourgeois interpretation of history the pillars of historical consciousness which, nevertheless (!) lead straight into the historial hermeneutics of Heidegger (Gadamer, TaM). But in what sense has Heidegger rocked these pillars, except with a vacuous and ambivalent assault on Technik and das man, vague appeals for the authenticity of Dasein and on the praxis of Sorge? What are these if not empty and reified notions that throw us back inevitably to the primordial physis, the hardness of being against the softness of spirit denounced long ago by Leo Strauss? Cacciari, K, p59:
The nihilistic critique does not re-found, does not reformulate these problems. Its skepsis is radical: either there is no sense or else the forms of reason discover a new logic, a new relationship with reality forms and reality that are now found to be without substance. Either the nihilist situation is invertible only ideologically, as in Schopenhauer or else that very misery of the formalism of reason, in which the crisis of the Kantian a priori seemed to terminate, needs to be founded founded on the necessity, precisely, of this formalism, of this loss of substantive nexus, of this definitive retreat of truth.

It is by analyzing the nature and purport of the Will that we can reflect on the practical implications of Schopenhauers truly radical inversion which will lead all the way to Heidegger. This is the operation Nietzsche effected, so ably traced by Cacciari (Logic of Wille zur Macht, in K, from p56). It is true that Schopenhauers inversion of Kantian formalism is, from a nihilist situation, merely ideological, and we will examine why below. But the question here is whether Cacciari is justified in seeing as founded by the settling of accounts with Western metaphysics in Nietzsche and Heidegger, this very necessity of this formalism, of this definitive retreat of truth. Because it could well be that even if we grant the necessity of the (empty) formalism and of the retreat of truth, even if we accepted the Nietzschean confutation of the philosophisch notion of truth still it is unwarranted if not impossible, or indeed unfounded, to conclude thereby that human praxis (that very Freiheit that Cacciari declares impossible in PNeR) is reduced to the destiny of Rationalisierung. The Ratio, maybe. But why also the concept of freedom understood in a more restrained sense (Augustinian, not Kantian) as initium actionis? And why does the acceptance of an ill-definable or indefinite Ratio or the constraint of Rationalisierung entail necessarily the impossibility of action? If it does not, then what and where is the problem except, perhaps, in the distancing of Utopia?
Tale e la stessa tragedia del soggetto. Per potere effettualmente, esso deve non solo disincantarsi sulle proprie forme a priori, sulla verita e bonta del mondo, sullo schematismo tra forme e mondo - ma deve altresi liquidare l estremo Valore, quello che anche il nichilismo piu radicale aveva conservato, anzi: di cui era stato il piu accanito difensore, l autonomia della soggettivita, la via interiore schopenhaueriana. Potere e integrarsi nel sistema, (K, p66).

So let us look at the via interiore by means of which Schop arrives at Nirvana.

Here it is that Schopenhauer attempts to improve upon Kant, by asserting the possibility of an immanent metaphysics, a metaphysics of experience. Philosophy, he says, begins where science leaves off, it takes things up and "treats them after its own method, which is quite distinct from the method of science. "^ This essential difference in method Schopenhauer indicates in no vague terms. Science is concerned with the systematic connection of differences. But in the conative consciousness the differences of the World as Idea vanish into one immediate unity, and scientific knowledge is transmuted into a consciousness of will, which demands no explanation, starts from nothing, points to nothing, but is itself an unending immediate striving. Schopenhauer, therefore, denies, on the basis of Kant's own epistemological results, the possibility of metaphysics, if by metaphysics is meant the scientific explanation of the inmost nature of the thing-in-itself as such, considered apart from its manifestation in consciousness. But he emphatically affirms the possibility of a metaphysics of experience, in terms of its completest and most immediate, i. e., most real manifestation. Will. In this sense, then, Schopenhauer asserts that his own metaphysics of Will is the key to the world-riddle. His test of the metaphysical ' realness ' of any phase of experience is in terms of a unity which absorbs multiplicity. This unity, however, is not the result of the abstracting process of conception, but, in contrast to the mediate character of all thought, is concrete, i. e., immediately present in consciousness. Schopenhauer seeks his ultimate reality in some specific aspect of experience, or rather in ^La philosophie de Schopenhauer, Paris, 1890, p. 35. 2G.. I, p. 128; H.K., I, p. 107. 72 SCHOPENHAUER'S CRITICISM OF KANT. some one sort of experience, in which, as in the apex of the cone, all the various radii may somehow vanish and be lost in one undifferentiated unity. The ' real ' is conceived by him as opposed to and contradistinguished from the rest of experience, which is thereby declared illusory. The ultimate unity is possible, on Schopenhauer's basis, only by means of the erasure of the organized multiplicity of phenomena. Reality is not truly revealed by its phenomenal appearance; rather it is the World as Idea the fleeting shadow of the Real, its veil of Maya. All the organization and coherence implied in the Principle of Sufficient Reason avail us nothing in the solution of the ultimate problems of experience. To learn metaphysics, we must unlearn science: this is the spirit of Schopenhauer's theory of reality. The result of such a conception of metaphysics for the interpretation of the reality now recognized as Will, is not difficult to foresee. We know ourselves as willing in our separate acts of striving. But it is precisely this our knowledge of the conative that introduces the element of multiplicity and makes impossible the complete metaphysical unity. Our consciousness of willing is metaphysically 'real,' not by virtue of its being conscious, but in spite of it,by virtue of its being Will. The Will-Reality [Wirklichkeit] as such, the metaphysical kernel of the universe, is not in time, because it absorbs all multiplicity in itself. Consciousness, inevitably temporal in character, is itself a mere accident of the metaphysical Real. The ultimate thing-in-itself is non-temporal, unconscious, irrational, free. "The will in itself is without consciousness,

