SECTION IX-REALISM AND IDEALISM Victoria Wike, Chairman Loyola University

Empirical Realism
by Augustin Riska (I) In the current discussions on realism and anti-realism, some philosophers of the realistic vintage regard realism as an empirical hypothesis or empirical theory. In our century this view was already suggested by the leading figure of the logical empiricist movement, Moritz Schlick, for instance, in his 1932 paper "Positivism and Realism."l Supported by his doctrine of verifiability, Schlick claimed that logical positivism (or "consistent empiricism," as he liked to call it) is not opposed to empirical realism, though it is incompatible with a metaphysical "realism" as well as with metaphysical idealism. As we know, Schlick considered both the affirmation and the denial of the existence of a transcendent world as metaphysical propositions equally devoid of meaning (i.e., as disqualified with regard to truth and/or falsity).2 Yet a statement such as "Something exists independently of us" had for him an empirically testable meaning and it was accepted affirmatively. The independent existence of atoms, cells, stars, historical events, etc., was for him fully testable empirically, for we can state the experiential conditions under which such hypotheses are confirmable. (2) A similar position was expressed by Hilary Putnam in the 70's, although Putnam, a student of the logical empiricist Hans Reichenbach, rejected the highly controversial principle of verifiability (in both its "naive" and its "sophisticated" forms).s In his Introduction to the first volume of his Philosophical Papers (1974) Putnam clearly declared his realistic perspective, not only with respect to material objects, but also "with respect to such 'universals' as physical magnitudes and fields" just as "with respect to mathematical objects."4 This scientific brand of realism, Putnam warned the reader, is not to be identified with materialism. He also added that his kind of realism in the philosophy of mathematics and physics might go far beyond what

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most realists would be prepared to defend, yet it is nevertheless a realism of an Aristotelian rather than Platonic stamp. In the same period, in his philosophy of logic,5 Putnam mercilessly criticized contemporary nominalistic interpretations of logic and embraced the existence of abstract entities, such as classes, numbers, functions, etc. Outlining his "realistic" philosophy of physics, Putnam even classified the nominalists as being materialists at heart. 6 (3) Putnam made his most significant pronouncements on the nature of his realism in 1976, in his Presidential Address to the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association (Boston, Mass.), as well as in his Oxford John Locke Lectures. 7 However, the empirical realism, which he still held, underwent remarkable changes and revisions, thus losing its previous quite dogmatic character. These changes were stimulated by the anti-realistic criticism due to the philosophers such as M. Dummett. 8 An Aristotelian version of the empirical realism had now been replaced by the so-called internal realism, in which the questions of existence become an intra-theoretic issue, i.e., they are treated as theorydependent. 9 In the internal realist position, the classical correspondence theory of truth had given way to Dummett's notion of "truth within the theory" or "warranted assertibility."l0 According to such a position, a statement about, say, electrons can be provable in a certain theory even if there are no electrons! This intra-theoretic understanding of existence is achieved after a suitable-as Putnam calls it, quasi -in tui tionistic-in terpreta tion of logical connecti ves, quantifiers, and Tarski's semantic definition of truthY It is interesting to note that there is a pervasive tendency in Putnam to elevate various "non-classical" logics into the enviable position of being "the logic of the world."12 Such metaphysical claims are, however, modified by his, almost J. S. Millian, understanding of logic as thoroughly empirical and thus subject to revisions. (4) Let us now try to determine the philosophical parameters within which Putnam's realism operates, in spite of all its shifts and developmental changes. Which are its common characteristics? (i) realism is an (over-arching) empirical hypothesis, or at least it is like an empirical hypothesis;13 (ii) realism is tied with a "correspondence theory of truth;"