and remains so in the greater part of its phenomena. The secondary world of idea must be added, in order that it may become conscious of itself."^ Will is the prius, the Weltprincip; nous is secondary, intellect is the posterius, a derivation and a mere appearance of the thing-in-itself. To urge the primacy of the intellect over the will, is therefore an "enormous proton pseudon and fundamental esteron proteron.''^ "It is the unconscious will," Schopenhauer insists, "which constitutes the reality of things, and its development must have G., II, pp. 323-324; H.K., III, p. 12. 2G., II, p. 230; H.K., II, p. 409. EXPERIENCE AND REALITY. 71 advanced very far before it finally attains, in the animal consciousness, to the idea and intelligence; so that, according to me, thought appears at the very last."^ II, pp. 314-315; H.K., III. p. 2.

It may be true that the Will itself is timeless for Schop. this would correspond with Freuds Es, the Unconscious -; but it is evident that our only mode of perception, our consciousness or intuition [Anschauung] of the Will, must have time as its essential dimension or horizon that is, intuition is essentially being-in-time as a unity of both concepts revealed by the ex-per-iri, going through time, of experience! The Will is timeless only because it is the Ding an sich, the qualitas occulta, not because it lies outside the sphere of intuition or experience! This is how Schop puts it,
"When in any phenomenon a knowing consciousness is added to that inner being which lies at the foundation of all phenomena, a consciousness which when directed inwardly becomes self-consciousness, then that inner being presents itself to this self-consciousness as that which is so familiar and so mysterious, and is denoted by the [67] word will. P68 Tsanoff: The world of perception is directly apprehended by the knowing subject, through the faculty of the understanding and its one category of cause-effect, resulting from the union of space and time. Its cognitive directness is in marked contrast to the abstract character of conception, with its multitude of artificial abstractions and formal laws, lacking all application to direct experience. But perception and conception alike, Schopenhauer holds, lack the immediacy of the conative experience. In the willing consciousness the entire intellectual web of the World as Idea is swept aside; the multiplicity of things in space and time, which hides the metaphysical oneness of all reality from the knowing subject, is no more; the one ultimate condition of the possibility of consciousness alone remains,time . This the consciousness of man cannot efface without effacing itself. "The will, as that which is metaphysical, is everywhere the boundary-stone of every investigation, beyond which it cannot go. "2 No "systematically connected insight"^ into this metaphysical unity of Will is possible; the inevitably temporal character of our consciousness makes us unable to grasp the thing in- itself once for all in its inmost nature. 'G., II. pp. 373-374; H.K.. Ill, pp. 65-66. 2G., II, p. 421; H.K., III, p. 116. 3G.. II, p. 379; H.K.. III. p. 71.

Continuing from p71 above, Tsanoff comments,

This position leads Schopenhauer to materialistic excesses. The whole world of perception and conception, of body and matter, which he formerly regarded as intellectual in character, he now describes in terms of the bodily organism.^ The intellect is reduced to a tertiary position, being the instrument necessitated by a complete organism, which is secondary and is itself the embodiment of the one and only Prius, the blind unconscious Will. The intellect is accordingly a function of the brain, which, again, is the will-to-perceive-and-think objectified, just as the stomach is the embodiment of the will-to-digest, the hand, of the will-to-grasp, the generative organs, of the will-to-beget, and so on. "The whole nervous system constitutes, as it were, the antennae of the will, which it stretches towards within and without."^ The relation in which the development of knowledge stands to the gradual objectification of the Will is conceived by Schopenhauer with curious inconsistency. In this respect, there are some apparent differences in point of view between certain passages in Schopenhauer's earlier and later works; but there seems to be no sufficient ground for maintaining any fundamental change of attitude on Schopenhauer's part. Schopenhauer might seem to hold two fundamentally opposite positions. On the one hand, he says: "The organ of intelligence, the cerebral system, together with all the organs of sense, keep pace with the increasing wants and the complication of the organism."* This conclusion follows logically from Schopenhauer's theory of the absolute bondage of intelligence; but it does not account for the obvious facts of consciousness. Is the highest development of intelligence always accompanied by a corresponding intensity of 'will,' in Schopenhauer's sense of that term? How is the 'disinterestedness' of thought at all possible on such a basis? Scho II, pp. 314-315; H.K., III. p. 2. 2 Schopenhauer's 'physiological-psychological' method, which here manifests itself in terms so extreme, is nevertheless implied in his very starting-point, . e., in his distinction between perception and conception. Cf. Richter, op. cil., pp. 139 f. 3G., II, p. 299; H.K., II, p. 482. *G., II, p. 237; H.K., II, p. 416. 74 SCHOPENHAUER'S CRITICISM OF KANT. penhauer, evidently realizing the difficulty of the situation, seems to shift his position. The gradual objectification of the Will, he says, is accompanied by a gradual 'loosening' of the intellect from its will-ground. In the course of its development, the intelligence gradually obtains freedom from the brute will impulse, and evolves an ideal world of its own, a world of knowledge, subject to universal laws of nature. This is the World as Idea, which Schopenhauer regards as at once the manifestation and the very antithesis of the World as Will. But the intellect "may, in particular exceptionally favoured individuals, go so far that, at the moment of its highest ascendancy, the secondary or knowing part of consciousness detaches itself altogether from the willing part, and passes into free activity for itself."^ Thus, in the man of genius, "knowledge can deliver itself from this

bondage, throw off its yoke, and, free from all the aims of will, exist purely for itself, simply as a clear mirror of the world. "^ This is the aesthetic knowledge of the Platonic Ideas, a unique consciousness of unity, different alike from the metaphysical unity of the Will and from the abstract unity of conception. No discussion of the problems raised by Schopenhauer's Theory of Art seems to be called for here, inasmuch as it has no direct bearing upon his criticism of Kant. It should be noted, however, that Schopenhauer finds himself obliged to reassert the autonomy of the intellect, which his metaphysic has put under the bondage of the ultimate Will. This autonomy of the intellect, in the passionless contemplation of works of art, is, nevertheless, only a passing phase. The real solution of the world-riddle is stated by Schopenhauer, not in aesthetic, but in ethical terms. The liberation of intelligence from the tyrant Will becomes complete and final only when the will is denied in the supreme act of self-renunciation. This denial of the will, to be sure, involves the cessation of consciousness, the total effacement of all phenomenal multiplicity, and the sinking into the nothingness of Nirvana. Enlightened by intelligence, the will of man may be led to realize the brute-like character of its iG.. II, p. 238; H.K., II. p. 417'G., I, p. 214; H.K., I, p. 199EXPERIENCE AND REALITY. 75 nature, and, directing itself against itself, achieve its own self-annihilation. The denial of the will is really the denial of its striving towards multiplicity; it is the denial of that impulse in it which leads to its objectification in phenomena,the denial of the will-to-self-perpetuation, of the will-to-become-manifest, of the will-to-live. This is what Schopenhauer means when he says, at the end of The World as Will and Idea: "We freely acknowledge that what remains after the entire abolition of will is for all those who are still full of will certainly nothing; but, conversely, to those in whom the will has turned and has denied itself, this our world, which is so real, with all its suns and milky waysis nothing."^ iG.. I. p. 527; H.K., I, p. 532.

CHAPTER IV. from Tsanoff. Experience and Reality: The Will as the Thing-in-Itself. The Critical epistemology leads inevitably to the conclusion that all possible experience is phenomenal, i. e., that it has no meaning except in terms of knowledge and in reference to the knowing subject. This realization of the fundamentally subjective character of the phenonemal 'object,' Schopenhauer regards as "the theme of the 'Critique of Pure Reason.' "^ The organization of this subject-object world of possible experience is formulated by Kant in terms of the mechanical categories, to the exclusion of the teleological. This is the formal result of the 'Dialectic'. The rejection of the rationalistic solution of the teleological problem does not, however, do away with the problem itself. The 'practical' can have no real application in an experience conceived in purely mechanical terms; nevertheless, Kant is deeply impressed with the undeniable significance of the moral and aesthetic phases of experience, and with the inadequacy of the mechanical categories to explain these. His vindication of the real significance of the teleological categories is intimately connected with his justification of the notion of the thing-in-itself.