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(iii) realism can explain the success of science so that this success is not to be viewed as a miracle (Putnam's frequently mentioned argument against idealism); (iv) a realist (with respect to a given theory of discourse) holds that 1) the sentences of that theory of discourse are true or false (the principle of bivalence), and 2) that what makes them true or false is something external;14 (v) realism does not endorse Kantian "things in themselves" or "transcendental egos," Le., it is not of a noumenal variety;15 is no intellectual intuition (intellektuelle (vi) there Anschauung) by virtue of which our mind would perceive essences, substantial forms, etc., (criticism of the medieval philosophers and of the rationalists); (vii) there is no a priori truth in the context of "all contexts," Le., in an absolute philosophical sense (although there may be such truths in a relative sense, for example, in Euclidean geometry). Of course, these seven significant characteristics of Putnam's realist perspective (four of which are stated positively and three negatively) do not exhaust all he said about these complex issues, often in an ambiguous manner. What is, however, important about such claims is the fact that other contemporary realists seem to be ready to assert them in various modified forms. Let us concentrate on those issues and claims that have a direct bearing on the critical understanding of the current versions of empirical realism. (5) Realism as an empirical hypothesis (or like such a hypothesis) presupposes the context of a theory, say, a commonsense theory of material objects, or a sophisticated scientific theory. Such a theory is expressed in an appropriate language and its sentences are expected to be true or false (see our characteristic [iv]) due to something external (extramental, independent of our mind). Truth of the sentences of the theory, couched in an appropriate object language, is supposed to be governed by the correspondence principle la TarskL The existence of objects or events-of the ontological underpinning of the theory-has an extratheoretical source, Le., the theory in question presupposes these objects and events, even if their properties and relationships are to be explicated by the theory itself. Does the extratheoretical source of these objects and events guarantee their mind-independent existence? Of course not-the objects might have been imported from another theory as mental constructs in

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the sense of an intuitionistic position, etc. 16 A genuine realist hypothesis, of course, cuts this process short by assuming (postulating) the existence of something extramental (with respect to any actual mind). What is the truth-status of the realistic assumption itself? As a hypothesis it possesses only a probabilistic status, yet the degree of confirmation must be high, for otherwise it could not serve as such over-arching hypothesis in the theory of discourse. Nevertheless, the realist's fundamental statement would have to be expressed as follows: "It is highly probable that there exists something extra mental (relative to the theory of discourse)." The addition, "relative to the discourse," indicates the cautious nature of an empirical realist trained in contemporary logical exercises, where the relativization to a system, theory, language is a conditio sine qua non. A statement such as: "It is highly probable that there exists something extramental in an absolute sense" (i.e., independently upon any actual or possible theory), would be viewed as a symptom of an extremist version of empirical realism, not to be taken too seriously, since the conditions of confirmability would be pushed so far away that they could never be realized. Such a hypothesis would remain ubiquitously present, yet guilty of the Kantian transcendental trespassing into the noumenal world. A metaphysical realist, say of a moderate Aristotelian variety, need not, however, hesitate to assert his basic assumption in an uncompromising way, viz., he should assert it without the initial probabilistic clause. In fact, for him the probabilistic formulation is a sign of false modesty resulting in the heavy price paid for scepticism which would permeate any human theory, including the scientific one. For the existential assumption of the metaphysical realist does not care so much about the question, "which are the real (i.e., mind-independent) entities and how many are there?", but is based rather on the assurance that there is (was) at least one extramental (as to any mind) entity, whatever its nature, for instance, G. E. Moore's hand in his famous demonstration. The satisfaction of this minimal condition, which is tied with the classical interpreta tion of the existen tial quan tifier, produces a fatal anomaly in the system of, say, a metaphysical idealist who claims that everything is mind-dependent. Evidently, a moderate metaphysical realist will be ready to regard more than one existential claim as being true, yet not without the careful employment of the methodological technique of, say, "warranted assertibility" or justification within a theory. Hence, a statement such as "There exists an extramen-