A change of philosophical method is to be observed at this stage of Kant's exposition, which Schopenhauer interprets as follows. Kant does not affirm, clearly and distinctly, the absolute mutual dependence of subject and object in all possible experience. "He does not say, as truth required, simply and absolutely that the object is conditioned by the subject, and conversely, but only that the manner of appearance of the object is conditioned by the forms of knowledge of the subject, which^therefore, come a priori to consciousness. But that now which in opposition to this is only known a posteriori is for him the immediate effect of the thing in itself, which becomes phenom iG., II, p. 205; H.K., II, p. 381. 62 EXPERIENCE AND REALITY. 63 enon only in its passage through these forms which are given a priori/'^ And Kant fails to realize that "objectivity in general belongs to the forms of the phenomenon, and is just as much conditioned by subjectivity in general as the mode of appearing of the object is conditioned by the forms of knowledge of the subject; that thus if a thing in itself must be assumed, it absolutely cannot be an object, which however he always assumes it to be, but such a thing in itself must necessarily lie in a sphere toto genere different from the idea (from knowing and being known). "2 Schopenhauer criticises Kant's conception of the thing-in-itself in the same manner in which he had criticised his theory of the a priori character of the causal law. Both doctrines are true, but their proof is false. "^ Kant argues that "the phenomenon, thus the visible world, must have a reason, an intelligible cause, which is not a phenomenon, and therefore belongs to no possible experience."^ But this is perverting entirely the meaning of the law of causality, which applies exclusively to relations between phenomenal changes, and can therefore in no way account for the phenomenal world as a hypostatized entity.

It is here that Schopenhauer effects his inversion. The sphere toto genere different from the idea (from knowing and being known) is a sphere that lies beyond (not behind) the sphere of the known-Object and the knowing-Subject. It is a sphere that generates the entire possibility of experience as its innermost being. It is the Lichtung, the self-understanding of being, it is the very being that interrogates being, the being in the world, which at once unifies known and knowing, subject and object in a subject-object because "the thing in itself can, as such, only come into consciousness quite directly, in this way, that it is itself conscious of itself; to wish to know it objectively is to desire something contradictory."* To posit the Object independently of the Subject, as a thing, is to objectify the Subject. Conversely, to know [the subject] objectively is to desire something contradictory.
It is at this point that Schopenhauer makes what he regards as his own great contribution to philosophical thought; here it is that Schopenhauer's philosophy joins onto the Kantian, or rather springs from it as from its parent stem.^ "Upon the path of the idea one can never get beyond the idea; it is a rounded-off whole, and has in its own resources no clue leading to the nature of the thing in itself, which is toto genere different G., Ill, pp. 510, 511; Basis of Morality, tr. by A. B. Bullock, London, 1903. pp. 44, 45. For a fuller discussion of this problem, cf. the writer's article on "Schopenhauer's Criticism of Kant's Theory of Ethics," The Philosophical Review, Vol. XIX, No. 5, Sept., 1910, pp. 512-5342G.. Ill, pp. SI I ff.; Bullock, pp. 45 ff.

'C/. R. Behm, Vergleichung der kantischen und schopenhauerischen Lehre in Ansehung der Kausalitdt, Heidelberg, 1892, p. 39. EXPERIENCE AND REALITY. 65 from it. If we were merely perceiving beings, the way to the thing in itself would be absolutely cut off from us. Only the other side of our own being can disclose to us the other side of the inner being of things. This path I have followed."^ Kant is correct in holding that we are unable to arrive at the ultimate reality of things by the road of knowledge; but he then proceeds to deny the possibility of all metaphysics, thus ignoring, in his Critique of Pure Reason, the paramount ontological significance of non-cognitive experience.

Thus, only the other side of our own being, that is, being perceived as thrown-ness, as Dasein, can disclose to us the other side of the inner being of things which leads us to the paramount ontological significance of non-cognitive experience and therefore not just to Da-Sein but also to the being of beings. This is the true precursor of Nietzsche and Heidegger: the fundamental distinction between being of being and knowledge of being the forgetfulness Heidegger uncovers, right from his early critique of Kant!
The doctrine of the transcendental freedom of man's will recognizes implicitly, Schopenhauer maintains, that in man necessity is phenomenal only, and that in him the thing-initself manifests its inner nature in the form of Will. "What, then, Kant teaches of the phenomenon of man and his action my teaching extends to all phenomena in nature, in that it makes the will as a thing-in-itself their foundation. "^ For man is not toto genere different from the rest of experience, but differs only in degree. The World as Idea is, as Kant says, purely phenomenal; but it does not exhaust reality. "As the world is in one aspect entirely idea, so in another it is entirely will. A reality which is neither of these two, but an object in itself (into which the thing in itself has unfortunately dwindled in the hands of Kant), is the phantom of a dream, and its acceptance is an ignis fatuus in philosophy."^ The path of objective knowledge does not lead us to the real nature of things, and so far Schopenhauer is in thorough agreement with Kant. But "the thing in itself can, as such, only come into consciousness quite directly, in this way, that it is itself conscious of itself; to wish to know it objectively is to desire something contradictory."* The thing-in-itself is unknowable, precisely because it is not a matter of knowledge but is in its inmost essence Will.