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tal entity (relative to a reasonably chosen theory)" will be regarded as true by a contemporary moderate metaphysical realist, even if he may be uncertain about the status of various theoretical entities, such as electrons, physical fields, quarks, real numbers, or whatnot. Ultimately, the support for existential claims comes from the various provinces of science, in an empirical way. The qualification, "a reasonably chosen theory," helps to avoid extravagant pseudoontological frames, such as ghosts, unicorns or squared circles. Hence, the morale of this story is that one either is or is not a philosophical realist-a realist accepts the eX,istential claims with regard to extramental entities as true, and not merely as highly probable. Quarks mayor may not exist, on the other hand, the familiar material objects of our environment-so the realist believes-do exist beyond any doubt. If the quarks, like phlogiston, are shown to be non-existent, the realist's thesis will not be overthrown, for it is resilient against the changes of theories. Nonetheless, the realist's position is to be kept relativized to the current theories, in order to stay in touch with the development of human knowledge and practice. Only in this way will the realistic doctrine retain its vigor and applicability. (6) Now, one might object that the preceding characterizations fit a very naive version of realism. Did not Putnam teach us (in his John Locke Lectures) that a sophisticated "twentieth-century realist cannot ignore the existence of equivalent descriptions: realism is not committed to there being one true theory (and only one) ..."717 Obviously, this demand can be met by the realist who is willing to present his position in alternative, more-or-Iess equivalent ways. For instance, if independence (independent existence) is the crucial concept of the realist's philosophy, there are at least four closely related variations on this theme: the existence of external objects and events can be regarded as (i) mind-independent, (ii) theory-independent, (iii) representation-independent, and (iv) language-independent. Whereas the traditional formulations of the realistic doctrine emphasize mind-independence, current versions of (empirical) realism heavily employ allusions to linguistic frameworks and semantical theories. Thus for Putnam the very choice of a "thing-language," i.e., a language in which the thing-terms (constants as well as variables ranging over things) are taken as basic or primitive, may demonstrate the preference for a realistic position, as opposed, for instance, to the idealist "sense-datum"

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language. In addition, empirical realists believe tha t the semantical notion of reference plays a significant role in determining whether the position is realist or non-realist. 18 According to Putnam, for the realist there is "one element in the meaning of the term 'electrical charge' that has not changed in the last two hundred years ... and that is the ref erence."19 Yet a closer scrutiny reveals that neither semantical reference, nor its close relative-truth defined by correspondence-are in themselves secure guarantors of a realist position. Although it is the case that, in the ordinary English language or in its relevant portion, "Cow" refers to cows (a favorite Putnam example), the very notion of reference will not yet produce the objective existence of the entities referred to by the general term "Cow." Similarly, I cannot say that "Unicorn" does not refer to unicorns, unless I specify the relevant context of discourse (is it about actual world, or about mythologico-artistic world?). Hence the existential assumptions are still needed to complement reference as well as truth via correspondence. Correspondence might namely secure the existence of mere intratheoretic entities, perhaps viable mental constructs, in a neat coherent manner, thus giving support to an idealist philosophical in terpreta tion. Of course, these seman tical issues are very subtle and one cannot treat them with justice in this very brief exposition. So my succinct remarks remain only programmatic declarations. (7) It might be admitted that current controversies with regard to realism and anti-realism challenge the metaphysical realist to rethink his position. Is empirical realism (especially its internal version) a viable substitute for the traditional metaphysical realism? Or is it just a special modification of the Kantian, in principle anti-metaphysical, campaign which had been so vigorously joined by the positivists of all sorts? It seems that, in spite of all its epistemological and logical sophistication, the empirical realism, as represented by the development of Putnam's position, is either retreating back into the more-or-Iess traditional metaphysical realism,2o or else ceases to be realism in the proper sense of the word and turns into intra theoretic conceptual enterprise with only provisional results. Then there is no possibility for breaking away from the circles of theories and the internal realism becomes merely a special version of an idealist doctrine. There is an important issue that is not treated adequately by the empirical realists-the fact of the constitution of new theories, not just the change of already existing ones. The

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unfamiliar objects or processes treated by such new theories must be coming from somewhere, and it is hard to believe that they have been dug out merely from the inexhaustible inner resources of human mind or imagination. Although now, when the new theory is formed, these previously unfamiliar objects and processes becomes theory-dependent, they were not so before the theory formation. And, yes, they might have been unknown, but not "unknowable things- and processes-in-themselves." I do not know what is a better tribute to the fundamental thesis of metaphysical realism. St. fohn's University Staten Island, New York
NOTES
1. Philosophical Papers, vol. II (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), pp. 258-84. Schlick is called an "empirlcal realist" by H. Feigl, in A Memoir (I938), op. cit., vol. I, p. xxix. 2. Philosophical Papers, vol. II, pp. 283-84. 3. Philosophical Papers, vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), Introduction. All 20 papers of this volume, published between 1957 and 1974, were written from a realistic standpoint. 4. Ibid., p. 7. 5. Philosophy of Logic (New York: Harper and Row, 1971). 6. Ibid., p. 36. 7. Published in his Meaning and the Moral Sciences (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978) as "Realism and Reason" PP. 123-38; and "Meaning and Knowledge" pp. 7-80; six lectures. 8. Putnam repeatedly recognizes Dummett's significance and influence. See, e.g., "Reference and Understanding," in his Meaning and the Moral Sciences, p. 109, where he states that " ... Dummett's position . . . represents the most viable non-realist position I know oL" Likewise "Realism and Reason," op. cit., pp. 127-30, where Dummett's non-realist or verificationist semantics is used in order to demolish the socalled metaphysical realism. 9. Theory-dependence is a more subtle version of the traditional mind-dependence. It is interesting how this Kantian feature of Putnam's internal realism resembles the principal ideas behind Quine's "on tic commitment" or Carnap's differentiation between "internal" and "external" questions.

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See Carnap's "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology," in Meaning and Necessity (University of Chicago Press, 1956). 10. See Meaning and the Moral Sciences, pp. 30, 108-09, etc. Also Putnam's Introduction to his Philosophical Papers, vol. 3; Realism and Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. xvi-xviii. 11. Putnam has always been preoccupied with the question of truth, and especially with the proper understanding of Tarski's semantic theory of truth, which he otherwise highly respects: "There is only one way anyone knows how to define 'true' and that is Tarski's way." ("Meaning and Knowledge," Lecture II, in his Meaning and the Moral Sciences, p. 30.) 12. See, e.g., his Introduction to Philosophical Papers, vol. 1 (1974) where he says, with respect to the quantum logic, that "we live in a world with a non-classical logic."
(p. x.)

13. For a) it could be false (is falsifiable), and b) facts are relevant to its support. See Meaning and the Moral Sciences, pp. 78-79 (note). 14. This formulation is due to M. Dummett, an anti-realist; see his "Realism" (1963), in Truth and Other Enigmas (Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 145-65. See also Putnam, Philosophical Papers, vol. 3, pp. 271-72, etc. 15. Putnam has a frequent tendency to identify the transcendental (noumenal) realism with the metaphysical realism as such. In such case he would clearly reject any identification of his position with metaphysical realism. But isn't his assertion of the objective existence of mathematical and physical objects (1974) typical of a metaphysical realist? In reference to Kant, Putnam later (1978) called his changed, pro-verificationist position a "demythologized Kantianism." 16. It seems that Putnam's eventual transition from the hard-core realism to the soft version-i.e., to internal realism where truth is intra theoretic, replaced by "warranted assertibility," provability or justification-was a result of Dummett's intuitionistic temptations. But this was occasioned by Putnam's chronic uncertainty about "the logic of the world." 17. "Meaning and Knowledge," Lecture IV, in Meaning and the p. 50. Also Philosophical Papers, vol. 3, Moral Sciences, p. 42f.; p. 211 ("Why There Isn't a Ready-Made World"). 18. Again, this is a theme permeating Putnam's entire philosophy. See his "Reference and Truth"in Philosophical Papers, vol. 3, pp. 69-86; "Reference and Understanding" in Meaning and the Moral Sciences, pp. 97-119; and many papers in vol. 2 of his Philosophical Papers.

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19. See his Introduction to Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, p. ix. Likewise, in his "Meaning and Knowledge," Lecture II in Meaning and the Moral Sciences, Putnam gives an account of R. Boyd's view according to which an empirical realism presupposes a principle to the effect that "terms in a mature science typically refer." 20. Putnam himself sometimes acknowledges this retreat. In "Realism and Reason" (I976) he admits that he was wedded to metaphysical realism as a picture which now (under Dummett's influence) collapsed (Meaning and the Moral Sciences, pp. 12930). He also says that metaphysical realism is not a theory but only an incoherent model, etc.